CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY

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
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY

The Sorbonne Lectures 1949–1952

Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Translated from the French by Talia Welsh

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Translator's Introduction

In 1949, four years after the publication of his great work *Phenomenology of Perception* and the cofounding, with Jean-Paul Sartre, of the influential journal *Les temps modernes,* Maurice Merleau-Ponty left his position as a professor of philosophy at the University of Lyon and moved to the chair of psychology and pedagogy at the Sorbonne. He remained in this position until 1952, when he took up a chair at the Collège de France, which he held until his premature death in 1961.

Student notes of the lectures Merleau-Ponty delivered at the Sorbonne were compiled and given to him to review. Subsequently they were published in the *Bulletin de psychologie* (formerly called *Bulletin du Groupe d'études de psychologie de l'université de Paris*) every few weeks from 1949 to 1952. In 1964 the *Bulletin de psychologie* gathered the first seven sets of course lecture notes and published them in full as "Maurice Merleau-Ponty à la Sorbonne: Résumé de se cours établi par des étudiants et approuvé par lui-même." In 1988 Cynara published a complete edition of all eight lectures as *Merleau-Ponty à la Sorbonne: Résumé de cours 1949–1952,* and in 2001 Éditions Verdier again published the lectures under the title *Psychologie et pédagogie de l'enfant: Cours de Sorbonne 1949–1952.* It is this last text that appears in translation here.

Complete English editions of the first and last lectures have previously appeared as *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language,* translated by Hugh J. Silverman, and "The Experience of Others," translated by Fred Evans and Hugh J. Silverman.[1] In addition, the text *The Primacy of Perception* contains two of the Sorbonne lectures, "The Child's Relation with Others," translated by William Cobb, and "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man," translated by John Wild. The reader will note substantial differences between the lectures in *The Primacy of Perception* and those contained herein as "The Child's Relations with Others" and "Human Sciences and Phenomenology." Cobb and Wild based their translations on material provided by the Center of University Documentation and not the material that appeared in the post-1964 French editions.

The first lecture and the last pages of the last lecture in *Child Psychology and Pedagogy: The Sorbonne Lectures 1949–1952* discuss childhood

language acquisition. But in between, we find discussions of an extraordinary range of topics, including acting and the role of the stage, Lacanian psychoanalysis, the anthropology of South Sea island peoples, Husserlian phenomenology, the impact of institutionalization on children, aphasia, Piaget's child psychology, children's interpretation of magic, and sexual development. Merleau-Ponty refers to hundreds of psychological, philosophical, and anthropological texts. Since these lectures were designed to teach students material needed for exams, the content in large part consists of detailed discussions of various texts.

At times Merleau-Ponty appears to be simply providing a summary of these works for the students, and at other times he analyzes these texts critically, advancing one author's work over another's and presenting his own interpretation. Given the length and scope of the lectures, this introduction will not serve as a comprehensive synopsis of the lectures themselves, but will instead serve to highlight some of the points where Merleau-Ponty provides us with a unique perspective not only on child psychology but on the human condition itself.

Merleau-Ponty writes extensively about psychoanalysis in the Sorbonne lectures. Alongside Gestalt theory, psychoanalysis provides us with significant insight in replying to reductionist accounts of child development. Properly conceived, psychoanalysis and Gestalt psychology investigate the full complexity of the child-adult relationship. Merleau-Ponty distinguishes a "broad" conception of psychoanalysis versus a "narrow" one and, while acknowledging that Freud's theory supports both, sides with the former. Broad psychoanalysis agrees that infantile traumas might never be overcome but nonetheless infantile history does not determine all future behavior. Psychoanalysis in the narrow sense is Freudian theory that assumes all pathological behavior is caused by infantile traumas that have become repressed and buried in the adult's unconscious. Merleau-Ponty argues against the theory that the Oedipus complex is a universal stage of childhood experience and that it universally determines adult experience. Instead, he draws upon anthropological studies that suggest that some societies, given their radically different styles of child-rearing, do not have Oedipal tensions in their populace.

Rejecting the narrow model of psychoanalysis as too limited, Merleau-Ponty champions a more inclusive sense of psychoanalysis and sees Gaston Bachelard, Jacques Lacan, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Georges Politzer as embracing a broader psychoanalytic approach. Merleau-Ponty's existential view of psychoanalysis includes his high estimation of broad psychoanalysis's rejection of a strong notion of the unconscious in favor of the concept of ambivalence, which better captures how the past

remains lived and present. He says, "We should therefore prefer this notion of ambivalence which paints perfectly all that is equivocal in certain behaviors, 'resistances' to treatment, of which the subject is partially complicit, attitudes of hate that are at the same time love, desires that express themselves as agony, etc." We find that past events continue to affect our present experience only because we have taken them up as part of present experience. Broad psychoanalysis argues that no re-creation of a past event can ever occur in analysis. Analysis can only have access to the lived and does not uncover past traumas as static, hidden contents. Merleau-Ponty refuses to permit a line to be drawn definitively between unconscious and conscious content. Unconscious content seems to indicate something that lies below or outside the subject's experience. This would appear to exclude any phenomenological access into such content. To Merleau-Ponty, the concept of ambivalence better expresses how we can be affected by the past and how we can experience it in the present without being fully conscious of it.

Broad psychoanalysis also draws upon Freud's work that provides us with an expanded idea of sexuality. Instead of sexuality always being directly tied to the genitals and behavior directed toward intercourse, sexuality "overflows" such a categorization. Sexuality is about a general relationship between the subject and other. It is grounded in body consciousness. Thus, Merleau-Ponty does not think that such a conception of sexuality results in "pansexualism." Pansexualism would argue that everything is sexual, but Merleau-Ponty argues that a proper conception of psychoanalysis demonstrates that sexuality, while having relevance far beyond genital intercourse, is grounded in the lived body. Merleau-Ponty is heavily influenced by Georges Politzer's critique of Freud, and he cites Politzer frequently in his summation of Freudian theories. Merleau-Ponty also extensively discusses the work of several contemporary psychoanalysts, among them his friend Jacques Lacan, Melanie Klein, Anna Freud, Hélène Deutsch, Germaine Guex, J. L. Moreno, and a number of psychoanalytic anthropologists. When praising their work, Merleau-Ponty focuses upon the ways in which these psychoanalysts provided more inclusive accounts of child development.

Importantly, Merleau-Ponty stresses the value of research that does not read the child through the adult. Lacan and Anna Freud are praised for understanding that the infant could not possibly desire sex itself, and hence we must be careful when speaking of infantile "sexuality" because the sexuality of the infant is of a different nature than that of the adult. Lacan understood that children cannot be attached to objects "as sexual" because they do not understand adult sexuality. Anna Freud argued that

psychoanalytic practice cannot be applied to children because they have not yet formed a distance that allows for the formation of neuroses or any unconscious resistance (and hence any possible transference) to the analyst.

While Merleau-Ponty seems more sympathetic to Melanie Klein in the Freud-Klein debates, he views both Anna Freud's and Melanie Klein's work as trying to uncover the child's experience in itself. While defending Melanie Klein's work against a sharp critique by Edward Glover, Merleau-Ponty notes that Klein's strong argument for infantile anxiety does not argue that the infant has memories that promote anxiety, as an adult might, but rather that the infant is very much *present*. He says that "the mother's body is there under the form of a presence and not of a memory. It is not possible to separate the internal from the external, nor is it possible to make a cleavage since there is an intermeshing." Too much work in child psychology has the tendency to assume that the child is internally occupied, and hence that we should read children's behavior as something about the child's psychological-physical state rather than see the child as engaged with the larger environment. Broad psychoanalytic theorists are praised for their understanding that the child is directly and immediately engaged with the world.

Another clear interpretation that Merleau-Ponty favors among psychoanalytically inspired writers is theory that limits the universal scope of the Oedipal drama. While correct about the existence of the Oedipal drama in Western society, Freud was mistaken when he thought that it was a universal human drama. Merleau-Ponty cites a number of anthropologists and sociologists as providing field cases of adult-child dynamics that are significantly different than the attitudes and child-rearing styles of Western families. The lectures cover the work of Margaret Mead, Abram Kardiner, Ralph Linton, Cora du Bois, Erik Erikson, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Bronislaw Malinowski, Octave Mannoni, Géza Róheim, and Leo Simmons. Merleau-Ponty devotes particular and repeated attention in a few lectures to a number of South Seas tribes as studied by Mead, Kardiner, and Malinowski.

Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that some structure of adult-child relations will inevitably develop, but that it will not necessarily take the form of the Oedipal triangle. Thus, Merleau-Ponty does not assume that the Oedipus complex itself is a product of Western civilization, as he understands Malinowski to argue, nor does he think that it is a universal condition of all human development, which he presents as Ernest Jones's conclusion. He lectures that a sociological view and the psychoanalytic one can and should be integrated instead of being seen as two opposing analyses:

> Freudians argue that the psychological structure is the cause of civiliza-
> tion. Malinowski replaces a psychological causality with a sociological
> causality and takes the Oedipus complex as a product of civilization.
> But it is evident that the one thesis and the other are both inseparable
> and contradictory. We must construct a psychoanalysis and a sociology
> that are not conceived in terms of causality.

Instead, Merleau-Ponty argues for the view of "culturalism" which he sees as coming out of the American school of "cultural sociology."[2]

Culturalism wisely draws upon Marx's theory of class, and hence of how the larger social milieu affects the family drama. In culturalism, attention is given to childhood upbringing, but also to the larger social world in which a family lives. "Childhood is not seen as the installation of certain complexes in the individual, ones which will play a destined role, but as an *initiation into a certain cultural environment*." The Oedipal complex is seen as tied to a certain cultural environment, not as a static product of that environment, but as a living engagement. Thus, parental upbringing plays an important role, but since the parents are themselves always already social beings, one cannot isolate parental dramas from sociocultural ones.

Despite his strong emphasis on the role of the social-historical context, Merleau-Ponty does think we can find some traits general to child experience and intersubjective life. What a more historical, culturally sensitive approach brings us is the understanding of inherent *structures* in human relations. Certain aspects of our experience will demand organizing responses because they evoke inevitable conflicts. These conflicts do not evoke a consistent style of structuration, such as the "narrow" psychoanalytic conception of a universal Oedipus conflict, since they arise from different individuals engaged within different contexts. But we will witness cross-culturally some general truths about human development and intersubjective life.

One example of conflicts that will inevitably be structured both by the child's physical-psychological development and the social milieu is the manner in which sexual development occurs. In a discussion of menstruation in the work of the French child psychoanalyst Hélène Deutsch, Merleau-Ponty argues that while sexual development is motivated by physical development, no account merely of physical development will suffice to explain it. He argues that "development is not a solely bodily fact, nor is it totally cultural." Merleau-Ponty does not disagree with the classical Freudian concept that heterosexuality is the normal telos of psychosexual development, but he argues against the notion that physical maturation causes heterosexuality to develop. In Deutsch's case discus-

sion of a girl who had started menstruating but whose sexuality had not changed, we find that the girl "had not psychologically assimilated the physiological event."

Yet the girl is not free to refuse to incorporate the physiological event. If her body has undergone a change, she is determined to respond to it. How she responds is in principle spontaneous, but in practice limited by social constraints. Merleau-Ponty turns to Gestalt psychology and Hegel in his description of this spontaneous structuration:

> Nevertheless, development follows certain lines all the same; the possibilities of aberration are not infinite. This order, entirely contingent as it may be, must surge forth spontaneously from prior states, from materials that it is going to utilize. Maturation consists in the adequation between the meaning of realized behavior and the materials with which this meaning realizes itself. The individual must take up again what the present bodily state has rendered possible. We find this very idea in the psychology of form, an idea which is itself much more a question than a response, is incomplete. Development is as little a destiny as it is an unconditioned freedom, for the individual always accomplishes a decisive act of development in a particular corporeal field. We find here once again Hegel's idea of "surpassing while preserving."

Merleau-Ponty argues that Gestalt psychology in its best form draws attention to these forms of structuration in the child experience.

Contrary to Piaget's and other critiques of Gestalt psychology, Merleau-Ponty argues that believing the child's perception is structured is not to fall into a belief in innate ideas (or what he terms "innatism"). The value of Gestalt psychologists such as Kurt Goldstein is to understand the notion of structure not as a fixed mental content that is placed upon the external world illuminating it, but as an order that realizes itself through "spontaneous organization."

Merleau-Ponty argues that in order to understand how childhood experience can be engaged and meaningful even in infancy, we must agree that some kind of organization is inherent in human life. However, we need not agree that this organization is rigid in its content or development:

> We maintain alongside Gestalt psychologists that infantile perception is structured from the outset . . . to say that infantile perception is structured from its first moment is not to declare the infant's perception and the adult's the same. Rather, it is a question of a summary structure replete with lacunae and indeterminate regions, and not the precise

structuration which characterizes adult perception. In the developmen-
tal course of the child's perception a number of transformations and
reorganizations occur. However, from the beginning certain totalities
(which merit the name of things) do exist and together they constitute
a "world."[3]

In a similar vein of drawing attention to the child's world, Merleau-Ponty
strongly rejects an "intellectualist" tendency in Piaget's explanations of
child development.

In 1952, crossing paths with Merleau-Ponty, Jean Piaget took a
professorship of genetic psychology at the Sorbonne. Citing Piaget fre-
quently in the Sorbonne lectures, Merleau-Ponty finds that Piaget overly
reduces the child down to "achieving" certain stages of development.
This is incorrect because such a model of child development fails to ex-
plain how the child transitions or matures from one stage to the next
and because it ignores the importance of the larger social, cultural, and
historical situation.

According to Merleau-Ponty, Piaget interprets children negatively;
he judges them in relation to how far they have achieved adult capacities.
In Piaget's discussion of childhood and adult language, we find a double
disservice: Piaget underestimates the value of children's language and
of adult expression. "Piaget therefore eliminates from adult language
all that is self-expressive and all that calls to others." By overvaluing ob-
jective language, Piaget passes over the value of artistic, expressive, and
childhood language. Merleau-Ponty accepts that children do not possess
objective language and thus are limited in certain kinds of communi-
cation, but he also finds that since children are not yet constrained by
adult normalization, their language exceeds that of adults in expression.
Merleau-Ponty asserts that "the passage to objective language can be con-
sidered equally as an *impoverishment*. When we move from childhood to
adulthood, it will not only be about moving from ignorance to knowl-
edge, but after a polymorphous phase that contained all possibilities, it
will be a passage to a purified, more defined language, but a much poorer
one." Merleau-Ponty's critique of Piaget argues that Piaget misses what
is lost in development by focusing on what is gained. Merleau-Ponty sug-
gests that this is due to a methodological problem in Piaget's experimen-
tal studies. Piaget assumes that adult perception, adult reasoning, adult
language, and adult cultural products are more engaged with reality.
Thus the standard of maturation in any study is how closely the child
approximates the adult standard. Any value in the child's response that
cannot be read in this light is ignored.

Merleau-Ponty calls for attention to the manner in which studies

are structured, and particularly the kinds of questions that children are asked.

> In fact, Piaget does not seek to understand the child's conceptions, but rather he attempts to translate them into the adult system. However, in child psychology, it is necessary to abstain from employing these adult concepts and even abstain from an adult vocabulary. In order to refrain from falsifying the child's thought, we must describe it in a new language that departs from the distinctions of adult language.

Piaget does indeed discover gaps, inconsistencies, and failures in the child's responses. However, this is not necessarily due to the fact that children are less capable than adults, but rather that questions motivated by adult styles of knowledge will inevitably result in children performing poorly in such experiments. This thesis about the value of childhood expressions and the critique of Piaget ignoring the uniqueness of childhood structures of expression comes to light most fully in Merleau-Ponty's discussion of childhood drawing and the child's reaction to magic tricks.

Merleau-Ponty repeatedly asserts that in certain ways, children are more directly in contact with their environment because children do not have as many cultural tools to separate themselves. They have not yet fully acquired social norms, including preferred styles of expression. Piaget and other contemporary child psychologists do represent an important improvement because they study childhood drawing. Unlike classical psychology's stance that childhood drawing is devoid of interesting content, Piaget does investigate it. However, Piaget's mistake is to always view childhood drawing as a function of adult drawing and, thus, to not see "a *positive meaning*" in it.

While it is true that children have fewer motor capacities than adults, we should be careful to avoid interpreting their drawings as merely reflective of their less developed motor skills. In addition, we must reexamine just what a child's nonrepresentational style signifies. One could interpret it as a product of a kind of interior occupation, in other words, that the child is less able to focus and pay attention to the object he or she is depicting. As we age, we acquire not only superior motor skills, but a more objective and realistic appraisal of the world. Merleau-Ponty disagrees consistently with such an assessment and points to modern painting as evidence of how we have traditionally been limited in our view of art in the West. Modern painting better reveals our true phenomenological encounter with objects by not escaping through an education in perspectival art.

Children's flat, nonperspectival drawing and their placement of body parts (eyes lying outside of the head, arms coming from the head) are not indications of a lack of comprehension about the nature of reality, but a connection to lived experience that is educated out of the Western adult. "The child is capable of certain spontaneous actions which are rendered impossible in the adult due to the influence of, and obedience to, cultural schemas." This does not indicate to Merleau-Ponty that the child lives outside of culture and is not influenced by it, but that the child's drawing better depicts the global perception of the child instead of a more strict visual organization of Western, perspectival, adult drawing.

The discussion of childhood drawing includes studies of the work on childhood drawing of Maurice Prudhommeau, Georges-Henri Luquet, Françoise Minkowski, and Sophie Morgenstern. While none of these authors is praised for completely grasping childhood drawing in its own logic, they are noted for calling attention to an analysis of the child's expressive creations. For instance, Luquet's interpretation, like Piaget's, is too negative, for he assumes that photography is "the most exact" representation of nature, and thus depictions that most approximate photography would be the most realistic. But Merleau-Ponty challenges this view of perception, pointing out that our perception is not at all like that of a camera. Instead, the "failures" of childhood drawing can be understood as revealing a more immediate connection to perception. Thus, flattening and depicting the object from multiple perspectives loses some of the object's visual appearance, but it preserves the "object's totality."

Merleau-Ponty also extensively discusses Piaget's and I. Huang's experiments on children's interpretation of magic tricks. Merleau-Ponty rejects the theory, suggested by Piaget, that children have a natural tendency to retreat from the world when pressed to explain it. Piaget writes that children are drawn to magical explanations when they encounter inexplicable phenomena. Merleau-Ponty sharply criticizes a view which assumes that children are prone to fantasy in their relations with the world. Also, Huang draws attention to the child's economic and social circumstances and thus allows us to understand when "magical explanations" are the result of class traditions. Children from the middle and upper classes are more likely to suggest fantastical explanations, given their larger exposure to fairy tales and children's stories, whereas working-class children tend to provide grounded responses. Piaget fails to take into account the child's socioeconomic situation. Another benefit of Huang's analysis is that he allows the child's explanation to come forth without asking leading questions. He focuses on the child's natural responses and not on his or her linguistic immaturity:

> Huang places the child before "a real event involving concrete and tan-
> gible objects (as opposed to a situation created by language), an event
> capable of evoking responses similar to those that child presents in his
> or her everyday life." Piaget, on the other hand, interrogates the child
> with regard to subjects with which the child has never been confronted.

Several of the magic tricks Huang shows children were ones where an
adult would understand how the supposed "magic" illusion occurred
either by having scientific knowledge or by being familiar with sleights of
hand. Since children have neither scientific knowledge nor understand-
ing of sleights of hand, we expect them to interpret the trick with appeal
to magic. But surprisingly, children "*never* spontaneously suggest a magi-
cal explanation." Merleau-Ponty notes that, just like the adult, the child
tries to take account of the phenomenon naturally. While we find their
accounts naive, we do not find a lack of engagement with the world or
the desire to return to an internal, superstitious worldview.

In order to present the child as intimately engaged with the world—
including the cultural and social world—Merleau-Ponty straddles a line
between a cultural, sociological approach to child development and a
physiological, psychological approach. The limitations of classical psy-
chological approaches are that they assume that what we witness in adult
experience must be a necessary consequence of the child's maturation.
Hence, the child's context and the adult's view of the child are less rele-
vant, since the child is destined to become the adult. Research focuses
upon finding the adult in the child and not allowing the child's experi-
ence to be unique. Broader views of the role of the child's own logic and
the cultural milieu in which the child is reared show the limitations of a
psychological approach to development. However, a completely cultural
and sociological approach would fail to capture the general structures of
human experience. *Child Psychology and Pedagogy* provides a unique model
for understanding development in this integrated fashion.

In translating these lectures, I have tried to provide both readability
and a scholarly apparatus for the manifold sources Merleau-Ponty cites.
As with most lecture notes, there are sentence fragments, and the out-
line headings are not always complete. I have included some additional
subheadings in brackets when deemed necessary. In the notes, brackets
denote references provided by me beyond those contained within the
course notes. I have endeavored to provide full citations of references
to the studies, texts, and theorists Merleau-Ponty mentions. In addition,
I have provided biographical notes about references that might not be
familiar to an English-speaking audience. I have preserved the use of the
masculine "he" to refer to the child as in the French, since gender-neutral

language would not be an accurate reflection of the manner in which Merleau-Ponty lectured.

I would like to thank Hugh J. Silverman and Fred Evans for their translations of the first and last lectures, which were consulted in preparing this text. I would also like to extend many thanks to Tony Steinbock for taking an interest in *Child Psychology and Pedagogy*, and the excellent staff at Northwestern for all their work on these lectures. So many research librarians and friends have aided in tracking down Merleau-Ponty's many references that my final thanks go to them.

CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY

Consciousness and Language Acquisition (1949–1950)

I. Introduction

The problem of language is situated between philosophy and psychology. According to the philosophical tradition of Descartes, Kant, and so forth, language has no philosophical meaning and becomes an exclusively technical problem.

A. The Reflexive Conception

In the Cartesian tradition, consciousness and language do not meet. If we acknowledge that consciousness is a unique kind of being, language finds itself outside of language, analogous to things. No interior link between consciousness and language exists since consciousness, in order to be conscious of something, is essentially self-consciousness. In such a conception, consciousness is a universal synthetic activity. Others are only the projection of what one knows about oneself. In principle, this philosophy states that one cannot meet the other. However, it does manage to avoid solipsism by declaring that there is no reason to believe that my consciousness is unique. We are indeed isolated, but language raises us to the universal.

In such a perspective, language comes from the order of things and not the order of the subject. Spoken or written words are physical phenomena; the connection between the word's meaning and aspect is accidental, fortuitous, and conventional. It is not about a conscious communication; my words simply give the other's mind an occasion to remember what he already knows. Language is an uttered message, but one without the force of effective communication. The word has no power of its own. Therefore, the best language is the most neutral and the best language of all would be scientific, algorithmic language where no equivocation is possible. (For instance, the project of a universal language, a dictionary that would encompass all languages and all thought.)

In this perspective, we end up devalorizing language; we only consider it to be the clothing of consciousness and thought. Even for a writer

like Sartre, who does not ignore the problem of the other, it is impossible for language to bring something to thought. The word has no "power." The word universalizes, it summarizes what already exists. Thought owes nothing to the word.

B. A New Approach to the Problem

This philosophy is an ally to the most positivist kind of science. It gives psychology complete license to treat language as an object (such as in the obsolete conception of aphasia as the loss of words' images).[1]

However, the agreement between a reflexive philosophy and a mechanist psychology is ruptured by an evolution that recognizes the problem. Sartre says that language provides no additional problems, but he nonetheless shows that in its formulation language does show the origin of new behaviors. (Consider the example in *The Charterhouse of Parma* where the Count fears that even though they have been in love for a long time, the first words of love will make the couple fall in love.)[2]

In general, we can no longer continue to base relations with others on the value of truth; we can no longer avoid encountering the other. As for language, the consequence of the above is that language makes communication between others occur. Language thus becomes a mysterious element since it is neither a self nor a thing. Psychology understands that the word is not a thing and no longer considers aphasia to be the loss of verbal images. The aphasiac still knows how to put words together. He no longer knows how to say "red" but he can still say "cherry-red." Kurt Goldstein says that aphasia is not the loss of a word, nor is it the loss of an idea, but rather it is what "makes the word ready to express."[3] For Goldstein, we must distinguish between a meaningful [*plein de son sens*] and a meaningless [*vidé de son sens*] word (in German, "*sinnvoll*" and "*sinnlos*") in order to recognize the presence of sense in the word. This analysis demonstrates that language has a kind of signifying power.

Contributions from the evolution of linguistics. For Saussure, language is not a multiplicity of words or of ideas in the speaking person, nor is it the sum of signs corresponding to a sum of ideas.[4] Rather, it is a unique collection where each word takes its significance from others as a mass that progressively differentiates itself. For the linguist Gustave Guillaume, a sub-linguistic scheme upholds each language that informs us, for example, about the architectonic in a given language.[5] However, individuals do not *think* this scheme. The scheme is neither in the interior of the subject's consciousness nor is it in an exterior reality. We must therefore find language's position to be obscure and ambiguous since it is neither a mind nor a thing.

Contributions from literary experience. The literary experience of language confirms these characteristics. For the past hundred years, language has been for writers something completely other than "clothing for thought." In classical writing, there is an absolute confidence in words (for instance, La Bruyère said that a good expression always exists even if the writer hasn't found it).[6] Fundamentally, the classical writer postulates that language is already in things. Jean Paulhan has analyzed this illusion: once the thing is said, it is as if it had always been said.[7] The word realizes the idea and allows it to be forgotten. Language is obscure in its function, which is to make everything clear. We cannot observe language only to use it, it is impossible to directly grasp it.

C. Conclusion

Language is neither thing nor mind. At the same time immanent and transcendent, its status remains to be found. This problem will always be present when studying the acquisition of language. The psychological examination of language will lead us to its clarifying function and the psychological problem will lead us to the philosophical problem. As we have seen above, language is invincible against all efforts to convert it into an object. But evidently it also shows that we should not confuse it with the mind. Language defies the sign-signified distinction. We have seen the powerlessness of the reflexive method in studying language. Will the inductive method be more successful?

[D. Methodology]

1. *The inductive method.* Let's first make the notion of induction clearer. In *L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique,* Brunschvicg analyses this method and argues against Mill's theory where induction is the simple recording of natural correlations. But Brunschvicg's critique remains equivocal due to a kind of contradiction between two parts of his analysis. In the first part he contests Mill's empiricist attitude, since he argues that the problem is not noting correlations between facts; rather, the problem is defining the variables that establish causal connections. Thus, his first task is active, he must make a hypothesis—an intellectual task, since it is not in nature that one discovers facts.

In the second part of his analysis, when Brunschvicg examines the connections between hypotheses and existing facts, he concludes that the only verifiable element in induction is the sum of numerical relations that exist between the phenomenon's different variables. What is verified is not the image of the facts that gives us a hypothesis, but only the sum

of established equations between facts. Even if the theory (the image of facts) is refuted by what follows, equations retain a sense if they are translated into the new hypothesis's language. Hence, in a way Brunschvicg shows that induction is not a collection of given facts; it is an intellectual effort. But insofar as induction represents the essence of the studied phenomena, it is unverifiable.

Can we hope to have a notion of the structure of language with the inductive method? We do not think that the relations between variables can clarify the nature of language, and that is all that induction can do.

2. *Phenomenological method.* Thus, neither of these preceding methods is useful for us. However, there is a third possible approach for our knowledge. It is about making contact with the facts, understanding them in themselves, reading, *and* deciphering them in a manner that gives them a sense. We will have to vary the phenomena in order to get out of these variations a common signification. The criteria for this method will not be the multiplicity of facts that serve as proof for advanced hypotheses. What will be the proof is the fidelity to the phenomena, the precise hold that we have on the employed material and, to some extent, the descriptive "proximity."

We find an example of this method in recent animal psychology. After having used a method which continually projected human consciousness into the observed phenomena, observers of animal behavior were obliged to use a strictly objective attitude. But soon this attitude was revealed as insufficient. Thus, in his rigorous examination of ape intelligence, Köhler uses a particular method.[8] He is not content to simply calculate what is measurable (which is insufficient to describe the entire phenomenon). In order to describe ape behavior, Köhler uses terms that one could find "anthropomorphic," such as "finding the answer by chance" or "by a fortunate mistake," terms that are qualitatively distinctive. As the objective (quantitative) result is the same when an ape finds a solution through comprehension or by accident, we can no longer hold to a purely quantitative analysis. In saying "the ape solves the problem," Köhler introduces a kind of indispensable anthropomorphism. We want to leave quantitative analysis, Köhler says, because there really are noticeable behavioral differences. For instance, the behavior of a real solution is a melodic and continuous movement, whereas the accidental solution is abrupt and discontinuous. Thus, we must be subjective, since subjectivity is in the situation; but this is not to say that we should be arbitrary.

Does Köhler proceed by induction? Yes, in the sense that there is a hypothesis and that he appeals to facts that a hypothesis cannot explain. But if he enters into the analysis of the phenomenon's intrinsic characteristics, it is so that the animal's life that we observe is not an abstraction of a spectacle. We cannot set aside [*écarter*] our human attitudes.

Others, like Koffka, clearly show that the "descriptive concepts" are at the foundation of this method and that in psychology they now come to clarify the "functional concepts."[9] Koffka and Köhler call this appeal to study our experience of observed behavior "phenomenological." The method's newness consists in how it establishes that effective knowledge is not only measurable knowledge, but also qualitative description. This qualitative knowledge is not subjective, it is intersubjective: it describes what is observable to all.

This is the method that we are adopting to study language. To study the facts, not in order to verify a hypothesis that transcends them, but in order to give an interior sense to the facts themselves. Most important is the rigor with which we embrace the totality and the detail of certain facts. This is the method that Goldstein admirably employs in studying aphasia and agnosia.[10] Instead of studying the same symptom in many subjects, he addresses the analysis toward only one subject, striving to explore all the sectors of behavior. It is a method of understanding no less rigorous than the other, since if induction searches the multiplicity of facts, Goldstein's method explores the foundation and cuts to the interior of a single case.

In conclusion, we propose to apply a method Henri Bergson defined but scarcely practiced. Philosophy should discover the meaning of phenomena described by the scientist [savant]. The role of philosophy is to reconstitute the world that the physicist sees, but with the "fringe" that the scientist does not mention that is furnished by his contact with the qualitative world.[11] This program remains valuable for us; there will be no difference between psychology and philosophy. Psychology is always an implicit, beginning philosophy and philosophy has never finished its contact with facts.

On this basis, in order to understand the being of language, we will address the following facts: (1) the child's psychological development of language, (2) facts concerning the disintegration of language, (3) linguistics' view of language, and (4) literary experience. (Because to be a writer is to understand personal language. It is to create a language and a public. Thus, the writer resumes at a superior level of language creation.)

II. Psychological Development of Language in the Child

An overview. During the first months of life, the child cries, makes expressive movements, and then begins to babble. We must consider this babbling as language's ancestor. Above all, it is extraordinarily rich and

includes phonemes that are not included in the language spoken around the child; phonemes that the child will be unable to reproduce when he becomes an adult (for instance, when he would like to reacquire them to learn a foreign language). This babbling is thus a polymorphous language, spontaneous in respect to the environment (it even exists, not as well developed, in deaf-mute children). However, there is a large amount of imitation. This imitation reaches its culmination between six and twelve months, but it remains rudimentary and doesn't grasp the meaning of what is imitated. The same relationship exists between babbling and language as between scribbling and drawing.

This imitation concerns the melody of the sentence as much as the words. We could say that the child tries to speak "in general." William Stern relates that for a month his daughter spoke a foreign "language," which had a conversational tone but meant nothing, as if she was playing at speaking.[12] Henri Delacroix says, "The child bathes in language."[13] The child is attracted to and enthralled by the language around him and thus tries it.

Language is the indissoluble extension of all physical activity and at the same time is something new in relation to it. Speech emerges from the "total language" made up of gestures, mimicry, and so forth. But languages transforms. Already it uses the phonation organs for something that is not natural for them. Instead, language does not have organs, as Edward Sapir says: all organs that language uses already have another function.[14] Language introduces itself as a superstructure: a phenomenon that is already witness of another order. The problem is to know how it has passed from a quasi-biological activity to a nonbiological activity, but also to suppose a movement, an activity that has integrated it into dialogue.

In the following period, from nine to eighteen months, fifteen months on average, spoken language begins. First the child knows how to say some words, then a kind of stagnation sets in. Preyer's son remained for two months with only two words; Stern's son had only one word for two months.[15] Less precisely, this phenomenon is found in most children—an incubation of language.

A. Language Acquisition During the First Year

1. *The first weeks.* The child's expressive manifestations are very premature. Antoine Grégoire shows that from the end of the second month the nursing infant laughs and smiles, not only to manifest satisfaction, but also to respond to surrounding smiles.[16] This already supposes a relation with the other that precedes the language that will appear in such a context.

This is why it is artificial to consider the first words as spontaneous. Well before their appearance, attitudinal responses existed. Grégoire insists on the fact that the infant's intellectual activity is much more important than we thought; we have the tendency to underestimate it, since it is not accompanied by exterior manifestations. From birth, there is a capacity for relation with the exterior which doesn't stop growing during the first weeks of life. Already in the embryo, we can provoke conditional reflexes. From birth the brain records specific changes that occur in the immediate environment.

Mimicry is considerably enriched during the first week, as is hearing and vision. An infant of four to seven days old understands one and a half times better than the child of zero to three days. Premature children have a normal intellectual development; they are capable of overcoming the physical handicap they have at birth.

2. *Babbling*. From two and a half months onward, babbling appears. It is principally formed of consonants (*l, r*) whose acquisition cannot be explained in terms of imitation. These vocal emissions seem, in effect, to be common to all babies, independent of the surrounding language. We could explain the use of these phenomena from a physiological point of view: the predominance of sucking activity favors the appearance of labial and guttural consonants.

It seems untenable to claim that babbling during the first period is a result of imitation. Some writers believe that imitation is about lip movement. But Paul Guillaume shows that children imitate guttural sounds that are invisible on the speaking person's lips.[17] If there is an environmental influence, it is hearing that draws out imitation and not vision. Moreover, children never fixate their gaze on the mouth, but on the eyes of the speaking person. It has often been noted that children open their mouths when they are listening to someone speak, but Grégoire says that this is about a kind of contagion of the other's behavior (like yawning) and not an effort to reconstruct what is perceived. But the presence of the adult's language excites the child in a general manner. From the moment of waking, the child hears speaking, most of the time language is addressed to him directly, and this acoustic sensation first provokes the stimulation of his limbs and then his phonatory organs (easily assimilated by the limbs).

In conclusion, from the environment the child receives the "direction" of language. Imitation plays absolutely no part in this stage, but it is important to underline the importance of the child's involvement with the way in which people speak in his environment (the rhythm, pitch, etc.). The effect of all this is a general attraction toward language (again, consider Delacroix's statement, "the child bathes in language"). Wundt

says that language development is always a "premature" development.[18] In effect, it is impossible to negate a certain spontaneity, but it is the relation with the environment that points the child toward language. It is a development to an end defined by the exterior and not preestablished in the organism.

Four months. From four to ten months (according to Grégoire) an important linguistic and intellectual development takes place. We are less sensitive to this development because during this period we are more attentive to the progress of motor skills. What is the significance of sounds emitted in this period? The child lingers and modulates certain sounds; he varies them according to the accent and duration, all of which can be translated by varying levels of energy and mood. From this moment on, certain appreciable nuances drawn from adult language appear. Bühler, in his book *Sprachtheorie,* observes that German children initially place the tonic accent on the second syllable of their vocal emissions, but quickly shift it to the first syllable.[19] They take up, we could say, "the German accent." Thus, even before speaking children appropriate the rhythm and accentuation of their language. It is around this period that children achieve extraordinarily rich vocal emissions, emitting sounds that later are impossible to reproduce. A certain selection, an impoverishment will later occur.

Seven months. Around seven months, the free babbling little by little seems to transform into voluntary speech. The infant is still far from articulate speech, but he makes attempts to pronounce and becomes increasingly sensitive to what he hears, as if his intention to speak becomes stronger and stronger.

Eight months. It is during the eighth month that the child can start to repeat vowels when one says them to him with the intention that he repeat them. The infant introduces them in a kind of sentence, a rhythmic imitation of a sentence. It is pseudo-language.

Twelve months. From ten to twelve months, Grégoire observes a polyphony and infinite variations of pseudo-words. In addition, around twelve months, his son amused himself by crying louder than his father, thus becoming capable of creating quasi-linguistic effects.

3. *The first word.* The moment the first word appears, a word that designates a train passing in front of the house, it is a particular word assigned to a single thing or, moreover, a set of things (the train, the emotion released by its passage, etc.). Above all, it translates an affective state; a plurality of meanings is in this word-sentence. It would be artificial to trace an absolute division between the first word and what existed previously. For a long time, the child had defined objects by his behavior. He simply did not give them a particular word. For Grégoire, there is no

room to say that the appearance of the first word implies a conscious grasp of the sign-signified relationship.

In the article "Le langage et la construction du monde des objets," Cassirer has said that the first word makes possible a synthesis of impressions and disparate facts.[20] This presupposes a greater richness of non-formulated experience, where the word arrives to sum up and prune. For Grégoire, on the contrary, experience before the word is poorer and less complete. The word emerges as a unity; it is not a synthesis but a differentiation.

Grégoire has attempted to show the continuity of language development. On the one hand, there is an expression and definition of the object before the first word appears. On the other hand, this appearance does not in any way end babbling, which for a long time will accompany the child's speech and perhaps even continues in certain aspects of adult interior language, often not formulated. On the one hand, from the beginning of life there are anticipations that will become language and, on the other, there is persistence of babbling in the adult stage.

4. *Significance of the first word. Intellectualist interpretation.* We are tempted to say with Delacroix that the sign is only really a "signifier" [*significant*] when it is a "mental sign."[21] For that reason, it is necessary that connections are established between words and that a logical principle, a formal relation, regulates their relationship. Thus, the sign becomes part of a context and its signification depends upon the context in which it is inserted.

Delacroix and Stern appear to agree on the first word's importance.[22] The first word reveals to the child that each thing has a name and accounts for the child's desire to learn these names. The first word's appearance suddenly makes the *sign-signified relationship* explicit. This conception more or less applies to the famous example of Helen Keller, the deaf-blind-mute girl whose teacher succeeded in reeducating her through touch.[23] In her autobiography, she recalls that for a long time all the efforts to provide her with the notion of the sign were in vain. But one day, when she was drawing water, at the moment where the cold water touched her hand and sharply impressed her, her teacher traced on the other hand a sign designating water. At this moment, Helen Keller had the sudden realization of the sign-signified relationship and in the hour that followed learned about thirty signs. This example encourages the conception of all or nothing, that there is consciousness and comprehension, or one has nothing at all.

Critique of this conception. Does the appearance of the first word really signify the conscious grasp of the sign-signified relationship? For several reasons, this seems difficult to accept. If this were the case, a rapid prog-

ress would occur after the child's first word, as in the case of Helen Keller. In fact, often what follows is a long stagnation. How can we explain this stagnation, if the first word really produces a general conscious grasp of the sign?

Stern himself even admits that the child far from possesses the notion of sign in the way the adult does. For the adult, the sign is a convention. For the child, until around six or seven years, it is a property, a quality of the thing.[24] For the child, the sign has an almost magical relationship, a participatory relationship, an intimate resemblance with the signified. Stern himself reports the example of a young child's creation of words. When asked later to give some kind of reason that inspired his word-creations, the child would say "because the thing seemed to have that name."

The first words are often distinct from adult words. Often, there is onomatopoeia (hence a relationship of resemblance). But even if the child uses an adult word, the meaning is always more ephemeral. Often a single word serves to designate a collection of things that have a similar trait ("music" for music, military music, and soldiers). The child makes generalizations neither in the above case nor when he seems to be using a metaphor. The child lacks concepts for generalization. The child possesses a syncretic view of the situation; it is what makes him able to assimilate things of different orders.

Thus, if, for the child, the word has a fairly slippery and confused signification, we can no longer suppose an understanding of the sign in the way we understand it (in this case, the child's representation would be more coherent). However, the acquisition of the first word marks a decisive step in language acquisition. How should we understand it?

Eighteen months to three years. During this period, the child makes an effort to better perfect his maternal language. The role of imitation is preponderant here, but it is only a textual production, a piecemeal product of the ambient language. We must distinguish between immediate and deferred imitation (the model that is incorporated into the child's latent knowledge and only used later). A famous example of deferred imitation is found in Stumpf's son.[25] After the acquisition of some words and several natural symbols (onomatopoeia, interjections, etc.), two years passed where the child did not add to his vocabulary, providing proof of a kind of passive resistance, of an ill will toward language, despite his more or less complete understanding. Around three years and three months, the boy suddenly abandoned this attitude and immediately started speaking. In this case, as in other less clear ones, it is about a real organization of imitated models and never about a pure and simple reproduction. (It is the problem of imitation that we will examine below.)

After three years. Can we distinguish subsequent stages? This would appear to be difficult. Stern distinguishes the movement from word to sentence. It is not a well-defined stage, since the first words always possess a sentence value even though the strict value of distinctions is contestable. Others distinguish different stages according to the vocabulary's growth and draw up inventories of the child's linguistic baggage at different ages. Numerous inquiries on this front have taken place, always providing disconcerting and disappointing results. Alice Descoeudres took a census of the vocabulary of children at around three years and established tests to avoid the necessity of repeating the census.[26] (Stern found 300 words at two years, Doville 688, and Major 143.) What accounts for the diversity of these results?

(1) The lack of an exact definition as to what constitutes *a* word. (Do two suffixes on one root count as two words or as one? The same goes for inflections, etc.) (2) As for the adult, the vocabulary one typically uses is much more limited than what the adult knows or could use, if the adult really felt the need. (Vendryes: virtual vocabulary is impossible to inventory.)[27] We cannot consider the linguistic equipment to be a sum of words. It is more a system of variations that make possible an open series of words. It is impossible to explore; it is a totality of open sectors, giving infinite expressive possibilities. When the child appropriates a new meaning for a known word, must we count this as a new word? Yes and no, we see that a word is really a whole and not a sum.

Five years. As Piaget suggested, we could perhaps introduce a new level of development after the age of five. Until this age, the child seeks only to communicate with the other (a dialogue) with a monologue. As a mode of social communication, speech only gains importance at around seven or eight years of age.

In his experiments in the Jean-Jacques Rousseau nursery school, Piaget came up with a ratio of 46 percent nonsocialized talk (juxtaposed monologue). But Martha Muchow, in a Hamburg nursery school, found only 30 percent.[28] This could be due to a difference in the education system; in Piaget's school the children were educated through the Montessori method; whereas the Hamburg children were used to group life. David Katz, in his observations, noted 150 quasi-informal conversations in his children of three and a half years old and five years old. He observed real discussions, indications of curiosity, and feeling, and so forth.[29] Within the children's conversations with adults, he noticed a real activation of language, going far beyond Piaget's conception of egocentric language.

Therefore, we must be careful to guard against all artificial divisions into "successive stages." From the beginning, it appears that all

possibilities are inscribed in the child's expressive manifestations. There is nothing absolutely new; instead there are anticipations, regressions, the permanence of archaic elements in new forms. This development where, on the one hand, everything is sketched out in advance and, on the other, it proceeds by a series of discontinuous progressions, denies both intellectualist and empiricist theories. The Gestaltists have helped us understand the problem better by explaining how in decisive periods of development, the child appropriates linguistic "*Gestalten*," general structures, not through an intellectual effort or by an immediate imitation. To elucidate this problem, we will consider in turn (1) the problem of phoneme acquisition and (2) the problem of imitation.

B. Phoneme Acquisition

When we ask about language acquisition at the level of the *word,* we encounter a major difficulty. The word refers to a certain concept; it already contains a duality, the formal distinction between sign and signified. However, it is possible to first approach language on the phonemic level. Phonemes do not make reference to any meaning at all; they are elements of language, having no significance themselves. The fact that they have no significance themselves does not mean they are insignificant. Reflection on the phoneme permits surpassing the opposition between sign and concept: it enables us to see what is the order (which is neither about intelligence nor about imitation) of language acquisition.

We follow Roman Jakobson's analysis in which he proposes to compare the child's phoneme acquisition and the aphasic's regression of the phonetic system.[30] Jakobson thinks that this system constitutes a very rigorous whole with such strong connections of necessity that its order of acquisition and disappearance is *invariable* and never optional. (No objection is made about the comparison between the child and the sick because the comparison only concerns itself with the phoneme system and not the totality of language.)

Jakobson starts with the distinction between a specifying spirit [*esprit particulariste*] and a unifying spirit [*esprit unificateur*] (Saussure), both contributing to forming a language and maintaining it in equilibrium. Take, for example, the case of children who refuse for a long time to speak the surrounding language, the case of future poets (where this refusal could be a sign of a unique power), the language of women in certain tribes, and the language of lovers. The existence of a specifying spirit is undeniable, but it is quickly absorbed in the unifying spirits, such as in the case of children using "baby" language who revolt against an adult who speaks in the same manner.

How can we understand the systematic and regular order of phonemes? Physiologists happily invoke a "principle of the least expenditure of energy," but in fact there is no phoneme in itself that is simpler or more difficult. We must explain this order with certain "privileged" behaviors that constitute a certain language's consonants. They are not easier in themselves; they do not lend themselves to be associated with some principle. They are the ultimate givens of the linguistic whole and permit the realization of maximum efficiency.

Thus, the phonemic system seems to be an irreducible reality and language acquisition to be an integration of the individual in his language's structure. This becomes very clear in the transition from babbling to the articulation of words. Here we see what Jakobson calls a deflation: suddenly the richness of babbling disappears, the child not only loses the unused sounds in his language, but also many that would be useful. Thus, the child who babbles the difference between *K* and *T* perfectly will, all of a sudden, lose this possibility of differentiating them, although he recognizes them when an adult says them. Here, it is not that motor or auditory models cause failures. Everything happens as if the child were obliged to restrain himself, because now sounds have taken on a distinctive signification. From the moment when phonemes serve to differentiate words, the child shows a need to appropriate their new value, to gradually acquire their system of opposition and of original succession. In conclusion, the child's capacity to pronounce does not depend upon his capacity to articulate (he already was capable of articulation at the babbling stage). Instead it is the acquisition of phonemic contrasts and their significative value. The rigorous order in which a child incorporates himself suggests the possibility of linguistic value. Jakobson thus defines this phenomenon as "the system of phonemic oppositions that tend toward signification."

Where does this "deflation" of vocal manifestations in Jakobson come from? The child ceases being able to utter certain sounds as soon as he begins to speak, but this is not due to some articulatory impossibility, nor is it due to the fact that the child ceases to hear these sounds. The child stops having the power to pronounce these sounds as *significative utterances* because they are not yet part of his meaningful phonemic system.

When the child, stimulated by his surroundings, wants to take a turn to speak, he perceives a certain number of stable "structures." He identifies them and experiences their intersubjective value. The child guesses a meaning behind the reappearance of certain phonemes. He begins to employ them as "rules of usage" for his voice. This prepares him to give them a signification, but first they are confused with the situation's significance.

The originality of Jakobson's theory lies in how it establishes a nar-

row correlation between the adoption of a phonetic system itself and its means of communication. In conclusion, the structure of this system as it is already used calls forth signification. By the force of hearing speech, the child guesses that it is about signs, since the phonemic system draws signification as if through "grooves" [*en creux*].

But Jakobson is less concerned with defining the ontological status of the phonemic system than in enumerating its properties. His study is more that of a scientist [*savant*] than a philosopher. He insists on the autonomy of this system. Its structure is rigid; its rules only refer to this structure itself and not to physiological conditions exterior to it. When language appears in the child, the system's rigidity is masked by the persistence of babbling. The child continues to employ onomatopoeia and interjections that do not obey the phonemic system's rules (and which sometimes contribute to its enrichment).

For example, a child does not yet know how to pronounce the *R* in a linguistic context, but he often uses it to imitate bird songs. He knows how to pronounce it as long as he doesn't use it for speech. Such is the case with educating stutterers; they are provided with a pattern where they can become accustomed to pronouncing the *R* (by imitating the turning of a motor, for example). Afterward, they are encouraged to integrate the sound into their language.

The author proposes to offer a counter-proof to his theory with the case of aphasia. Since the possession of language depends on the integration of phonemes, inversely aphasia should result in a destruction of the phonemic system. In all pure aphasiacs, Jakobson establishes a regular disintegration of this system, often accompanied by a provisional reequilibration. (For example, he observed a Czech who lost the distinction between long and short vowels. Since the Czech language places the tonic accent on the first syllable, this patient compensated for his inability by putting the tonic accent on the penultimate syllable. Thus he replaced the qualitative difference between vowels by a more energetic accentuation of the word.)

According to Jakobson, in aphasia, the unity of the phonemic system is substituted for a degraded whole, but this whole is still systematic due to this continual reequilibration. A question is raised: how does this work of equilibration take place in the aphasiac? An aphasiac cannot pronounce certain words, even though he does not have agnosia or apraxia. These words are only lost insofar as they were part of a totality. Jakobson uses here the comparison of Husserl regarding the game of chess. We can consider the pieces of the game in relation to their matter or to their significance in the game. Language is not attained through an articulatory

phenomenon but as an element of the linguistic game. It is not the innate instrument that is lost, but the possibility of being used in certain cases.

It is only in the second part of his work that Jakobson attempts to define the phenomenon. According to him, it is "the element of language which distinguishes a word with regard to the phoneme from all the other words identical to it. They are diacritic elements of language." Consequently, phonemes are essential constituents of words, although in themselves they are void of sense. (For example, the phoneme /i/ alone differentiates "pit" and "pat" but /i/ in itself does not mean anything.) These are, so to speak, signs of the first order. They do not relate to things, like words, but to words themselves.

But since the phonemes are the element that differentiates words and since words relate to objects, disorders in the phonemic system often have the same aspect and result in language disorders: homonymy. Jakobson takes the example of two German words: *Rippe* [ribs] and *Lippe* [lips]. The only phoneme which differentiates *Rippe* from *Lippe* is the /r/. Two disorders are possible: (1) the patient cannot distinguish the /l/ from the /r/; he has to use the same word for both things; (2) the patient has lost the meaning of the words. For him, these are two distinct words but he can no longer differentiate between them since they have no meaning. One of the two words falls out of use, and the other serves in both cases. There is homonymy in the two cases, either by the destruction of the phonemic system or by the disappearance of the words' meaning.

But, in all cases, it is about linguistic faculty problems: formulation problems or symbolic function problems. Phonologists no longer restrict the "symbolic function" to words. They integrate the entire phonemic system, since they argue for a close parallel between phonemes and words. Both are elements of the linguistic chain, and they differentiate the whole of which they are a part. (1) The word, like the phoneme, has its own properties, its own constant forms. (2) Both result in modifications in relation to their relationship (the phoneme modifies the words, the word modifies the sentence). (3) Both find their place in the whole because of their properties in the series (phonemic system laws for the phoneme, syntax laws for the word).

As for the phonemic system, it is composed, on the one hand, of a universal system that is common to all languages. It is the first thing to appear in the child who is beginning to speak. On the other hand, it is composed of a particular system specific to each language that distinguishes languages from one another. After having acquired the elementary system, the child determines this latter system. (According to Trubetzkoy, there are strictly speaking no universal components.)[31]

The order of phonemic succession is rigorous and invariable. Palatals appear after dentals ($/d/$ is replaced by $/k/$). The first vowel is $/a/$. Consonants appear in the following order: (1) $/p/-/m/$, (2) $/p/-/t/$, (3) $/m/-/n/$. All childhood language begins with this minimum consonantism. Then the system of vowels begins: (1) $/a/-/i/$ or $/a/-/e/$, (2) $/u/$ or $/e/$. This is the minimum vocalism.

Anterior consonants always appear before posterior consonants. Therefore, there would be in all languages founding elements and "founded" elements; the latter cannot appear before the former, and the former cannot disappear without entailing the abolition of the "founded" elements. This order of appearance is irreversible. In aphasia, the order of disappearance is the inverse. The rarest phonemes are the first to disappear.

In the rest of the work, Jakobson extends his theory into two applications. (1) *The language of dreams.* For Jakobson, the degenerate language in dreams follows the same differentiations as the language of aphasiacs. We can observe the same alternations: the rare phonemes disappear first, and finally, only the most elementary phonemes remain. This will explain the equivocal in dream thought which would be parallel or derived from that of language. (2) *Application.* It is again through the phonemic system's rules that Jakobson explains what happens when someone is looking for a word: the scheme that remains in memory is incapable of realizing itself in a word because the phonemic system is, at least in this regard, differentiated. These two extensions of Jakobson's theory clarify for us the nature of the phonemic system.

1. *Originality of the phonological analysis.* The originality of the phonological analysis (Trubetzkoy, Jakobson) comes from what they place on a previous plane to language, something kind of above language.[32] Language is a system of signs connected to significations; the difficulty is seeing the relationship between the sign and the signification. The phonologist studies the vocal elements that are already signs, but that lack any designatable signification. Phonemes by themselves do not mean anything, but they serve to distinguish words from each other. The phonologist brackets off the acquired language; he tries to rediscover the original function of the signs in the interior of the verbal chain, below all the conventions or all the historical events that have ultimately assigned a given meaning to a given word. According to Saussure, language is a system of signs in the process of differentiating themselves from each other. For the word, as for the phoneme, the phonologist seeks to find the differentiating modalities that correspond to differences in signification.

The phonologist studies the word as it refers to [*renvoie à*] language, the rule of sign usage. The problem is not how to find significations that

are added from outside to signs, but how phonemes are articulated from each other, how the sound carves out the world of meaning. The collection of phonic signs shows gesticulations, movements in the world of the signified.

Language [*langage*] has an analogous function to the language [*langue*] of a new writer who is not yet understood, but little by little becomes understandable by teaching people to understand him. The gestures made by him seem to show nonexistent direction, but little by little some notions improve their articulation into a virtual home in these gestures. Similarly, language perfects itself by enlivening the child. Language's internal structure contains its own signification. Language is a system of limited unities that serve to express an unlimited number of things. Therefore, the signified surpasses the signifier. The totality of meaning is never fully rendered. An immense mass of implications, even in the most explicit languages, exists. Or rather, nothing is ever completely expressed; nothing exempts the listening subject from taking the initiative to give an explanation.

Trubetzkoy shows that phonemes are not atoms. He studies less the phenomena in themselves and focuses more on their oppositions. Words in relation to phonemes are comparable to melodies in relation to the "scale." These are modulations of the phonemic system. Language, Trubetzkoy says, is a screen "used" for all those who speak it. For example, a Russian speaking German transforms German according to the structure of the Russian phonemic system.

Whereas phonetics is the study of sounds as they are produced from the exterior, phonology is an effort to return to the immediate reason why they are organized in a language. At the same time that it studies phonemes, phonology studies all the distinctive signs of a language: prosodic relations, accentuations, languages that count syllables and those that do not. Language has a triple function: (1) representative function, (2) expressive function, and (3) a function of appealing to others.

Phonology studies the values the sounds have under these three relationships. The phoneme is not a physical reality, nor is it a psychological one, but it is a value, an abstract and fictive value, comparable to money. Phonemes make the existence of language possible.

2. *How the child acquires the phonetic system.* Jakobson tries to understand this appropriation of the phonemic system by the child and how, for the child, "the self-sufficiency of isolated sensations, without connection, transforms itself into a conceptual distribution of these same elements."

A conceptual distribution could be produced in the child's mind; the child would learn and repeat the vocal phonemes, originally uncoor-

dinated. The phonemic system must be reinvented by the child, as it was originally invented by the group [*la collectivité*]. In reality, Jakobson compromises what was originally in the phonological analysis when treating the phonemic system as a conceptual system. He compares the acquisition of that system with the acquisition of the color system. Now, progress in the perception of colors is not an intellectual analysis, but an articulation or "*Gestaltung*" of perceptions themselves.[33] In the same manner, the acquisition of the phonemic system cannot result in an intellectual classification: the child assumes the phonemic scale, immanent to the language he hears, as he assumes the structures of the perceived world.

3. *Conclusion.* Jakobson's interpretation would be acceptable if language had only a representative function. But we have agreed with Bühler that language is indissolubly (1) representation, (2) self-expression, and (3) an appeal to others.[34] The child's movement toward speech is a constant call to others. The child recognizes in the other another self. Language is the means of realizing reciprocity with the other. It is about a vital operation and not solely an intellectual act. The representative function is a moment of the total act by which we enter into communication with others. We could sum up the notion of style as what is the newest in phonological analysis. The phonemic system is a style of language. The style is not defined by words, nor by ideas; it does not possess direct signification, but an oblique signification. It permits the characterization of the phonemic system of language, just as a writer is characterized.

[III.] The Phenomenon of Imitation

After the acquisition of the phonemic system and the first words, the child develops his language through imitation. We will study the problem of imitation in general before applying it to language acquisition.

A. Classical Conception

The problem of imitation would be the following: after having seen a gesture, heard some words, how does the child come to produce an equivalent gesture or words by taking that gesture or words for a model? This would seem to suppose a twofold effort. To translate a visual behavior into motor language, one must first understand what provokes the other's behavior and then reproduce it. In reality, this double translation does not exist. It is impossible for the child to return to the motor causes and muscular causes of the other's gestures and then reproduce these

conditions. We have already seen that the phonemic system is not at all acquired by this double movement of effect to cause and cause to effect. As we understand it, the phonemic system is like a register of scales for the child. Consequently, what the child hears and reproduces is not a perceptual spectacle but a certain kind of usage made by the surrounding phonemic possibilities. It is really a question of scales (Trubetzkoy). The child reproduces them without analyzing them; analysis is a much later achievement. Thus imitation cannot be this effort at double translation.

B. The Problem of Imitation According to Guillaume

In his theory of imitation, Guillaume surpasses the classical conception.[35] He begins with a decisive remark: before we make a movement, we do not represent it to ourselves, we do not envision the muscular contractions necessary to make it happen (the preliminary representation of movement in order to effectuate it is a pathological symptom in certain cases of paresis, for example).

Rather, there is an attraction that the object exercises, through the goal that we have fixed for ourselves. We do not represent to ourselves the movement toward the object, but the desired object itself. The same goes for speaking; we do not represent the sentence before pronouncing it. Either the interlocutor's words or our own call up subsequent speech. Furthermore, even if we wanted to represent the succession of movements, we could not. Consciousness ignores "muscular organization." This is particularly true for the child, who is completely ignorant of anatomy.

Thus, incapable of representing our own movements to ourselves, how could we represent the movements of others? We will henceforth presume that self-imitation (repetition) or imitation of the other is founded on something other than the representation of movements. However, what is the intermediary between the perception that we have of ourselves and the visual perception of others, if it is not a representation of movements?

Classical psychology has placed us in the presence of a relation of four members of which two are lacking (visual perception of ourselves and the kinesthetic perception of the other). It tries to show how we make up for it. As for the visual perception of ourselves, a very simple experiment of Guillaume shows how lacunary it is. He draws several signs on the child's neck with his finger; the child succeeds in successfully reproducing them, but the child draws a mirror image of the ones drawn on his forehead. The classical interpretation of imitation presupposes my analysis of the motor conduct of the other's gestures and founds it on

a preliminary identification of their attitudes and my own. Guillaume proposes to invert the problem: what classical psychologists take for a preliminary condition is instead a consequence. Instead of saying that the identification of the other's body and of my own produces imitation with their twofold kinesthetic and visual aspects, Guillaume says that the child first imitates the result of the action with his own means and thus finds himself producing the same movements as the model. The third term between myself and others will be the external world: the objects that are indicated by the actions of others as my own.

A profound and fertile idea: we are not first conscious of our own bodies, we are first conscious of things. There is a quasi-ignorance of the modalities of action, but the body moves toward things. Imitation is not only understood as an encounter of two actions around the same object; to imitate is not to do what the other does, but to arrive at the same result. At nine months and twenty-one days, Guillaume's child seized the pencil upside down and used it to hit the table. But, after several tries, he turned the pencil over in order to put the point on the paper. Again, this was not a question of the child reproducing the father's gesticulation, but the attempt to obtain the same result as the father (position of the pencil in relation to the paper). A few weeks later, the child no longer uses the pencil to hit but, instead, draws lines on the paper. Here again, he does not imitate the father's gestures, but the result. It is similar for all the actions that the child sees around him; hence his gestures have only an approximate and imperfect resemblance.

This means that imitation is "immanent"; it aims at the global result and not at gestural detail. The imitation of gestures arises only little by little from this oriented behavior toward things. For example, it is the case when a child (and even dogs who are used to their masters) turns to look in the same direction as the adult. At the beginning of this behavior, it might be that the adult's look falls on something interesting. But soon the parallelism between the two actions becomes separated from the goal and the child systematically looks in the same direction as the adult. In each case, this imitation cannot be explained by kinesthetic imitation. When the child turns his eyes to the same direction as the adult, his movement is different than the adult's because they are in different positions in relation to the same object. It seems impossible that the child could make the transposition. The phenomenon can be explained if we acknowledge that, for the child, the adult's look indicates a goal and that the child then adopts this goal.

In conclusion, we use our own bodies not as a mass of sensations, doubled by a kinesthetic image, but as a *systematic way* of going toward objects (and in the look as a way of inspecting objects). Imitation is explained to the extent that the other uses the same means as we do to

obtain the same goal, and that it could not be explained otherwise. Guillaume indicates that imitation is founded on a community of goals, of objects. It is due to this imitation of results that, later on, the imitation of others becomes possible. Consequently, the child takes up through partial imitations, particular representations. These partial imitations are a sign that he recognizes others in himself. Others are the universal intermediary between the world and the child.

There is a contrast between the involuntary imitations at the beginning and the explicit imitations later. Guillaume observes a nine-month-old child who knows how to correctly brush his own hair and that of others with a brush. But, twenty days later, the same child is incapable of imitating without fail the gesture of raising his hand to his head. He is still impervious to a gesture without a goal. (With this observation, Guillaume anticipates or rejoins Goldstein's analysis as well as Goldstein's distinction between concrete and categorical behavior.) Guillaume also observes a child of thirty-two months whom he asked to imitate the movement of moving his eyes from one side to another. The child first began by turning his head. This proves well that the child imitates the result and not the means by which the model obtains the result.

Imitation as we typically understand it (to intentionally make a gesture with one's body) is a delayed function, because it does not place in question the object but rather a sign, an expression of the object. Other people are considered first as behaviors and not as bodies in imitation.

C. Application to Language

Vocal imitation is a particular case of imitation in general. But it has the advantage of being exactly controlled by hearing; we are always witnessing our own speech. Therefore, regarding the imitation of speech, we find the possession of a kind of twofold kinesthetic gift that is lacking in gestural imitations. This gives a false simplicity to the problem of language acquisition through imitation, while in reality the problem is precisely as we posed it for general imitation.

It is still about the imitation of an articulated gesture. We can note that the child reproduces new sounds by assimilating to those he already has articulated. Here too, imitation signifies carrying one's own ways toward a goal (the heard words). The child imitates like he draws; he does not follow the model point by point, but gets the global result.

D. Extensions of Guillaume's Theory

Before imitating others, the child imitates the other's acts. This first imitation presupposes that the child immediately grasps the other's body as a

carrier of structured behaviors and that he experiences his own body as a permanent and global power of realizing gestures endowed with a certain meaning. This is to say that imitation presupposes the apprehension of the other's behavior and, from my own side, realizes a noncontemplative subject, but a motor subject: an *"I can"* (Husserl).[36] The perception of the other's *behavior* and the perception of the body itself by a global *corporeal schema* are two aspects of one original that realizes the identification of the self with others.

Identification's role. This role is primordial. In effect, the self and other are entities that the child only later disassociates. The child begins with a total identification with the other. How, out of this primitive identification with others, is the child able to realize himself and his aptitude for reproducing behavior? How can we explain the appearance of imitative consciousness? And, in general, how do we explain the passage from identification to the distinction between me and others? Guillaume never directly responds to these questions, but he constantly tackles this bias.

Child imitation develops on a terrain of *unconscious* egocentrism. The child is completely oriented toward others and toward things; he confuses himself with them. Within his exclusive interest in the exterior world, he takes for real what only exists in him. It is imitation that will assist him in sorting out this lack of distinction and will make possible the formation of a represented self.

In sum, Guillaume reverses the classical problem of the relations between ego and other. Classical problem: how to pass from self-consciousness to consciousness of others. For Guillaume, the question is how to construct a representative self from others. In effect, for the child it is the other who occupies the principal place. The child considers himself to be only "another other." The center of his interest is others. The consciousness of a unique and "incomparable" (Malraux) self does not exist in the child. The self is lived by the child, but it is not thematically grasped in all cases. The other is essential for the child, the mirror of himself and to which his self is attached. ("The ego is ignorant of itself as it is the center of the world," Guillaume.) In order to confirm this thesis, Guillaume invokes language as a witness.

Confirmation with language. The child's egocentrism is reflected in language development: pronoun confusion, the preponderance of other people's names over one's own, and so forth. There is a total lack of division between self and other, but if one of these terms has a privileged signification, it would sooner be "others." (1) The child's first words concern others as much and more than himself and prove that his consciousness is not self-consciousness, but *with others* (the expression "no more" used by all children means "I don't want it anymore, he doesn't

want it anymore, there is no more," etc.). Even affective expressions like "boo-boo" serve to express objective realities. (2) The same holds for the delayed appearance of the proper name, proving the primordial importance of the other. It is employed later than the names of people in the child's environment, and when he finally uses his own name, it is above all to make his place beside others (for example, in distribution). The evolution of pronouns is equally as delayed, marking the persistence of the confusion between self and other: "I" is used well after "you" and "he" is replaced by the first name, which is not abandoned until toward the end of the second year.

Does the acquisition of words play the role of effect or cause in relation to self-consciousness? There is evidently a reciprocal action; the word makes the notion more precise. But the child could not understand the meaning of pronouns if his experience did not already contain a reciprocity with others. Language is only a particular case of imitation. Guillaume compares the acquisition of a new word to the adoption of a role: to borrow a new expression is like borrowing suit, it is a behavior.

Analysis of affective imitation. Guillaume's interest lies in what is most turned toward the other instead of toward the act, that is, the imitation of sentiments, emotions, and so forth, these being almost as premature as acts themselves. Thus, imitation constitutes a kind of stumbling block for Guillaume's theory, and this analysis allows him to correct a few of his conceptions. If it is true that the two [imitation of emotions and the imitation of acts] are equally precocious, then the imitation of an act ought to involve a human component instead of an interest in the object alone.

In the child, an interest in the other's sentiments exists. This is not about a contagion of emotions; the invasion in us of the other's emotions also exists in animals. It is rather a kind of egocentric sympathy; a participation the child has with the other's sentiments. It is never an irresistible phenomenon: the child is occupied for an instant and detaches himself just as quickly. He has a kind of indifference that astonishes the adult. True sympathy is not this contagion. This is the more momentary enlargement of his own life: living for a moment in the other and not only living for his own benefit. Thus, when the child sees his maid being beaten, he cries and *seeks refuge close to her;* it is himself whom he pities. Real sympathy is a momentary investment in others to the point of encompassing others. The child must move from primitive sympathy to real sympathy by a movement analogous to that which carries him from the imitation of acts or results to imitation per se, that is, to the imitation of men.

For Guillaume, this passage occurs in play. This is the function by which the child and the parents exchange roles for the first time. The child changes perspective. In so doing, the child learns to distinguish

other from self. Guillaume cites the Scandinavian author Finnbogason, who in 1913 published a book on imitative intelligence.[37] The principal idea is that *accommodation* allows for real imitation. When we partially imitate the other's behavior, we are obliged, by a kind of induction, to take the total corresponding attitude to that behavior. (For example, we automatically take on the voice of the person whose gestures we are imitating.) When one adopts an aspect of the other's behavior, the totality of consciousness takes on the "style" of the imitated person. In other words, true imitation carries on beyond the limited consciousness and becomes global: once it has been *accommodated*, imitation surpasses itself. It is this kind of surpassing that permits the appropriation of new structures, for example, language acquisition.

In this thesis on imitation, Guillaume makes use of two very important notions, but he refuses to analyze them further. (1) The notion of a pre-self, a latent ego that remains in ignorance of itself, because it has not yet encountered in others a limit to the self. This notion remains inaccessible due to the indistinction occurring at this stage of development. (2) The movement which takes the child toward others and that makes him pass from act imitation to person imitation. Guillaume only explains this passage with the idea of "transfer" (an associationist notion and one that makes this displacement an illusion).

We cannot avoid the analysis of these notions which implicate the entire problem of the other. The relation with others, as Guillaume conceives of it in imitation, presupposes a quasi-magical relationship with our own bodies; others' actions are perceived as melodic totalities by us insofar as we have the same capacities. *These are the notions that Husserl and Scheler's phenomenology possesses in trying to present a philosophical elucidation.*

IV. The Problem of Others' Existence According to Husserl

A. Posing the Problem: The Apparent Impossibility of Conceiving of the Other

The Cartesian "cogito" poses the problem of self and other in terms that seem to render a solution impossible.[38] In effect, if the mind or self is defined by its contact with itself, how can a representation of the other be possible? The self only has significance insofar as it is this self-consciousness. All can be doubted except for the fact that it sees, and so forth. All experience presupposes the self's contact with itself, all knowl-

edge is only possible because of this first knowledge. Others would be a self that appears from outside of me—a contradictory idea.

It is repugnant to the other to only be the consciousness I have of him, since the other is for himself as I am for myself. For this reason, I cannot have access to him. Since others are not for me what I am for myself, I have no experience of them. Even if I wanted, by a kind of spiritual sacrifice, to renounce my "cogito" to pose as an other, this would still be me who would hold this existence, and therefore it would still be *my* phenomenon. The relationship of self and others appears to thus be a relationship of reciprocal exclusion and the problem seems to be insoluble.

B. Existence of the Phenomenon of Others

However, the phenomenon of others is incontestable and a number of our attitudes are only understandable as contingent upon others. We have the experience of others, even though it is uncertain if the form of that experience is the same as the experience of ourselves (a certain solipsism is insurmountable, Husserl says). The problem is thus that we must posit others, something that seems logically impossible, since for all practical purposes others do exist.

The solution: transform this relationship of exclusion into a living relationship. The problem's givens are that we must admit a certain presence of others as an indirect presence, since the only indubitable presence is of myself (the "cogito's" demand). Husserl looks for several ways to access the perception of others.

(1) *Lateral perception.* Others never exist in front of me, as objects do, but are always implicated in a certain "orientation," a reference in relationship to me. It is the "alter ego," a kind of reflection for me. This is about conceiving not a series of "for-itselves," but a community of alter egos, existing for each other. Others take their existence, in a certain sense, from me.

(2) *Perception of a lacuna.* We perceive others as reflections and at the same time as lacunae in relation to ourselves. In effect, it is like a forbidden zone in our experience. It is precisely a question of a real *perception* of others (in the sense of an incontestable experience, others are present "in person"), but this is not a perception in the genre of object perception. For objects, what is not actually given to me could always exist as such virtually (from another point of view, from a microscope, etc.). With others, it will always be impossible to perceive them in their totalities—that is, to perceive them as they perceive themselves.

The "flesh and bones" presence has a limit: we are never in the exact place as others; by definition, if we were in their place, we would be

them (distinction between our position "*hic*" and theirs "*illic*"). But all this—lateral perception, perception of lacunae—does not really posit others. We must go beyond; we must truly penetrate into the other's field, if we want to fully affirm the other's existence.

(3) *Perception of the other's behavior.* Here Husserl's analysis is completely parallel to Guillaume's. When I originally witness the other's behavior, my body becomes the way of understanding it; my corporality becomes the power of understanding the other's corporality. I regain the final sense (the "*Zwecksinn*") of the other's behavior because my body is capable of the same goals. Hence, the notion of style intervenes: because the style of my gestures and the other's gestures is the same, it amounts to the fact that what is true for me is also true for others. "Style" is not a concept or an idea: it is a "manner" that I apprehend and then imitate, when I am unable to *define* it.

(4) *Intentional transfer.* But the operation of conceiving of the other's existence is more than a perception of his style. It must also be a pairing ("*Paarung*"): a body encounters in another body its own counterpart that realizes its own intentions and that suggests to me its new intentions. The perception of others is the assumption of one organism by another. Husserl gives us many names for this vital operation which gives us the experience of others while transcending our own selves. He calls it "intentional transfer" or "apperceptive transfer," always insisting at face value that it is not a logical operation ("*kein Schluss, kein Denkakt*") but rather a vital one.[39] The other's behavior confirms my own intentions to such an extent and designates a behavior which has so much meaning for me that I assume it myself.

[C.] Husserl's Position

To what degree does Husserl find a solution to the problem of the existence of others in the context of an intuitive philosophy? As we have already said, there is a fundamental contradiction. The experience of others is given to us, but we cannot posit it logically. It is about making the experience of others *explicit*, seemingly impossible given the primordial condition that Husserl does not intend to abandon. Each time we believe he is close to a solution, he recalls this contradiction. This condition is the Cartesian conception of "cogito": consciousness is essentially self-consciousness. The experience of others also must be understood as another self. Without an alter ego, Husserl says, there is no other organism.

In such a way, Husserl denies the pseudo-solution that consists of concluding that the existence of consciousness of the other comes from my own consciousness and is constituted by noticing similarities in our behaviors. We encounter a disaccord here with the dichotomy of under-

standing and thought posed by Descartes. How can we pass from one to the other? It is the difficulty of the passage from the order of the in-itself to the order of the *for-itself.* The other is a for-itself that appears to me in things, through a body, thus, through the in-itself. In order to conceive of this passage, we should have to elaborate upon a mixed notion, something unthinkable for Descartes. Husserl himself refused to overcome the constitutive contradiction of the perception of others. I cannot allow myself to reduce myself to the image the other has of me. Thus, since I cannot succeed in positing myself in the other's perspective, I cannot pretend to posit the existence of the other.

Having shown the impossibility of surmounting this contradiction and the impossibility of a synthesis, Husserl adds that this synthesis is not possible and that the problem is poorly posed. The difference between my point of view and others' point of view only exists after we have experienced other people: it is a consequence. We must not, Husserl says, pose this distinction from the beginning and then oppose all thought of an experience of others. But with this remark, Husserl seems to want to renounce the idea that one attains the experience of others starting with self-consciousness. He seems to bring us in another direction. Thus, there are two tendencies in his work. One is the attempt to gain access to others from the "cogito," from the "sphere of ownness" [*sphère de appatenance*]. The other is to refuse the problem and have an orientation toward "intersubjectivity," that is to say, the possibility of starting without posing the primordial "cogito," starting with the consciousness that is neither self nor other.

But while envisioning this second possibility, Husserl effectively shows that although it would be more satisfying, it only masks the difficulties of the problem which remain, for Husserl, intact. Thus, on the verge of an intersubjective conception, at the end, Husserl maintains an integral transcendental intersubjectivity.

Later, Husserl was more conscious of the problem and came to affirm simultaneously the two requirements. For example, he says in his unpublished writings that transcendental subjectivity is intersubjectivity (the experience that the other has of me validly teaches me what I am), but he does not achieve a reconciliation.

V. Max Scheler's Conception

Scheler, a student of Husserl, tried to find a solution to the problem and to secure the perception of others in completely renouncing the "cogito" as the starting point (i.e., abandoning this Cartesian postulate that con-

sciousness is primarily self-consciousness).[40] He explicitly begins with the total indifferentiation between self and other.

Scheler generalizes the notion of "internal perception" (the perception of sentiments, for example) that applies as much to others as to myself because, on the one hand, the perception of my own body or my own behavior is exterior to the perception of objects and not more immediate; and, on the other hand, we see, we perceive the other's sentiments (not only their expressions) with the same certitude that we perceive our own. The differences between the diverse sentiments are furnished by perception itself (it is impossible, for example, to confound in the other the blush of shame with that of being angry or upset). Perception takes us a long way into the understanding of others (for instance, in Proust, the discernment of Albertine's life).[41] Equally, there is the perception of the other's will; we perceive it as our own will, and so forth. We should speak of a "current of undifferentiated psychic experience," a mixture of self and other, primitive consciousness in a kind of generality, a permanent "hysterical" state (in the sense of indistinction between what is lived and what is only imagined to be between self and other).

How does self-consciousness emerge from this undifferentiated state? Scheler says that one only has self-consciousness through expression (acts, reactions, etc.). One takes self-consciousness as what one understands as consciousness of others. Similarly, intentions are only known once they are realized.[42]

Thus, self-consciousness cannot be privileged. It is impossible without consciousness of others; it is of the same kind. As in all experience, self-experience only exists as a figure upon a ground (perception of others is like the ground from which self-perception separates itself). One perceives oneself through the intermediary of the others.

But a problem remains. For Husserl, the problem is to move from self-consciousness to consciousness of others. In Scheler's conceptions, it is about understanding how self-consciousness can surge forth from this ground of a primitive undifferentiated state.

A. Discussion of Scheler

For Scheler, *consciousness is inseparable from its expression* (consequently, also from the cultural whole of its environment) *and there is no radical difference between self-consciousness and consciousness of others.* But does this make it clear how the subject comes to posit others? How does both isolation exist and plurality of consciousnesses exist?

Scheler responds to this by saying that consciousnesses are only separated by their corporalities, by the collection of instruments that

serve them. "Corporality" is to some degree the sensible matter that assists in the apprehension of self or others. But the purely sensible aspect of a feeling constitutes only a minor portion of it. All the rest, its content, its *intention,* can be shared with others. Thus, in a fire, only the burnt subject can feel the sensible sharpness of pain. But everything else the burn represents, danger of fire, danger to the body's integrity, *the meaning of pain,* can be communicated to others and is felt by them. Thus, it is the same form, the same content of the sentiment that is lived in another manner. The signification, the sentiment's intention (what constitutes its essentials) is parallel for two consciousnesses. There is an isolation of the sensed, but not of consciousnesses.

Scheler introduces the notion of "emotional evidence," we cannot *really* become others, but we can intentionally become them. We can reach others through all kinds of expressive manifestations that they give to us. There is no bipartition in our consciousness of others (the perception of manifestations of others entails a hypothesis about their consciousnesses which by analogy produces similar manifestations in our own consciousnesses). In the other as in us, consciousness and its manifestations are one. Husserl had posed this problem in terms of consciousness; hence it was made unsolvable. Scheler tries to pose the problem in terms of *individuality.*

Scheler's essential contribution is the notion of expression; there is no consciousness *behind* manifestations; they are inherent to consciousness; they *are* consciousness. Because others are completely whole in their manifestations, I can posit them through their own existence and not by analogical reasoning.

To make consciousness of others possible, Scheler minimizes self-consciousness, reducing it to a simple contact with the self, contact that little by little is realized through experience and that is never achieved; it never becomes a full self-possession. In this conception, the "cogito" takes on a general importance, applicable to others as well as to the self. The cogito in a Cartesian sense is undeniably a cultural conquest. Since it gives rise to a coming to consciousness, it is not primordial. Since it was subordinated to a series of cultural conditions that have permitted this conscious grasp of self, it is *expression* in the same way that all consciousness is.

With Husserl, there was already a tendency to revise the notion of cogito (incarnation of ego in its expressions), but this tendency clashed with the same definition of a pure consciousness. With Scheler, consciousness is opaque, completely invested in its expression. But does this method not make consciousness's grasp of itself and the other as alter ego impossible? Does he not level down self-consciousness and conscious-

ness of others to a neutral psychic level that ends up being neither one? Even with the introduction of "emotional evidence" we only grasp the behaviors, not the persons. In pain, for example, we do not perceive others, as long as we do not represent our sensible and material pain. The intentional element of sentiment is only generalized in relation to the true sentiment. We do not have real experience of others as long as we have not linked the significations of a feeling to the very fact of *living these significations*. Scheler's conception rubs elbows with a kind of panpsychism; at the heart of his conception there is not individuation of consciousnesses. How could a subject who doesn't have self-consciousness (in the Husserlian sense) emerge as a subject from this common current?

B. Conclusions

In minimizing self-consciousness, Scheler equally compromises consciousness of others. Husserl, on the contrary, wants to maintain the originality of the ego and can only introduce others as destructors of that ego. With Husserl, as well as with Scheler, ego and others are tied by the same dialectical relationship: while they seem to exclude each other, they are also bizarrely related. It turns out that it is impossible to save one at the expense of another; both vary in the same sense (cf. the relationships of master to slave in Hegel's dialectic).

Thus, in order to resolve the problem, we must not suppress the initial opposition. Theoretically, it is insurmountable. But, as it is not about a logical relationship, but an existential relationship, the self could rejoin the other in rendering *lived experience* more profoundly. We must render the self as interdependent in certain *situations*. We must tie even the notion of ipseity to that of situations; the ego would be defined as identical to the act in which it projects itself. Self and other—we are conscious of one and the other in a common situation. It is this sense that we must make more precise in Scheler's conceptions and in Husserl's notion of "pairing." It is about encountering the same orientation. But, at the same time, there is only a possibility of comprehension in the *present* (a kind of geometrical place of self and other) and in an *assignable reality*. When Malraux says, "One dies alone, therefore one lives alone," he is making a false deduction. Life in fact radically surpasses individualities, and it is impossible to judge it in relationship to death, which is an individual failure.

The conception of consciousness in the perspective of Scheler, and even in certain passages in Husserl, brings us, as we have seen, *to expression*. Expression is considered to be the act through which consciousness realizes itself. It seems that we have therefore accomplished a kind of circle: *in order to understand language acquisition we have studied imitation*

only to discover, following Guillaume, that imitation is not preceded by the con-scious grasp of other and identification with the other. On the contrary, it is the act by which identification with others is produced. This brings us *to inquire what consciousness of self and other* accomplishes with this act; then *we find ourselves brought back to the notion of expression.*

But, in fact, this notion is no longer exactly the one we started with; it is enriched. From the beginning, we had considered language as an intellectual operation of deciphering the other's thought, as an inter-mediary between the speaker and the listener. But in this conception, the subject who learns to speak only finds in language the concepts he already has; language can add nothing new, since it presupposes thought. However, experience shows that language affects thought as much as the inverse—the classical notion of language cannot thus make sense of learning language.

On the contrary, in the light of Husserl's and Scheler's concep-tions, we can no longer consider language acquisition as the intellectual operation of reconstituting meaning, we are no longer in the presence of two entities (expression and sense) of which the second is hidden be-hind the first. Language, as an expressive phenomenon, is constitutive of consciousness. In this perspective, to learn to speak is to increasingly coexist with the environment. To live in an environment is, for the child, the incentive to recapture language and thought to make them his own. Thus, acquisition no longer resembles deciphering a text for which one would possess the code and key; rather, it is "deciphering" (deciphering without knowing the code). The decipherer is aided by two converging means. One is an internal critique of the text (frequency of certain signs, their arrangement, structure, and words). Another is an external critique (place and time of its emission, situation of the emitter, etc.). Experience shows that all types of texts have been deciphered. Yet there is always an intervention in this operation of an intuitive element, since the problem's givens never suffice for a logical determination. It is a creative operation, comparable to the child learning language in the sense that, in a given moment, the decipherer, like the child, ought to surpass the given ele-ments in order to grasp the entire meaning. It is the movement where the collection of signs, the style of the text no longer only means one single thing, where, as Jakobson has said about a phonemic system, it "tends toward" signification.

Between the period where the child does not understand and the moment where he understands, a discontinuity that is impossible to mask exists. Classical psychology, in affirming that thought precedes expres-sion, tries to cover up this hiatus, but at the same time raises its meaning to a language phenomenon. In fact, as the child learns to know himself

through the other, he learns to know others through himself. The child also learns to speak because the ambient language *calls* to his thought; he is enticed by its styles, until only one meaning emerges from the whole. This is why Ombredane could call language a "semiological gesticulation," which is to say that meaning is immanent to the living speech as it is immanent to the gestures through which we point out objects.[43]

We must compare this process to Wolff's research concerning the apprehension of the individual's style.[44] Wolff shows photographs of different people to subjects with no scientific background. He also presents them with the same people's signatures, silhouettes, and their recorded voices and asks them to match all these materials. The proportion of correct matches (about 70 percent) is *remarkable without the subjects being able to say what guided them in their decisions.* We must admit that perception grasps in the other a unique structure that participates in the other's expressions, voice, writing, and so forth. Wolff hence gives evidence for the existence of a nonthematic, fluent signification. It is a kind of signification where language is pregnant for the child when he hears it being spoken around him. Hazy at first, the signification articulates itself and becomes clearer and clearer. Thus, it is not about a phenomenon of the order of pure thought or understanding. It is the *value of use* that defines language: instrumental use precedes signification per se. The same even holds for language that is more elaborate, for example, the introduction of a new concept in philosophical language. It is according to its own usage that the author forces the acceptance of the sense for which he uses a new term. The signification of what the author proposes is therefore an *open* signification, without which there would be no acquisition on the level of thought. A language entirely defined (an algorithm like that of "logical positivism") would be sterile.[45]

Until now, we have considered language acquisition concerning the infant's first words; the infant has acquired the means to designate objects in their absence. But only objects that can be given in sensible experience have been considered.

The same problem is given again on the level of "thoughts," when it has been resolved at the level of the sensible. This is what Piaget calls the "lag" [*décalage*]. That is to say, all acquisition made at a certain level must be begun again at a higher level. Regarding infantile egocentrism, it will have been surpassed long ago on the level of perception when the child must surpass it on the intellectual and logical plane. Moreover, even for the adult, expression of what is most his own in his experience will always have to be perfected. In such a sense, Malraux says, "How many years must an artist need to find his own voice?"[46] Hence, far from being

limited to the first years, language acquisition is coextensive with the very exercise of language.

VI. The Evolution of Language to Seven Years

We now return to the study of language from the point where the child has learned to designate objects in the sensible world. In order to follow the further evolution of language, we will refer to Piaget's work.[47] Until around seven years of age, language is for the child more a means of self-expression than of communication with others. It is an *egocentric language.* Its manifestations are the following.

A. The Phenomenon of Echolalia

This is the indefinite repetition of the same word, properly characterized by Piaget as a play activity. The child amuses himself by showing or verifying the word's significance in repeating it. Like games that generally consist in adopting different roles, language as play allows the child to access increasingly numerous situations. By repeating the word, the child extends his behavior. He has fun exercising language as a manifestation of his imaginary life.

We can ask here, as with all games, to what extent does the child believe in the reality of imaginary situations? (Take, for instance, Diderot in his book *The Paradox of Acting*—does the actor believe he is the character he represents or does he lie?)[48] But Sartre in *The Imaginary* shows that this is a false problem.[49] The child, like the actor, is neither feigning nor is he in an illusion. He has left the plane of habitual life for an oneiric life that he really lives. He renders himself unreal [*s'irréalise*] in the role.

B. The Monologue

Another aspect of "egocentric language" is the monologue and, in the presence of others, the "collective monologue" where two or more children, seemingly giving replies to one another, are only really following their own monologues without taking into account the other's reactions.

We are posed the following question: is the monologue preceded by speech with others or is it the inverse? Piaget responds: for the child, there is no difference between self and other (it is precisely his "egocen-

trism"); the child believes that his thought and sentiments are universal. His way of expression is thus impersonal and anonymous (it is a "one" addressing itself to an "x"). The child is possessed by language more than possessing it. Therefore, the child is at the same time less enclosed than the adult, who is conscious of his personality, and at the same time less socialized than the adult, who, knowing how to really conduct himself in the presence of other individualities, endeavors to really communicate with them and thinks about others even when he is alone. Thus, the surpassing of childhood egocentrism will be characterized not by a "going outside oneself" (the child ignores the individual ego), but by a modification of self-other relations.

C. The Passage from Monologue to Dialogue

Between five and six years, Piaget finds egocentric propositions in 5 to 15 percent of the child's language. From this, Piaget distinguishes two successive stages where there is accordance between the children's opinions. First, an intermediary stage where the interlocutor is associated with action but does not really collaborate; a little later the same stage has a restrained collaboration, concerning facts or precise memories. Second, after seven years of age, real dialogue, discussion, and attempts at explanation exist.

When there is disagreement between opinions, we find pure and simple disputes, or a collision of unmotivated affirmations. And, after about seven years of age, a collision of motivated affirmations and rational discussion occurs.

But is Piaget's interpretation legitimate? He eliminates all the child's responses to adults as not being spontaneous (from 14 to 18 percent before seven years of age). But what does he mean by "spontaneous"? It is a fact that the child uses a different language when he speaks to the adult, but is it less spontaneous? *Anticipations,* abrupt changes to a higher level, are perhaps characteristics of childhood throughout its development. (Consider, for instance, Lacan's notion of "pre-maturation" which characterizes the child's psychological development.)[50] Perhaps Piaget excludes an essential element of the child's language as not "spontaneous," hence he points out that the child is silently interested in abstract ideas well before seven years. If we have to consider as "spontaneous" only those reactions of the child in relation to other children, we would set down an arbitrary picture of childhood.

But this conception of the child's language corresponds to Piaget's general conception of childhood: he envisions it uniquely under its provisional, hence negative, aspect. His conception of adult language, an ideal

for which the child must wait, appears narrow. (In Bühler's *Sprachtheorie*, language is as much a function of self-expression and an appeal to others as a communication of truths.)[51] The narrowness of Piaget's conceptions is reflected in the role he gives to *discussion*. For Piaget, where there is discussion, there is a possibility of separating out an objective truth. But we must not forget the other possible conceptions of discussion. For example, political discussion intervenes precisely when a general conception of history is applied to ambiguous facts, resulting in a lack of *objective* truth. Even in Plato's dialogues, discussion has a different function than what Piaget assigns to it. Discussion contributes to forming the truth; it is what gives the conclusion its sense. Discussion is a path toward a truth that only has meaning in movement, thus, it is not Piaget's objective sense.

Piaget therefore eliminates from adult language all that is self-expressive and all that calls to others. However, the writer's power resides much more in his "style" than in his communication of objective truths. Power resides in his manner of proposing significations without limiting them, giving them a certain voice, a voice that they cannot deny. It is therefore a question of knowing if the objectivity, proposed as a model by Piaget, can serve to measure the givens of human language.

But it is evidently the style of the writer that is not the same as the egocentric childhood language which must be surpassed. The child must pass through a stage of objective expression, even if later poetic language will resemble childhood language. It is the same for childhood drawing, to distinguish on an infra-rational plane from an over-rational plan. In drawing as in verbal expression, the child is not an artist. But if we admit this meta-objective language, then the child and the adult are less foreign to one another than it first seemed. And the passage to objective language can be considered equally as an *impoverishment*. When we move from childhood to adulthood, it will not only be about moving from ignorance to knowledge, but after a polymorphous phase that contained all possibilities, it will be a passage to a purified, more defined language, but a much poorer one.

VII. Communication Between Children over Seven

Piaget's experiments consist in controlling the transmission of one story or explanation of a mechanism from one child to another. According to an established text, the adult tells a story or explains the functioning

of a machine (e.g., a faucet or syringe) to the first child (called the "explainer"). The explainer transmits it to a second child (called the "reproducer"), who must reproduce for the adult all he has heard.

Two procedures occur. First, the explicator repeats his explanation once to the adult before transmitting it to the second child (this has the advantage of controlling the explanation, but it is inconvenient; his second explanation to the reproducer is often worse, the child is tired). Second, the first child goes to find the second immediately and the second transmits to the adult what he has understood. Piaget establishes four coefficients that characterize the totality of relationships between expression and comprehension: (1) what the reproducer has understood—in relation to what the explainer has understood; (2) what the reproducer has understood—in relation to what the explainer has expressed; (3) what the explainer has understood—in relation to what the adult has expressed; and (4) what the explainer has expressed—in relation to what he, the explainer, has understood.

Results. The explanation of physical mechanisms is better understood than stories. As for stories, the child better understands the adult, children poorly understand each other, but they express themselves well. As to the explanation of a mechanical device, the phenomenon is better understood than a story, but more poorly expressed. Despite the first child's poor expression, the second child understands the first better than the first understands the adult.

Interpretation. For Piaget, the best explanation of a mechanical device comes from the fact that it is not about a real communication. The second child understands the first because the device (or drawing) in question is underneath his eyes. He looks at the object more than he listens to the explainer. All this happens as if the first child believes he understands more than he does in reality and as if the second knew in advance that the first would explain it to him. The words they use are only signals that awaken in the listener schemas that he already possesses. In fact, in such cases, communication is not as good as it is in storytelling even though the result is globally better, since the process is only founded in part on verbal transmission.

Piaget *concludes that there is no real communication between children.* In a general way, ignoring all the details, the other understands in relation to what he already knows, forgetting all details. *It is rare that the child is conscious of not having understood* (about 5 percent). What happens is that the child who explains a mechanism does not even specify what the mechanism does (faucet or syringe). He disrupts the logical, causal, and temporal order. He goes straight to the facts without looking for the causes. A reversal of the "because" exists here. The child uses it to attach cause to effect and not the inverse. All this is part of the "verbal syncretism"

(global grasp of the phenomenon, the description only skirts around it), to be compared to the "synthetic incapacity" that Luquet demonstrates in childhood drawing.[52]

Piaget characterizes this thought as being of the *autistic order.* The child does not really search for comprehension, he ties causes to effects in a quasi-magical fashion. The adult has a conviction of having understood, since he thinks he can reproduce the chain of causes and effects. For the child and the autistic, and in general in all emotional circumstances, this is not necessary. In such cases, they have understood immediately without following the causal chain. For the child, there is only logic in the chain of his own thoughts. The call from the exterior is only an activation of already-acquired schemas. An accidental detail can change the course of his thought. For example, the child understands that "Niobe" is attached to rock, understands that she is "awashed"—washed, cleaned—and re-tells that she has "cleaned a pebble."[53] The child proceeds with entire phrases without analyzing them.

Examination of Piaget's conceptions. Everything that Piaget says is exact, but must we insist on the same aspects as he does (the transitory character of this thought)? Do we not also find this egocentric, autistic, syncretic thought in the adult as soon as his thinking must go beyond the domain of the acquired in order to express new notions? The notion of egocentric language is completely modified if we admit that it exists legitimately in the adult and that it can have the value of *knowledge.* In effect, a new notion cannot be immediately clearly explained. Terms cannot be defined in advance, since they are only clearly defined in the use that one gives them. Consequently, since the ideal or logical order can only be overturned, as it occurs in the child, the adult makes use of the "direct method" that specifically consists in supposing as known what is unknown (for instance, the philosophy professor who is obliged to use in his first lecture terms that his students will not understand until the tenth lecture, since in the first lecture all the terms remain unknown to them).

We can relate this illusion of a fully defined language to the notion of the "suggestion" [*sous-entendue*] in the area of linguistics discussed by Saussure. What we call "suggestion" in another language is what is not expressed in it, but is expressed in our own. For example, in the English phrase "the man I love" the relative pronoun is suggested.[54] But it is artificial, since this notion of another language does not really exist for those that use it. In reality, there is never anything that is "fully expressed," there are only gaps and discontinuities that, in our own language, we are not conscious of because comprehension between individuals speaking the same language is not affected by these gaps and discontinuities.

In this sense the child's language is not without a communicative value and, in any case, it cannot be appreciated in relation to the sup-

posed notion of the "fully expressed." Sometimes children understand one another like they understand a "flattened" cube drawn by another child to be a real cube. As soon as a mode of expression is understood by the partner, it must be taken as *valid* at this particular level. With his global language, the child makes himself understood by the other who plunges into his consciousness and grasps, through the rational order of his words, the totality of the phenomenon. This arises from the fact that in drawing children do not project the object in order to represent it on a particular plane, and in the same way in language they do not project signification on the particular plane of logical speech. We should study language in its living state, not as the logician's language, but that language where the orator, the writer, or even the scientist makes himself understood. We would then see that in certain respects language cannot escape being "egocentric." If Piaget has overlooked this fact, it is because the two examples chosen by him (stories or mechanisms) are extremes where there is too much or too little logic. All children over seven will understand the mechanism of the faucet by their own former experience and the drawing that accompanies the explanation *without having heard what is said to them.* On the contrary, if an episode is eliminated in the story of "Niobe," no intuition could come to fill this gap.

The notion of comprehension contains two aspects: one consists in seizing the concept's sense which has been, in principle, expressed. The other is taken up, in a sense discovered, from the verbal traces. This is what Stendhal called "the little true facts" that are significant in the whole. (For example, throughout a painting one can grasp the artist's entire universe.)

On the whole, Piaget clearly sees the fact of egocentric language, but he only defines it negatively, having nothing to do with intermediary cases with all their nuances. This happens so often in psychology where, in order to simplify, only peripheral and impersonal activities are retained. Even the work of Gestalt theorists on perception is founded on laboratory results, lacking what is personal and significant in the exercise of perception. The same occurs in language: logical language has the relative value of exactitude. But we lose the view that it is only an element, a dead element, of the totality of language.

VIII. Language Pathology

·It emerges from what has been said previously *that language is a surpassing, operated by the subject on significations he has laid down, stimulated by the*

use made of words around him. Language is an act of transcending. Thus, we cannot consider it to simply be a container of thought; we must see in it an instrument of conquest of self through contact with others. We will now attempt to provide a counter-proof to these affirmations by addressing examples borrowed from pathology.

It is impossible to know a priori what the contribution of pathology will be. Only the examination of facts will likely reveal the possible relations existing between the normal and the pathological. Nevertheless, we can immediately separate out two conceptions.

The first is the absolute *identity between the normal and the pathological* which was the conception of the positivists at the end of the nineteenth century. According to this idea, human activities are determined by natural, invariable laws, like a machine where even a dysfunctional one always obeys the laws of physics. But, as Husserl remarked, if a dysfunctional machine always observes the laws of physics, it no longer observes the laws of mathematics. We can say that we cannot compare a body to a machine constructed with an end. But whoever speaks about behavior speaks about an oriented activity. When behavior lacks a precise goal, we can speak of a failure. For example, in pathological behavior, and affirm the existence of a distinction between the normal and pathological.

The second is an *absolute alterity*, an equally unacceptable conception. Pathological behavior also has meaning. Illness is auto-regulation, an establishment of an equilibrium to a level other than the normal one. But it is not a totally incomprehensible phenomenon. Maurice Blondel was not wrong when he charged that morbid immediate consciousness has an ineffable character, and it is also true *that the structure of this consciousness remains penetrable.*[55] The normal and the pathological can be considerably enriched by contact with one another.

The doctor should adopt toward the patient the attitude defined by Eugène Minkowski: the observation of the patient is, in reality, a dialogue in the course of which what is normal and what is pathological become respectively differentiated and defined.[56] We must reject dogmatic attitudes; it is a point of fact that it is possible for us to understand mental illness as illness. We will study the phenomenon of speech in verbal hallucination on the one hand, and, on the other, we will study the disintegration of language in aphasia.

A. Verbal Hallucination

Consider Daniel Lagache's work.[57] The access to this illness has for a long time remained hidden by a collection of prejudices. Classical ontology, founded on the absolute distinction between the material body, the

soul situated inside this body, and the exterior world playing the role of stimulus, has resulted in turning scientists away from the study of verbal hallucination. From the moment where it was admitted that all perception would only be consciousness retaining sensory excitations, we can find the obligation to suppose that in the case of hallucination, in the absence of real excitation, an auto-excitation of the nervous system is occurring. Hence, the idea that hallucination is the revival of a weaker perception. On the other hand, in this conception, knowledge of a language reduces itself to a certain number of engram traces in the brain. Consciousness is evoked in the word's image and this image, by an inverse process that we suppose takes place in perception, disengages the nervous influx that, on the level of the motor center, comes to give birth to the motor act, in other words: speech. A complete neurology and all complete psychologies came out of the initial ontological position. But the facts have since proved that neither this neurology nor this psychology is valid.

First remark. Once the patient is aware of the difference between hallucination and perception, it becomes impossible to reduce one to the other and to explain hallucination by a simple excitation of the relevant nervous system. On the other hand, in the hypothesis of a natural identity between the two phenomena, it would be impossible to penetrate the meaning of the pathological phenomenon. At the most, we could only have pity for those who perceive without having an external object to their perception. In fact, there is much to understand in the patient's descriptions, descriptions that are already interpretations.

Second remark. Hallucination accompanies movements of the phonatory apparatus, be they latent, rough, or even visible movements. Hallucination would thus be founded in speech itself. It is therefore a matter of understanding the mechanism according to which speech itself is grasped by the subject as coming from the other.

The originality of the phenomenon in relation to "sensory" phenomena will only appear after a confrontation with other problems. Following Lagache's analysis, we will compare true verbal hallucination with the following phenomena.

(1) *Verbal impulse* is a word vertigo [*vertige*] that imposes itself on the subject in an obsessive fashion at the least appropriate times. The subject is forced to emit the word like one spits out a cherry pit, in order to rid oneself of an annoying object. In verbal hallucination, we find this character of "in spite of oneself." It constitutes a negative side of the illness. But it goes much further, since the speech will be attributed to others.

(2) *Complete motor verbal hallucination* is accompanied by initial movements; it appears as if it is a case of a transition between the case where

the subject considers his words as coming from himself and the one where he considers them to come from others.

(3) *Kinesthetic verbal hallucination* is where words do not emanate from the subject or from the other; the subject has the impression of being emerged in a current of anonymous words. He understands, for example, the bird's cries to be speaking to him directly. It is not about a delirious interpretation.

(4) *Motor verbal pseudo-hallucination* is where there is no longer any localization in space. The subject has the impression that people are speaking to him through his brain; he has the impression of hearing the "language of thought." The sensory phenomenon has totally disappeared. Here, it is a question of a mental speech that is nothing else but accentuated interior language.

To summarize the above: this description has shown that *the central phenomenon is not the sensory fact but, rather, the depersonalization*. The subject no longer has the impression of coinciding with his own speech. Therein we find the germ of the illusion of a foreign speech. For psychoanalysis, the relations between the composite elements of the *ego:* the *id* and the *superego* are immediately relations of discordance. The *superego* disavows the id, the involuntary element of the ego, and thereby realizes a behavior of self-punishment. However, when the tension created by the conflict is too strong, the subject will generally have the tendency to project in the other the contemptible element in himself, realizing a kind of détente. The conflict between self and other becomes less tiresome than the conflict with oneself. For example, after having lied, a child will accuse another child of lying. A patient who felt guilty about his mother's death will believe, several years later, that he himself is the object of persecution.

Therefore, self and other are not two distinct substances for us. The other is who delivers me from my own *ambivalence:* we are both, other and self, two variables of the same system. By a mechanism of *pro*jection, I attribute to the other the qualities that are my own, and inversely, by *intro*jection, I consider the other's qualities to be my own.

Application to hallucination. It is the same mechanism we find in hallucination. At the same time that there is a passage from "I am an assassin" to "I have been assassinated," there is also the passage from "I speak" to "I am spoken to." To feel injured is to injure oneself.

Lagache has shown that all speech is a twofold action: when I listen to the other speak, I am not silent; I am already anticipating his words and my response is already at least in an outline form. Inversely, for the person who is speaking, there is an implicit belief in my understanding. It establishes between us a "field of individual speeches." The function of language is not only a particular case of the general relationship between

self and other; it is the relationship between two consciousnesses, each projecting in the *other.*

This would be simply the mechanism pushed to the extreme that produces hallucination. The hallucinating person would anticipate the reactions of his possible interlocutors, substituting himself totally for them and adopting a resolutely receptive attitude vis-à-vis his own spoken words.

All classical theory about hallucination was constructed on the example of the *phantom limb.*[58] Currently the perception of the phantom limb has been reinterpreted, and the conclusions of this interpretation are completely incompatible with the classical conception of a perception provoked by the direct excitation of nervous centers. A person ill for several months has lost the use of his fifth finger. After the amputation, he had the illusion of a phantom arm with a four-fingered hand. If the absence of feeling for a period of time is sufficient to block this illusion, it cannot be about the excitation of nerve centers. In this case, it is about a global phenomenon. The illusion is founded on a *corporeal schema* (which is the schema of all possible activities, more than the schema of the bodily state).

We must make a similar revision to the conception of hallucination in general. We must consider speech as a total structure, a system by which we can attain communication with others. Hallucination is not a relation between subject and object; it is a relation of *being:* I exist through language in relation to others.

But is it legitimate to interpret normality in the light of the pathological? Certainly, this substantial identity between to "speak" as to "be spoken to" only exists in the patient, but if this confusion exists in the pathological state, it already exists in an embryonic form in the normal person. What already exists in the normal person is a germ of alienation, a potent relation between speech and listening.

Thus, we reach the following paradox: the normal subject would be the one that would accept only really being himself in contact with others, who would recognize the enriching quality of discussion. The abnormal subject would be the one who would refuse this dialectic of the self, who would obstinately only consider language as a kind of abstract logic and who would nevertheless remain conscious of this duality. He would come to see himself cornered into transferring one of these contradictory terms on an imaginary other.

B. The Study of Aphasia

Will it not be necessary to revise these conclusions, if we examine the physiological foundations of speech *(localizations)*? How can we, in effect,

understand language to be at the same time an intersubjective phenomenon and a purely individual one that is tied in the brain to the third gyrus of the left frontal lobe?

1. *The confrontation between these two theses.* The clinical analysis of aphasia (loss of speech, but that is not tied to a problem with the speech organs) has shown, to the degree it has developed, that classical interpretations were false. The verbal image is not an *engram,* the nervous center is not a *storehouse of images;* it is a center charged with organizing movements. It is only the place of a function.

This confirms the following facts: the aphasiac is not someone who no longer speaks, but someone who speaks less or in another manner. He remembers a word in one situation and not in another. For example, the patient is incapable of repeating the word "no," but when pushed further, he responds in exasperation, "no, I cannot say that word." Thus, we come to the idea that language has a double function. There would exist, one, a *concrete language* where the role would be to give a response to actual situations; two, a *categorical language* where the word is considered in itself as a purely abstract entity that responds to fictive situations or to "problems." Aphasia brings one to language in the first function.

2. *Goldstein's analysis of language.* We have reached the hypothesis here where aphasia would be an intellectual trouble wherein the material aspects of a language can in no way be attained. The patient would not have lost the automatic use of the word as much as the disposition toward a certain type of language: *categorical language.*

Goldstein has analyzed that in certain aphasiacs language troubles are accompanied by a more general trouble: the incapacity to classify perceived objects. For example, when one was put in the presence of a series of skeins of wool of different colors and asked to classify them according to their fundamental colors, he was incapable of doing so. He did not know how to assemble the different nuances of the same color. He went about it in a manner more detailed, gathering the samples in order to compare them. He did not follow any directive principle, and, in the course of the experience, suddenly grouped the different samples according to another principle, for example, their degree of saturation or brightness.

Interpretation. The normal subject is capable of considering a concrete object as representing a category: his behavior is categorical. If the patient seems to change principles, it is because in reality *he doesn't have any.* He only has a concrete experience of suitability or unsuitability. The patient can, however, recognize the color when it is an object characterized by that color, for example, cherry-red, bottle-green. The possibility of finding the name of the color indirectly again is explained. Consciousness that grasps the "red" is an abstraction, a disinterested attitude of

pure investigation, whereas consciousness that grasps the cherry is concrete. The patient thereby finds the abstract denomination: red. What is of interest in Goldstein's research is that it reveals the role of a *replacement function* that, for the outside observer, masks the problem. The subject answers "it is blue" while thinking "pastel-blue."

There are subjects who no longer possess the notion of number and who, nonetheless, by a replacement function can give the appearance of counting. For each object, they make a correspondence with a finger and each finger has a number from the automatically recited series. This discovery invites the psychiatrist to make a deeper examination. Whereas before, it was all about determining the functions that the patient was and was not capable of, now it is about researching in the same cases where the patient succeeds by *what means and in what sense* he succeeds. The "exterior verbal knowledge" is only the appearance of knowing, and can mask important deficiencies of real naming.[59]

But what exactly is the signification of Goldstein's analysis? Apparently, it is the meaning of Pierre Marie's work distinguishing the case of *anarthria* from *real aphasia*.[60] It seems that language is conditioned by thought, whereas Broca considered language as a collection of cerebral engrams. It is a global phenomenon and seems to require thought's general function. Thus, there is a reversal of initial positions. Contrary to Broca's position, Goldstein presents an idealist conception which shows thought's power behind the linguistic function. From the exterior, he returns to the interior, to pure consciousness, to a spiritual function that could not involve sentences or nouns, an indivisible symbolic function.

But then, how can this be vulnerable? In reality, neither Broca's attitude, nor the idealist or intellectualist attitude take the linguistic phenomenon into account. For one, there is no speaking subject, there are only verbal images. For another, there is no speaking subject, but merely a thinking subject. The theory of aphasia will come to pass over this second position as the first and determine the respective roles of the *corporal condition* on the one hand, and the *intellectual consciousness* on the other. Now, when we attentively examine Goldstein's analyses, we understand that in the best parts he is not oriented toward intellectualism.

(1) Physiological facts. No serious author has rejected the notion of cerebral localizations, but it is not a question of the relationships between containing and the contained. Goldstein proposes the following idea. There are two truths to be remembered: *the whole brain contributes to every partial operation* and, hence, no mosaic functioning exists.

This is not to say that the brain's functions are diffused. All the parts of the brain do not contribute in the same way to each operation. One plays the role of *figure* and the others the role of *ground*. There is a

localization in the sense that the integrity of a certain part of the brain is absolutely necessary to put into play a certain function. The substituted functions are never the exact equivalent of the destroyed function. For example, in the perception of a figure on a ground, the occipital region plays the essential role, but the entire brain comes into play.

(2) Clinical facts. Goldstein never pretended that the categorical function was absolute mentally. The incapacity of the patient to classify is tied to a transformation of his *own perception*. Whereas the normal subject organizes his perceptual field according to lines of force, there is a contrary organization in the sufferers of disintegration. The failure of the categorical attitude is, or implies, a change in the perceptual structure. Behind the naming, there is no intellectual act distinct from it. The categorical function is incarnated in the world; it gives it its physiognomy. When it fails, we have the impression that the word is "empty," that it has lost "what renders it appropriate from designation" (Goldstein).

It remains for us to understand how thought inhabits language, how sense inhabits the word.[61] Thought undergirds all the levels of linguistic material. This phenomenon is apparent in the patient where the syntactic thought develops at the expense of articulate physiognomy; this shows that thought really conditions the two phenomena. The aphasiac's language has lost an essential quality: it has ceased to be alive. Hence, one of Goldstein's patients could only speak when he was following a plan without any personal accent or improvisation. In the totality of his language, there was something uninspired, a total absence of style.

We must place emphasis upon the *productivity of language*. Language is a collection of instruments for our relations with others that reflect the degree of inventiveness of which we are capable. *It is a manifestation of the connection that we have with others and with ourselves* (Goldstein).

In a book that appeared last year, Goldstein made his ideas even more precise.[62] He redefined the categorical attitude. He then introduced a new notion: that of the linguistic instrument (*instrumentalities of speech*).[63] He shows that these two functions are closely dependent on one another, that the loss of one harms the other.

The interesting point of this analysis is that it does not reach the classical bipartition of body and spirit. It is the same trouble that we note at the level of the categorical attitude and at the level of linguistic instruments. It is not about reducing language to thought, but about introducing thought into language. In following this insertion we will be more or less satisfied that language appears as normal or abnormal. We will study *the categorical attitude* and *the linguistic instruments*, trying to bring to light the osmosis between the two functions and the role of thought in each of them.

The categorical attitude. The categorical attitude makes possible a series of operations where the primary principles are (1) the capacity to assume a mental task, to take the initiative, to execute a linguistic performance upon request, (2) the possibility of examining the same problem under different aspects, (3) the capacity to distinguish the essential from the accidental, (4) the capacity to conceive of a future, to think not only of the real but of the possible, and (5) the capacity to distinguish the ego from the exterior world. When there is a destruction of the categorical function, we find troubles at the level of instrumentality. For example, a patient no longer knows how to use the multiplication table, even when he knows it by heart. It is easy to distinguish the case where the instrumental function is attained directly and those where it is only indirectly attained through the categorical attitude. In the latter cases, we note that, first, the linguistic apparatus functions in certain moments and not in others and, second, that words become individual words, with a concrete signification, that no longer have relations to their context. For example, the word "thing" for the normal person covers a notion, becomes for the patient a manner of designating an object that he no longer knows the name of, a way of masking deficiency.

But the categorical function is incarnate in the object; its relation to language is the exterior relation of cause to effect. The word is a body through which an intention appears. Speech is not a simple automatism in the service of thought; it is an instrument of thought's actualization. Thought only truly realizes itself when it finds its verbal expression. For the patient, on the contrary, the word appears as a sonorous complex. It is no longer thought's vehicle; it lives in an exterior relationship.

Linguistic instruments. The troubles that come from the loss of linguistic instruments are very different: (1) confusion of letters or words, (2) instead of the sought-after word, the subject utilizes one with the same physiognomy (same number of letters or syllables), (3) deficiencies of little words (prepositions, adverbs, articles), and (4) repetition problems. The words are damaged, but they keep their significant power. Thereby we can see that thought is incarnated in instrumental language. By what mechanism? This is what Goldstein tries to show in borrowing from Humboldt the notion of "*innere Sprachform.*"[64]

For Humboldt, the "*innere Sprachform*" is completely different from the notion of certain psychologists of an interior language (simple evocation of a certain number of verbal images). It is the reflection in language of each culture's own perspective on the world. Each language has its manner of expressing different relations like time or space (for example, the structure of Greek indicates a very Greek "architectonic of time"). Even the manner of distributing accents, inflections, and the use

of articles is expressive of a worldview. The *"innere Sprachform"* is the totality of processes and expression that are produced when we are on the point of expressing our thought or understanding the other's thought.

The junction of pure thought and language occurs, thus, in the *"innere Sprachform,"* which differs according to how we speak or write, how we address ourselves or others. Between language, the collection of words and thought, a layer of thought interposes itself and supposes a certain relationship. It is this space of thought in language, nonexplicitly, that constitutes *style.*

We can now complete what we said at the beginning of this course concerning phoneme acquisition. Whereas for Jakobson this acquisition is determined by objective laws, Goldstein, on the contrary, says that phonematic development occurs according to a certain phonematic "style" that is not at all from the beginning determined by any necessity. An organism, far from realizing all the movements of which its structure renders it capable, adopts among all its defined postures privileged ones that conform to a fundamental organization of its behavior, an *"Urbild"* of the considered individual (for example, the position of Chinese relaxation cannot be explained by the individual's anatomy). The systematic form of phonemes that the individual uses is also elaborated by a linguistic community as the best means of expressing his worldview.

From the same point of view, we now revisit what Piaget said about child language. The words are not, as he suggests, simple indicators of language. They legitimately have, from the commencement of language, what Goldstein calls a "situational value." The child uses certain words before he fully understands their meaning, in the way that an adult who, learning a foreign language, uses certain locutions which he does not know the meaning of, but which he still knows how to apply to a situation. It is this language that does not take itself into account which Piaget calls egocentric. For Goldstein, it is the way that permits the child to gain access to language and which does not cease in the adult as a backdrop to his reality.

Other facts come to reinforce this thesis. (1) In repetition, the habitual process is not to repeat the phrase as it is presented orally, but to first understand it, then to give a personal equivalent reproduction of it. This is the degree to which thought traverses through signs and gives them meaning and the degree to which language slightly masks thought. Such an attention to language is difficult. This is because it is pregnant with signification, which finally is only possible through its *innere Sprachform.* (2) In chatty people, the abundance of speech develops to the detriment of its signification. In the pathological condition, the same phenomenon appears in the patient who has lost the use of interior

language. He *speaks* more to *say* less; the "*innere Sprachform*" is this expressive life of language that makes *style* possible.

All language is mind. It is not a verbal melody that supposes an intellectual vigilance. But the mind that governs language is not the mind in itself, but paradoxically a mind that only possesses in losing itself in language.

C. Conclusion

Broca's theory has been surpassed without the modern analysis of aphasia becoming a return to idealism. The sense that inhabits language is the situation sense which we spoke about earlier. This is easy to define when it is applied to concrete things, but more difficult when it is applied to abstract words like "understanding" or "philosophy." Nevertheless, these concepts can be considered to also be elements of a cultural situation. The "*innere Sprachform*" is a mental landscape common to all the members of a linguistic community and through which it is possible to coexist with one another in the cultural milieu.

IX. Contributions of Linguistics

Today, linguists no longer accept raising the issue of language's origin. There are many reasons for this. (1) The origin of language takes up language's prehistory and not its history. There are no investigations based on written traces, thus no positive solution. However, this objection is not decisive. Otto Jespersen sees a positive way to approach this problem, which would be to proceed from the present state of language and to establish a graph of evolution that we can inductively extend backward to language's origin.[65] (2) To explain the origin of language is to try to derive it from other things. Now, there is always a gap between expressive forms and language, properly speaking.

There were attempts made at the end of the nineteenth century to overcome this gap. First, one wanted to show that articulated language is a variety of a simpler language founded on imitation. In this case, the relationship between sign and signification is founded on *onomatopoeia,* representing the initial form of all words. For example, the rooster's song "cock-a-doodle-doo" yields the word "cock" and a family of words, "coquette, cocky, cockade." No one supports this idea anymore. Onomatopoeia is the equivalent of an ideogram in writing; but the ideogram is not stable, it gradually fills itself up with a certain meaning as it becomes a

syllabic or alphabetic writing. Similarly, language cannot be traced back to such narrow modes of signification.

Second, another attempt has been to link words with *emotional manifestations:* exclamations, for example. But, on the one hand, exclamations intervene when one is surprised by something said and, on the other hand, they vary from one language to another, thus they have an institutional value. As for the derivation of language from the cry, this only applies to a very small number of interjections.

The expression of articulated language rests on a different principle than that of rendering the imitated world possible. What makes the word "sun" designate the sun is not the resemblance between the word and the thing, nor is it the internal character of either. Rather, it is neither the relationship of the word "sun" to the thing, nor to its internal characteristics, but the relationship of the word "sun" to the collection of French words, the manner in which it is differentiated from them. The word is only signified through the entire language *institution.*

Many linguists think thus that posing the problem of language's origin would be to reduce it to modes of expression that have nothing in common with it. They only want to concern themselves with constituted language. However, we cannot deny, at the very least, the historicity of language. We participate in partial creations, whatever their origins might be, in nonlinguistic modes of expression. These creations are *conditioned.* We must admit that there are thresholds, that we do not get just anything starting from anywhere. In certain constellations, there is a given creation that was not possible until now. To admit a history of language is to simply admit that we cannot come to a certain state without passing through successive stages.

There is a *causal conception* of history which postulates that there is more, or as much, in the cause as in the effect. There is a conception of history as simple explication of what was originally given. These two conceptions negate the role of time. Language neither accommodates itself to one or to the other. It obliges us to consider history as a contingent course and a logic of things where phenomena can outline themselves and then be systematized by acts of social life or of thought. For example, the negation *"pas"* was begun by being a word that designated a man's progression when walking ("I do not do that" [*je ne fais pas*] in the sense of "I am not advancing a step" [*je n'avance pas*]).[66] It is by a sliding that the word *"pas"* is given its negative sense. Due to an equivocal moment, there was a renewal and an acquisition. After a certain period of use, the word becomes a new linguistic instrument. Every moment of time, language is renewed from the past and modified by a series of escapes. Then we must admit, if not a language's birth, at least a movement of language

toward its more expressive forms from the less expressive. These forms would have to be sufficiently different from our language to merit the name of "prelanguage."

These are the kinds of forms that Jespersen tries to reconstitute. He notes the progressive elimination of sounds that are considered the most difficult and longest. Primitive words ought to have the same relationship to our words as the plesiosaurus does to today's animals. Our language is less emotional than its rudimentary forms, since there would not have been an initial difference between the act of speaking and singing.

As for grammar: ancient grammars have a more synthetic form, modern ones are more analytical (Latin is more synthetic than French). Verbs could have varied according to numerous dimensions: sex, object complement, and so forth. Archaic speech would be much less complicated than modern speech.

The initial form of language would thus have been a kind of song. Men would have sung their feelings before communicating their thought. Similarly, writing was first painting, as language was first singing. In analyzing their song, it would have become a linguistic sign. It is by the exercise of singing that men would have had the experience of their expressive power.

We are searching, thus, to describe certain forms of prelinguistic expression that, without being *causes* of language, would be language's cradle. In the same manner, Géza Révész, in his mediocre work, describes experiments of contacting and calling that furnish language if not with the conditions of possibility, at least with certain conditions of realization.[67] We cannot speak of an empirical origin of language. We can at minimum describe prelinguistic forms starting with those which men have a tendency to speak and at which point language becomes immanent.

Even for the authors who admit an evolution, the appearance of articulated language is a like an "*Ursprung*" (a springing forth). Linguists thus invite us to place ourselves at the interior of language and not to consider it from the exterior. We could concern ourselves with either their general philosophical conclusions or their scientific works. If we adopt the second point of view, we collide with objections that are lodged against philosophers each time they use a positive discipline. They are reproached for tying the fate of philosophy to the scientific system in question, in other words, to relative and provisional theories, to *sacrificing philosophy to science*. And, also for reinterpreting scientific phenomena, giving them a signification they do not have, of *sacrificing science to philosophy*.

The two objections imply the necessity to choose between science and philosophy. Science is a construction elaborated by men, destined to elucidate by rigorous methods a certain number of experiences that

they themselves or others have had. Whether or not we can expect from science the knowledge of being itself, in no case can philosophy dispense with finding a philosophical link and status for its "verification" methods. Linguistics is the most rigorous examination of language as an institution; we cannot conceive of a philosophy of language that is not obligated to collect and articulate on the basis of its own truths the truths that linguistics establishes. If we consider philosophy to be the elucidation of human experience, and science as an essential moment of that experience, the dilemma disappears.

Thus, what we will ask linguists is not their philosophical conclusions (as philosophers, they are not more solid than others). We will seek to participate with their experience of language. The linguist, comparing one language to another, makes each appear on a ground that suddenly reveals itself to those who speak the language, but who *did not see* it. The comparative and objective study is indispensable to awaken us to this language which we believe to know because we speak it.

Linguistics, in principle, studies language objectively; in other words, it considers language as it is, "behind the backs" (Hegel) of the subjects who speak it. But we will see that in fact the objective method converges with a direct reflection on language.

A. Sounds

Phonetics is the study of changes in the phonematic system that intervene in the course of a language's history. Do sounds depend uniquely on our phonatory organs? In such a case, we could expect there to be laws of universal vectors [*vections*] according to which language transforms into certain senses. Now, according to this common constant, phonetic laws are only valid in the interior of a given historical period which lets us presume that these laws are not comparable to physical laws, or, more precisely, that they are never a constant necessity. There would be a dependence of the law vis-à-vis a certain historical structure of language. Similarly, in a physical law, the rate of falling bodies is valid only in a certain state of the world. The law of falling bodies is only understandable in a system where the speed of the earth's rotation does not go beyond a certain limit. The whole law is consistent with a certain factual coefficient (Brunschvicg). This is even truer for linguistics, where laws are affected by a facility coefficient. They do not permit any prediction and are only certain for the past (Vendryes).[68]

On the other hand, the phonetic phenomenon does not constitute an order in itself which would leave out the speaking subject. Even in terms of sounds, we see phonemes from other languages appearing at

certain moments; they are not determined by a phonetic necessity interior to language, but by a phenomenon such as imitation. A logical element is reintroduced as an afterthought by the language's practice. We argue, for example, that the effects of hyper-urbanism or hyper-dialectism are a voluntary overemphasis on the part of city dwellers and country folk arising from a need to distinguish themselves.

Finally, we must account for at what point the sounds that we use in language are richer than those naturally emitted by our phonatory apparatus. We will never equal the richness and the variety of sounds in a language *by no matter what sound.* Thus, beneath these relationships, it is clear that the sonorous phenomenon in language is already of a trans-natural order.

B. Grammar

The grammarians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, inspired by grammatical categories that are not adapted to the real structure of French, give us a deformed image rather than knowledge.

Etymology can equally falsify our idea of a word. In effect, the word's sense is not behind but before us; this prospective meaning is not necessarily the result of past meanings. "We are not the sons of our ancestors; rather, we choose our ancestors" (Aron).[69] This can apply to popular etymology, which is the choice by which a man expresses the effective sense that he actually gives to a word.

Semantemes are words like "sky," "table," and so forth, while *morphemes* express the relationships between words: "to," "of," "for," . . .[70]

Morphology is the study of the totality of forms which reunite words. The notion of morpheme is very generalized, and linguists have shown that the absence of sign is a sign ("zero-morpheme"). For example, the nominative, which requires no word ending in a given language, is designated by this absence of inflection, in the same way that there are expressive silences in music. In addition to the inventory of manifest morphemes, the complete morphology will therefore have to decipher these latent morphemes.

Here are some examples:

(1) Languages (Fula) exist wherein negation is marked by *intonation.*[71] (2) The expression "he has done" is composed of three words: the linguists ask if this analysis is not conventional. They compare it to characteristic morphemes of the aorist in Greek.[72] For the man speaking French, the expression "he has done" is not composed of a pronoun, a verb, and a participle. It is the total expression in which "he" is equivalent to the "σ" and to the augment in the Greek aorist. (3) In Chinese, the

relationship of dependence between principal words is marked by *word order*. No positive morphemes exist, yet they express morphological relations as strongly as we do by particularities designed for that effect. (4) When one says in French, "*Pierre frappe* [hits] *Paul*," the only morpheme expressed is the "*e*" in *frappe*.

This analysis of the notion of the morpheme leads us to generalize considerably; the morpheme is quite far from always being a word which we can make correspond to a positive concept.

Sometimes, there is a derivation of a morpheme from a semanteme ("*casa*" in Latin gives us "*chez*" in French). The semanteme is emptied of its meaning, whereby the meaning that inhabits it is sometimes imprecise. It is appropriate for the morpheme to be a grammatical tool, characterized by use values more than by *significations*. In certain cases, it seems to us to be extraordinarily indefinable. It is impossible to give a *definition* of the preposition "*à*" [usually "to"] that corresponds to all the eight possible translations in German (*zu, nach, an, in, mit, auf, bei, um*).[73] This remark will be useful to us when we ask, along with Saussure, how language signifies.

We have seen that the distinction between semanteme and morpheme which has a simple feel really becomes confused when we consider it more closely. Thus, the personal pronouns that at the beginning were semantemes have ended up becoming purely morphemes. For example, in "*je le dis*" [I say it, I tell him] the pronoun sticks increasingly closely to the verb. The conjugation of "*je dis, tu dies, il dis*" [I say/tell, you say/tell, he says/tells] (pronounced *jedi, tudi, idi*) is equivalent to the Latin "*dico, dicis, dicit*." *Jedi, tudi, idi* can be considered as the extending of a previous inflection of the word.

It is impossible to freeze words in an absolutely defined grammatical function since, in reality, there are no concepts of noun, pronoun, and so forth. The word is like a tool defined by a certain use without being able to provide us with an exact conceptual formula of this use. (This remark is true for most grammatical categories.)

The *gender*, even if it originally appears to be founded on observable or mystical characteristics of the object, no longer has any intrinsic signification today.[74] Each time that a word is not accompanied by an article which renders the gender quite apparent, the gender of the word tends to become ambiguous. For example, the words that begin with a vowel, "*l'aurore*" [dawn], "*l'abîme*" [abyss], have a tendency to change gender because they do not have an article that upholds their original gender. The gender tends to be a simple indicator that differentiates words, a "classifier."

The *number* corresponds to a certain aspect of things. But it is not

calculated from the relationship between things and cannot have an absolutely univocal signification. Should we write "*confiture de groseille*" or "*confiture de groseilles*" [gooseberry jam]?[75] This hesitation is the consequence of the fact that the French plurals cover two indistinct significations: *plurality and collectivity.*

The same remark is valid for most linguistic categories that always conceal, beyond their principal meaning, a latent sense in the course of development or of regression. There is not just one system of unchanging and inherent categories in things. Categories evolve—the plural (collective) French flourishes, language contains acquired and available significations, and others that are in the midst of being sketched out. We would impoverish language by reducing it to what is just stated.

Time is the distinction between present, past, and future and appears founded in things. But there are languages that do not have the future and others that possess other times than the above, that is, they understand time in another manner.

It is impossible to understand Greek conjugations or Indo-European ones if we do not introduce the aspect of time, which distinguishes action envisioned in an instant. The aspect would be more a category of *duration* than a category of time.

Thus, there is no objective evidence of grammatical time, but simply different *linguistic tools* for exploring time. In Hebrew, the future serves both as future and as past in a narrative, while the preterit can serve as future. We say that we are indecisive because we try to think the mode of time articulation in terms of our own language. In reality, if we succeed in thinking this conjugation according to its "own architectonic" (G. Guillaume), we would see that it keeps its own meaning and that it permits a communication of fundamental time relations.[76] Moreover, we see this aspect emerge in French, under the influence of the need to express oneself: words composed with the "*re*" replace the simple form when we only envision the *result* and not the process. Whereas initially "*re*" implied the idea of reiteration, later it took on a different signification. It indicates a nuance of aspect for which French has set no official designation. (For example, *abattre* [cut-down] and *rabattre* [pull-down], *abaisser* [drop] and *rabaisser* [reduce].) Therefore, we can see in a language the equivalent of what is found in another, expressed with more or less technical skill. If there is a unity of language across languages, we must find it in a common effort toward expansion and not in a system of "universal" categories. It is a unity in the existential order and not in the essential order. French conjugation contains enough exceptions to its own rules that we must consider it more as a linguistic tool than as a representation of time.

Active and passive. The theoretical discussion between these two

grammatical categories consists in what makes one an action and the other what submits to an action. For example, "the cat eats the mouse" is active whereas "the mouse is eaten by the cat" is passive. But the passive form is not confined to this latter use. Moreover, one performs no action when saying, "I am dying," "I am suffering." At the interior of the active conjugation, there are passive forms: "I went."

Certain languages only have the passive mode. The expressive apparatus thus cannot be considered as a sum of signs for discrete and juxtaposed significations. It is limited to only evoke pure understanding.

The transitive and the intransitive. In principle, one admits a direct object and the other does not. In reality, there is no rigorous conceptual value defined by this linguistic instrument, nor is there any logical-grammatical parallel about this point. "*Noces tibi*" [You are hurting yourself] has a transitive meaning. The possibility of a universal grammar thus remains problematic, since language is made up of significations in the state of being born. This is the case because language is in movement and is not fixed; and perhaps because one must recognize in the last analysis that there are "flowing significations," as Husserl has noted in his later writings. All our distinctions between kinds of words (pronouns, adjectives, verbs) are schematic in relation to the uses of language.

However, there exists an irreducible difference between two kinds of sentences. First, the *verbal sentence* that contains a verb that is not "to be" and, second, the *nominal sentence* that contains the verb "to be" and expresses the object's properties. But the Aristotelian analysis is insufficient not only, as we have already said, for passing from language to thought, but *also for characterizing language itself.* Linguists refuse to reduce the verbal sentence to the nominal one.

Finally, other distinctions of meaning are expressed by style and not by grammar. The word order in some languages without morphemes conditions signification. In others, word order is relatively optional, thus leaving open the field for nuances of style. In Latin, "*homo est avarus*" means "it happens to be the case that this man is avaricious," whereas "*avarus homo*" means "avarice is the failing of this man."

This is particularly apparent when we compare written language to spoken language. What in written language is "As for me, I do not have the time to think about this business" becomes, in spoken language, "When would I have time to think about this business?" (Vendryes).[77] According to certain people, it is out of spoken language, out of *living communication,* that grammar draws its origin. There would be a *pregrammar* that would allow and stabilize grammar.

After considering stabilized morphology, it will be necessary to study morphology's transformation. Language characterizes itself by two

contradictory needs: the *need for uniformity* and the *need for expressivity.* There needs to be a form whose use is understandable, and yet a form that when employed frequently loses its meaning (for example, "terrific," "unbelievable"). The need for expressivity fights against wearing out of words and forms; it even arouses linguistic creations in certain moments.

Naturally, these creations do not respond to any preestablished plan. They are systematic, but they depend upon chance in language's history. For example, the Italian accent of the second to last syllable has weakened the last syllable, but at the same time it has made a new system of noninflectional expression necessary. French, which emerged from Latin, began "repairing" by chance the means of damaged flections. For example, the participles *"vu"* [seen], *"tenu"* [held], and *"rompu"* [broken] have been incorporated into French by analogy with words from vulgar Latin ending with *-utus.* But this wasn't sufficient. Everything happens as if a new system of expression made itself appear. The articles and pronouns started to develop, and the need for prepositions came to transform full words into prepositions, for example *"chez"* (from *"casa"*), *"excepté"* [except], *"malgré"* [in spite of], *"sauf"* [with the exception of], *"plein"* (*plein les yeux*) [full, eyes full].

The erosion and decadence of an expressive system left behind it some debris that has been regrasped, reworked, reused as if by a new wave of expression. The erosion of the last syllable in Latin that resulted in an accent on the penultimate suddenly became the positive fact of the French accent on the last syllable. Everything happens as if the spirit plays by constantly retaking chances. It is thus a question of a kind of blind spirit whose nature we will have to clarify.

C. Vocabulary (Semantics)

Although linguists do not accept, without reservations, the identity of a word throughout time (we have already seen that etymology does not provide the real meaning), they are obliged to admit that *"absolutus"* has given us "absolute." Without this being the case, comparative morphology and even phonetics would not be possible. But this identification through time is "blurred" like certain "snapshots" in photography. Words that are indiscernible in living language—for example, *"louer"* [to rent, i.e., an apartment] and *"louer"* [to praise]—are different for etymologists because they come from two different words, *"locare"* and *"laudare."* There are words that etymology identifies and which it admits have many senses, even though in reality, the present state of language, these meanings are no longer related. Thus, we can find three meanings for the verb *"rap-*

porter." We can speak about a land [that yields], a dog [that retrieves], or a child that "tells." *Maréchal* (blacksmith) and *maréchal* (of France) [marshal of France] have the same etymology and no meaningful relationship. Similarly, when I speak about a "quill" [in French *"plume"*] for writing, I'm not thinking of a bird's feather [*plume*], which is, however, the origin of the quill. The "polysemy" of words is such that, in a given sentence, we can say that the word put back into its context, not the word itself, has a univocal meaning.[78] But the context itself is constituted by other words which also have many meanings. Thus, an interaction between words is produced that ends up attributing to *each one* the meaning that is compatible with the others. But these words, in turn, each have a compatible meaning with the first word. A problem of the same order occurs in perception, where each element of the perceptual field receives a chromatic, spatial, and significative value which is assigned to it by a whole *that, by hypothesis, we cannot yet use.* The constitution of such a gestalt in the perceived world is only finally understood if we refer to the considered *bodies* and the *organs* that make us capable of realizing such an interplay of parts with the whole. We "guess" by their *familiarity* with the perceived world what *will be* the whole's configuration and we confer on each detail its appropriate value. In a similar manner, in living language and present communication, we will never understand how a sentence can present us with an immediate sense, giving us the presence of the other's thought, if subjects are pure understanding. If the subject is compelled to give a census of all possible signification of each of the words and of the whole, the subject is not a *speaking subject* as much a *thinking subject.* Language functions with respect to thought as the body does with respect to perception.

To complete a semantic vocabulary, it is impossible to delimit the words of a language to make a complete census of them. Some words only come forth in us when we have need of them; similarly the spark is not contained in the stone, but is formed by the contact with the metal striking it. As an instrument, language is not like a hammer that has a limited number of uses. It is more like a piano, from which one can draw an infinite number of melodies. In an inventory of vocabulary, will we count a word for each signification? Will we count as part of an individual's vocabulary words whose exact meaning he does not know, even though he uses them appropriately? (For example, *"linotte"* [small finch] is not known by most French except through the expression *"tête de linotte"* [scatterbrained].) Will we count as part of French today the word "1900," which is still basically understood but is starting to disappear?[79] To say that we can count the words of a language is to suppose that this language is formed by a finite sum of signs and significations, when in reality it is a

question of a system of unified expressions whose applications are not always countable.

Truthfully, there are no *words* in a language, each given one or many meanings. Each word *only has* its meaning because it is sustained in its signification by all the other words. The same is true for all the other words. The only reality is the gestalt of language. In order that a word retain its meaning, it must be supported by others. "*Captivus*" (and its derivative "captive") supported by "*capio*" keeps its sense without changing. But "*chétif*" [puny, pitiful] slips into another meaning. The possession of meaning by the word is only possible in a very fragile equilibrium. A word only keeps its sense if it is frequently employed in different contexts (the word "*frustre*" that was originally only applied to money where the effigy was erased, changed its meaning and signifies "*grossier*" [coarse] because the checks and balances of varied contexts did not serve to maintain its initial meaning). But if the word is employed too often and in too many contexts, it ends up being attracted to each one of them, and this also changes its sense.

The unity, the liaison of all phenomena, that we have encountered within these three sections (on phonetics, morphology, and vocabulary) also exists between these three orders of phonemes. It is the combined and compensated action of phonetics, of morphology, and of vocabulary that is the life of language. But, in a sense, the same unity maintains itself gradually across the development of different languages. We thus arrive along with Vendryes at the idea of *a unity of language's function across languages*. It is not about the dream of a universal grammar that would dominate the conceptual system of all empirical grammars; Vendryes wants to speak about a concrete universality that is only realized little by little and is found in the expressive will that animates languages more than in the transitory forms which it reaches.

"A language is an ideal that is sought, a reality in power, a future that never arrives" (Vendryes).[80] It is an entity comparable to the Kantian idea that results in the totalization to infinity of all the convergent means of expression. French is instantly defined as the common aim of all the subjects who speak it to the extent that they come to communicate with each other. This communication succeeds in not prohibiting quantitative differences from transforming themselves into qualitative differences in an imperceptible progression from generation to generation. French is not an objective reality that can be sliced up along strict boundaries of space and time; it is a dynamic reality, a gestalt in the simultaneous and the successive. It is a whole, that culminates in certain distinctive properties, but about which we cannot say what is exactly here and what is there. We cannot exactly date the appearance of French, although, at

the end of a certain evolutionary time, we see a certain "architectonic" that emerges which is not Latin (G. Guillaume).[81] It inevitably overflows its "limits," since it is never a figure that separates itself from a ground. Even a common language like French can acquire an imputed unity by nonlinguistic (political) factors. But dialects abandoned to spontaneous linguistic forces can never achieve a unity. The isogloss lines are not superimposable; we can say here that French is like Provençal.[82] From this contact with some linguistic facts, philosophy can already extract some information.

(1) Concerning phonemes, we have seen that when one of them is removed from language, it is about a systematic change (all words that incorporated the removed one) without any kind of common decision taking place. The event is not somehow analogous with the remove of certain elements of the "corporal schema" that we observe in some illnesses. In Ganser's syndrome, we have noticed that many patients ignore their sensory or motor deficiency, and we are led to explain this fact by remarking that the subject avoids any task that requires the intervention of the affected limb or organ.[83] They are put "out of circulation." The subject seems to renounce them (since they are no longer part of his corporeal schema). In the same way, language puts out of circulation a phenomenon that it used without a real decision or convention occurring.

In a body activity like language, there is a blind logic, laws of equilibrium that are observed by the community of speaking subjects without any of them being conscious of it. Opposed to this spontaneous logic, there is the voluntary logic of *hyper-urbanism* and *hyper-dialectism.*

(2) When considering grammar, we have seen that the word is defined above all by its value as a tool that has more a range than a signification. In French, the particle "*ti*" as it is used by some of Molière's characters ("*j'aime-ti pas ma fille?*" [I don't love my daughter?]) is not explainable by logical analysis. At the origin, the interrogative form of the present indicative is used for all persons. Then, gradually, it stopped being used for the first two persons in the singular and plural (*aimons-nous, aimez-vous* [do we love, do you (formal and/or plural) love]) because it was equivocal with the reflexive. It underwent a weakening in the first two persons of the singular for euphonic reasons. The form that was appropriate for the third person (*aime-t-il* [does he love]) invaded the other persons, and "*t-il*" pronounced "*ti*" came to signify interrogation itself to the point that we can say "*j'aime-ti pas ma fille?*" When considering this birth in French of a quasi-particle "*ti,*" we explain that it would not be possible to give the particle "αγ" in Greek an analysis that reduces its different meaning to a unity.

Pronouns, genders, and numbers also tend toward their use-value.

The sense of a word ends up being reduced to a consciousness of a possible substitution with these or those other words and the impossibility of substituting them with others. In particular, it is apparent to us that a logical analysis of the proposition is impossible.

Thus, it appears that we cannot resolve the problem of language by conceiving it as a series of signs in which each signification recovers a signification or a concept. Consciousness of signification is not exhaustive in language. It does not go as far as a concept, and correlatively, it is less behind the sign that mixes with it like a halo of possible uses in communication. All isolated words suppose a present state of dialogue. Each sentence is the modulation of a power of total expression that we have in common. In the same way, to know how to play the piano does not consist in having the power to execute some pieces, but the general means of translating written notes into music. To know how to speak is not to command a finite number of pure signs and significations.

These remarks make us return to certain ideas of Saussure, who has oriented the work of linguists in the entire recent period.[84] Saussure admits that language is essentially *diacritic:* words have less meaning when they separate themselves from others. What this means is that each linguistic phenomenon is a differentiation of the global movement of communication. In a language, Saussure says, everything is negative; there are only differences without positive terms. The signified [*signifié*] side brings conceptual differences; the signifier [*significant*] side brings phonic differences.

What results is that we should speak of language "value" rather than "signification" with the sense in which one speaks of the value of a piece of money that one can change with an infinite number of objects. Michel Bréal compares the word with a historical institution.[85] For example, the Parliament was originally a court of justice; it progressively acquired, beginning with the right of registering royal edicts, the right of remonstrance. In the eighteenth century, it became an organ of political opposition. Similarly, the word that has been introduced to signify one thing loses its original meaning and acquires another. At each moment, the meaning is an element of a total configuration. We can thereby consider language as an aspect of what sociologists, the "culturalists," call "the culture." When Saussure speaks about the "conventional" character of language, he expresses in another vocabulary this idea that language is "cultural" and not "natural."

Saussure's endeavor regarding language is twofold. *On the one hand, it is a return to spoken,* living language: "language is not an entity; it only exists in speaking subjects." Written language bottles living language after it and cannot give us the key to language, even though it can sometimes

obtain a rigor and an articulation of expression that we don't have in spoken language. *On the other hand, at the same time language is* not a function of the speaking subject who is engaged in the speaking community: he does not own language. Language is entirely the will *to understand and to be understood.* Here Saussure encounters *the principal philosophical problem of the relationship between the individual and the social.*

For Saussure, the individual is neither a *subject* nor an *object* of history but simultaneously one and the other. Thus language is not a transcendental reality in relation to all speaking subjects, nor it is a phantasm formed by the individual. It is a manifestation of human intersubjectivity. Saussure elucidates the enigmatic relationship that ties the individual to history in his analysis of language. That is to say, he considers linguistics to be part of a more general "semiotic" as one of the most fundamental social realities.

First we will study the relationships that bond society through language, and then we will generalize and try to capture a general idea of the relationships between the individual and the collective.

[D.] Relations Between Sign and Signification

Saussure begins with the idea that *everything is psychological in language.* The present word is not purely and simply the result in itself of words which came about historically. We must distinguish between *substantial* identity (I can find the same coat that was stolen from me at the second-hand shop) and *structural* identity (the express train at 9:17 is always the 9:17 express, even if it is not the same train nor is it the same driver). Between the word "sea" and its Latin origin "*mare*" there is no substantial identity, but a structural identity. There was a transmission by continual passage from one general to another without being conscious of the word changing. It is not a phonetic or material continuity which is the foundation of the word's identity; on the contrary, the continuity presupposes the identity.

Regarding *forms,* there is no reason to explain contemporary French with eighteenth-century French. For example, the expression "*bon marché*" [a good buy] must be considered today as a unique attribute. It is the value of a word that makes its identity, like a piece in a chess game is not defined by its material but by certain defined possibilities of defense and offense. This indicates to what extent everything is mental [*psychique*] within a language.

But the mental is not individual. In effect, a language is not a nomenclature, a sum of signs attached to many significations. Words are systems of power that are interconnected with one another. Nowhere

can we confront a word with its signification. There is only a relationship between the verbal chain and the signified universe. At the interior of the same language, all the signs that express similar ideas limit each other.

For example, the area of action of the word "sheep" [*mouton*] is not the same in French as the word "mutton" in English because the English have two words for "sheep," one designating the animal, the other "mutton," the meat. Another example: in some languages there are two words for the sun according to whether or not one is speaking about the sun itself or the sun's rays on the earth.

The most exact characteristic of a word is to be "what the others are not." There is no signification of a word, but of all words in relation to one another. Our present tense could never be exactly translated into another language's present tense without a future tense. It is for this reason that we can never exactly translate from one language to another. Thus, the linguistic phenomenon is this coexistence of a multiplicity of signs that, taken individually, have no meaning, but that define themselves through a totality of which they are themselves the constituents. There are only "conceptual differences" and phonetic "*differences*" (Saussure). Thus, our ordinary manner of considering language in its relation to consciousness is wrong. Language's function transcends the habitual distinction between pure meaning and pure sign.

At that point, each speaking subject finds himself reintegrated into the collectivity of speaking subjects. It is the *global will* to communicate with the alter ego that founds the positive linguistic phenomenon. Considered moment to moment, the linguistic phenomenon is never anything but negative, diacritic, it is the currency of the possibility of communicating which makes up the very essence of the speaking subject.

[E.] Relations Between the Speaking Subject and the Expressive System

We cannot absolutely distinguish the speaking subject's language. Thought without words is like a "puff of air." Inversely, words without thought are only a chaos of sonorous signs. Language's function is to make articulate thought appear in a contact with this twofold chaos and not to serve as a material means to express thought. Saussure says that "pure thought" is like a puff of wind without figure and contour. Language in itself is like the mass of water in a lake without configuration. It is the contact of these two amorphous realities at the surface of the water which produces waves with their geometric forms, their facets. There is "neither a materialization of thought, nor a spiritualization of language"; thought and language are only two moments of one and the same reality.

This leads to an original conception of the relationships between mind and object.

[F.] Relations Between Reason and Chance

(1) *Speech-language distinction.* Speech is what one says; language [*langue*] is the treasure through which the subject can speak. It is a system of possibilities. But how can we arrive at French "in itself"? In reality, each time that I speak, I aim at my language in its totality, and it is very difficult for me to delimit the frontiers of speech and of language. The opposition cannot be maintained under such a simple form.

(2) *Diachronic-synchronic distinction. From the diachronic point of view,* language is considered in the succession, according to a longitudinal slice. It seems to us like a series of accidental events. We notice the decline of a system falling into disuse, the accidental use of a detail which will then be taken up again and systematized.

From the synchronic point of view, language is considered in its totality at a moment of its becoming; it reveals itself as tending toward a *certain order, as forming* a system. Imagine that a planet was suddenly eliminated; the entire planetary system would be modified. It would reorganize itself by using the forces that inhabit it. The same happens in linguistics. Chance is the basis of all language restructurations. In this sense, we can say that language is the domain of the *relatively motivated:* nothing rational can be found in it that does not derive from some chance taken and elaborated as the means of systematic expression by the community of speaking subjects.

We could revise the Saussurean conception on some important points regarding the relationships between synchrony and diachrony. G. Guillaume posits the existence of a sub-linguistic scheme.[86] It is defined by an architectonic, in its different expressive modes, and develops through time that guides the diachronic. Therefore, language would not be a gestalt of the moment but a gestalt in movement, evolving toward a certain equilibrium and, moreover, capable once reaching this equilibrium of losing it by a phenomenon of wearing down and looking anew for another direction. According to a conception of this kind, there is an interior principle to language which selects from the accidents of the diachronic. Here chance and reason, diachronic and synchronic, are no longer simply *juxtaposed,* as Saussure would have it.

But even with those, like G. Guillaume, who rework the Saussurean conception of the relation between synchrony and diachrony, an essential element remains: *the idea of a kind of blundering logic in which development is not guaranteed, there could be all sorts of derailments, and wherein order and*

system are, however, reestablished by the drive of speaking subjects who want to understand and be understood.

[G.] Application to the Philosophy of History

The Saussurean conception, if we generalize it, might permit finding a way between these two major attitudes in philosophy regarding history. (1) *History* is a sum of independent events, of chance events (for example, Cleopatra's nose). (2) *History is providential;* it is the manifestation of an interior, it has a comprehensible development.

Bossuet's and Hegel's conception of history have, above all, something in common with those who argue for a historical destiny.[87] The spirit guides the world, and historical reason works "behind individual backs." In fact, this appears as a retrospective rationalization (Bergson, Aron). It is an afterthought that the idea appears like a causal idea and because these conditions of realization are given by hypotheses. In the moment, the sense and orientation of history are never realizable without the support of events, the presence at a named point of this or that exceptional individual, a "midwife" of events (Lenin).[88] No power *absolutely* guarantees the due date, even if it is made *probable.*

What Saussure saw is exactly these gears of chance and of order, this revival of the rational, the accidental. And we can completely apply to history his conception of language's history. Similarly, the motor of language is the will to communicate ("we are thrown into language [*langue*]," situated in language [*langage*], and by it engaged in a process of rational explication with others). Similarly, what moves the whole historical development is the *common situation* of men, their will to coexist and recognize one other.

The principle of order and historical rationality does not eliminate chance; it turns it or uses it. As Saussure could say, it converts the accidental into systems. It solicits and invests the pure event without eliminating it. Maybe it was an idea of this kind that created the originality of the *Marxist* conception of history (as opposed to the Hegelian conception). At least Trotsky understood it when he said that the logic of history can be considered metaphorically, like a kind of "natural selection." (Certainly this is only a metaphor; the forces at play here are those of productive humanity and not of nature. It is more a question of a "historical selection.") If certain regimes disappear, it is because they were incapable of resolving the era's problems, the intersubjective drive of the moment. What we call history's logic is a process of elimination whereby only the systems capable of facing the situation abide. History is not a hidden God

who acts for us and to whom we must submit. Men make their history as they make their language.

Conclusion. We could say about language in its relations with thought what we have said about the body in its relation to consciousness. Similarly, we cannot put the body in first place, nor, however, can we subordinate it, or draw out its autonomy (S. de Beauvoir).[89] We can only say that language makes thought as much as it is made by thought. Thought inhabits language; language is its body. This meditation of the objective and the subjective, the interior and the exterior, what philosophy searches for, we can find in language if we succeed in approaching it closely.

2

The Adult's View of the Child (1949–1950)

This first lesson will clarify our object of inquiry: pedagogy. How should we approach it?

I. The Position of Pedagogy in Relation to Other Disciplines

Normally, pedagogy is situated very simply in relationship to child psychology. We accept pedagogy as an educational technique that is dependent upon the science of child psychology. At first glance, the relationship between psychology and pedagogy seems clear: it is between science (the study of causes and consequences) and technique (the study of means and ends). In such a conception, pedagogy is a collection of techniques that encapsulate scientific psychology, transforming it into rules of action.

But in such a relationship pedagogy is doubly subordinated: first to psychology and then to the subsequent morality. This kind of subordination presupposes preestablished values which themselves are not put into question. (For instance, the kind of implicit assumptions that medicine postulates—is life more valuable than death?) We must ask if this kind of double dependence is tenable.

Relationship between pedagogy and morality. Is it the case that pedagogy must presuppose an established morality confined to apply to preestablished values? We disagree; we cannot accept any preestablished values before knowing the child's real situation. First and foremost, it is necessary to establish the value of the situation itself. We cannot establish the preconceived imperatives before knowing the adult-child conflicts. In *L'expérience morale* Frédéric Rauh clarifies the idea that no morality can be established a priori.[1] Insofar as there are only abstract ends, there is no real [*réele*] morality. A moral imperative only emerges in contact with a situation. Therefore, this first separation [*découpage*] is somewhat artificial.

Relationship between pedagogy and child psychology. The dependence of pedagogy on child psychology is also artificial. Pedagogy is not the application of psychology; pedagogy *is* entirely child psychology. As there is no such thing as a pure medical practice, likewise it is impossible for the teacher to separate observation from action. Since it is a matter of living beings, moreover of human beings, there is no such thing as pure observation. All observation is already an intervention. One cannot experiment or observe without changing something in the subject of inquiry. All theory is at the same time a practice. The connection between educator and child is not an accessory; it is essential in the situation.

Thus, we can say that the link between theory and practice is not one of linear dependency. It is a circular relationship where envelopment is reciprocal. All practice presupposes a judgment and thereby produces one. At the same time, all pedagogy is more or less a psychology. The teacher's problem is the same as the psychoanalyst and, more generally, the same as all experimenters: the teacher modifies the subject. This is only problematic if one ignores the proper sense of intervention. Intervention should only be understood through the child's reaction. Therefore, the adult simultaneously learns to understand himself and learns about the child.

In our relationships with children, children become what we make them. It is not important if we know what we have presented to the child. All responses the child makes to an adult's question are relevant. This circular relationship, even if it implies a danger of illusion, cannot be evaded. There is no other way to access the child's world. One must slowly extricate what comes from oneself and what properly belongs to the child. In summation, the connection between observation and action, between theory and practice, is never a matter of pure knowledge, but one of existence. With a sufficient amount of critical thought, one can hope to constitute a real understanding [*savoir reel*].

We do not thus find three naturally distinct disciplines, but instead unique work whose manner depends upon where the work is directed, be it toward the rules of behavior (morality), toward objective knowledge (child psychology), or toward the adult's reactions to the child (pedagogy).

Child psychology sees things more from the child's position and pedagogy more from the adult's. Therefore, pedagogy will be the description of the image the adult makes of the child. It seeks to know how the adult establishes relationships with the child and the nature of these relations in different periods of history.

II. Pedagogy and History

All research must turn to the history of pedagogy. The history of pedagogy will teach us, both in fact and in doctrine, the different behaviors of the adult toward the child. History helps us understand the mirror phenomena that intervene between the adult and the child: the child and adult reflect each other like two mirrors endlessly placed face to face. The child that we believe exists is the reflection we desire. We are all indissolubly tied to the fact that the other is facing us the way we are facing him. History alone can make sense of at what point we are the creators of the "infant mentality." History shows us the concomitant variations that make us believe that, for example, the "repression" that we associate with the child is founded on a biological necessity when in reality it is an expression of a certain conception of intrasubjectivity. No part of conscience's grasp is as difficult as the part that concerns us and the phenomena that escape us because we are directly implicated in the situation. From the history of ethnography, we understand the pressure that we place upon the infant.

Our relations with the child seem dictated by nature, established by permanent, biological differences. Our dominant behavior seems natural and necessary to us since the child needs us for everything. Children seem to be possessions because they resemble us; they seem to be our continuation, charged by nature to realize our hopes. Our attitude seems justified and even imposed on us by "nature," since the infant comes to the world destitute and powerless. But we should make the distinction Descartes does between "freedom" and "power."[2] Freedom is the same for all, but power, the ability to realize freedom, is not. This is true for the infant: at birth one is completely deprived of "power." Freedom is meaningless for the infant because no autonomy is possible. It is precisely the infant's state that compels us to take up the possessive attitude. In reality, the temporary poverty of the human infant is tied to his later power: it is because the infant will become a man that he has so few instincts; he is much longer deprived than an animal infant. In prolonging the authority beyond early infancy, the adult does not obey "nature," he creates dependency: he makes and innovates slavery.

We do not see how our behavior is derisory because it remains for us to be detached from a "ground" (as the Gestaltists say). By comparing ourselves to different civilizations, we are thus able to procure for ourselves precisely this ground and are able to understand our own civilization. History furnishes us with a double reference to the past and to other sectors of human activity. History reveals to us the profound unity of different attitudes: religious, economic, and political. We are therefore

brought to look for what is, for actual pedagogy, the dual contribution of psychoanalysis and historical materialism.

III. Pedagogy and Psychoanalysis

Instead of examining the relationship "adult-child," psychoanalysis occupies itself with the relationship "child-adult." However, in the course of analysis, typical adult reactions can emerge. Take, for example, the hostile reaction of a 65-year-old grandmother whose hostility toward her grandson is revealed to be ancient displaced hostility toward her brother born when she was two. We must examine how certain general behaviors can be reduced to analogous displacements.

It is the custom of certain tribes to only give a definite name to the child when he is admitted into the community. Everything happens as if the tribe distrusts the child, fearing all the unknown the child doubly represents. Insofar as the child is the reincarnation of the ancestors, one does not know if he will be hostile or benevolent. He is also an agent of dissolution due to his absolute ignorance of social conventions. We could approach the child's isolation and the defiant acts, such as infanticide, as terrified behavior in front of the child. We could also generalize research, like Freud's attempt in *Totem and Taboo* where he explains totemism as the celebration of the father's death disguised as an animal.[3] Must we therefore think of psychoanalysis as an instrument of a collective psychology and philosophy?

How far can we apply psychoanalysis to the study of social relations? Psychoanalysis studies inter-individual relations insofar as they are established during the course of life. In general, psychoanalysis does not occupy itself with behavior schemas anchored in social life (such as how the social imposes these schemas on individuals). Is it thus possible to understand psychoanalysis as a study of social life?

We should first note that Freud tends to see all historical or social drama as the manifestation of a family drama. He thus explains totemism as the disguised revalorization of an ancient parricide. However, the "social"—the part of life that is composed of connections with institutions—seems to be composed of the ritual itself, a conception of sacred and profane that is not the result of the individual's own experiences, but of something that *precedes the individual*. Living in a society signifies living an experience larger than the strictly individual experience. Is it not therefore paradoxical to interpret social manifestations solely as a function of the individual experience? Our insertion into a collection of

legitimate behaviors is influenced by modifications in our relationships *with others. Therefore, all our relationships with others do not seem to* be comprised from solely individual behaviors.

For the most part, Freud connects the child's attitude toward society to the parents (the parents being the first image of society the child has). But there are other factors that determine the social attitude, since all integration in society implies an extension, a modification of individual life. Freud shows the existence of properly social components in the individual's attitude. In his work on monotheism, he tries to show how monotheism, introduced by Moses and temporarily rejected after his death, triumphs after a certain lapse of time with the rehabilitation of Moses and the "return of the repressed."[4] In this piece, Freud assimilates the historical and social development of a neurosis (trauma, latency period, return of the repressed) and seems to admit the existence of collective traumas on the individuals acting for many generations. But insofar as he admits the influence of collective factors, he acknowledges that the individual drama is not the only determining factor. Collective history superimposes its rhythm upon the individual histories.

Conclusion. (1) Individual history is thus not the only determining factor in the social attitude (cf. the collective unconscious of Jung).[5] Intra-individual history (the individual's apprenticeship in social rules) and the historical-social drama play a great role in the formation of the individual. (2) In general, the schema invoked by Freud is established by analogy with the individual history. These are interesting views for their heuristic import and for the new perspective opened to research. But they are insufficient since they have no historical evidence. They are hypotheses, conjectures (for example, the original parricide of totemism) taken from individual psychoanalysis. But they are devoid of all that is authentic. They are based in individual psychoanalysis: a very concrete feeling that ties the doctor to patient and permits him to anticipate the patient's reactions and feelings.

Equivocations in the psychoanalytic conception. The sexual drama: does it have a universal explicatory value? It is possible to distinguish two psychoanalytic outlooks: psychoanalysis in a strict and a broad sense. The equivocation provided by these two outlooks is found intermixed in Freud and his disciples; they pass continually from one to the other even though there are essential differences between them.

Psychoanalysis in the narrow sense. In his first works, Freud constructs a strict psychoanalytic system. He reduces behavior down to its sexual component in three manners. First, adult behavior is based on infantile prehistory. Second, this infantile prehistory remains unconscious. Third, this infantile unconscious is of a sexual nature.

Psychoanalysis in the broad sense. Alongside this strict conception of psychoanalysis, we find a larger conception that predominates in the second period of Freud's career. The "broad psychoanalysts" are inspired by this period. For instance, take Politzer's *Critique of the Foundations of Psychology,* Bachelard, Sartre ("existential psychoanalysis"), and Lacan in his article on the family.[6] The broad conception of psychoanalysis differs from the first in each of the following three manners.

First manner. The infantile prehistory does not remain inert in the adult. Rather, the infantile prehistory is perpetually re-created by the adult's current attitudes. The "complex" is a trauma that the infant never wanted to overcome and one which he re-creates continually: the lack of acceptance entails regression.

Second manner. The notion of the unconscious is replaced by the notion of ambivalence. The best analysis of how ambivalence impacts us is given by Politzer. The unconscious, he [Freud] says, is a creation of the analyst in the following manner: when a patient recounts to the doctor a dream he had, the doctor *interprets* this "first report" according to certain rules, he translates it into the language of psychoanalysis: the "second report." The analyst conjectures that the first report was given in the spirit of the second. He implies that the subject wanted to hide, to repress the real signification. To Politzer, this substitution of the interpreted report for the original report is absolutely illegitimate. The second report appears only to the doctor who supposes that the patient has a second consciousness behind the first wherein all that is obtained by the analysis is contained. This process would be legitimate if the dreamer had his dream in the same state—the state of wakefulness—that he had when he made his first report. But, by definition, the waking man and the dreamer do not have the same perspective. In fact, the dreamer does not dream his dream like he later recalls it. He lives it with the symbols which are not conventional signs that permit him to disguise his thought in the dream, but rather with affective realities, full of sense, freely projected in him. Only when awake does he stop recognizing their sense. Therefore, the signification is for him an *ambivalent* state (lived, predicted, but ignored) and not an unconscious state.

We should therefore prefer this notion of ambivalence, which paints perfectly all that is equivocal in certain behaviors, "resistances" to treatment, in which the subject is partially complicit, attitudes of hate that are at the same time love, desires that express themselves as agony, and so forth.

Third manner: sexuality in the broad sense. Already in Freud, there is a place to distinguish the "genital" (i.e., only the sexual organs and their function) from the "sexual." In other words, sexuality is all affective

investment, implicated equally in the genital but which largely overflows this category. This terminological ambiguity is the origin for the critique of "pansexualism" in Freud's theory. In reality, it is not a pansexual explication, but a generalization of the notion of corporality, of body consciousness. Consequently, Freud employs the term "sexual-aggressive," indicating that the sexuality is tied to a general relationship of subject with other. During this second period, Freud equally develops the notions of projection, identification, and fixation. Essentially, they are all phenomena of alienation from the other that have a meta-genital sense.

All these psychoanalytic notions need to be reappraised and deepened. Therefore Lacan takes up a much more concrete notion than the idea of an infantile narcissism (the "mirror stage").[7] For the child, the contemplation of his own image is fascinating. The child tests the contrast between the vision of his body and that which he sees from outside—the one the other sees—and the image he has of himself (the contrast between me as an object and me as a living consciousness).

The relation with the other determines a certain identification with the other. For example, in the experience of a cricket; the presence of the other cricket provokes morphological transformations. This shows us that the side "relations with the other" imports itself to the "sexual" side of the individual. "Corporality" thus exceeds "sexuality," which can be considered as a major case. Sexuality is important in that it is the mirror of our relationship with the body. Therefore, we see that sexuality intervenes as a constituent of corporality; moreover, behavior can only be explained by corporality.

We see that it is equally impossible to reduce everything down to a strict, abstract psychoanalytic explanation. Take, for example, jealousy. We know that Freud explains jealousy through latent homosexuality of the jealous partner: a woman jealous of her husband is, in reality, passively attached to the other woman. The rivalry presents itself in an unusual manner: a rivalry between the husband and wife for the other woman instead of a rivalry between two women for the husband.

This interpretation does not appear to be tenable. We cannot conclude that the "homosexuality" of the jealous woman would exclusively manifest itself in the case of infidelity on the part of the husband and it would only be reserved for the husband's lover. This would signify that the other woman is only valorized through the husband; without him, no attachment or rivalry would exist. Thus, this interpretation repeats the major difficulties if we retain a "strict" psychoanalysis. But the "broad" interpretation gives this conception a profound and unquestionable interpretation. An attachment to the beloved always signifies much more than a simple attachment to the person; it encompasses all the

spheres of interest of the beloved: his family, his friends, all which he "invests himself in." In this sense, we can speak of a kind of sexual polymorphism of the woman in love. Tied to a man, she is fatally, through him, tied to everything to which he is attached. Therefore, in her identification with her husband, the jealous woman personally feels all the amorous relations he maintains with others. Moreover, her suffering proves that she is intertwined in all relations whether she desires to be or not.

This interpretation largely surpasses the "sexual" sphere and turns its attention to a general phenomenon: all human relations radiate; they "overflow" into their surroundings. There is no relationship of just two people; even the relations between a husband and wife encompass a collection of givens that influence their reciprocal sentiments. In this perspective, the idea of Freud seems unquestionable. The examples we give necessitate that we consider in social psychology the profound unity of all behavior.

IV. Pedagogy and Historical Materialism

The transformation of nature by human labor has a profound influence upon all human relations. It is through this transformation that we can also understand the adult-child relationship. The style of property, of machinery, and of production has a much greater influence on any given society than one might typically believe. The manner in which we "work" in the exterior world defines our mode of thought.

Exposé of Engels's conception in "The Origin of the Family."[8] Engels outlines the constitution of the present family structure in a largely conjectural fashion. He supposes that the family's constitution is preceded by an epoch corresponding to the Stone Age. The earth was undivided between clan members and only a few working instruments (spades and hoes) existed, which could be equally used by women or men. According to Engels, women and men equally participated in production: men devoted themselves to fishing and hunting, and women occupied themselves with the garden.

During this epoch, women were not at all subordinated to men, either in the bed or in the household. It is the invention of the plow that put an end to this equality. The plow cannot be driven by the woman, and thus agriculture became the man's privilege. At the same time, the desire to appropriate land into parcels was born. Since there were not enough hands to accomplish this work, one developed servile laborers (prisoners, slaves). This is the birth of private property. Engels calls the appearance

of the plow the "historic defeat of women." He concludes that a new social progress, shackled by private property, and the present familial and social structure, could not have taken place without women taking a back seat in productive life. The appearance of new industrial processes makes possible a reintegration of women in collective life.

This distorted situation of women is the source of all infantile traumas and all family conflicts. The present family structure, based in a fundamental inequality, is called upon to disappear and take with it all that is woeful in child upbringing.

Examination of Engels's concept. A certain discontinuity exists in his analysis; he proceeds with the following successive "leaps."

(1) The birth of private property with the appearance of the plow. Engels explains people's "desire" to own the earth, but he does not explain why this wish starts, why the idea of property is formed. For us, the idea of property is natural. But, at first, it must have been foreign, since people had previously ignored it. In Engels, this point remains mysterious. In order to clarify it, we must refer to Hegel's thesis in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* on property.[9] Hegel writes about the origin of the idea of property, an idea that joins itself as a fundamental property of our consciousness: that of the human body, of *our body.* This body is precious for us in its mode of affirming itself as a concrete figure of our power. Private property is just an expansion. If man feels solidarity with his body, the idea of property is easily conceived. How does man stop feeling himself as an integral part of a clan and assert his own individual existence? As an ultimate human creation, man's movement separates him from the anonymous collectivity: he asserts his individuality with each bodily motion.

Technological invention, far from creating self-assertion, presupposes its existence. Because he has become conscious of himself, man then looks for new vehicles of power. Progress consists in what *follows* new conquests; it becomes a behavioral stabilization and induces the successors to have that attitude that was present at the invention's origin. In summation, for the creator, the invention is a consequence of his own self-assertion. For the successive generations, the invention becomes the condition, but without the self-assertive intention and without a new creation.

To summarize, Engels's analysis does not distinguish conditions from causes. Evidently, the use of tools is a condition of power, but to say it is the cause of power does not make sense. Technology is a stabilization of a certain attitude. For the following generations, technology becomes the *grounds* for certain styles of thought.

(2) The second hiatus in Engels's claim resides in this concept:

private property makes the woman a slave. For Engels, the process is simple. While creating a slave to increase his productivity, man creates a supplemental, permanent slave for his house. But why, in this case, is he not content with an ordinary slave? Engels explains neither the advent of this slave's particular situation, nor the special relation that exists between husband and wife.

In analyzing this phenomenon, Hegel shows how it naturally follows from man's new attitude. Man takes an interest in dominating another human being who is not exactly a slave. The woman as half-slave takes on not just an economic significance but also a human one. Within his project of complete aggressive self-assertion, man creates a permanent witness to his superiority. We understand that the invention of new tools and the control over the woman follow from the same male assertive-aggressive attitude. However, it is not necessary to reduce one of these consequences of man's aggression to the other; the structure of the family is irreducible to the economic structure even though the two are due to the same intention of man. Therefore, there is no "superstructure" in the sense Engels intended; superstructure and infrastructure support one another.

For Engels, and in contemporary society, private property no longer has the same meaning it did at its origins. It has become the inverse: from an instrument of progress and conquest, it has become an obstacle that paralyzes new progress. How, then, are the same tendencies always sustained? The same family structures always remain, proving that the "superstructures" have their own power: they express a human attitude. They were present from the beginning. Thus, we find that they are not merely economic consequences.

Conclusion. Valuable parts of Engels's concepts exist, such as the consideration that economic phenomena have human significance. But it would be false to think that the economic infrastructure constitutes the only causality. The family is therefore not only an economic product of a society; it also expresses human relations. Historical materialism has within it, therefore, a psychoanalysis. In every human phenomenon, it is impossible to abstract from its economic signification, but it is equally impossible to subordinate all other significations to it. The connection is a reciprocal determination that historical materialism in the "broad" sense (as in psychoanalysis in the "broad" sense) takes into account perfectly.

The history of pedagogy permits us to understand our conception of the child. But before studying the situation of the child in primitive societies, we will consider the family relations that are present in our society.

[V. Family Relations]

A. Before the Child's Birth

Husserl writes that the birth of a human constitutes a problem which is "difficult to think about," even for someone as directly interested as the mother. Indeed, it is the beginning of a consciousness, the passage of a living being from the condition of an organism to that of a subject, the passage from the "in-itself" to the "for-itself."

The pregnant woman lives this problem in a primitive manner. She feels her own body to be alienated from her; it is no longer the simple extension of her own activity. Her body ceases to be entirely hers; it is systematically inhabited by another being. Her body will shortly bring another consciousness to the world. Her own pregnancy is not an act like all the others she accomplishes with her body. Pregnancy is more an anonymous process which happens through her and of which she is only the seat. On the one hand, the infant's body escapes her, but on the other, the infant who will be born is truly an extension of her own body. During the entirety of her pregnancy, she lives this major mystery which is not of the order of matter, nor of the order of spirit, but rather of *the order of life.*

In addition, pregnancy is accompanied by all sorts of anxieties, worries, and ambivalent feelings. The woman's sentiments regarding her pregnancy are always mixed sentiments, since there is always a latent conflict between her personal life and the invasion of what could well be called the species-life. For example, consider Hélène Deutsch's work in *The Psychology of Women.*[10] Deutsch observes some married women who have a strong desire to have a child; the excess of their desire covers up their fear of a new role. An awakening of all the female anxieties occurs: anxieties that are connected to her surroundings as well as to her own infantile conflicts.

Connections to the woman's surroundings. (1) *With the mother.* We observe two typical attitudes that pregnant women have toward their mothers. One is where she abdicates her future role as a mother to her own mother and considers herself more an older sister to her unborn child, who will, in reality, belong to her mother. Another is where she is afraid of and, at the same time, refuses abandonment. This attitude is often accompanied by guilty feelings. Hélène Deutsch cites many cases where the fear of being obliged to abandon the baby caused the mother to have a miscarriage.

(2) *With the husband.* The attitude a woman takes toward her pregnancy will depend a great deal on her feelings for her husband. If she loves him, she will model her feelings toward her child on those she holds

for her husband. If she hopes to attach herself to her husband with the child, her feelings will be different. But her pregnancy could equally be the occasion for a moral separation from her husband: she could love the child *against* the husband. She could love the child because he does not resemble the husband or hate the child because he does resemble him.

(3) *With the child.* Evidently, major troubles will arise from the manner in which she envisages her connection with the child. This connection is essentially ambivalent: the infant belongs to her, but she also belongs to him. A variety of positive and negative feelings are activated by this connection. Positively, in a certain manner, the child is the goal of her life, her justification. The child makes her feel as if she is necessary. Moreover, pregnancy transforms a woman's "value" in an instant, independently from her own merits. Psychoanalysts consider that for the woman pregnancy constitutes a compensation for the weaning complex. We must not understand this complex literally, but as an anxiety over the permanent separation with the mother. It is the beginning of the apprenticeship of solitary human life. In this sense, pregnancy returns the mother with another being to the current of life in communion.

At the same time, in a negative sense, it becomes necessary to renounce many personal projects, to endure exhaustion and fear of deformation. She feels that this mysterious operation which is occurring in her puts her in danger (i.e., the symmetry between birth and death). Moreover, in this difficult situation, a situation over which she has no control, she must passively await its development. She is accompanied by all sorts of fantasies. The child is sometimes imagined to be a hero, sometimes a monster, he is imagined to be destined to be the happiest or the most miserable of beings. Often, she acutely resents the significance of this birth and the modifications to her life that will result. Speaking about the arrival of the child for the couple, Hegel says that "the being-in-itself of their love falls outside of them." The child is at the same time the expression of the dual being of the parents as well as its negation. The child is the third person who can only transform the relationship. Hence, Hegel continues, "the birth of the child is the death of the parents." The birth of the child is at the same time the fulfillment of their union as well as its transformation.[11]

Many of pregnancy's phenomena are the expression of this fundamental ambivalence. The vomiting is at base a physiological modification, but we do not find it in other mammals. It is, in large part, psychologically conditioned. Psychoanalysts consider vomiting as a refusal of pregnancy, a symbolic expulsion of the child. An understandable rejection, since it is always about the conflict between the individual and the species. The fantastical "desires" are also artificial. They are obsessions with

the infantile character, encouraged and amplified by the situation. But these phenomena are certainly tied to the beginning of pregnancy, when the mother-to-be acquires a vague malaise apparently without a solution. Later, in the presence of the new being, she becomes sensible. When the outcome approaches, an appeasement occurs. However, some relative worries about the child persist.

B. After the Birth

We often note that right after the birth, a sentiment of strangeness, of unreality arises. We can comprehend these emotions by considering that the infant has a relatively self-contained prenatal life wherein he was an integrated part of the mother; he was her possession. As soon as birth occurs, the infant is no longer hers. The infant escapes her; she can no longer feel he is "hers" to the same degree. Certain psychologists believe the anesthesia given during pregnancy is responsible for these feelings, but we often discover the same feelings even when anesthesia is not present. Rather, such feelings are explained by the fact that the infant has now passed from being the imaginary infant—to whom all possibilities are open—to the condition of being the real infant who can never realize all the imagined possibilities, certainly not all at once. This is the difference between the multiplicity of possibilities and the unique real [*réel*]. A type of impoverishment always follows, accompanied by a disappointment. (For example, such disappointment always follows by the return of soldiers on leave. One has the impression of two sides, the "he is not that" and false impressions, due to the fact that it is obviously impossible to be complete in an instant. It is also the case that we give the infant, as soon as he arrives, the equivalent of what he is to be for his whole life. The same impression generally follows meeting a "great man" for the same reasons.)

At the same time, we must give the mother flexible time, long enough to take possession of her child, to identify with the infant, and to love him as her own. The relation between mother and child is partly a weak instinctual relation and also a human relation.

1. *The mother-child relation.* The mother considers her child as partly an extension, as a double of herself, and partly as an independent being, a witness for her. Hence, her behavior toward the infant changes depending upon which ambivalent feeling dominates. Without realizing it, the mother passes between a wish that the child will be strong and free and a wish that he will always be dependent on her. A number of conflicts can be born from this ambivalence, particularly if the mother has not succeeded in liberating herself from her own traumatic past.

Insofar as she considers children as her extensions and would like

to avoid allowing them to have their own experiences, she often achieves, since her behavior is incomprehensible to others, the exact opposite of what she anticipates. (For instance, take the example of Mrs. Mazzetti in Deutsch's *The Psychology of Women.*)[12] The mother also can make herself the slave of her children, giving the appearance of abdicating all her personal life in favor of the children's. In reality, this attitude is often a way to influence them. She takes her suffering as a weapon and attempts to provoke an affectionate attitude with her resignation.

In fact, in humanity, the adult-infant connection is always difficult, since all circumstances place in question the totality of that relation. For instance, take the case of the child who, having succeeded at solving a problem, tells his father "I got you!"[13] In general, no truly just behavior toward the infant is possible since, when faced with the adult who wants to reason with him using language, the instrument of reason, the child becomes a small animal. But as soon as the adult wants to treat the child as a small animal, the infant replies with language (Simone de Beauvoir).

Connection between mother and son. Often, the woman considers her son to be the man who will avenge her against the masculine superiority under which she has suffered. To achieve this goal, she will encourage the son to have an attitude even more "masculine" than what she approves in other men. But just as she wants the famous and great in her child, in order to satisfy her own ambitions through him, she will also want to protect him from all risks. For the loss of her child would signify the failure of her life.

Connection between the mother and her daughter. Other identifications will complicate the connection between mother and daughter. On the one hand, she starts her life again with the daughter, but on the other hand, she sees in her daughter a rival who could oust her from the house and life. Hence, the paradoxical anger the mother has toward a daughter who is far too capable to replace her. The mother experiences simultaneous emotion and irritation at seeing her daughter becoming a woman.

In summation, we see that the mother-child connection is not guided by a "maternal instinct" capable of automatically resolving all problems. All the mother's problems are reflections of her attitude toward her husband and child and pose the risk of compromising the equilibrium of the family. Therefore, it is illusory to recommend that a young woman should marry and have children in order to remedy her difficulties. Maternity, after a short period of calm, can only accentuate a woman's neurosis. Maternity does not resolve personal problems, it often aggravates them. Balanced mothers were balanced before becoming mothers.

Connection between the mother and her adult son. In certain respects, it is during her decline as a useful person that the woman feels the greatest passion for her son. He is the living justification of her life having

become empty of meaning; he is the compensation for her useless presence. Hence, the rivalry with the daughter-in-law is often tragic. She is the stranger who robbed her of her son and who replaces her in the mother role. For instance, consider the case of Mme. Lefebvre, who coldly killed her pregnant daughter-in-law and never manifested the least remorse for the act.[14]

2. *The father's role.* The father's attitude toward his children is as ambivalent as the mother's. He identifies with the child and oscillates between domination and sacrifice. As in all identification, elements of sadomasochism are present in his behavior. He feels the child to be a second him who, since the child is part of him, compromises him when the child acts in such a way as to need a reprimand. But the punishment hurts the father himself since he identifies with the child. We often see parents who are irritated with their children and reprimand them; but as soon as someone comes to intervene, they side with the child. However, the father's problems with the child are much less acute than those of the mother for several reasons. The father's identification with the child is less strong and has a different nature. The mother's identification is based in gestation, in a physiological communion. The father's is much later and is composed on a different level: our customs give the man a greater serenity in his conflicts with the child from the fact that he is separated from the child for most of the day. He arbitrates conflicts from long and far away, often giving more generously, and including a factor of chance in his decisions. But this does not mean the role of the father is insignificant. His image is one of the most stable and strongest in the life of the child. His power is in his sole presence that makes its mark.

The sociological point of view. In many respects, paternity is an institutional tie. In studying the sexual and family relationships in the Trobriand Islands, Bronislaw Malinowski notes that the tribe makes no connection between the sex act and conception.[15] One is not the cause of the other. No real tie thus exists between the father and his children. For the child, the father's role is a distracting and consenting one. Repression and severity are left to the maternal uncle. By this kind of disassociation of the parental function, less conflicts arise between the father and his children.

The Oedipus complex is considerably attenuated. But sociologists have noted that the tribes organized on the above model are lazy and inactive. They found that a degeneration of the paternal role ("the decline of the paternal imago") might be accompanied by a cultural degeneration (consider Lacan's "Family Complexes" article).[16] We could say that the father's identification with his child is a *construction* in the sense that it is not inscribed in destiny but constituted by a free decision. This is not to say that the identification is arbitrary; it is a human realization created by communal life.

C. Conclusion

The relations with the other are always complicated. Even in an objective discussion, the triumph of reason is always felt as a personal triumph. Moreover, situations are rarely completely equal. Even if we make an effort to respect the autonomy of the other, even if we grant the other freedom, the other will never feel completely free since he receives his freedom in a partnership. Even within adult relations, we can always leave the dilemma by instituting a situational equality. We can place the relationship on a level above conflict (such as in friendship or marriage) and renounce the battle.

By definition, this equality does not exist and cannot be created between the adult and the child. During the first two years of life, the infant is completely deprived of "power," giving the parent a dominating habit. Following this stage, the perfectly fair attitude is impossible; the attitude will always move from one extreme to another, sometimes respecting the freedom of the child too much, sometimes not enough. Many conflicts are born from the parents envisioning the future. Children and adolescents think only of the present. Neither one can behave otherwise. Therefore, no equality is possible between the parent and the child. First, it is too easy to persuade the child since it is our authority, and not our reason, which persuades them. But, second, we can never persuade them completely. The child has the conviction that he is influenced and conditioned by the adult even if the adult only wants to reason with the child.

Therefore, even without wanting it, we cannot avoid encroaching upon the child's freedom. The adult's duty is to nonetheless reduce this encroachment to what is strictly necessary: not to respect all the child's fantasies, but also not to consider everything a fantasy. We must carefully examine our own attitude and avoid, in our behavior, acting upon past traumas instead of what is dictated by the present situation. It is necessary to go even further and accept risks for the child that we accept for ourselves. Avoiding all risks for the child will only create others. Relations with the child will never have an absolute objectivity, but we must make a kind of disequilibrium which will not be to the child's detriment.

The memory of their own childhood doubly controls the parents' behavior *toward their children.* First, they identify with their own parent, thereby being authoritative and repressive. Second, they identify with their children, being complicit and showing solidarity with them. One or the other of these identifications might constantly prevail. In general, they arise in turn in the same adult and provoke contradiction and ambivalence, characteristics of the adult-child relationship. Since their past controls their current behavior, a summary description of the child's stages of development and influences on the adult's behavior is necessary.

VI. Stages of Child Development

The views of Dr. Lacan are interesting in that they revise and enlarge psychoanalytic conceptions.[17] First, he proposes *a new conception of complexes*. We must understand the notion of "complex" not in the sense of an unhealthy formation, but, rather, as the key to all normal formation (there is no "man without complexes"). A complex is a stereotypical attitude regarding certain situations. In some way, the complex is the most stable element of behavior, being a collection of behavioral traits which are always reproduced in analogous situations. The complex is only unhealthy when the behavioral unity is acquired by an initial trauma (or, according to the vocabulary of Janet, a nonliquid situation).

In this sense, we can say that the base of the family is not the instinct, but the complex. Whatever the instinctual base, it is transformed by the human factor. A familial complex is the collection of typical attitudes in the human family. Family attitudes are sometimes generated through progress, sometimes by neuroses, and subsequently they either do or do not open up the child's experience.

The notion of the imago. Complexes are revealed by the presence of an "imago." The imago, in the Freudian sense, is neither an actual nor a sensed representation, but an implicit ground of behavior. For example, a man might never think about traumatic memories from his infancy; but they might preside over all he does. He remains dependent: his present suffers from past experiences. Lacan tends to replace the notion of "unconscious" with that of "imaginary." For example, the imago, in place of being deeply buried in the "unconscious," should be considered as a formation of the "imaginary." In other words, the imaginary is projected before consciousness. The imaginary totally replaces the retrospective conception by a *prospective conception*. Now we will study the complexes that mark child development in their order of appearance.

A. The Weaning Complex

For Lacan, sexual complexes appear at a much later date than assumed by classical psychoanalysis. The oldest of sexual complexes is that of weaning. We must not only understand the infant's troubles, but also what is the signification of the retreat of the maternal breast in human consciousness. The maternal breast has an unquestionable symbolic character. It is impossible to suppose that an infant of a few months has a clear perception of his environment. Equally impossible at that age is the idea that the infant has an "oral eroticism" which would suppose a precise and differentiated consciousness.

Yet, during the first weeks, we must account for a sensibility of the maternal presence, a confused perception of the mother's being. In addition, we must explain the fusion between the mother and the infant at her breast. We can assume that the separation of weaning reproduces and accentuates the first separation: birth.

The experience of birth is characterized by physical anguish caused by asphyxia and the changing of place, a certain uncomfortable labyrinth. The first six months of pregnancy are more or less imbued [*imprégnés*] (the "difficulty of being"). Thus, even though the infant does not remember *the fact of birth,* he conserves a memory of discomfort and can *imagine* the well-being that preceded this period (the unquestionable reality of fantasies of a maternal breast, a closed universe, etc.). In adult thought, birth signifies separation, and weaning, in constituting a more painful rendition of birth, is tied to all sorts of difficulties (teething, walking, etc.). The two are associated in the mind, forming a contrast with the "paradise lost."

The complex of weaning has important repercussions for the mother's behavior; she feels the discomfort of the child, since she too had the breast, and she looks to diminish the shock as much as possible. Hence, the persistence of care for the child and the stubborn will to protect the child from all the "unhappiness of life."

Consequences of the weaning complex. Continual problems arise after this complex; it can halt the individual's development instead of promoting it. After weaning, Freud's "death instincts" often manifest. Moreover, one must understand the absences of instincts and of insufficient vitality. Many troubles—psychological anorexia, gastric neuroses, and so forth—are reminders of the refusal to eat and the loss of a will to live after weaning. These manifestations of refusing to live a separate life from the mother are accompanied by a desire to return to the maternal breast, to safety, a return to totality, to the home, and so forth. (For instance, the parallels between many ethnographic languages and rites about the earth and the maternal breast: maternal earth, the earth representing life, etc.) In every case, the "weaning complex" is never a simple derivative of cessation of lactation, but a development and an enriching of an attitude taken as the beginning of life.

B. The Intrusion Complex

The intrusion complex is the collection of stereotypical attitudes taken toward brothers and sisters. It is not a matter of a rivalry of the vital order (for food, etc.), but of a human jealousy, competition for the love of the parents which is often activated by the birth of a sibling. Above all, the

intrusion complex is founded upon the identification of the oldest child with the youngest: the spectacle of the caring for the baby reawakens the need, and the desire, to return to the maternal breast. Later, we will see the complex arise in *play:* if the children are of similar ages, rivalry will determine the relationship. The simplest game will result in repetitious, continual provocations and counterattacks. If the age difference is greater, the relationship is modified: showing off (which is always showing off to the other and showing off to one's self), seduction attempts, ordering, and so forth. But, fundamentally, it is always an identification *with the other.*

Thus, jealousy is explained not by a homosexual libido, as Freud thought, but by identification. Lacan neatly distinguishes the identification and desire. Primarily, it is not a sexual relation. The jealous person's identification with the other is twofold. First, he experiences all that the other experiences; he leaves himself and becomes absorbed in the other. Second, he also feels the opposite: he hates the other. As a mixture of sadism and masochism, no fundamental differences between these two attitudes exist; they are tied to each other. In identification, suffering inflicted by the other is inflicted on oneself. Inversely, suffering inflicted on oneself appears in the other's being.

In the eyes of Lacan, masochism takes up and willingly accentuates the weaning complex, thus it is not constituted by a particular case (certain games, according to Freud, are symbols of weaning: taking, hiding, and then retrieving an object by one's own hand, for example). The masochistic child will suffer close to other children. Others might admire him, but also detest him. The attitude passes to the other's role: that is, the hostility of submission in extreme cases from death to suicide (at least symbolically). The image of one's brother who has not been weaned can reawaken the "imago" of the maternal breast and the death tendencies. The infant will come to establish a systemic relation with the other due to the mirror stage.

Importance of the mirror stage. The reaction the infant has to the mirror is specifically human; like with photo-identification, we do not find this ability in any other animal.[18] A great ape will show interest in front of a mirror and then look around the back to see what is present. Only the child will attentively contemplate the mirror, recognizing himself and responding with an intense jubilation. This jubilation responds clearly to the correspondence between observed changes in visual appearance and interior intention. For the infant, the event of the mirror image signifies a certain recuperation of his own body. Before this visual control, there is only a splitting, a bodily dispersion (for instance in castration fantasies, a particular case of this state, and unquestionably in many dreams and myths).

First, because of the mirror, a visual integration of one's own body takes place in proprioceptive consciousness. But, second, the mirror also represents a psychological danger to the child. Lacan takes up and enriches the myth of Narcissus. Seized by passion for his own image, he throws himself in the water to grasp it and perishes by drowning. Freud had always looked for the sexual component of narcissism, the libido turned toward one's own body. Lacan explores the myth and more completely integrates other components: (1) the inclination for death, the destruction of the self; (2) the predilection for the self as a spectacle (an examination or inventory of the self); and (3) the solitude component that is implicated by narcissism. The adult narcissist, seducer and despot, wants too much to see and to be seen and, at the same time, refuses the other. Therefore, the mirror equally permits the subject to isolate himself and to establish a reciprocal system—to facilitate the other's interference.

In the article "Presentation on Psychical Causality," Lacan again takes up the mirror problem.[19] The mirror image permits the infant to confirm his position in the world, his "passion for being a man," and "this craziness by which a man believes himself to be a man." The mirror image limits and suppresses the overcoming of one's human condition.

Lacan cites two experiments which prove the importance of the perceptual image of the body for animals. (1) Harrison's experiment with the female pigeon. The ovulation of the female is provoked solely, to the exclusion of all other senses, by the sight of a fellow pigeon. The sight of the male produces ovulation in about twelve days; the sight of the female takes about two months and the sight of the pigeon's mirror image takes two and a half months. (2) Chauvin's experiment with crickets. Two varieties of crickets exist with different morphologies: a gregarious variety and a solitary variety. Chauvin proves that the young cricket will develop into one variety or the other depending upon which kind of cricket he sees at a young age. These two sets of experiments demonstrate that there is a rudimentary recognition mechanism in animals. In man, we have said that one's own body image has a profound significance. In the animal, the body image is codetermined by mechanisms that one had believed to be strictly biological.

C. Oedipus Complex

1. *Definition.* According to Freud, the Oedipus complex is the situation created by an incestuous attachment to the parent of the opposite sex. Lacan objects by claiming it is not possible to conceive of a sexual attachment in children as young as four to seven years, where the child's sexuality does not correspond to any precise experience. For Lacan, no feeling

exists that exactly corresponds to the adult's feeling. Rather, a kind of anticipation exists that, as we often find in the course of child development, abruptly pulls the child to a psychological level quite advanced for his age. It is a kind of psychological puberty prior to real puberty. At this moment, sexual differentiation is founded more upon physiognomy, a general allure; it is a nonthematized sentiment and is not incestuous in the adult sense. This kind of sexual pre-maturation occurs around the fifth year and then regresses until puberty, when sexuality is actualized. The Oedipus complex, wherein both identification and rivalry with the parent of the same sex occur, is also compounded by that parent's forbidding that subsequently produces a sense of guilt in the child.

2. *The "Oedipus complex" and the "Electra complex."* Freud conceived of girl and boy development in a parallel manner, later giving the name "Electra complex" to the girl's attachment to her father. However, several essential differences exist. (1) The boy's fixation on his mother is more precise than the girl's on her father. Like the boy, the girl is primitively fixated upon her mother; her development operates by a kind of change, whereas the boy is directly attached to the mother. Due to prestige, repression is also stronger in the boy than in the girl; the father's authority makes his sanctions more frightening than those of the mother. (2) The evolution of sexual sentiments and their function cannot be identical in the case of girls and boys, due to differences in structure. The boy's evolution is more directly tied to the genital organs and development is more continuous. The girl's evolution is the passage from a diffuse sexuality to a genitally organized sexuality carried out by the passage from clitoral sexuality to vaginal sexuality. (3) Another essential difference concerns the evolution of the "castration complex." According to Freud, at around five years of age, the little girl discovers the difference between the sexes. She must give up an "imaginary virility" which she translates by detaching herself from the mother and attaching herself to her father. In the boy, the castration complex is more closely tied to the formation of the *superego;* it is an aspect [*instance*] of surveillance and punishment. The superego is more fragile in the girl due to her primitive attachment to the same-sex parent; the love for the father is always a second love for the girl.

Critique of the above point of view. There is no reason to believe that the girl, due to her physical nature, has a different kind of castration complex. In reality, castration fantasies are only a particular case of the split body, a fantasy common to everyone. In addition, if, as Melanie Klein remarks, an envy of virility exists in the girl, equal regrets of maternity must exist in boys.[20] However, the girl's envy is rarely based in a precocious discovery, but more in a constructed image of masculine power. Since the feeling of pride is attached to the sexual organ, and can only

be known from the interior of the boy himself, it is not certain that this sort of covetousness equally occurs in the Freudian sense. In summation, Freud understands the evolution of boys' and girls' feelings in a too symmetrical fashion.

3. *The importance of the Oedipus complex.* Lacan tells us that we need to retain the essential aspects of Freudian concepts. The Oedipus complex, with obvious risks of deviation, determines the individual's subsequent development. For the boy, the attachment to the mother can awaken and support the weaning complex, supporting regression and awakening the "death instincts"—a lack of desire to live. But the attachment to the mother contains an extremely important aspect: the identification with the father, the desire to resemble him. For the girl, identification with the mother does not contain the same dangers, since she finds in maternity a normal exit from the weaning complex. The importance of the Oedipus complex consists in the child realizing, for the first time, an objectification of the exterior world, a world distinct from the child. The child's subsequent life will depend upon what this objectification causes in him. Thus, according to Lacan, the Oedipus complex has two functions: a negative one, repression, and a positive one, sublimation and training.

Repressive function. The Oedipus complex plays a considerable role in the formation of the superego due to the collection of prohibitions and punishments (be they real or imagined) it represents. However, Lacan thinks the prohibitions that concern the body go back much further in the child's life. Anal education and the abandonment of immediate satisfactions might form an archaic superego, providing the rudiments of the feeling of splitting and of castration. The idea that one cannot become a real man without sacrificing part of one's own body is profoundly rooted in the minds of men; we find evidence for it in many primitive rites.

Sublimation function. With its identifications, the Oedipus complex contributes to the formation of the ideal self, of "conscience." It assures the constitution of the masculine or feminine ideal that the child wants to achieve. But this formation obviously cannot be realized without some conflicts.

4. *The question of the universality of the Oedipus complex.* Freud, in *Totem and Taboo,* presents the hypothesis of the universality of the Oedipus complex.[21] He imagines a primitive family strongly dominated by the father. The sons murder their father. After a latent period and the return of the repressed, the restoration of the father's authority is established in a totemic cult with a commemoration of the murder (totemic communion), guilty feelings, and a number of sexual prohibitions. This conception is not based in any actual historical analysis, and many counterarguments exist against it.

In matrilineal societies, sexual repression is not absent. The incest prohibition is universal. As to the universality of the complex, which is based on the thesis of an original parricide, one finds societies which do not have an Oedipus complex (cf. Malinowski). The Oedipus complex might be an "institution" tied to the structure of our society. Even given this hypothesis, the question remains of whether the Oedipus complex assures a better cultural development in the societies where it exists (Lacan). One can argue that a sort of stagnation and degeneration exists in societies where the Oedipus complex and the paternal imago have lost their force. It is in surmounting the fixation upon the mother and the tendencies toward death incarnated by a mother fixation that man would become capable of progressing. In the matriarchy, the spirit of sublimation is dominated by social regression because the two functions are separated (i.e., the dispelled maternal uncle).

It is interesting to confront this thesis with a contrary one according to which civilization should include a reintegration of women in productive society and should abandon masculine oppression. Society should make use of all the values of the feminine condition which until now have been "lost to history" (Stendhal, cited by Simone de Beauvoir).[22]

5. *Analysis of an example: Sun Chief.* An illustration of all the infantile conflicts brought to light by psychoanalysis is found in the autobiography, *Sun Chief,* of a Hopi Indian in Arizona.[23] It is the life of a worker who, having lived for some time in an American milieu, returns and settles, finally and definitively, in his village. He lives in a little village 1,500 meters above sea level in the desert of Arizona; a village haunted by memories of famines, the society in seeming decadence. Certainly, he is not like "everyone." He tells about his birth and how, in the stomach of his mother, he had a twin sister. But, during birth, the village doctor pressed too hard and united the two people into one. Thus, he carries on his forehead a mark attesting to the presence of his "sister" in him.

He had several traumatic experiences during his childhood. He caught his parents having sex and believed his father was in the midst of killing his mother. Ultimately, he felt a hostile reaction to his parents' solicitude. Another experience involved a real, or almost real, castration threat. While pushing a bad joke too far, his grandfather grabbed and mimed as if he would castrate him. When he fainted, the women, who were very angry, found nothing else to say to the grandfather but, "When he is older, he'll do it to you!" Generally, the relationship between children and old men is one of rivalry.

The child learned that all the legends of his tribe have a threatening character. One is the "double-hearts"—a kind of vampire who kills or demands that one kill his brothers and sisters. Another is the "Kachinas,"

the leftovers of the "double-hearts." On a fixed date, dancers mounted on stilts go throughout the village in order to entrap the children. The mothers appease them with gifts of meat. A mixture of game and real belief exists in these rites. Don, the hero of the story, also believes he met a "spider-woman" one night in the country. She wanted to ensnare him. (The parents calmed him, but they more or less believed in her as well.)

Pedagogical process. A distinct repression of violent manifestations, at least in appearance, exists. It is forbidden to hit children, and all violence puts children in danger ("natural" deaths are often the result of bad thoughts; any violent act can have incalculable consequences). The only mode of permitted punishment has a religious character. The child is placed in contact with threatening elements, specifically ones that suffocate: that is, the child is under a blanket, or is placed in smoke, or is bathed in ice water. Cruelty is also masked. However, it manifests itself during games. Old men put children on guard against sexuality, given the physical danger the woman represents for the man.

At ten years old, a brother is born. Don tries to suffocate him, and after having been slapped by his mother, a rare occurrence, he tries to commit suicide (cf. intrusion complex). Following this incident, he leaves for an American school thirty kilometers from his village. At around fourteen years old, he attempts his first sexual acts. Meeting some young girls in the middle of bathing, he turns around (conforming to the laws of society), but he stops not far away, well in sight, in order that they will come and join him. This attitude of ambiguous belief will characterize his subsequent life: a respect for forms of the law when they suit him.

At fourteen, his voice breaks, he starts growing a mustache, and he has curious dreams (young girls who transform into boys as soon as he wants them to approach him). (Cf. *sexual ambivalence,* noted by Freud, at this stage of development.) An incident which characterizes the form of violence that is the most authorized: violence between young and old men who find themselves in a state of permanent war. Don returns to his village, meets his grandfather, and lassos him and pulls him throughout the village.

When he leaves school, he travels to Colorado. His first purchase is a revolver (aggressivity). At this time, there is dissent in the village. Most of the villagers are hostile toward whites and, after an arbitration between them, some villagers move and establish themselves farther away. Don is one of those who stay.

Affective episode. When he meets a starving woman, Don wants to protect her. Hunger and the memory of ancient famines (where it seemed that people devoured the children) remain strong emotional factors. The episode with this woman does not last long, and therein one finds

another permanent trait of Don: each time a woman seduces him, he asks her to marry him and then completely forgets his proposal when another woman appears. He joins a Christian church, takes part in the YMCA: the only time he wishes he were white.

Important crisis. When he learns his sister has died in childbirth and that her death is attributed to the "double-hearts," he is brought back to his origins. This news awakens in him feelings of guilt; he asks why the "double-hearts" did not take him in place of his sister. The very same day, he catches pneumonia, and the care he is given at the hospital doesn't work. He thinks he has offended the "double-hearts" (who are equally powerful, evil, and unhappy), and he has a vision which he will remember for the rest of his life. A "Kachina" counsels him to visit the kingdom of the dead—to hurry and rejoin his body before dying. In his voyage to the hereafter, he passes through his village and meets his mother (who does not see him), then meets his grandmother, whom he recognizes as a "double-heart." Finally, he arrives at a bifurcation where he must choose his path (a common mythical theme). He chooses the good, meets some bizarre animals who cry to him to be quick, and he arrives at the mountain in front of the House of the Ancestors. Some kinds of clowns tell him he is late; he must make another important choice between two different elixirs. He chooses the one that brings him back to life. Old men counsel him to save himself without returning (a well-known myth, expressing incarnation and the contingency which must be overcome). He escapes from bad spirits. The animals he previously met tell him he must return and live for a long time. Now he knows that his body is "habitable enough." He awakes and looks around, the hospital personnel already believe him to be dead! Once again, he sees his "guardian angel," the "Kachina," who promises to watch over him and reprimands him four times, after which, if he fails to act better, he will die (cf. children and psychasthenics: recourse to numbers).[24]

Definitive return. He remains quite struck by his experience, which very easily submits to the rites of his tribe. His greatest preoccupation is to avoid marriage. However, he has many adventures with his clanswomen, knowing he cannot marry them. Finally, he marries much later, loses three young children, and is accused of sorcery (but not judged). He can no longer have children and adopts a son.

Second psychophysical crisis. In the middle of a fight with his adoptive son, he threatens to hit him. In anger, the son retorts "Then kill me, right away." The father has a pathologically angry crisis and beats his son (very rare behavior among the Hopis). He then reproaches his son for wanting his own death. In fact, he feels his own death approaching; he has all sorts of physical symptoms with suffocating feelings. Finally, they cease. How can we explain this violent and sick behavior?

Anger and illness in the incident with his son. The violent behavior between Don and his son contrasts with the typical gentleness between Hopi parents and children. Don was accused of sorcery on the occasion of the death of his three children and adopted an aggressive defensive attitude, saying "Kill me right away." When his son takes the same attitude against him, it awakens his guilty feelings. He projected this guilt upon his son, wanting to reverse the situation: it is the son who provokes his death and *Don becomes ill.* The symptoms are the same as the authorized punishments of his youth: inability to breathe, suffocation. In addition, a problem with his mouth occurs, recalling a particularly cruel punishment from his grade-school teacher: he was forced to keep a piece of soap in his mouth for an extended period of time. All the symptoms are tied to the traumatic experiences of his youth.

Conclusions. We can place Don's entire life under the sign of "alienation." All responsibility, all autonomy is delegated to an external authority: customs, spirits, and so forth. The "bad conscience" in a Hegelian sense is this conscience which is placed outside of itself, outside of its center. In this society, we note the importance of repressing violent manifestations. One cannot exteriorize violence; it expresses itself in dreams and legends. All the concerns of birth and death are imprinted with concerns about violence. Any natural death is suspicious, believed to be caused by bad thoughts. We must also underline the importance of questions about food: a haunting memory of ancient famines.

The entirety of the suppressed violence is reflected in the relationship between parents and children. It appears gentle, but behind it there is antagonism of "young and old" (symbolized in the young boy's initiation to manhood, dances, and violent jokes that express how the boy will, from now on, have the ability to oppress the elder men). Sexual relations are free and indulgently viewed. But from time to time, they reveal a terror and a profound distrust (the old men putting the young boys on alert).

In general, social relations are a mixture of hatred and love. A general ambivalence and alienation permit the creation (in the case of Don, more or less) of two completely separate psychical regions: the supernatural and the quotidian (as one sees frequently in primitives: a bipartition of the world). With this example, we see how it is impossible to reduce a behavior to either a sexual or a social cause. There always exists an interaction of the two with an individual position taken in response to every problem. Hence, we can understand the intersection of conditions and their consequences.

6. *Analysis of another example: the child's condition in the Trobriand Islands. Exposé by Mlle Grandjean on Malinowski.*[25] In this society, the "father" is considered foreign in the child's conception. He is simply the

only man living in the house, the husband of the mother. Marriage is *patrilocal*. The children's duties toward the father are legitimated by the care he gives them. The house belongs to the father; he is the master of it. But the woman's role is considerable, and certain objects belong to her. The parental authority is exercised by the mother's brother, who lives in the house. The boy receives his inheritance from the uncle.

Many rigorous taboos exist that are always effectively followed. Children are reincarnations of dead spirits who take their form when they are tired of their eternal youth. They float on water and enter the woman's body, typically through the head. Paradoxically, illegitimate children are excluded despite absolute sexual freedom. The explanation which is given is that children do not have a father to pamper them. Another contradiction is that it is unbecoming to say the child "resembles the mother." The father, although he is not the cause of the child, is thought to form the child's face through the constant care he gives him.

During her pregnancy, the mother lives far from her husband. Men are very proud of their family (sisters, cousins, and daughters). Children are not weaned until much later—until the child says he is hungry or thirsty. Neurotic or difficult children are taken to the beach or to another village; the difference in air is thought to aid them. Children are extremely free, and they are not made to obey their parents. This freedom also occurs in sexual games. Parents do not punish children, and in the case where they do hit them, the parents accept any retort as normal. In general, the idea of punishment is considered immoral and inconceivable. Children create a sort of "republic of children" where they are completely free.

Sexual life is not hidden from the child. Often, children witness their parents' sexual relations. They are merely asked to not show too much curiosity. Except for the numerous taboos, there is no moral code. Girls from four to five years and boys from six to eight years start making sexual gestures within their games. Adolescents also have sexual freedom.

Taboos. Tenderness between brother and sister is strictly forbidden; they are prohibited from playing together. While growing up, the child must learn the many taboos (often a traumatic event, since they are raised without any constraint) and the society's laws. The child then learns he does not belong to his father's clan but to that of his maternal uncle. He learns his own father is to be considered a stranger. Like children, adolescents live communally. They possess "Houses of Singles" where they meet but do not live. The House can hold three to five couples at a time and is greatly used.

Matrimonial life. Adolescent sexual affairs are restricted by engagements. The most favorable marriage situation is a man's son with his sis-

ter's daughter. This is a way for the man to give his son the benefits of the allowances and gifts he is obligated to give his niece. The daughter-in-law, his niece, is the true family relation who will protect the old father from any stranger's sorcery. By contrast, marriage between the children of two sisters is forbidden.

7. *Further information about Malinowski's observations.*[26] *The father's situation.* A conflict arises when physiologically the father looks more like his real son than his nephew who should inherit his looks. Many expedients are offered: he can give his son the right to enjoy his goods; he can arrange for his son to marry his cousin. Thus, the son will benefit from his heritage.

The wife's situation. The woman enjoys a certain social value; she owns personal objects, water jugs in particular. Her family must furnish her with half of the household needs. Sometimes the woman seeks divorce, but the husband rarely does. Yet the husband is the master of the house. Being patrilocal, neither the wife nor the children (who, in principle, after their early infancy rejoin the village of their maternal uncle, since it is considered to be their true village) are truly at home. The wife retains the prerogatives and taboos of her rank. If need be, she retains her social superiority when married. But she does not exercise the power; she is the representative of her clan's chief. As for magic, women practice a more poetical, lyrical magic than a practical magic (healing the ill). Practical magic is reserved for men (except the healing of toothaches).

Marriage. A striking contrast exists between the liberal life of singles and the strict character of marriage. No marriage ceremony exists: the couple walks together in public and takes their meals together. If the parents of the woman agree to the marriage, they send a present. If not, they come to take their daughter back. The young couple must live with the husband's family until the following harvest, when they can set up their own house. The married couple displays a great deal of affection and always devotes part of their free time to conversation. A husband has the right to kill an adulterous wife. But if she first decides to leave him, he cannot oppose her decision. Generally each person remarries very quickly. Several women, falsely accused of adultery, took their own lives. Malinowski interprets these suicides as demonstrating that for the wife it is equally impossible to continue to live with or without the husband. But perhaps we must also equally observe the intention to show the husband his error (such as the "honor" suicides in the Far East).

The clan's chief has the right to have many wives. We find three types of wives in his house: predecessor's wives, women chosen in his youth, and younger women that replaced deceased wives. He has the

right to any woman he meets, but it is also the case that the fidelity of the woman is not as rigorous as in ordinary marriages.

The pregnant woman is completely respected. She receives a special dress; she is taken to the baths (to be purified). During birth, she lives at her mother's and all men are removed from the house. After birth, she must rest alone for two more months with strict taboos (for instance, she cannot talk to her husband except through a door). Until the child is weaned, she stays alone with him. Such a situation is very favorable for the infant, attenuating the majority of the traumas of birth.

The children. Children are not acquainted with violence, punishment, or sexual repression. They thus come very quickly to combine affectionate feelings with sexual behavior. One does not observe in such societies, as so frequently in our society, a disassociation between sexuality and feelings of love. Marriage has not only economic interests in its origin, but also the will to make solid and official the bonds of tenderness which already unite the couple and their desire for children.

Negative aspects. As compensation for nonviolence, one finds (probably disappearing) stories of public orgies and the story of a custom where a woman chooses a man by cutting him with a knife. One also finds aggressive elements in castration fantasies and in legends of cruel women who inhabit the neighboring island, attracting and then killing men and children. There is thus a latent presence of a certain aggressivity.

A comparison between the Trobriand children and civilized children. Malinowski ties together the facts with the following comparisons. (1) The pregnant woman from the Trobriand Islands enjoys greater protection. (2) Weaning takes place later and the infant lives alone with his mother. The situation is less traumatic and allows for the child to have an easier life. (3) No rivalry for the mother's love exists between father and children. (4) No masculine tyranny exists. (5) Very few perversions exist; homosexuality was unknown until the whites arrived. (6) In the psychological development of the child, there is no association, as is so common for us, between the sexual and the anal combined with an "indecent" feeling about them. Thus, sexual development is more direct and less subject to deviations. (7) From three to six years of age in our society, we see the constitution of a paternal ideal and its simultaneous disappointment. In the Trobriand Islands, no such parallel exists. Authority is delegated to the maternal uncle who takes on all social roles. The father's role is pure affection and, thus, *no crisis of puberty* exists. (8) From six years of age to puberty, in our civilization we see the "latent period"—the decline of the "Oedipus complex" and the diminishing of sexual interest. Before declaring it a general law, Freud had admitted the influence of the environment on the existence, intensity, and duration of the latent period. In

any case, even in our civilization, the latent period is much less sensible among farmers, country people, and workers than in the bourgeoisie. (For instance, consider the sudden coincidence of the bourgeois interest in scholarly affairs.)

Among the children of the Trobriand Islands, no such latent period exists. During these years, one witnesses their greatest freedom (life in the republic of children) and the first sexual experiences. Puberty is a great period of family conflict, in particular aggressivity against the father and violence against mother and sisters, which are likely from thoughts about his own origin. Such a tension is unknown among the Trobriand islanders. At this time, the child leaves his village for his maternal uncle's village. Malinowski believes in the existence of a drama unique to the Trobriand people: an attraction toward the sister and hatred of the maternal uncle who represents authority. A series of facts proves the existence of this conflict: the excessively strict taboo forbidding any relation, even of friendship, with the sister. In addition, several myths exist with an incestuous tendency, as well as the analysis of insults.

8. *The controversy between Malinowski and Jones concerning the universality of the Oedipus complex.*[27] From the facts above, Malinowski wants to prove that the "Oedipus complex" is a historical formation tied to the patriarchal organization of a society. He proposes a new psychoanalytic orientation where one would research the complexes unique to each society in place of exclusively Oedipal formations. This position provoked a controversy between him and Jones—a psychoanalytic clinician.

Jones's arguments. The Trobriand complex is only a mask designed to conceal the "Oedipus complex" and to remedy it by displacing the aggressivity against the father onto the uncle and the love for the mother on the sister (who symbolizes the mother). Jones reproaches Malinowski for leaving no explanation for the origins of matriarchy.

Malinowski's response. Jones's objection and the psychoanalytic position are obviously irrefutable, since the absence of symptoms will be interpreted the same as when they are present; negation is as valuable as affirmation. For psychoanalysts, the absence of symptoms proves only that an extremely strong repression is at play; it cannot be proven nor can it be refuted. But these concealed complexes behind other complexes that suppose a kind of "ur-unconscious" are purely verbal solutions. Malinowski especially wants to critique the Freudian methodology that reconstructs history with elements awkwardly taken from our own psychogenesis. We do not have the right, for example, to interpret primitive totemism through indications furnished by the psychoanalysis of Occidental children unless the universality of psychological mechanisms has been proven. Otherwise, we take for proof what is only a postu-

late. In order to constitute an objective psychoanalytic anthropology, we must search for the elements on the same ground as that of the studied societies.

Another objection is the difficulty of conceiving that the parricide Freud argues for is supposed to be at once a result of the father's authority as well as the cause of the patriarchal civilization. At the same time consequence and base of a certain civilization, did parricide take place one time only, after which civilization is propagated, or must we conceive of a "parricide epidemic"?[28]

In the case of these difficulties, it is impossible to contend that the proofs are a priori. Despite a great interest in his view, we must review some *weaknesses in Malinowski's theses.* As for *the dreams of the Trobriand people,* they don't speak of them, but this does not prove that they do not dream (in all pathological cases, obstinate silence is an indication of some resistance). As for the extreme discretion concerning all sexual questions, the lack of dreaming seems to speak in favor of a certain repression. The *clinical description of a "Trobriand complex"* is conceived to be symmetrical to the "Oedipus complex." But it is not a real complex, it cannot function as one. The dynamic of the Oedipus complex is caused by the "three-person drama" where each antagonist is tied to the two others and where relations between two of them affect the third. Nothing is similar in the Trobriand complex: the sister and the uncle have no tie to each other; it is not *because* the boy is attached to his sister than he hates his uncle. We find *two independent conflicts.*

Freudians argue that the psychological structure is the cause of civilization. Malinowski replaces a psychological causality with a sociological causality and takes the Oedipus complex as a product of civilization. But it is evident that the one thesis and the other are both inseparable and contradictory. We must construct a psychoanalysis and a sociology that are not conceived in terms of causality. This is the orientation of the new anthropological psychoanalysis—*culturalism*—which overtakes and synthesizes classical givens.

VII. Work in Culturalist Sociology

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Since Durkheim, French sociology has had the notion that the "collective consciousness" is distinct from individual consciousnesses. This contestable methodological notion's metaphysical impact, which is greatly exaggerated, is the object of the most reservations. After having permitted a new boom in sociological work, it has also been a reason for stagnation.

In the American culturalist movement, the social factor is not a collective consciousness, wherein the influence of the environment on the individual is underestimated. Rather, it derives from the Hegelian notion of "objective spirit." Hegel distinguished the objective spirit (the human spirit is the projection on its surroundings as revealed in creations and institutions) from the subjective spirit (the human spirit that we grasp in ourselves). This conception is very different than that of a collective consciousness. It aims not only to be a hypothetical construction, but also a factual one that concerns human productions. The imprint of their intentions marks their creations (even visible in the countryside that has been profoundly transformed by man). This "culture," under the sedimentation of human activities, constantly impregnates the newborn from the first day. The individual lives with the demand to take up attitudes that contribute to form this context.[36]

Seen from this angle, the social influence on the individual is evidently not a hypothesis; it is an *intersubjective* conception (the identification of each individual with others). One can now found a positive sociology without creating a collective consciousness as a sort of *fatum* where the individual loses all his autonomy. Particularly in Kardiner's work, we can find a synthesis of the principal ideas of "culturalism."

Kardiner's work introduces the notion of a "basic personality." All culture, all social groups within society, tend to define a *type*. The more the group is restricted, the more the type can be exactly realized. We already find a similar notion in the works of Karl Marx since he speaks of an "individual class" (*German Ideology*).[37] The possible disintegration of a class is the demonstration of certain class circumstances. In every manner of speaking, the notion of integration is familiar to Marx.

Kardiner's conception of integration—the conformation of a certain ego ideal, a "*pattern*" proposed by society—is not static. An individual can modify and react against the social pattern. Since this modification is due to society's structure, it entails a revolution of customs. It is thus a dialectical and dynamic conception: a *pattern* transformation.

The culturalists study the chain of integrations that tie the individual to society and that carry the environment's institutional structure. Hence importance is given to the child's upbringing, but only while admitting that the exterior evolution of an individual can uniquely depend upon his childhood. Therefore, it is a different conception than Freud's. Childhood is not seen as the installation of certain complexes in the individual, ones which will play a destined role, but as an *initiation into a certain cultural environment.* The conflicts studied by psychoanalysis correspond to one of the affective constellations realized by history; all of life's facets contribute to form the individual in relationship with one another. Each element of a culture is significant in the whole, even if different facts do not seem to have any relation to each other.

A. Kardiner's Study of the Peoples of the Alor Islands

Cora Du Bois had already studied the inhabitants of the Alor Islands.[38] Kardiner collects her observations and completes them by compiling the descriptions, individual biographies, and tests (notably Rorschach) taken by an ethnographer who did not have Du Bois' results.[39]

1. *Description of the general traits.* The Alor Islands (a [former] Dutch possession), sixty miles to the east of Java and seventy miles north of Australia, have a largely black population: 70,000 inhabitants, of which about 10,000 are Muslim. The population is stationary (about four children per couple, although the infant mortality rate is very high). They have few contacts with civil servants, except with the police, but are forced to pay a very high tax: $1.25 per year by the head of the family, which equals about two months of work. Three types of houses exist: country homes—badly constructed, provisional, and rapidly obsolete—and family homes—constructed on piles and in less than a year equally as damaged. Only the large family homes are solidly built and last about five years.

The men are more adorned than the women; they have a more elaborate appearance and wear more jewelry. *Hygiene:* baths are infrequent, since water is so far away and they must find it using long bamboo tubes. Men and women bathe separately; they do not show their nudity to one another. The food is good (wheat, rice, mushrooms, bananas for the children, pork, chicken, some sheep, dogs; children chase and consume

rats). The land is owned individually and divided between the father, mother, and (theoretically) the children older than ten. All that concerns the crops and cultivation is the business of women. All that concerns meat—raising, butchering, and cooking—is that of the men. Although property is individual, work is collective. The people cultivate the fields together, one after the other, which is the source of numerous quarrels.

During celebrations each person brings meat which is distributed and eaten communally. Meals are frequent, even during the night, and are not very heavy. Generally, nights are active: the inhabitants come and go, eat, and make noise. *At first glance, children seem underfed.* They are always in a quest for food. In groups they will steal bananas and mangos, a behavior permitted by the adults. Women and men eat separately. The man and son eat first; the woman and daughters afterward. In general, food issues play a great role. They are stingy with food and do not like to give it away. Yet, there is never a real famine (more common is a period where one food or another is limited). Everything always exists in sufficient quantities; food restrictions fail to explain this real obsession with food.

The main masculine activity consists in *financial transactions; money is extremely important.* As "currency" they use pigs, precious vases, and gongs. *One-tenth of the inhabitants are financiers;* it is the most highly esteemed career. Each family owns one or two pigs, but even the very rich never possess an entire pig. They prefer a "participation" system of a pig (one-fourth or one-tenth of the pig) for two reasons. First, in this way, their fortune is more concealed. Second, when many have an interest in one animal, a better guarantee against theft is established.

Marriage is subject to very complicated financial conditions (the daughter must bring a dowry, but the husband must pay a sum around three times the worth of the dowry). There are endless talks, with the results not always favored by the children. Marriages are frequently unstable; women often oppose them. At first, or later on, they commonly refuse sexual intercourse with the husband. Divorces are equally complicated and give rise to inextricable financial conflicts. Family inheritance is bilateral. Marriage between close relatives is viewed poorly. Incest is forbidden in principle, but by weak taboos. Funerals are very expensive (because one must appease the deceased's spirit) and equally accompanied by complex financial transactions (as well as being interminable, given the fear of death). Seven groups of the deceased's family must participate in the funeral's organization. Practically speaking, there is no inheritance; families are even ruined by burial costs. Hatred exists between families, including wars between clans, thefts of children, never-ending vendettas. But everything can be settled with money.

Religion is very vague and not elaborate. The village has guardian spirits. Good and bad spirits exist, but they are poorly individuated, as is the totality of religion. One finds a fear of the supernatural and any relations with it. All that surpasses daily life is feared and masked. When death approaches, the ill withdraw. Their sons collect omens that they tell their dying fathers. At the end, the fathers embrace their sons until the moment of death. Sorcerers are considered subordinate (since they did not choose this career, they generally weren't able to become successful at finance). No example exists of natural magic (but one does find traces of natural magic in legends). Supposedly, the deceased have two souls. One immediately goes to the hereafter. The other prowls around the village and becomes satisfied with the funeral arrangements, seen from on high, and with the gifts of food. Afterward, the deceased are no longer interesting for the inhabitants. No cult of the dead exists. One does not find institutional suicide.

Some legends. One concerns the story of a man with six brothers. He is at risk of starvation after being abandoned by them. His father appears to him in a dream and tells him the place where he should go. He arrives in a "charitable" village. They promise him food, but at the moment when he enters the house, he is hurt by a projectile thrown from within. The two daughters of the house, types of kindly fairies, take care of him and feed him. He travels with them. In a hole in the earth, he sees his village and is taken there by magic. They refuse him water, except for one woman who gives it to him and whom he then marries. But little by little, she transforms into a "bad woman" and tries to kill him several times. Each time, he is saved by the two sisters. At the end, he definitively leaves his village and takes half of the "good" men with him. He sets up in the two sisters' "charitable" village.

The level of belief is very low; *no rituals exist.* Maledictions and fetishes exist, but they only believe in them half the time, hence the relative weakness of sorcerers. There is no aristocracy, but differences in fortune do make one part of the village dependent upon the other. It is very important to be rich, since it is impossible for a poor man to marry, and being single is considered to make one not really a man. One is not fully a man until one has had a child. They are extremely sensitive. Making an allusion to a physical defect is considered to be an extremely grave insult (but all injuries can be made right with money). A strong sentiment of shame exists; they fear "losing their face." Manual work is rare and devoid of artistic qualities; everything is rough and coarse. Some minor trades exist: *sorcerer, astrologer, genealogist* (but genealogies, like everything else, are poorly structured). No textiles, no poetry, only gong-fabrication

exists. A little versification, however prosaic, exists as a *dialogue between creditor and debtor.* We now come to the most expressive traits: those that concern the development of children.

Birth. The father's role is known. One believes the child is the result of the mixture of the father's semen and the mother's menstrual blood and that much sexual intercourse is needed for a conception. The pregnant woman has all sorts of illness, nausea, and desires (for food in particular). Spontaneous abortions are common. When the wife is discontented with the husband, she will attempt to provoke an abortion by working very hard in the fields. Numerous taboos exist during childbirth. Childbirth takes place in the woman's household; men are banned. After birth, the mother rests at her family's home for eight days, washes the child with hot water (later, one takes only cold baths), and breast-feeds the infant. At about fifteen days, she returns to work and breast-feeding regularly is quickly interrupted. From six days, the child eats mashed vegetables and bananas. The mother feeds him when she returns in the evening. Starting from this time, the child seems perpetually starved, receiving nothing in the day. As soon as he is mobile, he spends the day searching for food, trying to grab an adult's fingers (a favorite pastime).

Men are more interested in children than women are. Women dislike having and feeding their children. The infant shares the parent's bed and sexual activity recommences soon after birth. Women complain about this aggravation. They know that the husband will return, especially if he has not found another partner in the meantime. Children cry a great deal. Later, they have temper tantrums, rolling around on the ground when the mother leaves to work. The mothers masturbate the children to calm them. Children are not potty-trained until they can walk, at which time they learn quickly.

From three years of age, the child plays alongside his house, supervised by his father or an older child. Weaning is brutal; the mother often provokes the child's jealousy by giving her breast to another child. Children are used to being alone. They dry themselves with rough leaves, *causing ulcers which are cared for with an even more irritating process,* including cold baths that are very painful. One does not observe coprophagy or constipation in children.

The child's sleep is troubled by the comings and goings of adults. The first, very early, word is "Give!" after learning insults and swearwords. But, generally, children are quiet except for when they are angry. A typical sanction is to shame the child. No rewards are given, but many false promises are made: a joke adolescents often enjoy with children. There is no honest contact between children and adults, threats abound (but

no castration threat exists, nor are there any ones concerning sexuality). The parents display irregular conduct toward their children; they will punish and praise them for the same action. The children have many ideas of abandonment, and some legends exist on this subject. Bad harmony between parents is quickly used by the children for their own profit.

Moving house is frequent, and sometimes children are left with other families. At times, the child runs away and stays with another family for a while. From six years onward, the child's position improves. They are given a meal at morning and at night. In the day, they run around in groups (the adults ignore this behavior). Sometimes they work in gardens for food, or the butchers will give them leftovers. Children also chase and eat rats they find in the countryside.

Girls work mostly in the fields, whereas the boys are mainly spectators. Collective punishments exist by taking hostages. Generally, it seems they resent nothing. Lying is taken as natural. Everything that is said is doubtful. No one thinks that someone else might be speaking the truth. Their vocabulary is rich in words which express doubt.

Adults monopolize the toys given to children. From eight years of age, children receive a loincloth. From then on, sexual games and relations are concealed. Girls voluntarily make advances and play the role of the boys. Overt homosexuality does not exist; it is clandestine, rare, and thought of poorly. But there is no real repression.

For adolescents, no rite of passage, no initiation, no ceremonies exist except a badly composed tattoo which doesn't last. One can optionally file and blacken one's teeth. At this time, young boys take on coquettish airs and then consider entering into the financial system. A characteristic attitude of adolescents is to be paralyzed in front of violent—that is, a brawl or something indecent—scenes. They passively assist and never interfere.

In financial and marriage matters, women often take the initiative and exchange presents. Women often refuse sexual intercourse due to sexual inhibitions. When men are occupied with financial matters, they isolate themselves in the men's houses and abstain from all sexual encounters. (But one does not have the impression this is a ritual custom.) Marriages are unstable. In a village of 112 men and 140 women, 49 men are not divorced, 49 are divorced and remarried, and 14 are single. Among the women, 93 are not divorced, and 47 are divorced and remarried. The mortality rate is higher among the men. The woman's moral and social situation is more stable. Polygamy is permitted but difficult to finance. Women are the pivot of all productive activity, in particular the production of food, and without knowing it, they are very important.

2. *Kardiner's interpretation.* First let's summarize the most striking traits of the Alor Island society: (1) women cultivate the earth; (2) a poverty of religious and moral conceptions; (3) a poverty of magical conceptions; (4) a poverty of feelings (all is relegated to financial transactions); (5) marital instability. The *"base personality"* type that emerges from this civilization is characterized by a *lack of organization in all behavior:* an absence of technical behavior and an incoherent aggressive conduct.

Kardiner demonstrates that this type necessarily comes from the way children are treated. Their first contact with the social milieu is realized through their parental contact. A regular maternal presence ceases on the fourteenth day; the mother returns to her activities and abandons the child. Hence an *irreducible tension arises, translated, moreover, by hunger.* But it seems that the traumatic element is not the quantitative lack of food, but the *irregular access to food.* Food is given neither at a fixed hour, nor by the same person, thus *robbing the child of the secure feeling which emanates from the maternal image.* No systematic hostility exists toward the child, he is sheltered from material dangers, but *care* remains *irregular.* It is impossible to feel protected by a favorable and constant principle (in myths, the good arrive without warning from unknown places and lack any personal identity). The impossibility of constituting a paternal imago provokes a constant tension and a vague, defensive attitude without formative value, since it is never followed by any consequence.

No sexual repression exists, but the first contact with sexuality (when the mother masturbates the child to calm him), far from permitting a fixation, only augments a state of confusion. Kardiner in no sense gives this first education the role of a *fatum* that depends exclusively on the external world. He admits that a more attentive parental role, during and after early infancy, can correct these first impressions and permit a behavioral integration. But *the parental attitude only confirms the initial incoherence through their lack of encouragement and indifference* that we see from the early attempts at walking, sealed by the ulcer suffering, and so forth. Everything augments the child's anxiety and confirms that his position is without hope.

No established connection between cleanliness and reward is present. In the Occidental upbringing, the *education of sphincter control* takes place, on the one hand, in various "anal" diversions but, on the other hand, it permits the constitution of a fixed value system. A fixed value system and the resulting security allow for a collection of proposed ideal behaviors. In the Alor Islands, spanking and anal eroticism do not exist, nor does a value system. Instead there is a feeling of abandonment

and an incapacity to hold to the consequences of an act. Another consequence: anal fetishism is replaced by an overaccentuation of the breast.

Humiliation, mockery, irony, lying, false promises: these are the only stable behaviors given to the child. The result is to confirm the child's powerlessness and to cause him to adapt himself to a world where he cannot be proud of anything. Incapable of constituting a regular defense system, his only reaction will be an irrational, violent, and nonaggressive temper. It expresses his total confusion and is without any formative value. From this stage, the adult possesses a passive nonviolence born of weakness.

Theft is a constant and tolerated habit. It is especially *an independent attitude;* a kind of "gift" equivalence is realized where the idealization of the giver is replaced by the contempt of the stealer. Derived from the first social contacts, it is a suspicious and distrustful attitude. Subsequently the adult shows that his acts toward the other are devoid of assurance or coherence. The early frustration does not suffice to realize a coherent aggressive attitude. Such a reaction is impossible for the inhabitant of the Alor Islands due to his intimate conviction of uselessness. This lack of any profound sentiment given to their aggressive feelings is explained by how financial transactions can regulate any differences. Moreover, individuals have no ambition to realize anything except to establish a personal fortune.

The inability to retain a continuous effort, such as maintaining an obedient or tender behavior in order to obtain equivalent behavior from a woman, also derives from the same feeling of abandonment and incoherence. They cannot conceive of a relationship between their own behavior and the other's behavior. Hence, marital instability follows.

This society is characterized by a complete absence of any technical behavior: *everything is irrational.* They seem to lack any way to express their feelings (for example, in their great sympathy with the ethnographer, their only way to relate to her is that she is also a thief). In general, *the formation of a superego is weak because of the lack of definitive parental attitudes.* Even children do not cooperate with one another; the elder avenge themselves on the younger. No fixation on the parent of the same sex occurs: hence, an absence of homosexuality. The girl's antipathy toward marriage does not testify to a masculine attitude, but the fear of a hard life. Thus, it is more a social than a sexual attitude.

Consequently, everything carries within it a sense of divided behavior. The fleeing attitude (children run away from the family home) and the weakness of libidinal ties will be relived throughout life. No rite of passage for the boy into the life of an adult corresponds to the absence

of a conception of law which is part of an organized society. To become adult only signifies taking part in money struggles.

The suspicious attitude toward one's mother provoked by her appearance and disappearances will be transferred toward all women. The man displays anxiety, timidity, and varied problems. There is an absence of violence, but frequent divorces. The woman's attitude toward maternity is fear. The desire for maternity, according to Freud, comes from the desire to reverse weaning. In the Alor Island woman, it only calls forth her own violent weaning; hence, the origin of frequent abortions. Her sexual reluctance comes from what is considered a shutting-out [défaite]. The only compensation is that women regulate food and constitute the only factor which counteracts family disintegration.

No social hierarchy exists; rapid change in fortunes makes for a provisional social status. A *marginal society* results, one which is neither cohesive nor cooperative. For Kardiner, all these symptoms arise from the infant's first disappointments that are infinitely repeated during his development. Kardiner confirms his thesis with individual biographies and Rorschach tests. The biographies reveal an exasperated anxiety and a great number of inhibitory signs, and so forth, thereby proving that sexual orientation in Occidental societies far from exhausts all the possible sexual difficulties.

Rorschach's thirty-eight tests converge to emphasize the general malaise, the inhibitions, the passivity, the search for calm, the day-to-day improvised life, the lack of contemplation and enthusiasm, the simple disarray—all the symptoms already revealed.[40] Kardiner provides two general conclusions about his work. First, the Oedipal constellation is tied to a certain kind of culture. Second, it is possible to follow a rigorous method of work and to overcome the "sociology-psychology" dilemma.

3. *Conclusions.* The principal characterization of the Alor Island inhabitants is one of completely disorganized behavior and broken affective relations with the other. The observed troubles in this population are more linked to earlier complexes than to Oedipal relations. They cause one to think about the behavior described by Germaine Guex upon meeting certain patients who are not bettered by classical psychoanalytic treatment.[41] Such treatment allows the patient to relive the Oedipal situation and to resolve the attached conflicts; but the patients in Guex's work suffer from an infantile trouble which is linked to a manifestly pre-Oedipal state of continual insecurity. They feel obligated to endlessly verify the existence of their affective relations with each other. They are incapable of independently forming effective relations.

Kardiner's method has the advantage of overcoming the typical op-

position between psychology and sociology. His method awards a great importance to the entirety of the care given to infants, but does not consider any particular aspect of care as the *cause* of the ultimate behavior of the individual. A constant interaction occurs between the individual and his society. The care of children, envisioned as the first contact of the infant with the other, is a reflection of the conception that the parents create society.

Other ethnologists search in various ways to elevate children as the direct cause of a given social structure. But this is a false route in the sense that the correlation between two facts (the first care and the social attitude) does not definitely prove a relationship of cause and effect between these two facts. They prove a concomitant variation through another ignored cause. Kardiner demonstrates proof of this kind of vicious circle where a certain worldview is put in place by the parents to their children, who will in turn give it to their own children. Thus, a given culture can increasingly ossify in the circle that originally seemed easy to break. The culture finally hoists an inexorable weight upon the individual.

Kardiner's conceptions show the difference between a static and a dynamic society. In the Alor Islands, we see a type of monotonous, static society that accentuates its static principles generation after generation. Others, such as in Occidental societies, carry within them a seed of change. We see that the *culturalist method* is very subtle and permits us to understand social situations without dogmatism.

B. Another Example: The American Town of Plainville

After having studied the Alor Islands, Kardiner attempted to apply his method to study an American village, again trying to bring out a base personality.[42] The study was difficult for a number of reasons.

(1) It is more difficult to isolate the study of an American town than a primitive society. An American town is part of a much larger national entity and is tied to it in numerous ways (monetary system, communications, radio, elections, etc.). Thus, the behavior of the inhabitants is defined by the nationwide stimuli, even worldwide stimuli. But although it is true that it is difficult to distinguish what relationships of the American town's inhabitants are uniquely local, it is not impossible to grasp the inhabitants' experience.

(2) Typically, an American town's society changes more quickly than an archaic society. But archaic societies also change, although less quickly, and a sociological study can research precisely if the society has a mobile or immobile schema.

(3) The population of an American town is not homogenous (five

religions are represented in the same village). Is it possible to distinguish a type of base [personality]? It seems we can. A Calvinist and a Catholic resemble each other insofar as they both practice a definite religion that has evolved over a long time and thus allowed for the elaboration of different dogmas. Calvinists and Catholics profoundly differ from a primitive practicing the religion of the Alor Islands, which has little structure and could never have supported such a long evolution, since it itself has such little sense.

While difficult, Kardiner's attempt is extremely interesting. He tries to interpret and to systematize generally observed cultural traits without thinking of linking them to others. "Plainville" (only the proper names are fictitious) is a small farming town on the edge of the rich plains of the Midwest, lying half in the plains, half in the hills. The population is divided by farms that surround the center. Four kinds of enterprises exist: farms; small local businesses created with local money and which, generally, eventually collapse; day workers; and the fourth group, which is made up of young people who immigrate to the big cities at around eighteen but often return later.

Principal traits. The clothing is poor; men don't have undershirts or ties. They wear a combination of a mechanic's outfit and a cap. Women wear very inexpensive cotton clothes. The population generally lives in a closed economy. The farms produce everything which is necessary; the inhabitants avoid as much as possible buying from outside. Money is scarce. It is a "subsistence economy" as opposed to a "money economy" where surplus, prestige purchases are made. The people are suspicious of "strangers"; in other words, strangers to their town. Suspicion and hostility are held toward the New Deal "government" (for giving aid to the unemployed, which is considered luxurious and poorly seen in a society where money is scarce), as well as toward technological agricultural improvements and education. *The general disposition* is conservative.

Social structure. A distinction between the aristocratic plains people and the hill people exists. Many "milieus" exist, a small number of "big" property owners, a large number of middle-class farmers. They call themselves "good" and "honest" people, people who "work everyday," "nice," "fine," "people who are all right." The lower classes are made up of hill people who compose two groups according to religious convictions: practicing families who call themselves "better lower class" and atheists who are called by others "lower elements" or "people who live like animals."

The social life is reduced. On Sundays, everyone makes themselves look nice; the older men reunite in the town square, the women in a large grocery store. Some tentative attempts at new socialization are made; some dances for the young (which are poorly thought of) exist.

Religion. Four big churches exist. In the order of the social consideration, they are the *Christian Church,* Methodists, Baptists, and *Holiness* (Church of God). Many nonbelievers exist: membership in a church is a question of social standing (except in the Church of God). They are all, except the latter, stuffy, staid churches with formal services. The Church of God, which considers itself to be the only true church, is lively with the evangelical tradition. However, it is badly seen by the others as base and sentimental, without any "standing." A striking characteristic of all religious life: one enters into a church by "conversion," because one is "saved." Conversion is considered to be the mark that the individual is "saved," that he is *certain* of his redemption. Until 1925, the Methodist church had the highest social position. In 1925, due to the financial support of a member, the Christian Church, constructing a new building on the foundation of a bank, and so forth, became the most prestigious. A notable fact is that since the change, the Methodist church services have noticeably lowered. They have become noisier and more emotional.

The projective system is the entirety of beliefs or behaviors that are about something which is not immediately visible; religion is only one element of the projective system. Kardiner finds nothing Dionysian among the inhabitants of Plainville: no dancing, no jazz. In contrast, he finds a cult of cinema stars (photographs) which represent the ideal of social success. The immense popularity of Charlie Chaplin and Mickey Mouse shows that, although weak themselves, without expressly desiring it they can come to be the defenders of the weak. Both have renounced the security of social prestige. They are poor, humble, and solitary in a world where there is no place for them. But from time to time, they put the powerful in their place. For the middle-class man, in a modern society, there is only the choice to accept the ideology of success (with the discipline that results) or to renounce the world. Charlie Chaplin and Mickey Mouse are amusing because they are sardonic loners who give social failure an ironic dignity.

The people of Plainville seem to have "hereditary" political positions. Another element of their projective system, their political opinions *are those of the family* and are accompanied by a serious political skepticism. For the most part they are Republicans. They are against the status quo, against the New Deal, and against the politics of Roosevelt. They are against all the ways of self-assertion, against syndicalism, social ideas, against drinking and sexuality. One sees a latent hatred, mitigated by envy, against those who self-affirm and who distinguish themselves.

Children's upbringing. For Kardiner, the attitude toward the child's upbringing is closely attached to the parent's behavior toward the child.

The family is clearly patriarchal and monogamous, with the mother being predominant in the early years and the father thereafter.

Mother's attitude. The mother is extremely attentive to the baby's needs; he is changed or fed as soon as he cries. The negative consequence of her behavior is that the child becomes passive; the parents are seen as all-powerful, the proper role of the child is not accentuated. The positive consequence is that the child has a feeling of security. But the negative consequences are even more accentuated by a very late weaning, sometimes around five to six years of age, that keeps the child in early infancy.

Cleanliness is energetically imposed between fifteen months and two years. It constitutes the first socialization of the child and the child's first responsibility. (One can observe in the U.S. a sometimes pathological taste for cleanliness: advertisements, signs, makeup on the deceased.) Sexual latency is caused by a violent sexual repression. Decency demands that neither engagements nor marriages are announced. The woman's attitude of ignorance, refusal, and passivity is considered completely natural. One holds as normal that women have no taste for sexual life. One observes some social reactions against this repression: collective masturbation of young men tied to other gang activities, systematic dirtiness, and so forth.

Since living quarters are cramped, the child often shares the parents' bedroom and is witness to their sexual relations, which allows him to again idealize that the mother *submits* to the father's aggression. Hence a vicious circle is created: he will idealize his wife in the same fashion and she will *submit* to him. Family life is generally revealed as the highest point of the Oedipal constellation. But, again, the Oedipus complex is not so much the *cause* but rather the moment of a certain attitude toward the other implied by the entire culture. Corporal punishment takes place later; bullying is used on children. Hence, young people often leave at around eighteen years old, but generally return.

Consequences of this upbringing. A strong formation of the *superego* is achieved; a maximum introjection of parental defenses with the danger of neurotic manifestations (neurotic repression: makes one *forget* until the thing is repressed; it is the opposite of free will). This system of child rearing has solidarity with Calvinist, puritanical Christianity.

The projective system is much less strong than the repressive system. The forms of release realized by the promises of ancient religions tend to be replaced by the *cult of success,* by envy, and so forth. But these releases are insufficient for the ancient repressive system, which remains very strong. Hence a crisis situation is more or less pronounced in all Occidental civilizations, where an upbringing that functioned for a religion

survives that religion and then realizes a predominant repression without possible release. The weakness of the projective system of the people of Plainville is explained by the strong repression that breaks the individual without providing him with any compensation.

If this analysis seems less probing, less evident than that of the primitive society, this demonstrates that the projective system of an American population is more developed, more nuanced, and less able to be grasped. Given that this system is more complicated and familiar to us, we have the tendency to consider it not as a projection, but as a reality in itself without connection to the rest. One loses sight of the attitude behind the system: the cause of the system's volume. Moreover, the Alor society is a society in equilibrium, whereas Plainville lies in disequilibrium. Equilibrium is realized when the projective system provides a possibility to sufficiently discharge tensions. However, this is not the case for the inhabitants of Plainville.

C. Study of Another Type of Archaic Upbringing: The Navajos

Here the authors create a nonpsychoanalytic study of an Indian population in America: the Navajos (same geographical region as the Hopis, bordered on the east by New Mexico and on the west and north by Colorado).[43] The authors view early infancy with less importance, arguing that despite a liberal upbringing, the adults display affective troubles. They underline the importance of the rearing a child receives between six and twelve years. This work appears less clarifying than that of psychoanalytic methods because observed traits are not integrated into a coherent system.

The study begins with an interview of a young child of twelve. Principally, one observes in her a predominant concern about health and an accentuation of questions about life and death. The affective role is largely played by the clan family. One finds little mention of games, a predominance of *tasks* to accomplish; there is always something to do. One also finds that the importance of religious and supernatural beliefs counterbalances the health concerns. But the religion is mostly unstructured. One of their beliefs is that before the Navajos a holy people existed who gave the Navajos their rules of life and hygiene.

Upbringing of the first six years. The children are greatly appreciated. Women want children and have them every two or three years. A number of taboos during pregnancy exist. One is to not tie any knots, to avoid the baby being strangled during birth. Another is to not place the blankets in reverse, so that the child will be normal. They also should not watch an eclipse (so the baby will not become crazy or have a squint). One should

not prepare the cradle before birth. The collection of taboos indicates the terror that surrounds birth. Illnesses exist during pregnancy; troubles with birth demonstrate that the idea that primitive women give birth without pain is a myth. A high degree of mortality exists among mothers. In the case of a late birth, everyone undoes their hair and unties the animals.

After the birth, the placenta and umbilical cord are buried (a psychoanalytic interpretation is that this is evidence of hostility toward the child). All the dirty sheets are burned. The newborn is bathed and this water is carefully thrown away (an impure conception surrounds birth). In addition, to make all the biological signs of birth disappear and to mark the will to reshape the child, he is molded, shaved, and his first hair is burned. His first food is a wheat cereal (the mother's first milk is considered bad).

The child does not receive his name until four weeks after his birth. Also, his first cradle is provisionary. The cradle is a valuable object and plays an important role in social life. The first, which is provisional, as we have just said, is made of one plank. The second, permanent cradle is made of two oblique planks and decorated with a number of ornaments which differ according to the sex, but always have real artistic value.

The baby is tightly wrapped and solidly placed in his cradle so he cannot move. The Navajos believe the child will be weak if not secured in such a manner. We think, in principle, that this position hinders the motor development of the child. But it does seem to dispose the child to a precocious integration in his milieu. So solidly attached to his cradle, he can be taken around and the child can very early on participate with others in the vertical position which is the same as the others in his environment. The child does not seem to suffer from this lack of freedom. Although his muscles are not exercised, the different equilibrium and habituation with a vertical position can favor the development of walking (which depends more upon the functional coordination of the nervous system than on muscles). Around six months of age, one begins to release the child from his crib.

In fact, the age of learning to walk is about the same among the Navajos as it is among other peoples. The author therefore thinks that in a given context, this kind of parental care can be defended. Besides, the child is the constant object of attention. The mother changes him as soon as he wets himself and gives him her breast as soon as he cries, as well as putting him to sleep. The first smile is of great importance; friends are informed. As soon as the child can walk, he often demonstrates a great cruelty to animals, an attitude which is permitted by the adults.

The child's attitude is characterized by confidence and passivity. Since adults never exercise their authority, the child never has the impression

that adults inhabit a separate, powerful world, one to which he must accede. No introjection exists. Also, the adults completely lack a sense of authority; there is no chief.

A system of upbringing through punishments and prohibitions is replaced by a system of upbringing where reality, the threats of supernatural punishment, is in charge and not the will of the parents. The parents are never set out to be legislators.

The rules of *cleanliness* and of decency are always gently imposed as soon as the child can talk. The mother explains the rules to the children. With regard to *food,* the child eats what he wants, when he wants. He drinks tea and coffee (or at least has hot drinks). Weaning takes place between eighteen months and two years, but as soon as six months the child is given solid food. Weaning, like all other disciplines, is progressively and very gently imposed. The mother leaves for several days, warning the child of her absence. Despite all these precautions, weaning appears to constitute a critical period. The children are capricious and nervous, boys appearing more affected than girls.

One finds an extreme jealousy toward newborns, in general justified by weaning having just occurred. At this moment, all kinds of difficulties appear. The child often violently blames another woman, other than his mother; he does not seem to possess any overt rancor against his mother. Instead the child projects his rancor against his brothers and sisters. The personality of the last-born seems the most stable. Infant mortality is very high. In 1941, 57 percent of the deceased were children under six years. Around six, the child begins to be *integrated into the culture.* He begins to share the family terrors, assisting in magic ceremonies and in the prevention against the feared relative (in each family there is one).

In *summation,* the child never has the impression that an exterior will is imposed on him. Even anal control is taken more as a protection than as something constraining. No obsession with success exists, no norms are imposed. There is no establishment of the ideal of success, nor is there an idea of a parental transcendence to which the child must adapt.

From six years to puberty there is a striking contrast between the gentle upbringing of the early years and the brusque introduction into adult work. At six, the integration of the child in the most complex elements of society takes place. This society is characterized by a series of rigid cultural systems that fix relations between each individual and the other members of the family. A different language exists according to heritage (relations with whites are extremely irritating because of the absence of traditional forms of language and the attitudes which regulate

them). The uncle is in charge of prohibitions; relations between brothers are surrounded by prohibitions.

A change of family occurs. In a thousand subjects, four out of ten keep the same family from birth to adult life. Frequently the cause is the death of the still young mother, or divorce. The father is often absent or he works for the whites, thus his replacement by a stepfather is not traumatizing. The new husband, often as absent as the old, is always very affectionate with the children. The child is very attached to all the members of his family in his relations with them. His affectivity is not concentrated on his two parents; in addition, the name "mother" is not only given to his real mother.

Adults are not used to taking a moral authority over the children. Their relations with them are less straightforward than during early infancy. A get-together after dinner is common where the child must listen in silence to moral stories told for his benefit. The child does *not* seem to know the feeling of *guilt,* but more a *diffuse shame* in front of everything. In Occidental societies, guilt proves the introjection of the parents' norms. In Navajo society, no feeling of moral responsibility seems to exist. (In the course of a trial, one would see criminals and victims joke with one another.)

Repression is uneven. Except for brothers and sisters, sexual repression is not accentuated. But mothers warn their daughters very early about their future role as a woman and emphasize frightening aspects of sexual initiation. A severe reaction exists against bed-wetting and sleep-walking. The training process contrasts violently with the younger years and is destined to harden the young.

Games are poorly organized: funny-face competitions, reading constellations, fights, dances, and chants. White schools are a difficult adaptation for Navajo children for two reasons. First, the competitive spirit of their classmates escapes them. Second, the absence of defined relations with whites bothers them. They return fairly neurotic to their villages. Contact with whites brings another conflict into play: their own beliefs and the Christian religion. No possibility exists in their village for children who have pursued an education. For example, a Navajo who becomes a doctor cannot practice in his village.

Adult life. Physical maturity implies [membership in] the social majority. Opposite to Occidental societies, when a girl is nubile, it is sanctioned by a celebration, whereas there is no announcement of an upcoming marriage, since it is considered inevitable. Marriage is conditional on objective qualities: financial conditions, family advantages, and not by a sentimental choice. The husband and wife continue to con-

sider themselves as belonging to their own clans. The man exercises authority as the family chief. The woman occupies herself with the animal herds; she is more likely to take the advice of her father about their care than that of her husband. Women have the reputation of being more stable, more serious than their husbands, who often ask for a woman's advice.

As we indicated above, little stability in marriage exists. One in three women and one in four men divorce. People remarry up to six or seven times. Half of the divorces occur within the first year, a third in the second. Separations are rare in marriages which last longer than three years. The divorce proceeding is very simple. After a divorce, the two families often have a number of complaints against each other, which often prevents new alliances from forming.

Emotional life seems unstable. Discord often exists regarding sexual questions, but impotence and frigidity are rare. In the past, there were homosexuals who dressed in women's clothing. Conversations are very free, and sexual questions interest women as well as men. But there are a number of indications of latent difficulties: the mother's portrayal of a somber picture of sexual relations, sexual jealousy, violence, taboos, and purification ceremonies surrounding menstruation. Navajos believe that a man who sees a woman's vagina will be struck by lightning. Chastity between spouses occurs. Sexual relations are held in obscurity: the married couple remains mostly clothed. They abstain for the first four nights of marriage, and sexual relations are fairly distant. In general, Navajos seem to consider sexuality as a venerable and formidable force.

Old age and death. A seemingly large antipathy exists for old people, who are the only adults that exercise a constraint on small children. Death is considered as something horrible, since they have no conception of the afterlife. This aversion is evident in the burial ceremony, willingly left to the whites or to family members "rented" for the occasion. The dead must leave the house to the north (when needed, holes are made in walls) and for several hours, no one can cross the path taken by the body. Those who die from being struck by lightning are left where they fell.

Summation. The village is calm, silent, and harmonious. Nevertheless, some tensions arise due to sorcery and the fight against sorcerers. Essential psychological traits are curiosity, an intense interest in all that happens in the world, even the ideological reasons for war. A large difference exists between Navajos and the Indians of the pueblos who are more orderly, a more solid installation, but whose interests are limited to their own affairs. Another character trait is timidity. They fear seeming to lack money and never admit they do not understand when they are speaking

English. The same rules that apply to politeness apply to not intimidating the invited. One must never seem to draw attention. One can also note a personal effacement; as in many rural populations, they express a deeply held opinion by saying "maybe," "it seems," "one says . . ."

Time is very fluid ("all of a sudden"); it does not have meaning for the Navajos. They have a poor memory for dates, but they have a precise memory for the sequence and relation of events to one another. Their mood is variable. Affective warmth exists with periods of depression and self-withdrawal. Suicides are common (women are repudiated for suicide, sometimes to avoid prison). There are ten male suicides for every female one.

The authors compare their observations concerning the Navajo children with the results of several tests. (1) Grace Arthur scale and Goodenough's drawing test.[44] The results diverge: poorer results on the Grace Arthur scale than the white students. In the Goodenough test, contrary results exist. A larger proportion of gifted children are found. The authors think this difference arises from the fact that the Grace Arthur scale measures less "natural" intelligence than "trained" intelligence (the proportion of successful children is higher in villages where a school is nearby and where the school has been present for some time). The striking results of the Goodenough test (three to four times superior to white children) could come from the fact that the Navajo education is an essentially practical education exercising manual and visual intelligence. (2) A series of tests measuring emotional and moral responses: fear is the most important emotion (which comes in third or fourth place among white children). The moral responses reveal the importance of cleanliness, the family, the supernatural, work in general, and the lack of ambition. (3) Projective tests (free drawing, T.A.T., and Rorschach) in general find poor responses, few elaborations, and an imaginative flowering around eight which disappears around eleven.[45]

Remarks. First, the study is insufficiently coordinated. No connections exist and no interpretation of the whole; many discordant traits remain. Second, at the end, the authors clarify the sense of their study with some general considerations. The explication of psychological traits by the way children are raised is not considered to have ultimate importance. One must grasp the Navajo history. First nomadic, they settled down after the introduction of cultivating land and returned to a nomadic culture with the introduction of sheep (they "follow the herd"). Their way of life is tightly tied to their economy and indispensable for understanding the Navajo today.

With the following diagram, the authors propose evidence for the

idea that parental care cannot be considered a separable factor of person-ality, but that it is part of the history, the mode of life, and of the parents' personality. The type of care given does not reveal a "cause" of personal-ity, but a vehicle, *an* instrument of cultural transmission.

This interesting conception shows that a given culture forms a sys-tem made up of multiple elements. Each element is a mark of the entire system's reacting to each other element. In this conception, the *way of life* is considered a central phenomenon which is transmitted to the child by a constellation of circumstances.

VIII. Sociometry

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Moreno's ideas derive from two origins: a psychoanalytic one and a Marx-ist one.

A. Psychoanalytic Origin

Moreno's starting point was when he became a doctor in Vienna and took care of an actress who, being previously stable, suddenly started behaving violently toward her husband. Moreno advised her to play the various roles as a shrew. In these roles, she lost her nervous tension and returned to her calm demeanor. Moreno generalized this method and conceived of *psychodrama:* a systematic creation of situations where the ill can express their conflicts. The manifestation of profound conflicts is a total expression of the individual (attitudes and behaviors) and is more complete than the psychoanalytic expression (which is uniquely verbal).

But a psychodrama created a *personal and fictive situation.* In order to make up for this inconvenient fact, Moreno enlarged his method. He created the *sociodrama* to go beyond personal situation and to create a general situation to test the individual's attitude in the face of more general problems. For its part, *sociometry* seeks to address real situations (a series of investigations into the composition of groups, choices, repulsions, etc.). Until the present, the results of sociometric investigations are fairly incomplete, primarily revealing that the choice of partners is different according to the envisioned situation (work, play, life). Sociodrama is in development. In New York, once a week there is a theater of public sociodrama. In 1950 they dramatized world situations in order to explore different attitudes toward global problems (these are, of course, improvised sessions).

B. Marxist Origin

We can distinguish between a Marxist with a "Trotskyian" nuance and one with a "Stalinist" nuance. Trotskyism places emphasis upon class dynamics: the relations of consciousnesses that constitute a spontaneous history and that are a regulator of the party's will. Stalinism admits that in fact political action can guide the spontaneous feeling of the masses because in order to obtain its ends, political action must pass through phases where the socialist politics are not always apparent. The "detours" require an accentuated interior discipline.

Moreno's conceptions arise from a "Trotskyian" Marxism. An objective Marxist analysis of the social dynamism of economic conditions reveals itself in the consciousness of the classes. In fact, the majority of Marxists act as if the objective and subjective analyses were, essentially, acquired. Moreno proposes by a direct investigation to follow the pres-

ent study of social tensions. In principle, such a prolonged, nuanced, and precise study is a classical Marxist analysis.

This double origin of Moreno's ideas (psychoanalytic and Marxist) is the same as with culturalist thinkers. But Moreno is more subjective; he opposes the culturalists who insist upon an "objective spirit" that is revealed in the institutions, tools, and so forth, of a given society. Moreno is not content to place an emphasis upon a subjective approach; he tends to consider all institutions as "conserves" wherein intrasubjective life is not revealed. He only addresses attitudes and wants to seize the spirit of a society of *statu nascendi,* in everyone's consciousness. Moreno's method would be an excellent auxiliary way to compare approaches, but as a sole method of exploration (which is what he intended) it is certainly insufficient.

C. Sociological Orientation: Sociometry

1. *Interesting points.* Sociometry opposes the sociological experimental method as in Auguste Comte and Stuart Mill, who tried to codify a scientific method for nature. Supposing they had succeeded, their schemas are inapplicable to human sciences because they are sciences where the scientist [*savant*] cannot factually or justifiably remove himself from the science itself. Stuart Mill shows how scientific knowledge must consist of a rigorous induction (classical notions of correlations supply an objective causal relationship; science can be the reflection, purely and simply, of what happens in the physical world).[49] This canon is not applicable to a social science.

Brunschvicg had very justly remarked that *it does not suffice to find that two facts have a constant coincidence and justly tie them together with a law.*[50] Following this rule, one would accept that causal laws are completely chimerical. The relationship between facts must be comprehensible. In physics (cf. Davy's electrolysis of potassium carbonate) a great number of coincidences do not make for a law.[51] With stronger reason, *in the human sciences the relationship between facts must be understood.* Simple coincidences lead to fantastical conclusions (for example, it is not sufficient to note the coincidence between the appearance of an epidemic and an economic crisis. Is one caused by the other? Or are they dependent upon some third fact, for example, a group's envisioned psychological situation?).

Thus, Moreno opposes a solely exterior approach to social facts and substitutes an interior method. He does not rehabilitate introspectionism. Instead, he asks how to know the living society in itself and how to participate in it. Regarding the entire society, Moreno distinguishes its official or manifest history and the individuals who compose the society. Here we see the Marxist origin of Moreno's ideas. According to Moreno,

one must enter into the social dynamic in order to understand the latent conflicts that animate the regime's life. Marx was the first to propose the principles of a "profound sociology." According to Moreno, one must awaken the social spontaneity, the real [*réelle*] history that one lives. He adds that one cannot know a society without transforming it (being actively implicated in it). "One cannot be at the same time a member of a group and a secret agent of the experimental method."

One could say that Moreno's method is a *Socratic method* in the sense that each person is interrogated about the realities with which he is in contact. Moreno requires that one recognize the close connection between methods of proof and methods of discovery. He puts in question social psychology's imposition of a method of proof that is not in relation to the mode of discovery of social facts: social participation. Sociology can only be truly objective, that is, faithful to its object—the society of men—if it follows a "subjective-objective" method. (An idea one can find in French sociologists, particularly in Mauss.)[52] But Moreno can be *criticized* regarding his particularly hesitant concepts, his tendency to ignore a purely and simply institutional history and the objective approach that should function as a counter-proof and a check on the "subjective" analysis.

2. *The insufficiency of Moreno's concepts. Social role.* The Proletariat and the Bourgeoisie are "base personalities" that characterize a society. Moreno does not give a culturalist meaning to his concepts. He treats them as "conserves"—in the culinary sense of the word—as everything that is not alive in a society. Moreno is led to misunderstand what can be typical in the conflicts of a given life. He takes them as secondary and does not admit they are special problems. For Moreno, there is no Proletariat problem, in the socialist sense of the word, but rather a problem of the "sociometric Proletariat" (all who are discontent with society and their situation). This manner of reabsorbing an economic situation in an individual situation is not at all aided by Moreno's principles. It is inconvenient to postulate that there is no objective drama and that there are only impersonal dramas, itself a theory that is in contradiction with Moreno's idea of a distinct socialism in psychodrama. He even claims that psychodrama, if it were to expand in Europe, would save us from fascism. He tends to unduly restrict the notion of *role.* Karl Marx shows, on the contrary, that there are *historical roles* that are only analyzable by objective factors of class dynamics (the Bourgeois revolution of 1789 repeated the roles of the Roman republic).

Surplus value. We know the Marxist definition of this element of capitalist economic reality. According to Moreno, surplus value is a particular case of a present tendency in all of society. Surplus value would exist even beyond capitalism. This hypothesis should be examined, but

even if it was confirmed, one cannot at all conclude that the capitalist surplus value is not an important factor in the historical drama. There is something *naive* about this idea that social problems can be resolved by small sociometric revolutions in the given structure of society (in each enterprise, by sociometric reduction of interior tensions).

Let us compare Marx's and Moreno's idea of role. For Marx, all historical events take place twice: once with a tragic tone and once with a comedic one (Napoleon I and Napoleon III, the second living with the spoils of the first but creating nothing solid himself). The Proletariat, for Marx, is precisely what does not take a role; the Proletariat is ruined physically and morally. In emerging from the universal history, the Proletariat will become the pure man without disguise and without masquerade. The Proletariat's role is not fictive; it is the truth of the human condition. Thus, Marx ties a certain human situation (that of the Bourgeoisie with its masquerades) to the imposture of historical characters. Moreno, on the contrary, considers the social only a role that is "conserved." Marx has a profundity which is missing in Moreno. Even if one wonders about the capacity of the Proletariat to live up to its historical mission, one can, a priori for Moreno, contain all social history on the terrain of appearance and the imaginary.

Another contestable idea.[53] According to Moreno, the *social atom* initially is the constellation of an individual's characteristic social relations. But elsewhere Moreno declares "that the social atom is not the individual," that it is the simplest social form, the least composed one. However, elsewhere again, he estimates that the group is only a metaphor and only exists by itself. *This uncertainty regarding fundamental sociometric concepts* calls us to consider the thinness of all previous sociometric investigations. These researchers are far from exhausting what there is to know about social situations.

Until now, Moreno is interested only in artificial, short-lived societies (a college, a class in a college), measuring the emotional relations of the individuals. It is suitable to expand the field of application for investigation, to address real, durable societies that have a history and a certain image of themselves.

D. Psychological Orientation

Moreno is fairly tough on Freud. His first meeting with Freud took place in Vienna in 1912. However, he remained conscious of Freud's work and elsewhere took up important corrections of his theoretical conceptions. We can understand them under two rubrics: (1) infancy (the spontaneity

of infancy), and (2) the consequences of these conceptions in psycho-drama.

Moreno holds that the *spontaneous factor* is not grasped in batteries of tests. We see evidence for this factor when the individual is put in an unedited situation and finds original, adaptive responses. Moreno considers the infant not in the perspective of an animal or of a sick person, but instead the infant is oriented toward an adult truth which he seeks to rejoin. He considers birth in the following fashion: human birth is premature because the infant is little adapted for life. His survival is almost a "miracle." According to Moreno, the spontaneous factor intervenes as soon as birth; physiological maturation is an insufficient explanation. Spontaneity, a *prospective* factor, is a functional point of view that must take place before the anatomical point of view.

The situation of the infant's birth is analogous to that of the adult in a psychodrama (even suffocation is a spontaneous response). The infant has *physical starters* and *mental starters* which are furnished by the surroundings. The "physical starters" do not alone explain the infant's understanding; they are addressed to the bodily regions that are ready to function (oral and anal zones), but they function differently for each. The infant does not live his body like a totality. The mother's breast is a physical starter that sets in motion the sucking reflex. To get other functions started, the infant must use his "mental starters," which are given by the surroundings.

There are no physical starters which are not subservient to mental starters. Parental care profoundly influences physical starters (the food we spoke of earlier). The functioning of starters supposes an adaptation, an adjustment the infant makes to the mother (in the presentation of the breast to the infant, the manner in which the infant is held by his mother, inclination to the bottle, the hastiness or tranquility of the mother, etc.). Certain particularities, for example, infantile voracity, would be a consequence of the fact that the infant has not realized his fundamental unity with his mother and identifies his body as only having an oral function. Thus, the infant finds in all that surrounds him (in particular his mother) "*ego* auxiliaries." All that lives around him coexists with him. Moreno calls this collection the "social placenta" or "identity matrix." The mother's role is doubled: to aid and guide the infant. One must not speak of identification, as if separation was first; identity is primordial.

According to Moreno, we must not believe, along with certain authors, that the infant's dependency is like an imperfection and that the "pre-maturation of birth" is a handicap for the infant. In effect, birth "throws" the child into inter-human relations, and he will aspire to supe-

rior forms of development. The infant must be, as much as possible, in contact with a living situation. Moreno denounces the excessive use of dolls and modern apparatuses which are thought to replace the mother. They do not satisfy the need of the child for affection, they do not contribute to his "formation." "Spontaneity induces spontaneity."

From this schema of early infantile development, Moreno critiques certain Freudian notions: amnesia of the first years of life cannot be a consequence of repression. This mechanism does not exist in infantile stages. The adult has the experience of memory (a return to the past); this cannot be the case for the child because it requires a distance from connections between things that, in fact, do not exist. If there is no memory, there can be no repression of memories. The infant cannot remember simply because he cannot disassociate himself from objects. Disassociation in the child is exterior. It follows primordial unity; it is produced with the liquidation of egocentrism under the form of a scission between the imaginary and the real. (The role of psychodrama will be to try to reinstitute the unity of the imaginary and the real and return to initial spontaneity.)

Moreno estimates that in its contact with the child, psychoanalysis should revise its concepts (unconscious, memory, repression). Even the method has changed (free association being replaced by play and drawing, spontaneous catharsis, without needing verbalization). Considering the adult when applying psychoanalysis to the child, Moreno imagines, with psychodrama, a *catharsis by action*. (Conforming to Politzer's theory, where the notion of ambivalence should be substituted for that of the unconscious.)[54] For Moreno, psychoanalysis is retrospective. But the subject's life cannot be understood only by its origins. The individual is sought by what is presented to him; thereby he realizes behaviors more adaptive than what one would have believed possible.

Moreno opposes Freud not with a limitless freedom, but with the possibility that in certain moments an acquisition and renewal of the situation are present. Spontaneity is this power to improvise a role in response to a new situation. Past behavior constitutes action schemas, the "conserves" are the *chances* to reproduce all the times that the subject moves away from what is unedited in the situation. Thus, there is not, as Bergson wanted, a novelty in all moments. But there is no longer an exhaustive explanation made by the past. Spontaneity is like a "catalyzer." Its presence modifies our behavior and renders it insensitive to new aspects of the total situation. What one calls "tendency" is for Moreno that "spontaneity in conserve." In the course of a life, there are moments of repetition; we live on the "conserves."

The goal of psychodrama is to reawaken, to "reheat" the spontane-

ity. To bring the subject back to an instinctual sense, we must "deconserve" the individual. Hence, we find Moreno's hostility to all that is a "finished product" (works, books, etc.). The goal of therapeutic theater will be to restore the original unity between the imaginary and the real. We must not imitate life, but we can no longer reside on another plane. The individual must leave his most vital cares on the imaginary plane; thereby he can make them explicit by a process of *humorous self-expansion*—remove the impasses or blocks to his enclosed spontaneity. By a kind of induction effect, the awakening of spontaneity in each person creates an awakening in others, and conflicts are resolved by reciprocal action.

The play must be improvised: no role can be given that hinders the psychodramatic choice. Moreno critiques Stanislavsky, who said the communion between the actor and the room was insufficient.[55] Moreno argues that the text hinders spontaneity. Psychodrama is not antiartistic. Its function is not to "produce works of art." But it might make a renaissance of art possible ("after us, poetry"). In our civilization, an overestimation exists for works of art, which paralyzes the writer.

E. As Seen in Moreno's Practice

1. *Moreno proposes a series of various exercises to "deconserve" individuals.* (1) A *release* through sharing in the imaginary, for example in a "spoken journal." To act out people as they come to read in the journal. The manner of play is eloquent, but the desired goal is still superficial. (2) *Training for a job:* outline all the adequate gestures for a profession, occupation, and so forth. (3) *Learn foreign languages:* the subject is put in a new situation and attempts to play in the foreign language he is learning. (4) *Spontaneity test:* the individual arrives at a place in the psychodrama course where he must take a test. This operation, according to Moreno, permits us to distinguish *false spontaneity*—apparent ease, aggressive loquacity before proof, which ceases as soon as the psychodrama ends—from *true spontaneity*—a capacity to adapt to many roles, even new roles, for the individual.

[2. *Techniques*]: (1) retraining techniques, (2) interpersonal analysis, (3) psychodrama properly speaking (therapeutic by virtue of mutual action), (4) sociodrama.

Retraining techniques. (1) *Partial sketches* permit a new exploration of the psychic system and a retraining of the individuals' spontaneity. Partial sketches are interesting, especially for children. According to Moreno, a preference for certain roles is an excellent way to detect to where the individual tends. Moreno arrives at the conception of the child's "cultural age" by the number of sensitive roles taken up by the child. Children are given a kind of questionnaire (a list of professions considered interest-

ing), and thirty to forty roles are then selected. One asks the children to play certain roles or to designate what roles they do not want to take.

Children with a superior intelligence are often unable to play a great number of roles. They show a reduced spontaneity; sometimes they give proof of an "illusory spontaneity," where the child put in front of a precise problem cannot find an adaptive response. By contrast, less intelligent children can assume roles in a coherent, thorough manner. Some very intelligent children greatly dramatize some sequences of their games, but they cannot hold the role until the end. Intelligence and suppleness in play are not necessarily correlated.

By evaluating the roles that an individual is capable of, one can anticipate which children will enter into conflicts and which children will be agreeable. Children who only pretend with one or two roles are unlikely to resort to conflict. One also sees children adopt roles very removed from their experiences (worker, bus driver, for example). Moreno thinks this is a result of the fact that the most familiar roles (mother, father) have not yet become "roles" and are not sensitive to play. These children are not yet in the "identity matrix."

The exploration also carries over to the experience of adult subjects. Two subjects, husband and wife, are supposedly placed in their living room. The director announces that a fire has started in the dining room where the baby is. One examines their behavior and complicates the situation with accessory elements: the door does not open, the telephone rings, and so forth. Their reaction is a test of the individual's attitude in life. But Moreno estimates that these operations do not concern the entire individual and proposes a deeper investigation. For example, a woman learns her husband wants to divorce her in order to marry another woman.

Positive responses are furnished by some subjects: a philosophical smile where the situation is accepted for reasons of principle, to accept but also to declare that she already loves another man, to accept with the condition of meeting the other woman, to accept but to demand time to adapt to the situation, to accept and make a declaration of eternal love, to accept and propose a financial aid so he can remarry, to demand exclusive care of the children, to benefit from the insurance, to accept but to kill herself immediately after, to keep the apartment.

Negative responses are: she will have a child, she loves him and does not want to separate, she will have no help if he leaves her, she will become sick to force him to live with her, she wants to fight the other woman to keep her husband.

(2) *Complete sketches.* Moreno used complete sketches to help stut-

terers successfully. He used exercises to reexploit, to throw the stutterers back to how they are able to keep their spontaneity. The stutterers must play scenes where they do not speak words and utter random syllables. The goal of these exercises is to obtain an unblocking of the verbal apparatus that is interrupted when the stutterer articulates language. Moreno also cites the case of someone with ticks (contractions on the left half of the face). He takes him and asks him to throw himself into the role of the aggressor. The subject was bullied in life, and the tick appears each time he has a tick-free face. It is the stereotypical expression of fear in the face of another. The positive role of the aggressor unblocks his spontaneity.

Interpersonal analyses. Moreno intervenes in a matrimonial triangle: the clients are cared for at home. Three people share in a neurosis, not as three parallel neuroses, but as the same difficulty between three individuals. A married man loves another woman; they are all three in anguish and cannot find a way out of the problem. The wife has had five children in twenty years of marriage. She has insomnia, a bit of hysteria, suicidal ideas, and wants to return to the initial situation. She does not want to adapt to the actual situation or to restore it. The husband, in charge of work, sees no solution because he is at the same time detached from his wife and has difficulty with the other, whose family opposes a marriage. He has ideas of suicide.

Moreno makes him effectively feel what is happening in his wife's mind, about which he is not surprised. Alternative meetings with each spouse and the doctor take place wherein each tries to win his or her own case. Moreno understands that he is treating an interpersonal relation, a kind of mirror phenomenon, and he must try to facilitate the convergence of partnership feelings by putting them in each other's presence. The other woman is equally unhappy because she does not have epistolary relations with the man; the situation is at a dead stop.

Moreno takes the wife and explains to her exactly what her attachment to her husband is: she loves him because he is "her" husband, because he is the father of the children; their bond is completely social. The husband's hostility is reinforced by the fact that the children take the mother's side. The husband effectively retains some affection for his wife. But the situation has become impossible. The wife consents to divorce because she has understood the nature of her attachment to her husband.

Moreno claims to have gotten past Freudian transference. It is not neutral but discreet. The "transference" is, according to Moreno, a restructuration of impersonal attitudes; it does not take place solely or principally between the patient and the doctor. It is a change of the "telerelations" of the ill where if the doctor is active, he only plays the role of a

catalyst. In orthodox psychoanalysis, the doctor plays an excessive role, all the while affecting to not actively intervene, with his attitude of an omniscient watcher.

Therapeutic psychodrama. A typical observation is, for example, that Robert admits he has a kind of anxiety neurosis. One asks him to make a portrait of his father in any situation. He often identifies with his father. In effect, in the home, the boy always takes the father's side; he reproduces familiar remarks. During the psychodrama, Robert is always in a rush like his father, and he describes his mother as always complaining "that things are not in the right place." The father has a neurosis of time and the mother has one of space. The subject brings his wife a few days later. Robert's soliloquies always express an obsession with not having enough time, and he finds that his wife also does not put things in their right place ("this glass *belongs* on the sideboard"). All his life is minimized; he loses times looking for combinations to save time. Many unfinished acts exist in his life.

Psychodrama is continued spontaneously at home. Robert and his wife are warned of the difficulties of an unobserved treatment. In the theater, they can unblock their spontaneity in overt aggressivity. One asks them to play scenes from their life and to yell the private remarks which accompany them. Moreno also prescribes a "dramatization" of the subject's dreams: developing certain vagaries of a dream that occur during the dramatization.

One of Moreno's ideas is that everyone is a therapist without knowing it. We can object that in psychodrama one is on the margins of life, and it is precisely this neutralization which allows the subject to express himself. But psychodrama does not take place in the real, nor does it take place in the imaginary; it is more the order of myth. It is the deployment of real conflicts, whenever possible using real actors (or with ego auxiliaries which replace them) in a space made neutral by the presence of the doctor and other patients. Consequently, it is where contractions can be overcome and spontaneity can be mobilized.

Moreno also envisions relations with music in psychodrama taking two forms. (1) The use of music as a therapeutic method (meetings with impromptu chants on themes the director chooses—simple words, inarticulate language). One should thus utilize phonation in mimed sketches; the assistance makes an echo like a choir. Moreno also envisions the creation of impromptu orchestras. In this case, music would only be a setting in motion before the psychodrama. (2) The use of psychodrama in the treatment of musicians. It is always about releasing blocked spontaneity. In an observed case, a 45-year-old violinist, a virtuoso and a composer, suffered from hand trembling while in the performance of certain parti-

tion, particularly in a solo, before the public or for radio. However, this trembling disappeared when he was alone. In this case, Moreno speaks of a "musical stuttering"; he considers all tools as an extension of the subject's body. He assimilates the musician's incapacity to serve his instrument like the stutterer's inability to master his speech. The relations with his instrument are almost human; the musician is invested in his violin. A strong jealousy of his orchestral peers exists, 60 percent of whom he sees as his enemies, but the musician is indifferent to his family, whom he considers a simple life necessity. He has antipathy for himself as soon as he considers himself from a social angle. He can only accept himself as an "artist" in some sort of death for life. In addition, one notes a great unsociability in him.

Moreno takes care of his professional trouble with the following exercises: performances in front of the orchestra, without written music, violin without bow, bow without violin, or without an instrument at all. These performances are guided by concrete themes (it is not that Moreno thinks of music as a sonorous illustration, but these exercises permit the patient to overcome his resistances in front of the instrument and with certain parts.) Moreno thus transfers music from the plane of duty to the plane of game for the musician. He ultimately acquires anew written music. This observation is incomplete. We do not find out if the patient ceases his tremblings and is able to integrate his family and social lives. But we can draw indications of the idea of a *prospective and not retrospective analysis*. A case analysis can be undertaken against a Freudian method from such terminal phenomena instead of researching initial traumas. The obtained release in the terminal symptoms would resonate in the psychic whole. Moreno is obliged to create with his hostility against "conserves" such as written music. The musician "deconserved" can newly employ his spontaneity for the benefit of written music.

Sociodrama. Its difference from psychodrama is that sociodrama is occupied with ideas and realizations of collective experiences. Whereas in psychodrama the roles are private, in sociodrama the roles are cultural types. Sociodrama is a new process of recording cultures in the same bracket as painting, tools, and written works. Moreno's effort takes up the relationship of conflict-laden representations in cultures (for example, between blacks and whites, etc.). Sociodrama compares the human and social roles held by individuals in depicting their different personalities when they are placed in analogous situations.

Before sociodrama, each person only discusses the other through cultural clichés and sees himself through the eyes of the other; hence it was impossible to have spontaneous relations. Treatment consists in putting everyone in the presence of human realities and real problems

rather than ideological entities. The case of an anti-Semite who always makes exceptions for Jews because "they aren't like everyone else" shows that problems always present themselves differently according to whether or not one finds oneself in the presence of real individuals or abstract identities. At the same time, putting into play the roles of "communist-anticommunist," "black–white" would have the result of posing the problems in real terms, to make the conflicts pass from fantastic to real.

Sociodrama touches the *actuality of subjects:* the role of director is increasingly effaced. He proposes the theme, and the roles are chosen by the individuals. For example, after a black uprising in Harlem (New York), a sociodrama is played with the relationship black–white. The black couple (a role effectively taken by a couple of blacks) is unjustly attacked by a white who, finally softened by their good faith, invites the couple to dinner. The concrete problem: will we accept the invitation or not? The white woman's words shock them: for instance, does she *really* want to invite them?

The spectators are connected in sociodrama. One invites them to play anew the roles which have just been played, one tells them to vote whether or not they approve the manner in which the others have played the role. The advantage is that one is taken toward theoretical discussions on race, the responsibility of blacks and whites, the concrete evidence that there is something intolerable in segregation.

One must not believe that sociodrama is a way to drown problems. Rather, it takes them from the terrain of theories, of rationalizations, to the place of vital behavior and reactions. Sociodrama is not necessarily neutral. Problems remain after such meetings. The attitudes which are only founded on phantasms would be threatened. We must consider as an acquisition of child psychology to have learned, with Moreno, to reveal the avatars of spontaneity in social integration.

Structure and Conflicts in Child Consciousness (1949–1950)

I. Introduction

A. The Significance of the Word "Structure"

What we understand by the idea of structure is that the child's consciousness is different from the adult's both in content and organization. Children are not, as was previously thought, "miniature adults." Thus, contrary to the negative account, the child's consciousness is not identical to the adult's in everything except for its incompleteness and imperfection. The child possesses another kind of equilibrium than the adult kind; therefore, we must treat the child's consciousness as a positive phenomenon. In this train of thought, let us analyze the similarities between child consciousness, primitive consciousness, and morbid consciousness.

According to Lévy-Bruhl, primitive thought is completely foreign to the thought of "normal, civilized white adults."[1] Primitive thought is grounded in participation. Its logic is impenetrable and irreducible to the civilized individual. Because of this lack of comprehension, civilized adults consider themselves to have a monopoly on reason. Blondel has made a similar distinction with regard to the consciousness of the mentally disturbed. Since sane people find the insane impenetrable and irreducible, they consider themselves the sole owners of rationality.

These conceptions have undergone a revision in the past twenty years. Lévy-Bruhl has attempted to elucidate the concrete experience on which primitive myths are based. Exploring the concrete experience beneath myths provides us with a kind of "truth" of myths so they are no longer devoid of meaning; they express a worldview [un certain rapport avec le monde]. Moreover, the importance of "participation" is rediscovered to a lesser extent in the civilized individual when we scrutinize his private and latent beliefs. Lévy-Bruhl rejects the notion of a prelogical and instead speaks of the importance of understanding particular logics.

Similarly, if morbid consciousness is radically other than normal consciousness, we would have to renounce all attempts to understand

it. We thus react against the excesses of such a conception (which itself is a reaction against the ideas of Ribot and the seventeenth century).[2] Today, we have begun to recognize that mental illness is not an inaccessible isle: both normal and pathological consciousnesses are capable of understanding and mutually clarifying one another.

The same holds true for child consciousness. The fact that its structure appears to be incomplete should not prevent us from seeing its wholly positive meaning. Let us take as our example the child's drawings and the three possible attitudes exhibited toward them.

The first attitude was more common seventy to eighty years ago: that of the "classical" psychologist. The drawing is considered to be devoid of interesting content in itself and is only seen as imperfect. *The second attitude* is that of the majority of psychologists (including Piaget). Children's drawings merit study and they do possess original structures (e.g., intellectual realism, syncretism, etc.). However, they are always studied as a function of adult drawing. One views children's drawing as imperfect sketches of adult drawings which are the "true" representation of the object.

The third attitude is the positive psychological attitude. It recognizes a *positive meaning* within the child's drawing. For example, when an adult draws a cube, he draws it in perspective. The child draws four or five juxtaposed squares. If we insist on telling the child, "that is not what you see," we encounter a great resistance. The child maintains that he really does see it in this way (we find a similar attitude in adults who have had little training in drawing). Must we speak of "motor and perceptual insufficiencies," or is the difference caused by another way of seeing? The study of painting shows us that the geometrical perspective was invented in a specific period: in the Renaissance. The traditional attitude implies the postulate that the geometrical perspective is truer than another perspective. The efforts of modern painting place this postulate in question and give a positive significance to other manners of seeing. (In Picasso, the plurality of profiles is a means of expression.)

We can see proof of children's freedom from our cultural postulates in their drawings. We do understand that a perceptual-motor insufficiency does in fact exist; children are not artists. However, the efforts of modern painting grant a new meaning to children's drawings. We can no longer consider perspectival drawings as the only "truth."

It is in such a manner that we must understand the expression "structure of consciousness."[3] The child is capable of certain spontaneous actions which are rendered impossible in the adult due to the influence of, and obedience to, cultural schemas. Yet the difference between adults and

children is often exaggerated. In a study described in the 1932 *American Journal of Psychology*, Piaget's experiments on seven-year-olds yielded the same behavioral results when performed on nineteen-year-olds.[4] Also, in Deshaies' article "Le notion de relations chez l'enfant," it was reported that ideas thought to be unique to adult relationships were also found in children. Inversely, many remnants of childhood behavior were found in the adult. We find Henri Wallon's conceptions far more satisfactory than those of Piaget.[5]

B. Significance of the Word "Conflicts"

Perhaps we will find that the general "structures" we will begin to study (e.g., egocentrism, syncretism, etc.) are connected in part to the child's situation and in part to the conflicts in which the child finds himself involved. In reading the reports of psychologists, one sometimes believes that the child's behavior is a fateful result of his mental age. But another quality must be considered: the history and the events which explain the child's mentality. To neglect this historical aspect is to encourage the oft-cited reproach that child psychology tends toward abstraction. Such is the critique made by Politzer when he notes that it is too abstract to simply state that children are incapable of paying attention.[6] One must say what it is children are thinking about and what it is that their attention is drawn toward when they fail to "pay attention." Positive contents must be incorporated into explorations of the functional aspects of the child's behavior. For example, we must not just say that the child's behavior symbolizes something, but what it symbolizes and how it symbolizes it. For instance, consider Dolto's article on the "doll-flowers" in the *Revue de psychoanalyse*, which reveals the profoundly specific drama of childhood.[7]

Another manner in which psychology is guilty of abstraction is when it pictures the child in the presence of abstract *stimuli* such as colors. To be human is never to be in the presence of isolated and impersonal *stimuli*. As humans, we are confronted by beings, animals, and so forth. It is often in understanding our relations with other people that our relations with nature (including our manner of perceiving it) are comprehensible.

To its credit, psychoanalysis was the first to describe the child's relations with others (identifications, projections, etc.). More concrete studies are possible. Now the title of the course, "Structure and Conflicts in Child Consciousness," is clear. We shall move from the formal characteristics of the child's awareness to the particular features which clarify these formal characteristics. In our study, we will borrow in succession from experimental psychology and psychoanalysis.

II. Concept of Development

A. Phylogenetic Development

The question of development concerns not only the process by which the child becomes an adult, but also phylogenetic development. ("Genetic psychology" includes the studies of child, primitive, and morbid consciousnesses.) This concept presupposes that a child's consciousness represents an archaic state of adult awareness, whereas a pathological consciousness represents a regressive state. By uniting these three forms of consciousness, we are led to assume that they are parallel. We must examine the postulate which is at play here. One assumes that the development of the child recapitulates humanity's emergence (e.g., "Primitives are big children"; "Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny"). First, we will examine if a relationship can be legitimately drawn between the child and the disturbed individual; and second, whether a relation can be drawn between the child and the primitive.

1. *Connections between the child and the disturbed person.* Can one compare, for example, a child just beginning to speak to a disturbed child (an [adult] aphasiac) who almost no longer speaks? Aphasiacs were once adults. They retain, at least formally, some adult attributes. Kurt Goldstein shows that despite the aphasiac's loss of ability to use language creatively, an automatic use of language, an "external verbal knowledge," still persists for a long time.[8] For example, although the aphasiac can no longer count or think "2 + 3 = 5," he can rediscover the answer in a roundabout manner by using his fingers. Children also count on their fingers, but their automatic behavior is not the legacy of an adult life. The use of their hands in order to count represents an initial opening up of numbers in childhood. They use the hand as a system of reference, as a concrete numerical set, and compare this hand to countable things. Regression is never purely and simply the return to the state which preceded it developmentally. There is both more and less in the aphasiac than in the child.

Whatever the analogies between the child and the aphasiac are, an essential difference remains: the latter had spoken, the former had not. We find that in the disturbed adult a trace of an old knowledge persists that engenders certain acts of substitution and that creates an illusion. Nothing parallel exists in the child. In order to calculate "2 + 3 = 5," children count their fingers like aphasiacs. However, the child already possesses a certain insight into numbers—the recognition of a relationship between 2 and 3—that the aphasiac has completely lost. Thus, the same act in the aphasiac seems at the same time blinder and more certain than in the child, since, even though it is devoid of meaning, the action

takes place through a very old mechanism. This mechanism is not yet established in the child, and yet despite the fact the action is hesitant, it is marked by *insight* and an intimate comprehension of the operation.

The common scientific notion concerning the resemblance of the child and the pathological adult is based upon the valuable (though flawed) notion of *integration*. Introduced by Jackson and Head, this theory maintains that the nervous system has two levels.[9] Automatic actions are integrated little by little into a superior system (represented by the cerebral surface) which plays the role of the brake, or inhibitor, of the primitive system. In the case of lesions, the disorders which are produced in the higher centers are the proof of this phenomenon of integration and inhibition (e.g., the Babinski reflex).[10]

However, the tendency to think that brain functions consist uniquely of control and braking [*freinage*] (e.g., Head's "vigilance" of the brain) is thoroughly contestable. More recent authors have wondered whether the integration of inferior centers into superior ones is something other than we first thought. Perhaps integration also modifies automatic functions. If this is the case, we would find that disturbed individuals who have suffered damage to the superior centers of the brain would exhibit a transformation of behavior. However, the transformation would not be a simple return to primitive automatism. As during all development where everything has been transformed and modified to a great extent, we will find, in the case of injuries to the brain's superior centers, the appearance of something different than primitive automatism. As a result, it is unreasonable to postulate a strict parallelism between the child and the mentally ill.

2. *Connections between the child and the primitive.* In establishing a parallel between the child and the primitive, one assumes that the primitive represents humanity's childhood. However, we forget that most primitive societies have long histories behind them, and many represent a degenerate state of an ancient civilization.

We must abandon this idea of an archaic state held in common by the child and the primitive. However, this extremely powerful prejudice of evolutionary metaphysics can seduce even the most careful of thinkers. Even Piaget formally allows that a certain parallel exists between the child and the primitive. For example, in *Judgment and Reasoning,* he places the mentality of the child, the primitive, and the autistic individual all on the same level.[11]

And yet the differences between the child and the primitive are evident and even striking. A primitive is an adult according to his own society, whereas children live in a society to which they have not yet adapted. Furthermore, the child's acquisition of language does not bear

a deep resemblance to linguistic evolution. Paul Guillaume, in a 1927 article, shows that the child's language is a selection of what is offered by the child's society; it is not a recapitulation of old linguistic forms.[12] For example, it is completely artificial to attempt to find in children's omission of inflections a recapitulation of stages of languages which are without inflection. Even when children do not yet employ inflections, they understand what they mean when others use them; it is simply that this understanding has not yet crossed the threshold into spoken language.

Even Claparède believes in a parallel between children and primitives.[13] While he does try to eliminate certain prejudices, he nonetheless explains the parallel by the similarity of the situations. Claparède asserts that "Nature utilizes the same means" in forming the individual and the species. But, as we have seen, the child and the primitive do not find themselves in the same situations at all. It is true that partial resemblances exist and it is important to record them, but we must not interpret them as indicating a type of recapitulation.

In *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, Lévi-Strauss puts forward an entirely different hypothesis regarding these resemblances. His research bears on three points of resemblance between the primitive and the child (without intending to limit the points of resemblance): (1) the respect of the rule for the sake of the rule; (2) a certain effort toward the establishment of reciprocal relationships allowing for the resolution of conflicts; and (3) the synthetic value of the gift (the gift adds something to the given thing by the very fact that it is given). These three points are explained by an identification with others; the child only desires objects insofar as they belong to others. Reciprocity and gifts will lead to the overcoming of the conflicts born of this differentiation.

The child and the primitive may resemble one another simply because the child better reveals a certain common ground of all human life out of which various cultural differences take form. In the child, all these possible formations are rediscovered in outline. In the same way in which Freud speaks of the child's sexual polymorphism, following Lévi-Strauss, we could say that the child is socially "polymorphic."

Some of these formations are inhibited by later stages, whereas we find that in the primitive they become stabilized. This simply means that a plurality of possibilities exists in all children, civilized peoples, or primitives. Within different cultures different formations are inhibited and chosen. We tend to think of primitives as "puerile," and yet they have the same opinion of us. Some, like the North American Indians, regard our manner of questioning everything immature, because "adults do not question, they prefer to observe [*regarder*]."

This thesis concerning a polymorphism of the child cannot be

settled here. We only cite it to show that the hypothesis of recapitulation is far from being the only one which can take account of the similarities between child and primitive.

B. Ontogenetic Development

We must also scrutinize the notion of individual development for prejudices.

1. *Maturation and learning.* The distinction between the innate and the acquired has been more or less abandoned in favor of a distinction between maturation and learning. Maturation describes development as owing to internal or endogenous factors, and learning understands development as stemming from external or exogenous factors (e.g., the *Reifen* [maturation] and *Lernen* [learning] of certain German psychologists).

The examination of the idea of maturation. Aside from the infant's first few months, is there any other process that arises uniquely from internal factors? Certainly, even "instinct" can only appear when the organism is sensitized through certain channels. However, some restrictions must be admitted: are reflexes (the archetypal endogenous processes) based on preestablished organic arrangements? A number of physiologists have recently admitted that the reflex is not a normal activity of the organism at all. Rather, it is an artificial process instigated in the laboratory, one that might even be called a pathological reaction. The organism's normal activity may not be a reflex (that is, an identical response to an identical stimulus), but rather an activity of adaptation; an activity regulated at every instant by the particular properties of the external *stimuli.*

For reflexology, the *stimulus* serves to set in motion a previously existing circuit; it understands the reflex as a blind repetition dependent upon the trajectory of preestablished neural fibers. In fact, the reaction involves not an isolated stimulus. Rather, it involves the entire situation. A dog, for example, that walks about on three paws while dragging the fourth is executing something much more adaptable than a blind reflex. When the dog's paw experiences the least displacement by stimulus, this slight change of attitude presupposes at each moment a complete motor reorganization: a new equilibrium. It seems almost inconceivable that a different preestablished circuit exists for each variation. Instead of blind reflex to a stimulus, it is the stimulus itself that regulates the response; it is entirely a question of a scale between automatism and adaptation.

Thus, what one calls "instinct" no longer appears to depend strictly upon internal factors. We know that the nightingale can only sing its melodious song if it has heard this song during a certain period of its de-

velopment. In humans, there hardly exists any instinct which arises solely from maturation. Psychoanalysis has shown that "sexual instinct" and its perversions depend on the development and history of the individual (and thus, "sexual instinct" should be replaced by "sexual history"). Instinct cannot manifest itself if the internal conditions are lacking, but these conditions never comprise a self-sufficient causality.

Examination of the idea of learning. The problem of learning imposes similar restrictions. When properly considered, the conditioned reflex (prototype of all learning) is subject to the same criticisms as the reflex. When Watson studied inhibition in the child (e.g., in the example of teaching the child to no longer put his fingers to a flame), he maintained that learning never took place before the 178th day. Before this date, no inhibition was produced, no matter how many repetitions were attempted. But once inhibition was established, it became generalized. The child no longer touched the flame or any brilliant object. The child did not learn "to withdraw his finger," but to "avoid fire" (Koffka).[14] It is an activity that is too general to be a simple mechanism.

The conditioned reflex is never a simple connection between a stimulus and a response. Piéron says that animals normally develop certain reactions not in the face of isolated stimuli, but in the face of general forms of situation.[15] We have seen that it was impossible to delimit the exact role of maturation and learning, the two being indissolubly linked in the acquisition of all behavior. It is possible neither to separate external and internal factors, nor to separate maturation and learning.

It seems just as artificial to attempt to oppose instinct to intelligence. In reality, no clear-cut frontier can be found between instinctive behavior and intelligent behavior. The study of the role of perception will make it easier for us to understand the continuity between the two; all behavior, instinctive or intellectual, unfolds itself on the basis of the perception of a situation.

2. *The perception-motor (sensation-movement) collective. The classical position*—the relationship between sensation and movement—seems quite clear. Sensation is characterized by such terms as possession (of a quality such as "red," "cold," etc.), contemplation, and awareness [*relève de connaissance*], whereas movement is understood by action (what modifies the surroundings), events, and commands (when the subject is commanded by the nervous system). Considered in this way, there is no intrinsic link between perception (as an elementary fact of consciousness) and motor function (relating to the order of things). Classical psychology, which defines their relations in this way, creates an insoluble problem.

The new position. Gestalt psychologists have discovered a tight connection between perception and motor functions. Thus, they find it

impossible to dissociate the two. Perception and motor functions must be considered as two aspects of the *same phenomenon*.[16] For example, in an analysis of tactile experience, the sensation of "smooth" or "rough" occurs through an exploratory movement over the surface. Without a bodily movement that seeks to gain tactile information, no tactile sensation arises.

The same principle is true for vision. The experiments of Goldstein and Rosenthal demonstrate that each color brings about a bodily attitude; each color organizes a motor activity or inactivity.[17] An essential connection exists between "sensation" and "taking an attitude toward the external world." All movement unfolds on a perceptual ground, and all sensation implies a motor exploration or a bodily attitude. Vision would be nothing more than a spurious phenomenon if it were not guided by the *intention* of seeing.[18] On the other hand, all the subject's movements happen on a perceptual ground. Deaf children learn to speak only when a tactile or visual perception is substituted for the defective aural perception. In the same manner, motor dysfunctions (e.g., locomotor ataxia tabes) stem from perceptual troubles; it is a question of a lesion of the channels of sensation and not a dysfunction in the motor channels.[19] Koffka shows that these lesions incite a loss of basic tactile control, thus giving rise to an "aggravated" gait. And yet the subject can walk correctly if constant attention is paid to the feet; if he substitutes a visual sensation for a tactile one. Therefore, we find that movement is guided by a tactile, or kinesthetic, perception.

Thus, Gestalt psychology obliges us to reconsider the problem of sensation and movement. One must speak of a perceptual side and a motor side of behavior: two aspects of a single reality. It is difficult to do because classical distinctions rest upon deeply rooted philosophical grounds; grounds like the notion of a contemplative consciousness. The Gestaltists demand that we renounce this conception of a contemplative consciousness, a conception detached from action, and replace it with that of an *active consciousness* for which the body is the instrument for exploring the world.

The idea of habit. All the facts concerning *habit* confirm that we need to go beyond traditional thought when considering the relationship between perception and motor activity. In the classic view, habit does not concern the mind, but the body. Even if the awareness of the movement is lost, the automatic mechanism persists. From this perspective, there is no means of understanding the phenomenon of habit; it is impossible to think of it as a simple, automatic, mechanistic action [*automatisme*]. For instance, how can we explain the many instances when a single perception suffices to bring about habitual action?[20]

There are also *general* habits. General habits can be transferred (e.g., writing habits can be transferred from one hand to the other) and can adapt to various situations (e.g., the organist who can play other organs than his own after one inspection of the instrument). Thus, it is neither a question of mechanical actions nor of intellectual operations; the habitual act is clarified by "insight" without being based upon an intellectual act. What is the source of this suppleness of habit?

The problem can be resolved if perception and motor functions are not artificially separated. In this way, the issue would always involve a certain perception of the situation, on the condition that one grants that this perception behaves according to a corresponding motor adaptation. This bears on child psychology, since the development of motor activity necessarily implies perceptual development, and vice versa. Therefore, it would be useless to ask if a specific advance proceeds from perceptual or motor development. Instead, we find that they imply each other.

3. *Objective and subjective methods.* The problem of choosing between these two methods has long paralyzed research. However, this is an artificial problem, the two being indissolubly linked. *Objective method.* If one admits that all movement implies a certain mode of perception, then it is possible to decipher in the child's behavior the perception he has of his surroundings. In other words, it is reasonable to read in children's behavior their representation of the world. The objective method makes this postulate because, first, we cannot proceed differently, and second, because it is considered legitimate in animal psychology.

When an ape, without hesitation, picks up a stick to knock down a banana, we can infer that it grasps the instrumental relation between the banana and the stick. We cease being strictly objective in this case, if objectivity consists in utilizing only measurable givens. However, objectivity need not be conflated with measurability. When behavior cannot be described properly in any other fashion, the psychologist's interaction with animal or child behavior is legitimate to the extent that it is appropriate to introduce qualitative elements of evaluation (on the condition that the facts authorize us to do so).

Subjective method. Guillaume has shown that there is no natural difference between self-observation (introspection) and external observation.[21] Even when we observe ourselves we have recourse to the proof of the *behavior;* we cannot depend on impressions, but must decide on the basis of the givens of our own behavior. It is useless to remain obsessed by an alternative, because all methods share a fundamental similarity which stems from their respective encounters with various structures of behavior. Moreover, child behavior develops not only under the influence of physicochemical stimuli, but also out of a communion with the environment.[22]

III. Study of the Child's Perception

In this study of perception, our chief concern will involve the child's lived experience and not the ideas by which the child interprets this experience. We will address ourselves to the direct experience of the child: an experience not yet systematized by language and thought. The distinction between lived experience and rationalization marks the limit of the interrogative method of investigating children's experience. We find that a number of problems now pose themselves to us.

The problem of egocentrism. Is the infant aware of the outside world? Do infants experience an enveloping reality? In the first part of his work *The Child's Conception of the World,* Piaget shows that the child's thought is essentially characterized by "egocentrism."[23] Egocentrism (as a mode of thought and sensation) allows the child to overlook the external world. Piaget's understanding of the child's "egocentrism" remains a subtle concept which often exceeds criticisms made of it. Piaget does not claim the child originates as a pure subjectivity (a self-consciousness which turns away from the world in order to experience subjective "states"). In other words, Piaget is not necessarily guilty of committing the subjectivist prejudice that experience begins with "sensation." Instead, the concept of egocentrism has to be understood in a wholly different manner.

For Piaget, the child is *singularly* directed toward the outer world with no trace of introversion. Contrary to the subjectivist prejudice, Piaget affirms that the child is caught up in an excessive realism which renders him incapable of taking a critical perspective on things. The child does not yet discern the limitations of the place of the personal in experience and, thus, assumes his ego [*moi*] is the essence of objective reality. In the child, a state of indifference exists between the external world and the ego. Therefore, far from signifying an excess of ego awareness, Piaget's concept exposes the shortcomings of egocentrism.

Can we now conclude that the analysis of the child's concepts by an adult is a satisfactory method? It must be admitted that the subject matter of Piaget's research is much more convincing than his interpretations of it; a substantial gap often exists between what children do or say and how Piaget understands these actions.

Take, for example, some of the studies in *The Child's Conception of the World* concerning the evolution of the concept of "thought" in the child. Piaget distinguishes three stages. The first stage (up to about six to seven years of age) is characterized by an absolute ignorance of thought, except as a completely "materialist" concept (i.e., one thinks with the mouth or the ear). The second stage (about eight years) is when adult concepts already begin to intervene, although they are interpreted by

the child in his own way (i.e., one thinks with the head or the brain, but thought is considered to be in the voice). The third stage is where we find a "dematerialization of thought," where the child has assimilated adult concepts.

But let us look in detail at children's responses. To the question, "With what do you think?" the child responds, "With the voice." However, nothing indicates that the child "materializes" thinking. The child simply offers the voice as the vehicle of speech. Moreover, the child takes the voice and language in general to be a reality endowed with its own efficacy.

Another aspect of the child's confusion involves the distinction between vision and light, because for him the gaze is a reality that emanates from the eyes and lights upon objects. For example, many children have the idea that two gazes which cross can clash or get mixed up. They also say that they "feel a tingling on the cheek" [*sentir sur sa joue*] when being watched. For children, the eyes are luminous sources which emit a little light. Thus, the child would have a "substantialist" thought: the gaze and memory are bodily substances. The idea of a "mental object" is completely lacking in this first stage where no awareness of psychical entities exists. The child reaches the third stage when the following conditions are fulfilled: first, thinking becomes localized in the brain; and second, thought gets characterized as immaterial (detached from matter).

Discussion of the above. We must discuss Piaget's conclusions within another method of examination. Piaget thinks according to well-defined categories such as the dichotomies matter-mind-thought and inner language-outer language. He assumes that these distinctions are lacking in the child and analyzes the child's responses regarding strictly this impoverishment. In fact, Piaget does not seek to understand the child's conceptions, but rather he attempts to translate them into the adult system. However, in child psychology, it is necessary to abstain from employing these adult concepts and even abstain from an adult vocabulary. In order to refrain from falsifying the child's thought, we must describe it in a new language that departs from the distinctions of adult language.[24]

For example, Piaget says that the child does not believe that objects persist once they have disappeared from his or her visual field. But it is absurd to assume that the child possesses the same sort of belief in permanence, as well as nonpermanence, in the sense that the adult understands them. In order to describe the child's original experience, one would have to find a means of expression which suggests

neither a permanent world in the adult sense, nor a world of vanishing objects.

One must concede that Piaget has not found this neutral language which allows us to avoid adult categories. Yet he is aware of the problem, since he reproached Baldwin for not undertaking a positive description of the observed phenomena. This reproach turns back on Piaget when he declares that thought has a physical origin for the child. Piaget fails to ask what the child means by "thought comes from the mouth or the voice." The child neither possesses the adult notion of the psychic, nor does the child have the adult understanding of the physical: for the child "mouth" and "voice" are by no means physical phenomena. What the child understands by "body" is not the physical body, but the phenomenal body: a body which the child experiences intimately. The child uses the body as a system of means in order to enter into contact with the external world. The same goes for the voice: it is a verbal phenomenon. Children refer themselves to the virtual objects of thought in their interior experience. It is not at all about a "materialist concept."

Thus, Piaget does not depend at all upon real experience, but solely on his rationalization by way of adult concepts. (These concepts are, moreover, contestable even from Piaget's own position, for example, when Piaget asks a child of the third stage to conceive of thinking as simultaneously "immaterial" and localized in the brain.) In response to Stern, who maintained the "implicit" debut of the distinction between reality and fiction in his four-year-old daughter, Piaget declares himself incapable of taking the implicit conception into account. Therefore, Piaget admits that his study does not address itself to the conceptions that the child actually has, but to their rationalization, their second-order expression. This "translation" makes children's conceptions seem absurd, because their lived experiences are in fact so different. We can even find a strong resemblance between the child's experiences and those of the adult, if we look closely at the conventional expressions of the latter. In taking up the question of the child's perception, or perception in general, a certain number of preconceptions must be addressed.

A. The Classical Notion of Perception's Genesis

As classically conceived, the child enters the world with sense organs, each of which furnishes the child with a certain number of sensations. The child's perception is seen as a sum of sensory givens that are iso-

lated from one another, senses which have nothing in common with one another. The child's first experiences would be, then, actually multiple experiences disjointed from one another. Progressively, the child succeeds in making distinctions between them and in making perceptions and sensations correspond to one another. This conception implies that perceptual development requires an ordering of sensation by a *concept of space*. Only through this concept of space can identifiable objects exist. The notion of space intervenes as a hypothesis that permits the interpretation of sensations and spatial perception, and thus becomes the integrating element for the perception of objects.

Furthermore, this conception presupposes that the child possesses an *idea of causality:* objects presenting themselves in variable aspects (e.g., movement, different illuminating distances, and so forth). In order to recognize objects as objects, we must rediscover what is identical under what is variable. In other words, we must know *why* they appear to change. In this sense, our perception begins as a scientific project (Leibniz).[25] While looking at each and every object, the perceiver, confronted by many ways of judging, chooses the most economical hypothesis. For example, it is easier to assume that an object moves in relation to an unmoving frame than to see it the other way around. However, this does not mean that the other hypothesis (i.e., the background moving in relation to the object) ought to be rejected.

Thus, according to the classical conception, perception begins by residing in a disjointed and multifarious experience; the classical psychologist's task involves the reorganization of disparate sensations. Seen in this way, one would have "matter" which would be sensation, and, on the other hand, a "form" which reunites the different sensations with the assistance of concepts of space and causality. In other words, the child finds himself confronted by sensations which are in need of deciphering. Such deciphering is then accomplished by an intellectual operation. This conception postulates a diversity or multiplicity of sensations as the origin of the child's experience. The senses are individually and collectively responsible for synthesizing experience. Implicit in the classical position is the assumption that this synthesis is a function of an intellectual act at the level of judgment.

B. Discussion

1. *Do the first sensations of the child actually present themselves as disordered and multiple?* Experience seems to prove otherwise. If we follow, for example, the development of color perception, three stages are discovered: very

early on, the infant reacts to light, then a reaction to saturated colors appears, and finally, the differentiation of colors (first warm, then cold) develops.

However, the study of the child's perception of color meets with many problems. Results are uncertain, because the child is hard-pressed to define intermediate colors (Koffka). Moreover, we tend to believe that our perception and the child's perception are the same. In other words, we grant the child the right to be mistaken about the names of colors, but it is difficult for us to admit that there could be a difference of perception between the child and us. It seems to us that a proper correspondence exists between the contents of things and the contents of consciousness. Psychologists have often maintained a similitude of perception, but a difference in "apprehension." For Koffka, this is an illegitimate assumption because it is based on an illusion; the illusion of believing that the contents of perception necessarily reflect what is in the external world.[26] Koffka says that the child, in fact, does not perceive the same colors we do. During the first weeks of infantile life, the baby only apperceives global structures which are progressively articulated and differentiated. The infant's experience begins via vast categories within which little differentiation (e.g., colored objects, achromatic objects, etc.) exists. Such a viewpoint is far from the hypothesis which claims the original perceptual nature is an indefinite multiplicity of sensations.

2. *The connection between sensations given by different senses.* The classical conception understands the child as the receiver of different sensations from different sense organs which must be subsequently synthesized (i.e., visual sensations given by the eyes, aural ones by the ears, etc.). In reality, we find that these sensations are not bereft of mutual connections. Instead, it is a question of a *totality* of given sensations experienced through the intermediary of the *whole* body. The child makes use of his body as a totality and does not distinguish between what is given by the eyes, the ears, and so forth. The child has no multiplicity of sensations.[27] The fact that the child claims to see a sound that he hears implies the existence of *intersensory* relations. This is confirmed by many experiences: the influence of sounds on color perception (hearing a sound changes a color seen separately). A very brief stimulus provokes a disturbance of the body which is hard to localize in any one sense.

A unity of the body exists, which is not itself a sum of tactile or kinesthetic sensations, but rather a "corporeal schema." This schema cannot be reduced to a sum of sensations, since it encompasses both the spatial awareness of our bodies and the unity which embraces all sensory givens.

Thus, for the child as well as the adult, perception involves, on the one hand, the relation of different parts of the body and, on the other hand, the relation to the external world. We claimed that *perception* does not commence through multiple, disjointed experiences, but rather through some very nebulous *global structures* that undergo a progressive differentiation. Prior to judgment, a more fundamental unity exists. A particularly important example of this perceptual organization is the phenomenon of *constancy*.

C. The Constancy Phenomenon

1. *The classical interpretation.* Natural perception produces an impression of depth by the same means as the stereoscope. It is through certain signs (e.g., disparity of retinal images, adaptation to lenses, convergence, etc.) that we rediscover the permanence of the object. Thus, our perception of depth is essentially a task of analysis where we attribute a certain quantity of color to an illuminating brightness while, at the same time, we attribute another quantity of color to the illuminated object. In this manner we rediscover the object's "true" color through variations in brightness. According to this classical view, the perceptual order is of a backward intellectual order.

2. *Putting these analyses into question with Gestalt theory.* The phenomenon of constancy is a *precocious* phenomenon. As Guillaume sees it, the phenomenon of size constancy is the same for the eleven-month-old and the adult. The aforementioned analyses suppose that the object presents itself to me with an apparent size which becomes increasingly smaller with distance. But the infant and the uneducated adult ignore the reduction in apparent diameter which follows from the laws of perspective (e.g., these difficulties appear in drawings). As for the question of apparent color, we find that beginning in the first weeks of life the child identifies colored wholes, such as the face of the mother. At this stage, there is no possibility of theoretical recognition.

Gestalt theory shows that it is important to distinguish between *description* and *explanation*. The perception of the size of objects is a phenomenon inseparable from the *sensible configuration* which is offered to us. We *see* the object at a distance; we do not *judge* it from a distance. The constancy of size is seen in the same manner as all quality of form is seen. (Form is the property of wholeness. For example, in a melody the form is what remains constant when the melody is transposed.) All intellectual interpretations must be eliminated. The spectacle of perception is modified not by the understanding, but by a *factor of organization*. The perceiving subject ignores the supposed "signs" of classical psychology.

They are simply operant conditions; understanding them does not determine depth-impression.

The last "sign" classical psychology invokes to explain depth perception is the phenomenon of intervening objects. If the moon appears larger at the horizon than at its zenith, it is because objects are interposed (Malebranche). The classical interpretation asserts that if we isolate the moon by regarding it through a paper tube, its size is correctly viewed. Gestalt theory shows that when one gazes through a paper tube, one decomposes or analyzes the perceptual field. Inversely, when one looks at an object freely, the whole is allowed to act upon each part. The global organization provokes the phenomenon of constancy. If it happens to be more perfect on the horizontal plane, it is not because judgment took account of a certain intervening object, but rather because the structuration is better on the plane in which we live and move ourselves. Thus, it is a biological factor, not an intellectual one.

Wertheimer speaks about spatial dimension experiments.[28] For example, a subject sitting in an armchair sees the tilted reflection of his apartment in a mirror. The walls seem to be slanting (spatial confusion). After a certain amount of time, the principal lines gradually reform the sense of the vertical. Consequently, the impression of verticality does not stem from the retinal image, but from a *phenomenon of organization* (the principal directions tend to assume either a horizontal or vertical character).

The same sort of principle is involved in color perception. For example, in contrast to diurnal lighting, an electric light initially appears yellow at night. After a certain amount of time the lighting tends to appear neutral and the diurnal light will subsequently appear blue. Thus, the physical composition of the light is not the most significant, but rather its *position in a milieu.*

The phenomenon of constancy takes the form of a redistribution of all chromatic values within a field in relation to the lighting. Illumination is the most diffuse dimension in the visual field. Thus, both in the spatial and colored dimensions, a structuration is indicated which appears to be linked to the intrinsic properties of the *perceptual field.*

In the child, thanks to the phenomenon of constancy, a nonchaotic and structured vision of the perceptual field exists (though this is not to say that the structuration is the same, or as perfect, as that of the adult). There is no secondary work of interpretation.[29] The *explanatory attempt* provided by Gestalt theory is less valuable than the above-mentioned notion of the perceptual field. The perceptual field notion attempts to find the equivalent of the perceptual spectacle and its configuration in *physical forms* (Köhler) of which the nervous system is the seat.

D. Perception of Movement

Classical theory assumes that a particular moving thing is self-identical when it occupies various positions (P, P', P"). For Gestalt theory, on the other hand, it is impossible to consider things and movements as separate. Movement is a structural phenomenon imposed by the field's totality. According to Wertheimer, two limit positions of a single figure (a phenomenon conditioned by the whole) give the impression of movement, an impression which involves "stroboscopic" movement. However, the perception of stroboscopic movement is much more freely experienced by the child than the adult.[30] It seems, therefore, from the beginning of experience a spontaneous organization of the field (as Gestalt theory describes) exists.

E. Conclusion

According to classical psychology, the thing is the intellection of certain functional relations to variables. According to Gestalt theory, the thing has a preintellectual unity. It can be defined for perception as a certain style. For classical psychology, a circle is a law conceived by me while producing this figure. For Gestalt theory, a circle is a certain physiognomy, a certain curvature. We learn to see the *unity of things*. For example, the yellow of a lemon in connection with its acidity reveals a structural community which renders the particular aspects (yellow, acidity) *synonymous*. All of this thus confirms the fact that the infant's experience does not begin as chaos, but as a *world already underway* [*un monde déjà*] of which the structure is only lacunary.

IV. Elaborations on Gestalt Theory's Analysis of Child Perception

We maintain alongside Gestalt psychologists that infantile perception is structured from the outset. Many psychologists confront Gestalt theory with its apparent valorization of "innatism." They think that Gestalt theory attributes to the child a perception that is immediately like the adult's. But to say that infantile perception is structured from its first moment is not to declare the infant's perception and the adult's the same. Rather, it is a question of a summary structure replete with lacunae and indeterminate regions, and not the precise structuration which characterizes adult perception. In the developmental course of the child's perception

a number of transformations and reorganizations occur. However, from the beginning certain totalities (which merit the name of things) do exist, and together they constitute a "world."

Following Guillaume, we must reject Piaget's idea that the child experiences things as nonpermanent.[31] Piaget maintains that this nonpermanence is proved by the fact that the child no longer has a channel attuned to an object as soon as it disappears from view or if objects are presented to the child from an unusual angle. He offers as an example the baby who no longer recognizes his baby bottle when it is offered to him bottom first. This proof is simplistic, since only the manipulation and experience of the bottle could teach the nursing baby to recognize this asymmetrical object that is normally presented from the other end. The same sort of impediment does not intervene when the objects in question are more or less symmetrical.

In general, it is not a question of attributing to the child an *absolutely* permanent conception of the thing (such as the physicist's concept of nature which is, in fact, not even found in the adult's perceptual world). It is simply a question of acknowledging that the child's *logical operations* have already established perceptual organization. The child's perceptual organization is able to function according to its own logic.

By maintaining that infantile perception is structured, we are not therefore obliged to hold that the structure of a child's perception is akin to that of the adult. In an article in *Archives de psychologie*, Meili clarifies the ways in which the infantile and adult structures differ from one another.[32] To use Claparède's term, the perception of the child is syncretic; its structures are compacted, global, and inexact. On the other hand, the child becomes fixated on the smallest details, seeing them as intimately connected with the whole, where there may be no real link. More than the adult, the child is bound by perception's most extreme alternatives, perceiving things either globally or with an eye to the minutest detail. Thus, the child's perception is at one and the same time *global* and *fragmentary* (these two forms being not necessarily contradictory), whereas the adult's is articulate. For example, when the child draws a bicycle, he reproduces a more or less coherent picture with some accentuated details, such as the pedals. The adult's depiction of the bicycle is guided by its mechanical relationships (e.g., the connection between the pedals and the rear wheel), but these links escape the child almost entirely.

Meili distinguishes between the *form* (e.g., melody and rhythm) and the *structure* (precise connections between details) of perception. The child's perception quite often manages to grasp the form of the object, but very rarely the structure. There are cases where the child can grasp the structure because the form is complex while the structure is simple.

However, as soon as the structure becomes more complicated, it escapes the child, who thus falls back into an analytic perception of details. This fragmentary type of perception represents a reaction to disorder. When presented with a complex figure, the child develops a hypothesis based upon resemblance. Thus, the child invests the complicated structure within a simpler one with which he is familiar. The child later adds the original disturbing details of the complex structure onto the simpler one.

Thus, on the one hand, we see that the child's perception is in fact synthetic, but not *articulately synthetic*. On the other hand, the child's perception has some decidedly positive features. For example, the child perceives totalities much more readily than adults (e.g., the thresholds of "stroboscopic movement" are lower in the child). This suggests that the child possesses a larger number of "good forms." In other words, the child organizes wholes more easily than the adult. Only when the whole is too complex is the child forced to fall back on fragmentary aspects. In conclusion, we find that the child is best at perceiving strong, modestly differentiated structures.

Thereby adopting the Gestaltist explanation, we are not obliged to decide in favor of a theory of "innatism" as Piaget seems to believe. Koffka elaborates the Gestaltist position in his article entitled "Psychology."[33] He points out that children's perception begins through a relative disorder or confusion out of which certain forms emerge. Total chaos (*Und-Verbindung*) is inconceivable: to have an awareness of chaos is impossible, because awareness is always necessarily an awareness of something; a something which is differentiated from a background. *Und-Verbindung*, pluralism, and analysis are adult conceptions; the child's experience is always that of a totality. However, it is reasonable to claim that perception moves from a more chaotic to a better-structured state. That is, one finds a poor, but never entirely absent, structuration in the child.

In sum, the charge of "innatism" leveled against Gestalt psychology is an error of interpretation. It is an error which is partially founded, since certain Gestaltists only seem to include in the constitution of forms external conditions (i.e., proximity, similarity of stimuli, etc.) which occur from the very first moments of life and thus underestimate other internal conditions. However, other Gestaltists, like Kurt Goldstein, stress very thoroughly the importance of certain less tangible factors.[34] The great merit of Gestalt psychology is its discovery of the idea of *structuration*. Structuration is an order which is not added onto material conditions, but which is immanent within it and which realizes itself through the spontaneous organization of the material.

Confirmations. Let us verify the above-mentioned thesis by first examining some recent research. First, Piaget's latest work on perceptual

development and Michotte's work on the perception of causality.[35] We will then construct a counter-proof by studying the drawings of children.

A. Piaget's Work on the Development of Perception

(1) Visual perception of concentric circles; (2) visual comparison of height at variable distances; (3) the problem of the visual comparison of depth (constancy of size);[36] (4) plus two other contributions in the following volume of *Archives de psychologie*.[37]

Current research on the development of perception includes Delboeuf's work.[38] Delboeuf studied the perceptual comparison of concentric circles and the visual comparison of heights at varying distances. We also must consider recent work on the problem of constancy of size in the visual comparison of depth. The manifest object of these studies is a critical examination of Gestalt theory.

Piaget objects to the tendency of certain Gestalt theorists to reduce intelligence to a perceptual fact. Take, for example, Wertheimer's study on the syllogism.[39] Assuming two equal terms A and B, if B equals C, it is evident that A also equals C. The logical operation occurs by means of two perceptions: first, one perceives A as equal to B, then one perceives B as equal to C, and one makes the synthesis. Perception consists precisely in investing a given with a signification. Thus, reasoning is a fact of perception.

Wertheimer's analysis is not false in the sense that all reasoning supposes this triple perception. However, Wertheimer does not conclude that perception receives, at the same moment, some wholly new properties. At the level of perception proper, an intuition of a meaning takes place; the perception which gives B as equivalent to A is exclusive of all others, just as when one perceives a certain figure on a ground this perception excludes all others. Yet, in our example, B is perceived as simultaneously equal to A and to C. B is seen *simultaneously* from the perspective of A and from the perspective of C. It is this permanence of view under two distinct relations which renders reasoning and synthesis possible. In Wertheimer's hypothesis, we do not reason but perceive A, first in terms of one relation and then in terms of another, and A becomes difficult to recognize according to the previous perspective. What renders the synthesis possible involves something more than perception in the ordinary sense of the term. It is a perception which allows that A could be simultaneously identical in two different perspectives. Unlike humans, what Köhler's chimpanzees lack is an ability to envisage objects as falling under more than a single relation.[40] When a chimpanzee views a wooden box as a possible step on which to stand, it ceases to perceive it as a box.

Thus, Piaget is justified in questioning the reduction of intelligence to perception. However, what he proposes in the place of this empiricism is only another form of classical intellectualism, and in this move we cannot follow him. In fact, he seeks to show that regulation, in any primitive sense, is merely a sketch of a logical operation. He does in fact distinguish "sensorimotor intelligence" from intelligence proper, but his analysis of them does not offer anything which diverges from classical psychology. For Piaget, sensorimotor intelligence is either an *association of ideas* or a *logical operation*. As a result, all of his studies describe perception as an incomplete intelligence and not as a positive fact. In addition, Piaget lacks an understanding of something else which is crucial: the *world perceived* by the child. In this enterprise, the best method to follow appears to be "to attempt to express the relations of the perceived world in the language of intellectual operations." In short, he intends to "translate" perception by expressing it in the language of formal logic. The sole result of this method will be to reveal what is not logical in perception, what perception lacks from the perspective of the intellect. *In so doing, Piaget leaves himself open to the critiques that he himself levels against Baldwin and the psychologists who precede him.*

1. *Delboeuf's illusion as interpreted by Piaget.* Delboeuf's illusion is as follows. We have two concentric circles, and we must be able to acknowledge the apparent size of the inner circle when the outer circle is varied in size. Say there are two concentric circles, A and A', A being the inner circle and A' the outer one. Furthermore, let there be another circle A2, where A2 is equal in size to A and where A2 lies outside the other two circles, thus serving as comparison. We make the diameter of A' vary. Now the problem will be to know what influence this variation exercises on the apparent size of A (as measured by A2). We notice the following facts.

When A' is close in size to A, the situation is confused.

When A' is enlarged, a *positive illusion of growth* takes place; A becomes more and more overestimated in size up to a point of maximum illusion.

If A' continues to be increased in size, the positive illusion diminishes. The overestimation of A persists, but with decreasing effect.

When A' and A are a certain distance apart, we detect a point of *no illusion,* that is, A is perceived according to its real size, with no appreciable influence by A'.

Beyond this point of nonillusion, when A' is enlarged in size a *negative illusion of growth* occurs. Thus, A is underestimated up to the limit of a maximum negative illusion.

If A′ continues to be enlarged, the negative illusion becomes diminished.
A is perceived as much too small, but with decreasing effect.
Finally, when A′ is further augmented, it ceases to influence the perception of A and the illusion definitively disappears.

In sum, depending on the extent to which the diameter of A′ is increased (beginning with the diameters of A and A′ being almost the same), we notice:

a confused situation
an increasing positive illusion
a maximum positive illusion
a decreasing positive illusion
a point of no illusion
an increasing negative illusion
a maximum negative illusion
a decreasing negative illusion
no illusion

We also notice the following facts:

The illusion is stronger for small figures than for large ones.
The illusion is stronger in the case of children than in the case of adults. For adults, the *maxima* are not as great and the illusion stops more quickly (with a smaller distance between A and A′).

2. *Piaget's interpretation* of this phenomenon is that for the child, the *perceived* world precedes the *conceived* world (of the intellect). Piaget denies that this perceived world possesses any stable structure, for only intellect can introduce such stability. His belief in the nonpermanence of objects in the child's world stems from this assumption. No permanent objects can exist at the level of perception prior to the constitution of a representational world. Optical illusions are proof of the labile and unfaithful nature of a perception which has no underpinning from intelligence.

Transposition of the phenomenon into logical language. Piaget attempts to translate the phenomena observed in the concentric circle illusions into the language of formal logic. He makes a comparison between logical relations and perceptual relations by formulating the process in the following manner. Let B be the totality constituted by the circles A and A′. If, instead of being a perceived figure, B were a collection of classes

(in the logical sense) or a logical system, then any growing difference between the parts of this totality ought to be translated by a diminution of resemblance (i.e., if B is equal to A plus A', we will necessarily have A equal to B minus A' or any other possible logical relation along these lines). In perception, on the contrary, difference and resemblance arise independently of one another.

For example, *in the positive illusion,* we find a preponderance of resemblance over difference, where the inner circle adheres in a sense to the outer circle and participates in the size of the latter. However, *in the negative illusion,* difference prevails over resemblance, such that A and A' are disjoined and appear much more different from one another than they are in reality.

Piaget expresses the above in different ways, but he always uses the language of formal logic. In terms of perceptual totalities, changes in certain parts give rise to transformations; no compensation exists. These changes are *nonreversible* relations. Also, in the totality of B, a displacement of the conditions for equilibrium occurs to the extent that the parts are differentiable. Each time a change occurs, the value of the whole changes. We could say that a new equilibrium is created where difference, or resemblance, might come to be dominant. Thus, the conditions for equilibrium are not the same for perceptual wholes as they are for logical wholes. We find an absence of strict groupings in the perceptual relations at play, since resemblance and difference do not act logically, but *causally.* Resemblance exerts a sort of attraction and difference a sort of repulsion, such that the successive relations are not additive. Nonetheless, it is necessary to maintain a sort of *perceptual regulation,* one which is attested to by the fact that the illusion can be taken as the real divergence between the circles.

Piaget's explanation. Piaget assumes that the illusion varies as a function of the *size of the totality* and the age of the subject. The size of the totality demonstrates that the most important factor must be the real distance between circles A and A'. The illusion varies with the *age of the subject* as stemming from the real distance between A and A', because with age the factor of proximity diminishes in importance.

3. *Ideas of fixation and decentralization in the gaze. Fixation:* proximity is not solely at play in relation to A and A'. It is especially of concern in relation to the totality which forms the gaze's center of fixation. The illusion ceases in the case of large circles, because they exceed the subject's perceptual domain. In the case of small circles, the gaze remains centered on the whole. The fixation of gaze produces a central zone comprised of a small number of relations which all fall under the gaze simultaneously. Thus, this central zone becomes the standard for our perception. At the

same time, all fixations of the gaze involve an overestimation of the fixed zone and an underestimation of other areas. As a result of fixation, a relation which is absolutely contrary to logical relations exists. Consider three zones of successive fixation—F1, F2, F3—in a landscape, with the zones F1 and F2 being indistinguishable and F2 and F3 being equally indistinguishable. This does not lead to the conclusion that F1 and F3 can be perceived as indistinguishable.

Decentration. Correlated to fixation, we find that if a correction (where successive fixations disrupt one another and give rise to a new coordination) takes place, then decentration occurs. Piaget distinguishes between relative and absolute decentration. This distinction can be represented by the different meanings of the two points of nonillusion in Delboeuf's illusion. In the case where the illusion ceases completely (when the objects of two fixations by the gaze are different enough so that they cannot comprise for the eye parts of the same whole), then an *absolute decentration* has occurred. But in the case of the nonillusion where the positive illusion gives way to the negative illusion, a *relative decentration* has occurred. In this situation the forces of resemblance and difference happen to balance out just prior to a reversal of relations, whereas in absolute decentration these forces no longer act. Thus, in Piaget's terms, the collection of phenomena indicated in Delboeuf's illusion is explained by the setting up of a scale of perceptual value against which all other perceptions are measured. The scale itself is the central zone of the gaze's fixation. When the parts of the whole are no longer seen within the same scale, the illusion ceases to exist.

However, we come to a difficulty at this point. We have said that things transpire as if successive fixations of the gaze were always related to the first fixation. In reality, nothing like this is the case, since the illusion is produced both with a tachistoscope and with the naked eye, and one can fend off the illusion by adopting an analytic attitude.[41] To do this one must fix strictly on the circle A and refuse to take into account A', despite the attraction exerted on A by A'. In this way a "virtual decentration" is achieved.

Piaget thus thinks that our perceptual equilibrium is solicited by all the *possible* successive fixations and that perceptual regulation is thus an influence of *virtual* fixations on actual fixation. In such a manner, we can understand Piaget's notion of a perceptual becoming [*un devenir de la perception*]. Once all points of possible fixation are taken into account, they establish a definitive perceptual equilibrium and with it a world of permanent objects. Thus, in the stable world which the adult perceives, all the points of virtual fixation act to correct the singular fixation—the cause of illusion.

Application to perspectival perception. With the mechanism of decentration, Piaget explains the fact that the gaze discerns the object's apparent size as variable when one increases distance from the object. Each time the gaze fixes on the object, and thus centers it, all the possible or virtual ways of concentrating on the object come together to render the object's real size.

In the same manner, when one gazes at a cube in perspective, one identifies the apparently oblique lines as real squares and the whole as a cube. This identification occurs since the actual spectacle is instantaneously accompanied by virtual centerings [*centrations*] which make it possible to perceive the oblique lines and reestablish them in their vertical positions. (Thus, at one and the same time, the distant object is seen as reduced and according to its real size.) Thus, for Piaget true decentering (based on the possibility of implicating all the virtual fixations in the gaze's actual fixation) is only possible at the level of intelligence. At the level of perception alone there can neither be an absolute decentration, nor a structured and permanent world.

B. Examination of Piaget's Ideas

When we examine Piaget's conceptions, we find them to be hypothetical: he constructs a group of hypotheses which coincide with the observed results. Yet other sciences no longer find this method of proof a sufficient basis for establishing a theory. In addition, it is necessary that a theory provide us with an intelligible view of the phenomenon's workings. In psychology, we cannot dispense with the need for an appeal to lived experience, and it is clear that Piaget's schema does not respond to the experience of the subject. It is an associationist's schema. His notions of actual centerings, virtual centerings, and their interaction harken back to the constructions of physics (such as that of composite forces).

1. *Principal objection: does perceptual regulation arise by virtue of anterior, acquired schemata or is it inherent in each perception itself?* If the actual givens of perception are modified by acquired schemata, what is it that informs the actual perception that the schema should take up in a particular fashion? In order that the schema of decentration might be in play, something in actual perception must *call it into play.* It is this fact that Gestalt psychology demonstrates: in the "projection of images" (i.e., the fact that an incomplete given, like the words in a phrase, are nonetheless perceived as complete), the projection can only take place if the incomplete figure is *significant* in itself. This appeal to the memory of prior perceptions, which is invoked by Bergson, only manifests itself when the actual configuration favors it. For instance, when a figure is much more strik-

ing than the surrounding into which it is inserted (i.e., the principle of camouflage), we witness a recalling of prior perceptions. Similarly, virtual perceptions can only come into play if something actual provokes them. It is in this sense that Claparède has claimed that one has to admit that within each actual perception there is a reference to a point of *maximal* compensation, an *actual orientation* toward objectivity.[42]

Piaget objects to this idea of an immanent orientation in perception and presents instead a postulation (although it remains to be proven) of a regulation in virtue of anterior schemata. He only admits two modes in which perception is organized. First, there is the association and accumulation of memories and the perception of those memories. Second, there exists a logical and operational organization which is practically nonexistent in the child. Thus, Piaget overlooks precisely what is most original in our perception, the immanent organization that Gestalt theory discovers.

2. *Regulation of the perception of apparent size.* We know that as objects move away, their apparent sizes do not diminish as rapidly as their retinal images do (an even more pronounced contrast in photos or films exists). This phenomenon stems from a perceptual compensation which reduces the encroaching object and enlarges the receding one. Piaget postulates the intervention of a recollection of the average size of the object and of a reference to anterior centrations. However, in reality this notion of the conservation of size makes no sense.

First, nothing can be found in our awareness which refers to anything similar. Second, Piaget speaks as if the changes in the dimension of objects, and thus the transformations provoked by perspective (e.g., the convergence of parallel lines), were real transformations to which the intervention of other materials (i.e., memories) would emerge in opposition. However, it is impossible in normal, global perception to decipher the changes in apparent size. To accomplish this, global perception must be replaced by an artificial, analytic perception (e.g., close one eye and pick a reference point). Geometrical perspective is a result of an artifice of transposition. In reality, spatial values, such as distances, sizes, and so forth, are elements of a total configuration resulting from an interaction of each part of the field with all the other parts. Each of the parts is invested with a unique value in relation to all the other parts, and at no time can the memory of anterior perceptions intervene as the means by which this global perception articulates itself.

3. *Regulation of the perception of comparative depth.* In other articles, Piaget analyzes the phenomena which are produced when comparing relative heights. He maintains that such a comparison is exact when the objects are adjacent [*rapprochés*] to one another. However, when the objects being compared are separated by some distance, the comparison is

inexact, because an overestimation of the term which serves as the standard of measurement, the scale, always occurs. Thus, such inexactness results from certain nonlogical and nonreversible relations; the same term appearing larger when it serves as a standard and smaller when it is the term being measured. If, instead of comparing two objects of different heights, a whole series of objects of two different heights is compared, all the perceptual errors disappear.

Piaget's interpretation. In the serial comparison, the errors are eliminated because within the series, each term serves alternatively as the standard of measurement and the thing being measured. As a generalization, Piaget claims that we can say that the progressive education of perception can be considered as the constitution of a temporal series, each being the assimilative schema which suppresses the illusion.

Objection. It does not seem possible to consider these series by comparing them as a sum of disjointed and successively compared objects. Instead of considering a series as a *sum*, it seems necessary to admit that it constitutes a *totality* that is different from the disjointed and juxtaposed objects which compose it. The child already compares the terms of a series with an exactitude which he does not accomplish in the case of two objects alone. This proves that even children's perception tends toward an objective organization when it deals with several objects at once.[43]

V. The Perception of Causality

A. Introduction

Our *guiding idea* for this section is that the world is originally perceived as a total, if not complete, organization where effects are bound up with causes before all intellectual representation.[44] In general, the study of causality in children only bears on their elaborated expressions and addresses their *intellectual conceptions* rather than their *perceptual experiences* (with a sufficiently great distance always separating the former from the latter). In his analyses of causality in the myths of primitives, Cassirer concludes that their constructions and their conceptions of the world must be understood as beginning with their perceptions.[45] Along the same lines, if we intend to develop an exact idea of the child's world, we must first of all study it at the level of perception: *in perception causality is elucidated.*

In the classical analyses of causality (e.g., Hume and Malebranche), the relation of cause to effect disappears in the objective analysis of the

phenomena.[46] When two billiard balls are considered (the first striking the second which then begins to move), we say by way of metaphor that the movement of the first ball is "passed" into the second. However, in reality one can simply claim that the first ball ceases to move while the second begins to displace itself. In conclusion, we find that the causal link connecting the first ball to the second is a subjective or imaginary link; there is no experience of causality. Hume's analysis reduces the experience of movement to that of a simple displacement.

The Gestalt theorists object that the classical analysis seems incontestable *on the condition of having already, before the fact, reduced the perceptual field* by decomposing and analyzing it. The lived perceptual field is inhabited by all sorts of relations and traversed by "vectorial" lines of force to such an extent that Kurt Lewin likens it to a battlefield.[47] However, in order to understand these relations and forces, it is necessary to take the external world as it is given and not reduce it to a sum of isolated stimuli. By contrast, Hume and Malebranche reduce the visual field. When we are no longer concerned with a living landscape, but rather a multiplicity decomposed point by point, we will no longer find any trace of causal relations. Instead, we will have substituted a fictive world for the perceived world.

For the classical psychologist, the notion of causality finds its beginnings in the child's projection of "forces" into things, forces which are perceived through inner experience. And even though nothing in the environing world corresponds to these relations of causality, it would still be a very plausible form of projection in the child, since the child ignores the distinction between the subjective and objective. Piaget himself takes up this idea, which was originally suggested by Maine de Biran.[48] For Michotte, it is a question of a postulate to be discussed. According to him, the thing first presents itself to the child as "doing or making something." For the child, the ball which moves is not a fragment of matter undergoing displacement, but rather a being which acts on another being. *The child sees object A producing the movement of object B and perceives causality in this movement.*

In his experiments, Michotte shows that this causality is perceived or not perceived according to some very precise conditions that are always of the sensory order and not of the intellectual order. He proves that causality is a matter of true perception and not of representation. Perceived causality is evidently not that of the scientist (i.e., the relation of a function to certain variables), but rather a productive and quasi-magical causality. In seeing wine being spilled, we do not perceive liquid being displaced from one container into another. We actually see the wine *leaving* the neck of the vessel.

This type of perception is anthropomorphic. Yet, as Heidegger has re-marked, the perception of a completely objective world, one without any anthropomorphic content, is inconceivable.[49] Even a purely geometri-cal universe would be impossible without the human element. Thus, a geometric figure, such as the circle, can be expressed by an analytic for-mula, but a subject who has never seen a circle could not reconstitute the intuitive sense of the formula. All geometry is founded on the essen-tially anthropomorphic concept of contour, that is, of a limit between the "outside" and the "inside." Such a distinction only exists for subjects who are themselves situated in space and who see from certain points of view (their bodies). Only through this point of view does the distinction between the outside and the inside acquire meaning. No contour exists without a subject who structures given elements in order to make figures.

B. Michotte's Experiments

Michotte has conducted an experiment in which through a crack in a screen a subject sees another screen on which two squares—square A, which is to the left of center, and square B, which lies in the middle—are projected. From the perspective of the subject, square A moves to the right, touches square B, and then stops. Square B will move in its own way, and under certain conditions the subject will have *the impression that it is square A which communicates its movement to square B. The observing subject will have the perception of a causal phenomenon* or a "launching effect."

This causal effect is noticed always on the basis of certain rigor-ous conditions of the sensory and not of the intellectual order. These conditions include topographic, spatial, and temporal considerations. For example: square A disappears at the very moment that square B be-gins to move, or squares A and B must both be present on the screen on which they merge. Yet one has the impression that a single square is moving from left to right. However, for this impression of a single square to occur, vision must be directed. If the view takes place from a marginal position, then the "tunnel" effect is obtained. In other words, one has the impression that square A passes behind square B and continues to move. However, the distance from A to B and the path of B cannot be too great. The launching effect is obtained only when the phenomenon is centered on the point of merging. Beyond a certain limit, the effect is no longer produced; the two squares give the impression of moving about "on their own account." These quasi-sensory conditions result from true perception. How could the projection of a memory render such changes possible or impossible?

By varying the speeds and trajectories, one obtains other effects

besides the "launching" or "throwing" phenomenon. For example, when A and B are both in motion, but A progresses more quickly and contacts B, the "hurling into flight" effect results, and also sometimes the effect of attraction. The launching or throwing effect is destroyed by various changes in the perceptual field's configuration; for example, by surrounding square B with immobile objects, or by placing a third object to the right of B which moves in the direction of B (and thus in the opposite direction of square A). Further, this destruction takes place even though nothing in the subject's experience is altered. This experiment demonstrates again that it is a phenomenon of the perceptual order which is at play: the projection of a memory will not be affected by a change in the field, since the memory is not directly concerned with the phenomenon itself.

Michotte obtains the same launching effect with "phantom objects" (e.g., forms of indistinct marks and brightly lit borders), whether the example is between a square and a "phantom" or between two "phantoms." These are quasi-magical and absolutely irrational effects, where the subject's impression is that it is a question of a causality "from one world to another." However, we see that when we follow the merger of A and B, square B moves more quickly while square A remains motionless, and thus the launching effect between squares A and B is replaced by a "releasing" effect.

Michotte attempts to gain a better understanding of this launching effect. He recognizes that this phenomenon is always perceived as a global phenomenon, as one which seems to belong wholly to a single force and never as two movements. Instead, it appears as a *metamorphosis* of the movement of square A into the movement of square B. Thus, it is a transitive causality, the two movements belonging to the same "line of the world," to one and the same line of force. In disassociating these two movements, Hume and Malebranche were led to deny objective causality and to reduce movement to simple displacement. In fact, Michotte shows the striking difference between movement and displacement quite plainly by replacing the launching effect (i.e., movement) with a "transport" effect (i.e., displacement in the brute sense of the term), the latter being obtained when square A overtakes square B and the two continue on together. Thus, one has the impression that A transports B, that is, A "moves" itself while B is simply "displaced."

Another series of experiments examines the actual and vital perceptual experiences of the subject in motion. These perceptions, including the experiences of crawling or swimming, occur with the use of schematic figures. *Crawling* involves the way in which the two vertical sides of a rectangle alternate in movement when the subject moves from left to right

in front of it. First the rectangle expands as one moves from left to right, with the right side ceasing after a few centimeters of expansion. Then the left side begins to displace itself in the same direction as the right (the rectangle begins to shrink), ceasing to move when the rectangle attains its original dimensions. The rectangle reconstitutes itself as a whole a little further to the right; then the right side begins to move again, always in the same direction. The phenomenon of crawling is striking; the overall movement seems to be determined by changes from within. Spontaneously, the two sides of the rectangle are designated as "head" and "tail" and the rectangle is perceived as a living organism.

Swimming involves the expansion of a rectangle by the simultaneous displacement of its vertical sides in opposite directions (i.e., the left side moving to the left and the right side moving to the right). Subsequent to this (in the instance where the rectangle moves to the right), the right side continues to move to the right, though more slowly, while the left side returns in a lively fashion to a position which corresponds to the rectangle's original position. Once this movement has taken place, the same sequence of movements starts all over. The movement always seems to be produced by an internal change which seems motivated by a sort of *internal circulation of matter* by all those who observe it. The rectangle appears filled with a type of vague protoplasm. In disassociating the movement of the "head" from the movement of the "tail," a displacement will always be obtained, but at the same time the effect of auto-locomotion is destroyed. It is remarkable that this effect is also destroyed when the horizontal sides of the rectangle are suppressed, even though they do not play any effective role in the movement. Their presence is indispensable to the formation of a closed figure, and it is the movement of "quasi-matter" produced by the interiority of such a figure which is responsible for true and total movement.

C. Interpretation of the Results

We can interpret these results in the following manner. They show that the impression of causality can be provoked and modified according to certain precise conditions of the sensory order. The classical psychologists will object to this by claiming that certain *stimuli* which are small in number incite the memory of past experiences (e.g., memories of throwing, crawling, swimming, etc.) in the spectator. However, first of all, in order that each effect produced can incite a memory of a past experience (given that certain changes in the constellation which seem relatively insignificant can obstruct the memory from arising), it must be the case that our experience of the collision of bodies and of the movements of

animals is in fact depicted as much more precise and more diverse than it is in reality.

Second, if one supposes that it is a question of relating a borrowed memory to our experience of real movements, of actual crawling and swimming, and that as a result causality is not immediately perceivable in Michotte's experiments, then how we are able to perceive causality in terms of the swimming animal or the hurled stone still remains to be explained. If Hume was right that causal relations do not fall under perception, if they are a purely intellectual relation, then they are by definition *imperceptible*. However, if this is the case, they are no more perceivable in the case of true causality than in the case of pseudo-causality.

Finally, if we suppose that it might actually be necessary to invoke memory, it is still necessary that this invocation take place according to certain conditions (enumerated below). This means it must be impossible under other conditions and that something in *actual perception* itself renders this invocation possible or impossible. This something is precisely the phenomenon of causality. According to logic, the introduction of a third element in the perceptual field does not change the relative displacements of A and B. The point is that it is not a question of logical organization, but rather of perceptual organization. Affected by the configuration of the field, the perception of causality is in fact the perception of a sensible configuration as well. In this way, we discover a perception of the causality of the perceived world, and we will need to keep this in mind when we examine the "artificialism" and "animalism" of children.

VI. Children's Drawing

A. Preliminary Remarks

1. *Are there permanent traits in children's drawings which are independent of cultural influences?* When comparing recent (within the last fifty years) collections of children's drawings, one is struck by the differences in style which always seem related to the general style of the period. Similarly, the difference between children's drawings in various countries is tied to cultural differences.[50] However, it is impossible to separate cultural influences from what properly speaking belongs to the child. Sociological, even ideological, considerations always intervene in any discussion about drawing (thus, certain Marxists would see the child's nonfigurative drawings as stemming strictly from the influence of the bourgeois cultural milieu).

With regard to contemporary views, we must recognize that there has been a radical reconsideration of all problems involving painting since Manet (e.g., the recourse to primitive and Oriental art). Being radical, modern painting inevitably discovers the child's mode of expression which, though not yet a full-fledged form of expression, is itself "radical" as well. However, this internal link exists only between children's drawings and modern painting. Much of the time it should be understood as an *influence:* adult efforts such as billboards, posters, storefronts, and even furniture are broadcast as modes of expression which have an impact on the child's milieu for twenty or thirty years. This assimilation and diffusion of artistic efforts is a constant occurrence to which children are extremely sensitive.

It is necessary to note that this influence of the artist's work on the child's drawings involves an argument which also bears on the child's "realist" drawings. In a milieu that proscribes nonfigurative art, the realist drawings of children are still considered interdependent with their situation. Thus, it is impossible to separate the child from cultural influences; rather, it is a *false problem.* Even a total absence of milieu (if this is conceivable) would affect the child as any particular kind of milieu does. Thus, the child would modify his productions in this manner. Therefore, certain structural traits of the drawings must be taken into account if we wish to talk about the child's drawings.

2. *To what extent do children's drawings reflect children's perception?* Can we consider children's drawings an imitation of what they see? Certainly, many characteristics of children's drawings stem from their undeveloped motor skills, but it is easy to separate these negative traits from the positive ones in the drawings. The positive traits tell us what the child actually grasps.

The confusion in the child's drawing is not due strictly to a confusion concerning the things which appear before him. What the child sees and what he draws are not exactly the same. However, if we grant that the child's spontaneous drawings are often reproductions of his internal vision of things, the lack of precision in the child's drawings depicts a lack of attention to the precise outlines of things. In this sense, the children's drawings globally express their perception.

We should not interpret the child's drawing as a strict imitation of nature, but rather as an expression. Since the drawing represents an attempt to transpose onto a single plane what we see in depth, we use expression more than imitation. The geometrical perspective (i.e., translation according to certain systematic laws) seems to reflect our vision exactly, because a long artistic tradition has authorized or confirmed this process. Therefore, when the child takes up another manner of represen-

tation (e.g., flattening, that is, representing a cube by four or five juxta-posed squares), we ought to ask in what way this might involve a form of representation as viable as perspectival drawing. Further, it is important to recognize that the child does not view these juxtaposed squares *as residing on a single plane.* As adults, we do not possess a familiarity with the child's "key."

Objection to Prudhommeau. We are not in this way attributing an equal dignity to children's processes as to adult processes, since those of children are always abandoned later.[51] However, this fact does not authorize us to take our mode of representation as the only valuable one or as the one closest to perceived reality (cf. the attempts of modern painters). Thus, it must be understood that the drawings of children can never be seen as a copy of the world which offers itself to them, but rather as an attempt at expression.

B. Child Drawing According to Luquet

Luquet, in his book *Children's Drawings,* which is the first attempt to study this question as a whole, offers some important and consistently accurate facts, although his interpretations may be contestable.[52]

The facts: (1) *for children, drawings are a game.* They are expressly aware of this fact and carefully distinguish their drawings from, for example, explanatory sketches that they are asked to make (saying of these that "they are not for drawing, but for seeing"). Their drawings are for them works or personal performances (e.g., a child tries to draw a hundred stick figures in less than half an hour). The drawings are, however, almost invariably oriented toward things; a drawing without assignable signification represents "a thing." Luquet calls this orientation toward things the realism of the drawing.

(2) *Plasticity of the drawing.* Children are not always satisfied with their drawings. However, their corrections are "tacit." Rarely do they completely strike out the parts they wish to suppress, tending instead to act as if they no longer see them. It is as if the visual element was not the essential factor and it suffices to "mentally cross them off." Similarly, the meaning of a drawing is plastic. In general, the drawing has a "retrospective" meaning. The drawing can change along the way, provided it seems to correspond better, or more faithfully, to a new meaning. Furthermore, the drawing is just as real as any ordinary object. Since the drawing exists, it must signify something. At this stage, the child has forgotten what he created; the drawing now possesses the creation. Now the drawing asserts itself against the child, and all the details he has placed in it, even arbitrary marks, now are seen as having reasons for their appearance. The

child's capacity to express something by a drawing also differs considerably from the adult's. A few representative traits are enough for the child to recognize any given object.

(3) *Impermeability in relation to experience.* The child draws in a certain manner whether it conforms to observable reality or not. This is the case even if the child acknowledges this reality (e.g., the case of the drawing where arms are inserted in a head). In the same way, the child does not hesitate to make the same detail of a figure twice in the same drawing, such as when a second nose is added to a head. All of this shows quite well that what is at play is not an attempt on the part of children to reproduce what they see. Rather, everything transpires as if the child were conforming to some ritual. For the child, new procedures are used as if they were wrong. Childhood drawing indicates an intimate bond with the drawing's subject. If an adult copies the child, the child rejects this as duplicitous. Furthermore, the numerous drawings of animals with human heads show that it is clearly not a phenomenon of imitation. The child does not wish to represent an animal with its head, but an animal with a head "in general," the head being a physiognomic element.

(4) *The presence of an internal model.* Children do not draw what they see, but rather what they *know* is to be the constitutive element of a thing (e.g., the two bases of a spool). One always finds an original reconstitution of the object at play. This is what Luquet calls "intellectual realism."

Interpretation of [Luquet's] facts. Luquet begins with the guiding notion that children's drawings are "realist." In other words, we will never find "schematism" (not to be conflated with symbolism) or "idealism" (which is always oriented toward things). If despite this "realism," the child's drawing is extremely different from things, this shows that drawing has to go through many stages before it is perfected. These stages are *accidental realism, failed realism, intellectual realism,* and finally *visual realism.*

The stage of *accidental realism* involves the haphazard marks the child calls "a drawing." (One can also consider the linguistic stage where children imitate "general language" in its pace, style, or rhythm without pronouncing the words.) The child discovers vague resemblances between the drawing and an object and then interprets the drawing after the fact, stating, for example, "It is a horse."

The stage of *failed realism* takes place when, recognizing that his or her drawing could represent something, the child sets out deliberately to represent it. However, the child is hindered by his clumsiness, inattentiveness to detail, and "synthetic incapacity" (i.e., the impossibility of binding together all the details). Zazzo and the academic psychologists found that only 4 to 5 percent of children tested demonstrated an exaggerated importance to details, as opposed to the importance of the material set-

ting (e.g., the desire to color in all the leaves, to collect all the details in a smaller vacant space, etc.).[53]

Ultimately, the child's drawing culminates as a series of "disjunctions" of elements that are in reality connected. For example, the head of an animal is separated from its body, its eyes outside its head, or a steeple is separated from the church, or the door of a house lies between a window and the chimney, and so forth. *Thus, the child's drawing is always defined negatively; all of its particularities are considered as so many shortcomings.*

In the stage of *intellectual realism,* motor skill and the faculty of attention have grown to the point that the child no longer draws things as he or she sees them, but rather as he or she knows them to be. The child draws intellectual representations, putting down in the drawing everything which might specify his or her intentions (written guides). One finds no concern with perspective, and *transparence* (e.g., a man in bed is visible through the blanket, a corpse is seen inside a coffin, etc.) is a common occurrence in this stage. For example, "flattening" is a valuable technique for the child, since he or she does not imagine a cube projected on a single plane, but rather imagines it as existing on several planes simultaneously.

Finally, in the stage of *visual realism,* the demand for visual coherence manifests itself in the articulation of elements in relation to one another, an articulation which is possible from only one point of view. It is here that the child acquires the principle of geometrical perspective.

One finds a *graphic narration* which involves three processes. The first two are associated with the adult. (1) The child chooses to represent an action at a decisive moment in such a way that a spectator is able to recognize both what came before and what occurred afterward. (2) The unfolding activity is depicted by breaking the event down into a series of instants (as in Épinal's images).[54] (3) The child uses a "successive" manner to reunite different moments of time into a single image. In certain cases the child draws the same personages at different moments within a fixed setting. In fact, the child does not arrange them in the picture one at a time as individuals, but rather the various personages are drawn in the attitude that they express at different moments of "history." For Luquet, these are once again phenomena of intellectual realism since visual exactitude is sacrificed for continuity, whereas the adult sacrifices everything to visual exactitude.

Difficulties raised by Luquet's interpretation. Luquet contradicts himself by stating on the one hand that the child draws according to an internal model, and on the other hand that the child's drawings are not schematic or idealist. The difficulty arises because Luquet studies drawings only from the point of view of a "visual realism" that children *must* fol-

low, and thus judges everything in relation to a developmental ideal. He speaks of an internal model without making the consequences of this idea explicit. Because he does not take the child's drawing as it is given, but rather judges it as the work of a future adult, Luquet's description is strikingly negative, even before the terms (i.e., "accidental," "failed," etc.) are chosen.

The stage of deficient realism is entirely defined by its lacunae and contingency. In other words, children at this stage display clumsiness, chance, and a *lack of attention*. However, this type of explication has been disqualified by all contemporary psychology. For instance, Freudianism denies the notion of "chance," and Gestalt theory has shown the superficial character of explanations about *inattention*.[55] Given a series of perceptions, classical psychology postulates that more articulated perceptions already exist somewhere in confused vision. Thus, the confused vision is not always *clarified by attention*. In reality, we must grant that it is never a question of a clarity distinct from the perceptions themselves. Rather, a change in the structure of the perceptual field is what distinguishes stages. The objects to which one "does not pay attention" are not actually present in the configuration of the actual field. For example, when the child constantly draws things as separate, it is because this is the way they correspond to his actual mental experience.

Luquet's negative description is based precisely upon a postulate which has been called into question. He thinks that perception corresponds directly and rigorously to the external world of the adult and that consequently the child must in principle perceive in the same way that we do. Luquet claims that photography is "the most exact" representation of nature insofar as we perceive it. Instead, we must wonder if photographs really represent the world as we see it.[56] By labeling the child's perceptual processes as infantile, he also criticizes a number of other perceptual processes which are even further removed from photography, such as the extremely expressive forms employed by painters. (For example, consider the use of empty space as the reflection of light, a blue contour to indicate a certain quality, or in Daumier the intensity of expression attained by configuring the eyes "outside the head.") In general, one could say that the idea of a *contour* actually existing in nature is contestable; the very act of drawing consists in situating traits where there are none and vice versa.

All of Luquet's interpretations involve what the Gestaltists call "the constancy hypothesis," according to which our perception and the world (the latter as the stimuli which condition the former) are in a relation of strict parallelism. In this way Luquet concludes that children must see the same things that we do, and if they do not it is because they are "inat-

tentive." The same is the case for "tacit correction." We need not believe the child only pretends not to see the "mentally blocked" features. Instead they may be in fact excluded from the child's perception, perhaps by a phenomenon comparable to the inability of tired individuals to see objects they are looking for, even though they are right in front of their eyes. It is from this perspective that we must interpret the plasticity of the child's drawing as well: it is necessary to understand that the drawing corresponds to the loose structure of the child's perceptual field. We need not invoke the "association of ideas" with regard to this plasticity, but rather recognize that it is due to the great facility that children have with simple forms (they actually see them).[57]

At the end of his study, Luquet expresses some reservations about his own theories and ideas. He had *interpreted* the drawings of children *strictly in visual realist terms,* the final stage of children's development. *However, he concludes by wondering if, by this line of reasoning, we aren't substituting the world as seen by the adult for the world the child perceives* (which would explain the purely negative characteristics attributed to children's drawings). Taken on their own terms, children's drawings represent a mode of synthesis; while undoubtedly different from our own mode, they by no means reveal a "synthetic incapacity." Even Luquet admits the child attempts to represent all of existing reality, *while our mode of synthesis is an abstraction which subtracts from the world all that cannot be seen from a sole point of view.*

Luquet concludes from this that even the phenomenon of "flattening" constitutes a "realistic" process, just as valid as the perspective of the adult's drawing: both must sacrifice something, but while the adult sacrifices everything in the name of visual appearance, the child sacrifices something necessary to express the object in its totality. Thus, Luquet states that intellectual realism might have the right to exist alongside of visual realism "just as two differently structured languages" can exist alongside one another. We must not forget that our geometrical perspective is conventional; it seems as incomprehensible to certain primitives as the "flattening" of the child can appear to us.

In the same way, Luquet concludes by wondering if *graphic narration* is in fact based on a conception of time which is as legitimate as the adult conception. For the child the past is enclosed within the present, whereas the adult represents time as a string of neatly severed instants succeeding those that came before. From the philosophical perspective, this conception of a "successive time" is untenable; in fact, it is impossible to conceive of a present free of connection to a past and a future. This connection between past and present is what the graphic narration of the child attempts, in his own way, to render.

However, such concessions by Luquet call his entire interpreta-

tion into question. *The child's drawing springs from a mode of communication different from our own; one that is thoroughly affective.* For the child, a continuity exists between the thing and its graphic representation: the child tries to represent *the thing itself.* In a sense children go further than adults in this regard. Their drawings are at one and the same time more subjective and more objective than those of adults: more subjective because they are liberated from appearance, and more objective because they attempt to reproduce the thing as it really is, while adults only represent things from one point of view: their own.

Thus, we must admit that *a drawing is an expression of the world for the child and never a simple imitation.* Again we must take the term "expression" in its full sense, as the junction between that which perceives and that which is perceived, and not conflate it with the fabrication of a simple copy. Moreover, the principle of all drawing is to express things, not to resemble them. It would be as absurd to expect drawings to resemble the thing drawn as it would be to think that a word resembles the thing designated; they can only *signify* or *express* the world.

C. Prudhommeau's Interpretation of Children's Drawings

Prudhommeau's work *confirms the facts that Luquet has brought to light, but Prudhommeau places them within a wholly different perspective.*[58] While Luquet sees the child's drawings as a game, Prudhommeau understands them as an *element of the child's total activity.* Thus, drawing develops and is modified along the same lines as the child's conduct (e.g., Prudhommeau maintains there is a coincidence between the beginning of the voluntary making of marks [*graphisme*] and the child's first steps).

Prudhommeau also stresses more than Luquet the fact that drawings made from memory are common and that the drawing *obeys an internal pattern* (e.g., the persistence of *schemata* like the "tadpole man," despite the many other possible themes suggested by the child's immediate environment). But above all, Prudhommeau attempts to demonstrate the parallel between the development of drawing and various other aspects of psychic development. Therefore, the progress of "realism," inexplicable from Luquet's perspective, is explained as part and parcel of the dynamic growth of the child.

We can note three aspects of this dynamic growth: (1) the schema of the "stick man" [*bonhomme*] develops alongside the *awareness of the lived body.* In other words, to the degree to which the child differentiates the elements of his or her body, one finds the "stick man" taking on the same new elements. (2) The use of profile is also explained by the dynamism of the child's behavior and the elongation of the child's social relations. To

the degree that children extend their action to objects and other people, they seek to represent their "stick man" drawings as in the process of acting. This is the case because the phenomenon of drawing in profile lends itself to more than is actually given at any one time. (3) The necessity of realistic representation emerges with the beginning of the school years, which is when the child learns to distinguish the sign from what it signifies. Likewise, children acquire the technique of perspective when they have learned how to *affix* their contact with things to a plane on which they are "projected." *It is in this direction that the research of most modern writers is oriented. They seek to show that drawings express the total personality of the child, rather than the intelligence alone* (e.g., the use of writing in testing intelligence and drawing in the analysis of character). The drawing expresses the child's affective point of view [*prise de position*].

Such concerns are predominant in Read's *Education Through Art*, in which the child's drawing is, or can be, *nonobjective* and *nonfigurative*. As in the case of the primitive, drawing is not distinct from the symbolic act for the child. This might explain why their drawings only slightly resemble external models. Read shows that the style of drawing in every culture is essentially conventional. Thus, once certain primitives who have been raised in Western schools return to their villages, they take up again the emblematic manner of drawing native to their society at the very same time that they undertake rites of initiation.

The drawing can have still another function: liberation. Through it, children can free themselves from forms which obsess them; it can be a way of relieving tensions. This explains the quantitative regression of drawing which occurs when children have just learned to express themselves through writing.

The study of the role of drawing leads us back to the capacity which serves as its ground: perception. We have seen that drawings express affectivity rather than understanding. Consequently, we must pay close attention to what the child's perception—and even that of the adult when it can be stripped of conventional attitudes—consists in when encountering things not only as objects of understanding, but also as affective stimulants.

D. Drawing and Perception

According to Luquet, children substitute what they know for what they see. However, it seems that the child specifically tends to represent what he can touch or has experienced emotionally. For example, when drawing a field of potatoes, a child might draw a square representing the field strewn with small ovals representing the potatoes. General objects appear to the child affectively. The potato's weight, consistency, and temperature

in the child's hand is of utmost importance while drawing. Classical psychologists consider the affective aspect secondary. In reality, the affective character of the object is primordial for the child and constitutes the object's very structure. Only the adult has the idea of pure quality. Moreover, in general, sensible qualities cannot be expressed as pure states, but rather only in affective terms.

As Goethe said, there is no color which does not arouse an attitude.[59] Such attitudes are characteristic of the structure of colors themselves, because they involve a synchronization of our gaze with the given color, and this is what constitutes the dynamic nature of the phenomenon. We can extend this to all sensible qualities: each is at one and the same time excitation and symbol of a manner of being. Thus, we can conceive of an attempt similar to Bachelard's effort to develop a "psychoanalysis of objects."[60]

For example, honey appears liquid at first, but it proves to be viscous if touched; furthermore, in tasting it, we notice that it is sweet.[61] And yet each of these qualities is inseparable from the others. The viscosity and the sweetness are two analogous manners of being of the honey: it is simultaneously this matter which clings cunningly to my fingers and which, by the tenacity of its aftertaste, obstructs the freedom of the subject. The tenacious physical personality of the object is inseparable from its moral personality, and this personality reveals all of itself through each of its qualities.

It is not possible to conceive of a lemon as orange or green.[62] It is the acidity of the lemon which is "yellow," it is the yellow of the lemon which is acidic. "One eats the color" of a cake. The cake's taste is the instrument which gives its form and its color to what we could call the "alimentary intuition." Along the same lines, the fluidity, the "lukewarmness," the "bluishness," and the undulating movement of the water in the pool are each given through each other all at once. This totality is what goes by the name "pool water." This is what a painter like Cézanne actually sees, a painter who claimed to be able to paint everything, odors and tastes as well as forms and colors.

The same tendency can be found in a philosopher like Politzer, for whom each thing is invested with a human sediment. We also witness it in a writer like Francis Ponge, for whom each object is a *complex*.[63] Each object is a mode of existence with a most intimate relation to our life. These complexes furnish the ground of our consciousness and surface in the form of dreams concerning vegetables or minerals symbolizing these profound realities.

These considerations expand our conception of drawing. The child's drawings prolong the child's perception. They do not always cor-

respond to the reality of things, but rather to the *expression of a character and an attitude.* Two orders of research commit themselves to exploring this aspect of children's drawings. First, the analyses of Minkowski bring to light the constant and revealing *formal* characteristics of a mental constitution. Second, psychoanalysis is specifically interested in the *contents* of such a constitution and explores the reflection of certain conflicts in drawings (from two different points of view: as symbol of an attitude toward the world and as a means of therapeutic investigation).[64]

Minkowski found in the drawings of children· the confirmation of her typology (a double mental constitution [*schizoid-epileptoid*], between which the individual can range in the various degrees of all mental structures). According to the formal characteristics, the drawing belongs more or less to one or the other of these constitutional types. The *epileptoid type of drawing* is characterized by a "mental viscosity." It clings to things— that is, earth, family, nation—with violent explosions from time to time. There is a harmony with the environment. In such drawings, violent color and movement are predominant: thick, brushy groupings, dense masses, minute details, and so forth; everything seems stuck together and yet ordered. Sluggishness alternates with explosions of violent dynamism, but the world represented is always an organized world, a "cosmos" with deep internal connections.

The characteristics of the *schizoid drawing* involve an affective rupture with the environment, for example, "autism" and "morbid geometrism." Such a drawing is characterized by immobility, regularity, geometrical abstraction, effaced colors, and disintegration and division of details such that they are without connections between one another (in opposition to the agglutination found in the epileptoid drawing). The subject does not like to represent himself in the drawing, and if the subject does so, then he represents himself outside the familial context. The windows of the house are without life, without curtains, and the subject does not like to draw pictures of nature.

E. Psychoanalytic Conceptions of Drawing

As a means of considering the psychoanalytic exploration of drawings, let us consider Sophie Morgenstern's *Psychanalyse infantile: Symbolisme et valeur clinique des creations imaginatives chez l'enfant.*[65] Morgenstern's interpretation of children's drawings stems from her observation of a particular child whom she could explore by no other means. The boy was mute and quite reticent and was capable of expressing himself only through the drawings which he produced. The doctor would interpret these drawings while the child nodded or shook his head at the interpretations provided.

Morgenstern cites some of the child's productions to include *birds, tall animals, stick figures with hats, individuals with three arms, with a pipe, with a knife, men in the moon, wolfmen, parents without heads,* and so forth.

The doctor recounts to the boy the story of a fictional sick child, but the story has a happy ending. The interpretation has no sexual allusions and the child listens quietly. The boy makes a new drawing in response to the interpretation, one which includes a man with a knife who is now also holding an unnamed thing [*une chose innomable*]. Much later the child states that this thing represents the man's guts. The session ends with the child drawing a picture which clearly represents a castration scene. Later, the boy draws a picture of himself stabbed. Later still, he draws a bearded man and himself as bearded. His beard is both very long and covered with padlocks. He then draws a picture of Morgenstern with broken hands. In the third month of treatment, the child begins to experience trouble with his excretory functions (e.g., wetting the bed and defecating in his pants). Shortly thereafter, he speaks to his little sister, and then the treatment can continue with the aid of speech. However, even after this, the boy prefers to respond by drawings. For instance, he drew happy scenes and people of equal size, whereas before he had only drawn adults in an exaggerated fashion.

Analytic interpretation. The pronounced enlarging of the head is a displacement of, and an attempt at masking, sexual conflict. Men with hats, birds, and fires are so many fantasies of the father and the paternal sex and in particular express sexual hatred. The tongues and beards demonstrate an attempt to suppress sexual obsessions in order to avoid castration. His muteness is self-punishment in the face of his culpability before the father.

We can develop a certain method for understanding the child's drawings from this account. Luquet himself had pointed out the predominance of the head and the *tadpole man* in children's pictures, although he did not give any explanation for it. In psychoanalysis, the accentuation of the head is a species of displacement of height and represents an effort on the part of the child to dissimulate or transpose a conflict that he does not want to externalize. Faces become in some sense visceral and aggressive features are exaggerated. The overaccentuation of certain elements in the drawing (e.g., light, smoke, tails, and so forth) is related to the way in which children think of themselves in their familial milieu.

.Another example is a five-year-old girl with behavioral problems brought to Morgenstern. More than a year after her mother's death she came back to live with her immediate family. Upon her return, she discovers a stepmother who is passed off as her real mother. Noticing the difference, she tells her observation to her stepmother and the two of

them agree to say nothing of it to the father. Thus, the girl comes to lose all confidence in her father. She comes to doubt the death of her natural mother and demands to visit her grave. The doubt and mistrust become generalized, and the girl produces drawings in which everything is out of proportion and makes no discrimination between the size of an elephant and a person. We ought to recognize this girl's troubles as the expression on the motor plane of the moral *discordance* in which she is living: objects no longer represent any stable principle for her.

In this way, what Luquet calls "interpretation after the fact" takes on another meaning. For example, a child draws battle scenes with soldiers, and behind the soldiers stand bearded men, the officers. The soldiers turn their arms against these men. The child offers three successive interpretations: the Japanese against the Chinese, the British against the Germans, and young soldiers against officers who are bad fathers and who force the soldiers to fight against their will. For Luquet, one finds in this example *disinclination* in the mind of the child. However, following psychoanalysis, we would have to see it as the expression of the multiplicity of meaning in things: the *ambivalence* which characterizes the child's relations with his parents.

New interpretation of flattening. For Luquet, it was a realistic process, but for the psychoanalyst flattening represents a special instance of artistic thought (when it is defined as the synchronous representation of elements which do not appear as such, but are connected within the child's mind through an affective relation).

Lessons from Morgenstern's remarks. According to Morgenstern, the drawing is *sublimation* for both the child and the adult. The child, like the painter, finds in this outlet a form of *catharsis.* However, for us, great differences exist between these two sorts of drawings.

In the case of the adult, the psychoanalyst seeks to determine the latent content of a symbol whose manifest form appears only in a very deformed fashion. However, in children, it is impossible to imagine that such a censor mechanism exists; rather than discovering a simple duality of manifest content and latent content, we find a single text of undetermined meaning.

Georges Politzer has challenged the Freudian concepts of latent content and manifest content which, according to him, occur neither in the case of the child nor the dreamer.[66] If someone dreams of a house, he is not dreaming first of all of sexual organs; he is thinking directly of the house which is immediately a sexual expression. Likewise, in the child, symbols are evocative of immensity and masculinity in the broadest sense and thus directly represent the conflict between parents and child. The child's symbolization does not stem from an understanding separated

according to the terms *object* and *symbol,* but rather sexual meaning is immanent in the drawing. With regard to this question, Roger Cousinet has spoken of an "immediate analogy" and Minkowski of a "lived metaphor." This is the only way of interpreting the conclusions reached by Morgenstern: if children's drawings have any cathartic virtue, even though they do not verbalize their conflicts, it is because these conflicts are not locked up in some unconscious space.

VII. The Child's Relations with the Imaginary

According to classical philosophical and psychological conceptions, the child's relation with the real presents itself in the following fashion: the child becomes conscious of external objects full of qualities which the child can contemplate. However, as we have seen, perception of the real also involves the development of the child's behavior, where one cannot distinguish what is objective from what is tied to the structure of the child's thought. For the child, perception is a *means of conduct* by which the child engages himself in a veritable commerce with things. In this way we can understand Piaget's remarks concerning the egocentrism of children; it is a good notion that we will comment on below and give a *positive* content.

If we reexamine the child's relations with the real, the notion of the imaginary will have to be reconsidered as well. We can no longer say with Taine that the image is a sum of qualities which appear to us more or less weakly.[67] The idea that images are the same as *enfeebled perceptions* seems natural to us. It appears to be legitimated at first glance by the relations between perception and the organic self, but in actuality, the image does not correspond to any reality. We now know the theory of cerebral engrams is false.[68] Although a parallel between this physiological process and consciousness does exist, there is no content parallelism. Rather, it is a question of a functional parallel which does not authorize us to transport the notion of engrams from the terrain of the physiological to that of the psychological. According to the contemporary view, the cerebral centers are coordinating centers and not image storehouses.[69]

A. The Image

The image is not an enfeebled perception. It is not susceptible to being "observed" or examined point by point like a perceived thing. The image

is not given a location like a perceived thing in a flow of concordant appearances, with each variation set in perspective. The image is not an "interior" or "psychic" thing, but rather a global conviction. Alain said that the image is *credulity* or the *conviction of having seen:* one does not see; one *believes to see.*[70] The illusion of taking a tree for a human silhouette while walking in the forest is possible only if one has already "consented" to not actually perceiving. This is so, according to Alain, since *we never perceive anything other than the real.* We can make use of some perceived real thing in order to see something else, but in this case we do not perceive.

Thus, Alain comes to the untenable position of radically negating the image. The image is not a simple judgment, because it is not possible for a judgment to ignore its own activity. However, the image and the hallucination behave like impostors, presenting themselves like some quasi-vision. The falsehoods of mentally disturbed individuals are not themselves deceiving; there is always something positive in their vision which serves to ground their actions. Alain's analysis involves a contradiction, affirming at one and the very same time that the imaginary thing is never visible *and* is visible; the latter because what results is a judgment. To see is to judge.

On the other hand, an analysis of images encounters insurmountable difficulties when we think of them as abridged objects which are introduced into the conscious mind. Let us return to a direct analysis of the image. Imagination always concerns itself with the perceived object; to imagine is not to contemplate an image. The imagination always refers itself to a unique object. It is not the case that there is an image of Peter and a Peter in reality. There is only one Peter, the one over there, and it is that one which I strive to make appear here. To imagine is to stretch out toward the real object in order to make it appear right here. One finds a *pseudo-realization* of the imaginary object, a production of an "analogon" of the absent object. Sartre brought to light the function of this *analogon* in comparing the mental image and related phenomena.[71]

1. *To imagine with external support.* First, take the case of professional impersonators who succeed in embodying another person in a substance—their own lived bodies—which is entirely different from the person embodied. A sort of enchantment, or possession, takes place when a body is inhabited by the behavioral style of an absent person. The body becomes the *image* of that person. The second example is that of the photograph where a sensible support empowers the evocation of the image of the photographed individual: the *expressive nature* of the person invades the photograph's frame. The last example involves paintings: they achieve to the greatest extent the phenomenon of "presence within absence," as if the essence of the model came to reincarnate itself in the

present substance. It is Charles IX who smiles in this painting, who is embodied in it, just like minds appear through the record player. These examples demonstrate the affective character of images, a feature which is incomprehensible if one attempts to define it in common terms of knowledge.

2. *Limit cases* are pure central images which possess no material support. It is still a question of a projection, but without an *affective projection* (without what Alain calls "active and non-intellectual" support). In order to imagine Peter, I take the habitual attitude I have of him. In other words, I adopt the "behavior of Peter" (Janet). Thus, the imagination reveals itself to be essentially an *affective* and *motor* phenomenon.

From this perspective, feelings are manners of *aiming or directing* [*viser*] *oneself toward objects* and thereby giving them a quasi-presence. One directs oneself to the object by *movements* or *motor intentions*, without any need to represent it effectively (e.g., when one imagines the space behind oneself, it is a question of a sort of demarcation of the body coupled with a global impression). We concern ourselves with space without representing it intellectually. Thus, affectivity can no longer be defined by certain "states," but rather by "manners of directing oneself" or intentionalities.

To take account of what is actually fallacious in the image (i.e., that which has no ascertainable equivalent in the object), we must have access to something other than the functions of knowledge. The very problem of the imagination will depend on the degree of precision given to notions of affective and motor *intentionality*. Our connection to the imagination is not a relation of knowledge, but rather a relation of existence; it is a question of a mode of emotional awareness.

B. The Imaginary and the Emotions

Only very recently have we begun to conceive of emotion as a mode of apprehending things. Janet was one of the first to see that the physiological phenomena of emotions are banal. Essentially, no type of emotion is different from another. For Janet, "being affected" or "being moved" means adopting a certain attitude which, as a sort of flight, offers the subject an alternative to rational behavior. (Consider the example of a girl who must explain her symptoms to her doctor, but unable to do so, she breaks down and cries. In this way, she transforms the doctor's scientific attitude into a compassionate one.)

Janet conceives of psychic life as the result of a play of tendencies which are classified according to the relative difficulty (what it takes to execute each of them) and their degree of "activation" (the movement from the "preparatory" stage to "consummation").[72] These tendencies correspond to different degrees of *tension,* depending on their respective

difficulty and their degree of activation. A difficult form of behavior, involving great tension in the preparatory stage, consumes as much energy as an easy form of behavior, of low tension, which reaches the stage of consummation.

These ideas of Janet make behavior the result of a dynamic of tendencies. The replacement of difficult conduct by an easier one is understood as "derivation." However, with these physical metaphors, Janet loses the gains he had acquired in granting that all behavior has *a meaning*. Emotion becomes no more than a derivation of easier or less completely activated tendencies of directed behavior.

Psychoanalysis goes a step further in this kind of analysis: it sees in emotion a traumatic memory and gives it the positive significance of something equivalent to and symbolic of such an activity. However, this interpretation does not help us better understand *why* there is recourse to emotion, nor why symbolic behavior is emotionally moving.

In an article in *Psychologische Forschung*, Kurt Lewin presents a "topology" of emotion (i.e., a description of the situations which produce it).[73] When a subject strives toward a goal opposed by certain physical or moral obstacles, the subject's entire field of consciousness undergoes a reorganization in which everything is evaluated (positively or negatively) with regard to the goal. If the impasse cannot be overcome, and if, despite the impossibility of changing the given elements of the situation, the subject continues to strive toward the selected goal, emotion then appears. This description possesses the merit of showing that emotions are not isolated phenomena, but represent types of behavior or "modes of awareness" which affect the entire psyche. However, it does not say what emotion consists of or what makes it moving or touching.

Sartre extends these analyses in *The Emotions: Outline of a Theory* by revealing that in anger, for example, one is seeking an immediate solution to a problem.[74] Faced with the impossibility of resolving it, one tries to suppress or *deny* it (e.g., breaking an object which one cannot succeed in using). In this way, effective action is replaced by an emotional negation of the problem. The same is true of relations with others. When one cannot succeed in persuading an adversary, one fictitiously destroys him in a fit of anger. An affirmation of the essential power of consciousness arises with emotion, a sort of madness of the "for-itself" where the problem is resolved or suppressed *for me*, though not for others who witness it. Thus, it is essentially a mode of magical consciousness.

Sadness is equally a magical attitude. In adopting a compliance and disinterest with regard to the world, I effectively strip the world of anything of interest. In this manner, we verify that interest in things depends upon our desire and that we can change the way the world appears with

a change of attitude. Understood properly; such behavior occurs in good faith, because at no time is the subject aware that he is creating this new aspect of things.

Emotional behavior, which appears absurd in terms of the world of objects, is efficacious with regard to our relations with others. In effect, it is the proper meaning of the human face to act from a *distance* on the other. Others can affect me without using any real means. Human relations are essentially magical, because they are relations of meaning to meaning. Thus, here we find speech has a fate.[75]

Emotion is a manner of being. From this conception we can understand that the imaginary has its source in emotion. Thereby, the phenomena of dreams and hallucination take on a new clarity. Those who hallucinate posit an imaginary world. Through their behavior they confer illusory meaning on things. They do not perceive their hallucinations. Instead, they are themselves the difference between perceived things and the hallucinatory development. They maintain that others cannot understand their perspective. The hallucinating individual's perceptions undergo an alteration in the direction of his delirium. The transformed perceptions receive a new meaning through the attitude which envelops them. The hallucinatory object is not a sensible object; rather, it is the intentional object of a certain form of behavior. If, for the mentally ill, the hallucinatory object takes the place of reality, this is because reality has experienced such a devaluation that the individual can no longer, like the sane individual, *oppose* the lived world to the imaginary one.

We have seen the radical difference which exists between the imaginary and the real: the image distinguishes itself from perception by the fact that the former is never *observable*. Instead, the image belongs to the consciousness of the hallucinating or dreaming individual precisely *because it is not observable*. The image gives me the impression of being in direct and absolute communication: it offers itself all at once. Thereby, it has a kind of convincing power. One finds resemblances between the question concerning the perception of images and the question involving the child's desires. In both these operations consciousness culminates in nonsynchronous realities. These realities are not perceivable simultaneously, according to the Freudian "pleasure principle." It is the same as the domain of dreams, where anything whatsoever can signify anything else. (Along these lines, we must understand that the symbolism of dreams does not necessarily involve a simple censoring mechanism, because the realities evoked are masked not only by an attentive censor. But, above all, they show the fact that *in the dream* everything signifies everything.) In other words, a conflict with reality occurs.

The belief we have in images stems from the fact that we have lost

contact with the real and the relativism it supposes. We are thus placed in a special attitude. All perception knows that it is partial, that it moves within the relative. The imaginary, on the other hand, moves in the absolute. The imaginary sets me within a relationship with the absolute without my actually having to believe that the imaginary is real. Likewise, the hallucinating individual can distinguish these two worlds, but lives in the imaginary one, because he has lost reference to the real. It is in this sense that the power of imagination is at one and the same time a deceiving power and a manifestation of the freedom of consciousness. Consciousness liberates us from the present by way of the imaginary; it has a power of derealization [*s'irréaliser*] outside of things.

When I imagine the distance that separates perceived objects, the center of my consciousness disappears. The object that I imagine is not at *such a distance,* such that, if it seemed to be about a hundred meters away, I know that I would not actually be changing this fact by approaching it. Instead, consciousness must stop living in the world of objects and "place" itself in the view which is offered to it, a view where the subjective and the objective collapse into one another. Thus, it involves a third term which is inexpressible.[76] It involves the essence of consciousness as oneiric, as grasping something beyond the distinction between the subjective and the objective.

At the beginning of his book, Sartre makes an absolute distinction between the real and imaginary domains. However, we now see that this distinction cannot be maintained absolutely. In the course of his study, Sartre revises his conceptions. Sartre's absolute distinction does not suffice to resolve the problem of the imaginary. In order for the imaginary to be capable of displacing the real, we do not need to consider them antinomies, as different as day and night. In such a conception, there would be no room for myth. Myth belongs in this third, oneiric order that the author introduces in the second half of his book and which is *between* waking perception and the "fiction" of the sane adult individual.

In reality, as Sartre points out, one cannot even say that one *believes* in the perception of the real. Belief only intervenes after a preexisting doubt, and thus it is the imaginary that we truly believe in, *because* our beliefs lack some support. *I do not believe* in this chair I see: the chair is simply there, that is all. Perception does not await proof in order to grasp an object; it is prior to careful observation. In this sense, perception, like the imagination, precedes all premises. Further, there must be something conjectural and ambiguous about the perceived thing for the imaginary to be taken for reality. It is this everyday ambiguity which allows the imaginary occasionally to substitute itself for the real.

The child does not live in the bipolar world of the waking adult,

but rather he inhabits a hybrid zone of oneiric ambiguity. Jaensch has indicated that an enormous imaginative capability (i.e., eideticism or eidetic imagination) within the child remains confined to a quasi-vision. He has undertaken experimental studies on this subject. In reality, it is not a question in the child's case that an image might be as powerful as perception, but rather of a partial absence of a distinctiveness between the real and the imaginary.

The *true distinction* between the real and the imaginary stems from the fact that both are ambiguous forms of consciousness. Real consciousness is never in full possession of what it posits. It does not stem from criteria which empower it to identify an image over against a perception instantaneously and without fail. However, the irrational nature of perception is open to an experience which validates, while the irrational nature of the imagination is closed and, therefore, unable to be open to verification (such as in Sartre's description of the difference in behavior when a loved one is absent or present: "imaginary" and "real" love). The distinction between the real and the imaginary is dialectical, such that one can desire the real in a certain way as to find oneself lacking it (e.g., the case of the man who would like to love a woman for a certain number of reasons).

A man, who upon being questioned states that he will only accept what is "rational," still undoubtedly participates in the irrational. We must grant the perception of others this feature and assume the risks of what this may enclose within the unknown. In this sense, the assumption of the irrational is what leads to a life that can be considered as rational in the sense that it is not fragmented.

A dialectic, as well as an ambiguity, exists between the real and the imaginary. No rationality is possible other than the one that accepts the irrational frame of life and perception. The rationality of our relations with others resides in the fact that they remain free even when I think about them. One must establish a form of communication which does not condemn others to conform themselves to the image that I have of them. Thus, the passage to the adult state would be a passage to a secondary state where the human being is no longer a sorcerer and where each freedom ceases to be threatened by all the others.

Germaine Guex has demonstrated that a certain neurosis involves individuals who have continued, like children, to love by wanting to *possess* the object of their love.[77] Such neurotics, *the abandoned* [*les abandonniques*], live in a state of insecurity and affective avidity. Three elements are involved in this neurosis: a fear of being abandoned, followed by an aggressive attitude that results in an underestimation of the self.

The abandoned wishes to take revenge for what has occurred in the past (e.g., by being a demanding or tyrannical lover). Neurotics of this sort monopolize their lovers' emotional lives, detesting friends, even to the point of arriving home late when guests are coming for dinner. In general, they demand total attention on the part of companions. They disregard their companions' wishes and remain strictly within the realm of appearances. In short, they do not know how to introject into affective relations. The abandoned move in the absolute, expecting others to divine their wants and needs, and often test the individuals they love.

Such neurotics refuse to take contingencies into account and refuse to imagine love in someone who does not manifest this feeling at each moment. They do not give anyone the benefit of the doubt and never excuse someone for being late or failing to keep an appointment. Everything has a meaning for them; there is no such thing as "chance." They do not accept that anyone exists outside of their personal relationships with them. In a general way, the abandoned has a passive attitude: he allows himself to love, but never loves, and is incapable of *devotion*. Neurotics of this sort have remained at a receptive or captivated stage which brings to mind "infantile loving." In their relations with other people they show no sense of the "art of living." Having failed to experience a certain feeling, they will finally admit that they just are not capable of such feeling. In some sense, this is true. They blame their families for all their faults, which is reasonable to a certain degree, but the abandoned exaggerate to the extreme the manner in which such memories compromise their efforts to do something new. By all of this, the abandoned comes to feel hostility toward himself through an elementary masochism, although it is a masochism different from the one which Freud describes as deriving from guilt. Rather than a form of self-punishment, this elementary masochism is a refusal to respond to the self or to others; it is a refusal by the mind to live a moral economy and represents a devalorization of the self.

Piaget has singled out three successive stages in the intellectual development of the individual moving from the ego's confusion with the external world to the distinction between the ego and the non-ego. Following this affective model, we might be able to lay out a singular line of development. However, the emergence of self-consciousness in the emotional order is much later and more difficult than self-consciousness in relation to external objects. No parallel exists between these two lines of development; even in the adult, the former has often yet to be achieved. In the physical world, we find experiential denial in the resistance of objects, while on the affective plane, such denial is always ambiguous. In the case of an emotional conflict, any analysis of where my culpability

ends and the other's begins is always difficult (e.g., two people who have just broken off a love affair cannot tell to what degree each is responsible for the breakup).

In the case of the abandoned, this phenomenon is found to a more accentuated degree; he does not recognize that it was precisely his over-whelmingly demanding attitude that drove the lover away. His relations with others are based on an experience of exclusion: there is always the feeling of being the other, the inessential.[78] Such neurotics demand of others an intimacy so total as to rival that demanded of the mother by her baby. Everything is catastrophic, or threatens to become so for them, thus they refuse to express themselves (i.e., their horror of writing, of the tele-phone, and so forth). The abandoned have the feeling that their person-alities are falling apart and fear that their expression will only fulfill this breakdown. Neurotics of this type do not see that all their precautionary actions against loss or abandonment are precisely what makes them lost or abandoned. Thus, experience does not teach them anything and any full sense of self-awareness is indefinitely postponed, because they impute to others what comes from themselves.

Guex's description is based on an interpretation of the abandoned as still dwelling in the pre-Oedipal stage, having not undergone the for-mative Oedipal experience. The description given by her validates this hypothesis. The abandoned would like to acquire an absolute *within the immediate.* Their attitude is oneiric in the sense that it is a denial of ob-stacles and a refusal of the relative; they deny the existence of any con-tingency between themselves and others in order to gain these others *for themselves.* This feeling and all its consequences (e.g., the decentering of the self) spring from the image-projecting attitude [*l'attitude imageante*] that dominates their relations with others. This projective attitude, which is a "crazy" way of dealing with objects, is to some extent inevitable when dealing with other people. For another person is by definition *someone* whom I claim to be in direct contact with only through partial demonstra-tions. The abandoned's attitude simply takes this ineluctable component of our perception of others to an extreme. This "externalism," that is, the exteriorization of my feelings (and, inversely, the introjection of the feel-ings of other people in me), renders relations with others absurd, even after the adult leaves behind his belief in what Alain calls the "sorcery" of the other. Without something more than this "externalism," love would be in danger of becoming a simple ritual and other people would *not be there.* Since introjection and projection are unavoidable, my behavior toward others will always be in some respect imaging. Within my relations with others I find a stabilizing force which is by no means an indifferent equilibrium.

Because of their physical inferiority and the inequity of skills, children do not possess this generosity with regard to others. They do not have a recognition of the freedom of others through which the adult moves beyond "sorcery" and tends toward communication. By necessity, the child loves like one about to be abandoned. Thus, we discover on the affective level something like the egocentric nature of the understanding described by Piaget. Piaget's notion is rendered more profound, since Piaget himself has recently described in more precise terms the correlation between his views and certain Freudian conceptions.[79] We could point to parallels between egocentrism and magic on the one hand, and the pleasure principle (as opposed to the "reality principle") and the essential power of thought on the other hand. The being which exists in the immediate constantly practices magical thought. Further, it is the child's affective realism which explains intellectual realism, since it is the former which allows us to comprehend in an analogous manner the union of subject and world in egocentrism as well as the bewildering power of the imaginary. These structural points can clarify the nature of *games, imitation,* and *dreams.*

1. *Games* have sometimes been thought of as an exercise in preparation for adult life. This idea assumes a sort of subordination of games to real life. This distinction is an adult one; games are serious matters for children. Piaget has pointed to the game as an assimilative behavior (where the life of the child is a fluctuation between assimilation and accommodation), or what we might call an image-projecting and oneiric attitude.

2. *Imitation* is, according to Piaget, the *foundation of all images.* It stands as one of the sources of symbols in the child's experience; the image is an interiorized imitation. Fortunately, formulations like this, which are offered summarily in *The Child's Conception of the World,* are corrected in his *Play, Dreams and Imitation.*

3. *Dreams.* In the latter book Piaget distinguishes between three stages of *dreaming:* dreams coming from the external situation of the dreamer, internal dreams provoked by external phenomena, and purely internal dreams. However, he noticed that the child never confuses his dreams with reality. The child acts under the impression that dreams occur in the place that they represent and at the same time that they appear on the wall of the bedroom. This point leads us to suspect that there is something inadequate in the conception of the image as a "mental object." Lately, Piaget has begun to see the image, as Sartre has seen it, as a behavior which aims at procuring the pseudo-presence of something real yet absent. The dream is no longer a simple parade of images. It is a symbolic behavior that has its place in the dialectic of the child; it is a

species of language by which the child speaks to himself (i.e., a collection of primary and secondary symbols to be deciphered). In this manner, a convergence is discovered between the analyses of Piaget, Freud, and Sartre, as long as one subtracts from the first two the lingering residue of atomistic psychology.

VIII. The Child's Representation of the World

Can one speak of an actual *representation of the world* by the child? That would mean understanding the child's experience in terms of a conceptual organization which could be formulated in propositions. To suppose something of this sort in the child might be to misunderstand the essence of the child's mentality and to remain ignorant of the *problem* as such.[80] One of the essential differences between the child and the adult involves the fact that everything has an obvious meaning for the child and in such a way that no room for doubt exists. In order to shed a certain worldview, we must affirm a certain number of theses. To credit the child with a "representation of the world" undoubtedly makes the child seem too much like the adult, in the sense that one attributes to the former an ensemble of theses and formal explanations comparable to the theses and explanations of the latter. At the same time, we characterize the child as radically different insofar as we crystallize the child's experience into a "representation of the world" which seems absolutely alien to that of the adult, a form of experience grounded in a totally different logic.

It is perhaps on the condition that we do not speak of the child's "representation of the world" that we will succeed in becoming aware of this *adherence to given situations* which might be the essential character of the child's thought. Let us examine Piaget's conceptions, *The Child's Conception of the World* and *The Child's Conception of Physical Causality*, followed by a study conducted by I. Huang, "Children's Explanations of Strange Phenomena," an experimental revision of some of Piaget's ideas.[81] And finally, let us look at some relevant ideas of Wallon in *Les origines de la pensée chez l'enfant*.

A. Piaget

According to Piaget, the child's notion of physical causality passes through three stages of development. First, children give psychological explanations. These explanations are psychological, phenomenalistic

(e.g., statements concerning contiguity), finalistic (". . . in order to go"), moralistic ("because that's what you're supposed to do"), and magical (e.g., the interaction of things by themselves and with gestures). Second, we find artificial explanations. These explanations are artificial (e.g., fabrication), dynamic (e.g., forces which have a permanent intention), and animistic (e.g., quasi-human intentions) in nature. Finally, we discover in the child rational explanations. Starting at the age of seven or eight years, explanation of a rational type appears: an explanation involving circular reaction (e.g., "the air pushes the clouds and that makes the air that pushes the clouds"), contact, plantlike generation, identification of different substances (e.g., "the sun is made of clouds"), condensation and rarefaction, atomistic composition, spatial explanations, and logical deductions.

This development toward adult conceptions is produced in three ways, by de-subjectivation, by the formation of temporal causal series, and by the introduction of the reversibility of causal operations. Alongside of this, the notion of *law* also appears in three stages: as moral necessity, then as physical necessity, followed by physical necessity which doubles as logical necessity.

Piaget characterizes the young child's representation of the world as *realistic*. After this stage, the child must pass from *realism*, the stage involving a nondifferentiation between the ego and the world: (1) *from realism to objectivity*, in which the child must begin to assume the role of the self-aware ego and its rupture with the external world; (2) *from realism to reciprocity:* the child has to become aware of the fact that his perspective is not absolute, and that his cognitive and practical position with regard to others does not count for more than its own. In other words, the child must recognize that there is no "me" with a privileged position (e.g., if a boy has a brother, he must grasp that he himself is a "brother" as well, and if something is to his left, it is to the right of the person facing him, and so forth); (3) *from realism to relativity:* the child must comprehend the relation between various phenomena, for example, that weight is not a strictly intrinsic quality of something—"iron is heavy, wood is lighter"— but rather a property tied to volume, shadows are related to light, geometrical relationships, and so forth. These developments make the socialization of the child possible.

In his analysis, Piaget declares that he is not pursuing a study of the child's thought in itself, but in order to place it in contrast with adult conceptions, but scholarly adult conceptions. He takes as the criteria of adult thought the "truths of common sense" and certain principles of classical physics that have been vulgarized in the classroom. (Again, he neglects many aspects of this science, such as the nonreversibility of becoming in

nature.) We have to ask ourselves if this explicit postulate does not lead Piaget to characterize the child's thought in a *completely negative* fashion.

B. Huang

Huang conducts his experiments from a totally different outlook than Piaget. Instead of demanding that children offer, by means of questionnaire, an *explanation* of phenomena which often do not comprise a part of their direct and familiar experience, Huang exposes them to phenomena which we might call "surprising." Then he can observe their immediate reactions (typically curiosity and astonishment, which imply a conception of what is "natural" that is comparable to our own), as well as the manner in which they *spontaneously* seek to interpret these phenomena. In this way, we can see their thought at work and the principles of their thought in its implicit state. Between these experiments and most of Piaget's interrogations (or those of Wallon) lies the difference between a *test* and a *questionnaire*. Furthermore, Huang seeks to understand children for themselves and proceeds without a "normative" description. He executes some simple tricks of prestidigitation which amaze and interest the child.

1. *The broken toothpick.* In the broken toothpick trick, the researcher covers a toothpick with a handkerchief within which he had previously sewn another toothpick. He lets the child break the toothpick, and the child then finds intact what he believed to have been broken. Very few of the children think that it could actually be the same toothpick. They think it may have been only partially broken (in this case one then has them recommence the experiment) or that a substitution has occurred. They *never* spontaneously suggest a magical explanation. In the youngest of them, we find an undetermined attitude, but even they do not trust their eyes alone. Three children out of thirty-six did, in fact, invoke a magical explanation, but only as a last resort, and even here one must take into account cultural influences (e.g., fairy tales and the like). The children only opted for such explanations when forced into it.

2. *Penny in the sleeve.* In the penny in the sleeve trick, the researcher slides a penny up his sleeve, raises his arm to make the penny slide to the armpit, and then (having hidden another penny under a button) makes it appear as if he is withdrawing the first penny from under his arm by showing what is, of course, the second penny, to the child. In this experiment all the children demonstrated an even more marked resistance to any supernatural explanation. None of the children wanted to believe that the penny had miraculously traveled through the arm. They thought that perhaps a seam had been unstitched, or if they were shown that this was not the case, perhaps there was a penny in the sleeve and so forth. It

is remarkable that the child immediately and spontaneously forms a new hypothesis when the old one is called into question; we cannot detect a trace of the "impermeability of experience" that Piaget discusses. Of thirty-two children, every one rejected the idea of magic. They all gave *reasonable* suggestions, even if what followed from their suggestions was not possible.

3. *The candle blown out through a glass.* In the case of the candle blown out through a glass, the children began by agreeing that a candle cannot be blown out through a windowpane, although the candle is extinguished (because the breath goes around the pane). Five of nineteen children spontaneously explain that the breath passes *around* the glass, the others stating that it passed *over* the glass (an error committed by many adults), and, convinced to the contrary by a complementary experience, they ridicule the first hypothesis. *No child* supposes for an instant that the breath has passed through the glass.

4. *Floating needle.* In the floating needle trick, a sewing needle submerged in the water vertically falls to the bottom, while it floats on the surface when it is carefully dried off and placed on the water horizontally (the phenomenon of surface tension). As in the preceding experiments, Huang begins by asking the children about their ideas concerning flotation: he maintains that weight is tied first and foremost to the specific material at hand; while convinced otherwise, the child relates the weight to the size of the object. Contrary to Piaget's findings, Huang never claims to find a notion of density present in the children. Piaget interpreted the notion of "heaviness" in the sense of "solidity" in order to reconcile the apparently contradictory responses of the children when pressed with questions (e.g., "Why does paper float?" "Because it is light," then, "But why does a boat float?" "Because it is heavy"). Huang decides that it is not necessary to try to resolve a contradiction because the second response, extorted by the investigator, does not represent a conviction of the child. The child gives a second, makeshift explanation, but believes only in his first response.

Seeing the floating needle, the child searches for a spontaneous explanation (e.g., because there is air in the eye of the needle, because the needle is dried, and so forth). Thus, children attempt to reduce the unknown to a notion that is known, and while this is done in a *naive manner, it is by no means absurd.* They also seek to interpret the unknown by invoking a new factor. They explain, for example, that when the needle is positioned horizontally it has "no force" to penetrate the water. Other children confine themselves to proclaiming the strangeness of the phenomenon. In no case do we observe a difference in kind between the reasoning of the child and that of the adult (i.e., a prelogical or

mystical-rational form of thought); just like the adult, the child tries to take account of the phenomenon in a "natural" fashion.

5. *Jar full of water.* When a jar full of water is stopped by a piece of paper the water does not run out, even though ten out of thirty-one children thought that it was going to. Seeing that it does not, they say that the water sticks to the paper, which in turn stops it from flowing. Here again the explanation is naive, but not absurd.

6. *Die on cardboard.* A die sitting on a piece of cardboard does not fall off the table when the cardboard is removed with a sudden pull. In general, the children think that the die did not fall because it was not touched. Some think that falling is connected to the surface of the cardboard: a smooth surface means the die remains in place. Others believe that the position of the die on the cardboard is the determining factor (e.g., when the die is situated on the edge nearest the direction of movement, it will fall). Still others think that the cardboard must not have been pulled in a perfectly horizontal fashion if the die moved.

7. *Open cardboard box.* One takes an open cardboard box, in which one has placed some coins, and spins it on the end of a rope; the centrifugal force keeps the objects from falling out. This experiment had allowed Piaget to determine four stages in the development of the child's explanatory powers (including in the third and fourth stages, "Aristotelian explanations" involving the displacement of air). Huang never finds any explanations other than those of the "second stage": the box "turns too fast" to "allow the coins the time to fall."

8. *Contrast experiments.* A gray cardboard figure seems to be a different color when seen against a yellow background than against a bright, noncolored background. Some children think the figure has been changed, and others believe this to be a case of what Raspe called "mystical causality." Huang responds that the child does not have an affirmative attitude, but one precisely akin to an adult who constructs hypotheses concerning a phenomenon whose cause is unseen (e.g., "it must be the carburetor"). Thus, it is a question of a sort of "regional" causality.

9. *Bottle of water with stopper.* When a bottle of water with a stopper and tube is heated over a burner, a child maintains that the water rises by virtue of being heated. Most of the children see a correlation between the water's increased volume and the fire, but without feeling the need to comment. Piaget calls this "animism"; however, the child simply said "the fire *makes* the water rise," which implies a *dynamic* causality, not an animistic one. Piaget's error might involve the translation of the child's responses in terms of a "representation of the world" at the very moment in which the child renounces the need to state any "thought." *At the moment the child moves outside the logical realm, one formulates in logical language*

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his conjectures, and it is by this fact that they appear to be manifestations of another logic.

10. *Jastrow's illusion.* Two segments of a circle are identical, but due to their respective positions do not seem superimposable: the illusion is the same for adults and children. All the children recognize the problem of the positions, despite the fact that the situation has been set up to induce them into error (i.e., the two segments are presented against backgrounds of different colors).

By introducing a strange or surprising phenomenon during this experiment, Raspe succeeded in provoking explanations of a "mystical" type.[82] For example, when he made a metronome beat during the experiment, the children offered the explanation that the rhythmic beat was responsible for the illusion. Raspe interpreted this to mean that the simple contiguity formed a causal link. Huang wonders if this experiment might not be interpreted differently; perhaps the child simply took for a cause the only element in the situation which was *strikingly evident* and which did not seem to explain anything else. To explain is to fill a lacuna in a field, and the child fills it by taking up a phenomenon which is unknown and without context, because it is the only one susceptible to being integrated in the incomplete context. In this way, Huang succeeds in seizing the child's thought in a concrete manner: in *perceptual terms,* it is a question of *completing an incomplete situation.* In such a situation children do not reason, at least not like the physicist, but lacking a plausible explanation, they create a regrouping of perceived elements. In this sense, Huang rejoins Michotte's theories.

11. *Glass of water with phenolphthalein.* When a glass of water treated with phenolphthalein is poured into a glass containing only some sodium bicarbonate and bearing a red mark, the water turns red. It is then poured into a third glass containing sulfuric acid (bearing a white mark) and subsequently becomes uncolored again. The older children claim that the reflection of marks is responsible for the change in color or that a coloring agent has been added. The younger children see a connection between the color of the water and the marks, but still see the same relationship even if the colors of the marks are switched. Thus, they do not make an association by contiguity or resemblance, but seem to be searching for a cause in the only element which does not have any visible relations with the other elements of the situation.

Therefore, in general children do not give explanations of the "artificial" sort. Like adults, they seek "naturalistic" explanations. Their reasoning is not abstract and quantitative like that of adult science; rather, their *orientation* is essentially *naturalistic* (i.e., the regular action of one factor on another). Huang thinks that Piaget's interpretations are fixed

within the cultural milieu in which his experiments are carried out. Huang avoids this problem by questioning working-class children, while using a group of middle-class children as a control group. Another limitation of Piaget's interpretations, according to Huang, stems from the fact that the former does not question children about distant objects—the sun, moon, clouds, and so forth. When the children give animistic or artificial explanations, we must take into account the fact that the objects in question are not part of their field of manipulation and experience. Instead, such objects furnish themes from many of their myths and fables. A third problem could arise from the fact that Piaget considers even children's answers in response to the adult's questions to be faithful examples of children's explanations. Often the children do not themselves think of these explanations as sufficient, but Piaget condenses what is perhaps only a momentary recourse into a "representation of the world." To be able to speak of their veritable "representation of the world," the children would have to totalize their experience. However, it seems clear that they are not capable of such a totalization.

C. Wallon

We can develop a more precise idea of the child's thought by borrowing from a profound notion introduced by Wallon, the presence in the child's experience of "ultra-things," which are certain beings that exist for children but are not within their scope or reach.[83] Such beings are not fully grasped by simply looking at them, and children cannot change them by willing or by moving their bodies. In short, they are things that they are not able to fully *observe*. The significance of this notion has not been fully recognized. The earth and the sky are exemplary "ultra-things" and as such are always incompletely determined by the child.

The presence of these "ultra-things" in the experience of children involves or supposes in them a preobjective time and space which is not yet dominated and measured by their thought and which adheres in some way to the subject who lives in time and space. Children *know* that their parents were at one time the children of other parents, and so on, but they only believe "with their lips," and if one presses the point it becomes clear that the children think of their parents as having existed prior to their own parents, just as they believe that the "house" and the "yard" have an absolute quality (e.g., the adult is as big "as the house," and so forth). On this level, the child is incapable of conceiving of not having always existed. Moreover, even for the adult awareness it is impossible to really conceive of one's own birth and death. As a result, the subject

feels coextensive with being, and this belief, Wallon stresses, is inherent in subjectivity. In a sense, it persists in the adult: we are not able to think outside all points of view, we can push the frontiers of "ultra-things" further (e.g., in learning the Copernican system), but we cannot eliminate them completely.

The child's mentality could be characterized by its atemporality and its aspatiality, two aspects of his subjectivity. By this fact, a great number of "ultra-things" exist which are not yet inserted into the tissue of determinate objects. Piaget's interpretation is fallacious to the extent that "ultra-things" are portrayed as entirely different kinds of entities that are organized according to another logic.

IX. Conclusion

The difference between the adult and the child is not the same as that between logical and prelogical minds. Rather, it involves the difference between a perceived world which embraces only vaguely certain "ultra-things" (although some do exist even for the adult, for example, death) and the child's world which involves a great number of them, because the child's organized behavioral forms do not extend beyond an immediate sphere. A more human relation could be established between the adult and the child where the child is not imprisoned in a magical world. The adult can comprehend the child's preobjective experience by virtue of the fact that the "ultra-thing" forms the horizon of his own experience. Thus, the adult could find within himself the equivalent of the child's situation. At the same time, we see the dangers of a dogmatic rationalism in psychology: fixing a part of adult experience within concepts such as the "representation of the world." It opposes them as two "mentalities" which are impermeable to one another and renders communication between the adult and the child theoretically impossible, a communication which is nonetheless vindicated by the extraordinary "anticipations" of the child's thought and by the many forms of puerility found in adult experience.

Thus, dogmatic rationalism works against progress in knowledge and in psychology, and at the same time against humanism. *The only truly scientific attitude in child psychology is that which seeks to obtain, by an exact exploration of childhood and adult phenomena, a faithfully rendered account of the relations between child and adult as they are effectively established in psychological research itself.* Only the analysis of the child's and the adult's situation

could ground the possibility of research psychology. True objectivity consists not in treating the child's behavior *from above* and thus converting it into a system of concepts impenetrable to us, but in scrutinizing the living relations of the child and the adult in a way which brings to light what allows them to communicate with one another. Effective knowledge is at radical odds with dogmatic rationalism.

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Child Psycho-Sociology (1950–1951)

I. Notion of Development

Development is a central notion in psychology, because it is not simply "development." It is a paradoxical notion because it supposes neither absolute continuity nor absolute discontinuity. In other words, development is neither an addition of homogenous elements nor a continuation of stages without transition.

Two conceptions of child development exist. The first conception, the mechanist one, says that development consists of an addition of homogenous elements. The second conception, the idealist one, estimates that the child's psyche is not prepared for the advent of an adult personality, a personality that arises all at once when the child is of age. The first conception denies all qualitative and structural change interior to development. The second denies that there is a transition between the child's state and the adult's state.

The *mechanist conception* is principally reflected in reflexology (*learning* theory). It conceives of child development as the acquisition of a series of conditioned reflexes (Pavlov). This reminds us of the conditioned reflex. The organism is sensible to certain exterior excitations to which it responds by the circuit reflex mechanism. This can be modified when the natural stimulus is repeatedly associated with a conditional stimulus; the reaction is obtained by substituting one stimulus for another without the subject being conscious of the change. We must not confuse this with memory. For reflex theoreticians, it can be thought of as memory's explanatory principle. They consider behavior to be an edifice of increasingly complex conditioned reflexes, acquired by a transfer of reflexogenic power. The child's responses become increasingly nuanced. Even symbolic behavior comes from this same mechanism.

Discussion. First, such a conception supposes that the organism's given responses essentially depend on exterior phenomena. There is no internal condition, except for the anatomy of the reaction. In admitting that the exterior stimuli alone activate a response, the organism is not passive. The response is not only conditioned by the number and quality

of *stimuli,* but also by the organism's attitude toward them, which it selects itself from the operant elements of its surrounding environment. Some think that the organism's relations with its surroundings could also be assimilated to *stimuli*-response relations.

The organism would be shaped by the environment. We grasp that the organism's modifications are often anterior to the environment's influence. No adaptation of a passive organism to an active environment is possible, but often a preadaptation reveals itself. In other words, the organism tends to stabilize itself in its own environment to build its possibilities. The notion of adaptation is as equivocal as that of reflex, because modifications are not made in only one sense: reciprocity exists. Therefore, there is room to distinguish "geographic surroundings" from "behavioral surroundings."

In the second place, this conception only admits a simple difference of degree between the antecedent and the posterior. All child development would result in a sum of different changes. Yet, we have remarked that development is not continuous.[1] The development curve misrepresents quick acquisition phases followed by plateaus (similar to the curve representing Weber's law).[2] If habit were a sum of reflexes, we would not understand how it is possible to transfer a habit without needing new training. Moreover, a habit always has a general, relative character. What is acquired by habit is not a series of determined movements, but a possibility, an aptitude to invent a valuable solution to a situation. The situation is not possible to precisely superimpose on the one from training. This general character of habit is found in the phenomenon of habit transfer: for example, a habit acquired by the right hand is partially transferred to the left. Therefore a relative independence of habit from the motor apparatus exists. Consequently, in man there is an organizing capacity that is not reducible to our motor apparatus.

The *idealist conception* places emphasis upon the fact that development is not, in the human being, a registration in our nervous system of certain responses to certain excitants. Development supposes a conscious grasp, a comprehension of the situation that the mechanist view ignores. The mechanist point of view does not have a place for the role of intelligence in habit acquisition that is made by "insight." How can repetition be the only force in child development? According to the idealist attitude, all development is carried out by a series of ideation acts that intervene and completely rupture what preceded them. Except for Piaget's thesis, this idea is less a consequence of analysis, since pure reversibility is considered as different in nature from perceptive regulations. Consciousness's grasp of a situation on an intellectual plane supposes a certain reversibility of the mind. The child achieves this reversibility in surpassing

the sensorimotor level in order to arrive at the beginning of a thought. This beginning is not applied to a point of reasoning, but it can be virtually transported to an entirely different point. Thought quickly arrives at a certain moment; development is made by *"coups d'état."* This idealist attitude cannot make the execution of a behavioral order understandable and is even in contradiction with the notion of development itself.

In the mechanist conception, the child's socialization will necessarily be a mechanical insertion; the social environment intervenes from the exterior without preparation or a call to the child. Learning psychologists compare this socialization to the rat's insertion in an experiential maze where electrical charges inhibit it from taking certain paths. The same goes for integration in social life; the child is submitted to inhibitory bans. There is a "social maze."

In the idealist or "logicist" conception, the adult state is in no way equivalent to initial states. Piaget is an idealist in the sense that he considers a series of preintellectual "perceptive regulations" (imperfectly corrected perceptual errors) as opposite from adult thought (objective view, reversible, without a special point of view). Thus, perceptual schemas can only be registrations of past impressions without any intrinsic organization. The great merit of Gestaltists is posing the problem of concrete perceptual organization independent from intelligence. In a sense, they are complementary. We find different levels of analysis in the same author.

Such conceptions regarding thought are insufficient. Intelligence and perception manifest themselves in different manners. In depth perception, the number of errors is inversely proportional to the quantity of objects in the field. For intelligence there is only a difference of degree between different cases. In perception, perceiving two pieces of chalk is qualitatively different than perceiving a group of five pieces of chalk. The presence of five pieces of chalk also establishes a *level phenomenon* where the dimension and the distance of objects are better determined. Judging a point of view where the pieces are equivalent becomes very different in perception. (The first phenomenon of a studied level is found in Wertheimer where dominant, vertical, and horizontal lines situate the other lines in relation to them.)[3] But, in addition, we observe an interaction which confers on each of the terms of the group's properties "a transformation," an auto-development which does not appear in the conditioned reflex experiment. For Gestaltists, all forms are not static. A temporal form exists. Perception develops in time (melody is qualitatively different from the notes which compose it). Piaget's conceptions place between the child and the adult too much as well as too little difference.

Absolute reversibility of adult thought encloses the child in a prelogical mental state. On the one hand, the child has "anticipations."

On the other hand, we can ask if adult thought proceeds only, outside of mathematics, through perfectly pure concepts that provide an absolute reversibility. Another point of view finds the difference between the adult and child larger than Piaget believed. Piaget describes the child's attitude in a "negative" manner. For example, in the perceptual acquisition of colors, there is no difference of degree between the adult and child—the adult is more "attentive" to the same "sensations." There is a reorganization of the perceptual field itself. For the Gestaltists (Koffka), the structure itself of child perception is different, as is the notion of mythical sensation.

In the dialectic conception. (1) Development is characterized by the emergence of new forms which are motivated by previous phases (this conception is opposed to the *learning* theory). We are considering autotransformation, bonds prepared by previous acquisitions, and movement modifying its own movement. (2) Reciprocal action between inside and outside exists. Maturation and training are correlated. It is useless and impossible to justly separate them. (3) We witness that the quantitative accumulation phenomena produce qualitative changes, they move from a transformation of quantity into quality (level phenomena). This dynamic conception is found in *Gestalt theory* and in certain *psychoanalysts.* In sexual development there is auto-transformation, the reciprocal action of the libido ("internal condition") and the parental "environment." In the end, Wallon best expresses this theory.

Introduction to the second part of the course: *relations between psychology and sociology in child development.* According to psychoanalysis, and even a conception like Moreno's, we can envision situations under their interpsychological angle.[4] In their analysis, they do not make an intervention between the institutional and the individual domain. For sociologists (Lévi-Strauss), men are like asteroids obeying the laws of cosmology by reacting to parental and societal relations whether they know it or not. We can attempt to integrate the two theories (culturalism).

II. Introduction to the Problem of Passing from Perception to Intelligence According to Piaget

In a classical manner, we can find two ways to envision the question. (1) Some theories have a tendency to reduce intelligence to perception. (2) Others have the tendency to reduce perception to intelligence. To

resolve the problem in terms of one or the other is not to resolve the problem but to suppress it. First we can remark on the following.

A. [Sensualism]

The first solution to the problem has been made since antiquity by philosophers and subsequently by psychologists. The common idea is that an exterior world acts upon our senses and provokes a perception. Since Aristotle and the discovery of the formation of retinal images, such a tendency is almost irresistible. An analogy between psychological perception and the physiological phenomena which precede and provoke that perception exists; a constant relation between what acts upon my retina and what responds to it. My perceptual field would thus be like the sensible elements which appear in my mind in response to the excitation of different parts of my retina. This conception is influenced by *psychological atomism.* To perceive is to grasp the totality of the sensibles that I can have of this or that thing, and these sensible experiences are either possible (images) or actual. The association of images engenders a waiting state. In summation, perception constitutes a unity without any internal principle.

In this *"sensualist" conception,* what is thus the *relationship* between *perception* and *intelligence*? There is no cognizing in the perceiving state. Intelligence is only the expectation of perceptions, of images which call upon one another.

B. [Idealism]

In the second perspective, intelligence arrives as soon as perception does. Such is the position of philosophers like Descartes, Kant, Lagneau, or Alain, afraid of leaving impression as the corporeal setting of perception. Their perspective is a reflexive analysis that is at the interior of the perceiving subject. We can recall Descartes' analysis with the bit of wax where he concludes that the object is irreducible to its perceptions (color, odor, form, etc.).[5] The permanent element of perception, a certain manner of occupying space and of being capable of receiving a limited number of forms, is not sensible but accessible only to judgment, to the mind's inspection. "It is not the eye which sees," says Descartes in the *Optics,* "it is the soul."[6] To see, one must be different from the perceived object— not the retina, not the brain, not the bodily mechanism. One only sees the "which one knows," the "for-itself." Perception is only a modality of thought, of the *"cogitatio."* This conception is taken up by the entire *ideal-*

ist tradition. Take, for example, space perception as it was envisioned in the nineteenth century. It amounts to an intellectual construction coordinated with sensible elements.

Malebranche has noted that the moon appears larger as it approaches the horizon.[7] Attempts were made to explain this phenomenon (physical causes have not entered into the game; the earth's atmospheric vapors would play more a role in the inverse sense). For the idealists, when I see the moon at the horizon, its distance is materialized by the neighboring terrestrial objects; I judge it to be larger due to its great distance. Judgment modifies perception.

The same transformation can be observed when one sees an ambiguous figure. Take for example the cube ABCDEFGH. Following the idea above, it is sometimes the face ABCD that seems in front and sometimes the face EFGH. Let us take a third example: stereoscopic vision— in other words, normal vision seen simultaneously with both eyes. The disparity between retinal images is like a problem posed to the subject. It is resolved with an intellectual interpretation: vision is depth in relief. For Kant, the thing-in-itself is different from the mass of sensations it provokes in us.[8] It is the order of images that present themselves, the invariant of a series of diverse experiences, the law of development of concordant sensations. For Alain, "perception is a starting science; science is only a perception better achieved."[9]

Let us summarize. Here a logicist analysis is in play. We understand this word in a restrained sense; the perceiving subject as corporeal is habituated by a logical, nonsituated, universal activity. To perceive is to think.

C. Gestalt Theory

Gestalt theory's approach to the problem is positive. Gestalt theory rarely calls into question the constancy hypothesis when critiquing the notion of selective correspondence in the physical and psychological elements of perception. Gestalt theory argues that the plurality of *stimuli* differs from their global sum, that they have reciprocal actions, functions, and "transversal" properties. The notion of a sensation independent from its environment is unsustainable. It is interdependent with the notions of judgment and attention.

In his article, Köhler speaks about the case of a sensation without perception (such as when I desperately look for a familiar object that is in my sight).[10] Classical psychology appeals to the idea of unconscious sensations, of a lack of attention or absence of judgment. Köhler rejects these false solutions.

We must renounce the constancy hypothesis when it supports sensualist and idealist ideas. The same object can provide different perceptions. Attention is an empty word; perception becomes a *progressive structuration of the perceived object*. The critique of the constancy hypothesis argues that a given stimulus responds to a determinate reaction that permits the characterization of Gestalt theory. Thus, we take a position that is against both classical empiricism and intellectualism. It positively saves what each of the antagonistic doctrines sacrifices.

Perceptions have a sense, but the sense is not added by a free intellectual activity; it is immanent in perception, quasi-sensory. In the case of ambiguous figures (the cube), the passage from a perceptual mode to another does not occur due to two intellectual hypotheses, but due to a change in the figure itself. We only want proof of the following fact: even if, intellectually, one knows that there are different manners in which to see the figure, one can, in fact, fail to restructure them. Let's look at a few examples.

(1) *Camouflage phenomena.* We mask the characteristic form of an object in a vaster form, that is, a canon in a demarcated line between field and meadow. (2) *Experiments which consist in inverting figure and background:* this is only possible in a laboratory where a small number of stimuli intervene. In life, such a perspective change would carry with it a complete overturning—the disappearance of the world itself. (3) *Conundrums.* Find the rabbit in the bush. Even when there is no perception of the desired object; there is not nothing. (4) *The perception of the figure is different than that of the background.* Experimentally, one argues that the threshold [*seuil*] differential is larger for background color change than that of the figure.

Bergson says, "To perceive is to remember."[11] I see that I wait for myself to see. The Gestalt school replies: there are only experimental situations, memory projection does not function automatically; rather, it is absolutely coordinated by the presented configuration. In the experiment of two figures, rarely do subjects spontaneously see the symmetrical side of figure 1 in figure 2. The disposition to see this or that form is not in the things, but in us. Perception of an exact square is rare in reality; its form is privileged not by the frequency that we see it, but by the organization that it enables.

For intellectualists, to perceive is to decipher (stereoscopic vision), it is to discover the signification of signs by an intellectual act. But, as in Gestalt theory, these signs are not given by the subject. No consciousness of the disparity of retinal images exists, nor are we aware of crystalline accommodation. Signs are conditions of vision, but they do not constitute vision.

Experiment with white plates. (1) One places a shield E between two plates. The observer sees on plate A a different color than on plate A'. These conditions are restrained visions. (2) In free vision, vision without a shield, the two plates would appear to be the same color with a simple difference of lighting. We see that lighting does not constitute an argument bringing a reason with it; instead, light configures the perceptual field. Perception is a sensory organization, not an intellectual one.

Level notion. In the preceding experiment, lighting plays the role of the perceptual background. The color attributed to objects depends more on the colored level of the environment in which we find ourselves. At twilight, we are habituated to a diurnal environment; electric light appears yellowish and a little later it appears blue.

We call perceptual sense the value conferred upon each detail phenomenon by the general level in which it is situated. The illusion of movement depends on the point of fixation. Thus, it seems that the clock *tower is falling when one fixes on the clouds. My body becomes the fun-*damental composition of my perceptual field, the agent of my "anchorage" to a certain spatial or colored level.

D. [Logic and Psychology]

We will look at the relation between logic and psychology and the consequence for the experimental study of perception's passage to intelligence according to Piaget. When Piaget started his work, two extreme opinions existed: psychologism and logicism.

For *psychologists,* all intellectual things (intentionally, we no longer precisely determine this term) are only a secondary expression of our psychic life. Consciousness is a relation of facts and logical relations that are only a particular case of it (pushed to the extreme, this conception will end in an absolute skepticism). The associationalist tendency is to take causality, for example, as a constant relation between subject and object.

For *logicists,* from the moment of judgment, an order appears, different in nature from the "psychic" order. Truth and falsity distinguish themselves by virtue of their meta-temporality, from the empirical succession of states of subjective consciousness.

Starting from the logical position, Husserl tends increasingly to reconcile the logical and the effective value of our thought. Against pure psychologism, he utilizes the following comparison: a calculating machine functions according to physical laws; similarly, our minds function according to psychological laws.[12] But in order that the calculations are valuable, the machine must also function according to mathematical laws. The physical functioning is an effective functioning (the calcula-

tions are true or false). Mathematical functioning is useful functioning. The thinking subject, subject to psychological conditioning, overtakes this simple factual relation. Logical order is superior to factual order. This opposition of the psychological existing and of logical subsisting is what psychologists have taken from Husserl. Husserl's first period as a logicist had the greatest influence on the psychologists of his time and in particular on "the Würzburg school."[13] With experimental introspection, the Würzburg school researched logic in the facts themselves. Marbé says that we discover the logical law in the functioning of thought. This logical law is not the fact, but the invasion in the exterior organized fact. Seltz, the "psychologist of thought," says that factual thought is simply an image of "thought" outside of all existence. We see that in such a conception the problem of thought's genesis becomes a stumbling block. Piaget takes up this debate.

1. *Piaget. First of all, Piaget expressly takes a position against logicism.* All logic, he says, reduces unique thought to a series of elemental operations. Thus, formal logic decomposes simple reality, thought. We must find again· the fact of thought, living and acting, the unique motor of our thoughts' operations. Two tasks still remain: we must add to logic a logic of totalities and redefine logic in a manner that is no longer a sort of reality model but a living portrait of factual thought.

Piaget conceives logic as a *hypothetico-deductive* system, different in nature from factual affirmation.[14] Like in mathematics, I posit in Euclidean geometry, post- or meta-Euclidean, a certain number of definitions or axioms from which I deduce the resulting properties. The logic of corresponding objects constructs possible models of thought that we can thus apply to the existing world. Piaget says this is a rich attitude, an irreplaceable instrument of dissection. Logic is neither subjugated to psychology, because it has its own method, nor is it subjectable in relation to psychology because it is not said to be real, effective thought. Factual thought and its genesis constitute the real domain of psychology, which only finally converges with logic in the final state of thought's equilibrium.

For example, take the principle of noncontradiction. A is different than not-A. Does our factual thought respect this notion because it is imposed from without? It is manifestly not under such a form that we should pose the question of factual thought. Ordinarily, it is more about knowing that a compatibility between two elements exists: A and B. One does not ask if one can simultaneously be communist and not-communist, but, rather, if one can perhaps at the same time be a communist and a patriot.

There are two ways to resolve the problem. (1) In defining what is essential in the two notions put into play here, we follow the process dearly held by logicians. But the definition must stick close to reality; the

word and the axiomatic concepts must perfectly circumscribe effective reality. Yet the definition is only a retrospective grasp by consciousness and is often incomplete. Pascal, Descartes, and before them Montaigne, faced with the logic of Aristotle, signaled that the definition cannot exhaust the "sense" of the word which guards an overt signification. Thus, Montaigne says, "it is easier for me to say what is a 'man' than to say what is an 'animal' and what is 'reasonable.'"[15]

(2) The second way to resolve the problem is to envision what the effective functioning of thought is. We come to see that the definition does not exhaust all the elements of the real. Following the definition, patriotism and communism are contradictory in their final and eschatological elements; in fact, we find that in certain well-defined conditions of historical unfolding, communism can take on national defense (cf. Lenin). Living and interesting thought is not within definitions; we must try to construct concepts (put the two terms in relation) by relating to life. The problem does not pose itself in relation to the principle of noncontradiction. The effective functioning of our thought permits this principle to realize itself in a much more nuanced and complete manner. It is for us to observe a cohesion in lived phenomena more than to engage in a rigorous confrontation of logical terms. We seem to now be at the antipodes of logicism.

2. [*Concrete application.*] Yet, in concrete application, which is fundamental for Piaget, there are operations. But he says that these operations do not exist by themselves, but uniquely in groups or systems. The mind's effective work tends toward a *final equilibrium,* itself regulated by logic; in sum, toward a total and closed system.

But from the moment when Piaget admits that there exists for thought a state of final equilibrium where all mental operations are grouped, *he restores a certain logicism,* since we only come to a purely operational, reversible thought if we have recourse to closed significations. The idea of a final equilibrium of thought is in contradiction with that of operation in an active sense; that is, of unachieved operation. All factual thought appears as impure and imperfect, and Piaget has the tendency to define it negatively. Piaget considers intuitive expression, infantile language as inadequate, imagined, and poetic. (He talks about the "image's trickery.") He comes to neglect all the *expressive* parts of language.

Remark. At the same time, Piaget returns to certain psychological affirmations. If we consider the operational system as his final goal, we define the unfolding of partial operations in terms of absence from the ultimate development. We must, Piaget says, disentangle intelligence's "causal mechanism."[16]

We come to see that in principle Piaget takes a position against

logicism. In fact, since he is attached to thought operations as a collection that tends toward a final equilibrium, Piaget involuntarily adopts the position of the logicist. He devalorizes preintellectual forms that would be capable of having a causal explanation. The reason for this bifurcation in Piaget's thought is perhaps that he refuses an explanation of the problem. "The great merit of contemporary logic," he says, for example, "is that it detaches itself from all philosophy." Logic becomes an axiomatic technique.

But is it a proof of value or of philosophical nonsignification? In philosophy, to not take part in philosophy is also philosophy. Here we find a certain inattentive philosophy which leaves relations between logic and psychology vague.

Perhaps this can explain why Piaget, after deciding upon realizing an overcoming of logic and psychology, finally returns and alternates between these two attitudes. This heightens fundamental difficulties with the conception of development. In Piaget's thought, logicism makes initial forms of thought appear as nonthought. Intelligence's definition, according to Piaget, is that of a decentered, nonsituated, total thought like that of God in classical philosophy.

Such a nonsituated, nonperspectival result becomes unimaginable for us. It is no longer an operation in the sense of a dynamic work of the mind. Between the idea of this thought in equilibrium and the locomotion that precedes its genesis, a real discontinuity exists. Piaget's final and definitive equilibrium is grounded upon the physical notion of equilibrium.

Mobile equilibrium. Contrary to perception, which deforms and recenters its perceptual field each time it is in operation, thought does not modify the objects which perception carries, and it is not deformed by the object's aspects over which it traverses. *Permanent equilibrium:* thought tends toward the definitive, and additions do not upset the already acquired material. *Assumed reversibility:* whereas the perceptual field is invested with certain vectors (i.e., to see the chair in a painting is altogether different from seeing the painting on the chair), in the domain of pure thought, changing the orientation of the subject does not modify how things are known.

Such a definition of thought in equilibrium is not taken from logicians who speak of abstract, formal, or logical reversibility. Piaget rests his claim on a physical notion of equilibrium to avoid the dogmatism of pure logic. However, does not this notion of equilibrium have the same inconveniences of any logical notion of rigorous thought?

Living thought, Piaget says, is not limited to work with given definitions: "embalmed thought." One must form notions; it is not sufficient to

just explain the consequences of previously formed ones. But if this is the case, is thought capable of the kind of definitive, final equilibrium that Piaget introduces? If the "operations" are not "gelled," do they also not cease to be part of a final equilibrium? The life of thought transforms its own notions. Would not a thought in equilibrium actually be an absence of thought?

Thought should be known in states of equilibrium, but in relative and nonfinal states of equilibrium. We know that our most profound convictions will be completed and modified by our future experiences. All equilibrium of thought contains in itself an evolutionary seed. To be absolutely independent of one's thought would cause the subject to be immobilized.

Piaget speaks of a fundamental inversion of sense.[17] According to Piaget, development consists in the passage from a causal order to a mature state achieved by thought. He does note the difficulties of such a passage. He must either explicate the superior by the inferior, an interpretation which Piaget rejects, or place the final term as before in anterior states, something Piaget also does not want. What is left for him is to assume that the final state arrives "ex nihilo."

In applying his theory, Piaget falls into the last obstacle that he signals. He speaks of the "necessity" of the final equilibrium. By "necessity" he returns to an idealist mode of thought. The only possibility to avoid such difficulties is to substitute the final end and the preceding ends for a real dynamic development.

Let us examine the consequences of the principal difficulties concerning the passage of perception to intelligence (research on perceptual illusions by Delboeuf).[18] Between the parts of the perceptual field, there is a kind of attraction which deforms appearances. But these perceptual regulations can have a fortunate influence. Through the combined action of two contrary sense deformations, illusion no longer exists. Properly speaking, only a true decentration of the level of intelligence exists. Each actual centration is solicited by virtual centrations. This operation is different from real relations of geometrical intelligence of size; there are two errors which compose it. How does this regulation work in perception? Virtual centrations are registered within us by past experiences.

Claparède proposed that in each perceived spectacle, a perceptual orientation toward a superior equilibrium exists.[19] In perception, the organization conforms more to the real. Already, we find here the essential idea for Gestalt theory.

Piaget expressly rejects such an interpretation. The properties of a new object are only recorded by a relation to a previous experience.

He does not acknowledge auto-regulation, nor does he admit that a real intrinsic force at the interior of the perceptual field exists. No internal restructuration exists. Rather, Piaget argues for an accumulation of elements. Let us better examine the role of virtual centrations.

(1) *The cube.* When we see a drawn cube, certain elements are only represented in their real proportions. I must perceive a certain orientation of drawn lines in the rough and I must attribute to them a certain real length, different from what I see on the table. All happens as if I could place myself laterally in my thought and set right the oblique lines. (2) *Distance perception.* I see a little black spot which moves in a field and I say, "Over there is a man working." It is a virtual perception accounted for by my past experience. (3) *Hering's experiment* (see the experiment of white plates).[20] Through the observation slit, the white sheet (or plate) appears grey. In free vision, the same sheet seems white but with shade. In these three cases, Piaget explains perception by the addition of virtual centrations to actual givens.

In reality, there is not first a perception of a surface, then a perception of depth by virtual centration. In fact, I see the cube in depth; my eyes follow the oblique lines. The same holds for the other two examples: to see the point which moves is to see the man at a distance.

Regarding the experiment of Hering's sheet, I cannot say that it is me who projects the virtual centrations. Vision depends on beams of light themselves; it depends on the lighting effect on the perceptual field, what Claparède calls "implication." The reciprocal action of lighting and lighted object creates an auto-regulation of the field. Piaget's analysis proceeds by the "isolating" method. In a contrary move, Katz shows how the perceived organization implicates the structure of sensible qualities that fill it.[21]

3. *Guillaume.* After a student's exposé, we can discuss *Guillaume's articles.*[22] In the first article, Guillaume wants to show that Piaget's ideas appear to be those of an intellectualist psychologist. The idea of signal that "captures needs," for example, the timbre that replaces a natural motivation, would make thinking an associationist displacement. The very *late* appearance of the notion of reality and the idea of a first subjective phase of experience in the child recall the empiricist conceptions of genesis.

Certainly, we must have a conception of psychogenesis. The child's *notion of reality* is very different from the adult's. Each phase of development produces a division between subjective and real. The final result supports a restructured notion, but one which is *present* from the beginning. This remark is very important, for it marks the two different points of view about psychogenesis. Piaget thinks that if he can define his point

of view, the child would be "solipsistic." Guillaume responds that this is an adult reply: the belief in the persistence of objects. For Piaget, the child does not believe in them and then passes to a superior level where he does believe.

Guillaume responds that once the object disappears, the child no longer thinks about it. It is dangerous to say that the child has a thesis regarding object permanence or disappearance. We recognize here, in Guillaume's original and fertile idea, a desire to reform language to describe the child's position as not really solipsistic, nor as fully conscious of the other.

As for the subject of depth perception, Piaget tries to show that depth is not accurately perceived. This would not be to admit that there is no distance perception. Nothing can make us see the moon and stars on different planes, despite all our knowledge. Depth is thus a mode of perceptual organization and not a mode of knowledge. Piaget admits that, in the course of its development, thought comes to distinguish *a change of position and a change of state.* This presupposes the adult idea of space, or more exactly, the Euclidean idea. Piaget thinks that this distinction does not exist in the child and only appears quite late in our development. We do not contest this fact. But it is about knowing if, late or precocious, movement perception is immediately inferred from appearances.

In reality, when we perceive a movement, a relativity of movement by relation to a point of reference exists. But we do not have the choice between what will move and what will remain immobile. It underlines the original character of perception. However, Guillaume places in question the notion of the "sensorimotor" function; even the structure of this expression shows a division in a conception of elementary sensation and movement. In fact, sensation and movement are not opposed; they are two sectors of behavior and function as one. No movement without an intentional goal exists, and there is no sensation without a certain movement. At last, Guillaume proposes the profound idea that the perceived world is the "prototype" that our intelligence has to reorganize, but one that has *its* unity and *its* order.

III. Passage from Perception to Intelligence in Gestalt Theory

Our goal will be to clear up a terminological misunderstanding and avoid a superficial reading where intelligence is reduced to a particular case of

Gestalt perspectives. In this sense, certain texts of Wertheimer can make us believe that he takes up the classical syllogism of perceptual forms. Let us consider a well-known syllogism: Socrates is a man, all men are mortal, therefore Socrates is mortal (or the simple mathematical relation: A = B, B = C, therefore A = C). Here we near a pure perceptual organization.

For example, take Köhler's experiments with apes.[23] The ape cuts a branch and uses it as an instrument to prolong his arm and obtain something outside of his reach. One can make a parallel between the action of cutting the branch and the syllogism's major. There is, in both examples, a form placement that organizes the given. But it is essential to remark that in the case of perceptual organization, all is as if the initial object has lost its sense. In effect, if a fellow ape [*congénère*] is sitting on a crate, the crate loses all meaning for the ape, its former value as a stool is erased. The initial object is said to be enriched by the gestalt, but it is suppressed as an object. The ape cannot perceive a thing simultaneously as having two aspects; the crate's behavior is identical in all its possible usages. On the contrary, in the syllogism, the real reasoning is the three terms, well within their different relations, which stay identical under any variable appearance. Hence, the gestalt of intelligence is completely different from that of perceptual form. Gurwitsch says that when there is reasoning, not only a series of organizations is present, but also a consciousness of the term's identity throughout the significations.[24] We surmount the diversity of moments through time by thinking about the permanence of objects. But Gurwitsch takes more than the appearance from the substance of the Gestalt thesis, since, contrary to what one thinks, Gestalt theory does not reduce intelligence to perception.[25] Gurwitsch's position is neither associationist nor logicist (where the truth would be outside the factual order). His thought does not make "substance" outside of "existence"; it does not reduce one to the other, and it does not negate the origination of logic which makes truth and falsity appear. Gurwitsch's thought makes rationality part of existence.

The misunderstanding resides in the fact that one wants to make the gestalt a thing, but it is only a *phenomenon of organization,* a type of structure. Gestalt theory tries to analyze thought in an effective way, but the organization of intelligence and perception is not comparable. In both cases we are fairly far from pure events which have a pure value. But the structuration which we call intelligence is other than the structuration which is solely perceptual.

Let us make this point more precise. (1) We will see what parallels we can establish between intelligence and perception. (2) We will show that, although there is a field structuration, the two structurations are

partly shared and partly different. (3) We will finally discover that this difference does not constitute a true rupture making perception a pure automatism and intelligence a pure interiority.

A. Parallel Between the Organization of Intelligence and Perception

We envision the question on three different levels: (1) the sensorimotor level, (2) the animal level, and (3) the human level.

1. *The sensorimotor level.* Along with Koffka, we can take up the example of gaze fixation. The image forms on the two retinas, but how does it happen that I see just one object? The two images resemble each other, they form close to each other in the same retinal region; it is sufficient and necessary to suppress any disparity. The Gestaltists think that when the perceptual field reflects at the same time in both eyes, the influx in the nervous systems comes to express the visual center and the eyes converge in *such a manner* that the excitations are fused so one perceives one object. In her "thesis on space" Dejean signals the "prospective" activity of looking.[26] A paradox exists because although this function is not intellectual, the resulting immanence specifies different eye movements. It is a sensorimotor organization.

Here, as in all Gestalt theory, we find two tendencies. The first tends to explain more complex phenomena by their inferior forms; for example, when, in physiology, we look for the base of psychical operations. This is what one calls isomorphism, which is not an assimilation of one to the other, but the search for a structural commonality. This tendency would like to return intelligence to quasi-perceptual forms. The second tendency, a more positive one, consists in a pure and complete description of phenomena. For the problem we are currently occupied with, this theoretical tendency argues that intellectual organization is a different kind than perceptual organization (but the shared organization has a common denominator, allowing for the passage of one to the other without a reduction of superior to inferior). Gestaltists do not look here to negate the incontestable reality of judgment, but to show that it is a different order than that of perception. Perception has a sense. In effect, if we take the well-known example of an ambiguous figure, we note that the totality is always present in the different parts. But the sense of the perceived is not the intellectual sense; we can describe what is original without contesting the existence of a psychological intelligence.

Let us return to the example of gaze fixation. The object P appears to me in a certain point in space. For classical psychology, the explication is that each retinal point must have a spatial specificity and that each ap-

parent exterior point holds to two stimulated homologous points in the retinas. But the explication does not work when the object P is off-center; the two retinal images are not symmetrical. In reality, there is no affected spatial value, by construction, to a retinal element. We are faced with a distribution phenomenon of which the base would be the brain. The brain affects each local lighted stimulus with a spatial value and grasps the simultaneous stimulations. This function of the nervous system is generally known today. Piéron, speaking of chromatic values, remarks that for a long time it was believed that certain regions of the brain were affected by the perception of this or that color.[27] Yet today we know that perception of colors is not due to a functional distribution of diverse anatomical elements of the brain, but that the same region functions in a qualitatively different manner according to the received stimulus (co-ordinated centers).

Let us look at another example: Koffka's experiments. One presents separately to each eye two different rectangular bands. One notes that the two phenomena fuse despite their qualitative differences. Thus, in the experiment (A) what matters is the "point on the homogenous background" and not the qualitative differences. In the second experiment (B) on one of the bands, the black point is slightly shifted from its central position. Again, the "eyes arrange themselves" to assimilate the two images. The stimulus is not a matter of two symmetrical points, but the homologous images are fused as if the gaze, having given the analogous function to two points, anticipates the result. Thus, one can come to have double vision, in other words, the sight of two points. Our eyes function by realizing a unity. Stimuli seem to play the same role. The different parts of the field have between them intrinsic relations. All this occurs as if the gaze was sensible in its "function"; it was oriented toward a certain "mark," guided by a "prospective activity." Perception is thus different from the sum of local phenomena. Perception exists in intrinsic relationships between different parts of the field.

2. *The animal level, phenomena of practical intelligence.* In *The Mentality of Apes,* Köhler defines practical intelligence: the fact of being capable of changing the signification given to an object for a new one, to anticipate the function, that is, the branch becomes a stick. The animal level is not essentially different from the sensorimotor level. The gaze is already a corporeal apparatus capable of being directed at the spectacle's sense and anticipating it. However, past a certain limit, the fusion of images no longer works. Practical intelligence is, at the strongest, the same thing. In the strongest case, because the elements are more extended, the conditions are less strict. But this is not yet unconditional. Köhler says that the stick must be in *optical contact* with the goal to be treated as an instrument.

Such practical intelligence is also found in man. The German psychologist von Allesch recalls an example where he was mobilized in a mountain regiment, and found himself heavily weighed down one day.[28] In rappeling down, he found his cord was too short to reach the lower platform. His position was critical, and without even thinking about it, he seized the cord with his teeth. He remarked that his body had found for him the only possible solution to compensate when ordinary paths had proved themselves ineffective. We also find this same product in replacement phenomena (*Ersatzleistungen*). The insect who is an amputee improvises a new method of locomotion.

As in tennis, or any sport, one must understand the quantity of givens: wind, the ball's speed, the adversary's position, the nature of the court, the time in the match. The body "provides proof of intelligence" *before entirely new situations, the gesture resolves a problem which is not posed by intelligence*; the elements that compose it are infinite. We can also note that rules are present in a game without ever being invoked.

This form of intelligence is not conscious of itself; it is found in habits, but not those which we usually think of—mechanical and stereotypical habits—but in habit-aptitudes, act habits (rather than gestures) that permit us to respond to situations of the same type by adaptive and nuanced behavior (knowing how to dance, knowing how to swim). Chevalier showed how the habit of playing an instrument is not added upon. In a short delay of adaptation, the organist learns to know and to "incorporate," even in the case of a new piano arrangement.[29] The same follows for writing with the left hand; we find that learning is much faster if one has already learned with the right hand (habit transference). Thereby, we can conclude that a part of habit is independent from its instrument and that intelligence is capable of responding to new situations, to a whole and not to elements, to a general sense and not to stimuli. However, this concrete intelligence under the form of motor skills is still different than intelligence properly speaking.

3. *Human intelligence, organization phenomena toward a solution.* Let's take up the example of a geometry problem. It seems to be an overt situation, defined by "hypotheses." The solution is to reduce, in the subject, the provoked tension by the givens. In using the givens and recalling one's past knowledge, one discovers the solution. What is the sum of the angles of the triangle ABC? At the apex of C, one extends the BC side and one takes the parallel to AB. In the present construction, we can say that the angles B and C3 are equal as corresponding angles and that the angles A and C2 are equal as alternate-internal forms by the parallels AB and CD and the secant AC. However, C1 + C2 + C3 = 180 degrees, since the angle C is even. Thus the angles C, A, and B are equal to 180 degrees and the sum of a triangle's angles is equal to two right angles.

Now take the equation to the second degree: $ax^2 + bx + c = 0$. I can directly resolve it and have the idea of recovering a trick: the two first terms can be considered as the beginning of the development of the binominal square $b/2a$ of the perfect square $(a + b)^2$. I thus obtain the equation $(x + b^2/2a) - b^2 - b^2/4a^2 + c/a = 0$, which is easy to solve because of my past knowledge.

Therefore, I argue that in both the first and second examples, it is the form itself of the figure (or equation) that arouses in me the ideation of construction to do or use the theorem. There is a place of anticipation, acting as a result function that has not yet been found, but it is nonetheless not by chance we are directed, it is by a kind of intuition. In such examples, the form of intelligence is comparable to the two others, but it is characterized by the central phenomenon of construction.

B. Essential Differences Between Diverse Levels of Intelligence

Psychophysical intelligence is added onto the very strict conditions, the elements to identify become very little removed from one another. The animal's practical intelligence is still very limited; everything happens as if the animal can only think of the functional value of an object when detaching it from perceptual contingencies. The chimpanzee gives the object a new signification, but in a provisional manner, by way of chance. (Köhler notes a game of mimicry, the victorious experience of "ha ha!" or of the "*Aha Erlebnis.*") There is a certain generality of learning; the animal learns the means to an end, but it never seizes it fully. The animal can change the sectors of its field, but it is incapable of detaching them from the particular factual conditions. Correlatively, the subject is not so much the intelligent subject as the desiring subject. The relation "means–end" is not facultative, it is installed under the pressure of a need (hunger). It *is not really possessed by the subject. From this comes the narrowness of* the animal's power of organization. If the animal was moved by concepts, time would not intervene under the form of forgetting, of distraction. The properties' relations cannot be excessively distended. Even human perceptual organization has only three manners of perceiving an ambiguous figure.

On the contrary, in the case of an intellectual problem, there are a great number of ways in which to transform the givens. If everyone re*solves perceptual problems, everyone does not resolve or even pose the* same intellectual problems. We can note that on the three levels—sensorimotor, animal, human—the organization of intelligence is not constant. In the first stage, we have seen that intelligence is tied to a certain distribution of stimuli upon the sensory apparatus. In the second stage, the relation of means to ends is tied to what Köhler calls the "optical

contact"; in all phenomena of this practical intelligence, the principal agent is the body—the tool and the goal must be the trajectory of one sole gesture.

As for *intelligence properly speaking,* it is, at the limit, total clairvoyance, "insight"; the apperception of an internal relation between means and ends. It is a matter of an intrinsic relation, founded on the object's own properties, and not solely on the contiguity, or some other condition no less contingent, that accompanies the animal level "insight." On the contrary, intelligence properly speaking seizes what would be the complete relations of each experience, independently of the psychological events that vary from one moment to another. Intelligence tends toward a *truth.* The psychological event is of the order of fact. Truth is of the order of law. Between the pure psychological events and the *apprehension* of truth, Gestalt theory puts the middle term of *perceptual organization,* which surpasses the plane of mechanism.[30] (As Guillaume notes, all habit is general in the sense that it consists of a *reorganization* of myself which facilitates the ability to grasp the right relationship, the real function of intelligence.) Perceptual organization also already contains within it the intrinsic relations without which there is no real intelligence. Thought that organizes its field is not limited to creating structures which distort the object or, as the Gestaltists say, "camouflage." Perceptual organization is given as an *already existing organization that continues during and beyond the moment of perception.* In other words, perceptual organization is given as *true.* Its pretension is to penetrate just to the object's being itself outside of our particular psyche. When I perceive, I organize my field of experience using contingent properties of objects; when I intellectually organize, I use general traits, essential properties and not contingent ones. I retrace an "essential dynamism." What takes place is an argument and not a simple verification. Let's consider some examples from a recent posthumous book of Wertheimer's.[31]

Galileo's experiment. A priori, it would seem that the path of different bodies would vary. Thus, what is common about the manner in which a dead leaf, a writing quill, and a ball of rubber fall? In order to understand these phenomena, we must grasp between them a common element which is not given in the sensible appearance; it is "constructed," an ideal model which is the "pure" phenomenon, never observable, of the free fall. The experiment of an inclined plane only approached verification. This last example consists in adding to the creation of a free fall and certain additional conditions.

The same in chemistry: pure bodies are entities; there is no current use of pure sulfur whose temperature of fusion corresponds exactly to the theoretical temperature. Similarly, money is always oxidized. The com-

bination of theoretical elements does not find a precise correspondence in the real, but it finds itself verified in a totality.

C. Intelligence Differentiates Itself from Perception

Intelligence differentiates itself from perception because it makes the jump into the possible from which it would be necessary to understand an experience's strength. There is a re-creation and not an adaptation of the phenomenal field. Perceived phenomena become variants of a unique dynamism. Wertheimer gives some other examples of this idea.

1. *Surface of parallelogram example.* Students must understand that the construction of three lines, AE, GC, DF, results from a sole dynamism of thought, a central intuition that produces an equivalent rectangle. However, the problem appears unsolvable in the case of figure 2. The students do not have the idea to turn the parallelogram 2 180 degrees in order to transform the figure "big and thin" into this "small and tall" that they already know. It is access to the essence of the phenomenon which constitutes intelligence. They have not seen in the particular problem a case of an essential truth.

However, Wertheimer argues that *intelligence's work is a "Gestaltung."* Such an organization is susceptible to great generality, seeing what is essential in the phenomena. Again, the world of perception presents it; without this, all past edifices would have no sense whatsoever. A *reference of mind* to the sensible articulation of the figure exists. First, one must construct in order to demonstrate.[32]

Geometry sees the figure's vectors and therein the sensible changes when the solution is perceived. If I know the surface of rectangle AECG, what is left is for me to evaluate that of two triangles: ABE and CGD. These two triangles appear as the "sensible point" on which I must place my demonstration. From the moment when I see that their surface is equal to that of the rectangle CGDF, my perception itself of the figure has changed. Wertheimer's book *Productive Thinking* is full of fertile ideas, but one can protest the lack of a systematic exposé. Wertheimer presents the same problem under a different form. I discover that $a + b = b + a'$. I can only know that after the moment when I can say that $a + b$ becomes $b + a'$. The transformation that carries the mental and manual operations according to a general principle is inconceivable without the perception of the figure.

2. *The rectangle's surface example.* Wertheimer remarks that there are two sorts of demonstrations that are equally right, but one is clear for the mind and the other does not take *insight.* One looks at a row a formed with seven blocks, and the row b has two blocks. Thus, there will be $7 \times 2 =$

14 blocks. This represents the surface of the rectangle we are considering and is thinkable for the child. In using algebraic reasoning, one makes the following calculation: one subtracts b from a:

$$a - b = 5$$

$$(a - b)^2 = (5)^2 = 25$$

$$(a - b)^2 = b^2 = 25 - 4 = 21$$

$$(a - b)^2 = b^2 - a^2 = 21 - 49 = -28$$

$$(a^2 + b^2 - (a - b)^2)/2 = 28/2 = 14 = ab$$

This demonstration is equally formally correct, since after it one can trace the beta figure, but it is not "perceptive"; one cannot see how the consequence derives from the principle. Thought is added onto the structure of the considered objects; in other words, since we are speaking of algebra, to the configuration itself of the given equation.

3. *Arithmetic theorem.* This example is taken from the life of the physician Gauss who, when he was twelve, was given the task by his teacher to add a series of whole numbers, such as in the following example:

$$1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 10$$

Gauss found that adding the numbers one by one was a long operation, and hence subject to error.[33] While thinking about the series which intersected and those which did not, he had the idea to compare the numbers between them, the first with the last, the second with the second-to-last, and so forth. The obtained sum was constant by virtue of the law of construction and of the series: $1 + 10 = 2 + 9 = 11$. Hence, he could say that in the entire series of whole numbers, the value of each pair was equal to $n + 1$ and as there are $n/2$ pairs, the sum of the considered series is equal to $(n + 1)n/2$.

The reflection controls the question in attaching it to an essential principle. This last approach of the mind does not consist in a blind vision; it is vision, seizing the internal structure. Thus, one sees how Gestalt theory maintains the relationships between intelligence and the perceived world.

Intelligence is an organization of the perceptual field; it is visible in the example of the translation of triangles in order to demonstrate the surface of a parallelogram. In effect, the idea to compare triangle a and a′ supposes an entire series of convictions: the immutability of triangles.

The stable rectangle and the parallelogram are not changed by changing forms or by the mind's operations.

However, all these kinds of evidence are called into question with non-Euclidean geometry. In non-Euclidean geometry, the translations accompany the distortions; the permanence of form is what is exceptional. Neither evidence nor absurdity exists, since at certain levels, non-Euclidean geometry grounds itself. (The same is true for the perceptual level; a detail suffices to change the affective physiognomy of a friend.) This is to say that intelligence is a restructuration of the field.

D. Gestalt Theorists' Response to Objections to Their Theory

We have mentioned above that Gurwitsch reproached Gestalt theory for forgetting that intelligence is a structuration that retains the identity of objects by applying the reasoning: a = b, b = c, therefore a = c.[34] The element b states the same throughout the different *Gestalten* where it is successively engaged. Thus, it must, according to Gurwitsch, pass to the plane of the *"eidos"* to define intelligence as radically distinct from perception. To this critique, Wertheimer responds that to move to the plane of *"eidos"* does not solve the problem. In order for there to be identity in the mind, it must be the case that there is a transport from the element b of a relation to another. It is necessary that the mind *apperceives and effects* the transformation. Intelligence does not leave time. It is a dynamism oriented in a certain sense, it recaptures the past moment and anticipates the future, it reconquers time but it does not *transcend* it.

Guillaume says reasonably that the perceived world furnishes us with the *prototypes* of this organization; intelligence further pursues the recuperation of diversity. But in following perception's movement, intelligence transforms and explicates it without rendering it useless. Thus, one escapes the classical dilemma of empiricism and intellectualism without reducing one to the other.

We cannot even conceive what an absolute intelligence fully detached from the world would be. Wertheimer shows that perceptual changes accompany the resolution of the parallelogram's surface problem. First of all, there are the sides AB and CD which are grasped together; the sides AB and EF then no longer follow an oblique but a vertical direction. Such changes are always possible in geometry from the essential elements of the figure; consequently, the demonstration *à* has a general value.

Goblot speaks here of *logical* "observations" and "constructions" and not of the practical order of perceptual construction.[35] Wertheimer

himself notes this very difference: in all mathematical sciences there is a willingness to avoid the contingent, the particular circumstance. If we employ it for a greater simplicity, we endeavor to generalize when *discussing* the solution in order to return to a more general mechanism. This does not arise in the game of perception. However, the two mechanisms are close, since in both there is a structuration of the figure. "The proof, itself, has its structure," says Wertheimer. Speaking again of Gauss's problem, Wertheimer says that all formulas do not have the same value; only certain formulas are "sensible," giving light, *insight* to the question.

Thus the formula: sum of $n = (n + 1)n/2$, which concludes Gauss's path of reasoning and discloses his thought's mechanism. (We can remark that it is not twice employed in the same sense. In $n/2$ and in the sum n, n represents the number of terms in the series. In $n + 1$, n represents the last term of the series.) Whereas the formula $[(n + 1)/2]n$ is also algebraically useful, it is not a clarifying proof since the formula shows how the result is constructed from concrete elements. Wertheimer is close to Descartes and Kant. They say that we have an intuition of the form or a *formal intuition*. It permits us to think of space and to discern perception as well as logical thought. Like the insight of Wertheimer, formal intuition is both distinct and inseparable from sensible perception.

Hence, Wertheimer affirms that logical operations are not possible only with reference to concrete space, where perception is necessary but not sufficient to understand geometry. Descartes already pointed this out in his "Objections and Replies." There are two manners to present mathematical truth: an analytic manner following the order of discoveries, and a synthetic manner which deduces the result from past truths. Descartes' analytic order is Wertheimer's "perceptive" demonstration procedure.

Sometimes, one objects to Wertheimer because his remarks only have a pedagogical import for mathematical education (most successfully made by Dr. Stern).[36] In other words, they are only relevant for training, and only address intellectual mechanisms without concern for the essence of the mathematical phenomenon. We must ask Wertheimer, how does the truth define itself since, once discovered, it transcends causes and must be situated outside of the order of facts? Wertheimer would have confused *cause and reason*.

Our author opposes such an interpretation of his thought. If it is true, he says, that we have access to an intelligible order (quasi-Platonic) of ideas, they are no less inseparable from structural conditions that underpin them. To support this idea, he cites the famous discovery of Galileo: the movement of a body shifting on a plane is the limit case between a movement of an accelerated fall and an ascendant movement which slows it.

This assimilation expresses itself in the idea of inertia (a body that is not submitted to the action of any force, but is nonetheless moving in a uniform rectilinear fashion) and in the correlative idea of force. But, inversely, these ideas have no assignable signification except by reference to spatial representations where movement is uniformly accelerated (fall), the movement is uniformly slowing (rock thrown in the air), and where the movement on a plane appears as variants of a single dynamism. A synthetic presentation would seem fallacious, since even the sense of the idea is inherently in the concrete context where it is elaborated. Simply, Wertheimer says one must make truth itself a "structural" conception.

When we are referring to concrete methods, otherwise called cause and reason, we find that they converge and coincide with a clairvoyant and not with a historical process. Even if intellectual research ends up in the total transformation of ideas, making elements appear that did not formerly exist, it is, however, provoked by a loss of equilibrium which engenders a tension to change to a restructuration oriented toward a new equilibrium. We are undeniably before a structural process that clearly shows the error of logicism.

Gestaltists, however, do not take intelligence for perception. Regarding the latter, one cannot say that there is consciousness of an angle. Figures (angles of 45 degrees, 90 degrees, and 135 degrees) only become "angles" on the condition that they bring with them a circle which measures them.

IV. Comparison Between the Piagetian and Gestaltist Conception of Intelligence

The Gestaltists agree with Piaget that there must be a *decentration* for intelligence to exist. But Piaget speaks of this decentration as if it could be absolute (i.e., quasi-divine, nonsituated thought), whereas for the Gestaltists, decentration is relative. In reality, it is the opposite of a new centration. They say that there is only a structure for a new situated thought. In summation, they agree on the concept of dynamic development (disequilibrium and reequilibrium), but in the end they diverge. We would only be able to think in terms of relative centration.

A. [Historical Development]

Let's take up the comparison that we have established from the methodological point of view between the Marxist conception of effective

development and the psychoanalytic conception of the individual's development. We have already seen that we can distinguish, among many doctrines, three essential ways to envision history.

First, *the causal conception,* where the historical period is a collection of the sum of events and among them there is no intimate relationship. Thus, the Russian Revolution of 1917 would be provoked by a certain number of conditions without an intrinsic relation: (1) the collapsing army, (2) the birth of the proletariat in Russia, (3) the misery of the peasants, (4) the absence of a strong bourgeoisie. Historians are confined to noting the fortuitous convergence of such events.

Second, *the teleological conception* sees history as directed by intentions, whether in the spirit of those who live the events or in providential thought. Third, *the Marxist conception* is a methodological view of history and accords certain groups a historical mission. For example, in the unfolding of events, the mission of the Proletariat would be to resolve a series of problem-conflicts because history is made of conflicts. It is from conflicts that the Proletariat is born and why it carries with it its previously stated solution. History's result is inscribed within the facts.

We note, in passing, that Marx argued for the revolution more than he preached for it. He said that the revolution is a phantom which wanders Europe even though it has not yet been realized. The system of conflicts itself has a sense, and the play of its forces tends to make a new order appear. The internal logic of conflictual situation tends to resolve those situations. This is the sense of the celebrated phrase, "Proletarians of the world, unite!"[37] The Proletarians are not at home in their different countries since, from the very fact of their existence, they are virtual representatives of humanity, not due to privileged psychological givens, but due to their situation.

From such considerations, *two consequences* unfold. (1) It is inevitable that the evolution that composes [*dessine*] the facts will realize itself one day, but it is not fated. History can only be achieved if the agents are conscious of the facts of history, in other words, their situation and their mission. If it misses them, chaos results, since the immanent sense of the situation is not sufficient to establish it. The role of political, revolutionary men is to be the "midwives" [*accoucheurs*] of revolution. There are bad midwives who wish to abort the revolution, but they must understand the process unfolding and give it a final form. We see that there is a search for the *logic* in history, which is unaware of the *contingency* of facts. Marxists frequently employ the expression "ineluctably"—it is a compromise between "fatally," a nonorthodox notion, and "with an extreme probability." This formula better takes account of the necessity of an adequation of the sense of events and the consciousnesses of the men who live them.

(2) *The role of consciousness.* We have seen that it is not in the causal conception, the teleological one, or the Marxist one. Men make their history, but separately from the given situations. It is neither a creation "ex nihilo," nor is it a simple reflection of the preexisting situation. The fundamental problem is to describe and analyze the sense in which the events evolve, before we were conscious of them. Without this grasp of consciousness, historical events can be annulled and fall into disorder. We see that the envisioned, integrated conception had both the sense as well as the non-sense of history: the historical sense of which we speak is immanent, inscribed in the facts; it is the *situation's notion.* We can remark that it is the same notion that we find in life's problems.

Following Goldstein, the organism is not a simple piece of matter that reacts to its surroundings. The phenomenon of preadaptation is a sort of "choice" of internal possibilities. The organism is fixed in appropriate situations to maximize its development. Take, for example, the displacement of migratory animals toward regions where their internal equilibrium is better. Thus, there is a collaboration of the internal organization and of extra-organic conditions. The organization's situation is made from a constellation of internal and external conditions. Similarly, the unfolding of history is sense in the process of forming in the collectivity by the progression of this very collectivity.

The motor of historical development is the situation that we will now define. This is conformity to the spirit, or else to the letter, of the doctrines we spoke of above. From the Marxist point of view, the economy does not constitute an enclosed sector. No division between ideology and economy exists; Marxism recognizes the positive role of superstructures. The economy itself is a bourgeois concept: economic phenomena can be transformed by a human intervention (revolution). What characterizes men is that they are not just "objects" of history, like animals; they are essentially subjects of history. Ideas act when they become ground for consciousness taking, or when they stop consciousness from occurring. The collection of relations that men embark upon during work is mixed with value judgments, but these collapse if one removes the economic base. Marx remarks that the ideologies can be a reflection of either the economic state or of a fantastical opposing view. In both cases, ideas act. *It is neither consciousness alone, nor the economy alone, but man in his situation (in particular, in his economic situation). In other words, the conscious subject, who acts in contact with concrete facts where his role is essential, is the motor of history.*

The value of this conception is that it doesn't sacrifice the newness of the future, since the future is not contained in the past as a finalist theory would have it. At the same time, the connection with the past is assured, since the future is inscribed between the lines.

Following an analogous intuition, let us return to our initial subject: the *psychogenesis* envisioned in a manner different than Freud (even less so by his successors). Parallel to the example above of the philosophy of history, we can approach the problem from two angles: (1) the relationship of the body's evolution to psychological evolution (economy-ideology), and (2) rationality in development, permitting the above to have a certain order and a certain sense.

B. [Psychoanalytic Development]

The body alone is not a sufficient motor for development, but it is necessary for development. The body accomplishes nothing by itself, but one must have the initial somatic growth for what is produced by the genesis. For example, the menstruation is taken for the criterion of a girl's puberty, as Hélène Deutsch says, but it is not the key to the phenomenon of puberty.[38] The physiological event must be enveloped with a human sense. The body brings a vague growth, a blind growth, incapable on its own to arrive at a new state, the demand to create a certain overcoming. However, this drive can be rejoined with a maturation on the psychological side without reaching imperfect transformations or even pathological transformations. (Take, for example, the development of historical evolution, taken from class consciousness, in the Marxist ideology.) In her book *The Second Sex,* Simone de Beauvoir very accurately remarks that one can neither put the body in the first or second rank; the body is neither a normal end nor is it a simple means (which would degrade it).[39] Its position related to consciousness is ambiguous. If it was inert, it would be a tool. But it is not a tool, since its consent is necessary. The somatic subtends development, but the psychological gives it sense without being the only effective force. The appearance of rules, if it is not understood psychically, might be the cause of retrogradation. The consciousness which plays a role here is not the consciousness of knowledge. In effect, it is not the absence of consciousness which produces shock and trauma, since for the psychoanalyst ignorance is explained by a previous resistance. In summation, development's essential nature is a restructuration by which a new bodily situation is assumed when realizing a new type of life.

What makes order appear in development? If we do not admit fate, but rather argue for contingency and the possibility of chaos, what is the motor which frequently allows for formal development to be obtained? For this study, we will consider certain phases which are particularly interesting: (1) the passage from the pregenital to the genital, (2) the decline of the Oedipus complex and the passage to the latency phase, and (3) puberty.

1. *Passage from pregenital to genital.* This is the passage from a will for immediate and boundless pleasure to a mediating attitude, from aggressivity to love of another, now the distinction from the ego and alter ego. It is the libido which will break the initial vicious circle: aggressivity, guilt, anxiety . . . the brute givens of overcoming are furnished by the body. Thus, the sadistic attitude is tied to a minimum of activity, oral activity, to a period when the child can do nothing by himself. But motor somatic development of the genital apparatus, hormones, and so forth, are insufficient to realize overcoming. An example is the identification of the little boy with his father in the resolution of the Oedipus complex. It is the preceding period's failure, the impasse, the frustration which ends up creating anxiety. Anxiety is a factor in development for it makes possible the assumption of a new role without providing it (this is not an entelechy). With this anxiety, the child is integrated into the *cultural atmosphere* where he lives. The individual is initiated into the social milieu, where he is the object, with the least background. All the gestures and the behaviors pertain to a global system: the idea his parents and society take toward him. He perceives the significance of the attitude that we have of him. Social integration assumes an enormous importance in education: a little girl is treated like a future mother, we give her dolls, we teach her decadence very early. If the child chooses the way of Oedipus very early, it is because this way is indicated by the cultural atmosphere which surrounds him. Freud did not expressly speak about culture, but he was the first to underline the close connection that exists between an individual psychology and an inter-individual one.

The passage to the genital phase supposes a physiological and psychological determination. But Freud remarks that the identification with the same-sex parent is prior to the attachment to the parent of the opposite sex. We can ask why this is the case. For the adult, who plays the role of the model, a relation of reciprocity between the child's development and the behavior of the parents toward the child (showing the child the little office [*petit bureau*], etc.) exists. The child makes a restructuration to resemble adults by performing a welding of psychological nature and physiological acquisitions. The decisive moment in development is the appearance of new relations, of an indispensable reciprocity between goal and conditions, between "forms" and "forces."

If we introduce the *notion of form,* we can generalize the question, put in relation to the problems of psychogenesis: perception, passage from before to after, the birth of a historical period which for Hegel signaled the discontinuity with the relations which provoked it. This notion of form (a better one than the Freudian expression of the abstract force "libido" that carries the developmental schema within it) brings to light

the welding between the psychological or cultural project and the insufficient motor conditions.

2. *Passage from the Oedipus complex to the latency phase.*[40] In this article, Freud considers two explanations. First, the Oedipus complex disappears due to maturation, just like baby teeth fall out at the proper time because of endogenous, internal factors. Second, exterior circumstances govern passing the Oedipus stage. For example, take a little girl who believes she is her father's beloved. The day she is severely punished by him, she will abandon this illusion. Even if no traumatic incident occurs, the Oedipus stage disappears due to its inherent impossibility. We are led to claim that the Oedipus stage is an experience which brings about a transformation of self by the self. This conception is more satisfactory than the fear of castration.

Freud refused to choose between these two hypotheses. However, he retained a certain affection for the first hypothesis since it could be applied to a phylogenetic conception: where ontogeny reproduces phylogeny. Psychoanalysis has since replaced this thesis with cultural factors. We place emphasis upon the second hypothesis in the interest of those conditions that cause the decline of the Oedipus complex. Failure in conditions that previously determined the Oedipus stage brings about a general change in behavior. It is the collection of conditions that permits us to understand the mysterious passage in a libido destined to be Oedipal. For the latter, the relationship between ends and means is continuous and mobile in the child's behavior. We can approach the traditional theory of instincts where ends and means are associated in a preestablished relationship without prior learning. We would rather say that there is an insertion of means into the ends, of moments in a totality: the development would be a drive [*pousée*] without finality, caused by somatic evolution, used by the conscious subject who identifies with his environment. Or, to employ a Freudian image, the rider can change his mount, for there is an innate solidarity between the two, the ride being the child's consciousness which identifies with the adults.

3. *Puberty.* The problem consists in carrying out a welding between the psychic element of affection acquired during latency and the increased reality of sexuality and instinct. The child creates his development under the conditions of the ambient culture. At each acquisition, the process starts again and calls for a new development. Development is not inscribed a priori in a static nature, nor does it arise ex nihilo. Rather, it progresses from *Gestaltung* to *Gestaltung* as a writer slowly creates his language.[41] For instance, take Malraux, who says that "the writer must learn to speak with his own voice." Life's exercise—the creation of self by the self—is how the child becomes adult. No developmental guardrails

exist other than the parents' presence and the culture that transports the child.

We can touch here upon *the relationship between psychology and inter-psychology.* All facts of individual psychology are also facts of social psychology. This is not to say that individual facts are always explained by society intervening in an exhaustive manner. There is not a point-by-point correspondence between the individual and the society. The fact that the exterior modifies the behavior of each person takes account of the individual's past. The social is at the interior of the individual and the individual is at the interior of the social, since the past individual is himself interpsychologic from birth. On the other hand, all typical attitudes that are given by society can always be modified by individual drive, explaining cultural evolution. There is no competition between psychology and interpsychology in the same way that there is no rivalry between plane geometry and three-dimensional geometry. They are not boundaries: all is social and all is individual. We see that the culturalist conception of the norm is insufficient.

Margaret Mead remarks in *Male and Female* that feminine and masculine characters differ with cultural configurations (for example, this is also the case among rabbits, dogs, and horses as well as in different human societies).[42] Hence she concludes that an event is normal if it agrees with the considered culture (for example, use of cradles and wrapping infants). There is no such thing as normal in itself. But this idea does not satisfy us because it does not take into account the possible change in cultures. The *pattern* of a culture is habituated, without a doubt. In what are called stagnant societies, the realization of a norm does not mean that all the possibilities of the individuals have been realized. In certain cases, there is a reference to another norm, and that is what makes certain societies change.

4. *Hélène Deutsch's analysis of puberty.*[43] Deutsch distinguishes between puberty and prepuberty, the latter being a transitional phase. Not a child and not yet an adult, the individual must restructure his life. He is thus the object of a double appeal: the *future* adult state and the *past,* which causes regression in difficult cases. The future appeal is strongest during the commencement of prepuberty. It is composed of anticipation of adult behavior, but such adult behaviors are not centered or elaborated, they are mostly imitative. Nonetheless, the temptation to revert to the past is very strong for sexual behavior. After some shocks, we find the return to an almost infantile position: reappearance of infantile situations, the grounding return to the parents.

Deutsch draws a parallel with the triangular Oedipal situation. From beginning of prepuberty, the young girl is tied to a preference

for a "best friend"; it is a homosexual attitude or, moreover, a nonhetero-sexual one. Little by little her affection produces a sliding toward interest in the brother of her best friend, the boy having her heart (cf. *War and Peace* by Tolstoy).

At this moment, there is a passage toward normal heterosexuality. The young girl's hesitation in the Oedipal situation between elective at-tachment to her father or her mother is reconstructed. A parallel situa-tion can be found even in the adult state: certain women can only fall in love with their best friend's husband. This kind of situation is an example of *perseveration*.[44] Development, on the contrary, requires that certain be-haviors are surpassed in their characteristic phase.

We see how this conception is dynamic in that it describes relations that tend to surpass typical situations and equally takes into account antic-ipation. At the same time, it is highly psychological: strictly physiological factors play a deaf role—they do not determine the orientation of forces (such as the psychoanalytic conception of causality).

In the prepuberty phase, Deutsch accentuates the *ego's* develop-ment and not the somatic phenomena. The psychic baggage is already considerable, causing self-renewal. The young girl will search for other relationships than those with her parents. She will turn away from her mother to her best friend or to an older person, for example, her phi-losophy professor. She feels the need to pass from the imaginary to the real in assimilating a heroine and in forming her life's ambitions. She will construct secrets to identify with older people who always say to her, "You will understand later . . ." From the need to invent, we can understand her tendency to life, her larval [*larvaire*] mythomania. However, all these activities have a fictional character. She tests out very intense but hollow sentiments. Her best friend is not always loved for herself, but for the new milieu that the two friends create.

The young girl does not yet have the timid attitude that she will develop later during puberty (for instance, a refusal to wear stockings and makeup). At this age, she has the desire to prematurely enter into the adult life. The strong push for sexual life, such as in certain gangster behaviors in America that took place after the war.

All this series of psychological restructurings prepare for the future of puberty. Deutsch distinguishes between several phases. *Prepuberty* con-sists in a premature puberty "renewal" of the Oedipal problem. The de-velopment of the "ego" [*moi*] takes on an aggressive character: the child tries to pass to reality. But this passing does not result from effective needs. It is anticipated and abstract. It results in an attitude of mimetic "play," hence the reason for its anachronistic character. This anachro-nism expresses itself in two ways: from anticipated behavior, condemning

one's own childhood, the liberation from all guardianship and regressive behavior when one needs protection. The child hates his childhood and wants to completely exorcize it. This development has a close correlation with the parents' attitude toward the child. The child's subtlety can cause worries for the mother in particular and increase her own fears. We thus see that puberty can fail in two manners: when the liberation is too violent and when it is too weak.

The nascent phase of puberty is characterized by a more solidly opposite-sex orientation. The passage is formed by a renewal of previous attitudes based in triangular situations. This is the bias that permits the child to slide toward heterosexuality. We have already mentioned that there is a renewal of old attitudes. The phenomenon we are considering has its roots in the past, but it is not a pure reproduction; there is *a renewal of the past*. The Oedipus complex was the first encounter and is followed by a latent period. The hesitation toward heterosexual orientation is often imaginary: that is, the fantasy of the "twin brother" who is adorned with all the qualities befitting a desire for masculinity.

5. *Puberty properly speaking. On the psychological plane,* puberty is characterized by two sorts of phenomena: regressive attitudes caused by the collection of defense mechanisms against instinctual drives, and progressive attitudes where the "ego" develops and perfects itself. This period is particularly characterized by the solitary sentiment and self-contemplation. The little girl would like to be an artist, a journalist, or a novelist caused by the desire to show, to appear, more than by her own positive taste. She wants to slip into a character.[45]

A type of abstract decision to research experiences exists. But this "delight" of the self does not impede the very violent, even inflexible superego. The young girl is at the same time too confident and too distrustful, and with a satisfaction which fuels her own negation, she believes she is misunderstood. (Maria Bashkirtseff is an example.)[46]

This period is equally characterized by a mixture of audacity and infantilism.[47] Ideas about sexual life are still very infantile at this age. And those who have more progressive opinions are sometimes those who behave in the most infantile manner, since there is an enormous difference between intellectual notions and what is truly assimilated. It is precisely this assimilation which is the problem of puberty: the junction of intellectual elements with the affective life and the penetration of one by the other.

The *physiological side* is necessary but does not constitute a sufficient condition. The young girl's attitude during menstruation has a direct relationship to her mother's attitude. In general, the mother has a reversed, secretive attitude that makes the child think it is something frightful. Cer-

tain folklore legends and popular expressions that attribute maleficent properties to menstrual blood have psychological roots that later become cultural factors. Psychoanalysis joins to this discussion the fantasies of a splitting body, of castration. The lively reactions during the menstrual age correspond later to strong reactions to wounds. We thus observe in some women a surprising sensibility to cuts.

All of the above can only be a result of psychology and interpsychology. As to the young girl's ignorance, it is more an effect than a cause. It is explained by a resistant attitude toward all that touches this sensitive zone.

Deutsch gives equal time to another series of explanations. The depressive attitude would be the cause given for the expectation of an imaginary phenomenon. It follows a disappointment that Deutsch paraphrases as "it is not that" (an expression Stendhal put in the mouths of some of his characters). This is the result of a confrontation between the imaginary and the perceived. The imaginary domain is vague whereas the "perceived" is always strictly limited. The shock in the presence of the perceived is thus inevitable, and the depression that follows is more intense than the intense imaginary life with numerous fantasies that preceded it. Depression is also a psychological phenomenon.

Finally, a series of reactions can be considered as the psychological conditioning of physiological phenomena. Deutsch cites the diversion phenomena caused by psychological fear.[48] The function displaces itself by symbolizing the subject's resistance. But psychological functions are not always exclusively dependent upon the psyche. In reality, the two orders imply each other mutually.

In conclusion. The corporal factor exists, but it is vague and blind. Sexual development is not a simple explanation of what a libidinal factor would be. A constant relationship exists with the psychic life of the subject. Freud makes another intervention between the cultural environment and tradition (*costumes, language*). *As to the development mechanism,* there is not only a *welding* (exterior association) but a conversion of knowledge acquisitions into something lived and sensed. A total restructuring of affective life thus appears as something that truly corresponds to the significations that the child has thrown himself into with imaginary eagerness. Development is not a solely bodily fact, nor is it totally cultural. (Isolated sexuality is pathological.) In this twofold situation, a type of behavior develops which looks for an equilibrium, one that cannot be found by a simple addition. It is necessary to find a *true present* between anticipation and regression, a present that initiates the future: a future that is full and unanticipated.

C. [Wallon and Development]

*[Following an exposé made by a student on Wallon's theories about child develop-
ment, Merleau-Ponty underlines some general conceptions.]*[49]

1. *What is the milieu of development?* In other words, what is it that de-
velops in the child? What is striking is the regularity of development, the
succession of phases considerably identical among all children. Indeed,
we note that when substitution takes place, it only concerns two succes-
sive phases. Can we accord a certain explicative, conditioned value to this
succession? We note a discordance between the beginning of a new phase
and development proper: "Anticipation," Wallon says, "is the rule." The
reason for this is that development is less about perfecting its mechanisms
of execution than it is about the presence of an internal ground. It is the
child's availability which makes him assume a role that his organism is
not yet able to carry. Hence the psychological need is admitted to the
interior of behavior.

The correlative notion to anticipation is regression: a failing in an
apparently acquired behavior. One cannot therefore conclude that be-
havior is or is not acquired at all levels. For example, causality, even if it
is acquired on the perceptual level, might not be on the verbal level. At
this stage, we argue that the child already has mythical and participation-
ist [*participationnistes*] responses. In the same manner, certain sounds that
figure in infant babbling are phonemes not yet acquired for language.[50]
We must distinguish between the gesture's materiality and the system to
which it belongs.

Even a strictly behaviorist psychology must distinguish centered
from noncentered behaviors. Acquisition is thus an integration of be-
havior's totality (as Goldstein's study on aphasia showed that in language
acquisition there are two levels: automatism and a categorical level).[51]
Development's form is thus not the body, since one cannot make a state
of the interior element of behavior, nor consciousness, since one cannot
understand how consciousness can integrate itself little by little. It is a
third element: the total structure of behavior.

Apropos of this, Wallon makes some remarks about the signifi-
cance of certain methods of experimental psychology that are concerned
with knowing an analysis's value and its verification. Speaking of corre-
lations, Wallon says that an authentic psychology must give a unifying
hypothesis that reconstitutes the totality, the internal unity of behavior,
that are manifested by the correlations. In particular, he has reservations
about the possible signification of conceived tests as behavioral correla-
tions. He wants to show a test of the global attitude of the child. The

elevated statistics of normal facts only give us the contour of the child's behavior.

2. *The motor of development and developmental factors.* We could say that at first glance, Wallon takes a contradictory position. First, he concerns himself with organic causes: bodily growth. At least during the first part of infancy, the organ develops before the function. Wallon underlines the importance of the hormones for the appearance of puberty. For example, he explains the breaking voice of a young man by the appearance of a new structure of phonation device innerved by an infantile system; an interior transformation brings with it a functional change.

In the rest of his analysis, Wallon admits that for most psychical functions, the connection between the organic and inorganic is less simple. He opposes Piaget's idea that development is the result of the accumulation of sensations or "schemas." Development is actually the product of restructurations and integration, not consequences but conditions.

Wallon's position is not organicist. He does not deny an additive explanation or the appearance of the new, but on the contrary he insists on *functional maturation.* In the human organism, functions have to find themselves; humanity is in its own indefinite state. Organic change is necessary, but not sufficient, for development to reach full development (as in Deutsch: without hormones, no puberty arises). A complex psychological state must exist between anticipation and regression. For example: the feeling of inferiority in relationship to one's parents as well as the opposition to them, heterosexual relations and quasi-homosexual ones (prepubescent friendships). In Deutsch, we find an entirely psychological definition of puberty.[52]

In reality, if Wallon has insisted upon the body's role, it is in order to oppose *"learning"* conceptions. It is neither the body nor consciousness that accounts for development, but the understood existence of the collective configurations and possible behaviors that a particular moment gives an individual. Besides, *learning* is never a mechanical recording: a theory of attempts and failures.[53] It is the perceptual and practical context of a certain task as the animal tries to actualize (cf. Gestalt theorists Köhler and Koffka).

All behavior oscillates between assimilation and accommodation. It responds to a situation and the organism's rhythmic functioning (anabolism–catabolism). There is thus a primary reaction and a secondary latent and incubatory reaction. We see how the final latent concept is stretched by organicist and mechanist theories.

In conclusion, Wallon makes some comments on the comportment of phases, stages that are momentary pauses in a continually changing development. There is no such thing as a natural stage of the three-year-old

child, but a provisional developmental stabilization that takes place around three years. Such a dynamic conception is more concerned with "the age of the child" than with "the age of childhood." Wallon never denies that there are already known approximate phases, but this dividing of childhood only has macroscopic and no microscopic value. The same holds for linguistics, where determining the exact date of passage from Latin to French will be arbitrary: the transition is spread out over a long period. Wallon denies the ontological character of these phases (Piaget). They are orderings of size. With a child of seven, we cannot define his developmental degree by a few signs that permit us to classify him in a certain "stage," we must discover his individual dynamism.

V. Reciprocal Connections Between Psychoanalysis and Sociology

From the beginning, sociological psychoanalysis invaded sociology without taking into account the specific state of the social. Not only in *Totem and Taboo,* but also in *Essays on Psychoanalysis,* we find that social facts become anecdotal.[54] The groups Freud proposed to study are closer to *individual oscillations than social institutions.* At the same time, he compares the hero's action on the group with the relationship between the subject's psyche and the model produced in family relations. He reduces social facts to phenomena of a desexualized libido. In *Totem and Taboo,* Freud thereby explains the Oedipus complex by a previous parricide to which historical memory is lost.

Therefore, we must have reservations about a too narrow conception of the social. In remaining faithful therefore to fundamental ideas of orthodox psychoanalysis, certain disciples of Freud, such as the Austrian Elsa Roheim in her study of oral sexuality, do not seek to construct history according to psychological hypotheses such as that of an original parricide about which no trace remains.[55] Moreover, Freud himself, in his last works recognizes that outside of the parental superego, there exists a collective superego that constitutes an original connection, irreducible to different individual lives, between the different members of society.[56] It consists of the introjection of common social values. The germ of a more objective conception of sociology is found in these texts. From now on, we must take into account the psychological and social phenomena without always reducing one to the other. In the formation of the superego, we must not attribute only social values or parental values as having the sole role. Parents play an essential role through the transmission of

social values, but their role as parents comes from society. We arrive at a generalization of the idea of the superego that becomes the expression of a cultural, historical, and original drama. We take up correlated observed examples between neuroses and social phenomena. These examples give us bold initial theories: *these correlations have value provided that one does not attempt to reduce one term to another.*

First we examine myths that are about the hero's birth and legends loved by paranoid personalities. We find that in fantasy stories about their birth (the king's son raised by a shepherd), due to their repetition, the imagined father is at the same time envied and hated and the real father, considered as a caregiver, is tenderly and indulgently loved. Second, we examine the parallel between the dogmatic or fanatic mentality and the obsessive ritual.

There is a parallel between the obsessive ritual and the state of the fanatic's or dogmatist's spirit. We must not consider the content of the dogmatic affirmation, but what it excludes. In this sense, we can say that it is because there is always heresy in dogmatism. Certainly, we can understand this better if we study the rituals of obsessives. Salvation and external damnation are suspended in the face of the cracks between two stones. By this convention the sick escape the vertigo of uncertainty. In the cases that are the least pathological, such as morning exercises where the ritual of lifting and resting are like a battle against the terror inspired by freedom, a good and harmonious conscience is assured.

Now we compare primitive myths and dreams. Myths are not the transposition of individual dreams; dreams form a boundary between effective life and psychosis. There is thus a reciprocal enlightenment.

Despite his dogmatism, Freud has the merit of paving the way. He had the intuition to compare pathological phenomena with sociological facts. It is his scientific premonition. However, he envisioned his own work as markers on a path. At the end of his life, he returns to his first affirmation in saying that neurosis is a caricature of social phenomena. Hysteria is thus a deformed work of art, paranoid mania a counterfeited philosophy, and the obsession is a deformed religion.

If we refer to the debate on the universality of the Oedipus complex, we can say that Malinowski makes superficial observations. Different civilizations invent different manners of defense; however, the Oedipal situation is always realized.

Psychoanalytic applications for some economic and economic-political phenomena. We quickly perceive that we can explain individual conflicts over things such as money as economic exchanges.[57] We do not need to deny geography, but need to say that it does appear in a pure state; instead it

is surrounded by psychological symbols. Thus, like around the grain of sand in the oyster, images, thoughts, beliefs, and legends accumulate.

One can psychoanalyze the traitor, the collaborator in the studies made by Kissling in England.[58] There is a profound pleasure in profaning the country (maternal symbol), as well as a complicity among those who violate it. But we can only explain it by reducing it to incest; we must also account for the psychosocial situation: sympathy for whatever intellectual aspects exist (political, economic, social). Such an analysis is compelling but is not exhaustive. The entire functioning of the oyster is necessary for a pearl to form, but the grain must be the cause.

People have tried to explain capitalism through anal eroticism that causes avarice. Odier wrote a psychoanalysis of small profit.[59] Fromm spoke of the anastomosis of social and psychoanalytic phenomena.[60] Karen Horney said that some neuroses are social neuroses caused by a time's events.[61] Bastide said that the social is an original order that brings its own situations and conflicts but that when it comes to individuals, the social awakens in them sexual harmonics.[62] This results in a social or political eroticization. Social symbols in dreams are not inevitably sexual. A separation exists between social sexuality and libidinal sexuality. In the case of sexual taboos, we find that it is a certain form of social sexuality that is forbidden, not an individual sexuality considered indifferently.

But when psychoanalysis abandons its dogmatism, it constitutes a useful complement to sociology, in particular when considering noninstitutionally crystallized social relationships. This is a common problem when in contact with two cultures. For example, the life of blacks in the U.S. is governed by practical use. Inter-human contacts are much more than simply codified by a law. One cannot speak of a simple exploitation: there is no possible comparison between the richest of blacks and the richest of whites. We see here the necessity of a psychoanalytic analysis to explain American black messianism and the attitude of intellectual American blacks (even negrophiles who contribute in forming the myth of the black: idyllic attitude, singing, direct connection with nature). This image creates an impression on blacks themselves. These whites love blacks, but for poor reasons: flattering and inhumane, resulting from their personal neuroses. The same occurs in a study of Russia from February to October of 1917. A consideration of economic factors does not suffice. We must envision the battle of consciousnesses, each acting according to what he thinks the other will do. It is this study of the relationships between consciousnesses that is the originality of psychoanalysis.

VI. The Relationships Between Psychology and Sociology

A. Mauss's Ideas About the Relationship Between Psychology and Sociology

1. *Psychology's situation in relation to sociology.*[63] (1) An animal psychology and a human psychology exist, although sociology is essentially human and anthropological, since it concerns itself with *institutions* that are the trait of our common life. (2) Psychology is oriented toward the individual, sociology toward the collective. Collective psychology or interpsychology cannot substitute for sociology. This substitution is only possible if the society is reduced to a phenomenon of individual consciousnesses. If interpsychology legitimately interprets the arbitrary and the symbolic, it only explains the constraint. (Take, for example, Durkheim: "the social fact is coercive.")

According to Mauss, the social fact equally comprises the material substrate and the group's actuality [*concret*], whereas interpsychology only addresses the group's mentality. The three orders that interpsychology cannot reach are (1) morphological phenomena that are different because there are men, elderly, and children who have complementary roles according to use; there are customs and rules that institutionally limit the group (for example, a marriage permitted or prohibited by a parent); (2) social physiology or the manner in which economic, monetary values are presented; and (3) history, group tendencies, and habits that interpsychology cannot understand because it has an abstract conception of the individual.

Mauss would surely approve of studies on minorities, since he thinks that collective representations and the behaviors they give rise to—what we call today a society's *projective system*—are essential elements of study. From his perspective, this research represents more an encroachment of sociology onto psychology than a social psychology. All of consciousness's superior formation is only comprehensible within an institutional dynamism.

An invasion of the social occurs even in the corporal: signs, instituted symbols, tears. It is not a matter of reducing the individual to the collective; the individual transforms institutions. But one cannot isolate within an individual life a sole fact that is not equally in sociology's jurisdiction.

2. *Services rendered from psychology to sociology.* Sociology provides facts; psychology permits comprehension. Psychology is an important complement to sociology when it is a psychology of the entire person, when it is

opposed to a psychology of faculties and functions, and when it is devoted to describing the relationship between consciousness and the body. For example, the psychopathology studies on psychoses and neuroses can be applied to the study of Australian society. Due to psychology, we can understand the sociological fact of *thanatomania:* the individual is in a sinful state so he lets himself die.[64] On the subject of *Totem and Taboo,* Mauss says that in some aspects *Totem and Taboo* contains ideas capable of immense development. It confirms the bridge between sociology and psychopathology. It places emphasis on the concept of the symbol later demonstrated in Head's studies on aphasia.[65] Due to symbolic consciousness, the individual's insertion into the social totality is possible as initiation rituals are symbols of a civilization.

3. *Services rendered from sociology to psychology.* Psychology is right to understand that there are states that are normal in the collective but become pathological in the individual. For Mauss, linguistics is a part of sociology. From linguistics, psychology can learn to treat man as an entirety, since language is at the same time a biological, psychological, and social phenomenon with any possible quantitative distinction.

Mental reverberations. The implicated symbols in Vishnu's multiple arms would be the expression of a plurality of consciousnesses in society. Similarly, the signification of right and left is neither physiological nor psychological but essentially institutional. The interpretation dwells in the magic of archaic societies. The principles of closeness and distance equally have an institutional and social origin.

In summation, Mauss recommends collaborative connections throughout purposefully uncertain frontiers between psychology and sociology. This proposition has been confirmed by history. We argue for a reciprocal envelopment and not a rivalry. Sociology studies institutionalized human life; psychology studies human life in its nascent state and doesn't reduce it to social phenomena. Mauss says that humanity has constructed its spirit in using its body (body technique) in a complete osmosis of all domains that were typically distinguished. Psychology reveals a perspective of comprehension; sociology an objective perspective on institutions and norms.

One understands thus the necessity of convergent effort toward a sole reality which blends body, soul, and society because it is concerned with "phenomena of totality." But the ambiguity remains, since individuals and society are two totalities: there is therefore a totality in a totality and a double perspective. Psychology can no longer be a faculty psychology; it must instruct us to know the affected man in all his being, no matter what physical or psychological shock he has undergone.

B. Culturalism's Conception of Relationships

[Merleau-Ponty notes the following questions are raised in Margaret Mead's text *Male and Female.*] If the relationship between psychology and sociology, private life, and social morals is clear in the micro-societies the culturalists describe, we can ask if this relationship is also immediately known in societies like ours. Two principal elements are different:

1. *Their volume.* In Kardiner's Alor Islands, the size of a little village is one where the terms of "political" and "social" life do not make sense. As there is neither a government nor an organized administration, social relationships are evidently psychological. No social, collective phenomenon exists about which we can make predictions from private life. However, this difference between micro-societies and voluminous societies does not impede us from trying to form a psychology of more elaborate societies, such as Kardiner's analogous study of a medium-sized town in the United States.

2. Societies that are called primitive sometimes seem at first to be in a *stagnant* state. Kardiner says that the Comanches knew about such events as the introduction of a new kind of rice, but that it was not a result of the society itself.[66] Reservations are caused by the possible insufficiency of our macroscopic observations; we can say that the *connection to time* is not the same in both societies. Individual mental space is continually modified, whether by the newspaper or the television that is at base social conditioning. In our world, social life takes on a true autonomy with necessarily perpetually changing positions. One can argue that this is in opposition to psychic structures which evolve slowly.

In societies that are considered historical, this connection is the most complex. Historical in the sense of *"Geschichtlich"* [historical] qualifies societies that consider a factual past and a future necessary to their temporal realization. Completion takes place from one generation to another; the movement of one phenomenon takes place within another. In sum, it is a total becoming where everything has its reason for being in evolution. A more complicated analysis is required, since the circuits of causality are extensive. The open question is if the *social event* in such societies is more important than the *psychological structure.*

It is true that this social, historical time cannot move without some psychological structure. Thus, an important acquisition of the culturalists is to consider that the psychological and the institutional are two aspects of the same structure; they no longer perform a psychology of the "individual lived experience" [*vécu individuel*], a contact solely with the ego, but a "lived general intersubjectivity" [*vécu intersubjective généralisé*], which is their original concept.

Such is the structure of *a base personality* that expresses what is prepersonal in us.[67] In the classical philosophical conception, we think there are psychic atoms, or monads, and space: the subject-object, mind-extended matter dualism. For culturalists, between monads and space there exists an anthropological space populated by human characters that floats around us and in which we all participate (such as Hegel's objective Spirit). Where, faced with reality, the subject doesn't only know what is its proper being. Thus, the relationships between the mother and child are not relationships of knowledge, of "cogitation," but of experience. The linguists already detected this when they spoke about the essential reciprocity of language (*to speak to—to be spoken to*).

It is a connection between two ends, as if each individual held the end of a rope. The body serves as a vehicle, the way in which we can relate to the other. "It is the body that learns the way of the body" (Mead). Thus, between the child and his mother there exists a carnal connection that assists in the immediate identification with the mother; our first social initiation. Culturalism's merit is thus to furnish us with a concrete conception of social ties that does not suppress the individual's reality.

C. Conclusions About Lévi-Strauss and Margaret Mead

Lévi-Strauss's position seems paradoxical. On the one hand, he establishes an internal relation via interpsychology between psychology and sociology. On the other hand, he conceives, along with the culturalists, of a different sociology—one of the lived experiences of individuals—forming an order in the self, distinct from the psychological order.[68]

Apropos of Mauss, Lévi-Strauss defines his own conception. He knows that in order for it to have practical application to the culturalists' ideas, there exists a close connection between the social structure and the psychology of the interpersonal connections the child has with his parents. A homogeneity exists between the two studies, since the social order is not natural. "All that is psychology is social, and conversely, the social proof can only be mental. We only are sure of understanding an institution in reviving its authority on individual consciousness . . ."[69]

The relationship is really linear between the two disciplines because all sociological experiments must be taken up through the *lived experience* of the sociologist, since in all research made by man, the reference to the lived is indispensable. "The study of sociological fact must be complete; the observer is in the same nature as his object; he makes himself a part of his object. In this particular situation, the object is at the same time thing and representation. One must totally understand in living it as the native and not in observing it as the ethnologist."[70] "The observer comes back

to reviving in essence, by an imaginary experience, the family structure he came from. One ends up with the sociologist's identification with the psychosocial structures he studies."

But Lévi-Strauss's ideas evolve over the course of his work. He affirms that social relations are well explained by representations, but by *representations that are unconscious*.[71] It is Mauss's theory where "in magic, as in religion and linguistics, they are the unconscious ideas that act." The social becomes again an exterior reality to the individuals who live in it; this is what drives an objectivist conception of sociology. Family relations are underpinned by ideas that we would need to understand about our own family experience and what modifies it. It would be necessary, for example, to produce the intuition that affectively represents the connection between cross- and parallel cousins. But this is impossible for us, since the manner of liaisons operates without the natives knowing it. The relations are determined without them knowing it, they say that "atoms do not need to know the laws of physics" that cause their action, "the preceding meaning determines the signified as in language; the social is an autonomous reality."

This conception creates a progressive mathematization of sociology. A finite number of simple relationships exist, realized in numerous societies, and from which the scientist can determine the different forms of possible societies.

In such a way, Erikson traced, following Freud's work, a table of all the possible types of pregenital sexuality.[72] The actual world studied by Freud, and since him, is only a small sector that the combinatory sociology must interpret in light of numerous possible combinations. Considered at first, Erikson's schemas have only meaning in relationship to our lived experience and by imaginary variations of this experience. If we introduce the notion of the social acting unconsciously, the social becomes a sort of "in-itself" independent of psychology.

What are the reasons that brought about this bifurcation in the thought of Lévi-Strauss? One is the fear, under the pretext of doing a phenomenological sociology, of making a wordy [*verbeuse*] phenomenology. He would like to avoid reducing the social to conceptions of the savage [*sauvage*]. Language, even the type of social relations (semantics), is an autonomous phenomenon. It is irreducible to conceptions that we have of it, that themselves are an analysis made "after the fact" [*après coup*], from rules of grammar that we have learned and forgotten.

Lévi-Strauss fears that we are unaware of what is profound in the social. Thus, a phenomenon like trade must be perceived immediately as a collection, a social structure, and not as the sum of psychological acquisitions.

Are we obliged to found the social on unconscious notions? We must introduce the possibility of living in relationship with others into consciousness. It is about establishing a relationship with my unconscious and with another myself who is the primitive man. We can make here an instructive comparison: psychoanalysis does not reveal an ego that operates behind my back; it links the unconscious to the conscious. We do not want to take responsibility for the unconscious. Similarly, the social does not escape consciousness; people live more things than they can think about. *The unconscious is not a second consciousness, but a nonthematized lived experience* [*vécu*]. Thus, the family system, if it is not thematically known (for a thematic knowledge we would need a kind of ethnology to make comparisons), is not inevitably unknown to us who live it. *The autonomy of the social resides in the notion of the lived experience* [*vécu*], *larger than that of the unconscious of Lévi-Strauss.*

D. Final Interpretation of Culturalism

(1) We must not reduce it to a particular case of causal thought that attaches little causes to large effects. Parental care is the reflection and not the cause of the envisioned society. Cultural transmission is made by a reciprocal identification from one generation to another, by a circular process.

(2) Culturalism is close to a phenomenological sociology, since it considers the child's integration in society as a phenomenon of symbolic consciousness. The ambiguity between these two conceptions is manifest in Lévi-Strauss's, Margaret Mead's, and Kardiner's work.

In these authors, what is the study of the base personality envisioned in more complex historical societies? The relationship between psychology and sociology, while less direct, remains essential. Kardiner sketches this relation in the case of the small American town "Plainville" with its puritan inhabitants.[73] From a psychological point of view, this society has an accentuated Oedipal structure: punishments, sexual taboos, female ignorance of sexuality (that is, a canonical Oedipal structure).

From a social and political point of view, the inhabitants are skeptical Republicans, hostile to the Democratic administration, "to the red ideas of Roosevelt," such as social welfare, since they give more importance to the value of money than to the value of nature. We can ask what is the profound root of the common skepticism in their psychological and political-social ideas. There is a connection between their attitude about life, sexuality, pleasure, and their attitude about the New Deal. The common source would be the tension from a power that escapes them. Children escape parental guardianship in the same way that adults escape

political engagement. The tension, at the interior of the family milieu and on the social plane, corresponds to a crisis in the entire system. Here, as in societies without a government, the explanation is at once social and psychological.

*Culturalism is the best contribution for a hundred years to the prob-*lem that occupies us. By the intermediary of base personality, it offers us a way to think about the relationship underlined by Marxism.

This is not a weak, bare Marxism where one only considers economic determinations—relations of production. Vigorous Marxism returns to the entire structure of the world and, in particular, to economic, social, and political motors. It is not indifferent to cultural problems. It does not judge in relation to an orthodox reading of an author, but as a contingent upon particular cultural norms. Thus, Marx affirms that Balzac was an author of premier importance, without regard to the fact that he was a reactionary. We must not apply to culture the devices that bring together economic and social factors, but orient our researches according to aesthetic, sociological criteria.

5

The Child's Relations with Others (1950–1951)

I. Introduction

A. Connections Between This Subject and Two Previous Lectures: "Consciousness and Language Acquisition" and "Structure and Conflicts in Child Consciousness"

Connections with the lecture "Structure and Conflicts in Child Consciousness." This course envisioned *the child's relations with nature:* perception, perception of causality, the child's relation with the imaginary, the child's representation of the world. This year the child will be studied in his *relations with his parents, his brothers and sisters, in school and with his social class.* Last year's course emphasized the psychology of knowledge that we often consider to be a kind of infrastructure. This year will emphasize the psychology of affectivity and the child's relations with the other. It will be shown that these problems are neither secondary nor more special. Last year's course called for the following conclusion: perception and relationships of causality grasped by the child are not a reflection of external phenomena, nor are they a simple ordering of environmental givens. They are a "structuring" [*mise en forme*] of the child's experience. For example, the child's drawing is not an adult drawing that lacks something (Luquet); it is not a reflection of the world.[1] The child's drawing is a manner of expressing his experience of the world. The subjects of the child's representation of the world—animism, artificialism—can be *considered as explanations that the child uses in order to respond to* the questions that the adult poses about "ultra-things" (Wallon's term). These representations of the world are caused by the adult's questions. Therefore the child's perception and knowledge are supported by a more profound function: a linear connection with affectivity.

Connections with "Consciousness and Language Acquisition."[2] We arrive at the same conclusion: the child acquires a system of overt expressions not by intellectual operations but by the use and assimilation of the language employed in his environment. For the child, language is not think-

ing about language but acquiring the handling of a *linguistic instrument,* to adapt to a behavior. Again, knowledge is more an effect than a cause.

B. Affectivity Is Not Subordinated to Functions of Intelligence

First example. Even the perception of things is profoundly modified by personality and interpersonal relationships in the human environment. Consider Else Frenkel-Brunswik's work on the intolerance of ambiguity as a variable of personality in the emotive and perceptual domains.[3] These works are inspired by Jaensch's work on the perception of ambiguous figures that are more frequent in "liberal" subjects (individuals who are more apt to recognize many aspects of one thing).

Frenkel-Brunswik's study is founded on the same principle as projective methods (Rorschach) which presume that all of personality is expressed in the manner in which one structures the sensible givens. The chosen personality trait is psychological rigidity. Research on corrections of this trait with certain perceptual modes is experimental. 120 extreme cases on 1,500 children from 11 to 16 years (clinical exam: interview, tests, and tests of the parents). Psychological rigidity, the idea has a psychoanalytic origin, is the attitude of subjects who on all questions give *simple responses, summaries that are entrenched without any nuance,* and they are little disposed to recognize discordant facts. This rigidity is not at all a psychological force, but a mask under which an extremely divided personality is hidden: it is a *reaction formation.* For example, these subjects, who are in general traditionalists, hold onto exterior traits when describing their parents as if they fear to find deeper imperfections. At the same time, when they are presented with a trap ("What people would you take to a desert island?"), they omit any mention of their parents. Also, in the T.A.T. tests, they insist on coercive aspects of their parents.

These examples reveal that the subjects have a *profound division* with themselves and *a repressed aggressivity toward their parents.* The subjects avoid all ambiguity and proceed with dichotomies (obedient-authority, cleanliness-dirtiness, virtue-vice, masculinity-femininity dilemmas). Psychological rigidity is effectively born from relationships with parents and extends to moral ideas. The families of these children are, in general, *authoritative and frustrating.* The child creates a double image of his parents: one is beneficent and appears first, the other is aggressive and is deeply hidden ("good mother and bad mother").

Melanie Klein had distinguished the concept of *ambivalence from that of ambiguity.*[4] *Ambivalence is where the subject makes two alternative images for the same being; alternatives that are not seen as representing the same object.* Ambiguity is an adult concept. *The subject perceives two images, but he knows that*

they apply to the same object. The social aspect of the phenomenon is that these families are socially marginal (for example, the nouveaux riches, Italian or Irish minorities in American towns) and *because of this* they are *authoritarian,* hence the psychological rigidity of the child that gets transposed into a certain manner of living social relations. The "rigid" child often has racial prejudices that arise from what he projects onto "exterior" minorities. What he cannot accept in his own personality. (For instance, the myths of black sexuality in the U.S.A. and myths of the battle of the sexes; everyone puts the faults on others that he does not want to recognize in himself.)

This first example shows how psychological rigidity is expressed in perception. The subjects undergo tests in order to detect their psychological rigidity. For example, (1) "People can be divided into two categories: the weak and the strong." (2) "Teachers should tell students what to do instead of asking them what they want." (3) "Girls should only learn household tasks." (4) "One should kick out refugees and give their jobs to veterans." (5) "There is only one way of doing something well." In general, psychologically rigid subjects *respond in the affirmative* to each question.

Other experiments on the same subjects are conducted to bring to light *their perceptual characteristics.* The subject only perceives the change very late and persists in not seeing what contradicts his earlier vision. He loathes recognizing *transitional phenomena.* The subjects who have very strong conflicts have strong difficulties recognizing ambiguity in ideas or perceived things. *Emotional* ambiguity is translated into *intellectual* ambiguity. They are very slow to adapt to a new kind of problem. Whatever the statement, they conserve the same method and have a tendency to bring an already known experience to all new situations.

The author does not want to say that psychological rigidity is always translated into perceptual rigidity. Her point of view is more nuanced; the relation existing between the two phenomena is quite complex. Some subjects compensate for their psychological rigidity with a great suppleness in the perceptual domain. In all cases, the two phenomena are always connected and form a single whole. The author also does not want to tie psychological rigidity to *certain opinions.* Apparently liberal subjects can have an absolute, abstract manner: for example, they declare that all men are identical, *from every point of view,* and refuse to see differences in historical situations. What predicts psychological rigidity is less the adoption of this or that theory (except racist theories which, founded on a myth, are only justifiable as an explanation of psychological mechanisms); it is more the manner of adopting, justifying, and holding these opinions. Thus, the psychologically rigid liberal refuses to admit differences in en-

vironment. The entire world is ambiguous, but what is important is the manner in which one deals with this ambiguity. Psychological maturity is shown in accepting to see ambiguity and to "interiorize" conflict.

The author's goal is to bring to light the *connection between the manner of perceiving and the manner of living socially.* It is not at all a question of showing that cognitive functions are explained by social structures. The question of causality is not one that can be approached by experimental judgment, since we can always presume that the perceptual world preexists and, in part, determines the way of relating to the other. The subject has always been in the social environment in which he exists, and he has lived this experience with his constitutional predispositions. Thus, no possibility exists to institute a deciding experiment that establishes what causes what. *In reality, the question of causality is devoid of sense.* How can we say if our manner of living socially shapes our perceptions or the other way around? It would be necessary to isolate the two phenomena, which is impossible. *Mme. Frenkel-Brunswik has only searched for close correlations that exist between the two phenomena; she showed that they are two moments of a single whole: the individual's situation in a certain historical environment.*

Second example: *the development of intelligence and the acquisition of language are tied to affectivity.*[5] Correlations exist between the age of greatest dependence on the parents (zero to two years) and the *responsive period* of language acquisition. If during this period the child does not have a linguistic model, he will not speak, or at least he will never speak completely normally. For example, take wild children and rehabilitated deaf children. In the syntax of the latter, there are some curious peculiarities: for example, the absence of a passive voice.

Rostand studied the connection that exists between the mother-child relation and the acquisition of language. All language is to some extent maternal. As in the child's relations with his mother, language acquisition is an *identification phenomenon.* To learn to speak is to learn to play a certain number of roles, to assume behaviors of which one was previously the spectator. *The parallels between the family constellation and language acquisition are first studied with a case of accentuated jealousy in the younger child.* After the birth of a brother, the child identifies with the newborn. In the first stage, we observe language and character regression. In the second stage, a few days later, the child identifies with his older brother and overcomes his jealousy. This jealousy can be overcome due to the arrival of the fourth child, who removes the older brother from his quality of being the absolute eldest. We witness thereby a quick healing of a neurotic stuttering and, in just a day, the acquisition of the simple past, the imperfect, and the simple future.

The jealousy that is manifested at the younger brother's birth can

be interpreted as a refusal to accept the change in situation. The arrival of the newborn supplants the previous role. This stage disappears due to the constitution of a kind of past-present-future schema. After claiming his present place which he considered absolute, the child replaces his attitude of "Someone takes my place" with "I was the last, I am no longer; I will be the oldest." The child restructures his relations with the other and restructures his universe. It is about a phenomenon of *decentration* (Piaget), but it is a lived *decentration* that is realized in a vital, and not an intellectual, operation. The child learns to think of reciprocal relations: he distinguishes between the concept of role and that of individual. He learns to relativize the actions of the youngest and oldest. But again, intellectual development is born by vital and affective development.

Rostand then studies the case of a little girl of thirty-five months who was excited by coming across a dog having puppies. Two months later, at the birth of her younger brother, the girl suddenly acquired certain linguistic modes, notably the imperfect. A connection exists between the acquisition, the brother's birth, and the past emotion.

How can we explain what happened? For the little girl who knows she is about to have a brother or sister, the dog represented a symbol. The future schema: "brother-me-parents" has been anticipated by "puppies-me-dog." To assimilate this schema, the child came to quit her position as the privileged object and took a maternal attitude toward the newborn. It is necessary to move from a *captive* attitude to an *ablative* attitude, from a *passive* attitude to a *positive* attitude. We thus see the appearance of the use of the imperfect, of the "me," the "I," and four future verbs. The future is an aggressive tense: the subject takes foot in the future and makes projects; the use of "me" and of "I" indicates that the subject adopts a more personal attitude. The use of the imperfect shows that the young girl understands that the present is extended; it is the past, but the past that abides in the present. The imperfect is employed each time the baby is brought up, the baby being what she was up until now.

The emotion was only an occasion to restructure the human environment. There can be linguistic progress without these kinds of emotions, but then linguistic progress is always discontinuous. It always presumes a restructuration of the child's human environment because the human and parental environment is the mediator in the earliest infancy of all relations with the world and with being. What one calls *intelligence* is a name for designating the type of relations with the other, the mode of intersubjectivity that the infant achieves. Here again, it is not about a causal explanation of a phenomenon through the other, but of recognizing the connection of the two "projects" at the interior of the unique project which is the child's life. *The manner in which the child assumes his*

relations with the family constellation can be read in the type of perception and knowledge that he accomplishes.

II. The Theoretical Problem

Before tackling the study of the child's relations with his parents, brothers and sisters, with the school world, and so forth, a principal question is posed: *In what conditions does the child enter into relations with others? What is the nature of this relation? How is it established?*

A. Classical Psychology

Classical psychology addresses this question with many difficulties, and it turns out it is impossible to resolve it. (1) *What is the psyche?* Academic psychology responds that *it is what provides a singularity [seul]*. My sensation of green or of red is mine and you will never know it. The other's psyche is ungraspable and incommunicable even in its essence. (2) *How is the other's body represented?* The other's psyche is revealed by his corporeal appearance: gestures, mimicry, speech. In the presence of this body, I can know that a psyche inhabits it, due to the fundamental concept of classical psychology, of *cenesthesia:* my body would be seized by me through a mass of brute sensations that inform me about the state of my different functions and organs. However, if my body consciousness is not graspable by cenesthesia, it will remain impenetrable to the other, and the other's consciousness thus becomes impossible as well. Only one solution remains possible: to presume that, as a spectator of the other's gestures, I decipher the given expressions and I project in the other what I sense within my own body.

The problem of the experience of the other appears as a system in four terms: (1) *my body as object*, (2) *my sense of my own body* (interoceptive image of my own body), (3) *the other's body that I see* (visual image), and (4) *the feeling the other has of his own existence.* The perception of the other would consist of deducing the fourth term from the third by analogy with the supposed relationship between the first and second terms. *Thus, the problem appears difficult to resolve.*

First, *the perception of the other is relatively precocious.* The child is sensitive at an early age to smiling. How could he through a complicated system and earlier study know so early that the smile is a sign of benevolence? In order for this projection to have taken place, it must be founded on an analogy between the other's gestures (here, the smile) and one's

own. This operation would presume a kind of reasoning by analogy: to understand the significance of the smile of the other after one's own smile. It would be necessary for a precise correspondence between the seen body and the sensed body. However, the infant has a minimal visual experience of his body, and the interoceptive image of his body is very different from the visual image of the other. *We must presume that the child has different ways to globally identify the other's body.*

Second, we consider *the phenomenon of imitation.* The child performs a gesture he sees the other do: he smiles because one smiled at him. It is necessary to translate the perceived image into motor language, but it is not an image of himself smiling, nor is it the other's motor sensations. The transference of the other in the child is not possible by analogy.

B. Abandoning the Prejudices of Classical Psychology

We can only resolve the problem by abandoning the prejudices of classical psychology.

1. *Reform the concept of the psyche: concept of behavior.* The other's psyche is only accessible to a singularity and is completely impenetrable to others; it is in his behavior that I am able to grasp, to find, the other: *actions have a sense.* For example, for Paul Guillaume we imitate the other's gestural actions.[6] What the child imitates is not the individual but his behavior. The child can discover that his actions are those of someone because the child himself is capable of executing them.

2. *Reform the concept of cenesthesia: concept of postural schema.* My body is not only known by internal sensations, but also by a corporeal schema (Head, Wallon, Lhermitte). The conception that I have of my body is a system, a schema that carries the relationship to the position of my body in the ambient environment. Different sensory domains concerned with the perception of my body support certain relations: the body schema furnishes me in this way with a system of equivalences. If my body is no longer only known by a mass of strictly individual sensations, but as an object organized by relationship to its surroundings, the result is that the perception of my body can be transferred to the other and the other's image can be immediately "interpreted" by my body schema.

By reforming the concept of the psyche in replacing it with the concept of behavior, and the conception of cenesthesia being replaced by that of postural schema, the problem of the consciousness of the other can be resolved. We thus have a system in two terms: my behavior and the other's behavior that constitute a totality.

For example, *for Husserl the perception of the other is like a phenomenon of coupling* (a term taking at the same time from the *physiological* sense and the more general sense of *couple*). I see the other's body and I sense in

him the same intention that reciprocally animates my own body. We cannot perceive the other if we make a distinction between *ego* and other. On the contrary, this becomes possible if the psychogenesis begins in a state where the infant ignores differences. I am little by little conscious that my body is closed around me. Correlatively, this produces a modification of the other's image that appears in its insularity.

The *first stage* is the existence of a kind of precommunication, an anonymous collectivity with differentiation, a kind of group existence. The *second stage* is the objectification of one's body, segregation, distinction between individuals. For example, Guillaume notes that a first consciousness is not closed in on itself; the first ego is latent, virtual.[7] Egocentrism is the attitude of an ego that ignores itself, an ego that lives as well in others as in itself (such as in the *syncretic sociability* of Wallon). Individual consciousness only appears later, along with the objectification of one's own body, establishing a dividing wall between the other and me and the constitution of the other and of me as "human beings" in a reciprocal relationship. *This study permits the description of the stages of the child's relations with others.*

III. The Child from Zero to Six Months

This is the initial stage. The child puts in place his body schema and begins to perceive others. In these two cases a sort of incarnation occurs. They are two analogous and complementary operations. However, the perception of the other and the perception of one's own body do not develop according to the same rhythm. The perception of one's own body precedes that of the other. It is a system that develops in time. These perceptions are not innate. Development exists, but development is not *additive*. Body perception that appears first creates a disequilibrium and calls forth the subsequent perception of the other. In each stage of development, there is a germ that prepares the following stage.

A. Perception of One's Own Body

First, there is an interoceptive body.[8] The exteroceptivity can only exert itself in collaboration with interoceptivity. It is a *buccal* body (buccal space of Stern) and a *respiratory* body.[9] In the following stage, the child perceives regions tied to excretion functions. Interoceptive organs come to serve exteroceptive organs until there is a soldering between the two domains (this justifies the importance accorded by psychoanalysis to the mother-child relationship).

It is only between three and six months that the soldering between external and internal (myelination) occurs.[10] While this soldering is not realized, perception is not possible because the body must equilibrize itself for perception to work (equilibrium is realized only in the position of dorsal decubitus, even though it is sleep). *No total body schema yet exists.*

When the soldering is acquired, a displacement still subsists (for *example, myelination creates a relation between the feet and hands with* a delay of three weeks and a delay of twenty-six days for the left hand to have a relationship to the right hand). True attention to the body is late; attention to the right hand occurs on the 115th day, exploration of the left hand by the right hand occurs in the 23rd week, and a perplexity when a glove is placed next to the hand occurs in the 24th week. Consciousness of one's own body is first of all fragmentary.

B. Perception of the Other

Guillaume notes a quick, surprised, and attentive expression with regard to the human face between nine and eleven days. According to Wallon, the newborn does not have true sensations of the change of his own body. Until three months, the infant does not have the concept of his own body but only an impression of *incompleteness.* The first exterior contact, the first exteroceptive stimulus, is the *human voice.* It provokes cries and smiles at two months, and the face directed toward the infant makes him smile at two to three months. The infant responds to the cries of another infant; he cries no matter who is there. From two months and five days, we find the visual experiences of the other. The infant recognizes his father. At three months, he greets everyone by crying.

The first relations with other children are expressed by a contagion of cries (two to three months). The first looks fixate on parts of the other infant's body. He transfers to himself different consciousnesses of the other only after six months. At six months, the infant is capable of fixing on the face of the other child.

IV. The Child from Six Months to Three Years

This period is characterized by a quick development of consciousness of the other's body. It is the period of "incontinent sociability" (Wallon). We begin by studying the development of this kind of system, of which interoceptive consciousness of one's own body, the exterior perception of one's own body, and the perception of the other are three elements.

We will thus examine in parallel the development of the experience of one's own body and the consciousness of the other.

A. Development of the Experience of One's Own Body

After six months, the child acquires a visual representation of his own body due to the mirror and the specular image.

1. *The contrast between the animal and child behavior in front of the mirror.* Preyer studies the widowed drake of Turkey, which, on the death of its companion, sits constantly in front of a mirror.[11] According to Wallon, this behavior would not be comparable in a child. The bird considers the images not as an image of itself but as that of a second animal (the female) in front of him. It is even the case that the female before her death was only an image of the male bird. Wallon reports the behavior of two dogs. Presented with a mirror, one reacts with fear and avoidance. The other, whose master pets him during the experiment, is calm and turns its head toward him. The image for the dog is not another dog nor is it its own image; the dog can only make sense of what his body senses interoceptively. Köhler studied the behavior of chimpanzees.[12] When they see their image, the chimpanzees pass their hand behind the mirror; they appear deceived and doggedly refuse any interest in the mirror. Wallon interprets this attitude by saying that in the moment when the monkeys would acknowledge the mirror's image, they pull away from the object that appears foreign to them. The image gives a bare hint and disappears as soon as it appears. However, chimpanzees seem to recognize themselves in images and in photographs of themselves when presented with them. All these behaviors contrast with those of the child placed in front of a mirror.

2. *The child's recognition of the other's specular image* is more precocious than the child's recognition of his own specular image. The same holds for the distinction between the image and the reality of the other. After Guillaume, consciousness of the other would be precocious, and after Wallon, it would not appear before the end of the third month. Around four or five months, only a simple fixation exists. It is only after six months that we see true behaviors, and not merely mimicry, appear in front of the image. For example, the infant smiles at the specular image of his father. When the father speaks, the infant turns around, surprised. He did not therefore have a precise consciousness of the difference between the image and the model. It *appears at that moment* that the child learned something; his attention proves that it wasn't a simple training, nor was it a conditioned reflex. The infant begins to consciously grasp something, even though he does not yet have possession of the image-model relation-

ship, and he does not know that the image is a projection of his father in the mirror. However, the infant's behavior is not yet closed and stable. For example, a few months after the above-cited experiment, Preyer's child tried again to grab his father's image in the mirror.

In this first stage, the child thinks the image and the model have their *own independent* existences. The specular image is the father's phantom. We cannot yet say that the infant who turns around and recognizes his father in a completely practical way has stripped the father's image of its quasi-reality, its phantom-like existence.

3. *The stage of the acquisition of the specular image and one's own body.* It is only around *eight months* that the reactions are clear-cut. At thirty-five weeks, the infant extends the hand toward the image and seems surprised when he contacts the mirror. At the same age, when one calls him, he turns toward his image. Why is this image of one's own body recognized later than the image of the other? It is because the infant is in front of a difficult problem (Wallon). The energetic child has two visual images of his father: his father and his father's specular image. But the child has only one complete image of his own body: the mirror image. He must understand that this image is not him because he is where he interoceptively senses himself when he sees his image in the mirror.

[4. *Wallon.*] According to Wallon, we must admit that the child begins by seeing his own specular image as a kind of self-projection (autoscopy).[13] In dreams and in hypnagogic states in moribund patients, the original childhood consciousness reappears. Primitives might believe that one person can be at the same time in many places. The same goes for the child who can believe that he is both where he sees and where he senses himself; the child can think that a person can be, at the same time, in many places even when he just saw that person. *The child has a different style of spatiality than the adult.* This spatiality that adheres to images is reduced during development's course. By intellectual development, we come to learn to cut up our specular image and our own bodies and recognize that *the image is only in a sort of pre-space.* Because our intelligence redistributes spatial values and corrects the givens of our experience, we reach the recognition that our specular image is not real [*réele*]; we surmount this spatiality which adheres to images and replace it with an ideal space by redistributing spatial values.

At one year, this reduction to an image without reality is accomplished. Guillaume reports that his daughter, when passing in front of a mirror and realizing she forgot to take off her hat, puts her hand to her head and not to the reflected image. The specular image is nothing anymore but a symbol that returns the reflected object. A counter-proof consists in observing the troubles with spatiality among those with apraxia.[14]

They have difficulty acting in an adapted manner upon seeing their ges-tures in a specular image.

We do not want to say that this system of correspondence between image and body is without lapses and is perfectly acquired at one year. Between twelve and fifteen months, the child practices in front of the mirror, practices that are analogous to those employed by the reeduca-tor with persons with apraxia: executed gestures that take the specular image as a model. When one asks the sixty-month-old child to show who his mother is, he designates her by laughing at the mirror. If he still plays with this image, it is because he is not far from the first stage. At fifty-seven weeks, Preyer's son passes his hand behind the mirror and, upset, turns away from it (comparable to the behavior of the chimpanzees). Wallon shows that this is not a lack of comprehension: the child's research is about the mirror and not about the image. The explanation is not en-tirely convincing, since in order for the image to be well understood the child must have some kind of intelligence about the mirror. However, the child does not yet understand reflection. *Specular image constitution sup-poses a total gradual elaboration of a naive psyche.* At sixty-one weeks, Preyer's son touches, licks, and hits his image when playing with it. Wallon reports a young girl of twenty months who kisses her image each night before going to sleep. At thirty-one months, the child plays with his own image; he amuses himself by observing a reflection that has all the appearance of being an animated being (Wallon's "young animists"). But these young animists do not prove that the child has in his possession a perfect specu-lar image. If no traces of primitive phenomena remained, these games would remain incomprehensible. The child still thinks that the specular image is his double. We can also ask: does the adult really consider the specular image to be a simple reflection? Adults have two ways to perceive themselves: analytic and reflected or global and direct. The latter implies the presence of an animated being. (Similarly, in front of a painting, for example the portrait of Charles XII, we are in the presence of an image. However, the smile, the gaze are not merely seen as things.) *The image is something mysterious and inhabited* (for example, the Muslim repugnance at the reproduction of human traits). The image is some sort of incarnation. From the same point of view, we understand that consciousness of the image must be difficult to acquire and is subject to relapse. The image is never a simple reflection, but a quasi-presence. At four years, Preyer's son saw his own shadow and was afraid. When walking on Wallon's shadow, a girl of four years and six months declared she was walking on him. The shadow resides with an invested human value. Understanding the shadow must also be acquired. Unlike Wallon's thought, *it is not a matter of an in-*

tellectual phenomenon, since such a phenomenon is understood at once or not at all (law of all or nothing).

In arriving at this idea, Wallon considered the consciousness of one's own body and of the other's body as tied into the same system. *He strongly critiques the concept of cenesthesia; this knowledge of the body itself is a fact of adult psychology.* In his relations with his own body, the child does not distinguish what is given by interoceptivity from what is furnished by the exterior. *The visual and the interoceptive are given without distinction.* The child perceives the other's body when he sees it in the mirror. Wallon cites a pathological case where troubles with cenesthesia are tied to troubles in relating to the other. Inversely to classical psychiatry, modern psychiatry shows that first there is a type of intervening syncretism in the relations with others, and it is not first the patient's localization of images (internal voices). This connects to Lagache's view.[15] How can we understand that the subject believes he hears exterior voices even though it is the subject who is speaking? It is because language is a dual operation. In pathological cases, an indistinction between the acts of speaking and listening occurs. Wallon invokes a similar phenomenon. The so-called problems of cenesthesia are only troubles with relations to others: an impotence in maintaining a partition between me and the other, between the passive and active.

For Wallon the interoceptive body, the visual body, and the other's body form a system. *We can presume that just as the child makes a global identification with the mirror image, there will be identification with the other.* The child cannot limit himself to his own life, hence the phenomenon of *transitivism: indistinction between self and other (syncretic sociability).*

5. *Wallon's interpretation must be completed.* When Wallon suggests that there is a unity between my body and the other's, he goes farther than when he speaks of the specular image. Indeed, Wallon properly characterizes the image as not real; he shows how the child learns to reduce the image. But he does not say why the child's specular image interests him, nor does he say why the child finds this experience so amusing. This is what the psychoanalysts try to help us to understand. *We will see that there is no discordance between these two points of view.* It is only about giving this problem *a more concrete sense.*

In his article, Dr. Lacan rightly starts from the fact of the infant's jubilation in front of his image.[16] Why this extreme interest in the child who has not yet achieved motor maturity or connective nerve maturity? The child still has enduring maternal humoral traces. It is about *identification in the full sense that analysis gives to this term. To know the transformation produced in the subject when he takes on an image.* The child becomes capable

of being a spectator of himself. He is no longer only a sensing ego, but a spectacle; he is this someone that we can see. Before the specular image, personality is *the id*. The image will make possible another vision of personality (something that one can and must see), the first element in a *superego*. This can be considered as the *acquisition of a new function, a self-contemplation, a narcissistic attitude* taking on a cardinal importance. At the same time, this image of my own body makes possible a kind of *alienation*, a *harnessing* of the ego by my spatial image. The image prepares me for another alienation, *the other's alienation of me.*

"The jubilant assumption [*assomption*] . . . seems to me to manifest in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the *I* is precipitated in a primordial form, prior to being objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its function as a subject."[17]

The infant discovers a total dimension of experience with the specular image. He can contemplate himself, observe himself. The infant constructs a visible ego: a superego that ceases to be overwhelmed by his desires. The infant is tied to his immediate reality; his attention is captured by this ego which he finds to be the first symbol of the specular image. This game already realizes, before social integration, the transformation of the *I*. It produces an alienation of the immediate ego for the mirror ego.

6. *Differences between Wallon's point of view and psychoanalysis.* Psychoanalysis accentuates the affective essence of the phenomenon, whereas for Wallon it is a matter of the work of consciousness. For psychoanalysts, the visual is not only a sense mode; it has an entirely different significance. *The visual is the sense of the spectacle, the imaginary.* It is where the integration of different sensations becomes a way of relating to self and even to the other. At the same time, psychoanalysis places an accent on anticipation and the always possible regression. The child defines himself by a kind of anticipation taken by the subject on his current resources. Birth is characterized by pre-maturation: *the first Oedipal drive is a sort of prepuberty or "psychological puberty."* The child lives in the future, but only the adult can regress. Childhood is never fully realized. We continue to see, by a kind of magical belief, a double of ourselves in the image.

The child's acquisitions in this domain are not, strictly speaking, intellectual. Once understood, the past should be perfectly reabsorbed. Since, in fact, past formations are not annulled, new formations are not the result of a purely intellectual activity, but of a *Gestaltung:* vital, concrete, always partial, always capable of regression, and less stable than what a progression purely caused by intelligence would be. Psychoanalysis puts *the comprehension of the image and the child's identification with the other*

in relation to one another. *These critical remarks permit us to define the ways in which we should engage with psychological analysis.*

Wallon reduces the comprehension of the specular image to a process of intellection: intellectual activity that operates at all moments as a reduction and integration. I see the image and then, due to intelligent consciousness, I strip the image of its absolute existence, since my body is only the place where I sense. *But can we furnish a psychological explanation of this phenomenon?* Is not intellectual activity more conditioned by sensing than it conditions sensing? Wallon remarks that for the child, a sensing body and a visual body do not exist in two distinct places. These two spaces are not comparable. It is more a matter of a second body in the mirror, a kind of identity at a distance, a ubiquity of the body. The operation of reduction to unity of these two bodily places is no longer outside reason to be, since there is no clear-cut distinction between them. The analysis is to recapture this in another language. It is not by reduction to an intellectual synthesis that the problem will be resolved. The child must be put in relation to the other as the other. I have an exterior aspect; I am visible for the other. The other has a view of me. *The relation with the other has the value of a real structure;* it is a system of relations at the interior of my experience. The phenomenon thus understood will necessarily have an imperfect character and is no longer about an ideal synthesis where it is difficult to think about the anticipations and regressions. We do not certify intellectual control that supposedly "reduces" the image. We do not have the impression of judging when we look at ourselves in mirrors. The redistribution of spatial values is subject to certain failures. Therefore, the activity is more than an intellectual activity. The search flounders for a state of equilibrium and does not clearly know its goal. *Consequence:* are regressions the only examples of a return to infantile thought in the adult? We will examine this in studying syncretic sociability.

B. Syncretic Sociability

Between six and twelve months, the relations with others come to light with an explosion of unrestrained sociability. Between six and seven months, the child suddenly quits fixing on people without gestures to accompany his look. Gestures toward the partner or toward his own body multiply (four times more frequent than in the preceding stage). The child smiles when one looks at him. The social sensibility that develops is remarkably advanced compared to the child's knowledge of the physical world.

In her book Charlotte Bühler reports her observations of children in a waiting room of a hospital.[18] Before three years, children are less in-

terested in those younger than them because they have not yet emerged from their situation. When two children are in each other's presence, often one parades while the other is the spectator. One speaks, plays, shows off, and the other watches (an analogous situation between the des-pot and the slave). In order for this situation to present itself, there must be at least three months' difference between the two children. Generally it is the older one who parades around, sometimes the younger if he is used to people asking his opinion. It is the automatic logic of affective situations (Wallon). What characterizes this relationship is that the two children are in some manner merged in the situation. The contemplator only exists by identifying with the other. Above all, despotism is founded on the sentiment that the slave has in being a slave; it is not founded on the adversary's defeat. What the master searches for is recognition that he is the master, and he only finds it in debasing the slave: a confusion of self and other in a similar sentimental situation.[19] The combining with the other is the same in the child's affective situations.

The relation with jealousy is important in this period. The spectator-spectacle pair is interiorized. The jealous person is someone who would like to be the person he contemplates. He has the feeling of frustration. According to Guillaume, jealousy appears at seven months; according to Wallon, nine months. Later, jealousy manifests itself in sulki-ness; the child renounces what he wants to be and accepts the anxiety surrounding a repressed action. *Jealousy is essentially confusion between self and other.*

The phenomenon of cruelty is tied to jealousy. The other's being is to the jealous person's detriment; he tries to make the other suffer. But cruelty supposes a sympathy for the other, who is considered another self. Cruelty is a "suffering sympathy" (Wallon). The evil I do to the other, I do to myself at the same time. To love to do evil to others is to love to do evil to oneself. In all sadism there is also masochism (an idea little different than Freud's concept of sadomasochism). The jealous person loves to make himself suffer and experiences a kind of complacency that is aimed at augmenting his sexual pleasure.

All of Wallon's conceptions here rejoin psychoanalytic conceptions. For psychoanalysis, in all jealous behavior an element of homosexuality exists. For Wallon, the jealous person takes the attitude a third party would have toward another character (psychoanalysis's concept of the "voyeur").The latter insists it is the jealous person's contemplative charac-ter who is captured, captivated, and who wanted to capture and captivate. The jealous person plays in spirit all the roles of the situation he finds himself in. (Cf. Proust's analysis in Albertine's character.)

Sympathy is primordial for Wallon. This phenomenon appears on

a ground of an irreducible mimesis. There is a harnessing, an invasion of me by the other. Mimicry is an aspect of that system that brings me to the other. I am capable of taking up physiological expressions in my way and understanding the sense of them. It is through the postural function that I understand the other's attitudes.

The connection between mimicry and the postural function is that the postural function permits the relations of the conditions of any gesture. Mimicry permits the reality of analogous movements to those I see. Perception of appearance [*semblance*] translates the attitudes that have the same signification as those of the other. It provokes in us a motor reorganization. According to Guillaume, we substitute ourselves for the other and we carry out actions that we already know how to do. For Wallon, mimicry would be the point of departure for the emergence of sympathy; *sympathy is a manner of translating the me-other system.*

Let's make clearer the characteristics of the stage of "precommunication" by studying *the conception of the child's personality* and *the child's expression of precommunication phenomena in language.*

C. Conception of the Child's Personality in Relation to Self and Others

The child's personality does not distinguish itself from the situation in which it is engaged and from which it emerged. For example, the child does not recognize his father if he doesn't appear in a habitual surrounding (a child, habituated to seeing his father in Vienna, didn't recognize him when he saw him in the countryside). The child is grounded in the situation.

In her study, Elsa Köhler cites the case of a young girl who eats her brother's candy.[20] When the father arrives, she approaches him and enthusiastically tells him that she ate the candies. When her father reprimands her, she cries and expresses regret. A few moments later, the same scene happens with the mother (enthusiasm, tears, repentance). How can we understand this? It must be that the child makes no connection between the scene with her mother and with her father. Each situation is taken in its immediate signification; each behavior is autonomous in relationship to previous behaviors.

At a sister's birth, William Stern's son identifies with his older sister and ascribes her name to himself. He believes, with this act, to take the older sister's characteristics. In the child's eyes, the situation relative to the family unit defines him. He can feel many different ways and play many roles (as in an example of a patient of Janet's who thought she was at the same time the Virgin and her daughter). This makes comprehen-

sible the real conversation that the child holds with himself and explains the phenomenon of transitivism. The child's, or the patient's, aptitude to find in the other what appears in himself is similar to the attitude of hypochondriacs who seek to find signs of illness in others. All that happens to us makes us conscious of the relationship with the other. In psychoanalysis, we find an analogous conception. By *projection,* we think the other [*nous pensons autrui*], due to our personal experiences (*transitivism*). Similarly, by *introjection,* we project in us what comes from outside (*mimicry*).

In an example Wallon takes from Charlotte Bühler, a young girl sitting by the side of her friend gives signs of discomfort, hits her friend, and then says her friend hit her. The child passed through a stage of anxiety that has the effect of impregnating the entire life and spectacle of things, in particular her friend. The slap is a response to anxiety that comes from outside. The two personalities are indistinct. *This very special conception of the child's personality supposes a complete structure of child consciousness: indistinction in different moments of time* (example of the broken glass), *syncretism of space,* and in a general fashion, *the inaptitude to conceive of time and space as comporting distinct perspectives between each other.* The child neither distinguishes things in time and space nor distinguishes symbols and what they signify (fusion between sign and signified, absence of symbolic consciousness).

In last year's course, the study of child drawing showed us that the child does not have a conception of perspective in the same sense as the adult.[21] The child flattens in one drawing different aspects of the same object, aspects that the adult would declare incomprehensible.

D. Expression of the Phenomena of Precommunication in Child Language

The syncretic relations with the other are also demonstrated in the use the child makes of language. The child's first word-phrases zero in on behavior and actions that appear equally in the other as in the self. This seems to presume a space of abstraction. In reality, this is explained by the fact that there is no distinction between what is perceived as one's own and what appears in the other. *The child is as disseminated as the images where the actions took place* (Wallon). (Children have a greater facility in understanding modern painting than adults, who are trained by a classical artistic culture.)

Children's thought is generally prepersonal, preindividual. The word "I" appears late, since the child takes a long time to distinguish himself from his surroundings. He is conscious of communicating with the thing. The "I" intervenes when the child understands that the "you" [the subject *tu*] and the "you" [the object *toi*] can also be addressed to

him and to others. For Guillaume, a great number of people's names are acquired at the beginning of the second year. But a child of sixteen months only uses his name in a few cases (What is your name? This cake is for whom?). At this age, the child is not yet conscious of his own perspective. To refer to himself, the child does not employ the subject (in order to say "*je veux écrire*" [I want to write], he says "*kire*"). For others, he uses a subject (to say "*papa écrit*" [Papa writes], he says "*papa kire*"). The acquisition of the proper name is made after other characters. The use of the pronoun "I" comes still later, at least in its full sense, when the child understands that everyone in his turn can say "I" and can be considered as "you" [*toi*]. When the child is conscious of the relationship between different pronouns and the passage of one to the others, we find, for example, Guillaume's son of nineteen months saying "to me, to you, to him" and at twenty months, he adds, "to each." *At the end of the second year, the acquisition of the "I" is complete.*

V. The Crisis of the Third Year

Following the work of Elsa Köhler, the child ceases to lend his body and thoughts to others; he ceases to confuse himself with the situation and roles in which he is implicated.[22] The child is separate from his different situations and roles. The child can represent a situation instead of living solely in himself. Thus, a kind of opening of the spectacle is accomplished. The child becomes a free subject in relation to sensible intuitions and is capable of redistributing them according to his own thought.

Wallon discusses a certain number of characteristics of this crisis during the third year: (1) a deliberate decision to do everything alone ("all alone"); (2) the child's changing reactions to the other. Before three years, the other's gaze encouraged and aided the child. After three years, the impression of being watched becomes annoying (principle of "stage fright"). The child declares that he no longer wants to do it if someone watches him (*inhibition*). He displaces his attention: "him in the middle of doing his act" *becomes* "him who sees himself in the middle of acting." This connects to pathological cases:[23] (1) case of a hemiplegic shaken with convulsive laughter and agitating his limbs when someone watches him; (2) case of a test driver in whom the presence of another person in the car provokes an anxiety pressure characterized by tics; (3) case of general paralyzed persons who, when one looks at them, take on interrogative, approbative pantomimes; and (4) case of idiots who yell when one looks at them.

These attitudes are similar to those adopted by people before a cam-

era. The other's gaze awakens the consciousness of there being not only what the child sees, but what others see in him (a phenomenon already noticed in the study of the specular image). The other's gaze crushes us in a point of space, thus we have the impression of being limitless. The child becomes conscious of this kind of doubling of himself and perceives that things have another aspect. When the *ego* truly emerges, it is coupled with another *ego* in the other's eyes.

We must not understand the annoyance of being looked at with shame (the shame of being naked, for example, does not appear until about six years) or the fear of being reprimanded. At the same age, the child wants that we occupy ourselves with him; he has attitudes of duplicity, and the child breaks up other's games with pleasure. The child no longer gives his toys without adding that he doesn't want them anymore. He takes objects of others only for the pleasure of taking them. The idea of gift is in the sense of a transaction, interfering. *The child plays with me-other relations that have ceased to maintain their lack of differentiation.*

Problems that the third-year crisis poses. In what way is the third-year crisis a restructuration of infancy? In what way is the me-other distinction achieved? Does the former state remain? Wallon responds that it is not abolished. *The forms of activity in the previous stage are not yet surpassed.* Is syncretic sociability liquidated at three years?

It seems that the crisis of three years is truly a *decisive* time, but syncretism is pushed back [*repoussé*] more than it is suppressed. The child becomes conscious of the distance between me and other, he perceives that barriers exist (such as the *lived distance* between the child and other, as in Minkowski). Transitivism is pushed back; the child will avoid making certain accusations against the other, since he knows it is a kind of confession on his part. But does transitivism disappear completely? Doesn't the indistinction between me and other reappear in some adult cases? For example, in love: the case of a person who does not want to affect the person she loves. Whatever her attitude is, she will affect the other, and it is because of this very fact that she refuses to allow him to approach her. It is a paradox to not want to infringe upon the will of the loved being. To love is to accept undergoing the other's influence and to also exercise influence on the other. At the same time, the adult cannot adopt an attitude of nonintervention with the child. Adults are obliged to intervene in some cases; they cannot let the child do certain dangerous acts, for example. Even between adults, this participation with the other exists. If one is tied with someone, one lives his life, at least in intention. The experience of the other is necessarily alienating for me (Alain, "Love swears"). To love is to affirm more than one can know. It is why the experience of the other can always be an object of uncertainty, such as in the aban-

doned's attitude—the refusal to be dependent. In this case, the mentally ill patient demonstrates a more critical rigor than the sane person. All relations with the other are consequently something that gives rise to a state of insecurity. The joint ownership with the other subsists on another level (a discrepancy in Piaget). Transitivism is surpassed in the order of habitual life, but not in the order of feelings.

VI. The Psychoanalytic Approach to the Child's Relations with His Parents

In the study of the particular relations that the child fosters with the other, we will commence by examining the essential role of the relations with the mother and father. In this domain, psychoanalysis will provide us with important givens [*données*]. We will make use of certain givens in psychoanalysis, but it is important to remark here that what we are going to do here is a *psychoanalytic psychology:* the study of a certain number of correlations in behavior that represent typical mechanisms. It would be antiscientific to lose interest in this material. It would not be wrong to believe that these givens are, by themselves, an introduction to the psychoanalytic practice or a demonstration of its value.

This content does not permit a concrete analysis of others or of oneself. To be interested in psychoanalytic psychology and to perform an analysis of a suffering individual are two very different things. *In the case of psychology,* it is about discovering the signification of certain types of behavior, properly intellectual work that can work with texts. *In the case of psychoanalysis,* we must return to the individual's history, to find a life's essential events, traumas, and the individual's defense mechanisms with which he counters his problems. This is the object of a true art: the psychoanalyst is a practitioner. The psychoanalyst's art is not codified; it is only conveyed by the experience of *training psychoanalysis.* Students sometimes play at being psychoanalysts, desiring even to engage in auto-analysis. But psychoanalysis has always presented analysis as an operation where the analyst is separate from the analysis.

The presence of an other permits the psychoanalyst to take on significance, since the individual's own perspectives are concealed the more important they are to him. *Psychoanalytic psychology would be true without the psychoanalytic practice being entirely justified, and the practice could be effective without the entire theoretical frame being justified.* It could be true that man acts according to psychoanalytic mechanisms without treatment being able to bring him a remedy to his conflicts.

Psychoanalysis does not only heal by making an individual's life intelligible. It is not only about making the subject understand his life, but also about making him live again and liquidating, within his relationship with the analyst, his ancient conflicts. With transference, the subject takes up the totality of his attitudes toward people and objects that make him what he is. All of his past object relationships reappear in his current *relationship with the psychoanalyst. This relationship has nothing to do* with his life's relations. The analyst does not intervene, he does not speak, he observes with an absolute impartiality. In not deciding for the subject, the analyst makes the subject decide for himself. The analytic situation substitutes the transference neurosis for a neurosis. It is therefore about an entirely different thing than a simple operation of *knowledge*. The relations revealed by psychoanalytic psychology could be true without psychoanalytic practice succeeding to heal, as inversely psychoanalytic art could be beneficial without Freud's theoretical explanations being founded. Psychoanalytic ideology could constitute a symbolic system that grasps neurosis without necessarily requiring that we hold it for a true philosophy. The diffusion of psychoanalytic psychology is inevitable because it is interested in everything and it is necessary for its progress to know. It must not mask (1) the necessity of a theoretical elaboration that determines the final meaning, and (2) the originality of psychoanalytic practice that requires a long apprenticeship.

A. The Child's Relations with Others According to Freud

These are molded for the first time by the relations with the parents. Each time that the adult has a difficulty, he has a tendency to regress to infantile behavior, influenced directly by his relations with his own parents. From these difficulties we see already in parental relations that *there is always a kind of tension between me and others.* Freud expresses this in many ways.

(1) *The opposition between the pleasure principle* through which the organism searches for immediate satisfaction and the *reality principle* that tends to defer this satisfaction. All relations with others require the abandonment of immediate pleasure. (2) The *opposition between narcissism* (the ego's solitude in its own reflection, self-esteem, and self-contemplation) and the *object relations*. Freud considers development as realizing a narcissistic reduction in favor of object relations ("narcissistic scars"). The child moves from a captive love to an ablative love that respects the other's difference. Freud gave to this developmental dynamic a fairly schematic description that later became more nuanced. *We first do an exposé of Freud's oldest schemas and then the additions he added. Finally, we look at his successors'*

schemas. This historical exposé is necessary, since theory is constructed by successive trials and errors. If we want to grasp the system's dynamic, we must understand these different states.

1. *Freud's early conceptions.* Freud started by describing the relations ego-other as the meeting of two exterior terms: *from the one side,* the unconscious, the drives, and the individual; *from the other side,* social control, the outside. Their relationship can only be a *collision.* The entire unconscious was quite closely attributed to repression. If there was a dynamic, it played out in the meeting of the individual and the exterior world (*dualism between individual and others*).

The elaboration that survived consisted in presenting the conflicts of man as conflicts with himself and not only with others. A complicity forms between me and the other such that when there is censorship, there is something in me that provokes the other. Freud takes up the notion of psychological "defense" as a general notion wherein *repression* is only a particular case of defense. He defines defense mechanisms as a series of operations by which the ego tries to oppose tendencies coming from ourselves. (Anna Freud defined ten of these tendencies.) Psychoanalysis is not only a psychology "of depth," of the "abyss," but also an ego psychology; it is not depleted in the study of the unconscious.

The individual appears split between the ego and the self (le Ça, das Es, the Id): individual part, anonymous, unconscious.[24] The study of the self evidently encompasses repression. I am my *ego* as well as I am my *self.* It appears even that I am in triplicate: the superego (the ideal ego, what I would like to be, the model of myself) represents the introduction in the ego of parental characters whom I admire and with whom I identify. For Freud, the superego constitutes the end of the Oedipal crisis. The total subject is no longer only a desire and a vital force that goes toward its fulfillment. On the contrary, the subject's interior has an ego and a superego (image of others that limit my drives), even if I could say that there is in me a life instinct and a death instinct and that repression is less mine than the drives are. My developmental dynamic rests on a conflict with myself. The life instinct is itself ambiguous, since it supposes that we accept what Freud called "the noise" and "complication," yet nonetheless pleasure goes toward relaxation and rest.[25]

In the beginning, Freud tended to branch masochism off from sadism. But he subsequently separated them less and less. Aggression toward the other is already aggression against myself. The hatred of others is only a reflection of conflict with myself. We move thus from a conception where the ego is opposing social censorship to one where the relationship with others comes through our relationship with ourselves. Initial dualism is "interiorized." Narcissism that was considered as an at-

titude of departure is later understood as a permanent component of human life; the same goes for object relations.

From this a new signification arises in psychoanalytic wisdom. From the beginning, we could ask if conflict between the unconscious and the social did not give, for Freud, all its sense to human life. Wasn't Freudianism an assertion against all social machinery? Following the texts, we can understand that for Freud the problem is not erasing social barriers. The real "release" does not consist in removing an exterior obstacle; it consists in a modification of our own attitude toward ourselves that will render us capable of relations with others. It is to make appear in the subject a situation of freedom that will make possible a coexistence with others.[26]

In Freud's early work, the matrix of our relations with others is the sexual and pregenital relations with our parents. This compels all the subsequent clarifications: what is the real nature of this pregenital sexuality? The first sexual manifestations appear at the beginning of life: oral sexuality. In the sucking period (relationship between the child and the mother who nourishes him), the relationship does not make the child leave himself, pleasure overwhelms him. It is an autoerotic period. All forms of later sexuality that reappear at this stage will be autoerotic. Sexuality in this case only consists in what is barely an *act:* the subject is solely overrun by a state of pleasure. The following stage is characterized by the *bite.* The meaning of biting behavior becomes understandable due to the study of primitives; that is, the totemic meal where consumption provides an absorptive relationship with the sacred object. The relationship with the object is one of destruction: to love is to destroy. This relation incorporates a sadistic and cruel element, one of a power instinct. Only when the child moves to the genital stage does he learn to love without sadism.

This stage of oral sexuality is followed by a stage of anal sexuality. At first glance, retention and expulsion do not seem to be related to parental relations. But it is under parental control that the child learns to master his sphincters. This explains how Freud can give to defecation the sense of a gift and later the sense of "delivering a baby" [*mettre au monde*]. This act becomes a way of affirming power. The training the child undergoes has the effect of privileging the attitude of retention on the basis of distrust: refusal to give, the desire to hide. Spontaneity is ruptured by a too abrupt control: the original formation of character. The phallic stage succeeds these two stages in the later conceptions of Freud. It coincides with the Oedipal stage and belongs to the *genital sexuality.* We will speak later about the phallic stage.

Why does Freud call the sexual and pregenital stages both anal and oral? Does Freud want to say that the same libido that brings genital life is already present in the pregenital stages and is applied to anal and oral

apparatuses? This metaphysical conception that makes us think about the dormitive power of opium would be in disagreement with Freud's ideas, since he dramatically showed that in its adult form genital activity presupposes a historical elaboration in the individual's history; it is not therefore a question carrying it out in advance.

The initial libido cannot at all resemble what we normally would call a "sexual instinct," since Freud's work consists largely in showing that no *ready-made* instincts exist. Why does he thus call pregenital activity sexual? He wants to say that there is a behavior in relation to the mother and father's sexual differences insofar as they are different without there being any knowledge of how, nor any knowledge of the general mechanism. There is sexuality in an anticipatory sense, a sense of discrimination between the sexes that is prior to the complete functioning of the genital apparatus: a *pre-mature* sexuality.

This difficulty does not seem to stop Freud, who often speaks in a realist language, from introducing the libido as an occult quality. It is as if, from the beginning of life, it was *destined* to be put into action in the genital apparatus, and as if it immediately possessed a sexual character before possessing the means or the instruments of expression. But once again, this conception is difficult to reconcile with the fundamental idea of Freud according to which all that is related to the genital *resulted* from the individual's history. The initial libido should be indeterminate: *the child is polymorphously perverse.* Some indications permit us to correct the realist conception of the libido. When he declared that the child's activity is sexual as soon as he is born, Freud wanted only to say that *the child knows the difference between his parents' sexes.*

This sexuality that by definition is *vague* is most often expressed in fantasies. *There would be a kind of anticipation of sexual relations* that the child could not know. The Oedipus complex represents *psychological puberty.* The child has the astonishing power to *transport himself into the relations of adult life,* even though he cannot really imagine it or participate in it. Apropos of this subject, an important idea of Freud's is that from the beginning of the Oedipus complex, *the identification with the parent of the same sex would be primary,* and not the love for the other parent.[27] This makes the precociousness of the child's sexual life more understandable. If the young boy, for example, senses the mother's presence as a sexed being, it is first of all because he identifies with his father. The "sexuality" is less a searching for the other sex than it is the child's identification with his own sex. *All relationships of the child with a parent are relations with any person in relation to this parent. The child takes on the relationship the father has with the mother.* It is about a diffuse, anonymous sexuality. We can thus conceive of sexual relations as a permanent dimension of infantile life

without this sexuality being known explicitly by the child, or without it being expressed or expressible in adult language. This sexuality is ambiguous: a body that is not yet genital is nonetheless capable of carrying sexual characteristics.

The child's sexual instinct is not yet centered. Sexual relationships are carried by an organism that is not yet itself. Freud writes that there is a path between the sexual functions and what they are not: a path that could be taken in two senses. These functions can be assumed to be provisory by other apparatuses that at the same moment are the child's principal vehicle with the world. A kind of *sexualization* of buccal and intestinal apparatuses exists. (Later mechanisms of desexualization will appear: sublimation phenomena.) Sexuality is capable of annexing domains that are not its own, domains that become desexualized by adult activities.

The idea of "sexualization" is already introduced in the *Three Essays,* giving us a better understanding of the ambiguous character of pregenital sexuality. Freud already says in the *Three Essays* that sexuality is the backdrop to vital functions. He admits that the relationship between curiosity and sexuality is not simple because there are elements in curiosity that are not specifically sexual. "Sexual love and filial love," he says again, "draw from the same source."

Anna Freud wrote that "the Oedipus complex is simply a practical and almost algebraic manner to assign to the child a collection of tendencies toward an exclusive love for the parent of the opposite sex."[28] As soon as the child is in the world, he anticipates it and takes what is offered by his situation. He experiences his mother as an absolute. The term "algebraic" strips the historical signification of the Oedipus complex. Oedipus was an adult and the complex took place at the level of childhood; there is no question of realizing in the child an adult libido. Thus, there is no metaphysics of the libido here, but a capacity of absolute adhesion in the child, a capacity to identify with one parent and love the other.

Freud never said this in his texts, but only this interpretation permits us to understand why Freud, in the *Three Essays,* rejects an idealist deflection (Jung's "psychic energy" libido) and he also *refuses any pansexual explanation.* Man, situated in a body that has a sex, is inhabited by a demand for total love that makes him anticipate the roles of adult life. Fundamentally, the idea is that of *incarnation:* man is situated in a body without being reduced to it.

This concrete sense of the notion of sexuality is only drawn out little by little in Freud's work. In the *Three Essays,* the passage from narcissism (from captive where sadism is the reality) to ablative (where the objective appears) is described as a passage from a *passive pleasure to discharge.* The genital stage is characterized in a completely physiological manner (dis-

charge). (We should not forget that Freud always described the masculine libido, like all libidos, as having a masculine essence.) However, even in the *Three Essays* and in other texts introducing sexual development into psychological motivations, Freud shows that in the latency period, a development of tenderness combines with a new sexual pressure in puberty. He says it is *as if a tunnel was pierced at once from two sides.* This image already provides a more satisfying notion of psychological and physiological relations.

2. *Freud's corrections to his early schemas.*[29] Freud increasingly dismisses an essentially physiological schema, and psychological motivations intervene more often. The idea of a series of successive, well-delineated stages decreasingly occurs, since we always find elements of the preceding stage within a stage. For example, Freud relinquishes a disconnection between the narcissistic and object stages (for instance, in the psychoanalysis of Hans), and he considers narcissism and object relations as two permanent poles in the individual's life. The Oedipal stage is less clearly isolated than it was before. The same goes for the successful object (ablative) relations and the elimination of narcissism that appears increasingly as an undertaking [*tâche*] and not as a *state.* From these two evolutions a third results: a deepening in the study of the Oedipus complex. Sex is less and less defined from a physiological point of view.

In the same individual, insofar as the individual is bisexual, a normal and an inverse complex exist. From the moment when the normal Oedipus complex is preceded or accompanied by the inverse Oedipus complex, all constructs are affected. The being to whom the child is attached by an *object* connection is, *at the same time,* the being with whom he identifies.

Structure of ego, the condition of the relation with others. Freud's new analysis of the ego starts from his remark that the dream is not always the realization of a desire. Unpleasant dreams exist. The child repeats displeasing scenes, in order to become master of them (abreaction), in order to be free of them and to erase their harmful [*vulnérant*] character. A connection exists between the relations with others and the relation with oneself. All narcissistic scars are compensated for by aggressive behavior toward others. In particular, projection mechanisms constitute placing in the other what one feels in oneself; it is a kind of individual defense against oneself, a way to ignore real interior dangers.

We catch sight of the idea of a system in three terms: (1) *the conscious ego* (my life "techniques," what I accept being), (2) *the self* (my spontaneity), and (3) *the others* and how they are represented in me.

The relations with others pass through the relation with oneself. When I defend myself against another, in reality, I am defending my-

self against myself. The ego constructs barriers, "counter-charges." The trauma is a rupture of these barriers created by anxiety. The only activity that will deliver us is repairing, the act of repetition, through which we try to erase the traumatic experience. We must admit that there is present everywhere in us *a demonic principle*, a tendency to stagnation, a force of moment and of countermovement. The self is also inhabited by such a power of negation. All searching for pleasure tends toward relaxation, to rest. In summation, even in our instincts themselves there is a desire to die, to cease to exist: *the organism simply only wants to die in its own manner.* Thus, at the interior of the self there are negative aspects, a death instinct, and in the ego, there are positive aspects.

Sexual instincts contain an antipathy toward themselves: *primary masochism* (tendency toward self-negation). There is no derivation between the self-aggression and aggression toward others, but instead they form a system. In comparison to narcissism, where we find two kinds of behavior—loving without being loved and being loved without loving—the mature attitude consists in accepting both terms and not choosing between them. Ambiguity is normal but different than disassociation. These considerations permit us to understand the three instincts: ego, self, superego. They are not three realities outside one another, but three aspects of a single dialectic of personal life.

(1) *The ego.* In a Freudian sense, the perception-consciousness system is what brings me in relationship with the exterior world, searching for contact with reality, for proof of reality. Whatever the experience, the ego looks for various technical means of action to control it. A large number of these means of action are acquired in the course of the latency stage: reading, writing, learning at school. What results is a greater margin of freedom, a greater facility with responses in the adult. But the child finds himself more often in situations that he doesn't possess the means to respond to, ones that Freud, after 1926, defines as *anxiety* (anxiety was initially defined as the result of sexual repression. It now has become the principle of repression. The weakness of the child's ego constantly causes the experience of *danger*).

(2) *Relationships between the ego and the other two.* There are no disconnections, no frontiers between them. The ego is the part of the self that grasps reality. It takes on all the forces of the self and is used as a tool of command (compare the rider as the ego and his horse as the self). At the same time, strictly instinctual forces seek relaxation and reach a simple state of pleasure that immediately stops: a kind of negation of the self by the self. The ego goes on to function by practically using the forces and mediating between them. There is no antithesis between the ego and the self. The ego finds in the self a kind of complicity: Anna Freud declares

that "*the defense mechanisms are not the work of the ego alone.* There exists *a tendency of the drive to return to its contrary.*"[30] The work of ego control is searched for by the self: complicity between the self (pleasure principle) and the ego (reality principle). Even though it is true that Eros, a component of the self, tends to enter into conflict with the ego, we do not have to radically oppose the pleasure and reality principles. Freud shows the transition that exists between the two: "*the self comprises all the physical elements that the ego draws out.*" If the unconscious is unconscious, it is us who resist it. But since the operations of resistance escape us and since they are a function of the ego, it follows that *a part of the ego is unconscious.* Freud recognizes that he must amend the notion of the unconscious; we see more clearly what it signifies, since it is at the same time controlled and controlling, suppressed and suppressing, repressed and repressing.

(3) *Relationships between the superego and the other two.* The superego is constituted by a first outline in the ego-ideal. An ideal is a manner of compensating for what we are and what we represent as what we want to be. Originally, the ego-ideal arises from our relation with others. When the relation fails, the ego wants to embellish it. It introduces the other in itself and makes the other a part of itself. Character is partly formed by these introjections. The self is the origin of the formation of the super-ego. It is the self whom I want to please. The object libido becomes the narcissistic libido, to love others in myself or for others to love me.

In the oral stage, parental identification forms the first layer; it is the only mode of relating to the other. The narcissistic element will always subsist, even in objective choices. The child wants *to be* who he loves more than he wants to *have* the beloved. When the object resists, the child renounces it as an object and introduces it in himself. During the Oedipal crisis, when the child reaches an impasse, he interiorizes his parents. The superego is the heir of the self. I have the superego before me more than on my side: it is how I can contemplate myself. This consciousness, this observation of the myself is only partially attained. Freud wants to say that the superego is not always an ideal that is entirely conscious and with which I expressly represent myself, but a being toward which I tend, a witness toward whom and before whom I act. The superego is the affective ideal of my life, the pole toward which my main actions are oriented. The superego, this plea for control, sometimes tends toward the negation of what I am. However, it is not an exterior element, since it is the ego who introduces the superego within itself.

What are these three agencies (instances)? They are not three consciousnesses at the interior of my consciousness, nor are they three personalities at the interior of my personality. Between the superego and the self, the ego finds itself as the industrious and willing recapitulation of

spontaneous elements under the gaze of the superego. What Freud presents us with as the ideal type of relation with others is not a relationship where the superego dominates the ego, nor is it a relationship where the ego dominates the superego. It is a relationship where the three agencies are no longer cut off from one another. When the self, the ego, and the superego are separated, neurosis and pathology result. Take, for example, the disassociation in hysteria and the repression of the obsessive neurotic. The goal of psychoanalytic treatment is to reestablish the communication between the three instances; to have only one life where they manifest at their levels. Each one, because each is self-contradictory, calls for the others.

The initial schema according to which the relations with others move from narcissism to object, from "pleasure" to "discharge," becomes more complete, more concrete. Pleasure tends to escape itself, reality is not introduced from outside. The object relation is susceptible to assume two forms: (1) the real object relation, and (2) the pseudo-object relation: when we self-identify with others. The presence of others does not make us leave ourselves, since in fact there is a failure of the real relation (a case of Oedipal impasse). At each minute, the child is oriented toward a life for which he does not have the skills, and it is thus inevitable that he will want to "be" what he cannot "have." Identification threatens all our relations with others. Freud even asks if what he calls sublimation might not be ascribed to an introjection mechanism. He concludes in the negative, but it is characteristic that the question is posed. It is possible that certain individuals never arrive at a real object relation. Relations with others appear as an inevitable tension between one of the two terms of the relation with the other. The subject wants to remain in his immanence, which is difficult to overcome. The other's alterity can only be obtained by true objectivity. Certain forms of devotedness to the other are narcissistic: a search for one's own satisfaction. All purely interior veneration also has the chance of being narcissistic. It is easier to cherish a memento than a living person. If we transfer the other in us, if we interiorize the other, it is so we can shelter ourselves from surprises and deceptions. The two extremes of initial narcissism and secondary (introjection) narcissism are similar. Beyond this opposition real human relations begin.

B. Contributions from Freud's Successors: Glover and Abraham's Work

We study the way in which Freud's students elaborated the notion of pregenital sexuality and the relations with others in the initial period of life. *Glover and Abraham's work.*[31] These works give a more concrete image

of the way in which the relation with others is inaugurated at the beginning of life. These pregenital relations are formulated in the adult's character, and from there comes the necessity of *a character psychoanalysis,* since a psychoanalysis of events turns out to be insufficient. Character is not a simple reflection of events; it represents a surplus, as a remainder of an individual prehistory or an archeological period of life. When the nursing infant is with his mother, he learns certain attitudes: in the oral stage, an attitude of response, in the anal stage, an attitude of possession, in the genital stage, an attitude of gift. A happy development supposes an integration of these three attitudes. The genital stage suppresses while retaining. Adult regression will be dominated by previous stages. One of the phases, the oral stage, for example, might be overaccentuated (fixation) in two opposed ways. On the one hand, the child might be very well nourished; on the other, he could be very poorly nourished (food signifies not only a good diet, but also a harmonious relationship with the mother). From these two manners, the result is that the child reaches later phases with an onrush of desire. If the child is frustrated, he has the tendency to reproduce the previous phase. If an excess of passion exists, the later phase is a disappointment and the child regresses to the previous one.

Pregenital stages are ambivalent. Relations have a twofold sense due to the relationships the child can, at the considered moment, enter into with others. His interoceptive body is unfit to live in the exterior environment. The child finds himself in a state of powerlessness and dependency. He oscillates between pleasure and aggressivity (when there is no longer any way to arrive at satisfaction). Hence the child has a double image of mother. At once she is beneficent and evil. The immediate and direct relation is love or aggressivity. A sadistic component is found in the two stages. Not only do the causes produce the predominance of one stage opposed to others, but also the effects do.

If a certain phase produces a frustrating situation, the child tends to defend himself, but he is not always conscious of his defense. The adult's attitudes that were established in this infantile phase can be opposed. Thus, such a characterology would give at least a picture of characteristic behavior of the "oral character" or of the "anal character"; since the symptoms can vary, a certain *style* of behavior can be found in contradictory behavior. The oral phase constitutes the departure point from which the individual will never forget what attitude he has. We can find common traits in the anal and oral character, but the behaviors will not have the same style. For example, anal and oral subjects show a great magnanimity, but this behavior does not have the same sense for each. In the anal subject, periods of wastefulness alternate with periods of avarice.

Characteristics of the oral stage in the child and its adult expressions. For

a principal reason, the characters are less clear in the anal stage. All oral manifestations are more accepted than anal ones; for example, greediness, pleasure of the mouth, speaking. In its surplus, the oral stage is older and is modified by later stages. Abraham admits that the anal stage is never pure, and it already supposes some breakdowns in the preceding stage. Certain phenomena might come from the oral stage; for example, the ambition that only appears at the phallic stage and that, in fact, is only revised by this last stage. The oral stage is characterized by the pleasure of lactation, then by the pleasure of chewing. We can distinguish two parts of this stage.

(1) The *primary oral stage* is characterized by a state of violent immediate desire. Without his mother, the child can do nothing, he is destitute of means. He experiences a sentiment of powerlessness when he does not have what he is waiting for, and has a sentiment of being all-powerful when his desires are satisfied. According to Glover, we must admit that the relation with the object has a chaotic character here.

(2) *Secondary oral stage.* Biting represents a rudimentary technique that consists in incorporating the loved individual: *a cannibalistic stage* (Freud). It is a kind of immediate communication with the object by absorption. There is almost no interval between the instinctual tensions and the emotional discharge.

(3) *Theoretical schema of the oral character.* The following traits are particularly important: all-powerful ideas; object ambivalence; quick emotional discharge; fast, alternating periods of excitation and depression; tendency to see, touch, sense; and a participation of the skin and muscles with the buccal activity (erotization of the act of eating). This kind of theoretical schema of what becomes an oral character is founded upon clinical observation.

(4) *Oral types linked to the primary stage* are characterized by impatience, magnanimity, gaiety, sociability, an open spirit to new ideas, a tendency to worry, and hastiness.

(5) *Oral types linked to the secondary stage* are characterized by a destructive tendency, envy, jealousy, hostility, a caustic character, a conservative (in the large sense of the word) spirit, and by touchiness.

(6) *Characteristics of primary oral subjects.* Primary oral subjects have a tendency to be perpetual babies, to be optimists, empathic, to believe they will always be protected. They are characterized by an overestimation of speaking, by an eager way of speaking, by a love of abrasive and incisive speech, by quick and expeditious behavior (particularly in love), by their interest in psychological questions, and their eagerness for knowledge. A failed primary oral stage drives the overaccentuation of the subsequent phase. The same occurs, however, for a too enjoyable primary stage. In

these two cases, the subject moves to the secondary oral stage with eagerness, hence an inordinate expectation, deception, and regression.

(7) *Characteristics of secondary oral subjects:* subjects whose preferred behaviors are insistence, supplication, and making demands. They are characterized by a complete intolerance of solitude, even momentary ("vampire" attitude), by an attitude of pessimism or depression, but also a suffering ambition, a desire to succeed, to be promoted, a desire accompanied by the idea that it is impossible, intermittent activity, eclipse-like activity, with phases of rest and inactivity. They are attentive to questions of schedule; they have the habit of reading in the evening before sleeping (relationship with evening nursing). They are envious and do not like to share. (For instance, the case of a professor who did not enjoy teaching in his specialty and always preferred to give particular lessons. The case of a man who had a horror of dining in a restaurant with his wife in order to not share the intimate ceremony of dining with others; the case of another man living in the country who was concerned about being the first to awaken in order to take possession of the house and garden before the others. He also concealed news, keeping to himself what he learned, and had a horror of conversations that he didn't participate in.)

This collection of characteristics can take place from reaction formations designed to mask early attitudes, for example, the insistence on giving. (The case of hosts who insist that one take more of a dish and who seem strongly disappointed if one refuses; the case of those who love to drink, of those who water down advice to you or give showy gifts.) What permits a similarity between these and earlier ones is that in all cases, the situations of this genre are themselves overaccentuated, in one sense or another (attitude of the same style). For example, an excess of amiability can hide significant aggressivity. In many respects, these subjects have a sadistic character, a desire to aggravate others. But we must distinguish this secondary oral sadism from anal sadism. The second is characterized by the desire to keep, by attachment to certain objects, the first by the fear of loss which does not depend on the value of what is possessed.

Analysis of the anal stage. The characteristics of this stage are more convincing because they are more visible. This stage is more repressed and more recent. Its origin is the child's experience from training to cleanliness. The control of excretion follows two goals: to repress any infantile tendency to coprophilia and dirtiness, as well as to regularize the timing of excretion. What does this education signify psychologically? For Abraham, the collection of functions gives rise to a narcissistic pleasure, to the impression of omnipotence. For the child, it is about sacrificing everything from the moment of training to cleanliness in exchange for the *parents' praise.* (The parents often overaccentuate the importance of

stools.) This praise permits the baby to acquire control over his sphinc-ters. If he did not receive this affective compensation, there would be a fundamental permanent conflict. (Abraham cites the case of an ill woman who was very well-raised, well adapted, supple, gentle, capable of self-mastery; however, there appeared in her a foundation of insolence and a spirit of vengeance which rose up unannounced. The second of three children, she was subjected to a premature training at the same time as the eldest child, and one found in her an incapacity to exchange primitive anarchy for an adapted condition.)

In order for an education on toilet training to take place, the neces-sary psychological condition is that the child leaves a kind of organic life. The child must become interested in others, in his mother, and particu-larly in his family. It is for the other's love that the child will sacrifice. Fear can produce apparently excellent results, but then *the libido remains in a narcissistic fixation* and incapable of communicating oneself to others, a diminution of the ability to love. The omnipotence of this thought would be tied to the omnipotence of excretion. It would produce in subjects conflicted by this stage a diminution of power in all relations with others.

The anal character. Four traits can be distinguished after Freud's and Abraham's studies. (1) *Desire for omnipotence, sentiment of uniqueness.* Only what the anal subjects make of themselves is well done. They resist any in-trusion by others, they are faithful to their own decisions and to the rules they give themselves. (A mother, for example, controls her daughter's program, a program where different points are numbered.) These sub-jects are "restricted" in themselves; they resist hands of friendship from outside (relationship with the child who begs to be alone). Refusing to excrete represents the outline of the anal character: certain subjects only give so that one does not ask of them. (Take the case of a married man who refused to give money to his wife when she asked for it, but he would give it to her later when she did not ask.) Or they give in little amounts what is asked of them, a reluctant giving similar to the fragmentary stools of the child. (Take the case of a patient who fed his goat straw by straw.) The anal subject critiques others: *he is discontent.* He is sensitive about his independence and autonomy; *he is persistent or stubborn.* Faced with the psychoanalyst, the anal subject shows a lively resistance that manifests itself in different ways: sometimes refusing free association (active resis-tance), sometimes waiting for questions in silence (passive resistance). These subjects want to keep control themselves. This attitude is accom-panied by an orientation toward passive homosexuality. The regression of instinctual activity in the anal stage leads to a decrease in productivity. The sadistic component in this attitude renders anal subjects inferior to what they could be.

(2) *Tendency to only act at the last moment, to defer acting.* But when they begin to act, they follow the action obstinately until the end. (Jung's introverts would be such subjects.) This tendency could be related to delaying excretion. Anal subjects shrink from solicitations from outside (the case of certain writers, for example). They are often jealous, the stranger is an interloper.

(3) *Interest in money, some kinds of greediness.* This interest is not necessarily translated into the deliberate desire to keep everything for oneself. They take care of their money in a fastidious way, but they do not know how to get a large profit. There is a relationship between excretion, money, and all that has value. Saving, for anal subjects, is the same as holding back. (Abraham cites the case of a banker who dictated that his children should hold back as long as possible so that they could absorb the most amount of food.) We find in these subjects all the nuances of greediness: some do not want to spend for nondurable acquisitions. (Take the case of a man who would buy records, but wouldn't pay to go to a concert.) Food is, in general, placed in a category of important things. (Take the case of those who often weigh themselves.) Some persons skimp on insignificant things. (Take the case of a man who had the habit of not buttoning his clothes so he didn't wear out his buttonholes.) They practice economies of time: only time consecrated to work is not lost. They don't know how to relax: one of the possible factors of the "Sunday neurosis" is the anal character. Very often they do two things at once. Abraham analyzes the custom adopted by certain subjects to read on the toilet. This had a double signification: to utilize time to a maximum; excretion being synonymous with production, one activity encourages the other. (Take the case of a subject in analysis who finds his best idea associations on the toilet.) The taste for collections, making a census of money and objects (Harpagon's inventory of his treasure; writers who love to read themselves) would be tied to the same attitude.[32] Some do not love to be separated from objects and save everything. (Take the case of a woman who tricked herself when tidying up in order to lose objects that she would not want to throw out.) From time to time, they make a large ordering (analogous attitude to the double rhythm of retention and liberation). Some subjects hesitate to wear unused clothing and "store" them. Anal subjects are sensitive to everything that concerns the utilization of leftovers, a frequent attitude in schizophrenics. As a matter of course, these traits can alternate with opposite characteristics: some forms of hasty wastefulness are symmetrical to the attitudes described above. What characterizes this type of behavior is the overaccentuation of acts in relation to money.

(4) *Meticulous taste for cleanliness, order, purity, taste really more appar-*

ent than real, a kind of reaction formation. (The case of subjects who are clean on the exterior but have dirty underclothes; the case of subjects who have clean desks when cupboards are disordered; they are only concerned about what is visible.) It is a surface phenomenon. Anal subjects have the taste for symmetry (adolescent dreams; crossing into a given space in an even number of steps; the case of a patient who buys something each time his wife makes an acquisition for herself). Some anal subjects forget their debts and want to be even with others. In the two cases, the same motive is at play, to be independent. They have the sense of exactitude, of precision, they have the tendency to occupy themselves with the "backside" of things; they often confuse right and left, east and west, a kind of generalized reversal. (Sexual inversion would be its most visible symptom.) By a sort of habit reversal, they are up when the rest of the world is sitting; they work when everyone else rests, and make a system of this attitude. They sometimes have a taste for curious foods; *they are "originals."* (The case of a student who ate a meal in an inverse order of courses and who in fact became paranoid.) Finally, they have the tendency to project and exchange roles.

Physiognomy of anal subjects. The anal character, according to Freudians, ends up visibly inscribing itself on an individual, even modifying his physiognomy. Abraham characterizes the anal physiognomy by the following traits: morose air, expression of narcissistic satisfaction, accentuation of the furrow nasal-labial, and predominance of the upper lip; the anal subject has an air of sniffing, of suspicion, of investigating himself. (Take the case of a subject who sniffed his hands and objects.) Thus, this characterology doubles as a physiognomy; it is not at all a simple juxtaposition of facial traits that matter, but general mimicry. The physiognomic traits are interesting because of their function in the face, reflecting behavior.

Analysis of the genital function. Abraham tried to characterize this stage in opposition to previous ones. He did not insist much because the genital function is the constant subject of psychoanalysis. Love expressed through normal sexuality constitutes the means to overcome what the imperfect, aggressive, and narcissistic residue of previous phases, all of which the libido will drain. We cannot believe this, insofar as this maturation does not contain any degree of kind or difficulty. In particular, Abraham insisted on the existence of a stage that realized a genital maturation without a corresponding psychological maturation—the phallic stage would be the introduction to the genital stage. The maternal body is, for the child, a subject of surprise and worry. Although he has been invested with the libido during the Oedipal crisis, this is insufficient to pass to the genital stage properly speaking. In order for the affective relation

with the other to be realized, it is not necessary for it to be centered on the genital organs of the opposite sex. When this situation is surpassed (passage to the phase of tenderness), we do not have to believe this will only be owned by the genital apparatus. It is necessary that this attitude be encompassed by a larger activity: tenderness. During this latent phase, the characteristics of tenderness and the affective capacity to be connected to others are acquired. At the same time, the apparatus of the ego develops. All this signifies that the Freudians consider an elimination of the fetishism of the genital (falsely attributed to Freud) as revealed by activities that have not attained their goals and activities that are centered on the genital apparatus.

Range and significance of this characterology. Freud's explanation of sexuality. In response to what we have said above, if we consider the pregenital stages, there is no sexuality in the restricted sense. There is a relationship with others and with the sexual characteristics of others, but it is carried by the corporal, and not the genital, apparatus (the latter would be an illusion: a projection of adult sexuality in the child). Sexuality in the adult sense is not yet present. What, in the adult, would be genital relations is for the child a relationship with the opposite sex by the means of apparatuses other than the genital one. *It is not legitimate to say that Freud wanted to show that the mouth, for example, is sexualized in the adult sense of the word.* He wanted to show that the mouth is an affective vehicle which, in the adult, will be more or less genital.

The genital stage itself is not at all only defined by genital activity. What matters is that it is an ablative phase, an offering. Maturity is the integration of the genital in object relations. From a Freudian point of view, any genital activity that is not fully ablative would be paranormal. This genital activity only functions harmoniously when it assimilates the tenderness acquired during the genital stage. A phallic libido only is realized in the negation of a full libido. This is what Freud would have wanted to explain regarding sexual behavior; sexual behavior is the bearer of relationships with others.

Is psychoanalytic characterology explicative and causal? Should we admit that Freud wanted to explain character traits by the functioning of certain parts of the body, for example, the mouth or the anus? The body, the digestive apparatus do not play an explicit role as the bearer of a man's typical attitude. Consequently, it is not the body as a material mass that plays an important role, but the body as integrated in human life. The primary attitude is reception, the secondary attitude is conservation. The analysis of character types does not draw its relevance from the fact that certain character traits are associated with certain parts of the body, but from the act where character traits reveal a typical bodily behavior.

What would take place is an examination of the connection between the psychological and the corporeal in psychoanalysis: *the connection of symbolization* (the mouth is the symbol of reception; the anus that of conservation; the genital apparatus that of ablation). These behaviors are tied to the detectable presence of the same sense, the same in human life, in existence. They are a manner of existing. We see that this way of understanding psychoanalysis is profoundly different than the current simplistic way. Psychoanalysis bears upon bodily functions with the total manner of existing. The body, even by its structure, overaccentuates certain attitudes. This point of view is thus completely different from that of classical psychology, which explains the body by the mind or the mind by the body. The psychoanalytic characterology is neither idealist (the body is only an instrument) nor is it a kind of explanation of the psychical by the bodily. For the psychoanalyst, what is original is the structure of the body as an emblem of life.

The above does not at all bring us to an imperious fatality. Certainly, psychoanalysis insists on the importance of the past, the infantile past in particular, but the connection between the prior and what follows is *a relationship of integration, of the relationship of parts to a whole.* Inasmuch as the integration is not realized, one can discern easily recognizable traits. When integration fails, regression occurs. Abraham insisted on the fact that character is not definitely drawn by childhood; after childhood, a construction and reconstruction of character are effectuated. The present adds its own contribution. All love brings about restructurations. The present remains open; everything is overdetermined. No fixed point of our past continues to exercise its role without being reprised and modified by the rest of our lives.

All this happens as if the givens of our childhood were themes we utilize. We confer a sense to these givens. The beginnings of life do not create a fatality; all possibilities remain. Childhood is only a starting situation. Character traits have a general and ambivalent character. What is inherited by the adult is the preponderance of such a dimension or such an ordering of problems or such an ordering of difficulties. How the individual will solve these problems is another affair; it is not fixed. An anal subject's behavior, for example, will have a compulsive character, but there are possibilities of reaction formation or sublimation, and nothing predestines his behavior to give or to conserve. The predominance of the archaic is a ground upon which we construct our present and our future, which themselves present difficulties insofar as the past has not yet been integrated. It is always true that behavior has a connection to the past, but many solutions are open to us. We must no longer believe that the present eliminates the past. We must take an idea that is analo-

gous to Hegel's on overcoming: to conserve in transforming. All stages bring a contribution to adult life. Oral components provide an energy *turned toward the future; anal components furnish other contributions* in preserving something profound and continual. Even sadism furnishes a positive contribution in providing a spirit of battle. In fact, there is a relative overcoming. Psychoanalysts are far from thinking that the past is overridden. The normal character has pregenital components. Each stage gathers and elaborates upon the contributions of previous ones. From the moment of nursing, these traces remain in the adult.

Abraham thinks that the adult character is not an even medium but an integration (a self-coherence). There are only individual norms. This rejoins the modern physiologists' point of view: privileged behaviors are different according to the individual. Each has his own manner of acting; individual gestures are unbelievably different. For example, a manner is held differently by individuals. Similarly, there is no normal temperature for every body, nor is there an optimal proportion of calcium in the blood of all people. The idea of a general norm does not suit this domain. Psychoanalysts are close enough to this idea when saying that the mature character is not an even medium. Such behavior after such a past would be normal. It is abnormal in another person who did not have the same past. Normal signifies integrated: different character traits are assumed by the total organism. On the subject of *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood,* Freud says that everything is explained by the artist's past and that, in another sense, nothing is explained by his past (his works of art). Leonardo da Vinci was an illegitimate son who only later had a normal family life. His mother was a kind of unique parent for da Vinci, and from her came his interest in legends of female animals that conceived alone: for example, the vulture. We can find these childhood fantasies in his paintings: the vulture in the folds of Saint Anne's coat. *Freud does not pretend to explain art with this psychological genealogy.* If, in a sense, in all adult connections to the child (for example, anal subjects are sometimes sculptors or painters) there is something that escapes the past, it is the significant power that these elements have received in Leonardo da Vinci. This does not come from the child; it is the artist's conversion of his materials. Like what we said above about the present, art, like the present, escapes fatality.

When we enter into the domain of expression (taken in a large sense), everything happens as if the abnormal particularities of the artist were made profitable by the art (for example, the painting). From the moment when a man is an artist, a physiological trait becomes a method of expression. From this point of view, we could not accept Freud's ideas where he reduces the man in the man's search for his childhood. The

adult artist is only visible in the child if we already know his work. Thus, Freud does not reduce the adult, but makes the child, the nursing baby, greater [*grandit*], showing how the activities that we believe are purely "bodily" have a psychological importance. Moreover, a mother has always been considered very important in nursing or in the digestive functions of her child; even the facts that are shocking when reading Freud have been well known by mothers before him, but they have remained a secret between them and the child. *Freud was one of the first to take the child seriously;* not by showing an explanation for bodily functions, but that these bodily functions take place in a psychic dynamism. The digestive tube not only serves for digestion, but is also a manner of entering into relationship with the world. The child's fate is to perceive the inequality between small and large and to aim toward the large. Melanie Klein says that what characterizes the pregenital stages is a limitless demand, an absolute manner to relate to the object.[33] In conclusion, as Montaigne said, it is not always that the most "brilliantly heavenly" [*supercélestes*] ideas are the most respectable. Freud wants to return the child to the current of existence where the body is the vehicle. These explanations are necessary to eliminate certain misunderstandings about psychoanalysis.

C. Contributions from Freud's Successors: Child Psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis was only applied later to the direct study of childhood; this study is interesting because it tries to bring verification or refutation to the ideas of adult psychoanalysis. Child psychoanalysis has confirmed these ideas, but it has also partly disrupted and reworked them. In order to study these modifications, we must make a brief historical survey of child psychoanalysis and its evolution. Sigmund Freud never performed a child psychoanalysis except by the intermediary of the father in the case of little Hans. Anna Freud systematically directed her work to child psychoanalysis, but in 1926 she argued that the classical orthodox technique is not applicable to children. Her opinion was founded on the following reasons.

1. *The child has no consciousness of illness, nor does he decide to heal. Anxiety is not resented for what it is, it is masked and elusive.* The result is that the analyst's relationship to the child is not the same as it is with the adult. The adult comes to the psychoanalyst of his own free will; he is conscious of his deficiencies and wants to remedy them. The analyst can count on the adult's good will in an essentially complicit manner. This is not possible with the child, and the analyst must intervene in the child's life (what he would not do with the adult). *The analyst must become an educator.* Or he makes himself the child's collaborator, or he makes himself have

a common cause with his superego. In every way, the analyst occupies an authority function, intervening in the child's life and abandoning his objective attitude. For example, a twelve-year-old obsessive whom Anna Freud tried to make relax, became perverse. Anna Freud intervened in an authoritarian manner, and this time the girl watched her language and stayed seated at the table.

2. *The child doesn't have a real neurosis about transference.* (Remember that there is a transference neurosis when the subject replaces his original neurosis with another one that transfers his conflicted relationships with others to his analyst.) This is not possible with the child because his relations with his parents are still ongoing. Essentially, in the adult, the parental conflicts are ones of the past; they are about fighting ghosts with the past. In the child, whose parents are living, they are not easy conflicts to erase, to transform the image the child has of his parents. The analysis cannot take place without knowing the parents. (It is possible in a clinic that one could obtain such results far away from the parents, but when the child returns to them, the results could disappear and a new neurosis could appear.) The parents must act to obtain an end to the child's pathological symptoms. For example, children become clean as soon as they are removed from the mother and stop when they are returned to her. The superego is not yet assured. Even later, during puberty, the parents' actions sometimes create an asocial character.

In addition, all interpretation of material can be accepted by a patient in whom the *ego* is educated. The truth is accepted even if it is disagreeable. The adult's superego is less cruel than the child's. The possibility of forming a relationship with the analyst is excluded in the child. The analyst must make himself the child's accomplice, but what will result is that the child will find it difficult to accept the analyst's interpretation when the analyst takes up the psychoanalytic attitude. The child's possibility of playing is present; he plays the parents against the analyst and the analyst against the parents. It is thus necessary to ask for a minimum of reports from the parents.

3. *The child refuses to freely associate.* In free association, the subject is in a relaxed state, he abandons himself to ideas that come to him and that he reads from the analyst. *The child acts more than he speaks;* hence one needs particular appropriate techniques: *the telling of dreams* (dreams are taken very seriously by the child) and *games* (studied particularly by Melanie Klein). The inconvenience of these techniques is that they do not reveal defense mechanisms. The child plays to play, and his playing activity is not oriented toward the psychoanalyst. The adult subject's entire behavior has an emblematic sense because he is in a transference situation, but in the child, we can only obtain fairly interesting material.

For example, according to Anna Freud, it is dangerous to interpret the materials of the game.

4. *The material that comes from a child analysis is often clearer* because the unconscious is closer than in the adult (not enough reaction formations are present), *but child analysis does not give material that comes before the period of language.* It is only the latency period that brings a series of false memories and reaction formations that alone are revelatory. It is easier to grasp the prehistory when it is masked; it is the mask that permits one to find what it conceals.

5. *The child is chronologically very close to the formation of his neurosis.* There is not the same long interval that in the adult is used to make action techniques which the subject can reemploy in other formations. If we free the adult from these forces, they find their reemployment. Such is not possible in the child; the child is incapable of sublimating. Hence there is the risk of a zigzag between neurosis and perversion, where the only risk of liberation is repression.

6. *Anna Freud's conclusion.* For the reasons above, Anna Freud concludes in 1926 that orthodox psychoanalytic technique is not applicable to the child and psychoanalysis should not be used with all children (in opposition to the Vienna school and the English school). Some neuroses can disappear by themselves. Symptoms can be carried away by the wave of development. (For example, an effeminate child will adopt a more virile attitude in his development.) There is a possibility of definitive overcoming. The neurotic trouble is characterized by a libidinal rigidity; a kind of calcification in the psyche's interior. But the majority of childhood troubles are not neurotic. For example, the *ego's* still deficient techniques sometimes build setbacks that are translated into obsessive fear. The child must learn to renounce certain resources, autocritical, guilt complex, hence the tendency to negate the exterior world and ignore one's own instincts (projection, introjection). All reaction mechanisms contain difficulties that in childhood are just overcome by age. There is only neurosis in a number of limited cases: hysteria or obsession. This accounts for the inability of the child to acquire certain techniques until he is of the age to understand them (the need to sometimes interrupt studies). Anna Freud's view here is similar to Sigmund Freud, who in 1905 only conducted a child psychoanalysis with the father as intermediary.

7. *Child psychoanalysis following Anna Freud (1946 conceptions).* Due to her experiments and discoveries in this domain, Anna Freud came to modify certain of her conceptions of 1926.[34] *She admitted the risk of perversion, of anarchic liberation arising due to psychoanalysis being weak.* From their coming to consciousness, tendencies lose their force. The reemployment of repressed energies is possible, the possibility of mechanisms

and sublimation exists. Thus, two of the preceding objections are lifted. *The development of the analysis of defense mechanisms of the ego* permits a better understanding of the child and abbreviates the introductory phase. Anna Freud tends to admit that the mother-child relationship is less of an authoritarian relationship than she thought in 1926. *Finally, parents are more familiar with psychoanalysis* and can have a more neutral, objective attitude. However, an opposition between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein remains, and a long discussion took place, at the British Psycho-Analytical Society, between these two tendencies.[35]

8. *Child psychoanalysis following Melanie Klein. If the analyst intervenes with an authoritarian attitude,* he awakens the child's anxiety and cannot get the child to relax. If he wants to make the child conscious of his wrongdoing, he will heighten the anguish and will not obtain a compensatory liberation. Fundamentally, the danger is the same as the insufficiencies or dangers of sex education. When explaining these questions with an objective tone, we do not touch the real conflict; we do not touch the child's personal case. The child can listen to explanations without applying them to his own case. (For example, a child who is witness to his parents' sexual relations is not relieved by explanations of the sexual act, and one achieves no result over his fantasies.) *If there is no transference neurosis, there is still a partial transference,* since the child adopts an attitude toward the analyst who is the parent's substitute. The parents who are living can carry their examination to the analyst, whereas the adult's deceased parents cannot any longer. The child's parents can change the attitude toward the analyst. Their presence is, in a sense, an advantage.

The lack of free association is due to *an excess of anxiety* and not the child's incapacity. Being deprived of this method makes us deprived of an indispensable resource. Verbalization is necessary since it permits grasping language, which is the most direct connection to the world. A psychoanalysis without verbalization will be ineffectual because it deprives the subject from taking possession of his own life. The difficulty comes in that the child is not used to verbalizing his own experience, nor is he used to putting his life in formulas, but there is no way to avoid this principle. *The danger of perversion is not an objection,* since in fact experience shows that psychoanalysis does not substitute repression for perversion but gives a conscious critical attitude.

9. *Melanie Klein's conclusions.* The failures of child psychoanalysis that Melanie Klein speaks of hold only if one has not risked a direct child analysis. We must see in this attitude a kind of resistance, in Anna Freud, to psychoanalysis. (Nothing is more frequent in psychoanalysis than to explain opposing theories in psychoanalysis's language. Thus, an analyst speaking about Germaine Guex's text accused her and the Swiss school of

arranging the facts and negating the universality of the Oedipus complex by saying the school was proof of a resistance to psychoanalysis.[36] This is naturally not ruled out. But the rebuke can always be returned.)

We could say that in psychoanalysis, Melanie Klein represents the extreme left (radical position where orthodox psychoanalysis is applied all the way), the Swiss school represents the right, and Anna Freud the center. The right can rebuke Melanie Klein for wanting to destroy psychoanalysis in understanding it too quickly, but the left can respond that the prudence of others shackles psychoanalysis's progress. (Similar to the discussions in the political universe of Marxism between the "left" and the "right"—each accuses the other of being the "revolution's gravedigger.") Each time these kinds of objections are produced when we are on the terrain of existential things, when the objective result can depend on the subjective attitude. There could be something very correct in what certain psychoanalysts say because we are dealing with a *practical* affair. But in order to leave it, and as we can always argue that the intention is perverted from the facts (we can argue that the "left" attitude is a "provocation" and the "delaying" attitude is "opportunist"), we must judge as much as possible from the situation itself, from the case observation, and must not follow supposed intentions.

On this point, psychoanalysis gives us a wise lesson. Anna Freud on two or three points comes around to Melanie Klein's view; they are presented with their respective experiences, and their points of view come together. This discussion on the method of child psychoanalysis corresponds to a discussion on doctrine: if the method is applicable to children (even a very young child; Melanie Klein psychoanalyzed a child of nine to ten months), this would make the child's structure to be what psychoanalysis has grasped. However, applied to the child, these fundamental notions of classical psychoanalysis undergo a modification that we will examine.

10. *New tendencies of child psychoanalysis (Melanie Klein).* There are three main tendencies to examine. (1) *Greater and greater predominance of the theme of aggression in the childhood period that precedes the genital phase.* This idea, already expressed by Freud, who employed the expression "sexual-aggressive," is made more understandable by Melanie Klein. First, she describes the child's position in the family as a position of rivalry (comparison made by the child between himself who is small and his parents, the people who surround him, who are large). The triumph for the child consists in overturning the relationship. This rivalry makes the child guilty in his own eyes. Hence, a kind of vicious circle arises: disproportion between the child and his surroundings, anxiety-aggression, guilty, anxiety grows, and so forth. The circle can be interrupted by the contribution

of a completely other element: the libido, sexual development. In the first stage of the Oedipus complex, aggressive tendencies that are repressed particularly exist. The theory in Freud's reform of 1926 wherein anxiety is something primary and not derived from repression is pushed to the limit by Melanie Klein. Consequently, the accent is placed upon the primacy of aggressivity. In a sense, we already find this in Freud, but it is more categorically expressed by Melanie Klein. The initial situation is experienced by the child as dangerous; he lacks means and is without recourse and without help. Anxiety is the attitude of someone in the face of a situation that he cannot face; he is blocked [*bloqué*]. This anxiety is translated into aggressivity and is what gives birth to the feeling of guilt, making anxiety double. The relationship anxiety-aggressivity forms a circle into which the libido intervenes as a transverse force. There is an indissoluble connection between the libido and aggressivity, the latter having power over the former. *These two components,* Melanie Klein says, *are always unified and opposed.* The passage to the genital stage will be established with an equilibrium between them. The overcoming of the Oedipus complex is not considered as a fear of castration but as the released guilt about aggressivity toward the father.

Later, Melanie Klein defines the child's situation as a *depressive position:* comparison between the child's behavior and the behavior of the mourning. Mourning makes the child regress to infantile behavior. The aggressive wishes against the deceased are reawakened, causing a feeling of guilt. The adult fights against these painful memories by refusing to have any kind of allusion made about the deceased's faults. After this first period, other attitudes arise: a desire to change things, to change houses (symbol of the reconstructive attitude, typical obsessive attitude). In a new period, mourning is no longer silent. The idealization of the departed no longer necessitates the repression of wishes of death.

These are the adult's behaviors, but the child placed in front of beings he fears to lose can have analogous behaviors. The child lacks confidence in his power, even in his power to love; he doesn't have proof of his power, even though this obsessive attitude fades with experience. Aggressivity does not necessarily come from exterior frustration, since a subject submitted to difficult objective conditions could not suffer from them; aggressivity has an interior root. The principle of interior frustration is the consciousness of an internal danger, projected by the child toward the outside (it is less painful to be exposed to an external danger), hence the tendency toward destruction. Interior danger is the danger of the instincts. (The case of a five-year-old who believed himself to be protected from animals, elephants, wolves, hyenas, leopards, and so forth. But he feared they might revolt against him. The elephant represented

the muscular structure of the child; the leopard, his fingernails; the wolf, the projection of what the child thinks contains poison: excrement. The child lives in fear of an interior enemy: animal and slave revolts. Sadism is also turned against himself.)

Melanie Klein's *Contributions to Psychoanalysis* exposes that this state of insecurity is founded upon "*a certain degree of frustration at the maternal breast is inevitable since the child needs a limitless satisfaction.*"[37] Anxiety is understandable by the desire, the immeasurable will that is in the child; this will is immediate and goes straight toward the goal because there is no articulation interval between means and ends. It is in this initial situation that we find the motor of aggressivity and anxiety. It results in a characteristic attitude of the child—*an ambivalent attitude*—the double sentiment of omnipotence and impotence; the child can do nothing and he wants everything. This double sentiment is reflected in what he experiences with others; children are sensitive to the manner in which adults act toward them: "nice" people and "not nice" people. Moreover, these epithets are applied to the same person, "good mother" and "bad mother." (For example, the child takes refuge in thinking about the good mother when the bad mother comes to punish him. The bipartition of the mother also includes her body, "good breast" and "bad breast." Recall that ambivalence is almost the contrary of ambiguity.)

(2) *The conception of the body's role and the operations of introjection and projection as bodily mechanisms.* The psychological mechanisms of introjection and projection, instead of appearing as spiritual operations, must be comprised as modalities of the body's activity. The phenomenal body is the vehicle of the child's relations with the outside. During the oral stage, the relation of the nursing child with the breast has, according to Melanie Klein, the value of a true introjection (a notion that comes close to cannibalism).

Melanie Klein finds in analytic material numerous references to the body and the parents' genital organs. When she shows that the child has fantasies about parts of his parents' bodies, she does not necessarily want to say that the child has seen them, but in the infantile manner of seeing traits of his parents' behavior, the organs play the role of emblems. The father's sexual organ is the manner of expressing masculinity or virility. Here, the organ is taken as representing the totality of the typical character.[38] For example, for the girl the doll represents her own child, herself, or her father's penis. This does not signify that there is, in the child, an image in the adult sense of the father's sexual organ, or that there is an anatomical representation. The doll is the incarnation of the virile force of the father. The doll has the power to provide the impression of virility, an impression that can be translated by this fairly vague image. *There is*

no association between an appearance and latent content that is different from the appearance; rather, a nondissociation exists. Virility is like a category in which the child develops, and the doll is found in this category. These ideas rejoin Freud's analysis on the subject of the pregenital libido. Symbolism is an infantile way to zero in upon objects in the environment, and not a representation of the doll (in an adult sense) to which a sex representation is added (in an adult sense). "In truth, via the breast, the mother represents the exterior world."[39] Corporality is the means to access the world. The child does not think about sex in the same way as adults do. There exist two ways to interpret psychoanalysis: for example, we could say that this man is a painter because when he was a child the anal phase was overaccentuated. But we could also say that anal activity is the first movement of the child toward the activity by which he will later orient, the manner of accessing the world of forms and colors. This later interpretation is more just.

Such being the signification of sexual elements in analytic material, *how do objects assume a sexual character?* Projection and introjection are constant bodily functions: the oral or sexual incorporation of objects of the exterior world and the child's appropriation of the object's virtues helped by material operations. The aggressivity against the mother is the desire to take possession of the maternal body, to merge into it, to tear it apart, to devour it, to destroy it. This aggressivity abides in the adult; in the woman, the sexual act is a kind of introjection. The bipartition of the interior and exterior world is understood by the child as what is in his body and what is in the exterior. Even the adult has a tendency to situate his thought, his soul, in his body. (Me: it is my body, what I introject, what I engulf [*avale*]). Consciousness is what I see; unconsciousness is the intra-corporal. The baby, having incorporated his parents, has made them into internal objects. In becoming internal, people, things, and events have become inaccessible; thereby doubts, anxiety, and uncertainty arise. *This brings us to a more concrete idea of the unconscious:* to admit that experience follows interior and exterior plans between which perpetual exchanges occur.

In this concrete manner, Melanie Klein argued that the formation of the infantile superego would not at all be a result of the termination of the Oedipus complex, *but it would begin to form as soon as the first relationships with others.* The body, mysterious zone, contains through introjection the corporeal parts of the parents. The superego is the collection of exterior realities that continue their subterranean activity, hence the superego will be modified according to Freud's description of the superego's formation. The infantile superego is much crueler the earlier it occurs: the power of a limitless repression. The child does not have the

possibility to face it. The Oedipal superego in the third year inherits the first superego. Fantasies of devouring animals represent parents, since they are menacing and worry the child.

The superego is understood as containing not only the parents' bodies, but also objects. All perception, all relations are "digested" by us. *It is a world, a universe.*[40] If the superego constitutes an organized world, with its properties, its language, and its symbolism, this moment is difficult to analyze with words, it is intuitively understood; hence, in his medical practice, the psychoanalyst listens to the patient, everything is organized in him.

This conception of the superego as a universe, as a totality, is important and original. For example, we can better understand the tastes and distastes for certain foods in the child. If we admit that the superego is an interior landscape, a double of objects, it is not surprising that an element does or does not take on significance and becomes sympathetic or not. (Take the case of a child who suddenly had a profound distaste for fish, even though he loved it for a year. This distaste has a correlation with his affective evolution. The open fish, empty, lacerated, expresses aggressivity against the father.) The conception of the body's role is interesting. Proust already spoke of this body memory: according to the position of his body when awakening, he thought he was in this or that place. This notion of the body's role in relation to the world and the past is also found in psychoanalysts: the relaxation on the psychoanalytic couch produces a manner of being. Similarly, Moreno cites the case of a subject who, when a dream was evaporating, recalled it by trying to play it out.

(3) *Nature of the Oedipus complex.* Melanie Klein's conception of the Oedipus complex is her best-known idea. This conception is not only distinguished by the precocious date assigned to the Oedipus complex, but also by the changes made to the complex. The question of date is less important than the question of nature. The first question is not, however, entirely neglected by the author herself; sometimes Klein speaks of Oedipus at the end of the first year or at the beginning of the second, sometimes she has it appear later. *What is the nature of the Oedipal situation, and what differentiates it from the Freudian Oedipus?*

It is about an Oedipal situation that is established in the pregenital stages (oral or anal). This is a relationship to a different genital object (aggressive or sadistic relationship). The individual finds himself placed in a situation without exit because he is tied to an object for which he does not possess any technique that permits him to master it: state of dependence, of attachment (omnipotent and impotent) and, hence, the aggressive character of relationships with objects. "Genital drives remain outside of view first of all because they are only maintained around three years of age . . ." "Conflict thus is not as clearly visible at this stage as it

will be later . . . It is confused and vague."[41] The child has a general tendency to incorporate the mother's body, hence the fear of punishment, the fear of retaliation [*talion*] for his own conservation. In this situation, the relations between parents are thought of as oral relations. The child's situation is projected into this conception of his parents' relationship. "The oral frustration gives birth to an unconscious notion that the parents receive an oral sexual pleasure."[42] These sexual relationships will be understood as aggressive relationships. The psychoanalytic or psychological material shows that the sexual act is conceived by the young child as a battle between a mutual destruction or a torment the father inflicts on the mother.

The Oedipus complex has a global character. It is not so much the child's relationship with one rather than another parent; it is more about the relationships between the two parents. The mother's body is conceived as a totality containing all the objects with which the child can have relations. For example, the father's penis would be kept by the mother in each sexual act; it will be what becomes of children in the mother. The mother's body thus contains at the same time masculine and feminine characteristics. All the child's fears are represented in his aggressivity toward the mother.[43] If the relationship is understood as a relationship to the maternal organism, the precociousness of the Oedipus complex is explained. Freud described the stage where the child has a representation of a phallic mother. For Klein, it is the mother's body that contains the phallus. Similarly, the sentiment of castration, the desire to have a phallus in the girl becomes, for Klein, the desire of the child to have her father's child. The two sexes are reunited in one constellation. (We note in passing that this represents an important correction to Freud's thesis on the male essence of the whole libido.) In the same manner, Freud made an addition to his theory when saying that the Oedipus complex, in its initial phase, could be preceded by an inverse Oedipus complex. For Klein, the direct Oedipus complex and the inverse one coexist (as the different stages of development, like the genital and pregenital, coexist). All object relations with a parent are at the same time identification with the same parent, and consequently, object relations with the other.[44] The parallelism is reestablished between the boy and girl's development. There is no priority of representing the masculine body.

Klein admits that a feminine stage exists in the body parallel to a masculine stage in the girl. From the stage of attachment to the mother, there is an ambiguity and polymorphism: a kind of fluctuation between father and mother. Sexual difference is conceived more in psychological than in physiological terms. The girl would already have a global sentiment of her body as an enclosed secret.[45] It is always in a magical

manner that the woman can dominate her anxiety. She is less imposed upon by action than by seduction by the sole presence of her body. But, psychologically, boy and girl can occupy all "positions." The "feminine masochism" that, according to Hélène Deutsch, provides the castration complex would be simply the fear of the internalized paternal penis. Melanie Klein is oriented toward a more psychological conception of masculinity and femininity whose differentiation is founded on the evolution of individuals from comparable beginning situations. This conception of the Oedipus complex permits us to arrive at a subtler and less dogmatic psychology.

Study of a case analyzed by Melanie Klein.[46] Rita, who was two years and nine months old at the beginning of the analysis, is characterized by a manifest anxiety, by obsessive ceremonies, and by successive states of naughtiness and goodness. She has lost her appetite and cries for no reason. She very often poses questions like "Am I good? Do you love me, Mommy?" She does not feel secure in her relations with others. She had, for example, an anxiety crisis because her father, jokingly, threatened a bear in a child's book. Rita tries to bring the least possible imagination to her games, which most often are dressing and washing her doll.

The child was weaned early after having been nourished at the breast for some months; she refused to take the bottle. However, she accepted a bottle before going to sleep and obstinately refused to give up this habit. She shared her parents' bedroom until she was two. She has a little brother. Her neurotic mother's attitude is ambivalent. Until the end of her first year, Rita had a marked preference for her mother, then for her father. Her preference for her father was accompanied by jealousy; she wanted to be alone with him in a room (at fifteen months). At eighteen months, the relation modified. The mother became again the preferred one. Finally, we must note the child's phobia regarding animals in general and dogs in particular. This description shows us that there took place *an Oedipal development in the girl.*

How can we explain why the preference for the father did not last? The fact that the child was present during the parents' sexual relations, in the bedroom they shared with her, gave birth to jealousy and anxiety (inasmuch as the sexual relations were understood as aggressive relations). At fifteen months, she saw her mother pregnant. Everything happened as if the Oedipal orientation was inverted: anxiety, sentiment of guilt toward the mother brought the child back to her first orientation. The sadistic oral impulses, very strong, demand the interpretation that the child gives to external phenomena. The Oedipal drive makes the situation more intolerable. The excessive love for the mother would be another expression of the stage where she is violently opposed to the mother. The child

fluctuates between several positions, and it is impossible to fix a common situation. The detailed symptoms are blocked by the light of the guiding ideas: the phobia of dogs that concerns the parental penis.

At three, Rita sees a coachman beat his horse. She is indignant at this act of brutality, but she asks later, "When can we go see the coachman beat his horse?" In order for the child to want to see a thing at the same time, as herself and as another, the horse "represents" the mother and the coachman the father. During analysis, Rita plays with little bricks and a hammer, she hits the bricks in a point and covers up the paper, saying "When the hammer hits, the little woman is scared." Or she plays with her bear Teddy; she imagines that she takes a trip. When Teddy goes to a very nice lady's house, she wants to get rid of the coachman who doesn't want to bring him. Another time, she places her stuffed elephant close to her doll so that he stops the doll from going in her parents' bedroom. The elephant represents the superego, and the doll is Rita in her relations with her parents.

During a meeting with the analyst, Rita writes on a piece of paper, scrawling and tearing it. She places the pieces in a glass and makes the gesture of drinking them, but she stops and says "woman dies." This is the symbolic act of destroying the mother by oral means. This attitude shows that the girl is on the point of giving up Oedipal rivalry. The refusal to take food and to give up the bottle at night signify that the child refuses to enter into the next phase. From the period of psychoanalytic treatment, the child accepted the fictive maternity and embraced entrance into the Oedipal stage.

11. *Survey of the discussions that Melanie Klein's ideas have raised.* In 1945, Glover in *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* vehemently critiqued Melanie Klein's ideas.[47] If he approved her first conceptions, exposed in her 1932 book *The Psychoanalysis of Children*, it is because they are in the Freudian vein. Glover reproaches Klein for going too far in her later works, for having totally transformed psychoanalysis.

Glover's reservations about the 1932 book. For Glover, Melanie Klein bridged a lacuna in the Oedipal stage that was not previously studied, this stage having been essentially founded on libidinal development. For example, Freud admits that the relations with the parents before the genital stage are already Oedipal. Glover could add that Freud recognized (in his notes in *Essais de psychanalyse*) that he was wrong to separate the pregenital and the genital in that he made one follow the other (passage from autoeroticism to the object). The psychoanalysis of little Hans taught psychoanalysts that, from the first attempts at speech, there is a symbolization of the sexual by the nonsexual and that children, between three and five, are already capable of object choices. But according to Glover,

it is wrong to say that Melanie Klein crystallized what was only indicated by Freud. She overestimated the importance of anxiety and aggressivity and underestimated the importance of the development of the libido. *The reproach is not decisive.* A pregenital libido can only be aggressive, since it does not have other means to express itself. The notion of the libido is modified and loses its metaphysical character.

Indeed, Freud had the tendency to invoke hereditary and phylogenetic factors. Thus, regarding the passage from the Oedipus complex to latency, Freud, in his article "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex," formulated two hypotheses: (1) the passage to the latency stage would be tied to the presence, in the child, of a regulatory principle of development; and (2) the Oedipus complex appears or disappears as a consequence of *the relationships with surroundings;* fear of castration, for example. These two hypotheses do not exclude each other, but there is, in Freud, a certain complaisance for the first (for which he is often reproached). The merit of Melanie Klein was to show that the libido was not an entelechy and to make Freud's conception subtler.

What offends Glover in Melanie Klein's conception of the libido represents in reality an effort to conceive of a notion of dynamic development. Despite some critiques, Glover considers the first works of Melanie Klein to be largely an amplification and extension of Freud's work.

Reservations about Melanie Klein's later works. Glover reproaches Melanie Klein for disrupting metapsychology. (1) *Critique of her conception of aggressivity.* When Abraham speaks of a kind of infantile cannibalism, it is in the sense of a libidinal expression.[48] Glover declares that for Melanie Klein, it is a sadistic expression of aggressivity. In fact, this transformation makes the notion of cannibalism more understandable and more plausible. Klein abandons the metaphysical conception of the libido. It is preferable to say that the child's relations with others are a kind of anticipation, similar in that certain functions are assured by other organs, by anticipation. What is not yet sexual can become sexual.

Glover also critiques the manner in which Melanie Klein conceives of *regression and fixation.* A child fixes or regresses when the aggressivity addressed by him toward the object gives birth to his fear, and in compensation he excessively attaches to the object. Glover says that it is presenting things by giving their primary status an undesired negative factor. But this concept has relevance in giving a dynamic significance to behavior. Fixation and regression are not only residues of the past, they are effective actions to fight against aggressivity. They are connected with the general dynamic of behavior. Glover underestimates the contributions of Melanie Klein's dynamic conception of behavior.

(2) *Critique of the role that Melanie Klein has for the body and the sim-*

plifications she brings to child psychoanalysis. Between an image, a fantasy, the significance of an experience, an introjection, an interiorized object, and the superego, there is no great difference. The total activity seems simplified, hence Melanie Klein makes it more a corporal activity than a psychic one. Paula Heimann, a student of Melanie Klein, writes, for example, "introjection and projection are employed to refer to mental mechanisms modeled on corporal mechanisms . . . The first attempts of the child consist in an effort to take possession of the object and in touching and sucking it . . . It is incorporated . . . All offerings signify spitting or expulsing . . . The first roots of the super-ego must be looked for in the good or bad breast . . ."[49] These extracts manifest an extreme simplification. All perceived objects are also assumed to be "internal objects." The distinction between the fantastical and the real is less clear. Between the corporal activity (sucking, swallowing) and introjection, there is no clearly established limit. The superego ceases to be an identification with a person and becomes a meeting between the diffuse state in all relations with the exterior world.

Does this represent a degradation, a confusion of Freudian concepts or, rather, a theoretical progress? Glover does not grasp the real significance of the body. The body has an effective mediatory function in relations with the world; it is the vehicle and the agent of the superego. Glover, however, admits that the superego was not studied by Freud in its formation and that it is necessary to study the precursors of the superego. All this happens as if Glover approves of Melanie Klein's research but eliminates the means to do so.

(3) *Critique of the role that Melanie Klein gives to fantasies and the imaginary and the role of the fantastical in Oedipus.* The controversy about the date of the commencement of Oedipus complex is not settled. Freud is not categorical on this front. He speaks of the girl's attachment to her mother. But Melanie Klein says that Oedipus is at the same time direct and *inverse.* If Freud refuses to make the debut of Oedipus as precociously as Klein, he indicates that development might be accelerated by the environment's particular circumstances: presence of the child during the parents' sexual relations, the birth of a brother or sister, for example. The object is not a question of words. If one understands the *classical direct Oedipus complex,* it is evident that the Oedipus complex is later. But if one speaks of the Oedipus complex such that we have described in its ambiguity, its precociousness is no longer surprising.

On the subject of the fantastical nature of the Oedipus complex, Glover reproaches Melanie Klein for emphasizing the hallucinatory satisfaction, the fantastic, the interior frustration, for it suppresses the frontiers between frustration, interior, and surroundings and consequently

self and ego. *The question is to know if these frontiers exist.* Are these notions not adult ones? Glover does not grasp what is new in Klein's theory. She does not assimilate child fantasies to adult ones. It is about an earlier state, prior to the differentiations between the perceived and the image. From the first months, the child has a multitude of relations where he recognizes the fantastical, loathing, fear, and so forth. This seems implausible to Glover, since at this age memorization is still weak. But it is not about memory, about a capability to evoke the past in a temporal place. The mother's body is there under the form of a presence and not of a memory. It is not possible to separate the internal from the external, nor is it possible to make a cleavage, since there is an intermeshing. This rejoins Lewin's view where we cannot separate "aptitudes" in a given situation.[50]

    Glover's conclusion brings us a psychoanalytic diagnosis of Melanie Klein. Klein interprets the child's acts due to a desire to show that they are responsible, and consequently contain the desire to defend the mother. We have said how such arguments are arbitrary, and only an examination of the facts could decide. But Glover does not judge according to the facts; instead he judges on what seems to him "implausible" in the theoretical conceptions of Melanie Klein. On this terrain, it seems he does not see (1) the necessity to construct for child psychology concepts that express that the child's attitudes are undifferentiated; (2) the interest in psychological conceptions of a dynamic character; and (3) the importance of the phenomenon of anticipation. Yet all this responds to a need in psychology. Politzer, in his *Critique of the Foundations of Psychology,* asks if psychology does not apply to the dreamer the concepts of the waking man. The kinds of distinctions that are the property of adult psychology escape child consciousness.

    12. *Case of children without parents.* This study will serve as a *counterproof.* We will analyze the work of René Spitz, Dorothy Burlingham, and Anna Freud.[51] These studies have the advantage of proceeding from a method (observations of groups) other than psychoanalysis, which only observes individual cases.

    René Spitz's work. Spitz examined the developmental conditions of children in institutions. In 1940 investigations were undertaken in the USA. Despite improvements in hygienic conditions, it was very common to find psychiatric troubles in the young orphans: asocial children, delinquents, the mentally frail, and all cases of difficult children (*problem children*) who had a sensitivity to contagious illnesses. The troubles are *increasingly pronounced depending on the duration of the stay* in the institution. There was no visible alteration until three months of a stay, troubles appear if the stay lasts longer than eight months, and they are

irreversible after a stay of three years. The first year of life is particularly sensitive to these troubles. The decisive factors are (1) *the absence of stimulation:* the children lack occasions to act, clinics are better equipped to produce the worst results because the surroundings become mechanical, hence a kind of psychic sterilization. (2) *The absence of the mother:* institutions where the mother is present give better results.

Spitz takes up this work. He studies the conditions of development in two hospitals (69 in a *Nursery* and 61 in a *Foundling Home*).[52] By way of comparison, he studies 34 children raised in a family environment (11 from a bourgeois neighborhood and 23 from a rural one). Spitz employs the baby tests of Hetzer and Wolf that permit a personality investigation (perception, mastery of body, social relations and relations with objects in general).[53] These tests are translated by a personality curve and give us a concrete appreciation of the child's psychic state. The rough results under the form of *means of developmental quotients* are the following:

Environment	First 4 months of the first year	Last 4 months of the first year
Bourgeois household	133	131
Rural household	107	108
Nursery	101.5	105
Foundling home	124	72

These developmental quotients appear as a breakdown in the *Foundling Home* children. What accounts for this sensational plunge of the child's developmental quotient in the Foundling Home? The hygienic and sanitary conditions are as good as possible in the two institutions; however, in the Foundling Home children are much more sensitive to contagious illnesses than the Nursery children. During an epidemic of measles, of the 88 institutionalized children of two and a half, 23 died. The percentage is even higher among the children between one and one and a half years. Of 26 children of ten months to two years, only two could say some words and knew how to walk, and none was toilet trained. On the contrary, in the Nursery, the children showed great activity and curiosity.

Similarities between the conditions of life in the two institutions. The children of the Foundling Home had normal mothers: those of the Nursery had mothers who were minor delinquents, often the mentally weak, psychopaths, and even sometimes criminals. This latter institution is thus less favorable. The hygienic conditions in the Nursery were a bit better; the children during the first six weeks are placed in glass-encased cu-

bicles where the adults could not penetrate without sterilized scrubs and after having washed their hands. Around six months, they are placed in bedrooms of five or six. In the Foundling Home the children were less isolated. The disposition of cubicles is worse; the glass windows are only on one side, and a series of boxes divides them from one another. There are no chairs, no tables in the cubicles. The babies are breast-fed in the two institutions, but they are weaned more precociously in the Nursery. The medical care is excellent: a daily visit in the Foundling Home, and a visit each time it is necessary in the Nursery, where the daily visits are not imposed.

Differences between the conditions of life in the two institutions. The equipment in the Nursery is richer: numerous toys, the colors between the cubicles are bright, the children see and hear their peers (low, glassed-in cells). Mothers play with them, at six months they live in communal rooms. *The social life is more active* than in the Foundling Home. The children are very active, whereas in the Foundling Home they rest immobile, lying on their backs (hollows in the mattresses); they can only see the ceiling (drapes are stretched over the edge of the beds in the day); they play with their hands and feet. The essential difference is that they are *between the hands of the nurses (one nurse for nine children)*, whereas in the Nursery the mothers feed their children; no *anonymous* personnel.

In this latter institution, the mothers are placed in unique conditions. The young interred women do not have the right to wear showy dresses or nail polish or eccentric hairstyles, hence the suspension of all narcissistic attitudes. The mothers carry this attitude to their children and have a rivalry with each other about their baby being the biggest, the best dressed, the best cared for, and so forth. Spitz does not give an example of these compulsive behaviors, but from the fact that the nurses exact a severe control, the children draw all the benefit of these kinds of care.

The lack of *affective* care is responsible for the bad results obtained in the Foundling Home. Indeed, the developmental curve in the two institutions crosses around the fourth month (time of weaning). The institutionalized children of the Foundling Home rapidly diminish at this point. We are permitted to think that it is the interruption of the only human relations that is responsible for this state of things. From the fact of this happier disposition due to place, the Nursery children have the possibility to play, to receive more *motor and perceptual stimulation.* This factor is integral to the *affective* factor spoken of above. The child's investment in the world is facilitated. The Nursery children experience security. Toilet training and language, for example, are facilitated by the mother. In the Foundling Home, "the surroundings are void of human persons." At the end of the second year, the development quotient falls

in the latter institution at forty-five months; the child presents the characteristics of babies of ten months. Of 91 children from zero to three years, one reports 27 died in a year and 7 the following year, giving a mortality rate of 37 percent in two years. Of the 21 children remaining between two and four years and examined by Spitz, all have an extremely retarded mental development and only one is capable of saying sentences. On the contrary, in the Nursery, even though the children are younger, the physical aspect is more favorable. At three and a half years, no case of mortality is reported; at fourteen years only three have died out of a hundred children.

Conclusion. The comparison of obtained results in the two institutions is conclusive. The downsides of the Foundling Home are not meaningful in the three first months of the child's life; they are less serious when the children enter into the institution at an older age (after a year). The extreme importance of the psychological factor is constituted by the *mother's presence,* and it is *between three months and a year* that the mother's absence entails serious consequences for the child's development. Studies such as Spitz's show that there is a way to develop a methodological knowledge of affectivity in early infancy without waiting for our knowledge of underlying psychological mechanisms to be perfect. The facts of behavior are important, and we cannot leave them in the shadows under the pretext that underlying physiological mechanisms might contain unknown facts. Such a postulate would be the negation of psychology. The child is a situated organism in a human context and not only a physico-chemical organism. The child is capable of behaviors that are not solely explainable by organic functioning; he can *anticipate;* he has a premature relationship with the environment (he is ahead of the organization's effective state).

Fictive, imaginary, and fantastical relations with the imaginary parents: relations with an imaginary mother. The relations between the nurses and the institutionalized children are instituted in a way similar to the ones mothers have with their children. They constitute kinds of "families" (a nurse and several children) where we find, for example, sentiments of jealousy; the child won't allow any adult except the nurse to observe him. The jealousy can become compulsive; children "clamp" [*crampons*], fearing losing their nurse, as much as they have already endured separations from their real mother. The institutionalized children's behaviors toward the headmistress and the nurse are different; this results from the different affective attitude toward these two adults. The child is more difficult with his mother or his substitute than with other adults; for example, a child calls his nurse each night, even though he has nothing to say to her.

This does not avoid the tensions of the affective situation that the

child forms. The child's attachments to adults are evoked by the adults; it is a reciprocal situation. If the child is loved, he loves. Children experience in their own life the repercussions of the other's affectivity. The creation of a fantasy mother does not provide the satisfaction of a real mother. These appreciable differences exist between the education given by the mother and that given by the nanny. Between the mother and her child there is, on the side of the mother, who knows she is a mother, a physical identification. From the beginning of life, the child does not distinguish his own body from that of his mother's. This "identity matrix" is fairly similar to what forms between the nurse and the institutionalized child. The child sucks the thumb of his nurse instead of sucking his own, for example. But there is something more between the mother and child; it is the feeling that the mother created the child. The nanny's behavior is more objective. If it is normal that the place left open by the mother, in the institutionalized child, is occupied by someone else (the nurse), this place is not entirely filled in and the child compensates for the emptiness with autoerotic behavior. He sucks his thumb longer than the child who lives with his mother; he rocks, he makes rhythmic movements; he hits his head and throws things when angry. He has an exhibitionist tendency and parades around, more if these manifestations are not punished at the nursery. The attitude of institutionalized children toward visitors is characteristic; they dash for them, showing them objects or toys that they own.

Curiosity is repressed in the family, especially curiosity about the parents' bodies. The child enters into a kind of state of stupor if this curiosity is too repressed, creating taboo objects. This doesn't exist in the nursery where his curiosity is partially satisfied, since he sees his peers (on the contrary, there is a narrowing of life in the nursery). The institutionalized child who can, however, notice all the corporal particularities of other children does not less maintain his fantastical theories about sexuality; hence the difficulty he has passing from the imaginary to perception.

The big difference that exists in the institution is that the child does not exert his curiosity toward the adult. The nurse is always dressed in the same way and is only known in her nursery work. She's an incorporeal person. The child cannot have the same knowledge of the life of nurses as he can of his parents. Thus when a nurse changes her scrubs, the children crowd around and are astonished to see her dress. Thus, the adult has the value of a ghostly person. The children report their curiosity about the rules of life in the institution, "quitting time," "on duty," "vacation." The children multiply their questions: "What are you called?" "Where do you live?" "Where do you sleep?" This last question appears essential. They are very sensitive that there is something impersonal in the nurses.

Adult discussions intrigue them and the children create incorrect ideas: an eight-year-old girl asked her doctor, some moments before an anatomy course given to students, to see the book that she carried under her arm. After having seen a transverse cut of the human body, she asked, "And whom are you going to cut today?" The institutionalized children have the feeling of being at the margin of adult life, and the secrets that surround them are very troublesome.

Fantastical relations with the father. Even if he rarely comes to the institution, the father plays an important role for the child. Indeed, if the mother is replaced by a nurse, the father's place rests unoccupied. Children endure the absence of the father well enough, but they cannot accept the announcement of his death; they continue to speak of him as if he is still living or they deny his death. The case of Tony and Bib are characteristic. These two children make images, sometimes beneficent, sometimes maleficent, of their father, and their feelings about him move from a passionate love to total aggressivity. The father's image follows the affective development of the child, who is incapable of disassociating the imaginary from the perceived.

It is remarkable all that develops during children's relations with other children: from babies of fifteen to twenty-four months there are scenes of tenderness and love without having ever witnessed such manifestations between adults. Children propose to their nurses. It is enough that a child has heard his peers speak of family life for him to adopt an analogous behavior to what it would have been if he had lived with his parents. Girls have maternal attitudes. The least givens (parental visit, stay with a friend in his family) suffice to orient the behavior of the little institutionalized children. We see the great importance of culture.

Development of the institutionalized child's personality. The children imitate the nurses' and doctors' gestures and attitudes. They have a great capacity to learn if they have already functional behaviors toward the family. The success of the child's education depends on the possibility of the child affectively attaching.

13. *Essential ideas in Dorothy Burlingham and Anna Freud.* (1) The importance of relations with parents. (2) The relations with others do not come from an external addition; they are internal and fostered by the child. Relations with the parents are not relations of instinct but historical ones. The maternal instinct does not intervene; what is important is the consciousness that the mother gave birth to her child. The mother-child relationship is *a relationship that is constructed.* (3) A more contemporary idea drawn from the work: the child's relations with others are not tied only to the existing persons, but are also mediated by certain acquired conceptions when the child learns to speak. The significations are around

him, even if at the beginning they are devoid of sense. His knowledge will be co-determined by the surroundings; the institutional setting plays a role of the first order, especially if the child does not have real parents. The relationships child-other and the relationship between the child and his culture are profoundly tied.

VII. The Importance of Parental Relations

The study of the child's relations with his parents can appear to be a restricted domain of only one case. Does not the child also have relations with other children? With other adults? With groups, school and social friends? Why have we consecrated such a great place for parental relations?

A. Fundamental Character of Parental Relations

The child's relations with his parents constitute the matrix of relations with adults. The parents are the pivots, the cardinal point of child life. The other adults are themselves considered as parental people. The child resumes his experience of familial life with adults. The relations with parents are more than relationships with two people: *they are relations with the world*. The parents are the *mediators* of connections with the world. This point should be underlined, since it does not always appear in the work of psychologists. For example, following Piaget, the social instincts that appear around seven or eight would not have antecedents. Sociability would not have a prehistory. It would be difficult to accept an ex nihilo establishment of relations with others. Indeed, *from the egocentric stage*, already surpassed around seven or eight, relations with others exist. Susan Isaacs, who employs terms little different from Piaget regarding an initial egocentrism, declares that the other is a point in infantile fantasies and admits that this point is surpassed in the transformation of relations with others, a transformation that is *progressively* accomplished in order to appear in a very marked way around seven or eight years old.[54]

The first relations the child has with his parents are translated into ambivalent feelings (love and hate); the child does not have means to act on the world, hence his desperate, impotent character that is excessive in relationships. The birth of a tension begins: the child feels that adults are superior to him. Relations with others are established over the course of *individual manifestations of aggressivity*. For example: (1) *the sense of owner-ship* should not be considered as an innate instinct nor a psychological

atom, but as a continuation of the sense of the child's own body. Moreover, this sense of ownership is a social response. The battle for objects is an affirmation of self and an opposition to others. Such tensions already exist in the relations with the maternal body ("good and bad breasts"). (2) *The rivalry between children* is also characteristic. Hostility is most often addressed to smaller children and in particular to newborns, but rarely to adults. The attitude of hostility is moreover a protective attitude. This feeling is in relationship to the connection with parents, a connection itself affected by ambivalent feelings. The child feels that his parents, when they are together, form a group from which he is excluded, and he works on techniques to separate them. *Group hostility manifests* itself at around four or five years (until this age, groups are small and unstable).

Thus, in the same stage as egocentrism, the child does have relations with others, ambivalent relations of love and hostility. How does the passage to a more realized form of relations occur? Isaacs shows that initial sociability transforms little by little. The relations with parents are modified. We have seen that the child feels excluded from the group formed by his parents, but this parental group has a more favorable aspect: there is a possibility for the child to block his hostility to one and devote it to the other; one receives only hostility, the other only love. (In the case where the child has only one parent, the sole parent remains the carrier of both hate and love.) The concentration of one attitude toward one of the parents makes possible the development of positive sentiments.

After the *Oedipal stage* where the child tries to capture the parents, a dormant, calm state of *latency* follows which drives the interiorization of his attempts. The child assimilates or is assimilated by his parents; he assimilates their behavior, their justice, and so forth. *He learns the adult role.* The parental relation modifies interiorly. This entails changes in the attitude toward other children with the appearance of a sense of justice, of equality. For Isaacs, its culmination takes place when rivalry exists. The most economic way to resolve rivalry is justice: the period of battle is over. In addition, the feeling of hostility toward adults brings children closer together. Around four to five, groups of children are founded on this hostility and they take on the character of packs, gangs. A mystical and elusive unity in these groups: a feeling of belonging to a group from which others are excluded. Groups of children around four to five are striking in this regard. The presence of common "enemies" moves the hostility toward them. The hostility toward younger children tends to lessen and is replaced by hostility toward adults. Take the cases of teachers "undone" in teaching institutions. In the group, the child learns to have a relationship with other children. For example, "selling out" to adults disappears.

(Isaacs cites the case of two children who fought and were separated by a teacher. One of them had been naughty, but his schoolmates accused the teacher. A projection of aggression on the adult occurs.)

We cannot thus say that it is only around seven to eight years that social instincts appear *without any antecedents*. The relation with parents is not an isolated fact. The entire system of relations with others is formed over the course of the development of parental relations. The relations with parents have the character of an *infrastructure*. Also, the initial mode of parental relations can have an influence on the later development of relations with others.

Connections between parental relations and the culture in which the child finds himself: we are saying that the fundamental character of parental relations does not signify that they are the first or unique cause; they are not unconditional. The parental relation is the vehicle of all relations with the world; the social relations manifest themselves at the interior of this relation. The discussion is confused between those who accept that conflicts come from inter-individual relations and those who do not. In fact, certain psychoanalysts are very attentive to social relationships while continuing to think that the psychoanalytic technique is indispensable and well-founded. Psychoanalysis is not closed to discussion. However, the inter-individual factors are not the only ones. Psychoanalysts would have the advantage to explain the above. Their adversaries who often consider social factors to be a unique cause forget to ask: by what means do these factors act on children? It is not certain that social events (war, for example) have a direct impact (children's "elasticity"). They seem more to act by the intermediary of the parental milieu by modifying the impact. The child's integration in a culture or a subculture is made in large part by the parents.

Thus, there is no *concurrence* between the social factor and the parental factor. Parents act in relation to their role as far as it is allowed in their society; they are "parental figures" who in *grosso modo* conform to their culture. They communicate to their children their personal imprint, but also the culture in which they live. Truthfully, the two kinds of causality must not be separated. All parental influence is built on a certain cultural schema and, inversely, social initiation is accomplished by the intermediary of parental influence. Culture can be defined as the collection of tacit attitudes recommended by society or the different groups in which we live, attitudes that are inscribed in the material installation itself of our civilization. For example, the fact that we use chairs leads to a complete body technique. Fatigue and relaxation do not have the same meaning in societies where chairs are unknown. This explains why

a vacation in a foreign land where all the objects are different, where the bodily techniques are different, always brings about a kind of exhaustion.

Culturalists want to say that the family conflict is an initial initiation into the contradictions of a culture. Inter-individual conflicts are a mold, a matrix. They then take a position regarding the first relations with the world. We cannot debate the primacy of private factors and social relations; these factors cannot be isolated. We must give up the idea that psychology (or sociology) will give us a *truth* when sociology (or psychology) can only tackle an *appearance*. Man lives with everything that he is: his childhood past, his temperament, his social condition. It is because we reason in terms of *causality* that we are obliged to choose between psychology and sociology.

Must we choose between the psychoanalytic or sociological interpretation? If we consider that parental relations already constitute an initiation into a certain kind of culture, the significance of these relations becomes much more general. The two orders of factors—psychological and social—encroach upon each other. Man lives with his initial relations that constitute his first connections with the world, as well as living with his later relations. Between social and psychological factors (in particular, familial factors) the connection is less simple than we imagine. In the rest of life, conflicts we encounter are not without connection to the conflicts of the parental milieu. Experiences acquired later turn out to be related to childhood experiences.

Family conflicts are the conflicts between this child and his parents, *but also between the different roles of the subjects, roles that are tied to the social environmental structure.* Social conflicts are related to family conflicts because there is also a historical and political relationship between what happens on the social plane and the familial one. *Private psychic life is already institutionalized;* this is to say that psychic life develops according to schemas, learned structures. Inversely, the adult's institutional life is susceptible to a kind of psychological analysis. Social institutions are the most rooted ones, corresponding to psychological differentiations. This supposes that we accept that there are symbolic elements in lived experience, and reciprocally that psychological elements remain in adult life.

Our goal is to show that between the psychic and collective, or social, life *there is a mediation, a milieu: culture.* Culture and cultural integration give a concrete sense of relations between the psychic and the social. This has already been noted for a long time, since Marx and Hegel. Hegel said, for example, that solipsism can be considered as corresponding to a certain kind of relation with nature (private property). When depicting these observed relations, we do not see the "how." *The notion of cul-*

ture brings us a response. The relationship between the economic and the psychological (or ideological) is not magical: social phenomena are not only economic phenomena; they are also a certain arrangement of environment in its most concrete aspects: the shape of houses, for example. The entire cultural world that the child already has relations with induces a certain existential mode (societal style). Due to the behavior of the parents toward the child, the child immediately finds himself in contact with collective phenomena. A culture should be considered as a conception of the world that is inscribed even in the utensils or the most typical words. From such a point of view, *we must accept at the same time a historical and social explanation of psychoanalysis and a psychoanalysis of the history of social facts.* Psychoanalysis is born as the expression of an Occidental society in certain historical conditions. Psychoanalysis can be considered as the portrait of this society. But reciprocally, the psychological mechanisms that psychoanalysis describes intervene in the social functioning insofar as they reduce "individual" facts. For example, psychological analyses of racism and anti-Semitism do not reduce these political phenomena to individual psyches. Such a class psychology can provide the inherent characteristics of an individual in this class: Marx's "class individual." However, this class psychology does not presume a pure and simple suppression of the individual psyche: the individual past plays a role at the same time as the class membership does. Class psychology does not impose a *destiny* on the individual. For example, anti-Semitism is, statistically, a fact of the petit bourgeoisie, but all the members of this class are not anti-Semites. Thus, the question is to know why this petit bourgeois is an anti-Semite while the other is not.

We can and should at the same time admit that psychological analysis implies a deference to historical and social facts and, reciprocally, that all social determination has a psychological sense. *But we must stop thinking in terms of causality.* Or again we must admit that we are dealing with a *webbed causality* [*causalité de réseau*] and not a *linear causality* [*causalité linéaire*]. In particular, the development of psychology can truthfully be considered a socially conditioned phenomenon. We cannot speak of "mystification" when the doctrine masks the facts. It becomes an *ideology* in the Marxist sense. But it is truly impossible to sustain that psychoanalysis masks more than it reveals. *A psychoanalyst who would be a reductionist* should be considered an ideologue. A psychoanalyst who is conscious of being the scene of a certain society's functioning, at a certain time, does not close the horizon and ceases to be an ideologue. Such a psychoanalysis shows its effectiveness in treating childhood neuroses without hiding the facts and letting them be known.

Psychological conflicts are not exterior to social facts. The debate

could be resolved on the condition that we have an open conception of psychoanalysis and of the social.

Open conception of psychoanalysis. Psychological drama could be only an aspect of a more general drama: the institutional drama. Psychoanalysis studies certain social roles in the interior of a certain culture. For example, the Oedipus complex is the form that takes a certain conflict of roles in a society like ours. In a conception like this, the role is the response to a child-parent situation with identification relationships. Again, for example, the psychology of men and women in our civilization does not signal an eternal masculine or feminine. We must study the preponderant factors in our society of man. We have noticed a phenomenon of stagnation (less production) in matriarchal societies. We must not thus consider the attributes of the woman or the man as natural, but as historical. There is no contradiction at all, rather the contrary, between the study of a dynamic interpsychology that follows psychoanalysis and the study of a historical dynamic. The best proof is that Marxism gives us a theory of the family.

Open conception of the social. Social life must be considered not as a "thing" (Durkheim) but as a cultural dynamic.[55] Indeed, the notion of "thing" is debatable, since it contains the idea that one could occupy one-self with an order comparable to the natural. The individual's integration in the social is so great that the social does not need to impose itself in a coercive manner; as Durkheim argues, the individual is impregnated within the social. The social is the plurality of men in their relations with concrete life insofar as the relationships have become institutional.

B. Immediate Connections Between the Social and the Individual

In order to make the notions we have shown concrete, we will show the internal connections between the psychological and the social in certain cultures different from our own. Indeed, we must leave our civilization, since these connections do not appear clearly in our society; we think about them through categories that parcel them out according to distinctions that we say "come from themselves."

1. *The culture of the Alor Islands.* Cora Du Bois' 1924 study of the people of the Alor Islands is commented on in Kardiner's book.[56] *The population of the Alor Islands.* These islands are close to an equal distance from Java, from New Guinea, and from Australia. The studied population lives on a fairly small island (50 by 30 miles) and it includes 70,000 inhabitants, of which 10,000 are Muslims who have Negroid characteristics. The indigenous people have only remote connections with the Dutch administration and few relations with the police. There are taxes which represent about two months of work for the head of

the family, plus a month of work for the care of the roadways. Medical care and hospitals are insufficient. Cora Du Bois took a study of 180 inhabitants of a small village situated at 2,500 feet, relatively isolated from other villages. Thus, practically speaking, the colonial influence is not felt.

Style of life and civilization. Food. The inhabitants eat rice, wheat, bananas, mushrooms, pork, chicken, rat, and dog. The meat is prepared by the men. The vegetables are cultivated by women and they are their property. Meals are numerous but unimportant. Food is found in a limited quantity and the children are underfed.

Human activity. Masculine activity is in large part consecrated to financial transactions: gongs, pigs, and vases serve as money. Pigs serve as investments of resources. One buys pigs in a herd and can thus spread one's fortune. Transactions are not always for a profit motive; prestige relationships are very important. A tenth of the men are occupied with financial transactions, and most of the others are their satellites. Women are occupied in the fields.

Marriages. The girl has a dowry, but she is also bought (three times her dowry). The purchase is regulated by scaled payments; negotiations go on forever. Debtors are forgiven in giving their daughter in marriage. Private intrigues provide serious dramas. Financial rules are often hindered by the interference of certain celebrations: in particular, funerals expend great resources; inheritance often does not cover them. In the case of divorce, money given by the husband is transferred to him, hence a certain stability of households. When the woman has a new suitor, she is in charge of "reimbursing" her old husband.

Social organization. Kinship is bilateral. Marriage between cousins is not forbidden but rarely recommended. Kinship connections are complex, and endless family wars occur. In general, they end with financial arrangements.

Religion is largely unstructured. It is about a diffuse belief in good and bad spirits. Rites are not systematized and sacrifices are not orderly. Sorcerers are never used with the intention of harming one another.

Behavior in relation to death. The patient goes to his home at night. One trusts the counsel of soothsayers. The son hugs his father. Delirium and agony are considered equivalent to death; sometimes the ill are buried alive. Indeed, there exists a certain repugnance to losing control of oneself. Alcohol is prohibited, the mentally ill are few, but they are in general very aggressive, often asking to be buried alive (however, collective suicide does not exist). Death is considered as something to fear. Funeral ceremonies are for the goal of assuaging the deceased's anger and do not have the character of a returned honor. The dead have two

souls: one leaves the village to "beyond" and the other stays around the village. This second soul is hungry and one must satisfy and appease it.

Social conditions. Racial differences are uniquely based on differences in fortune. If the young man does not possess enough money, he cannot marry. A close connection exists between money and character. The Alor inhabitants are very sensitive, particularly the men. Allusions to physical faults and poverty are considered to be insults and must be repaired with amends. On the contrary, praise for this or that quality does not exist (the superlative is unknown in their language; only intensifiers exist). An atmosphere of shame surrounds interpersonal relations, and each man fears at every moment that one will shame him.

Work. Men work with wood (arrows, bows, and mortars), but in a rough and unaesthetic manner. The most valued trades, after financier, are genealogist, poisoner, sorcerer, and calendar maker. Trades are generally little structured. Homes are constructed with little care and often don't last longer than four to five years. There is no fabrication of pottery or cloth. Versification is elementary. (Financial conflicts are often the subject, for example, of a dialogue between debtor and creditor.) Men play gongs.

Life cycle. The Alor Island inhabitants believe that the woman is fertile during repetitive sexual acts and the child forms little by little. Pregnant women have nausea and "desires." Abortions are fairly numerous from the fact that women continue to perform rough work. Some doctors are considered to have the power to stop or delay conception. Taboos are respected: during labor the women return to their parents; men wait and eat no food prepared by the women who assist during childbirth.

As soon as the child is born, he is washed in hot water. Six days after birth, the grandmother buries soft potatoes, which signifies that the parents can return to hard work. (From the moment of birth, the father also interrupts his work.) Infants eat solid food very early (mashed gruel and bananas). Adults are interested in newborns, particularly young boys. The child is rocked and bitten; kissing is unknown. Less than two weeks after birth, the mother returns to the fields. The child is left with his father, his grandmother, or other children. From this fact of irregular breast-feeding, one sees starving babies on the arms of their fathers looking for the breast. Children are continually underfed; however, the mothers do not like to feed their children. Babies sleep with their mothers. The relations between the mother and child are rarely close. When the baby cries, the mother masturbates him. She makes no effort to teach him to walk, to speak, or to control his sphincters. Weaning is brutal; the mother pushes and hits the child. From three years of age, the child is under the eye of other children and old people. The child is very jealous

and sucks his finger, for which he is subject to much teasing from the adult. One finds no tendency in the child to play with his own feces. Constipation is unknown. From three to five, children are free to play without control. They are made to take cold baths, which makes them angry, since the cold water makes the ulcers contracted from wiping themselves after excretion with leaves painful. Masturbation is not repressed. Sexual scenes and conversations take place in front of them. Their sleep at night is disturbed by the eating that reigns during the night in the village. Learning how to walk and speak receives no reward. Although promises are made but not held to, sanction is received through ridicule. Conflicts between children are hypocritical; they pinch each other and then flee. This is all reflected in stories. For example, in a folktale a child fights with a friend; his mother orders him to look for water with a bamboo tube that is pierced. A bird tells him this, but the child does not believe it and only glimpses it when he arrives at the fountain. Returning, he sees his parents, who have left without waiting for him. Only his grandmother remains behind and carries him. They both arrive at the sea. While he is sleeping, his grandmother flees. When he returns to the village, he is told that food is hidden in his parents' home. Two young girls, beneficent beings who come out of nothingness, enter accompanied by their father. The child, or moreover the young man, must marry these two girls. His parents return for the marriage, but for food their son only gives them a tube filled with excrement.

The relations between the parents and the child are characterized by quarrels about who is the cause, and the child plays one against the other. Changes in residence are frequent, runaways are numerous. Underfed children steal soft potatoes, flour; they receive the undercuts of meat during celebrations. Sometimes they attach themselves to an old woman and run errands in return for food. They chase rats in the fields to eat them. Stealing is a kind of institution.

Girls work much earlier than boys. Girl and boy adolescents take care of the babies. The civilization is dreary: few celebrations, no adult games, only dances. False promises and lies are considered natural, hence a great meanness and doubt about everything that is said. (The number of words that express deception is important.) Children sometimes are held hostage for debts. Corporal punishments consist of boxing ears or tying up the child. Children are not spanked. The daughter-in-law can be punished or beaten by her stepmother. At eight, boys are given loincloths. Eroticism tails off; open homosexuality is judged poorly, but not really repressed. There is no fear of castration. The beginnings of sexual activity are not repressed. Obscene words are used by children; sexual power is highly esteemed.

One trait of collective behavior is remarkable. The Alor Island inhabitants are paralyzed by open or confessed violence and have no reaction. They do not interfere with what does not concern them. For example, they will not help put out a fire that started in their absence. Adults think that children know and feel nothing. Rites of transition, the men's house, and secret societies do not exist. Between ten and fourteen, tattooing occurs. Around sixteen boys wear long hair, blacken and file their teeth, and in general are more ornately dressed than the girls.

Amorous relations. The initiative comes from the women. They often refuse their husbands. Men often have sexual inhibitions, particularly during financial discussions, during which they sleep in isolated houses. Amorous customs are not very particular. There are no perversions. Unions are not very stable. Of 112 men and 140 women, 49 men and 93 women are divorced. Fourteen men and zero women have not ever been married. (Polygamy exists.) Stable illegitimate relations are rare. Women *who live together as husband and wife are considered crazy.* Adultery is ruled out (theoretically punishable by death), but it is not severely punished (practically, it is sanctioned by a fine). Women try to limit polygamy in contesting the legitimacy of having a husband when he wants to buy another woman.

Scope of this study. To connect and understand the elements of Cora du Bois' study, Kardiner searched for traits that constitute the *base personality* in this society and then showed that they are renewed in each generation by the manner in which the children are raised. He brings the traits to six: (1) female responsibility for food; (2) vague and poor religious concepts; relative importance of sorcerers; (3) poverty of feeling and weakness in affective relations; importance of money in this domain; (4) instability of marriages; weak superego (weak importance of the parents' influence on their children); (5) lack of organization of aggressive attitudes; (6) poverty of techniques of cooperation in work. *All present a general anxiety.*

Kardiner wants to understand how this base is constituted through the manner in which children are cared for and raised. This point particularly interests us. Kardiner wants to show that child-parent relations are an initiation into inter-human relationships and into all social relations realized in the adults.

How this initiation is made in the Alor Islands. The child does not suffer from an open hostility, but as early as the fourteenth day of life, maternal care tapers off. Then tensions begin, in particular, hunger. However, this is not so much the lack of food as the lack of an image of the person tied to the cessation of food that is the most important; the child has no one to give it to him, hence myths of benevolent characters. The child does

not receive help in learning life skills. Tensions, anger serve to make confusion so that the parents appear as those who can resolve those tensions. Masturbation does not create an affective fixation. Even after two or three years, the child has no recognition, his activity will be unconscious; he will be crushed by his behavior, there is no connection between self-control and reward; functions of evacuation are not overvalued, anger never transforms into organized aggressive acts, the child has no occasion to form constellations or systems of expressive or aggressive action. The attitude toward stealing is not formative and cannot take place with the "idealization of the giver." The ineffectiveness of angry behavior can cause fear of aggression, paralysis, a tendency to abandon, hence the weak and mean-spirited character. Obedience in order to acquire admiration or love does not exist. Mockery, deception make the child manifest his attention with the same means. For example, a child stole from the ethnographer to whom he was attached. Conscience is replaced by shame or fear; no key superego exists. The rarity of homosexuality is explained by the lack of fixation on the parents of the same sex who do not have a real existence. Rites of passage that integrate the adolescent in the society of men do not exist. We are dealing with a world of riches. Thus, the need for money to marry puts the son in conflict with his father, but not in a sexual manner. The general attitude of aggressivity in sexual relations is explained by timidity and male anxiety. It is women who take the sexual initiative. Sexual power is overvalued.

The vagueness of beliefs is explained by the superego's weakness. Only the sense of shame and fear of punishment exist. Women have no tendency toward maternity; they have no desire to give, since they did not receive care as children. Moreover, it is a manner to refuse the feminine role, which is too hard. However, since the men are weak, they are obligated to make the advances. The behavior of these individuals tends toward pulverization, atomization, dissemination that come to accentuate the force of financial ties. Social rank does not exist; power is given by acquired fortunes. However, this prestige comes later. Active searching for power corresponds to a feeling of inferiority and insecurity. Financial activity is not productive; it is a subjugation of the debtor. When a man possesses too much money, he gives parties to disarm envy. Funeral celebrations cannot be considered a cult of the dead; they must appease the dead, who is a sort of creditor. Without a vigorous superego, open aggression is infrequent and paralyzes the victim (lack of organization). Fear regarding alcohol and comas corresponds to the outbursts of aggressivity, since they know by experience that they will not succeed. The lack of art and invention are characteristic. One passes time protecting

against thieves. (Planted stakes in front of the doors of houses should bring a curse on the thief.) The lack of life skills prevents the formation of a government. Work conflicts are unknown.

Confirmation of this synthesis. Kardiner wanted to confirm this synthesis made from the child-parent relation by cross-checking them with biographies of the inhabitants of the Alor Islands and by the study of the inhabitants with *Rorschach* and *Porteus* tests.[57] The biographies confirmed the almost complete suppression by men about women. Women present profound differences from men. They are even more disorganized and have an unformed character.

The interest in applying *Rorschach* and *Porteus* tests rests in the fact that the persons charged with giving these tests were not up-to-date on ethnographic research. The obtained results indicate a distrust of self, fear, timidity, anxiety, a generally passive attitude, little expansiveness, fear of effort, action by oblique means, lack of creative power, emotivity, and a lack of curiosity. After these tests, the Alor inhabitants are characterized again by the following facts: they live next to one another more than they live *with* each other. They are incapable of living by themselves; they are more agile than active. Women are more timid than men but more capable of reaction.

2. *Study of Margaret Mead's work.*[58] We must complete Kardiner's view with some of Margaret Mead's, who has more systematic and methodological ideas. Mead analyzes the child-parent relations in showing their tie with the social structure. Parental relations are not held as natural but as *institutional.* Indeed, in our society we have the tendency to consider them as founded on *human nature.* If Mead perceives the "factual" institutional sense of these relations, it is because she has succeeded in assimilating inter-human relationships in each society. Child-parent relationships appear as a moment in life relations. Masculinity and femininity are in a close connection with the husband-wife relations and the girl-boy relations. A universal problem is posed independently of the styles of resolution that one might have.

(1) In every civilization children are for the parents an image of their own childhood, and the parents are for their children an image of their own future: *identification relationships.*

(2) The child is born into a human couple; in a human group in which the relations are already established. The treatment that the child will receive will be influenced by the already existing relations between the parents. For example, Lewin, regarding the creation of this triangular relation, studied the repercussions brought by the group relations of two children's already existent relations on a third child.[59] The child

perceives the most minor nuance in his parents' relations. All society is found in front of a problem: how to establish relations with a third, with a newcomer.

(3) *Infantile pre-maturation.* The child, far from being an annex, far from being a marginal product, is engaged in adult life that is not his own measure. This pre-maturation reinforces the first two facts, indicated above, and at the same time expresses them. The child has sexual behavior before knowing about sexuality proper. When many children exist, the problem becomes more complicated. All civilization must pose this problem: there is always a drama in the relations between children and parents even in the civilization's relationships. Parent-child relations are comparable to the physiological or psychological givens of sexuality: masculine-feminine relations. Even the nature of sex determines sexuality. On this basis, cultures embroider [*brodent*] their theory. In parental relations, where the parents are big and the child is small, cultural elaboration can vary.

Mead endeavors to define the relations between parents and children in terms that permit their connection to adult relations in the same societies. Schematically, she distinguishes (1) symmetric relations (the child is known as a totality, equivalent in principle to the adult); (2) complementary relations (the child is only the complement to parental behavior; for example, the passive term in a benefactor-beneficiary relationship); and (3) reciprocal relations (relations of exchange where the child *provides* exactly as much as he receives).

After having defined these three abstract variables, Mead studies how they are balanced in different civilizations. In this way, she meets the beginning of adult relations and the way in which they are realized according to the importance given to different parts of the body. For example, the buccal relation is essentially a complementary relationship, with all kinds of nuances and varieties, however. Thus the mouth can have a passive role even if eating is active. The relations between children and parents on the training of excretion are reciprocal relations. We come to see that relations can be symmetrical, as in Bali.

In a culture, it happens that relations are first of all complementary, then symmetrical. In Great Britain, for example, where children are first taught in a complementary manner in their family and are then sent to *boarding school,* where the relationship is symmetrical (or, in the U.S.A., where the mother changes her attitude toward the child early in the child's life).[60] These relationships are at the same time the cause and effect of a certain conception of masculine and feminine relations and of the total social structure. The care given to the child is the cause of his later attitudes, but they are also the effect of the culture the parents live

in. This was already Kardiner's idea, hence in the Alor Island inhabitants the need for an organized system of defense, with the weakness of life skills and all constructive activity. The child does not have the occasion to form a superego (on the other hand, suicide and masochism are unknown in this population).

Margaret Mead studies seven tribes in the South Seas. (1) *The Arapesh*.[61] The connection to breast-feeding is overaccentuated. It is an active breast-feeding, the child stays passive. This gives girls a satisfying preparation; boys are passive toward females (fear, little aggressivity, little creative capacity). This society shows traces of institutions that separate men and women: men's houses where the adolescent is initiated into the adult role. (These houses have a tendency to become extinct.) Boys and girls are treated in the same kind way; there is no formation of the latent stage. *The relationship is complementary, but without excess.*

(2) *The Tchambuli*.[62] The buccal relationship is important; the child's behavior is active. Men's houses exist; the language designated for this house is the same word as "matrix." According to myths, musical instruments are created by women who gave the secret of their invention to men. It is a sacrilege if women see these instruments. *The complementary relationship is extreme.* The initiation of boys consists of sacrifices and humiliations. The men have a double role: admiration of young men is great for the exterior life of men they see, far away in the men's house. But in the family home, the role of men is fairly pitiable, and the child is given to consider them as a reflection of his mother's life. The institutions are invented as a manner of overcompensating for the relationship with the mother. The men's houses and initiation uproot the child from the mother's domination.

(3) *The Manus*.[63] Financial or juridical connections hold a great place. Women are a good and are not separate from their dowry. We are dealing with a *reciprocal relationship* based on the anal. The erotic or amorous relations are undervalued and considered as shameful things. The sexual act is, for the Manus, a kind of two-person excretion. *The equality of the sexes is established by the devaluation of all sexual difference.*

(4) *The Mundugumors*.[64] Women detest children and avoid all bodily relationships with them. They carry their babies on their back in a basket. Men's houses do not exist; initiation is no longer a collective act, but a kind of parade of celebrations. Women are considered as nonessential and as a simple intermediary. Tensions are overaccentuated to the greatest point: tendency to atomization. The general behavior of the Mundugumors shows an apparent force but a real weakness. They lack suppleness and find it difficult to adapt. According to a myth, their race is separated in two (be it displacements of men or displacements of rivalry).

They do not react to change, keeping a terrible fear of the water, and their hate for their brothers who live on the other shore is implacable. They live as hangers-on with their cousins. They are incapable of assimilating the skills introduced by colonization.

(5) *The Balinese and the Samoans.*[65] In Bali, artistic development is very strong; in Samoa the richness is less, but the inhabitants are more spontaneous. These two civilizations are bisexed [*bisexuées*]. The two sexes have equal rights. The relations are symmetrical. The mother does not establish domination over the boy. The familial relation is diluted. The adult male is remarkable in his serenity and gentleness; he shows neither great gifts nor aesthetic nor religious pursuits. His occupations are backbiting and little political intrigues. These people have avoided the Oedipal difficulties, but they also did not benefit from its formative virtues. The parents are too restrained to have a passionate behavior toward the child. Mothers do not transfer their marital unhappiness onto their sons. The Samoans, with a great deal of force and suppleness, have adopted certain skills of the colonialists, still keeping advantageous elements of their own skills (example of building houses with limber roofs that resist tornados well). They have adopted Protestantism, but God has become synonymous with forgiveness.

3. *Conclusion.* We can be tempted to think that the social and the psychological appear to communicate in primitive societies; but this is not the case in less embryonic and more voluminous societies, where they are less closely tied. Can the culturalist conception be understood beyond archaic civilizations? Culturalists do not ignore this question and Kardiner, for example, has posed it.[66] In a society like the U.S.A. that has a collective history, is not the social more extended than the psychological? (1) However, there are, at the interior of voluminous societies, relatively independent knots; one can make an analysis of a little American town in the same manner as the Alor Island societies. (2) If the relation between social and psychological is not immediate, this does not mean there is no relation. Even the participation in a collective history, the contact with the historical event, assumes a certain psychological structure that can be studied. In a voluminous and historical society, there is no longer a pinpointed correspondence between the social and psychological. But the deep history of the society in question had its expression in the changes of family structure and the facts of intra-individual life; sexual and conjugal relations meet, transposed in another language, into fluctuations and in historical and political crises. Thus the Oedipal formation pushed to its highest point in a puritan American village carries with it a real crisis. The formation of the superego that permits the acquisition of life skills is a double-edged weapon; since Oedipus can be the occasion of a series of

repressions, the drawbacks are more important than the formative advantages of the superego. This is what happens in "Plainville" (Kardiner). But this psychological fact corresponds with the State's economic and social order and its conception of ownership.

Culturalism is well-oriented toward the problems of the relations of the social and the psychological. It avoids the famous alternative: to be a psychologist against sociology or a sociologist against psychology. Psychological conflicts and the social drama do not form an alternative. Culturalism avoids the downsides of reductive thought. The psychological must not be reduced to the sociological, and inversely the sociological must not be reduced to the psychological. We must not forget any of the two kinds of problems, and we should find the same difficulties, the same problems, on the psychological and sociological planes.

Thus, in insisting on the child's relations with his parents we have not wanted to explain them through other relations with others, we have not shrunk our subject. The difficulties of familial relations immediately correspond to the difficulties the child has in the place wherein he lives.

Human Sciences and Phenomenology (1950–1952)

I. Introduction: Husserl and the Crisis in European Knowledge

From its very origins, phenomenology emerged as an attempt to resolve the crises in philosophy, the human sciences, and science in general. Husserl's efforts centered around the attempt to overcome all these crises simultaneously.

The crisis of the sciences is found in studies published from 1900 to 1905.[1] Husserl himself was part of this crisis. He initially was a mathematician (his first work described a theory of arithmetic), and this work had a great deal to do with his commitment to undertake a radical philosophical investigation.[2]

The crisis of the human sciences is provoked by the development of certain psychological, sociological, and historical studies. These studies attempted to represent all expressed thought and opinion as determined by the combined actions of psychology, sociology, and history. The result is the movement of psychology toward psychologism, sociology toward sociologism, and history toward historicism. For example, psychology is striving to eradicate its very foundations, since the psychologist's (or the sociologist's, or the historian's) postulates are considered to also be predetermined and thus of doubtful value.

The crisis of philosophy. The skepticism psychology has for its own principles is equally the case for philosophy. The principles of philosophy are considered to be expressions of external causes. The result is that the statements of philosophy, formerly considered to be products of a direct, internal contact of the mind with truth, are impossible to maintain if the mind itself is conditioned. From 1905 on, philosophy's crisis leads to an irrationalism appearing as a contingent historical product.

Husserl faces the problem of rendering philosophy, and all the sciences, possible in a new way. He establishes the coexistence of philosophy and the sciences by elucidating their relationships and their processes of understanding, and thus he brings an end to the division between systematic knowledge and progressive knowledge. Husserl continues to

pose precisely the same problem toward the end of his life in his 1935 Belgrade lectures, *The Crisis in the European Sciences,* endeavoring to present the means of a philosophical and scientific restoration.[3] Husserl says that philosophy is "humanity's civil servant." The philosopher's professional role is to assume and take up the conditions of human existence: that is, rational existence. This point contradicts the claim that Husserl's work is oriented against knowledge and against reason. In fact, Husserl seeks to move knowledge and reason beyond the crises in which they are embroiled.

Course perspective. We are not interested in proposing a "school" of phenomenology, or in treating phenomenology as a problem in the history of philosophy. If these were our concerns, the problem would be to know, on the one hand, what Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger think about psychology and, on the other hand, what the psychologists think of Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger. However, such an effort has disturbing results. Never have philosophy and psychology been further from understanding one another than now: the phenomenologists do not understand that the psychologists are sometimes in agreement with them, and the psychologists believe that phenomenology represents a return to introspection. Given such a constant lack of understanding, the task of bringing these positions together might never be completed.

Our proposal is to envisage the history of philosophy as a dialectical history. In this way, we expose not only the ideas explicitly stated in the phenomenologists' texts, but we also express their ideas according to their intentions. Furthermore, reading psychology in terms of its spontaneous development (and not in terms of its explicit statements) helps us encourage its convergence with phenomenology. The history of philosophy is always placed in perspective by certain problems and is accordingly systematized as historical. It is not a question of a simple registration of works, because by collecting and classifying Descartes' texts, one has already selected, interpreted, and stressed a Cartesian *intention.* Thus, one has made oneself responsible for Descartes. A strictly objective history of philosophy would be content simply with the presentation of assembled texts. We attempt to redefine what a rigorous philosophy, phenomenology, and psychology are. Accordingly, we pose the following problems to phenomenology and psychology.

(1) How did Husserl conceive of the human sciences at the outset and during the development of his phenomenology? (We will also take up the theses of Scheler and Heidegger, insofar as they relate to the late work of Husserl.) What sort of expectations does the phenomenologist bring to the human sciences, and how do these expectations relate to the human sciences?

(2) In what manner does the development of contemporary psychology converge with phenomenological research? First, we will take up this question by consulting psychologists who have explicitly recognized their debt to phenomenology. For example, we will consult Koffka on the compatibility of Gestalt theory and phenomenology, Jaspers in his *General Psychopathology*, Binswanger (whose work in psychopathology has its origins in the investigations of Jaspers and Heidegger), and Minkowski in his *Psychiatric Evolution*, which takes up phenomenology and the existential analytic in psychopathological terms.[4]

Beyond this, we will try to disclose Husserl's diffuse influence, not only in German psychology, but even in behaviorism (after Watson) and psychoanalysis (after Freud). It is not a question of demonstrating a direct influence, but displaying that a spontaneous growth of studies occurred because of Husserl's influence. The manner in which these studies take up their objects of research makes them achieve theoretical and experimental positions similar to phenomenology's intentions. The same effort could be undertaken with regard to sociology, history, linguistics, and so forth.

II. The Problem of the Human Sciences According to Husserl

A. The Problems of Psychology and Husserl

1. *Psychologism, logicism, and phenomenology.* Philosophizing individuals have nobly believed that they are expressing the contact of their thought with itself. However, as soon as one considers them externally, their thoughts seem empty of any intrinsic value and appear to be simply the result of psychological, sociological, and historical conditioning. Moreover, every critique of thought returns to a reassessment of its causes. This thought process turns back on those who employ it: critical psychology is vulnerable to its own method of critique. As a result, a radical skepticism (i.e., psychologism) becomes the norm. Sociologism is subject to the same danger: all political conceptions, when judged from the outside, appear to be contingent and irrational. On this account, the philosopher's task consists in distinguishing the true from the false.

2. *The originality of Husserl's position.* Husserl does not oppose psychologism (or sociologism) to logicism (a logicism which posits the existence of a sphere of truth; a world of thought in which the philosopher would be in direct contact with the truth). Such a logicism renders the return to psychologism and sociologism unavoidable.

Instead of finding a path through either psychologism or logicism, Husserl attempts, by a radical reflection rejecting these prejudices, to "suspend" all conditioning (biological or cultural) without denying its existence. The philosopher's thought can will itself to be radical, but it recovers its native place at the moment that it seeks to measure the extent of its radicality. Thus, even the philosopher descends into the flux of our experience; even the thought which pretends to dominate descends and takes its place in experience.

In their philosophical activities, philosophers must not think like humans, if one understands human thinking to be restrictive. It is true that philosophers must take a retreat, but, nonetheless, this retreat inevitably leads them back to everyday human life. What is most proper to philosophical life is to detach oneself from everyday experience. Even though we never leave the everyday situation, we can consider our empirical personalities simply as possibilities.

The phenomenological reduction, which involves the suspension of natural affirmations as a whole, does not place us outside of time. There are many ways to live time. For example, one can live time as a victim or by grasping it in its unfolding. In any case one remains in the temporal realm. Phenomenology is not the science of eternal truths. It is the science of omni-temporality: an exploration of the very essence of temporality that makes no claims to overcome temporality.

Logic understands the laws of our thought to be universally valuable. Logicism reifies this position by viewing the individual as communicating with a universal thinker (e.g., God) and thus founds the universality of logic on an absolute law. Husserl does not attempt to justify the laws of thought outside of Being. The laws of thought only extend as far as what we can affirm. Thus, the universality of thought is founded very soberly on the basis of thought's adherence to the ego. Husserl goes so far as to say that even God must conceive of the world as a temporal unfolding of perceptual aspects in the form of open profiles. (The notion of God is only employed here as a sort of philosophical index, in order to put the character of human experience in perspective.)[5] This temporal unfolding is the essence of perceived objects and the very definition of the world.

From the outset, Husserl's work confronts us with a sort of phenomenological positivism which does not found universal truth on some law prior to the facts, but rather on the central fact of self-reflection by which I recognize the meaninglessness of everything that does not obey the principles of true thought. For Husserl philosophy is thus not a leap outside of time or a definitive system, but rather a limitless, "infinite meditation" that unfolds itself within a "dialogical situation." Philosophy does not reach the level of universal thought: it is situated. Its only means of

leaving its situation is through communication with other people. Only in this way is the purity of thought realized: "Transcendental subjectivity is intersubjectivity."

Philosophy is an idea (in the Kantian sense of a "limit idea") that we cannot totalize. Philosophy remains on the horizon of our thought as the limit of possible operations and is only validated in an open-ended historical process. Thus, philosophy is not the reaffirmation of ancient philosophical entities (e.g., eternal truths and the like), but rather the elaboration of an integral philosophy that is compatible with all research in the human sciences.

Therefore, Husserl struggles on two fronts. First, he works against psychologism and sociologism, which claim that philosophy is not in contact with its own thought. Second, he fights against logicism inasmuch as it seeks to establish a direct access to truth. The essence of his project is the assertion of a rationality which is tied directly to experience, and the investigation of a method that empowers thinking simultaneously about interiority and exteriority. This project is fairly analogous to Hegel's enterprise. Moreover, the term "phenomenology" is itself Hegel's. For Hegel, phenomenology involves a logic of contents; the organization of facts does not stem from a logical form but, rather, a content that spontaneously realizes a logical organization. It is the double desire to gather together all concrete human experience (i.e., history as the experiences of civilizations) and to find a spontaneous order in this development that phenomenology could characterize. The phenomenological spirit is visible before us in appearances, in things. It is a spirit spread throughout the historical and geographical relations prior to their rediscovery in reflection. It is not only the internal spirit of the cogito, but a manifest spirit as well.

Similarly, Husserl seeks to ally the exigencies of the concrete and the logical. Whereas for Hegel, phenomenology is an introduction to logic, for Husserl, it is logic itself. Husserl does not wish to give the rules of logic a value distinct from the effective operations of verification at play in each region of Being. The analogy with Hegel is even more evident in the last period of Husserl's work, particularly in terms of the problem of history. Husserl asserts that philosophy is still in the world, but, at the same time, this limitation does not impede the emergence of truth.

Husserl's struggle is for an integral science, but without sacrificing science (and in particular, psychology) itself. He searches instead for a way of liberating psychology from its entrapment in methodological difficulties. Furthermore, he is confronted by conflicts between the exigencies of philosophy and science. How can one discover a mode of understanding which does not detach itself from experience, yet re-

mains philosophical? For Husserl, the solution to the problem is sought in the intuition of essences, a form of understanding which possesses the concrete character of psychological knowledge and the dignity of philosophical knowledge.

3. *The intuition of essences.* (1) The *Erlebnisse* [lived experiences] can be thought of as psychologically and socially determined, but they can also be approached in a manner that reveals a universal meaning. For example, my presence at a concert can be determined by factual conditions. However, the concert itself is not understood in an instant, for it appears in the executions of the artists; it is still a cultural object which is not reducible to any one given execution. If I succeed in thematizing what I have heard, then I perceive the essence of the work. (2) *Intentionality* is the orientation of consciousness toward certain intentional objects. It is a reference to something with which my consciousness is in discussion. Intentionality lifts consciousness out of the contingency of events. (3) *The vision of essences (Wesenschau)* is this opening onto what I perceive. One need not take it in a mystical or Platonic sense. The vision of essences does not imply a supersensible faculty alien to our intelligence. On the contrary, we see essences constantly, even while we are engaged in a natural activity of life. Through concrete experience, I grasp an intellectual structure which imposes itself on my ego [*moi*]. It exceeds my singularity and the contingency of the everyday by conferring a *sense* on the series of events, although this sense is not immediately given.

4. *Oscillations at the beginning of Husserlian thought.* In its first formulations, Husserl's thought oscillates between the stumbling blocks of psychologism and logicism. The *stumbling block of psychologism* appears in his *Philosophy of Arithmetic.* Originally a mathematician, Husserl was shocked by the logistic tendencies of most mathematicians and thus sought to base mathematical notions on psychological experience (e.g., the notion of number as an attribute of a psychological nature). Here phenomenology makes its appearance as a "descriptive psychology." Already in this work, Husserl recognizes the need to return to consciousness in order to ground mathematical concepts. However, he comprehends it as only one region of Being among the many that psychology must describe. As a result, consciousness becomes coextensive with all beings, since it is in reference to consciousness that everything exists. Therefore, this transcendental consciousness will be the primary object and the proper ground of philosophy. The stumbling block of *logicism* emerges in Husserl's other writings where psychological elements are more sufficiently formulated. Instead, one finds a Platonist tendency to present essences as simply perceived and free from any internal relation to the activity of projection.

5. *The phenomenological reduction*. Husserl definitively breaks with logicism and psychologism in his *theory of the phenomenological reduction:* consciousness in its essence is not to be confused with the consciousness of the incarnate and situated individual. The reduction places consciousness's spontaneous relations with the world in suspense, not in order to deny them, but to understand them. This reduction bears simultaneously on the appearance of the external world and the ego [*moi*] of the embodied individual (the significance of which phenomenology seeks to explore). By this conception, Husserl distinguishes the transcendental subject from the empirical subject which is embodied and situated in time and space. All intentional objects relate to transcendental consciousness as the pure source of *significations:* that which constitutes the world and the empirical ego [*moi*].

Husserl moves beyond the tendency to oscillate between psychologism and Platonism which characterized his early works. This conception appears in its first systematic form in the period of the *Ideas*.[6] However, his thought continues to develop through a deepening of the phenomenological method and, at the end of his life, the goal of the investigation will no longer be to rediscover behind particular phenomena a consciousness arranging everything necessary to the founding of essences. Rather, he rediscovers a subject already engaged in these phenomena. This evolution is going to become more apparent in our examination of the Husserlian conceptions of psychology, linguistics, and history.

B. Husserl and Psychology

1. *Husserl's conceptions prior to "Ideas." Eidetic reduction and psychology*. In what way does the Husserlian project safeguard a rigorous psychology? Psychology is a science of facts. Specifically, it is the science of how the human in the world responds to situations through different forms of behavior. Thus, it is does not confuse itself with a transcendental phenomenology (which is a universal reflection that explicates and interrogates all the intentional objects that consciousness takes up).

Psychology cannot take philosophy's place. By itself, it does not suffice as a philosophy, because psychology begins with the convictions of common sense and receives its realistic postulates from common sense as well. The enterprise of psychology is legitimate, but it remains a "naive" manner of thinking without any ontological status. When we begin to reflect upon the fact that the situated subject is the same subject who thinks the world (no world is conceivable if it is not thought by someone), we find that the empirical subject takes its leave from the world. This world exists only on the basis of a transcendental subject. In this way, Husserl

maintains Kant's "Copernican Revolution."[7] Even a psychology which is concerned to show the unity of consciousness, like Gestalt psychology, is considered an insufficient psychology. Even if consciousness is conceived as a totality, it is a totality still understood according to natural forms. Gestalt psychology *naturalizes* consciousness insofar as the notion of totality is not elaborated without a natural equivalent. In general, psychology does not see any radical distinction between consciousness's mode of being and that of its objects.

Husserl's philosophical rigor demands that he exclude both Gestalt psychology and atomistic psychology. In order to arrive at a concept that preserves the singularity of consciousness, he needs an analysis that uncovers the unique meaning of every possible *psyche*. Husserl must reassess *internal sense* through an intentional analysis and not by simple observation. All factual truth belongs to psychology, but this truth presupposes a prior elaboration. Moreover, if it does not comprehend the consciousness that it studies, psychology's inductive method remains blind. What is the relationship between Husserl's eidetic method and psychology's inductive method? In order to understand human experience, we must infuse this induction with an inner vision that can render experience explicit.

Eidetic psychology is, thus, a reflective psychology which elaborates the fundamental notions of psychology. We draw from everyday, prescientific experience groups of facts like *concepts of perception, images, emotions,* and so forth. But these groups of facts must be subsequently invested with a coherent and valuable sense for us to know what the experiences of perception, imagination, and emotion mean. Thus, the autonomy of psychology's ability to investigate facts is preserved, but psychology remains dependent upon an eidetic psychology which establishes the meaning of experience by reflecting upon it. An illustration of this point is found in Sartre's studies dedicated to the imagination and the emotions.

First example: imagination. Sartre indicates in the last part of *The Imaginary* that inasmuch as we have not reflected on what an image is, all experimental work remains ineffectual [*lettre morte*]. If we conserve the old ontology of the image, we introduce strange elements springing from a prescientific thought into the psychological analysis, and we lose the sense of imagining as it occurs in human life.

Although the image presents itself as observable, it is not because its claim to presence is not founded. It remains simply an evocation of an object and a reference to an ego [*moi*] who thinks the object with the pretense of making it appear here and now. To imagine is then a *manner of relating to certain absent objects through the intermediary of analogons;* to imagine is to make an absent thing appear in the present. I make use of certain elements of present perception as *analogues* in order

to provoke the magical presence of a "quasi-object." In this way, eidetic analysis is considered indispensable for comprehending facts. It catches us in the process of imagining. Through imagining, we understand the essence or sense of the intentional act.

Second example: emotion.[8] Emotion is presented to us in an extremely mixed form. Common sense analyzes it through certain concepts. At one and the same time, emotion is a representation and a corporeal manifestation. (Some psychologists approach emotion as a representation, while others study it as a corporeal phenomenon.) The task of phenomenological psychology is to replace a picture of reality which is based on poorly conceived concepts by a picture based on more appropriate concepts. Eidetic reflection interrogates the meaning of emotion, taking emotion as an act within the totality of consciousness and exploring the emotional concerns. Various psychologists have helped sketch out the nature of emotion. Janet cites the case of a young girl who faints in a nervous spell as a way of liberating herself from a situation where she is being questioned.[9] In this case, emotion has already appeared as a behavior that possesses a meaning that must be rediscovered. Freud also considers emotion to be a symbolic realization. Psychic facts have a meaning. We must reintegrate them into the total life of consciousness.

However, according to Sartre, these analyses do not go far enough. Emotion is a modification of my relations with the world; it is a rejection of regularized action on the basis of a mode of imaginary action. The grounds of the second form of action involve a magical relation between me and the world, a relation which suggests the possibility that the subject's constant will can be projected immediately onto an object without meditation.

Psychology's relation to phenomenology should be understood as a relation akin to that of physics and geometry. In the same way that geometry is necessary to the development of physics, psychology draws its methodology from phenomenology. Husserl claims that the same sort of relationship exists between sociology and statistics, where statistics is itself sociology (because the former lacks contact with social reality). Similarly, a *psyche* must be included in the account in order to make sense of psychology's empirical investigations and the data they offer us. This crucial research must be guided by the efforts of an eidetic reflection which is not at all an extravagant activity divorced from scientific practices.

Objections. We can formulate two objections to these findings. The first objection stems from a misunderstanding which is easily cleared up. From this point of view, the demand for an eidetic psychology represents a return to an introspective psychology, with the former suffering from all the problems of the latter. Thus, Husserl is compared to Bergson and

his work is denounced as tending toward obscurantism. However, this confusion is ultimately unreasonable. It is true that the discovery of the *sense* of a lived process is founded on *reflection,* on the subject's power to look within and gain some ultimate evidence in which being and appearance are not distinguishable.

Husserl speaks of the *cogito,* of consciousness grasped in its ultimate state. This cogito is irreducible to external things and given to itself as the ground of all certitude. For Husserl, as for all Cartesians, the existence of consciousness cannot distinguish itself from the consciousness of existing. The knowing subject is the subject that I am, and Husserl seeks to utilize this proximity of the ego to itself to define the cogito. However, Husserl's Cartesian reflection has nothing in common with introspection.

Introspection is, in effect, internal perception: the notation of facts that arise within me. Introspection speaks of the passivity of a consciousness catching itself in the midst of living. Reflection, on the other hand, is an effort to *disengage sense* from a lived experience. Even Husserl claims that there is more certitude in an external perception than in the internal perception of introspection. It is a question of explicating the origin of internal perception as well as external perception.

Only the efforts of a phenomenological reflection can take up others and what I witness as the behavior of others. In the *Cartesian Meditations,* Husserl introduces the notion of conduct or demeanor *(Gebaren)* with regard to others. "A pure, authentic psychology of intentionality is a psychology of pure subjectivity." As early as 1910, Husserl recognized the possibility of an intersubjective determination of psyche. Thus, it is impossible to move from eidetic psychology, which is indifferent to the "internal-external" distinction, to introspection.

The second objection goes further in that it questions the role Husserl assigns to psychology. As the objection was anticipated by Husserl himself, it stimulated a modification of his ideas in the second half of his career. Is psychology reduced to the study of minor details in the presentation of an eidetic psychology that determines the fundamental categories of the psyche? Is the eidetic experience adequate by itself? Does it fully grasp experience, including its universal structures? In some older texts, Husserl had defined the relation between psychology and phenomenology as the relation between the explication of *contents* and the explication of *form.* For example, phenomenology can tell us what space is, while psychology can make this account more precise by describing the tactile and visual contents that I encounter in the perception of space. Thus, the essential part seems to be furnished by the eidetic intuition: empirical and inductive psychology would have no other role than to show the existence of the phenomenon whose essence eidetic psychology

has already established. In other words, psychology determines the factual laws of phenomena, while the task of describing and comprehending behavior falls to phenomenology. Is this a satisfying definition?

Husserl specifically stated that the intuition of essences must allow for an understanding of the concrete. Thus, the intuition of essences is tied to experience. It grasps experience's significance and, at the same time, it involves an understanding of the universal. But can the eidetic reduction actually accomplish this synthesis?

Phenomenological psychology can show how the essences appear in the causal unfolding of a life. However, in this case, any discovered transcendental relations could never be called into question by the causal order of psychological genesis. Thus, psychological genesis would show nothing but the partial and confused empirical realizations of contingently gathered essential relations. In fact, the problem of psychogenesis is initially a secondary question for Husserl. Increasingly, however, this notion of genesis takes on a positive importance, to the point that the *Cartesian Meditations* speaks of a *genetic phenomenology*.

2. *The evolution of Husserl's thought.* One finds in Husserl not a reversal, but a maturation with regard to the above-mentioned problem.

First remark. We notice that Husserl was aware that the understanding of facts is always secured by the vision of essences. He concluded therefore that all valid understanding of facts must involve certain intuitions of essence. Yet it is difficult to establish a deep distinction between empirical psychology and eidetic psychology. Galileo, for example, though neither a phenomenologist nor a philosopher, developed a *Wesenschau* of the physical thing (qua fundamental spatial determination) through a study of falling bodies.[10] Every subsequent physicist has contributed to the development of the eidetic form of the thing. Thus, the phenomenologist does not have any exclusive rights to research concerning essences.

Second remark. We must interrogate the nature of this intuition of essences and its relation to facts. A *Wesenschau* is first and foremost an *observation*. Husserl does not envisage an a priori eidetic psychology in the typical sense of the term. Rather, the a priori is a *material* a priori. Deduction is of no use in psychology, because there is no "mathematization" of the phenomenon. No geometry of lived experience exists. Phenomenological psychology is essentially descriptive and thus opposed to a mathematics where multiplicities are exhaustively defined by a system of axioms. We find neither constants nor psychic entities (which theoretically could play the role of axioms of "exact essences" that stem from univocal determinations). Instead, we find "morphological essences," which might be called inexact, except that we would be hard-pressed to define

the "laced" form, the parasol, or the lenticular form in the same terms as the geometer might.

Thus, Husserl stresses the concrete character of the essence. Although perception is the fertile ground of the *Wesenschau,* it is not its source of validity. Perception grounds the *Wesenschau.* The *Wesenschau* is an intellectual reprise, or elucidation, of what is tested or experienced. Therefore, the *Wesenschau* is essentially a posterior and retrospective form of knowledge. We find here a more direct understanding of how the essence is detached from the context of its meaning. This leads to the idea of a double development: thought envelops the object, but at the same time concrete perception is guided by the essence as something that it presupposes. At the base of the *Wesenschau,* we find that the intuition of the individual must itself appear. No intuition exists without "visibility."

Third remark: the consciousness of example and induction. Husserl reacts against Mill's theory. Mill defines induction as a process. We find that within the plurality of facts there are some facts that have a relation of succession or of constant simultaneity. The process presents these facts as characteristic of the totality of facts. Husserl's criticism is analogous to that raised by Brunschvicg in the case of Galileo.[11] Did Galileo develop the idea of the law of falling bodies by experimenting on different falling bodies? The law which Galileo discovered is in fact an ideal conception of a pure case of the free fall of bodies, without any example from experience in which falling bodies are always affected by friction. Thus, the facts become comprehensible by way of the pure concept of falling in conjunction with other freely constructed concepts. The physicist proceeds by realizing some "idealizing fictions" that are freely formed by the mind.

According to Husserl, Newton's law does not make any pronouncement on the existence of supposedly gravitating masses. Therefore, for Husserl, induction is already a reading of essences: I read into the facts the free fall of bodies as conceived and forged by the mind. What gives the idealizing fiction its value is not the number of observed facts, but the *intrinsic clarity that this fiction brings to the facts.* Such a law is not a reality-force, but rather a light on the facts.

Induction and Wesenschau—eidetic variation. Much like induction, a *Wesenschau* builds upon facts, though only by a *free imaginative variation* (in other words by varying the experience in thought in order to isolate an invariant which would constitute the essence of the phenomenon under consideration). When all the notes are changed in a transposed musical system, what remains invariant is the essence of the melody. One always thinks in terms of the facts, but the individual fact is not posed as a reality since one can make it vary. Eidetic psychology is a reading of

invariant structures in our experience by beginning with imaginary cases, while scientific psychology, proceeding inductively, *begins and ends as a reading of real cases.*

The sole difference between the two is that the former is character-ized by imaginative variations, while the latter involves effective variations which are actually realized. Their kinship stems from the fact that induc-tion never verifies the specified relation for the totality of the cases; it is always extended via interpolation from a finite number of experiments. Even in induction, one perceives relations in certain experiments, but one reconnects the different instances by imaginative variation.

How can we arrive, for example, at the psychological notion of the labiality of behavior? Labile behavior is defined as behavior that always re-mains the same or that inverts itself in an unpredictable manner. This no-tion presupposes the identification of excessive fixity and radical change. How does this definition come about? It comes through a mental con-struction along the lines offered by Goldstein in his notions of centered and noncentered behavior.[12] In terms of its two features—constancy and fragility—labile behavior can be defined by a lack of centralization. This notion cannot be obtained by abstraction on the basis of accumulated facts, but, instead, it is created by an imaginative variation that gives rise to the idea of the phenomenon. Thus, the conception of induction in Ba-con and in Mill involves an opinion without rigor, an opinion that hides the practical play of the *Wesenschau* in the discovery of laws.

Husserl has never claimed that these two modes of understanding, the inductive and the eidetic, are totally homogeneous; they exemplify different explanatory levels. However, his notion of tested essences sug-gests something like a convergence of these two modes. One finds a sort of dialectic of the concept of essence: the essence cannot imply some supersensible faculty. It must, like a fact, also be contingent.

3. *The parallelism between psychology and phenomenology.* On the ba-sis of its very principles, psychology is at every stage of its development parallel to phenomenology. He goes so far as to write that "all empirical statements, just like all eidetic facts, when made from one point of view, must respond to a parallel statement made from an opposed point of view" ("Nachwort zu meinem *'Ideen'*").[13] In other words, the statements made by empirical and experimental psychology must correspond to an eidetic statement, on the condition that former statements can be sepa-rated from the latter.

In this way, we have moved beyond the idea of an eidetic psychology that would couch all possible psychic reality in terms of a simple reflec-tion and, also, beyond the idea that our understanding of other people stems solely from our own psychic structure. From Husserl's perspective,

human reality represents a *point of insertion* of the *Wesenschau*. It is in being aware of myself as existing that I can perceive essences. At this level the possible and the real are not distinguishable.

Husserl even goes so far as to say (in the *Cartesian Meditations*) that intentional psychology already carries the transcendental within itself. In other words, he is saying that the human being is held in common in psychology (including empirical psychology) and phenomenology. Consequently, even if we acquire our empirical image of the human being with all the presuppositions of empirical psychology (which means grasping the individual as situated within the causality of the world), empirical psychology always ends up reversing the direction of the work. When empirical psychology reflects upon what it is describing, it makes the human the bearer of reflection and not a part of the world. Thus, the intertwining relation, the relationship of reciprocal development, between psychology and phenomenology is clearly indicated by texts like those we have cited above.

We find it thus necessary to correct Sartre's formulations which cite Husserl's early work, and assume a movement of succession from psychology to phenomenology. As we see in *The Imaginary*, Sartre defines the phenomenological analysis of the image's essence as certain. Later, in the second part, he defines the inductive and experimental analysis of the image as only probable. In reality, what is assumed in the first part of the text is called into question in the second part. First, the essence of the image was defined as a false presence of the past in the present, but in the second part, where certain states (like illusions) are introduced as exceptions, the perceived and the imagined are understood as indissoluble phenomena.

Thus, we can see that the distinction between phenomenology and psychology must not be presented as a rigid distinction. Husserl is cognizant of the danger of presenting the vision of essences as having no anchor in experience. In an early article, he asserts that eidetic intuition and the Scholastic method have nothing in common.[14] Certainly, it could be said that I do not grasp an essence, but rather a concept, a premise, and so forth. This misconception can be avoided if we recognize that understanding a group of facts is not sufficient. On the one hand, the construction of an essence takes place and, on the other hand, the facts serve as a test of the essence. The logic of things necessarily should have led Husserl to grant a much more profound connection between induction and his notion of *Wesenschau*, as well as between psychology and phenomenology. Some psychologists have been more perceptive than Husserl on this point.

Husserl always rebuffed the psychological trends which developed

in his time, particularly Gestalt psychology, even though this movement stemmed from writers who had been his own students. For Husserl, whether one conceived of consciousness as a totality or as the sum total of all psychic atoms made no significant difference, since even the totality conceived by the Gestaltists was still a thing and not a consciousness.

Koffka responded to this criticism in an interesting manner in his *Principles of Gestalt Psychology.* From the perspective of his conception of science, a new manner of describing consciousness that avoids the double difficulty of logicism and psychologism is possible. The description of "psyche" in terms of structures and form can satisfy the essential demand of philosophy for the existence of an order of meanings [*l'ordre des significations*].

Husserl's objection with regard to Gestalt theory (as with all psychology) is that it does not grasp the radical originality of consciousness. Instead, it reduces consciousness to a certain number of structures and thereby "totalizes" it while raising the concerns of the order of causes, of nature, and of events. In reality, what Husserl sought as "ballast" for his eidetic intuition (and to distinguish verbal concepts definitively from it) was, unbeknown to him, a notion of the sort that the Gestalt theorists suggested. It is a notion of order and meaning which is not generated by an application of the mind's activity to some material external to it. Rather, it is a notion of spontaneous organization which transcends the activity-passivity distinction of which the visible configuration of experience is emblematic.

Gestalt theory is a psychology where everything has a sense. There are no psychic phenomena that are not oriented toward meaning. In this sense, it is a psychology founded on the concept of intentionality. The meaning which inhabits all psychic phenomena does not originate from a purely mental activity; it is an autochthonous meaning which constitutes itself on the basis of "elements." This might have been Husserl's opportunity to recognize a truth in Koffka's "integral psychology" from the sole fact that it arises on the terrain of facts. Gestalt psychology clarifies some of these facts and, even without knowing, or wanting to, glimpses certain essential philosophical truths. Husserl describes how Galileo posited the bases of an eidetic form. He could have admitted that Gestalt theory introduced an eidetic form as well.

C. Phenomenology and Linguistics

Initially, we examined the evolution of Husserl's thought with regard to the relations between phenomenology and psychology. We find a parallel in the evolution of his thought with regard to the relationship of phe-

nomenology and linguistics, as well as phenomenology and history. We will only study the evolution of these latter relations as an illustration and clarification of the relation between phenomenology and psychology.

1. *Husserl's initial thesis ("Fourth Logical Investigation").*[15] This text represents a radically dogmatic position. Husserl maintains that we can only understand a language (as a means of human expression) by placing it back within the context of a general theory, or eidetic, of language (i.e., an enumeration and description of all forms of signification). In other words, like the grammarians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Husserl conceives of the constitution of a universal grammar.

In the same way that eidetic psychology extracts the essences from certain psychic regions, the eidetic of language enumerates the forms of signification which make a language [*langue*] what it is. This eidetic reduction brackets the presuppositions of language (e.g., categorical existence, particularity, singularity, the modalities of the possible and the probable), and grasps what is required for a language to be a language.

Thus, we must begin with a table of the fundamental modes of expression and the forms of meaning that are inevitably present as the source of every possible language. It is necessary to distinguish two forms of study: an eidetic of general grammar, universal and reasonable, and an empirical linguistics which utilizes essences in order to clarify facts. However, how is this universal language, the rigorous condition of an empirical linguistics, constituted? Do we have a sufficiently radical means to grasp the essence of language in order to answer this question? Is it enough to reflect solely on our mother tongue? Or is it not, on the contrary, necessary to detach ourselves from it by exploring other languages?

A similar problem arises for psychology: can one reach essences without recourse to facts? What is the connection between the facts and the sovereign intellectual activity that grasps the essences? However, in the *Logical Investigations,* Husserl does not content himself with a dualism of science and reflection. His conception of the relation between thought and language follows in the same direction; he speaks less and less of a sovereign reflection which owes nothing to the facts. Instead, Husserl opts increasingly for an image which resembles the experience of speech [*parole*].

2. *Husserl's second thesis.*[16] According to this article, reflection on language does not consist in positing language and then leaving it behind. On the contrary, it is to rediscover *the speaking subject* on this side of the objective science of language. Phenomenology attempts to take full account of the speaking subject, differing in this effort from linguistics, which approaches language from the outside (for example, how one explains the present state of the French language by its previous state). The subject

who speaks, on the other hand, ignores the past, and instead turns toward the future. For the speaking subject, language is the means of expressing his intentions and of communicating with others.

The observer, the linguist, breaks language down into a series of processes which destroy the unity of language. The linguist does not accomplish this by ascertaining the limits of a language. A language, Vendryes claims, is never a reality, but an ideal.[17] Likewise, the observer comes to place the distinct reality of languages into doubt. For the subject who practices language, language has a reality. A difference always exists between the moment when one understands language and the moment when one no longer understands. To think language is no longer to investigate the logic of language prior to linguistic phenomena, but to rediscover *a logos* already engaged in speech, a rediscovery of the language that *I know* because *I know it*. Moreover, Husserl states that one must rediscover a reason already incorporated within its instruments of expression. In the *Cartesian Meditations* and later writings, Husserl accords an increasingly profound significance to the problems of language. To speak is to concern a subject with words, and not to translate a thought into speech.[18]

The development of the relations between body and consciousness is similar to the development of the relations of language and thought. However, it seems to begin as an external relation, a reflection striving toward a pure consciousness. I proceed from an *apperception* when I think like a consciousness tied to a body through a causal relation (that is, when I think like a man). But this apperception cannot change the characteristics which define consciousness. Thus, relations with another person consist in perceiving, behind the other's body, a thinker who is distinct from that body.

In the *Cartesian Meditations* the "consciousness-body" relationship is deepened; the spontaneity of my body informs me of the other insofar as my body takes into account the conduct of others and realizes the "pairing phenomenon." My link with another consciousness is an internal one. Likewise, the consciousness of language is no longer what founds language. First of all, we must speak and move within the representations of other languages.[19]

The problem of language must be resolved if we want to understand existence in the world, in ideas and in cultural objects (for instance, if we want to understand books, museums, musical scores, and writings that posit and insert ideas into the world). In order to comprehend the possibility of a plurality of subjects participating in an ideal existence, one must recognize these same ideas in speech. Thus, a universal linguistics is impossible, although language in fact becomes the model for under-

standing the nature of other languages. Here Husserl is especially close to Saussure, who stresses the necessity of a phenomenology of speech.

D. Phenomenology and History

1. *Husserl's initial thesis.* Husserl began by opposing empirical history to an a priori science of history that determines the concepts the historian utilizes: social processes, religious processes, and so forth. For example, take Durkheim's research into *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. He lays out the question of the sacred and examines this phenomenon in Australian tribes. He concludes that the origin of the notion of the sacred is social in nature and that the essence of the religious phenomenon is, in general, social. The title of his book implies that the totemic phenomenon offers the *element,* that is, the essence, of religious life, and will allow one to consider every other religion on the same grounds. It is here that we perceive the legitimacy of Husserl's difficulty. Durkheim's research is blind. Is the sacred part of the infrastructure of every religion? Husserl's question is: what is the essence of all religion? If the answer is the "sacred," Durkheim does in fact present an *element.* However, if the sacred is not present in every religion, or if it is merely a *secondary phenomenon,* then Durkheim's conclusion is no longer reasonable. Religion will have to be conceived in the abstract, as distinct from the different cultural forms in which it is encountered.

One could say the same thing about art or law. Research remains confused inasmuch as we have not determined, on the basis of a nonempirical examination, the nature of art or law. The history which judges and affirms engenders its priorities in the ideal sphere, and therefore contains a latent phenomenology. This point, therefore, affirms the necessity of reflecting upon the possibility of the historical fact which is autonomous in relation to the facts themselves. In this manner, Husserl's early work suggests a relative devaluation of historicity. Like his contemporaries (and certain present philosophers), he took seriously the notion of *Weltanschauung.*

Dilthey deemed it inappropriate for philosophy to establish itself outside of time, claiming instead that it must become a synthetic and provisional awareness of every significant aspect of our knowledge of time.[20] Husserl takes the position that philosophy must be a strict science. Certainly, Dilthey's project involves a legitimate need, that of postreflective living. The *Weltanschauung* [general perspective on life] is the notion of a goal situated in finitude, the idea of a provisional aim, analogous to the idea of a provisional morality. However, for Husserl, this practical necessity is not sufficient justification, because a rigorous philosophy would re-

flect upon our time as well as other times and would also be a truly actual philosophy. Those who remain attached to the notion of *Weltanschauung* impede progress toward a scientific solution to the problem posed above.

We must strive toward philosophy and not toward wisdom, toward *Weltwissenschaft* [a scientific understanding of the world] and not *Weltanschauung*. Although philosophy ought by all rights to provide the grounds for action (or to be more exact, it must encourage action without end or limits), it must be taken as a form of existence unto itself and not, as Dilthey understands it, as some preparation for existence. Husserl does not intend to sacrifice philosophical rigor to the philosopher's historicity. He concedes that the philosopher would not offer an opinion concerning contemporary issues if he could contribute to a total philosophy.

2. *Husserl's second thesis.* However, the more he considered it, the more Husserl recognized that reflection discovers not some eternal ideas, but rather an intellectual emergence of ideas, a *genesis of sense* (*Sinngenesis*). Reflection uncovers a sedimented history in cultural realities. Take, for example, the geometry of the nineteenth century. With Euclid, it seems geometry gains certain invariant elements. In reality, and despite its eternal air, Euclidean space is a cultural formation which is tied to a certain state of knowledge and is valid only for a given time. The modifications in this space produced during the nineteenth century pose the problem of the appearance of the notion of space: "Ideas are not inert" (Plato). The seat of philosophy is not in the eternal realm, nor is it in movement, but rather it is in a thinkable, comprehensible, intentional, and dialectical history that offers an order and a sense. In Husserl's last works this notion receives added credence; Husserl speaks of a "reason in history."

To be a philosopher is not to move from existence to essence, but to understand the past by virtue of the historical bond that ties us to it. Thus, historical understanding is the renewal or reanimation of a series of cultural operations by us through our present, the *living present* (*lebendige Gegenwart*), and it is from this living present that both the past and the future come to live again. The conceptions of historical and ethnographical research change as well.

From the very beginning, Husserl maintained that history teaches philosophy something. History reawakens the *Gemeingeist* [collective spirit]. Furthermore, all criticism is the inverse of affirmation and precedes reflection. For example, regarding the historical critique of the reality of "Christianity" or of "royalty," Husserl writes to Lévy-Bruhl to discuss his reflections concerning the latter's work, *Primitive Mythology*.[21] In this way it becomes clear that facts sometimes stimulate the philosopher's imagination, necessitating a sort of detachment from human life

for the sake of understanding it, because it is not possible on the basis of imaginative variation alone to represent every cultural setting. The merit of Lévy-Bruhl's book is to make us relive the European *Umwelt* [environment], to make us grasp what it would mean to live in a *stagnant, ahistorical* world as opposed to the European notion of a historical world. A juncture must be established between ethnology and phenomenology in order for the facts to become truly alive and meaningful.

In this regard, Husserl goes so far as to say that historical relativism is not without its reasons. The profound evolution of Husserl's thought is found in the indication that the intuition of sense demands that we revive the milieu of the entire society that is founded on the basis of an affective experience. The historical eidetic is not a substitute for contact with historical facts: the philosophical task is accomplished in contact with the facts themselves. This resembles Hegel's notion of phenomenology, that is, the idea of a reflection on history which follows the experiences of consciousness in all their variety. Thus, it is not accidental that Husserl has given his research the name "Phenomenology."

E. Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger

Husserl's evolution isn't just a changing of mind (which would suggest that he forgot his initial position), nor is it the hesitation of a thought which does not succeed in asserting itself. Rather, his evolution is best described as a maturation; a maturation that is an inevitable movement if one considers the problems which preoccupied him. Husserl's problem is: how can we demonstrate that a middle way exists between psychology and philosophy? How can our thought be considered neither eternal, and without roots in the present, nor as an event without intrinsic meaning? From this inquiry comes Husserl's conception of reflection as a *sense*-giving, as an opening onto an unreflective realm. In addition, his concept of reflection on time (which deepens temporality instead of overcoming it) also springs from his inquiry into psychology and philosophy.

Reflection and historicity no longer oppose one another; they are correlatives. Thought is historicity in the sense that the latter is a possession of the former, a deliberated insertion into history. The very movement by which I take possession of myself also reveals a temporality and history, not as so many external facts, but rather as the essential substance of my thought. In this sense of the terms, reflection always remains to some extent naive: it is in an internal relation with history. For example, the relation between the philosophy of history and dogmatic philosophy is a reciprocal relationship. In other words, the history of philosophy is always understood by the thought of a philosopher, and it is a thought

which only understands itself from the standpoint of this history that it presents itself as a spectacle. "A relative clarification of one side illuminates the other side."[22] Thus, our initial problem of the opposition between fact and essence, time and eternity, and the human sciences and philosophy finds a provisional resolution because essence is not outside fact, nor is eternity outside of time, nor is philosophy outside history.

In his attempt to attach philosophy to time, Husserl is much more committed than Scheler or Heidegger. However, it is well known that Scheler and Heidegger are much more direct in their attempts to incorporate various nonrational elements into philosophy. At first glance, the projects of Scheler and Heidegger represent efforts to introduce an analysis into philosophy which would no longer pertain merely to the understanding, but also to the "logic of the heart," as Pascal has said. What Scheler defines as emotional intentionality is intentionality prior to the intentionality of understanding.[23] One can consult Heidegger's *Being and Time* to understand the relations of humans and their world (as they reveal themselves in affective and practical experience).

These writers seem, then, more committed to leaving behind a philosophy of the eternal in favor of a philosophy of temporality. In reality, they are less radical than Husserl when it comes to the issue of reconciling philosophical activity and everyday life, because they maintain the primacy of philosophy on this score.

For Scheler, understanding an essence is important by the mere fact that within the *Wesenschau* I do not take into account my physiological particularities or my individual history.[24] Scheler sometimes grants a direct vision of some eternal essences, because it is quite true that when I think the pure essence of a being, none of my individual determinations seem to interfere. However, ten years later I will apperceive that these intuitions, which did not seem to owe anything to the time in which they were lived, do include historically determined biological and social factors. Thus, Scheler demonstrates that essences are *for* a certain temporally situated individual.

We have seen that Husserl was aware of this danger of taking words for essences. Heidegger describes the situated individual in such a way that the ability to find a pure thought, a philosophy face to face with the truth, would appear impossible. However, when he defines the philosophical enterprise, he offers no reservations regarding its absolute power of understanding.

One reads in *Being and Time*, "To philosophize is to describe and explore the natural notion of the world prior to science."[25] In this description he utilizes a philosophical power which is considered unlimited and which has no need for recourse to ethnology or psychology. The human

sciences are purely and simply subordinated to philosophy. It is necessary to already know what is essential in relation to the facts in order to proceed inductively. Heidegger claims a priority for philosophy in relation to psychology, while Husserl, as we have seen, tends to replace this relation of dependence with a relation of reciprocal envelopment.

Scheler and Heidegger both affirm the opposition of the ontological to the ontical and of philosophy to positive science. Husserl, on the contrary, indicates the secret connections between these two orders of research. We will not pose the problem of the reasons why Scheler and Heidegger are at one and the same time more irrationalist and more rationalist in their view of philosophy when compared to Husserl. Perhaps it is because irrationalism is an immediate rationalism which is unaware of itself as such, or that inversely it is much more difficult to integrate the irrational into the philosophy of a philosopher such as Husserl. The phenomenologists and Husserl believe that the psychological understanding is of a particular type, as different from the induction of the empiricists as from the reflective method of the traditional philosophers (i.e., the partisans of the return to an a priori determinant of the structure of our experience). Phenomenological psychology seeks the essence or meaning of actions through effective contact with the facts and in a "material a priori."

We must now examine how deliberately (or perhaps without having sought it out) psychology has for the past thirty years been guided by theory and by practice toward research of this sort.

III. The Convergence Between Contemporary Psychology and Phenomenology

In the second part of this course, we will attempt to show that, because of the problems it faces, psychology, directly and indirectly, has been led to converge with phenomenology's approach. The encounter of psychology and phenomenology will permit us later to define a compatible psychology and philosophy.

A. Psychology's Situation at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century

From the beginning of this century, a categorical opposition exists between psychology and philosophy that did not arise without some com-

plicity. A singular relation linked these two disciplines, a relation that presents itself in the fact that there was an abstract fashion of conceiving philosophy that excluded psychology and a scientistic fashion of conceiving psychology that excluded philosophy. These two notions are linked in the sense that philosophers never feared that psychologists (nor psychologists that philosophers) would infringe upon their domain.

1. *Abstract philosophy* does not follow a particular doctrine, but takes up a latent doctrine, one expressed explicitly by psychologists. Philosophy proceeds above all by reflection: to be a philosopher means to turn one's back on experience in order to discover, in the thinking subject, the significations which can be applied to things. The Cartesian cogito is a result of this fundamental moment in philosophy: subject and consciousness are posited as the universal center of meanings [*significations*]. Philosophy is the domain of the transcendental, of the a priori. This conception is not false, but it is much too simplistic. If philosophy is a reflective movement, it is also conscious of this movement as proceeding out of the unreflective; it is an effort by the mind [*l'esprit*] to understand itself.

2. *Scientistic psychology*, on the other hand, is inspired by positivism and opposes philosophical knowledge. It states that *psychology is objective.* Scientific psychology first rejects subjective being. Philosophy is reflective (or introspective, according to the psychologists who borrow from both disciplines), while psychology must be objective. From the perspective of psychology, philosophy depends on the principle of introspection, on the internal perception of an experience (e.g., I suffer, therefore I know what suffering is). Objective psychology must examine things from the outside, not from the inside; the subject under study must be distinct from the observer. Objectivity is the possibility of an understanding which is valid for a plurality of individuals. The grounds for verification involve the observation of many instances.

The alternative lies between an inexpressible knowledge and a communicable knowledge. Psychology believes that communicable knowledge is only attainable in our dealings with bodily manifestations. It is predominantly physiological in its approach, with the study of the nervous system playing a major role. Physiological psychology tends to approach questions concerning the operations of the mind by studying the functions of the nervous system (e.g., the connection between language problems and their localization in the cerebrum).

Scientistic psychology *enunciates laws.* Psychology seeks to lay out general propositions. On the one hand, we can say that psychology is able to establish verifiable forms of knowledge. On the other hand, it could be said that it overlooks the singularity of the event. Psychology does not seek the singular, but the generality of laws. On the basis of this positivistic conviction, one can say that the law is truer than the facts. However, the

law possesses a different mode of existence than fact, and the idea that the world is made according to laws is a conviction of the naive rationalist. (Mature science reverses this relationship and shows that a law is only the imperfect expression of the facts.) Thus, psychology is a psychology of the body which is also oriented toward general propositions.

3. *Consequences of the opposition between abstract philosophy and scientistic psychology.* (1) *Psychology is obliged to apply the methods developed by the natural sciences.* Since psychology must be objective (supposing that to be objective is to be natural), the methods of the natural sciences are used. The methods of natural science aim at subsuming the multiplicity of facts under causal relations. Psychology's method will be assimilated within that of science in general. The goal will be to extract the relations between the consequent and the antecedent, relations much simpler than those which spring out of our experience. Thus, the methodological conceptions of Mill and Taine will be applied. For Mill, the scientific and experimental method consists in a sort of triage of the facts, revealing the connections between specific facts. Science is a type of selective filter by which one is released from the trauma of phenomena. For Taine, the goal of physics is to achieve a kind of unique law that recapitulates all other laws, that is, a generative axiom. The goal of experimental knowledge is to discover this unique and fundamental relation. Psychology brings this conception to bear on itself, challenging itself to find certain simple relations of causality by reducing the psychically complex to the simple.

(2) *Psychology must be quantitative.* Quantity is considered the very stuff of science. In order for science to exist, it is both necessary and sufficient that things be measurable. Thus, all consideration of values must be excluded from the science of psychology. Furthermore, the distinction between the normal and the pathological, or between adaptive and nonadaptive behavior, is often effaced, because such distinctions assume certain norms of validity and a rigorous conception of objectivity will exclude certain subjective notions.

(3) *Philosophy and psychology do not understand one another.* Under these conditions, the philosopher and the psychologist are opposed to one another point for point. However, some reactions have surfaced among both psychologists and philosophers which represent attempts to escape these antinomies. Unfortunately, even when attempted by a philosopher like Bergson, these efforts do not succeed. They simply confirm the suspicions of the psychologist because they do not bear on what is most essential, that is, the revision of some of the fundamental definitions proffered by philosophy and psychology. For the scientific psychologists, one is seeking to determine psychic facts. Bergson opposes this approach with "the immediate data of consciousness" as the internal source of my life. He was right in a certain sense to claim the existence of the ego's

perspective on itself and to oppose the lived position of individuals to their determination from the outside. He was right to show that quality is not reducible to quantity and to search for a legitimate description of the qualitative world. Finally, he was right to demonstrate the necessity of a philosophy which would take up contact once again with the facts; he had even foreseen the necessity, affirmed by Husserl, of bringing the philosophical and positive forms of knowledge together.

In his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Bergson defines the philosophical intuition as a process in connection with certain facts, and from a certain perspective, one that draws a line of facts that extend toward a horizon. Thus, he defines the important idea of an experimental metaphysics. He does not, however, put it into practice and, consequently, his philosophy does not achieve its full promise.

By removing himself from the world of objectivity and taking up the strictly lived position of the human, Bergson discovers élan vital and duration with its degrees of contraction.[26] The élan vital is discovered initially in the free act, then in the organism, and subsequently in religious experience. However, Bergson never offers an explicit inventory of structures. His philosophy remains lacking in structure. In *Creative Evolution* we read about "instinct" and "intelligence," and in *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* we are exposed to the ideas of the "closed society" and the "open society."[27] Bergson never even sketches out a philosophy of spirit like that of Hegel. As Georges Politzer has shown so well, Bergson wants to rediscover the concrete, but only "the concrete in general."[28]

For psychologists, this notion of lived experience posited by Bergson is an inexpressible idea. Bergson himself, in explaining what he means by the lived experience by recourse to a rough theory of language as incantatory and metaphorical, provides them with ammunition for their arguments. This theory is a solution born of desperation: it consists in inviting the reader, through a multitude of images, to place himself at the center of a philosophical intuition. In order to validly achieve his goal, Bergson would have had to generate an entire theory of language with this problem as its crux. An effort like Bergson's cannot influence psychologists, who, confronted by this effort to show the speechless coincidence of the self, believed that philosophy had nothing to say and enclosed themselves even more firmly in the appeal to an objectivity so rigorous that it was the very antithesis of subjectivity.

B. The Evolution of Psychology

The exchange between philosophy and psychology was terminated by both sides some thirty years ago. A radical opposition between philosophy

and psychology marked the advent of this century. Psychology's subsequent evolution was made possible by an overcoming of philosophical and methodological antinomies.

1. *A revision of the antinomy of the subjective and the objective.* Psychologists demonstrated that subjective experience is not necessarily the same as introspection. In other words, a difficult, slow, and nonimmediate form of self-understanding exists which requires a deciphering as complex as the one we use to understand other people. Thus, it is not reasonable to deny the same sort of objective value to this self-awareness that we accord to the awareness of another. Likewise, the objective is not necessarily external, and understanding is not a simple notation of given facts. The latter always implies an interpretation and introduces new notions.

All scientific methodology has evolved in this direction since 1900. Science no longer thinks of itself as the registration of facts, à la John Stuart Mill, but rather as a construction of concepts which permits the ordination and coordination of facts. Similarly, in psychology objectivity consists in a methodological construction projected against a backdrop of certain conditions of verification. This revision of the relation of the objective and the subjective allows it to move beyond the alternating choices of objectivist empiricism and subjectivist introspectionism.

2. *Revision of the antinomy of the body and consciousness.* Psychology recognized that the investigation of the body, and the nervous system in particular, as a means of comprehending the mind (e.g., to explain language on the basis of linguistic functions) was a mystification. In reality, the schemata of cerebral physiology were only so many tracings of the psychology of the time. Thus, Pavlov seeks to explain the functioning of the brain not by borrowing the givens from an objective psychology, but rather by projecting what occurs in behavior onto the cerebral mechanism. This physiology reflects a hypothetical psychology rather than a scientifically elaborated one. Therefore, in order to fully account for behavior, psychology is better advised to address concrete phenomena, since the image that it constructs of the body already presupposes a conception of behavior.

3. *Revision of the antinomy of individuality and generality.* All objective understanding is not necessarily general understanding. There is no reason for science to devalue the understanding of the individual and the singular. For instance, contemporary neural physiology makes use of studies of these particularities (Goldstein). It is just as rigorous to study a single subject in several different relations. The proofs that are established by the gathering together of many sectors are as rigorous as those that compare a great number of cases in a more summary fashion. Thus, the notion of induction is expanded, and the Aristotelian postulate, "The

only science is the science of the general," has nothing to do with post-Galilean science. We can only say that the details are contingent and that the law alone is necessary; we must follow Brunschvicg in criticizing the positivist dogmatism concerning laws.

4. *A revision of the antinomy of the simple and the complex.* Psychology no longer believes that psychological science consists in the investigation and discovery of relations of increasingly simple causality. Thus, a conception of scientific methodology which grew out of the logic of John Stuart Mill is left behind.

C. The Development of Psychology and the Philosophical Antinomies of Soul-Body, External-Internal, and Mentalism-Materialism

We are confronted by attempts to overcome certain antinomies, antinomies resulting from the manner in which philosophy and psychology were conceived at the turn of the century. First, we can consider the philosophical antinomies between the objective and the subjective, between the body and the soul, between materialism and mentalism. Stemming from these antinomies, we find methodological antinomies concerning quantity and quality, explication and comprehension, and causality and values. Initially, psychology thought it had made decisions in favor of one side of each of these antinomies, but in reality, by its evolution and development, contemporary psychology has neutralized these antinomies.

1. *The notion of behavior, and the "phenomenal."* Behaviorism seeks to choose between the two sides of the alternative. A refusal to choose would be to the profit of certain scientistic antitheses. However, behaviorism does not end up being consistent in its approach. From its very inception, it posits an opposition between the manifest content of its doctrine and the profound significance of its research, an opposition which calls its scientistic postulates into question. Behaviorism is against introspection, against consciousness conceived as a series of self-contained states. Its intention is to place the subject back in contact with the world, the social world in particular.

Behavior, when defined as a debate between the individual and the world, is the proper object of this psychology. For Watson, behavior can be studied without recourse to physiology. Instead it can be taken as a "current of activity" toward the physical and social setting, as the source of a certain meaning.[29] Watson seeks to distance his work from any form of physiological reduction, but is troubled by the opposition of the external and the internal. He is only able to express this revolt by an analysis of nervous phenomena. Ultimately, he can go no further than a

"reflexology" where behavior is seen as a chain of conditioned reflexes. In the same way that we study the acquisition of animal behavior in a maze, we must study humans in the social maze. They are caught up in a series of conditioning forces which structure their relations within the sociohistorical context.

Thus, Watson turns his back on his initial goal. He is no longer trying to explain the relation between the physical milieu and the human milieu. Instead, Watson searches for a *causality*. The negation of the mental realm does not succeed in renewing a relation with the external. If it is accomplished by an appeal to the nervous system, it imprisons the individual in the causal processes which have the nervous system as their seat. In admitting the legitimacy of the behaviorist enterprise, in reexamining the notion of behavior, and in defining it as a *dialectical notion* (that resides in the space shared by the subject and its setting as a totality with its own internal law), we can fulfill the initial project proposed by Watsonian behaviorism. Ultimately, such a project would strikingly differ from Watson's efforts. For instance, Tolman distinguishes between *molar* and *molecular* behavior.[30] *Molar behavior* is behavior grasped in its totality: in its mental setting and its cultural specificity. From its molar perspective, behavior is not explicable in terms of neural phenomena, but rather is defined by its economic and historical environment. Tolman implies that a perception of values is at play that has to do with the cultural configuration. It is in this way that the general situation of conduct is defined. Behavior possesses a meaning which can no longer be reduced to the nonmeaningful collection of results.

Does such a distinction remain possible at the more elementary level of animal behavior? Is there no room to introduce an element of intentionality here as well? Even the rat's behavior in the maze is not devoid of meaning. The analyses of Koffka will enable us to examine this aspect of the question. Koffka's investigations of the notions of "behavioral setting," "psychological field," and the "phenomenal" are brought together in the second chapter of *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*.

The notion of "behavioral setting." Koffka distinguishes the causes and conditions of behavior (the geographical setting) from the object the behavior aims at, in other words its meaning (the behavioral setting). The notion of *geographical setting* defines the collection of effective realities within which the individual moves. The notion of *behavioral setting* involves the constellation of realities within which the individuals believe themselves to move. This distinction is valuable no matter what one's position on consciousness may be.

Consider two chimpanzees placed in the same geographical setting, in a room with some bananas suspended from the ceiling and a stool.

One of the chimps makes use of the stool to reach the bananas, while the other simply sits on the stool. Thus, while the geographical setting is the same, the behavioral settings are different. We find, immanent in the behavior, two valuations of the stool-object, sometimes as a seat, sometimes as a tool. Someone may object that this is to speak in excessively human terms, that the innate or acquired ability for assembling things is not the same for these two animals, that the differences we cite are superficial, pointing out the ways in which geographical characteristics should lead us back to a consideration of the nervous system. However, the question is, then, to know if the body is ever definable for us (as well as for physiology) via its geographical reality. Let us examine this problem in the following manner.

A descriptive difference between the two forms of behaviors remains: the same stool is not the same for the two chimps. All behavior concerned with immanent objects can be defined by their examples: the regulation of behavior occurs in the behavioral setting, and the results of the behavior are registered in the geographical world. Behaviorism's claim was to ground us in the objective realm. In our analysis, on the contrary, the idea of behavior grows and doubles over on itself. We perceive, within all behavior, an orientation and we cannot, as Goldstein has demonstrated, define behavior in terms of gesture, for example, the movements of the mountain climber falling into a crevice do not constitute behavior, because they are not oriented toward a specific behavioral setting. At the very most, such movements express a catastrophic defense reaction. All bodily movement is not behavior. Therefore, behavior is more than the necessary subjection of the body to this or that stimulus. Furthermore, understanding only reactions does not permit one to grasp internal laws of behavior.

Certainly, all the experiments of psychology are subordinated to a single condition: to determine animal behavior. However, it is not a question of totaling up a given number of responses to a given number of stimuli. It is necessary to interpose, between the stimulus and the reaction, the behavioral context that defines an individual and that distinguishes what may be obscured or confused in the geographical setting (such as in Jastrow's illusion where one perceives two equal and parallel segments of a circle to be different). Inversely, the behavioral setting can identify two things which, in the geographical world, would be understood differently. (For instance, take the example of two points, one white on a black background, the other black on a white background, which have the *same function,* and how they are identified in perception.)

Thus, the difference is not between the material and the mental, but rather between the objective conditions and certain visible factors

which define the animal's behavior (i.e., the behavioral situation). While the *stimulus* has only an external relation with the response, the *situation* is an intelligible relation to this response. In a parallel manner, we must distinguish between a *geographical response* and *behavior.* Suppose there are three rats in a maze that subsequently exit it. Their geographical responses are identical. However, a description or an analysis of these three behaviors supports the distinction between the different behaviors of excitation, search for nourishment, and pure exploration.

It is this differentiation that behaviorism cannot generate. Also, animal psychology has often placed animals in situations where these differences were not visible. Köhler, for example, criticizes a number of experiments in animal psychology that put animals in situations where there was no true solution. Moreover, the animal's simple success or failure is not a fundamental issue: "There are good failures and bad successes."

Thus, we could say, without issuing a hypothesis on animal consciousness, that there are cases where behavior adjusts to the structure of a situation and other cases where it does not. In other words, certain forms of behavior have an internal meaning and others do not. It is necessary, then, *to decipher the meaning of this reaction through the fact of the reaction.* In other words, one must discern the internal structure of the behavior on the basis of its observable characteristics. Ultimately, the behavioral setting unites everything into a whole.

Behaviorism maintains it has a firm grasp of the geographical setting, and therefore of behavior, through a study of the synapses, and so forth, that rely on the basis of scientific givens. In reality, these "givens" are already *elements of the human setting.* Therefore, in this sense, the behavioral context ultimately embraces even the geographical world and, in any case, it is impossible to situate oneself once and for all in the geographical world.

Certain Marxist writers believe they have found an ally in Watsonian behaviorism, but in reality nothing is less Marxist than behaviorism. Marx once said something about science that resembles Koffka's statements. The *datum,* Koffka said, is in reality a *construction.* Marx shows that the sciences are a moment in the evolution of human history and that their epistemological structure corresponds to the structure of the society in which they are born. Thus, it is impossible to hypostatize any given science, because science does not exist in itself. Watsonian behaviorism appears in reality as a mechanistic materialism founded on a false conception of scientific objectivity. The ideal of objectivity is a chimera if it consists of a simple notation of external givens, because the external world is always grasped from a human situation.

Furthermore, this position does not amount to anthropomorphism.

We cannot just assimilate the behavioral setting into the setting of *our own* behavior (e.g., the belief that animals have the same behavioral setting as we do). This confusion must be avoided, since it is evident that we grasp the rat's behavior through our situation, out of our human condition, which allows us to perceive, by analogy or contrast, the mentally ill individual and the child, as well as the animal. As Husserl says in the *Cartesian Meditations,* the animal is for us a variety of humanity. Contemporary psychology develops postulates which represent a significant departure from its initial claims.

The notion of psychological field. From what we have just seen, we must grant the descriptive originality of the behavioral setting and of behavior itself in relation to "geographical" *infrastructures.* Such a perspective defines a certain psychological *field,* in a double sense. It is first of all a notion like that introduced by physicists (such as the Newtonian theory of gravity). This is the gravitational field that is responsible for the local phenomena of gravity. We use this comparison to develop a notion of the psychological field as a milieu of relations of forces, tensions, and reactions, thus permitting us to comprehend human conduct. No individual relation between stimulus and response exists; instead this relation necessarily occurs within a milieu: a field of forces.

The psychological field also resembles the field of photographic instruments which define the size of a visual perimeter or a number of visible things. Similarly, behavior can be conceived not as the result of a causality coming from stimuli, but rather as a selection or a construction by way of the organization of certain elements of the geographical world. The notion of psychological field reveals the fact that, even at the level of behavior, we can find no complete passivity in the organism.

The notion of the phenomenal. Let us examine the particular case of perceptual behavior presented by Koffka. At first glance, the word "perception" seems to reintroduce the notion of consciousness. In reality, this behavior is defined as a primordial task imposed upon every individual; there is a difference between perceptual behavior and other forms of behavior. And if we grant that psychologists must study behavior, it sometimes happens that they discover forms of behavior that explode the old behaviorist notion of behavior. How can perceptual behavior be characterized without appealing to philosophy?

Can we say that perceptual behavior is a response to what an object incites in me? The physiologist indicates that the retinal image is the source of my behavior. Actually, this stimulus is constituted by a plurality of physical agents which have no internal relation to one another; there is no *image* of things on my retina. When stimuli have registered on the retina, all the work of segregating the thing from what it is not remains to

be done. To speak of the retinal "image" as a stimulus is to take the result for the cause; organization has not yet taken place. Vision cannot happen in the eyes, and the traces of the external world on the retina are not yet a seen thing. It is akin to Descartes' statement, "Seeing is not a property of the body, but a *property of thought*."[31]

Koffka's approach is similar, although he does not presuppose the reflective method involving the order of the for-itself. He wants to achieve a trans-objective order different from the in-itself of the object, but an order which is not the same as that of the for-itself. He denounces the "error of experience" which consists of inserting into geographical things what in fact results from our activity *apropos* these things. We do not see stimuli, but rather we see *on the grounds of* these stimuli. Thus, he distinguishes between the stimulus and the object of perceptual behavior, and thereby broaches the idea of the sense or orientation of behavior. In support of this idea, he does not introduce a notion of consciousness, but simply shows that my gestures designate, within the world, objects with regard to whose structure and meaning I comport myself. We cannot superimpose the cause of perception onto what concerns that perception; the *immediate causes of perceptual reactions are not themselves perceived.*

If this is the case, if we can only derive from things the aspect that they possess for our behavior, where does this aspect, the one visible in the relationship of gesture and object, come from? Things do not geographically possess the properties that they have for our behavior. For example, in the case of camouflage, the relation between things is dissimulated and does not figure into the behavior of the pilot. Perception is not, then, the transfer of the qualities of things into me. One other hypothesis remains: if things are not the appearances that they have for my behavior, then perhaps the properties of things belong to stimuli which are much more immediate. This is false as well. It is not the rays of light or the degree of light, it is not a local property of proximal stimulus, which is decisive, but rather the internal arrangement of the perceptual field (e.g., an organizational process involving lighting and what is revealed by this lighting, such as in Wundt's experiment: when one observes two moving vertical lines through a hole in a perforated screen, two black bands appear on the retina, more or less large depending on the distance at which they are moving. However, the subject perceives two lines which move toward or away from one another, but these lines always retain the same size.) In our behavior things are conservative (the law of constancy). The parallelism between my effective vision and the geographical world stems from some intervening phenomenon within our organism. Our perception is conservative; it tends to maintain real relations. One might believe that this parallelism is some law; however, in reality, the accord

or discord between behavior and the geographical world is explained in terms of the behavior itself. We must therefore renounce the "constancy hypothesis": even when the very same object at various distances is identified by our behavior, this does not mean that it *is* the same; that depends upon perceptual organization. This organization is a fundamental fact and therefore must not be understood as the result of some intellectual interpretation. Constancies also exist in animals; for example, a three-month-old chicken perceives a piece of grain at a distance to be larger than when it is much closer (even though the image on its retina is one-third the size at the longer distance).

Consequently, between stimulus and response a field of behavior intercalates itself, a field in which organized vectors take on meaning. The value of local phenomena is a function of spatial organization: of the auto-organization of our behavioral field. A sort of "transverse function" regulates the distribution of the parts of the whole by way of the exigencies of the whole. The behavioral setting is the situation: stimuli when they are understood to form a constellation and inasmuch as they organize themselves and take on a meaning.

Katz has studied the modes of appearance of colors.[32] In themselves, aside from spectators, colors are all simply colors. If we consider colors within the context of a behavior, the qualities and differences of function of various colors become apparent. The manner in which the color exists depends upon the function that it serves in a visual field, now as *Oberflächen* [over the surface], now as *Flächen* [on the surface], now as "illumination" (*Beleuchtung*), now as "illuminated thing" (*Beleuchtetes*). A red is not the same red depending on the role it fulfills within the spatial field; even texture itself can be modified.[33] The world of behavior engenders the determination of what a color actually is, although all of this belongs only in a perceived world, in direct experience or a phenomenal world. Koffka distinguishes between an objective world, in which things are in-themselves, and a phenomenal world, in which things exist in terms of a behavior, according to the way in which I deal with external elements and the way in which I draw distinctions between objects.

Thus, Koffka moves beyond introspective psychology inasmuch as the latter determines that the object of its study is certain givens which are only accessible to a single witness, while Koffka's notion of the "phenomenal" is discernible in all human action. Furthermore, Koffka moves beyond introspective psychology by surpassing any psychology which privileges the understanding consciousness; Koffka's "phenomenal" in no way supports a notion of consciousness as inactive. For example, language is a form of behavior that *is* a signification; it does not *have* a signification. Certain actions *are not* signification, but, rather, they *have* a signification.

My linguistic gestures designate entities that I evoke which are not actually there, entities that I want to render recognizable. Thus, linguistic behavior is different from gestural behavior concerning, for example, a lamp; the former must be pursued in its intentional object on the basis of the structure of discourse. Therefore, understanding consciousness is only one part of the observed world; it is not the model for all awareness. The phenomenal is the project by which a subject brings meaning to appearance in its ambient surroundings. Psychology is committed to making creative contact with the world, not just simply understanding it.

Thus, phenomenology (Koffka employs the term) is the systematic study of this lived experience, a naïve description that is as full as possible of the direct experience of what is and what is not a thing. For example, the problem for the soccer player is to determine the interval between the other players and not the players in themselves. The difference between the structure of the playing field for the spectator and the player is an example of the distinction between the geographical and the phenomenal. These descriptive differences do not constitute a theory all by themselves, but they exclude the possibility of bad theories by making us cognizant of what needs to be understood. Psychology has to present the significance of pondered behavior, a significance which will determine the posterior fecundity of this behavior.

Psychology is thus the understanding of the essential structures of behavior; psychologists begin to analyze *sense*. In *Les origines du caractère chez l'enfant*, Wallon remarks upon an active gesture of grasping. He then refers to a distinction between the pseudo-gesture of the newborn and the true gesture. Here we are no longer in the presence of an objectivist psychology, but rather of a psychology which examines the contents of behavior in order to *seize its sense*. Wallon has, moreover, never supported the so-called objectivist thesis. Goldstein singles out certain gestures which are, at first glance, much more superimposable (such as individuals with diseased brains who can make grasping motions, but are unable to make designating motions). What is decisive is not the *elements* of which behavior is composed. Rather, the internal *sense* is decisive. In other words, the intentionality of "showing" is to be distinguished from that of "taking." We must be able to differentiate between a difference in the value and in the level of a behavior.

Thus, the problem that arises is to distinguish the relations between the geographical world and the behavioral field. We have seen that the confusion of habitual methodological notions no longer supports the depiction of this relation in terms of causality. Instead, the positive form of the relationship between geographical world and behavioral field involves the problem of the relations of soul and body.

2. *How do psychologists integrate these new notions?* For *Lewin,* the philosophical problem posed by the development of psychology and by the introduction of these new notions is the problem of the relation between the geographical world and the world of behavior. This relation is lived by the acting subject. The acting subject's actions are concerned with the real world via a phenomenal world distinct from the geographical world. However, how can psychology describe this subject's actions on the real world?

Lewin offers an interesting solution to this problem. He does not pose it as a problem comparable to that of the soul and the body, presupposing that two substances have been distinguished and their relations interrogated. It seems to be a simple question of causality. However, if one no longer thinks in terms of substance, if one abandons realism, then this thesis is shattered. The forces of the behavioral setting are considered not as things and not as substantial, but as *constructa,* forms that do not represent substantial elements. From the moment Lewin suggests that the behavioral settings are *constructa,* he is able to conclude that science need not occupy itself with the substance or the matter of these forces. In fact, he concludes, these questions are asked in vain. The problem involves the intelligible relations (i.e., structures and forms) that are buried in the phenomenal field, and no ontological power can serve to define these relations. By way of an example, Lewin brings up political economy. In this domain, as in many others, one employs notions without which it would be necessary to intervene with some notion of "substance" in order to speak about it. At the time that Lewin writes, a surplus of American gold is interfering with the European monetary situation. The economist interprets this gold surplus as a sort of suppression that spreads and affects the rest of the world. This does not mean that the economist thinks this "suppression" is a material and substantial power, but rather, it is a nonarbitrary mental construction that does not constitute an economic "substance."

He then goes on to make use of another example: in the Soviet Union, at the time Lewin writes, demand exceeds supply, while in the United States supply exceeds demand (overproduction or, rather, underconsumption). According to Lewin, these entities allow the comprehension that in the U.S.S.R. there can be no unemployment while in the U.S.A. factories are slowing production. The economist does not go on to "reify" these phenomena, but instead thinks of them as relations, not as substances.

Similarly, in psychology, the phenomenal field "works" in the geographical world, without the need for us to envisage anything other than the relations that we might construct to try to understand this action.

If one grants the notion of world as a system of phenomena linked by thinkable relations, then a certain dialectic can be expressed in terms of behavior, an economic theory can define it in some other fashion, and so forth. Thus, it is no longer a question of causality or of knowing how the physical world acts upon the behavioral world. All these domains and their relations belong to the universe of discourse. In renouncing realistic or substantialist thought, one succeeds in eliminating the problem.

We find in all of this some interesting indications for psychologists who would like to establish their own philosophy. However, the problem is not eliminated, but changes form. Beyond the problem of realism, we discover the problem of the relation between the various dialectics where the individual serves as the theater. In effect, the physical, economic, cultural, and social dialectics collide in the individual. As easy as it is to reconcile these areas theoretically in the abstract (where they do not meet), it is necessary to confront them in the existing individual. Under the pressure of events, certain dialectics disappear from the internal dynamic while others are accentuated. If economic phenomena take on great importance, the life of a people becomes almost exclusively "economic." In other cases, for example, that of favorable economic circumstances, the actualization of other dialectics is more effective.

Yet how is it that among living individuals in the same modern circumstances, differences in behavior still persist? The idealist's response does not suffice; we must also explain why. Take the example of a conflict between a collection of motivations that do not stem from my familial milieu but from my cultural milieu in the larger sense. How is it that one of the groupings of motivations predominates at any certain point? We might say quite rightly that one never completely replaces the other. However, from the individual's perspective such a preoccupation designates the dominant orientation. Life is not made of the continuing coming and going of dialectics devoid of any rivalry.

We see that although the causal problem cannot be entirely eliminated, we can at least pose it differently by introducing the notion of *motivation*. Whereas causality is in the third person and concerns external relations, motivation springs out of action and its meaning is anything but indeterminate. The impulse is taken up by the individual as a pattern which accounts for the individual's choice among the various dialectical elements. How does an economic dialectic, for example, become a pattern? One can not simply claim that it is because of the existence, or nonexistence, of a quantity of gold. We must know how this situation concretizes itself in my setting, how the economic infrastructure acquires and transmits its influence in individual phenomena. It is not enough to affirm that economic forces act upon the minds of individuals: this would

be a magical conception. We must determine a *medium,* a milieu (like that being explored by the American culturalists) of tools, of instruments, and of institutions that shape my manner of thinking. It is in beginning with this cultural world that I take up (this world of tools in the widest sense) that we can conceive of the action of economics; the individual undergoes the force of economics through the mediation of the cultural world.

The questions posed by Lewin are not resolved by the simple introduction of notions, such as *constructa,* because my experiences are not based solely on an appeal to *constructa* but also to *motivations.* Lewin achieves, then, only an important first step: the radical elimination of substantialist thought. This first step allows us to pose and resolve these problems in a different way.

Koffka, in his *Principles of Gestalt Psychology,* recognizes that the problem as laid out by Lewin is essentially an attempt to modify the conception of reality. However, we will only be able to fully account for Lewin's ontology if it is already in place. Thus, Koffka thinks that for the time being it is necessary to agree to place these different orders—the phenomenal and the geographical—in the single common milieu that we understand: the physical universe.

Koffka develops a physicalist philosophy. Something must be shared in common by the geographical and phenomenal realms, and this something is that they are both manifestations of the physical world. However, since the physical world is the geographical world, Koffka finds himself led back to his initial problem. Nonetheless, he does not grant this to be an impasse, for the phenomena of forms are discovered in the physical world (e.g., the distribution of an electric current in an electrical conductor is a phenomenon of form). Now, if such phenomena exist in the physical realm (and the nervous system as well), it is possible that the phenomenal world could simply be, for consciousness, the expression of these phenomena of forms for which the nervous system serves as the site. On the one hand, psychology is phenomenology, a description of the structures of direct experience. On the other hand, psychology is explanative, because the order of lived phenomena must be left behind in order to discover the physiological phenomena in which the former reside.

With reference to descriptive concepts, functional concepts must be introduced in order to offer an account of the nervous system's physical phenomena. The principle of *isomorphism,* which posits lived forms as internal replicas of the physical world's external forms through the intermediate forms of the nervous system, permits the soldering together of description and explanation.

According to Wertheimer, whether the forms, which in the last analysis are lived forms, do or do not rest upon the forms of the nervous

system does not alter anything in the description that we give of them. Description certainly permits the uncovering of the richness of psychic life. It is not a question of defining the psychic stuff, but of explaining its structures. We can only rely on psychic forms if they are also shaped by the forms of the human world. Dialectical thought is a curious profession in Wertheimer, since at the very moment the principle of isomorphism is invoked it is used to return to a substantialism which is not a solution, but at the very most an expedient.

This principle of isomorphism entails two fundamental difficulties. First, if the forms of the nervous system are isomorphs of those within the phenomenal field, then Koffka's critique of behaviorism no longer holds, since what we have said about retinal images could be repeated in terms of all nervous phenomena. Just as no *image* exists in the retina, nervous phenomena in general only converge for a spectator. Either it is wrong to move from the physical order to the phenomenal order, or the phenomenal realm is neither a simple fragment nor a particular case of the geographical world. Therefore, *Gestalt theory* returns to behaviorism. (They are especially close in terms of the organization of nervous phenomena.) For Koffka, the conscious process contributes nothing, since everything is founded on nervous structures, and consciousness can be linked to the actualization of a specific structure; it becomes an *epiphenomenon*. One can then ask: what becomes of the reclamation of direct experience?

Second, what becomes of social psychology in this conception? If my behavior is explained by the actualization of certain physical and chemical phenomena in my brain, how does one account for my relation to society and to a historical and cultural milieu? Inside a behavioral setting, and only inside it, can one comprehend how the motivations of a social order possess any efficacy: the relation between individuals and their social settings is only conceivable with the aid of an original field of behavior. In terms of a thesis of epiphenomenalism, how can one conceive of the possibility of cultural relations inscribed in my brain becoming motivations?

Thus, we see the regression which occurs in Gestalt psychology: everything is set once again on the common denominator of physiological factors. No more radical negation of the historical and social realm exists than the one engendered by the necessity, invoked in *Gestalt theory*, of abandoning such considerations and returning to those imposed by Lewin.

Paul Guillaume pursues an itinerary parallel to Koffka's. It will be instructive to see (in the course of this exposé) how, guided initially by a Gestaltist and phenomenological point of departure, Guillaume returns

(because of methodological commitments) to a physiological and physicalist conception. We can read with interest Guillaume's "L'objectivité en psychologie," *Introduction à la psychologie,* and "Peut-on decrire un phénomène?"

Like Koffka, Guillaume is initially led to a radical psychology, one capable of integrating motivations of diverse sorts by excluding nothing on the basis of a methodological approach. This integral psychology grants the fact of conditioning in some form, but also at a much higher level the possibility of more integrated forms of behavior. In certain cases, the relation to the setting is mediated by structures proper to the individual with no references to actual motivation; such behavior cannot be reduced to the geographical setting. In the case of still more complex forms of motivation, verbal behavior must be considered as sources of information capable of revealing internal structures.

In this manner, this integral psychology establishes both *reflexology* and complex behavior as the limit cases by which the individual asserts specific stimuli in a particular manner. A plurality of methods is applied with regard to these different levels. Certain extreme actions are explained by a physical causality, thus giving rise to pure explanation, while other, more complex actions involve a comprehension which grasps the structure, manifest or hidden, of the individual. However, Guillaume ultimately turns back before completing this integral psychology, renouncing it in consideration of the phenomenal field. The following three elements can be distinguished in his *Introduction à la psychologie:* (1) in physics, only the causal explanation, which traces each fact back to antecedent facts, is meaningful. (2) In psychology, introspection is worthless, since it presupposes a total understanding. However, we must learn to know ourselves to know others. (3) Beginning from these premises, Guillaume ends up applying the methods of physics to psychology: the "stimulus-response" relation is homogenous with the physical relation, "antecedent-consequent."

This solution is only valuable if one posits introspection and physical method as alternatives to one another. However, a third order exists beyond these alternatives, that of the phenomenal (an order which must be distinguished from the Bergsonian notion of coincidence with lived experience). This third order lends itself to verification, although it cannot be reduced to the physical order. Moreover, such research could arise if physical knowledge responded appropriately to the indicated schema. In the following paragraphs, we will examine the points on which we can agree with Guillaume, as well as the points on which we must distance ourselves from him.

Points of agreement. If we want to depict introspection as an imme-
diate access to individual psychic reality, this notion must evidently be
rejected. For self-understanding by the self is indirect; it is a construc-
tion. One cannot rely on immediate impressions: I must decipher my
behavior as I decipher that of others. Guillaume stresses that "the states of
consciousness are not psychological facts, but meaningful indices which
depend on these facts." For Gide, on the contrary, loving consciousness
does not distinguish itself from love. The latter is only supportable with
difficulty, because at the very least a difference in verifiability exists.

Furthermore, all acts of self-understanding are in relation to an ex-
ternal object. We could take the optician's chart as an example: the act of
reading is only affirmed *through* the reading itself. The operation always
aims at the world, but Guillaume adds that phenomenology's error is to
maintain that we must break off our activities in order to grasp our rela-
tion to the world. Though a questionable opinion, it makes an important
point concerning the *dimension of sense.* Although I alone have access to
my lived experience, the meaning of lived experience is not given by the
sole fact that I am alive. We are caught in a perpetual misunderstanding
here, because Guillaume thinks the phenomenological reduction is a
reduction in the states of consciousness. In this sense, phenomenology
becomes a pure nothingness or a pure indeterminacy. If I interrupt all
commerce with the world, what is left? From reduction to reduction, I
come to deny everything. In reality, the phenomenological "bracketing"
or "reduction" only interrupts the ordinary relations of the self in its
world, interrupting them so that it can see and reveal them. The goal of
the reduction is to teach me about this constant thesis of the world.

Guillaume's second point of analysis consists in taking up a general
notion of objectivity to arrive at a psychological objectivity. The first act
of thinking, in its effort at classification, is to select certain properties
which come to be intersubjective, properties analogous to Descartes'
primary qualities. Objectivity is not on the order of givens. Rather, it is
constructed. The qualities of form are immediately given, and it is on
the basis of these that one can begin a classificatory schema (e.g., the
classification of objects as red or white). Subsequently, the relation is ca-
pable of being generalized. However, this first effort which represents the
debut of physics does not achieve the objectification of phenomena. The
Daltonian, for example, lives in a universe which is different from that
of the normal seer.[34] Thus, a second work of objectivation remains to be
done: the study of the relations of colors in terms of diverse organisms,
that is, taking account of the particularities of physiological structure.
With the appearance of various incongruities, I strive to reduce them via

explanation or via theory construction. Objectivity prevails and psychology is constituted when one apperceives, beyond a universe of primary qualities, a residue of the physical object which remains to be objectified.

Finally, Guillaume's third point involves the extrapolation and extension of the objectifying procedure of physics into psychology. The entire domain of psychology must be integrated into a system of causal relations. Other laws must be constructed to explain subjective facts. To know a fact scientifically is to insert it within a system of causal relations; the phenomenal realm must be surpassed in order to situate the fact in such a context. To know is not to coincide, but rather to grasp by inserting what one wishes to know into a context.

In such an effort to objectify psychology, a moment arrives in which one is confronted by relations that cannot be assimilated into relations between objects. The "stimulus-response" relation is mediated by a structure introduced by the practice of the organism. Similarly, between the stimuli and behavior, we are obliged to interpose a structuration of these stimuli. From the very moment when a structuration is found, certain phenomena only appear by means of the functional totality of this structuration, and thus thresholds and phenomena of perceptual constancy again become part of the configuration of collected stimuli. We are in the presence of a transverse phenomenon and no longer simply a longitudinal one: a phenomenon that deals with various stimuli in terms of the relations that link them.

Psychological understanding does not relate directly to the geographical object, but rather to the phenomenal configuration. Therefore, the confusion or reduction of the phenomenal world to the geographical world is illegitimate. In the case of a laboratory experiment, the configuration of stimuli can be considered as an external given (e.g., the proximity of stimuli, their qualitative resemblance, and so forth). However, these objective determinations, or conditions, do not have a *causal* characteristic.

Through the qualification of a form as a "good form," for example, we have in mind a privileged form (e.g., square, circle, etc.). But what does the term "good form" signify, and how should it be defined? It involves an idea of perfection that has meaning *in itself* and that is only procured by reference to a specific organism. If we ask, like Goldstein, "Why does this thing have a certain form?" then we are obliged to produce a decisive endogenous factor.

Thus, we cannot consider the stimulus-response couplet as a physical process. The organism contributes its part by selecting the stimuli that are affected and accords them a certain order. The first goal of psychology and physiology is to determine these modes of organization. If we

take the case of a free perception, the formation of *Gestalten* does not seem to be linked to external conditions alone; all objective conditions are not equally dominant. Furthermore, Guillaume offers an even more striking account. He believes that authentic perception is very different from perception studied in the laboratory, where one proceeds by the abstraction of certain stimuli. By no means is this to say that we should dispense with experimental investigation, but rather that the induction in which such work takes place does not consist of disengaging an invariant causal sequence via abstraction. Instead, it consists of reading a structure of typical behavior in the facts. The accumulation of facts is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for experimentation. One can isolate a law by undertaking a single experiment prepared by a series of prior investigations.

In any case, since induction is derived from a structure, there is no reason to presume that psychology must refuse to make use of all procedures which furnish access to the inner aspects of phenomena. Induction is an effort to connect the objects shared by these phenomena with intelligible links. We never find in the facts the means to understand them; we must construct relations and notions intended to account for the perceptual phenomenon by structuring them. The example of perception is particularly appropriate in Guillaume's case because perception is always external perception. Nonetheless, we cannot draw from this an argument for objectivist method. In other realms it is even more difficult to reduce all psychological understanding to the stimulus-response schema. In the understanding of others, for example, the task of psychology is to take up this experience and thematize it. Certainly, psychology is indirect knowledge. Psychology's perspective regarding others is not to be confused with subjective lived perspective. However, if we attempt to explain psychology's understanding, we must isolate structures of typical behavior from the phenomenal order. The greatest part of psychology's domain only leaves itself recourse to the sort of explanation proposed by Guillaume. For some studies, such as the study of personality or of the conditions of forgetting and recollecting, a causal explanation on the basis of the universal determinants of forgetting or of recollecting is patently too abstract. We only understand such forgetfulness or recollection by placing it back in the dynamic of behavior.

The essential point in undertaking this exposé is to show the unacceptability of the two alternatives: an objective psychology that would employ the methods of the physical sciences, and an introspective psychology that would be unverifiable. Guillaume grants that explanation sometimes arises in reference to the phenomenal field's structure, and that it is especially important to comprehend the dynamic of the indi-

vidual. In "L'objectivité en psychologie" he admits that describing the phenomenal field is necessary; he assigns animal psychology the task of describing the phenomenal world, accessible through the description of behavior. However, elsewhere the "phenomenal" becomes for him the pure individual phenomenon, the "immediate lived experience," the "givens of individual consciousness," and the "exact nuance of a lived impression." Thus, it is Bergson that Guillaume thinks of while confusing the phenomenal with Bergsonian "duration." In reality, psychology does not exist at the level of "immediate lived experience," but then it does not exist at the level of the geographical world either; the psychic realm is *between* the two.

How can we explain Guillaume's position? In the article already cited ("Peut-on décrire un phénomène?"), he poses an objection to himself: there is something incommunicable in instantaneous lived experience. Yet modern literature has succeeded in creating a technique for expressing lived experiences described through the mediation of the objects of the external world. This technique involves the attempt to communicate the world as I see it. However, despite appearances, it is not a question of an actual communication of lived experience; the reader has to verify what the subject who writes the message is trying to communicate. The relations between objects are the sole theme of our communications; communication is only possible if it is devoted to describing the relations between the objects of the geographical world. Communication of the form of the objects occurs, but there is not communication of the phenomenon of form. Expression is not controllable when it seeks to account for lived experience. Guillaume in fact recognizes that there is, or might be, knowledge of my experience through the objective milieu of this experience. But he adds that this knowledge is not objective, and if such knowledge is objective then it is not lived knowledge.

However, on the basis of this account no communication in the physical realm would be possible, because the relations of objects make up part of incommunicable consciousness. If these objects were in fact objective, the individual would not necessarily be incommunicable. When the psychologist describes the introverted character, it is not a question of ineffable structures. We must concern ourselves not just with qualitative observations, but also with observations that accomplish an interpretation of the lived realm transmittable in language. Guillaume overlooks this, and thus the phenomenal realm remains inexpressive for him.

When Guillaume examines contemporary psychology more closely, he is obliged to recognize that it is hardly the same as canonical psychology because the former makes use of the subject's own perspective in its efforts to show that subjects do not proffer their own interpretations. He

offers as examples psychological experiments disguised as physical experiments: the measurements of thresholds, as well as tests of intelligence and character. This is, of course, a good precaution, since one cannot rely strictly on the hallucinating individual in order to know what a hallucination is. Guillaume admits as much in certain passages of his *Introduction à la psychologie;* the word "hallucination" can express the common structure in many individual perspectives. He adds, however, that this word therefore designates a common structure and not a simple phenomenon. At this point the discussion is wholly verbal: if one understands it, as we do, as "phenomenal," that is, as a common configuration in the experiences of several subjects, then his psychology is phenomenological.

Similarly, in other passages Guillaume hints at this sort of compatibility between the objective method and the problems of interior life. Objective psychology remains capable of integrating interior life, when considered as the dynamic of behavior, because interior life always expresses itself in behavior. (One can recognize, Guillaume says, from the outside a gaze which does not look back.) Thus, objective psychology can take the interior life of others as a domain for study, because what appeared reserved to the intimacy of behavior can be examined outside of this behavior. Interior life also makes up part of the domain of objective psychology because it attempts to penetrate the meaning and intention of the dynamics of behavior. Language makes up part of behavior, and psychology has the right to avail itself of what subjects tell us about themselves. The method remains objective if the testimony is not taken literally, but considered as an index or as a document in order to establish the laws of behavior. These remarks are well-taken, but by them Guillaume exceeds his initial definition of objective psychology and returns to an integral psychology.

Guillaume then goes even further: apropos the distinction between psychology and physiology, he points out that there is no reason to oppose physiological explanation to psychological comprehension. However, in other places in his text, he speaks once more in objectivist language. For example, he allows that the psychology of anger consists in constituting a "group of symptoms of anger that permit one to anticipate its actual appearance." It is not sufficient to add up the facts of anger to uncover the meaning of anger; rather, it involves the discovery of a common meaning in these facts, of connecting them by the apprehension of their general meaning and behavior. It is not necessary to investigate a liaison as part of an objective series, but rather to find a type of motivation.

Taking into consideration what we have discussed above, it is possible to retain two cautions to phenomenological psychology. First, it does not suffice to suspend preestablished scientific concepts and return to ex-

perience in order to be certain of arriving at the intuition of the phenomenon's essence. We must be on our guard against verbalism.[35] However, the phenomenological method does not present in this regard dangers more grave than any other method.

Second, the method of phenomenological comprehension or seizure of the structures of behavior does not permit us to rigorously distinguish between the *theory* and the *facts* by which we test it, nor to achieve an absolute objectivity. Guillaume formulates this remark with reference to psychoanalysis and he is correct. However, it is also equally true of history and sociology and, at the extreme, of all investigation into the domain of the human sciences. We need not conclude that these investigations are arbitrary, but rather that it is a question of *objectification* and *not* of *absolute objectivity*. Perhaps this is the price of all human sciences, because in this domain how we envision ourselves and how we are in reality cannot be absolutely distinguished.

What are the reasons for Guillaume's hesitation? He thinks that the development of psychology in France has been retarded because researchers have not attributed any value to objective method and have instead first been trained in philosophy. Guillaume presents the question as if it involved a conflict between psychology and philosophy. He reproaches philosophers for transforming the simple temporal difference which exists between the advent of physical objectivity and the advent of psychological objectivity into an ontological difference. However, it is Guillaume that is building a philosophy, for it is the philosopher in him, and not the psychologist, who speaks when he imports the supposed canons of physical objectivity into psychology. Furthermore, who is developing an ontology if not Guillaume when he declares that there is an order and a sole type of objectivity, a single universe of discourse? He substitutes the unity of the physical order for the plurality of experiences, whereas it is furthermore necessary to make [*faire*] the experience of Being and constitute what Husserl called "regional ontologies." We have to define what a human and history are through our historical experiences, and we must not postulate the absolute value of a method or prematurely decide about the nature of psychic life.

Guillaume speaks in the name of a philosophy; he says himself that he wants to construct the "philosophy of psychology." However, difficulties begin to multiply as a result of this position. He embraces a philosophical realism, but since on other occasions he claims the real is "constructed," it is impossible to see how these two notions can be reconciled. His *Introduction à la psychologie* relates to a concept of induction like that of Mill or Bacon, which are conceptions of philosophers, not scientists. After Brunschvicg, the residue method has never been applied in science.

It is a blind method by which, beginning with a complex phenomenon, one achieves an inexplicable residue of this phenomenon by the residue of antecedent phenomena. This would be reasonable if one could lay out a complete list of antecedents, but this is never the case. This conception of scientific knowledge is quite distant from the scientific practice of induction.

In fact, we have seen that the existent psychology can hardly fit within the canon of the psychological understanding that Guillaume postulates. Therefore, we cannot say that he speaks in the name of psychology. Good philosophy, comprised in part by objectivist principles, does not damage the development of psychological research, but a philosophy without rigor does. It is these prejudices which have imparted an unmerited privilege to psychophysiology. If many researchers have turned their backs on psychology in France, it is perhaps also the case that they have only been offered a psychophysiology, objectivist prejudices having overshadowed the psychology of personality.

3. *Goldstein's conception of physiology and its relation to psychology.* Goldstein insists that the realms of the physiological and of the organism should be defined not in terms of categories and ontological notions, but rather in terms of the meaning that the physiological phenomenon takes on in the course of research.[36] Truth occurs in definitions that accord with verification operations. We should endeavor to abide by what appears in experimentation and in scientific investigation. If we speak of psychology in this way, an ambiguity involving the confusion of the phenomenon with Bergson's inexpressible lived experience is possible. However, this ambiguity is eliminated if we succeed in demonstrating the scope of the phenomenological orientation in the study of the nervous system.

The study of the nervous system was carried out by Goldstein, the psychiatrist, when he had become interested in the reeducation of patients with brain injuries at the end of World War I. He quickly became aware that the only manner of characterizing the maladies of his patients was in terms of a psychological analysis. He elaborates his conceptions on the basis of initial clinical studies of the cases of cerebral pathology. We will see how Goldstein's research, beginning by suspending prejudices of all sorts, starts with an analysis of psychological understanding in the phenomena of aphasia, hemianopsia, and reflexes and heads toward a definition of the physiological and the psychic organism. We are, once again, presented with a good example of a nondeliberate convergence between experimental research and the demands of the phenomenological method.

(1) *Placing in brackets contemporary prejudices.* Goldstein begins his

research determined not to rely on a definition of the physiological. It is an original determination, because physiologists already approach their objects with certain presuppositions of what the body ought to be. If one wants to study it scientifically, then one is obliged to conceive it as a particular instance of matter. And if one considers the body as a mass of functioning matter, a quantity of attributes or predicates will be devalued and rejected as nonscientific. Everything in the spectacle of behavior that evokes differences of quality or signification is termed a naive description, since it does not relate in the last analysis to different combinations of simple elements. The mechanistic prejudices require, in effect, that objectivity be identified with the analysis of simple elements. Certainly this analysis could be practiced at the level of reflex, but not at all levels. From this prejudice, one passes to the ontology in which simple elements are fundamental and complex elements are derived from them; all without asking oneself what these simple elements are.

Goldstein does not grant that we need to rely upon these mechanical prejudices or upon vitalist ones. Instead, we must simply follow an experimental study to its extreme. Thereby, we will succeed in defining physiology and life. We cannot know what the organism is before having made contact with it. Thus, we will then define physiological being according to knowledge of it as a subject of physiology. Goldstein seeks to define physiological being in terms of the phenomenon as it appears to us.

(2) *The study of aphasia.* The problem of aphasia places us before the question of the relations between physiology and psychology. Aphasia has been linked for some time to cerebral lesions. It is thought to be a malady definable by the absence or the deficit of a certain specialized apparatus of language (e.g., deficiency in written or spoken language, deficiency in the comprehension of written or spoken language, etc.). The trouble is attributed to cerebral lesions. The integrity of the instruments of language is considered to be tied to the integrity of certain centers. In this way one thinks that one can develop a physiology of aphasia by a study of perturbations in language. However, according to Goldstein, this study remains above all psychological; all analyses are commanded by contemporary psychology. Current practice in effect decomposes languages into a number of operations, such as speaking, writing, naming objects, and so forth, and the physician examines the patient in terms of these commonsense categories. The picture of the patient reflects these categories: the doctor does not allow himself to be guided by the "facts," examinations are conceived in terms of the dominant notions concerning the structure of language.

If we submit aphasiacs to a more complete examination, problems

take on a different aspect from the ones that they had initially presented. If we reject this segregation and selectivity of common thought, no massive deficiency follows. The aphasiac speaks in certain cases and not in others; each time he speaks he uses an automatic language. Aphasiacs do not employ true language, since they do not use true acts of denomination.

The patient cannot name colors, for example, but can rediscover the color red through the intermediary of a strawberry. Thus, the patient maintains automatic language: a group of linguistic tools which he uses in a quasi-impulsive manner. However, the patient has lost the possibility of taking up the singular object as a participant in an exemplary structure of a certain category. The former attitude is a concrete attitude, while the latter category demands the mediation of an idea. One can employ words in two fashions: integrated into an automatic language or by giving them their full meaning. Aphasia consists of a collapse of the dimension of speech from the categorical to the automatic level. However, it is not language; the word as sonorous ensemble has disappeared. The first incomplete observations of aphasia are a radical response to a question which cannot be resolved in this way.

In order to understand the aphasiac, we must know what meaning the performance of language has for the patient, because due to automatic language the patient can give the impression of naming by utilizing his "external verbal knowledge." However, properly speaking, no denomination, no internal operation which joins the word to the thing through the intermediary of the category, occurs. (For instance, take the illusion of calculation. The subject accomplishes the requested addition, but he does not actually deduce the answer, instead posing first ciphers on his fingers, etc.) No longer knowing what a number is, he utilizes a series of numbers in an entirely automatic fashion. It never suffices to say, then, that the aphasiac is capable of counting; we must also know how he does it. The subject always manages to mask his deficiency, so we must penetrate into the nature of the problem in order to reveal it.

Thus, aphasia can no longer be conceived as it once was. All illness does not depend on a cause from which all symptoms are deduced. In reality, the picture of the aphasiac is complicated by admitting that other causes arise that disturb the purity of the case. We were obliged, therefore, to make recourse to auxiliary hypotheses; the diagnosis always has a hesitant aspect. Goldstein thinks that the nosological entities have been poorly defined. He does not define aphasia by its cause, but by a change in the linguistic structure: a breaking up of the categorical attitude. Similarly, for Head, it is a fracturing of the symbolic function.[37] Goldstein makes his analysis more precise and shows that the fundamental trouble

can be interpreted in a manner analogous to that found in many subjects if we define it as an inability to distinguish the essential from the accessory (e.g., an inability to differentiate accents). A deficiency exists in the articulation of figure and ground; the patients have lost the ability to orient themselves by the possible. They do not comprehend or retain the essentials of a short story and are only capable of intellection in a factual situation; the imaginary one has no significance for them. The aphasiac moves within an apparatus of stereotyped meanings; language has lost its productivity. One notices analogous deficiencies in sexual behavior. There is no massive deficiency, because the subject is not impotent, but he becomes incapable of initiative and does not seem to feel the impulses of desire. The fundamental trouble is not definable by an absence of elements, but rather by a new type of organization of behavior.

If all this is true, our understanding of the physiology of aphasia is indirect and reflects the poverty of the clinical study of aphasia. However, by setting out from a comprehension of the aphasiac's behavior we can attempt to conceive of the processes which engender his behavior. All understanding is a construction, and this is also true of physiology. What offers itself for comprehension is behavior; the sole fabric immediately furnished is conduct.

Yet, is it possible that aphasia is a special case? Is there not a simpler example which would demonstrate that physiological knowledge is indirect knowledge more rapidly?

(3) *The study of hemianopsia.* We will make use, following Goldstein, of the phenomenon of hemianopsia.[38] A patient affected by this trouble has a visual field reduced by about half when measured by the customary laboratory methods. However, Fuchs, who has studied a patient with hemianopsia experiencing free vision, maintains that the visual field is in fact shrunken, but not by half.[39] Furthermore, the field remains visible: one observes a bilateral redistribution of the visual field which has been reduced in scope. By what means does this redistribution occur? The eyes of the patient rock back and forth, the intact demi-retinas tend toward a central position. The fovea found in a marginal position are rejected; they no longer play their former role, with another region being taken into account. Thus, a delimitation of functional fovea occurs. This signifies that in the functioning of the eye, a spatial redistribution of each of the retinal points has taken place. Physiology is not merely the reflection of the anatomical situation: the functioning of the eyes structures the anatomical conditions so that a minimum of useful functions can be maintained.

What can be said about this new functioning except that it is a behavior? It is not the simple reflection of a certain anatomical state,

but it relates itself to a certain task that the organism must accomplish. There is a tendency to conserve the function at a certain optimal level. This reorganization produces itself without any species of consciousness on the part of the subject. In the case of hemianopsia, for example, no functional reorganization is found. Thus, we are concerned with a non-deliberate phenomenon inherent in the very activity of the organism.

The comparison with certain more complex physiological activities remains possible, as Goldstein has demonstrated. Aphasiacs behave in such a way as to avoid the catastrophic situations they cannot master; they display avoidance behavior toward any anxiety-producing situations [*situation angoissante*]. Possessing a constantly preoccupied attitude, they order objects in a meticulous manner. For the patients in Goldstein's study, all order defines itself through a certain behavioral orientation; the fact that patients had a place for each object proves that they are incapable of comporting themselves in an ensemble of objects arranged according to an improvised schema. The compulsive order of these patients is pathological; it is a question of shrinking the solicitations of the setting in order to avoid unsolvable situations. What is lacking here is the function of projection, the capacity to get one's bearings from the possible.

These attitudes that narrow the setting are analogous to those that one finds in hemianopsia. The disorder is still a form of behavior. The behavior is still meaningful; it is not a blind causality. Instead, it is a position taken up by the organism in regard to conditions indeed imposed by a certain state of this organism.

(4) *General considerations.* One often understands by physiology the physiochemistry of the organism. However, physiology is the study of functioning, and since anatomy alone does not account for such functioning, physiology must take up its own study. This point is also provisionally admitted, since yet unknown anatomical and physicochemical conditions might, by themselves, explain these workings.

The physiologist Stein declares that physiology needs to reach strictly objective conditions (e.g., chronaxies, etc.).[40] Stein asks whatever the observations may be, is it not the case that behavior, all behavior, is supported by mechanisms determined through chronaxical measurements? Goldstein responds that there is no difference in nature between a physicochemical study of life and a physiological study of the organism, but only a difference in the means of access. We cannot reach the workings of the nervous system any more directly through physiochemistry. In the last analysis, behavior is the sole dialectical unity.

Perhaps one needs to interject notions of value, quality, or dimension in the examples cited. Maybe we should consider an order of strictly specific phenomena. Goldstein tries to show that the method is always

the same, whether for psychology or physiology. The method is to reach various structures by different means. The measurement of chronaxies might seem to introduce and lead to the objective determination of cerebral phenomena. In reality, this is only an appearance.

There is no intrinsic opposition between beginning with measuring chronaxies and by analyzing the subject's manifest behavior. "This physiology believes it has a much firmer grasp of functioning in adopting physical methods. Yet it is not a question of direct verification, but rather of the subject's verification of the nervous system's working within determinate situations." When we have obtained a manner of representing the nervous system to ourselves, we are led to believe that it offers an opening onto the functioning *in itself*. In reality, it is only a manner of *interrogating* the organism, and it can be interrogated in many ways (e.g., clinically, etc.). The second procedure [the study of the subject's manifest behavior] is similar to the first, but it is no more direct. In any case, the results obtained are always only an approximation of the central phenomena, which is the reaction of the whole organism in terms of the situation in which it is placed. There is no coincidence with the facts, whether it be external or internal, but a certain manner of interrogating the organism. The goal is always to reconstitute the dynamic of behavior.

Goldstein is not against physicochemical analyses, which would be a philosophical postulate. It is simply a question of recognizing that these are only a few analyses and of maintaining the distinction between artificial operations and natural operations. The psychological approach and the physicochemical approach must be thought of as complementary methods. The analysis of phenomena must aim at the determination of behavioral forms with the aid of all methods. In fact, Stein and Goldstein's research converge.

(5) *Study of reflexes.* We will illustrate this point by showing that, in the case of elementary reflexes, physiological application becomes psychological explanation. In the case of pyramidal lesions, the normal reflex is reversed (e.g., flexing of the ears becomes the extension of the ears). How is this to be explained? One imagined that the lesions interrupted the control of the encephalus on reflex reactions, that an automatic apparatus was no longer subject to the encephalus's control. This explanation appears to be a certain manner of describing or naming the phenomenon. The automatic apparatus is a pure fiction, and the inhibitory apparatus which normally controls it is also conjectural. The explicative process begins with one realizing what one has to explain. If, instead, one observes the facts, one maintains that the reactions of the subject whose pyramidal pathways have been injured do not always have the same meaning. What the phenomenon of extension signifies in the organism is an avoidance reaction. The phenomenon of flexing is a reaction of ap-

propriation. When the reaction of differentiation, which consists in the substitution of a finer reaction for a simpler reaction, is impossible, one finds a return to a less elaborate behavior. The inversion of chronaxies is only a local aspect of this phenomenon of dedifferentiation which characterizes the general activity of the nervous system.

In certain forms of peripheral paralysis one also observes Babinski's sign. If we undertake a more detailed observation, we notice that it does not remain constant in any given subject. Certain additional factors, such as the position of the head and the body, interfere; they intervene, by virtue of their vital importance, like factors favoring or not favoring the play of the nervous system at any given moment. These facts suggest that we should consider the Babinski sign as a process revealing a certain level of functioning of the nervous system as a totality. No domain of research exists where the organism's total activity within a situation does not manifest itself.

Pavlov furnishes us with an example of the founding pretension of objectivist physiology.[41] According to him, the physiological study of cerebral functioning must serve as the basis for subjective studies of human life. He wants to constitute a science of nervous functioning which would serve as a guide for psychology.

His conception of reflexology is an intellectualist conception. Pavlov asks: how can the organism broaden its reflexogenic field to other associated stimuli? He explains it by the principle of irradiation: all associated stimuli in another individual acquire, by this sole fact and it alone, a power of excitation. But if irradiation were at play, by itself and in every case, the new reactions would be pernicious, suppressing the prior ones. Irradiation, thus, must have a limit: the selection of conditioning factors. In order to account for this notion of selection, Pavlov appeals to the principle of inhibition, conceived as a positive factor. Thus, the expression of certain stimuli would have the effect of temporarily suppressing the actions of certain others.

One sees by these few examples that in reality Pavlov attempts to construct a system of concepts which allows taking into account the institution of conditioned reflexes. Is this group of concepts valuable? We could recoup this postulate where all reactions to a complex stimulus could be obtained from elementary stimuli. However, a certain stimulus, inhibitory in a certain context, ceases to be in another one. Thus, it is necessary to conclude that there is no elementary stimulus which would possess *in itself* a certain reflexogenic or inhibitory power. More generally, there is no stimulus in itself, only operant stimuli *for* an organism and *at play* in a certain setting. The reflexes are reactions to certain relations between stimuli rather than to isolated stimuli.

Pavlov embarks upon his theory starting from theoretical preju-

dices. In contrast, Piéron in *Nouveau traité de psychologie* underlines the important distinction between the theory and the facts, a distinction that is not so easy to maintain even in a domain as objective as physiology.[42] The manner in which the facts are presented already stems from a theory. The solidarity between the theory and the facts is natural, but we must know how to select. The physiological *presuppositions* of Pavlov are very visible in certain cases, such as phenomena of perceptual constancy. For Helmholtz, the classical solution to this problem is judgment. Pavlov himself speaks of conditioned reflexes, but it amounts to the same thing. In both cases, the explanation furnished assumes that we must construct the whole by assembling the parts.

The decision to ignore psychology cannot be severed from the decision to only address oneself to nervous phenomena. What is most relevant to objectivity is not whether we speak of nervous, corporeal, or material elements. Pavlov's analysis is an analysis of behavior, but a bad one. He is nonetheless led to report some interesting reactions: when the collar is placed on a dog that has taken part in the experiment several times, we note the appearance of pathological phenomena. Normal reactions, secretory or motor, are disassociated, and on the other hand one observes negativistic reactions: the dog declines all relation with ambient surroundings. Pavlov in fact attempts to explain all of this, but his explanations are very complex, and the facts do not move in the direction of his theory.

In any case, one perceives a simpler manner of interpreting all these facts by giving them a different significance. How to comprehend, for example, the animal's pathological reactions? Pavlov explains them by a freedom reflex [*un réflex de liberté*]. Instead, we find a refusal of all stimuli on the animal's part, and in experimental situations the refusal is total, because they are not natural. It is with regard to certain complexes of stimuli (e.g., those related to feeding, attraction to females, etc.) that certain forms of behavior possess a meaning. The organism no longer tolerates the external conditions when one seeks to maintain it in the laboratory. It has other, intelligible responses inasmuch as we include habitual tasks in this category. From this perspective, Pavlov's conditioned reflex must be considered a pathological fact. His explanations permit us to eliminate the myth of a direct physiology devoid of any analysis of behavior.

Let us return to Goldstein's perspective. Instead of thinking of the conditioned reflex as the prototype of physiological reaction, it would be more exact to consider it as either a pathological reaction or one of a higher order. These two aspects are, moreover, not incompatible to the extent that difficulty in realizing a higher-level act can bring about a

pathological reaction. The conditioned reflex is a pathological reaction since it is a response to an isolated stimulus; isolation is characteristic of a pathological form of behavior, the nervous system thus functioning by a separated part. We more easily procure the initiation of a conditioned reflex in the child than in the adult and more easily in the backward child than in the normal one. On the other hand, it can also be easily procured in subjects capable of superior behavior and is almost as simple with an organism of considerable cerebral development. It is also characteristic of higher forms of behavior to select stimuli without practical value. I can very well come to be aware of partial stimuli and partial reactions by the decomposition of global movements, for example, habitual motor functions. However, the analysis is difficult and presupposes in some way a second-order operation, a difficult activity of which the animal is incapable. Reactions to isolated stimuli are the deeds of higher organisms.

(6) *Perspectives on physiology.* Mechanistic conceptions, far from representing scientific conceptions, are the reflection of anthropomorphism. We are in the habit of thinking that mechanistic conceptions are the most objective, but in reality they are only souvenirs of our human condition, in physics as well as in the human sciences. It is the error of biologists who attempted to account for the behavior of unicellular beings with the aid of categories from human behavior. One presents the amoeba's conduct, for example, as a series of "choices" of preference and one understands that human behavior could really be mechanically explicable like the amoeba's "choices." However, this identification is only achieved through an anthropomorphic conception of these tropisms which projects the contents of human activity into them. Likewise, we claim to explain human phenomena by simpler phenomena, but it is because we have already interpreted the former in this way. There is no common standard between the tropism and human action: the tropism is a manner of elementary reaction, while human action almost never offers a constancy of this sort. The mechanistic prejudice is not favorable to science, but rather contrary to it; mechanism is no more a remedy for physiology than is anthropomorphism.

Physiological knowledge is, in effect, indirect and does not have the privilege of immediacy. One simply approaches the organism from different sides by the study of behavior or the study of physicochemical phenomena, but in any case never indirectly. On the other hand, one cannot exempt oneself from recognizing the existence of qualitative differences of structures or values under the pretext of objectivity. Behavior is not the effect of external stimuli on the organism, but rather the result of a transverse elaboration of these stimuli. This elaboration is sustained in the organism's functioning.

Physiology remains entirely legitimate, but must be placed back within the dialectic of the organism and its milieu. It furnishes indices rather than realities, and there is room to proceed next to the examination of the quality or the value of behavior in relation to the a priori of the situated organism. Thus, we must ask at one and the same time, what places the organism in such a situation and what is the sense of its response? Goldstein's distinction between showing and seizing can only be understood by making an inventory of the meaning of these two attitudes: in *grasping* I confine myself to reacting in relation to the object, while in *showing* my gesture is not a possessive but a representative relation, almost an operation of expression, which refers back to a certain object presented at a distance. The difference between the two gestures is wholly the difference which exists between concrete and categorical behavior: in the second case I am concerned with an object, not inasmuch as it exists but inasmuch as it is the object to be regarded, contemplated, comprehended. It is essential that we grasp the difference between these two forms of behavior and nothing eliminates the need to do so, not even if we know the chronaxical disjunctions and all the physiological factors which underlie them, for we will not be able to decide why they are produced in one instance and not in another.

All of the above remains valuable at all levels. For example, in the case of the simple sensory discrimination of colors, the effects of lesions of the visual cerebral cortex are doubled: the subtraction of certain perceptual contents and the change in the structuration of perceptual behavior. Dedifferentiation is prior to all compromise.

It is the same in linguistics: Saussure points out that language [*langue*] is a means of differentiating signs from one another and a means of diversifying the gestures of meaning which operate within language [*langage*]. Similarly, the nervous system's functions are doubled in how it discriminates between perceptual contents.

Goldstein distinguishes two dimensions of human conduct: the organism attempts simultaneously to maintain life and the essential or functional value of life. In normal subjects the two projects are intermingled; the healthy organism does not pursue mere conservation. In the case of the sick individual, there is a division between the organism's tasks, a division that seeks to ensure the minimum conditions necessary to the pursuit of life; the instinct of conservation appears. And if one adopts in this regard Lucretius's distinction between the causes and reasons for living, one must recognize that the healthy individual is not particularly concerned about causes. However, the behavior of sick individuals tends to bring about a certain limitation of the environment that is a manner *of withdrawing from the unexpected. One notices an orientation toward*

the conservation and the shrinking of the milieu. Conversely, patients with anosognosia do not perceive their deficiencies, such as in the case of the blind individual who speaks the language of people with vision, the phantom illusion of amputees, and so forth. As long as the lesion is not deep the subject is not aware of it, and the organism's collective orientation toward tasks which are habitually presented to it subsists: the organism remains polarized by the group of tasks within the normal setting. These are the considerations which must oblige us to be concerned with the structures of behavior.

(7) *Connections between psychology and physiology*. Let us examine the position Goldstein takes concerning the problem of cerebral localizations. We can cite it in three essential points.

(a) All lesions of the central nervous system provoke problems in the structure of behavior, and the same problems could be provoked by rather different lesions. The central nervous system involves two sorts of localizations. First, those corresponding to the contents of behavior (e.g., visual, auditory, and linguistic cortex, etc.), where a vertical organization in which each peripheral element corresponds to a specialized region of the cortex. Second, those where the regions of the frontal cortex do not appear equal and would bring about a certain structuration of behavior. The frontal cortex probably functions each time in a qualitatively different fashion by rendering certain possible levels of behavior.

The relation between the function and the substrata is not the same in the two cases. In the peripheral regions the function seems to reside in the substrata, while in the cerebral cortex it is different and the function consists rather in using the nervous mass in a certain typical manner at a specific level. Even in the case of simple functions, we can only say that the function is in the substrata. As Von Monakow pointed out, there is a difference between *localization of the lesion* and *localization of the function*.[43] The peripheral regions never function by themselves. This double type of organization by way of safeguarding the different levels of behavior must be made more conspicuous.

(b) If it is true that all lesions provoke general structural problems, it is still true that localizations exist. After World War I the observation of substitutive phenomena tended to make us abandon the theory of localization, and the conclusion aims to show that cerebral activity was undifferentiated. That is not exactly true because the functions of replacement are never equivalent to the first ones, and some of the latter are not completely lost. A perception repaired to the aid of gestures of the hand is not exactly equivalent to natural perception. Certain functions remain linked to the integrity of certain cerebral regions.

(c) *In beginning with this double localization, horizontal and ver-*

tical, how do we represent the functioning of the nervous system? Goldstein says to start by taking up the notions of figure and ground advanced by Gestalt theorists. Thus, the cortex is the site of a figure-ground process for each perception, as simple as it may be. All the regions do not work in the same vein; some work by producing an addition to a form, others to a ground. The nervous system always functions as a totality, but certain functions remain attached to certain territories. Furthermore, each nervous phenomenon takes two aspects: a local aspect (figure) and a total aspect (ground). It is thanks to this metaphor that we can represent the nervous system's functioning. Goldstein does not support all the theses of Gestalt theory, against which he raises interesting and important objections. In particular, he understands forms in a more dynamic and biological manner than the Gestalt theorists have done.

7

Method in Child Psychology (1951–1952)

I. The Problems Confronting Child Psychology

In child psychology (as in psychopathology, the psychology of primitives, and the psychology of women), the situation of the object of study is so different from that of the observer that it cannot be grasped on its own terms. We cannot easily exclude our adult presence when observing the child's behavior. When witnessing the relation between adult and child, rather than solely focusing on the child's own nature, we should describe the child's relationship with the adult.

In psychopathology, consider the case of aphasia. Aphasia was initially characterized by the disappearance of certain behavioral contents and certain verbal images. Aphasia is actually characterized by a change in the internal structure of language [*langage*], making it a significantly deeper and more central phenomenon. It amounts to a reduction in behavior from a certain complex level to a simpler and more rudimentary one. At first, we were not able to realize the character of aphasia because medical science traditionally raised questions about the sick organism the same way as a normal one. Since medical science could only define aphasia by removing certain qualities from the normal condition, aphasia remained misunderstood.

In the primitive. We encounter the image of blacks who are seen in a certain relation with the colonizer: for example, black Americans *in relation* to white Americans. The black man is not satisfied with the white man's attitude of scorn or idealization. What is lacking is a sense of equality. The white man's judgment lacks naturalness; it is not a balanced relationship. We can conclude that when an inequality exists between the observer and the observed, psychology runs the risk of being more a portrait of the observer than of the observed.

The psychology of women. We find that women are seen as possessing a complementary nature to the defined "masculine nature" in our civilization. We see this characterization take the form of deprecation (e.g.,

the lying woman, the deceitful woman) as well as in idealization (e.g., the poetic woman) [*femme-poésie*]. Generally, women find that they deserve "neither this excessive honor nor this debasement."

In child psychology, the difference between the observer and the observed is even greater. Since children react so quickly to our behavior, we do not notice that it is our very own adult presence that has caused their reaction.

II. The Child's Relations with Adults

We are not describing the child's own nature, but rather the child's relationship with a being who is no longer a child. Such a relationship reveals the way that childhood is conceived of in our society.

The old-fashioned attitude is to *consider the child nonessential*. Old conceptions of authoritarian education consider the child to be an undeveloped adult. *To consider the child essential* is to place the child at the center of the family. Some mothers, who remember or believe they remember their childhood as unhappy, relate to the child as though he were an invalid. The child reacts to this attitude by complementing it. The child "believes in himself" a great deal, but he also believes himself pitiable; he feels exposed to a thousand dangers. The question, "Do you want to do this?" saves the child's freedom, but the constant pressure to make decisions that exceed his own ability [*force*] puts the child in a state of bewilderment. (Consider the example of such a child in a "new school" experience: when changing schools, the child asks, "Will we have to do what we want?")

In *summation*, the child's situation is no happier in the last example than in the authoritarian example. In both cases, the children have not yet acquired an equal footing in their relations with adults. They lack something that could provide them with a sense of equilibrium. We must always ask ourselves what the reason is for the attitude we adopt toward children (*even if our attitude is a benevolent one, it could be described as demagoguery*). Our attitude should not be the result of our own traumas. The child must not suffer the consequences of the shocks that we have lived through. Children exist for their own sake; they do not exist as a consolation for our own personal misfortunes.

It would be beneficial if we did not encounter educators who enjoy pedagogy with a suffering passion. Such an attitude puts the child in an abnormal situation. It should be that the educator is an educator through

a taste for life, not through a resentment against it. The same problem exists for psychology, where the object is always either overestimated or underestimated. It is rare for us to live in an equal relationship; we always view the other as stronger or weaker than us.

Stronger. The other appears stronger than us, because we do not witness his hesitations. (Valéry remarks that a book which is read in a few hours by the reader took ten years for the author to compose. We are thus led to suppose that the author had a spiritual density that no one else could fill. No wonder we are disappointed when we come into contact with the author in real life.)[1] *Weaker:* others appear weaker than us, because we never grasp their potential. We say they always have the "same old look." We say they are monotonous. Others appear fixed to us, because we do not witness their freedom. We always have the tendency to think that the other is finite and fixed, whereas we are not.

III. The Child's Relation with Adults: What Should Our Child Psychology Be

We should not fix the "child's condition" within an infantile mentality, nor should we think the child does not participate in human life. Even if it is good to recognize—as we have for the last fifty years—the originality of infantile mentality, we must not thereby freeze it into a mental structure which would remain opaque to us adults.

Should the adult be removed from the child's education? No—a purely immanent education, where children are left to their own devices, is no better than an authoritarian education. Left to their own devices, children are no more able to acquire the skills necessary for life than if they were subjugated under their educators. When the child is always left with other children, puerile behavior and a certain boredom develop. We might wonder if in fact an adult presence and certain conflicts with adults have a formative value for children.

The manner how to introduce the child into the cultural heritage. In secondary education the use of the Socratic method (where everything is derived from the students' own thoughts) has not given us great results. We have witnessed extremely slow progress and even students who are just "treading water." Students learn by imitating the manners of speech and thought of the teacher. Therefore, they do not learn cultural heritage solely by intelligence, but also by a quasi-dramatic imitation of the adult.

IV. Critique of the Conception of Infantile Mentality as Closed In upon Itself

A. Primitive Mentality

Is the mind of a primitive person substantially different than our own? Lévy-Bruhl discusses this topic.[2] He asks how primitive peoples could have acquired our techniques, have learned something about us, if their minds were organized according to principles other than ours and if they had distinct ways of behavior [*voies*]. Are we not also sometimes prelogical? For example, consider the surprising reaction of Mannoni's little ball collector.[3] Having received a gift from Mannoni, the child starts to expect all sorts of other favors, whereas we would have expected a sense of gratitude from the child. These reactions do not prove that the native child reasons differently than we, but rather that there exists an abyss between the differing social conditions that creates different relationships of *dependence*. A similar situation arises in the relationship between the teacher and the young student. A student only becomes a true "outlaw" when the teacher shows a special interest in him. When one first arrives in the colonies, one notices only the picturesque. When one lives there, the picturesque disappears and one sees the human concerns, all so similar to those of one's very own countrymen.

B. Is the Morbid Consciousness Closed upon Itself?

Ribot maintains that the behavior of the pathological subject is identical to the normal subject.[4] The laws of behavior are only more visible because they are exaggerated. Charles Blondel sides on the other extreme; he maintains the opacity of the morbid consciousness.[5]

Although it is certain that morbid conduct is other than our own, it still remains comprehensible. Normal and morbid behaviors cannot be *superimposed* upon each other, yet they are both responses to the same problem of existence. For example, we can consider the seeds of our own obsessions, desires, and fears. We can also consider Goldstein's examples.

Minkowski demonstrated very well how we should proceed in order to understand the mentally ill.[6] For example, Taine said a hallucination is a perception without an object.[7] However, interviews have shown that the mentally ill do not confuse perceptions with hallucinations. We could then conclude that the patient does not at all understand, and thus the hallucination is caused by delirium. In contradiction, Minkowski says: I will "coexist" with my mentally ill patient and observe the repercussions of his conduct on me. I will locate the moment when I have the feeling

of slipping into the patient's morbid universe. I will listen to the patient, write what he says and how I feel. I will then have a picture of the relation between the mentally ill patient and my normal self. We can only give a picture of the relationship between the mentally ill and the normal subject. It is only through this double account that we can understand how hallucination appears to the hallucinator.

Is there a feminine nature? The portrait we paint of women implies a certain representation of man. In other societies, women are conceived as far stronger than men. Therefore, the fragile woman is a fact of culture and not of nature. Methodologically, there is no point in denying the psychological differences between men and women that arise from biological differences. The only way in which to know whether, and to what extent, such differences exist is to get rid of notions of a "feminine nature" and of a "masculine nature."

The child. The same is true for the child. We want to reintegrate children into all the aspects of our historical and social world in which they play a part.

V. Methodological Precautions

Childhood polymorphism. We must conceive of the child neither as an absolute "other" nor as "the same." Instead, we must view the child as *polymorphic.* It was Freud who said that the child is polymorphously perverse (virtually homosexual, etc.).[8] Lévi-Strauss proposes to generalize this notion by admitting that, from a cultural standpoint, the child is also polymorphous.[9] There is no infantile mentality, but rather an infantile polymorphism. Since children are not yet integrated into our culture, they display behaviors that recall certain pathological or "primitive" behaviors. The apparent resemblance between pathological and primitive mentalities on the one hand and infant mentality on the other arises from the fact that children have not yet taken part in what will be their cultural formation. However, these three prelogical mentalities are not comparable.

The phenomenon of pre-maturation is the possibility children have to live through conflicts and episodes that exceed their physical and intellectual powers. All of a sudden, their lives are defined in relation to other people and institutions. For example, the bottle and breast-feeding have already established contact with others and with a culture.

Relationship of identification. The relationship between the child and the adult is a singular *relationship of identification.* The child sees himself in others (just as others see themselves in him). Children see their destiny

in their parents; they will become like them. In the child, there exists a particular tension between that which cannot yet exist (according to the model) and the model itself.

A critique is to be made of those who, in defining feminine "nature," crystallize it. Stendhal has shown that the traits of the feminine "nature" are the result of the history and the style of education under which women have been subjected. He critiques pedants who pretend that women have the more lively spirit, whereas the men have the more solid. To fully understand the feminine nature, it is necessary to take into account everything that nature, in shaping it, has placed around it. If feminine nature were different, perhaps we might witness very different capacities developing. Stendhal remarks that women's occupations are stifling, yet they allow women the freedom to dream. Thereby a woman's imagination results from the type of life she leads. If women display less rationality, it is because rationality is not demanded of them. As Stendhal says, all the geniuses who are born women are lost to humanity. Although corporeal structure and the ability to procreate are important, they alone do not compose the feminine "nature." Education has a sad effect: at ten, a girl is much more lively than a boy; at twenty, however, she becomes a "great timid idiot who is afraid of spiders."[10]

Critique of the concept of an a priori infantile nature. We must apply all that Stendhal has said about women to children. We must reintegrate children into the entire social and historical setting in which they live and against which they react. First, we must not speak of an infantile nature, but of an infantile polymorphism. Very diverse possibilities coexist within the child, making the child resemble certain neurotics, certain "primitive" peoples, or actual, mature adults.

Second, this polymorphism is accompanied by pre-maturation. From the outset of their lives, children already lead a cultural life. They enter into contact with their peers at a very early age. At the same time, they demonstrate an interest in the most complex phenomena that surround them. For example, children acquire a true science of distinguishing and recognizing faces at an age when we would assume they only lead a sensory life.

Third, there is a double phenomenon of identification. (1) From children to parents: the adult age represents a type of perfection and the child's own age represents an imperfection. The adult age is where one can do what one wants, an age where failures, sufferings, and imperfections are suppressed. (2) Identification in reverse: the mother relives her childhood through the childhood of her daughter. All sorts of consequences result when these two mirrors are placed face to face. Sometimes there are women who raise their children leniently because they were

raised strictly. Yet the children of a liberal upbringing demonstrate a type of need for rules that manifests itself in their political ideas. A dialectical movement arises: traditional grandparents, liberal parents, authoritarian children. Upon arriving at a mature age, these children of liberal parents completely change their ideas and are only able to conceptualize in them an authoritarian method. Children are therefore not always the image of their parents; sometimes they are the opposite. How are we to understand this? The education was not truly liberal: it was compulsive and systematically liberal. Children realize that their parents are settling their own childhood accounts. Something altogether nonauthoritarian in these liberal principles causes the child to hesitate: the child is bored with having to exercise his freedom in a way that others never do. At each moment, we weave the child's attitude into our relationships with him.

Fourth, consequently, we can say that, before there is a psychological science, the facts in child psychology are always already interpreted because the facts are the expression of a tangled relationship between the child and the adult. Such a fact is always also a concept which attests doubly to who the child is and how the adult conceives and treats the child.

VI. How to Elaborate a Rigorous and Scientific Understanding of the Child

A rigorous psychologist will be aware that his conception of life will exert an influence on the child. In any case, psychological science must not be understood as a simple notation of facts. *All objective knowledge is a construction.* Lewin, in his book *A Dynamic Conception of Personality*, takes inspiration from the natural sciences. There exist two methods by which to imitate the natural sciences. First, there is a weak imitation that utilizes an exact and literal transposition, resulting in a scientific psychology which has the same forms of laws and numerical relations as in physics. Second, there exists a more fruitful and profound method. We need to understand why physics has developed in the manner it has. For Lewin, physics occurred at the moment when it renounced a simple notation of facts. If we only took into account immediate facts, Galileo's discovery would be nonsensical. The connection between a floating feather, a stone that rolls, and a ball on a plane only becomes intelligible through the construction of the idea of falling, a construction which presupposes the finding of a free fall and the analysis of facts. Therefore, science only exists after the construction of ideal models which permit the assimilation of different phenomena.

Psychology is not a simple notation of all the child says and does. The notation gives only the traces of a dynamic development that has resulted from the familial constellation and the social environment. The historical fact amounts to nothing, only the significance of it is valid. The qualitative fact itself is thus both original and reconstructed.

Rectification of the deceiving communal consciousness. Our consciousness of the child, of other peoples, and of everything else is by nature deceptive. First, Marx and Freud show us that self-deception is an essential trait of consciousness. For Marx, it is natural to our consciousness to ignore the social and economic relationships which shape the world's evolution. It is natural that we conceive of humanity as the image of our class. Our consciousness considers what is truly historical as traits of human nature. For Freud, the meaning of human behavior is hidden; things are never what they seem. One example is jealousy. We normally consider the man jealous of his rival out of love for his wife. For Freud, the jealousy in fact results from an attachment to the rival and not to the wife. Another example is mourning, since traditional behavior hides an explosion of aggressivity toward the deceased.

Why have Marx and Freud admitted that the meaning of our behavior is hidden? According to Marx, since it is a historical class, the bourgeoisie sees things through the prisms of the bourgeois mind. But why is it in the case of jealousy, cited by Freud, that heterosexuality is viewed as homosexuality? Why is scientific research obligated to invert appearance? Since we do not know ourselves reflexively, we see ourselves exclusively through others in projection.

In order to know, we must make a certain distance to ourselves available, a distance which is not possible to achieve by ourselves. It is not a question of an unconscious which plays tricks on us; the phenomenon of mystification maintains that all consciousness is a privileged consciousness; consciousness that privileges the "figure" and tends to forget the "ground," without it, consciousness has no meaning (Gestalt theory). We do not know the ground despite the fact we live it. We are for ourselves our own ground. In order for knowledge to progress, in order for there to be a scientific knowledge of the "other," we must make the ground become the figure. We must cease to see what comes from ourselves as *fatum.*

Second, it is in the same perspective that Moreno envisages the technique of psychodrama.[11] Individuals become conscious of their own conflict when they play their life-role [*rôle vital*] in a scene. Often the real partners are not present; rather, two assistants play their roles. Yet the attitudes of the subject are so striking that the "ego auxiliaries" automatically assume the requisite attitudes dictated or imposed by the subjects' own implied attitude.

When individuals find themselves in a conflict, they no longer recognize the meaning of their behavior. Thus, as soon as husband and wife are together, certain unconscious attitudes obligatorily arise. The individual no longer knows what he is doing but sees in the other the role which must be played. In Moreno's technique, individuals are able to perceive their attitudes by acting out in unreal situations (e.g., in the replayed dream that releases forgotten elements).

Moreno wants us to avoid appraising our behavior as fated since, in reality, our behavior arises from us. We must stop seeing ourselves as the reflection of the other. We must see ourselves as others see us. With regard to the relations between adult and child, we must likewise not consider the child from our point of view or, in any case, from a point of view different from our own. We must withdraw from our ordinary role in human society. It is necessary to awaken our proper spontaneity (Moreno).

VII. Essential Principles (Illustrated Below by a Number of Examples)

The general principle is: we have to reconstitute an interpersonal dynamic rather than simply arrange various characteristics of an infantile "nature."

A. We Must Avoid Speaking of the Child's "Nature"

We need to avoid all rigid and statistical conceptions of the stages of childhood (e.g., speaking about the nature of any certain age of childhood), as well as all rigid conceptions of the psychology of the sexes. In tests it is unnecessary to consider the results at any given moment as absolutely true. They indicate a momentary state of the personal and interpersonal dynamic.

The psychology of the child is not at all the evolution of an occult nature. Thus, for Freud, anatomical determinations are given from the outset, but within his theory they are almost nonexistent. The determination of a mode of sexuality at any given moment is a function of the different positions that the child takes up in the familial constellation. Adult sexuality surpasses all the previous phases. To say at birth, "It is a boy" or "It is a girl" is to say almost nothing at all. However, whoever says "boy" or "girl" speaks of a situated individual. The child is situated in a force field which at every moment represents a particular nuance of masculinity or femininity. In this field, the child is subjected to vectors that draw him in different directions. For example, consider Freud's

triangular situation and the later nuances he supplies to the theory: the classical Oedipus that precedes the inverted Oedipus. The possibility for revolution is explained by the fact that reality is a moving dynamic always susceptible to change.

B. Critique of Realist Thinking

Realist thought cuts up and separates as well as distinguishes between exterior and interior, situation and response. However, in fact it is the situation which counts for the organism. If the situation depends on the conditions where the organism is placed, it also depends on the organism's own structure: there exists a preadaptation. This is already true at the biological level, since the organism settles in a favorable milieu. It may be that internal properties of the organism have caused it to stabilize itself. There exists neither an organism without a situation, nor a situation which is not the function of an organism (Lagache).

The same holds for the theory of the nervous system. We cannot isolate perceptual and motor functions as classical psychology did. Current psychology no longer separates sensory systems and motor systems, but instead speaks of a "sensitive side" and a "motor side" of behavior. Let us consider the motor development in a dog. We find that behavior supposes an anticipation of its results. The perception of objects is altered if the dog cannot move. Therefore, perceptual and motor aspects are not two distinct phenomena.

As far as speech is concerned, we can also witness that the motor function "speaking" and the perceptual function "listening" are not separated.[12] In the same way, child psychology must construct itself via this relativity. The idea of objectivity is often badly employed. Pseudo-objective thought lacks the constitutive truth of the child's life.

The atomistic conception is impossible, since this mode of thought consists in statically cutting out [découpage] the child's development. However, if the child constitutes a moment in a dynamic totality, it is impossible to dissect [découper] infantile behavior. Regarding the preceding dichotomies (such as the distinction between the perceptual and motor functions), we can add the following distinctions.

(1) *The innate-acquired distinction.* Taken in its rigorous sense, "innate" means what manifests itself from birth. However, psychologists extend the meaning of the term to include what is due to conditions that arise from the subject and not from the subject's milieu. The innate was considered to be synonymous with the endogenous. We should have the same reservations about this notion as about the notion of aptitude (if aptitude is taken to mean that the child's nature is inscribed from birth and thus all subsequent development only further explicates this

innate inscription). Such a nature can only develop in being dependent upon certain environmental conditions. Since this nature and this aptitude cannot possibly realize themselves alone, are they not dependent upon certain external conditions for their expression? It is a question of a situation-response and not merely a response dependent upon internal conditions. Therefore, the notion of aptitude is relative to certain situations.

(2) *Physiological and psychological distinctions.* It is impossible to separate psychological conditions from behavior caused by physiological conditions. Whereas mechanistic physiology speaks of the brain as a machine, it is actually necessary to deal with the differences in level, signification, and structuration of the brain. Such notions are borrowed from our experience of the psychological subject. Thus, the difference between the superior linguistic ability of the normal individual and the inferior linguistic ability of the aphasiac consists in a value difference, rather than what we have attributed before as a difference of levels. Pure psychology is a limited concept.

(3) *The distinction between maturation and the learning process.* Maturation is a collection of nervous conditions upon which the organism's development depends. Development is not to be contrasted with "learning," because organic development depends on certain external experiences. Maturation cannot be separated from the learning process [*apprentissage*].

We see that child psychology cannot content itself with these sorts of dualisms: psychology and physiology, maturation and learning. Certain objections are raised against the idea of a sexual life in children because they are not sexually mature. But this opinion is arbitrary and antipsychological; indeed, psychology exists because the facts show that the relations between children and their situations are not exactly what they would be if only seen from a viewpoint of maturation. Children anticipate their contact with their situation; they are entangled in advance within a milieu of anticipated relations. The child plays mama with a doll long before she is actually a mother. Psychology was born the day that there was a recognition that children's relations with their environment is not engendered solely by the state, or degree, of their physiological development.

VIII. Errors due to Realist Thought in Child Psychology Research

Some research efforts pose questions to children that they do not ask themselves, thereby importing a foreign problematic into infantile behavior.

A. Research That Investigates the Child's Representation of the World

When we ask children for statements responding to some general questions, we tend to ask children to totalize or condense their experience into a certain number of formulas. The very idea of representing the world supposes there exists a possibility of finding already within the child a thesis about the world. Piaget gives numerous examples in his book *The Child's Conception of the World*. When he asks the child about the location of thought, the child responds that thought is located in the throat, the tongue, the head, or the breath. Should we conclude from this that a thought is something material for the child? That from our adult point of view he or she has not yet made the distinction between thought and the body? But the words "breath," "voice," and "throat" have a child's meaning. The child hears them as a voice. These words are lived from the inside; they do not forcefully demonstrate that he confuses the thought with the object. Rather, we find in the child a notion of the phenomenal body undivided between thought and extension.

Wallon shows that there are certain things, things of his own environment, about which the child does have theses. There are others ("ultra-things") about which he does not have any theses and which do not play any part in the context of the child's life.[13] Children display their animistic and conjuring [*artificialiste*] beliefs most forcefully when they are asked about these "ultra-things," but in regard to what they live and experience they are most reasonable.

As long as we remain dogmatic, or adhere to "common sense," we continue to pose questions to the child that are not related to his situation. In the same manner, the first analyses of aphasia stemmed from a rough definition of symptoms based upon prescientific categories. But when we can seek to penetrate into the child's polymorphous universe, we recognize that what we call the child is actually our representation of him. We will thus have great reservations about posing the problem of childhood representations. We can use this method to show that the same occurs in many other problems in child psychology.

B. Problem of the Perception of Colors

According to a dogmatic psychology, the child perceives the same colors as the adult; it is only a question of degree between the two. But if we pay attention to the child's reflections, particularly to his style, we notice that it is quite likely not a difference of degree, but that in fact there is a structure in the child's universe of colors which is not superimposable

upon that of the adult. The structuring of the child's universe of colors is less differentiated and more confused than ours (Koffka). We need not believe that the difference consists solely in the number of contents and the degree of attention.

How can we explain the fierce persistence of this error? It stems from the constancy hypothesis: assuming that the same conditions always cause the same consequences. Or, to put it more specifically, it is the idea that the adult's universe includes the child's universe as one of its parts. Likewise, when one postulates that perceptions are the same for both child and adult, one reduces any differences to differences of attention. If we introduce the idea of structure (the perceptual configuration is different despite similar stimuli), we will understand how the child can be simultaneously much closer to and much further from us than realist thought believes.

C. Problem of Object Constancy

Piaget discusses the idea that premature perceptual constancy is independent from intellectual development.[14] For the Gestaltists, the constancy of the object's size when it retreats would be a result of the organization and configuration of elements of the field. For Piaget, there is only true constancy when there is intellectual constancy. Piaget always insists on the imperfection of "perceptual regulations" and thereby interprets them negatively. For Piaget, the true order is the rational order. This rational order only becomes established when operations are able to be reversed (which implies a very advanced intellectual state).

But need we underestimate, as Piaget does, the types of unity that occur prior to intellectual unity? Isn't this lived unity still found in adult perception? For the Gestaltists, the organization of the field commences before intelligence. Field organization belongs uniquely to perception. Gestalt theory never sought to pretend that this organization was perfect from the start; it only maintains that from the beginning there is organization. The alternative of rational order versus disorder is the sign of an intrusion of adult thought into the life of the child. In order to comprehend the child's actual perception, we must visualize an order which is not a rational order, but nevertheless is by no means chaos.

D. Research on Drawing: Luquet's Work

The research describes children's drawing in relationship to adult drawing, in other words, perspectival drawing.[15] This characterizes the child's drawing process negatively: children do not represent what they see but

what they know. Luquet has construed what the child sees on the basis of what he, Luquet, imagines the child ought to see. However, perspectival drawing is in fact a historical acquisition and not something given in our perception, since many possible "perspectives" exist. On the other hand, if we approach the child's mode of perception in a more positive fashion, the adult's perspective appears as one particular case in a process of expression. For example, "flattening" [*rabattement*] is a means of expressing the simultaneity of the parts of the field that hide one another, and does not indicate a simple ignorance of perspective. In conclusion, we can say that we must recognize the ambiguity and polymorphism of the child's consciousness. Thereby, we can avoid effacing them in the questions we pose to the child.

A child psychology chiefly concerned with the child's understanding would be extremely artificial. For example, when considering the child's acquisition of language, we must recognize that the child's understanding of language is not in question; instead we must analyze the practice of language—a practice that can lead to some very striking modes of expression (since they do not belong to "objective" language). Similarly, in analyses of the lived body [*corps propre*] and mirror-image recognition, we have too often sought to interpret the child's development as a development of understanding. Actually, it is a question of an annexation by the child of his own image and a taking possession of his own body—vital operations that are closely tied to the child's affective life.

Again, we must avoid [*écarter*] the realist thought of the adult in order to understand the relationship between the psychological and sociological aspects of the child. The child is, simultaneously and without difficulty, in the social realm and his own body. As a means of keeping ourselves on guard against realism, we are led to a certain number of reflective themes which we will discuss in the following examples. These examples have the purpose of keeping us on guard against realism.

E. Critique of Methods That Only Employ Statistics

It is commonly thought that when psychology arrived at certain regularities it became a science, since regularity and frequency are the criteria of scientific research. Consequently, the literature prejudicially understands all individual acts pejoratively. Many psychologists still actually consider a particular in-depth study [*une monographie*] to be only a preparatory work and not yet a scientific work.

We must call this issue back into question. The particular in-depth study, if it is an in-depth work, has as much, even more, value than a superficial study of numerous cases. Thus, for Goldstein, it is more scien-

tific to study a single case thoroughly than to compare some observations superficially (such observations could not be restored to their context). For example, the case of visual agnosia is a question of studying the subject not only from the point of view of perception, but also from all other points of view: language, and so forth. We must envisage all sectors of personality. Thus, individuals who suffer from agnosia are incapable of improvising in conversation and they lack any initiative, or freedom, in sexual conduct. They are incapable of structuring and handling a given element under different conditions and of varying their point of view.

There exist two types of scientific induction: one can develop a general proposition founded upon the facts by means of an abstraction, or one can investigate the features of a case by cross-checking. Child psychology ought to take its inspiration from the latter method. The concept of "generality" has two meanings: either the kind found when one examines a great number of cases (and thus, generality is much greater as the cases become more sketchy); or the generality that one obtains in returning to the core of the concrete phenomenon, in which case one is dealing with an "essential generality." Yet, most often psychologists employ a statistical generality: they find that three years is the "age of negativism" and compare all observations on the basis of this assertion. But then they can no longer explain anything; they simply give names to certain facts without explaining them. Psychology ought to tell us why such phenomena occur.

The concepts of "instinct" and "aptitude" present exactly the same defects. Aptitude is simply an "observed behavior, established in advance within the child." And, as Lewin puts it, instinct or tendency is an "abstract selection of common traits in a group of acts which occur frequently." Psychology today, according to Lewin, often reduces itself to a psychology of the Aristotelian type (that is, it is thoroughly limited to a vision that is consistent with scientific reality).[16]

The statistical method is particularly exposed to this danger. A statistical mean takes on a representative value. This representative value is used, for example, to characterize the mental age of a two-year-old child and make future predictions. However, mathematical techniques do not provide a sufficiently scientific investigation. Psychology is forced to demonstrate that it is a science by employing as much mathematics as it can. But in using this mathematical apparatus on Aristotelian concepts, one always falls short of scientific standards.

If laws are only "abstract generalities," the study of them cannot be scientific. Lewin believes that statistics can be valuable, but it is necessary not to use them blindly. Binet's famous jest, "Intelligence is my test measure," directly means that what is scientific is not wondering what intel-

ligence is, but measuring and comparing the behavior of a child to that of other children of the same age.[17] However, if the understanding of intelligence remains in this form, psychological science will not progress very far. The question "What is intelligence?" is not a matter of indifference to science, since even the most experimental science must take up this question.

The factors measured by tests are very often peripheral factors that are relatively independent of the subject's total personality. The same test taken again some years later will not yield the same results at all. Such abstract tests do not permit predictions. The test ought to be close enough to the child's total way of being in order to measure the general state of his behavior and not merely the consequences of a particular state.

We must grasp the totality of the child's becoming. We must reconstitute the dynamic development and not just enumerate a certain number of performances that the child either succeeds in or does not succeed in at a given moment. It is the same for Goldstein's aphasiacs: the automatic linguistic practice is preserved, but not the intelligent one. The aphasiacs do not demonstrate verbal destruction, but rather they fall to an inferior linguistic level. In pathology, we are initially concerned with symptoms defined by responses that the organism no longer gives to environmental stimuli and to the psychologist's questions. However, this does not give us the essence of the illness. We must reconstruct the symptomatology by posing questions to the organism that are more precise than those of common sense. Truth only arises from the moment that we reach the center of the personality.

Another aspect of this "general prejudice" is the exclusion of pathological cases. This is a prescientific mode of thought which separates the sick from the healthy human. We commonly say, "It is an exceptional situation" and "The exception confirms the rule." But this notion of "exception" is a contradiction, since, on the contrary, the exception invalidates the rule. In fact, these "slogans" show our prejudice in thinking that there is a "general science." Once generality is obtained, one gathers up all the results pell-mell and produces reports on "the unique child of Vienna in 1928," or in a generalization such as "the child of one year."

According to Lewin, the error of this method is being content with the face value of things, with immediate, observable facts, as well as with the "historico-geographical." Despite the extent of the research, the results will mean nothing if different cases have been mixed together. It is impossible to construct a mean without a principle that informs us about these different elements in order that we can meaningfully collate them together.

F. Lewin's Galilean Inspiration

We need to begin with the dynamics of the issue's development. Lewin advocates a descriptive method and is against an analytic, atomizing method. He also is against a superficial descriptive method (which impedes one from reaching the ground of the phenomena). Lewin criticizes descriptive methods which content themselves with the phenotype (consequences) and not the genotype (premises).

The Galilean method must replace the Aristotelian method. It is not a question of external imitation. We need to reconstruct for psychology what has been done in physics, not by doing the same thing (for example, a false reconstruction would be to reduce all behavior to physical behavior) but by finding as fruitful a method as physics. The mode of thinking must be defined; it is essential to reform both the knowledge and the understanding of the psychologist.

What are the principles of this "Galilean" thought? The first principle is the homogenization of the field of research. For Galileo, the physical world is homogenous. Instead of being disjointed phenomena in superlunary and sublunary space, what happens in the stars, on the surface of the sea, and a falling stone are all aspects of the same series. Instead of thinking in terms of class, one must think in terms of series.

This method should be applied to psychology. We must not take this as a question of sacrificing qualitative differences, of a psychological atomism, or a strict associationalism (behaviorism). We do not need to sacrifice the diversity of facts, but rather we must understand them. The normal and pathological facts, those concerning men and women, the adult and the child, must be considered not as identical, but as constituting parts of the same series.

First, pathological behavior and normal behavior are responses to situations which are objectively the same. However, the behavior of avoidance, for example, is not found in the normal subject. Normal and pathological behaviors are not identical, but they exist in comparable situations. Similarly, in any relation with others, one must live [*il faut vivre*] the situation. While perceiving the problem to which the behaviors correspond, one must always keep in mind different descriptions of behaviors and not just pay attention to the situation.

Second, the same is the case for the relation between civilized peoples and "primitive" peoples. We are joined by a common ground, for something ties us firmly to them. If this were not the case, we could not understand them. Thus, it is necessary to create a sort of retreat [*recul*] from ourselves in order to understand the things where we live and in order to under-

stand one another (such as the study on an American city actually done like a study of an archaic society).[18] In a scientific perspective, we must not privilege one population or civilization over another. The relation between two civilizations must be considered reciprocally.

Third, the relations of masculinity and femininity have to be seen as detached from the same ground. The problem to resolve is the same for each: human life. In a sense, it is necessary to homogenize the varieties of responses to a situation. We must regard the patient, the primitive, the woman, the man all as parts of the psychological universe. Psychological laws will never be some sequences of facts that can be found everywhere. Scientific psychology will exist when we are able to understand the very different lives of primitives, adults, children, and so forth, as parallel systems responding to the same problem by different means. In other words, we find parallel logics.

As a result, statistics must pass from the mean to the "pure case" (Lewin) where the observed facts are those that truly have an intrinsic and essential connection. One must think through the fact and reconstruct it mentally. Science is not merely observation (cf. Poincare's statement that one does not build a house by throwing stones together haphazardly).[19]

Galileo's law of falling bodies cannot be obtained by simple verification. Rather, it is defined through an ideal process; it is founded on an "idealization" (Husserl).[20] The paradox of science is that in order to understand the concrete, we must begin, in a sense, by turning our backs to it. Galileo had to reconstruct the givens of the senses by an intellectual step. When, on the contrary, the desire is to notice the fact directly (for instance, how Aristotle noted the natural place of heavy bodies), one is led to abstractions. Science commences the day that, instead of passively noticing, it reconstructs appearances, thus giving itself "models" of reality. The exception will no longer be the scandal that it was for Aristotle (for whom the individual was irrational). Forms of behavior are variations of a developmental dynamic. Thus, in psychoanalysis, we can envisage at the same time compulsive forms of behavior where subjects struggle against their freedom and some where they get lost in their freedom (perversion), because either form can arise in the libido's development. Thus, they recuperate a unique psychological reality. We should not go to the general, but rather to the central.

A large part of physics involves a consideration of vectors. Psychology should follow suit using notions of value and signification in a similar manner. Science is not the elimination of quality, value, and signification; it is the consideration of the facts *in their context.* All psychological conduct is a response to a situation. Therefore, we can envisage a teleology, a tel-

eology not *of nature* (inscribed once and for all in the individual), but a teleology conditionally subjugated in relation to the situation.

G. Characteristics of Scientific Psychology

According to Guillaume, psychological science seeks to empirically establish consistent ideological regularities [*consécutions*].[21] The law is an essence to which particular cases more or less adhere. Lewin maintains that it is such a conception that reduces psychological explications to the terms of an "Aristotelian essence," making psychology no longer a science at all.

For Lewin, the key criterion of a scientific psychology is that it abandons the cleavage between the generality of an intelligible essence and the particularity of the fact. We must think about series and not classes. The three conditions of a scientific psychology are (1) conceiving of the field of psychological facts as homogenous without reducing the most complex facts to the simplest ones, (2) the use of "conditional" genetic concepts and not class concepts, and (3) going to the concrete indirectly, by the construction of concepts which permit the comprehension of individual facts. Scientific psychology consists in the above three conditions and not in the exactitude of measurements.

The notion of situation. Lewin used the notion of situation to combat the idea that psychology can only be scientific by renouncing the use of concepts of end, teleology, and oriented activity. These concepts have a scientific character only if one considers them as vectors dependent upon the mutual relations of several facts. We must consider all the elements as interactive in the field. In this manner, says Lewin, we can discover the importance of the notion of situation. It can never appear as long as science makes objectivity a false idea of knowledge by declaring that only numerical qualities count as characteristics.

The situation does not involve all the elements of the external world, but only "the set of traits of the external world which are capable of provoking a response on the part of the organism." The situation is the result of an organism's inner experiences as well as some external givens. The situation mediates between the purely objective realm and the organism's own efforts (the subjective side of the organization). Therefore, an understanding of the situation is essential if we are to understand the individual (the organism in question), since it represents the juncture point between the outside and the inside. An action of this type lies at the heart of Galileo's discovery. He conceived of the dynamic of the phenomenon as tied to the situation and, taking account of this, he was able to assimilate the phenomenon in question.

The law results from the application of this notion of situation. It is what is "between" all the particular cases, the connection of which they are variations. Therefore, the vectors that determine the phenomenon's dynamic are defined by the concrete fact, the object, and the situation. From this, we discover the possibility of a nonabstract generality that psychology needs.

H. Examination of the Scientific Psychological Elements in Contemporary Psychology

First, we should consider the notion of instinct. So long as we consider instinct as a force oriented toward a certain goal, that is, "*physis,*" we remain in an Aristotelian psychology. The psychology of form modifies the notion of instinct. For the psychology of form, no expressed finality sure of its goal exists. Something which is oriented does exist within instinct; however, it can be diverted from its course or even halted. Therefore, instinct is different from a "*physis*" that possesses a "*telos.*" It does not have a goal as its nature; rather, it is comparable to certain open situations that demand a certain mode of evolution without being entirely determined.

Therefore, we do not consider instinct as something "exceptional" [*à part*], but rather as something like the notion of habit and voluntary act. Responding to the rule of homogeneity of which Lewin spoke, instinct can reenter into the general dynamic of behavior. A totality of behavior exists where instinct is only a moment.

Second, we can consider the notion of open situation that is comparable to the melody awaiting the return of fundamental strains in order to resolve itself. We also see this "resolution" in the finality of instinct, which no longer consists in the exercise of an immutable, innate power (which does as it likes), but instead, the finality has to be conceived in its function in the whole personality. By way of example, the following is an exposition on Margaret Mead's book, *Male and Female,* and the social determinants of masculinity and femininity.[22]

IX. Margaret Mead's Conception of Masculinity and Femininity

If anything seems to depend upon corporeal conditions, certainly the character of masculinity or femininity does. However, the contribution of psychoanalysis has been the discovery that masculinity or femininity cannot be understood outside of interpersonal relations.

1. *Margaret Mead's contribution to classical psychoanalysis.* Margaret Mead did not begin with psychoanalytic conceptions; instead, ethnographic investigations led her to psychoanalysis. She modified psychoanalysis at the same time that she rediscovered it; she "generalized" psychoanalysis.

In regard to the question of sexuality, *in a sense* classical Freudian psychoanalysis remains very traditionalist. When Freud declares that the essence of all sexuality is masculine, that feminine sexuality is only a variant of masculine sexuality (and thus posits the existence of a castration complex in the girl), we are in the presence of a traditional conception of masculinity as a reflection of a patriarchal conception of the family. However, at the same time, this bridge thrown between masculine and feminine behavior inaugurates a concept of *ambivalent* sexuality.

Freud shows that in spite of a given sexual destination, psychological events can detour the individual toward sexual inversion. He was the first to reattach sexual inversion to psychological causes. Freud claimed that belonging to a sex is not only physiological and anatomical, but psychological as well. Therefore, it seems that there is a conflict in Freud between the conceptions that he had inherited and those he elaborated: a conflict between a naturalistic and a psychological interpretation of sexuality.

For Freud, the Oedipal situation is the central and unique pivot on which human civilization turns. But for Mead, the Oedipal situation described by Freud is a unique solution to a problem that only appears universal. What is universal is a certain problem posed to all societies by the existence of parents and children. *The universal fact is that children begin life being feeble and small, all the while participating intimately in adult life.* "There is a premature eruption of sexual feelings in the child who is as yet incapable of procreation." The child is polarized by sexual questions while being incapable of carrying out activities which characterize adulthood.

A *double identification* exists between children and parents: children see their future in their parents at the same time that their parents see their own childhood in their children. The consequence of the universal fact of the biological cycle taken up by consciousness is that parents appear to children as mirrors of what they must become (and vice versa). Therefore, the arrival of the child represents an intervention in the relations between adults. It provokes a change, not a simple addition without any modifications, in the dynamic relations of the two parents.

This same universal fact can be formulated differently. The child has a sexual life which precedes the procreative capacity, or in Freudian terms, a pregenital sexuality. The child's whole capacity to be fixated on

something comes into play with the first oral relations between child and mother. We perpetually rediscover the idea of *pre-maturation*. In Freud, we already find the idea that the child's existence takes up a universal problem, but this idea had not been worked through. Freud only saw the child-parent relationship via the Oedipal structure of the family. He failed to pass beyond the particular case of the Oedipal constellation.

Margaret Mead brings some connections to light that Freud had sensed but only given us a general view. She shows that the child-parent relationship exists in even more general cases than the Oedipal one. However, this is not to say that the Oedipal situation is in a less privileged position. Rather, we cannot place all familial and social structures on the same level as developmental structures. Simply because the Oedipal complex is not universal does not mean it is valueless. Germaine Guex has shown in her work *La névrose d'abandon* that the abandoned would only be pre-Oedipal subjects who have not yet passed through the Oedipus stage. The Oedipus complex is the *condition of a formation* and not an evil. In order to leave the infantile state, which consists of the immediate realization of what one desires, it is necessary to pass through the Oedipus complex. The Oedipal complex is where the child learns in all his affective relations to not only be a child (a being of the immediate, the absolute, and the capricious), but also to know how to renounce one thing in order to have another. Pre-Oedipal individuals remain children all their lives, since they cannot engage in any affective relations that are not instantaneous.

The goal of Margaret Mead's research—the generalization of psychoanalysis—is not to show that Freud is "crazy." To generalize and to discredit psychoanalysis are not the same thing. This generalized psychoanalysis will consist in writing a sort of equation of child-parent relations in order to find the general formula of which the Oedipal structure of the family represents a particular case.

2. *Different types of relationships between the child and mother.* Mead defines three possible types of relation between the child and the mother: symmetrical, complementary, and reciprocal.

Symmetrical relations. We are for each other as the other is for us. In this relation, the child has a comparable will [*l'enfant est une volonté*] to the adult's. The relation is one of cooperation and equality. *Complementary relations:* the mother plays the role of protector: she gives and the child receives. The relation is one of domination and submission, leading us to a spirit of competition. *Reciprocal relations:* the relation is also one of equality. However, it is not founded on a relation of one being to another; rather, it is founded upon the exchange of goods.

A complementary relationship is realized in society when the child's

relation to the breast is overaccentuated. Many modalities of such a relationship exist (from the passivity the child is placed in during nursing to the aggressive relations the child has toward the breast). A reciprocal relationship is witnessed in a society, like our own, where the child's hygiene training is overaccentuated. Excretion can become important for the child insofar as the adult pays attention to it. Valorizing excretions makes the child view the excretion as a gift to the parents. Furthermore, the reciprocal relationship will become the fundamental manner in which the child will conceive of human relations. A symmetrical relationship arrives later for us. It superimposes itself upon the complementary relationship, for example, when one passes to the symmetrical stage of relations during puberty.

Such a system of concepts permits us to analyze the facts regarding pregenital sexuality. It also is intended to aid us in foreseeing certain analogies between the relation of mother to child and the relations of adults with one another (within the societies we are questioning). For instance, the relationship between masculinity and femininity is crystallized in the mother-child relationship insofar as it is characterized by concerns of care and customs.

Margaret Mead's goal is to demonstrate the relationships at the interior of society (the relationships between man and woman). The relations between child and mother simultaneously cause and effect one another. When children become adults, they tend to reproduce the same structures as the masculinity-femininity relation. No category occurs in a pure state. However, we believe that the masculinity-femininity relationship exists in sympathy with the mother-child relationship and the relationship of man to nature.

Let us consider the following examples. *A negative example:* the society of the Alor Islands.[23] In the Alor Islands, there is a total absence of parental care. Children are left to their own devices. The counterpart of the parent-child relation is seen in the relations between adults. Only negative relations exist between adults: there are no great hatreds, but also no great loves. The adults have left themselves to whatever happens and made no attempt to organize their lives. Their economy is characterized by dilapidation, since they do not know how to stockpile or build.

The inhabitants of the Alor Islands show no formation of a superego, no repression, and no sense of guilt; hence no machismo and no suicides exist. Certain advantages exist in a society that avoids Oedipal inconveniences, particularly the capacity to work and produce. We see that the parent-child disjunction is parallel to the disjunction between adults and the relationship to nature.

A positive example can be found among the Arapesh.[24] For the Ar-

apesh people, the relation of the child to the mother's breast is overaccentuated and passive, because the child receives the breast as soon as it is demanded. A passive attitude of dependence develops in the adult female; she seeks to be coaxed. For the boy, a passive attitude is not compatible with his life as a small male; hence he has a fear of women who are considered oversexed. The boys are not very aggressive; they are not affirmative and remain uncreative.

A series of customs corresponds to this complementary attitude. The rites of initiation are the exclusive reaction of men against such a tight familial relationship between the mother and child. The rites are much more accentuated due to the difficulty of wrenching the child from such an exclusive relationship.

Among the Arapesh, the rites of initiation exist without cruelty because there are no rivalries between boys and girls or between men and women. Thus, there is no need to react violently against the mother's preponderant influence. Also, one does not find a formalization of the period of latency; latency is greatly limited and exists only when there is a great differentiation between femininity and masculinity within the family's Oedipal structure.

With the Tchambuli, as with the Arapesh, the oral relationship is also overaccentuated.[25] However, in Tchambuli culture, the baby has an active and demanding behavior. The images of sexual relations and rites of initiation are also very different; both are much more energetic and active. For instance, in the rites of initiation houses exist only for men. In the family home, the men appear mediocre and pitiable and are considered a pale reflection of the women. The aim of initiation is to pull the child away from the mother's domination.

In Manus society, one finds a society of pure reciprocity.[26] At one and the same time, a close relation between masculinity and femininity exists and, as a unique and original characteristic of this relation, the totality of the relations of parents-children and men-women are also part of a relation of pure reciprocity. What predominates in education is all that involves the functions of excretion. Subsequently, sexual relations between men and women are also dominated by reciprocity. The lyric and poetic side of sexuality is dispelled [écarter] in favor of a sort of asceticism which tends to be ashamed of the body in amorous relations. Sexual relations are hurried and considered a sort of "joint excretion." Sexual characteristics are not valued and masculinity is not particularly valorized. One discovers an impoverished equality in the sexes arising from an underestimation of everything that touches on the sexual. The conjugal tie is a sort of association and not a sentimental bond; the woman seems like a commodity. A *circular relation* determines the repetition of these same typical attitudes from generation to generation.

In the Mundugumor society, the women detest their children.[27] They carry them in baskets like objects, only feeding them irregularly. We find the mother-child relation paralleled in other traits of the civilization. Since no attachment to the mother exists, there is no need for the males to recover the boy from her, no need for rites of initiation or men's houses. Rites of initiation exist, but they are all merely symbolic displays and not truly group meetings. The typical character of practices (the expression of a separation from the women and a new birth) is not found in the rites of the Mundugumors. The principal cleavage is not that between masculinity and femininity, but rather between parents and children, resulting in a tremendously violent tension. These societies are incapable of adapting to new situations. For example, they did not adapt to a river's change of course. They have a horror of the water, since they do not know how to swim. They also display cannibalistic sentiments toward a sister population across the river.

The Mundugumor inhabitants resist punitive expeditions organized by colonizers, but capitulate as soon as the colonists imprison the richest of them (the rest fear for their women). Thus, their resistance ceases under certain moral conditions. In conclusion, their capacity for resistance is regulated by the law of "all or nothing" or, in other words, by their rigidity. These populations are no more capable of giving their children a versatile education than of adapting to new situations. Such societies are in constant danger of self-annihilation.

On Bali, one finds complex cultural forms. An aesthetic and sentimental civilization flourishes, one that is determined by rather active censures during childhood and infancy. On the other hand, in Samoa, no censures are imposed on the child.[28] Children are considered to be equal members by the whole family. The boy does not constantly see in his father what he himself will become, and likewise the father does not constantly see in his son what he has been: the contours of the Oedipal triangle grow dim. The affective and sexual relations between the father and the mother are not strained: neither one is the absolute for the other; they do not demand everything of each other. Hence, one finds a remarkable détente in the family, a serenity, sweetness, and solidarity between the adults. But, in contrast, there is no talent, no profound religion, and only mediocre occupations. They easily assimilate European techniques (e.g., in the construction of houses, they adapt to their climate methods that the Europeans had not expected to find). From an ideological point of view, they have accepted Protestantism, but they have also weakened or loosened it. For them, God is someone who "pardons," but that is all. They lack seriousness. For instance, they have the taboo of virginity, but the fiancée can compensate for this by bringing the blood of a chicken to her wedding.

In conclusion, regarding the analysis of Margaret Mead's conception of masculinity and femininity, we find that the masculinity-femininity relation is an element in a total tissue of relations. As we find in this society, the relations between mother and child, between self and stranger, and in general the inter-human relations are all part of the tissue in which we find the masculine-feminine relation. We have no grounds to speak of "the" masculine and "the" feminine since each civilization, according to its mode of existence, elaborates a certain type of masculinity in correlation to a certain type of femininity. But within any given society one finds *sexual stereotypes.*

Margaret Mead wishes for a "multisexual" society in which all types of "masculinity" and "femininity" would be admitted, each individual choosing his or her partner according to the masculine or feminine type that corresponds to his or her own type. This society would allow individuals to accept themselves as they are. (Note: Margaret Mead is American, living together in America with a multitude of people of different origins. We who have a past think very little about it and are not worried by our roots. Those who are without roots are, on the contrary, preoccupied with them. Thus, we find that in the United States unity is of utmost importance. Since unity is not founded on a long common history, it is sought in an uncompromising participation in certain stereotypes. This is why Mead is preoccupied with this omnipotence of a model or of statistical norms.)

X. Discussion Regarding a Student's Exposé of Puberty

Lewin calls a "blind investigation" an investigation designed to study the correlations between the age of puberty and freedom, or social class, or nutrition. These coincidences, which G. Stanley Hall tries to uncover (and which in fact do not even exist), do not provide us with scientific psychological explications.[29] We find once again the criticism leveled against induction in all sciences: to note the simultaneous presence or absence of two facts does not indicate a scientific correspondence (such as the analyses of Brunschvicg). Thus understood, induction supposes that the cause of a phenomenon can be found. Such a conception of a simple texture of nature is mythical. A phenomenon does not have *a cause;* it is the intersection of a series of conditions. Moreover, in order to have a scientific psychology, it is not necessary to note correlations, but rather to construct the variables on which the phenomena depend.

There is no response to the question, "What is the cause of puberty?" It is the confluence of a series of conditions and does not have *a cause*. Physiological conditions are caught up in an intimate complex with whatever use the subject makes of his life. Thus, we cannot say: "Here is the cause, here is the effect." Hélène Deutsch's conception of puberty needs to be placed within the larger context of the child's development. Due to the orientation of his research, Freud achieved a methodological transformation of our ideas on this subject. He studied (1) the passage from pregenital sexuality to genital sexuality, (2) the passage from genital sexuality to the latency period, (3) the passage from the latency period to puberty, and (4) the phases of involution and of maturation [*viellesse*] constructed through ascending phases.

A. Passage from the Oedipus Complex to the Latency Phase

When writing upon the passage from the Oedipus complex to the latency period in "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex," Freud puts his finger on the methodological problem. What causes this dissolution? Freud proposes two hypotheses: (1) the Oedipal complex might disappear as the milk teeth disappear in favor of the permanent teeth via a phenomenon of maturation. The various phases could be inscribed in a "living calendar," the body would possess within itself a principle regulating the chronology of its development. (2) Another possibility is that certain disappointments set off the decline of the Oedipus complex. For example, a little girl who believes herself to be the beloved of her father is punished by him one day. In other words, we could see this as a molecular phenomenon: an experience of the subject triggers the passage to a new phase of development. Then the libido would not be an entelechy, fixed once and for all, but rather the libido depends upon the subject's experience. The continual frustration that constitutes the Oedipus complex in its development would be the cause of its disappearance, leading to an impasse: "The Oedipus complex dies out due to a lack of success; it is the result of its inherent impossibility." In this self-extinction hypothesis, the fear of castration (which is an external phenomenon) is less important.

Freud refuses to choose between the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic explanation and seeks instead to combine them. For Freud, development is based upon the very play of developmental forces. If one supposes such a program is written in the organism, then it becomes a question of knowing how the individual will elaborate on this program.

Thus, the question is: what is the exact nature of the libido? Is it a tendency that carries within itself the temporal progression and nature of its successive phases? According to Freud's first hypothesis, yes; according

to the second, no. The second hypothesis allows us to imagine an entirely different solution. The libido is not predestined; it does not have a set goal for now and always. Rather, the libido is an available force which enables the realization of various connections. When a setback [*échec*] occurs, the new forces for seeking another solution are already there. Such a setback liberates an activity which is not self-oriented. We can thus understand why the setback is a sufficient condition for the passage from the Oedipus complex to the latency period.

B. Relation to Puberty

In considering the appearance of puberty, we find that the first theory (founded on the idea of an innate calendar in the organism) explains the appearance of puberty like the arrival of flowers in the spring. The second theory considers puberty comprehensible only if it is placed within the internal dynamic of psychological phenomena. A third possible conception is the following: the libido is not only part of an individual psychological nature; it must be integrated within the development of social factors. In effect, in the second solution, the Oedipus complex does not disappear just as a result of the child's relations with the father or the mother, but also as a result of the mother's relations with new children and other family members. The whole family constellation would be at the origin of this decline, which would then not just be a fact of interpsychology (i.e., between the mother and the child), but also of general interpsychology. We must consider that even the structure of society, which forces the parents to assume certain ways of being, is important.

The problem of puberty is twofold. (1) What is the exact relation between the psychic and the physiological realms in puberty? On the one hand, to consider the body alone is an abstraction (cf. Hélène Deutsch). On the other hand, there is no absolute psychophysiological parallelism. In fact, there are no borders between the two: "The body is neither first nor second" (Simone de Beauvoir).[30] Actual puberty requires that the puberty of the body and psychological puberty integrate [*se recouvrent*] with one another. (2) How is it that, instead of there being only confusion and chaos, in a certain sense development forms itself? How does it happen that the development has *this* history? How is it that there is an exceeding of previous phases? This question imposes itself even more if one thinks that development is not guided by preestablished lines or regulated like the workings of a clock.

These two problems are, in fact, one problem. We can compare them to the problems in the philosophy of history. We ask, "What is the relation between material phenomena and the phenomena of conscious-

ness?" The two phenomena share an internal bond, but this bond needs to be explicated. The moment of historical maturation is the moment where consciousness recovers the bases of economic development which made it possible.

A study of the advent of the bourgeoisie furnishes us with an example. The bourgeoisie's power existed for a very long time, but the awakening of its awareness was much slower (1789). Capitalism exists when the phenomenon, instead of being simply inscribed in the fact, becomes conscious; that is, the bourgeoisie developing self-consciousness. Similarly, Hélène Deutsch says that the completion of puberty can be considered a successful revolution.

The notion of form, or "gestalt," will be useful in the two domains. The "gestalt" is an order that spontaneously establishes itself through the interaction of elements without any preestablished destiny. An arrangement and a relative equilibrium exist in the given condition, which is original in relation to anterior forces. Therefore, psychoanalysis leads us to the problems of development and psychological causality. Gestalt theory permits us to rethink these problems. It explains the advent of a new structure that allows us to imagine a psychic revolution that needs no recourse to a pregiven entelechy.

XI. An Examination of Hélène Deutsch's Conception of Puberty

The goal of this examination is to make more precise the notion of psychic development in the child and to explain the relation between corporeal and psychic development.[31] For psychoanalysis, puberty is directly related to the subject's psychological past. It is a reissuing of the conflicts of the Oedipal period and involves the echoes of the individual's oldest psychological history. The Oedipus conflict is seen as an anticipation of puberty; the child is engaged in an adult affective situation. Puberty is a revival of the Oedipal phase: a real engagement of the individual in adult society. It is a question of a problem that is resurrected: a lived and efficacious problem that defines the individual's behavior at any given moment. It is a question of a secret interrogation for which no intellectual response could provide a solution.

The Oedipal problem is revived *under new conditions.* After the initial Oedipal phase, everything is put back to rest. During this latency period a development occurs that concerns the ego (the perception-consciousness system, the seat of our conscious activity); the system of relations with

others develops considerably and the techniques of life are enriched. However, the instinctive ground remains the same and hardly anything changes until prepuberty. Thus, the Oedipal problem will be revived along with all the abilities acquired during the latency period. Hélène Deutsch distinguishes three periods that converge.

A. The Prepuberty Phase

The prepuberty phase is first characterized by the fact that the *ego undergoes considerable development* (following the latency period) in terms of independence, responsibility, and a more complete contact with reality. The circle of people that interest the child grows larger. The child is willing to emerge from the oneiric and the imaginary. This development of the ego is accompanied by a *devaluation of the parents*. The child no longer considers them absolutes, because he no longer lives incorporated with them. All the child's relations with the world no longer pass through the parents. During prepuberty, children make some *new affective choices*. They show hostility toward their parents, and turn toward a schoolteacher and place in him the trust that they previously gave to their parents.

For example, little girls take "the friend of a sister or the sister of a friend" who is older as a model, and thus the girl's affective investment slips from girls of her own age to an older girl. A movement occurs from a relationship of companionship with those her own age to a relationship of imitation with an older model. Psychoanalysis has often shown us how such slipping [*glissement*] between models occurs in affective operations. In this example, the child, through her friend, likes all the things her little friend likes. She identifies herself with a known heroine. Furthermore, the little girl is obsessed with the secrets of older people and creates for herself some big secrets in retaliation against their "secretiveness." She chooses a "best friend" for herself, an attitude that represents a manifestation of separation from her parents. These extremely ardent friendships between girls are accompanied by the pomp of adult life; they make themselves up, pretend to be pregnant, and try to dress themselves with the charms of femininity. The prepubescent girl mimics the adult woman's condition, whereas, from the first moment of puberty, girls deny any indications of femininity; they refuse to wear stockings or lipstick. This phenomenon is called the asceticism of puberty. In these pairs of young friends, we notice the existence of two roles: one active, the other passive; one commands, the other follows.

All these reactions are manifestations of *pre-maturation*. We witness a series of actions that are not deeply willed by the subject, but that are adopted by an extraordinary development of the imaginary [*imaginaire*].

This imaginary reconstructs a not-yet-present maturity. The common phenomenon of "gangsterism" is proof of such imaginary reconstructions. There is also a tendency toward heterosexuality which is an imaginary sexuality. At the same time, we find *anticipation* and *regression* to infancy. During this period, a constant ambiguity exists: a desire for and a fear of adult life, a persistent need for protection and simultaneously the will to do without it.

The ambiguity of prepuberty is reinforced by the mother's feelings, which constitute the counterpart or complement of the child's attitude. She is in a hurry for her little girl to grow up and yet it is at the same time unpleasant. She still wants to protect and watch over the child. The mother's uneasiness in the face of this period of transformation only serves to increase the child's uneasiness. The threat puberty poses is a troubling influence upon children's future adult lives if their efforts to separate themselves from their parents are either too strong or too weak. True development, *true maturation,* consists in a double phenomenon of both *surpassing and maintaining the past.* To truly surpass the past is also to conserve it; in becoming something more, one must not refuse to affirm what one has been. If the rupture has been too violent or if it has not been pronounced enough, a prolonged infantilism ensues in the adult. Such people are dependent and feeble in their relations with others; friendship and love are replaced by passive attachments and demands for tenderness.

We always rediscover the same phenomenon of pre-maturation in *the attitude of play,* a typical manifestation of prepuberty. The adult who remains prepubescent will still have this attitude of play: playing with feelings, provoking them, and then shirking them. Prepuberty is thus characterized principally by the development of the self, a phenomenon of the psychological order. The instinctual thrust is barely perceptible at this age. Above all else, one finds a debate between the ego and the subject's childhood.

B. Nascent Puberty

Before puberty we find no heterosexuality in affective bonds. Now, the *passage to heterosexuality* will be made obliquely and with recourse to the *triangular situation.* The little girl likes a young girl friend who flirts with a boy; now her affection for the young girl is diffused toward the boy. The same situation presents itself in the love two little girls have for a teacher. Heterosexuality "plays tricks" with prepubescent homosexuality, tricks played much more adroitly than when the triangular situation reproduces the Oedipal situation. The idea of playing tricks is very Hegelian;

in effect, it is a question of a psychological dialectic. The emotions of a sexual character are not self-conscious ones. We are in the presence of an essentially psychological maturation; corporeal phenomena do not play an initiating role. Children no longer adhere to masked gangsterism, but to revolutionary groups. Girls become less involved than boys in such groups; instead, girls tend to restructure their emotional relations within affective triangles.

Heterosexuality is not directly related to the physiological phenomenon of menstruation. Hélène Deutsch cites the case of Evelyne, who began menstruating at the age of twelve and whose menstruation had no direct influence on her mode of sexuality. She had not psychologically assimilated the physiological event. The passage to heterosexuality, even when menstruation has begun, is still premature.

Frequently, there is a *feeling of emptiness* in girls this age. They are not at ease, feeling out of sorts because they are not yet in one age and no longer entirely in the previous one. The young girl is privy to the sexual secrets of her older, married sister, but she is separated from her the moment that her sister's baby is born. This troubles the young girl because it attests to the fact that she is still in childhood.

Among subjects who anticipate the heterosexuality of the older sister, we find women who are only able to be in love with the husbands of their friends, or those who only endure their marriages thanks to the presence of a woman friend. Such women are perpetually involved in triangular situations. In this stage, the same phenomena are often reproduced. For example, one finds veritable epidemics of appendicitis in response to a psychological motivation. This operation realizes the fantasies of rape, intrusion, labor, and pregnancy, and thereby permits a discharge of these tensions. The fantasy of a twin brother is an expression of homosexuality which the subject is in the process of eliminating. The brother is embellished either with the qualities that the little girl would love to possess or, on the contrary, he serves as a scapegoat.

C. Actual Puberty

Actual puberty is characterized by two sorts of processes: one, a defense against the instinctive drives (the development of the superego); and two, the pressures of the ego's growth (narcissism). We find in narcissism that the emotions are turned toward the self; everything is felt in a sort of isolation. As with a young girl who loves to break many hearts, we find in this narcissistic stage that true attachment is impossible. The subject thinks of making herself noticeable; she wants to be an actor, detective, novelist, journalist, poet, and so forth. However, in her taste for theater, she almost

always displays confusion between exhibitionism and the true meaning of dramatic art. Many children believe that being an actor means showing oneself or letting oneself be admired. But to perform is an art or skill. Children at this age also display a false confidence; most often they are, in fact, quite nervous.

Young girls often have the feeling of being misunderstood—they do not understand themselves and project this obscurity which they feel within themselves outward. We find in this narcissism, which is accompanied by a violent development of the superego, a progressive side and a regressive side, as well as a mixture of anticipation and old infantile beliefs.

"Feminine passivity" appears to have its roots in puberty. We find a psychological persistence of this age, when this passivity continues to be too accentuated beyond the age of puberty. Undoubtedly, this passivity is prescribed by the anatomical-psychological structure. However, the desire for an ideal love, the Platonic conception of love, would have to be considered a stagnation or an exaggeration of the pubescent mentality.

The role of menstruation. We ordinarily date puberty from the onset of menstruation, but the psychological reactions that it precipitates are the most important factors. Its appearance can set in motion a series of troubles or disturbances in the young girl. The legend established by maternal attitudes (which try to preserve the secrecy of this matter) maintains that such emotion is a result of the beginning of menstruation. Menstruation can awaken fantasies of the body being torn and castration fantasies which should find experimental verification. This phenomenon is so tied to the affective infrastructure that warning the girl changes nothing. Psychoanalysts maintain that sex education will produce nothing new and will contribute nothing to the subject's psychological maturity. The simple fact of knowing changes none of the emotions that the child can experience in the face of menstruation. Ignorance is not the cause but rather the effect of the emotion; the girl is predisposed to receive menstruation like a drama. Hence, the girl might refuse to understand what she has heard said about it. The appearance of menstruation is by no means the same thing as puberty. Once menstruation has begun, everything still remains to be done: the integration of the elements into a whole. But this integration is not always, or even often, completed (e.g., the abhorrence of menstruation in certain adult women). The girl who imagines that menstruation changes everything is very much deceived. Maturation will still have to establish a bond between the imaginary and the perceived, a bond between the fantasies about menstruation and the real facts.

Puberty is accomplished when the individual accepts the phenome-

non of menstruation. Nothing has happened when such and such a phase of development has occurred, unless the corresponding behavior has been accepted by the individual. Whether there is anticipation or even persistence in phases of development that the body itself has left behind, no maturation and no developmental completion can occur.

We have found that development no longer is to be conceived of as phenomena of the cognitive or intellectual order superimposing themselves upon corporeal phenomena. Understanding is not comparable to a complement that adds itself to the physiological phenomenon in order to constitute complete development. When menstruation is understood, it is not necessarily accepted. It is not a question of an abstract decision; understanding is not enough to cross a stage of development. On the contrary, when attention is given to the phenomenon, this attention is sometimes the sign that the event has not been accepted by the subject. Quite often, those who earnestly await the physiological event find there is no change when it occurs. They are often even deceived into perceiving the event as "it is only that" (Stendhal's *Lamiel*).[32] This reaction shows very significantly that the subject is not ready, not mature enough, to undergo this transformation.

Development is only accomplished when the new functions have been taken up and integrated into the subject's spontaneity. This integration stabilizes the transformations taking place in the body. In fact, there have been cases where menstruation has appeared in a subject and then disappeared for some time. The external fact does not at all imply the psychological maturity beneath this relation. Hélène Deutsch cites this sort of case in which the physiological facts have been completely transformed by an imaginary life.[33] A function such as menstruation can migrate in the body according to the feelings that the subject has about her own body. In this case, we find that there is an accentuation of the lumbar region.

Therefore, a singular relation exists between the body and the total subject. The body must be thought of as a mirror: the expression of the total subject's psyche, the expression of a psychological history. The anonymous development of the body is nothing as long as it is not integrated into its psychological history.

Conclusion. We can now respond to the questions posed at the outset of this study: how does development have a meaning, and what do corporeal and psychic phenomena contribute to it? In reality, these two questions comprise only one, because the character of apparent finality in development depends upon the response to the second question.

There is no way to explain corporeal development by psychic development or vice versa. The ineffectiveness of the purely psychic and the purely corporeal is evident. Hence, *development is neither causal nor final.* There can be no finality as if the libido guided development. Such

an entelechy does not exist because the facts are much too varied and, in any case, even if it does exist, it is not all-powerful. No finalistic form of development over which consciousness presides is at play; there operates neither a schema of causal development nor some purely corporeal theory of development.

It is a question of a relatively *contingent order.* Nevertheless, development follows certain lines all the same; the possibilities of aberration are not infinite. This order, entirely contingent as it may be, must surge forth spontaneously from prior states, from materials that it is going to utilize. Maturation consists in the adequation between the meaning of realized behavior and the materials with which this meaning realizes itself. The individual must take up again what the present bodily state has rendered possible. We find this very idea in the psychology of form, an idea which is itself much more a question than a response, and is incomplete. Development is as little a destiny as it is an unconditioned freedom, for the individual always accomplishes a decisive act of development in a particular corporeal field. We find here once again Hegel's idea of "surpassing while preserving." The individual only moves beyond his first states if he agrees to retain them. Thus, we rejoin our general conceptions of the personal and interpersonal dynamic.

XII. The Child's Representation of the World (Based on Material Provided by a Student)

A. The Status of the Problem

In his book *Les origines de la pensée chez l'enfant,* Wallon posits the following question in the initial plan for research: Does the child have a problem representing the world? Is his contact with the world totalized and crystallized in a *representation?* Perhaps we must think that only a *description* of the child's experience of the world is possible.

For Wallon, precategorical thought exists in the child; the child cannot express himself through a table of Kantian categories. Further, in crystallizing the child's thought by placing it in "categories," Piaget has made the child a being who is first too similar to the adult (Piaget looks for a mode of reasoning in the child) and, second, too different from the adult (when Piaget does not find the same system of thought in the adult as in the child, he accounts for this by claiming there is a difference in mentality).

In fact, the child is different from an adult: his thought is neither theoretical nor categorical, but polymorphous. However, the child is not different from the adult in terms of mentality. The difference exists in between what is still confused and polymorphous and what has been defined by culture. But this difference is not such that the adult is impenetrable to the child or vice versa. The child anticipates the adult condition.

B. Examination of Some of Piaget's Ideas

First, let us consider *the evolution of the child's notion of causality*.[34] *First period.* From five to six years we find the child gives a psychological account of natural phenomena explained by motivation ("in order that . . ."). It is a question of a cause which seeks to obtain its effect. The explanations are phenomenalistic, remaining on the surface of things. The continuity of space and time allows him to take one of the facts for the cause of the other.

This is also the age of finalistic explanations (e.g., "water flows through the mountains in order to go into the lake") or magical explanations, such as the child proclaiming that there are relations of participation between things. Finally, explanations often have a character of moral necessity: the sun shines because it ought to; it is its natural duty toward humans.

Second period. From seven to eight years, we witness that the child still gives rudimentary explanations. The child's explanations are artificial (for the child, nature works like a human being), animistic (the child assumes that things have wills), and dynamic (the child supposes that there may be oriented forces in things). One finds an attenuation of the affirmations of the preceding stage, but the child has not yet gained a true notion of causality.

Third period. In the third period, we find that the child's rational explanations occur because of spontaneous evolution or development. By compounding certain elements, the child begins to construct naive explanations formed by condensation and rarefaction. But these explanations are wholly naive, and show that the child is raised according to models of causality that correspond to certain traits of physical reality. Evolution consists in a de-subjectivation. A series of events in time order themselves for one another and, at the limit, become reversible; in other words, they are separated by the conditions of our experience.

Second, let us consider *the evolution of the representation of the world*. (1) *From realism to objectivity.* Realism is the feeling I have in my private existence of bumping into reality. Objectivity is the rectification of my experience. In effect, certain elements of my experience, which are com-

pletely evident to me, can simply be my own. I must become aware that what I sense is only one point of view on things and that it is necessary for me to construct a point of view that is adequate from all points of view. In breaking the immediate adherence to things, in exposing them to the critical eye, we are rid of animism. Such notions have meaning only for the subject; the object itself cannot be defined by such relations.

(2) *From realism to reciprocity.* A passage exists from one's own perspective to an objective one. What is objective for me is what will allow me to coordinate my experience with the experience of others. The child's notions are overcome [*envahie*] with the same reciprocity. Relativism begins to take hold and thereby the child is no longer an absolutist. Understanding right and left exemplifies this: the child takes a big step the day he understands that what is right for him is not necessarily right for others.

(3) *From realism to relativism.* The notions of the large and the small are essentially relative (cf. Plato).[35] They depend upon a system of references; the same object can be called large or small depending on its comparison. However, we need not fall into skepticism, since such a *certain* object is always in constant relation with *a certain* system of reference. For the child, the notions of brother and sister are at first unilateral; they serve only to express the child's relations with others. Peter and Paul are his brothers, but he is not the brother of Peter and Paul. Therefore, the child must pass from realism to relativity.

C. Critique

General critique. Piaget accepts the basic postulate of a spontaneous development, but he orients spontaneous development around a representation of the physical world. The problem thus poses itself: if the world is there, as physics describes it, how does the child rejoin it? The solution is that the child tends to merge with it spontaneously. Thus, we are faced with two postulates, one concerning the initial state, the other the final state. (1) The child's development is placed entirely within the perspective of the adult physicist's state of mind; and (2) the adult's state of mind is the same as the adult physicist. Are these postulates true? Is it not possible to move beyond childhood without arriving at this stage that Piaget speaks about (the stage where the child is always interrogated from the scientific point of view)?

Huang's critique. Contrary to Piaget, Huang does not ask "if—and at what age—the child is capable of giving a correct response."[36] These questions fatally characterize the child's thought in a negative fashion. Huang does not want to show a separation between the child's thought

and that of the adult. His goal is a positive one; he asks what happens within the mind of the child. The responses of children, despite their naivete, can be "rational."

Huang's *goal* is a descriptive and normative model. Since Huang allows the child to speak, his *method* is very different from Piaget's. He tries to capture the child's implicit view of the world. Huang does try to make children express what they are thinking, but tries to catch them "dealing with things," rather than "dealing with thoughts."[37] Huang places the child before "a real event involving concrete and tangible objects (as opposed to a situation created by language), an event capable of evoking responses similar to those that child presents in his everyday life." Piaget, on the other hand, interrogates the child with regard to subjects with which the child has never been confronted. The result of Piaget's interrogations is that the child responds in reaction to a verbal situation.

Huang wants to grasp the child's relations with the aspects of the world with which he interacts. He presents some facts and observes the child's reactions in the face of the facts. He creates magic tricks which appear unnatural at first. Thus, the child is encouraged to look for an explanation on his own. The difference between Piaget and Huang can be defined as the difference between an interrogation and a test. One always finds a very great separation [*écart*] between verbal and practical responses. If one interrogates a subject, one places him in a different situation; the subject must now prove his own thoughts.

The opinions people express constitute a system which is a counterpart to what they do (compare the gap [*écart*] between the ideal and the practice of marriage). Moralizing verbal demonstrations are often compensations for a lack of morality. By analogy, we can understand the difficulty involved if we seek to break into the lived universe of the child.

Examples. In the "penny in the sleeve" experiment, the experimenter slides a penny into his sleeve in front of the child, raises his arm to make the penny slide to the armpit, and, having a second penny hidden under a button, creates the illusion of pulling the first one out from under it (showing, of course, the second penny to the child). The child does not search for a magical explanation, even though that would be quite easy since the situation is extraordinary. The child does not show any "impermeability to experience." He tries a hypothesis and, if it does not work, seeks another one. Four out of five children reject the idea that the penny would have been able to pass through the material. The child's suggestions are naive, but reasonable.

The "floating needle," the "candle and the glass," the "dice on the card," and the "test tube whose opening is corked by paper" all show us that the child's responses are similar to the adult's.[38] The responses cor-

respond on the whole to Piaget's second stage. In contradiction to Piaget, Huang does not find any trace of the first stage.

Another example is when the experience of a color contrast suddenly becomes operant. For instance, we can witness the reaction of a child when the color of a figure changes as a result of the abrupt appearance of a deep yellow. If we now place the figure near a metronome, one presents the child with an element which he is able to question. In fact, the child energetically resists any magical explanations, and if he succumbs, his attitude is not different from our own when we say: "That must have come from . . ." Since there is a coincidence between two sorts of phenomena, the child expresses a hypothesis, but it is not a belief. It would only become so if one asked the child his opinion.

An intellectual explanation is the physicist's concern; the child seeks for more concrete explanations. When the situation is "open," when there is a gap, the child must fill it. If one gives the child an object, a phenomenon without a context (cf. the metronome), the child will use it to fill the gap. However, the child does not have a belief in the sense that the physicist does, that is, in the domain of thetic thought. Rather, the child needs to arrive at a solution. He seeks to confront a situation and to close what is left open. Outside the level of judgment, beyond the predicative, there is the level of experience of the world, of life with the world. For the child, phenomenal causality does not exist. The child does not proceed at all costs toward "magical" explanations, but toward natural ones (not in the sense in which the physicist understands this word, but in the sense that it is commonly given).

Discordances between Piaget and Huang. How can we explain the results that Piaget believed he had achieved? First, we can note that Piaget questioned children who all came from the same social environment (without a systematic verification against the responses of children from other environments). Huang himself examined children from both a middle-class environment and a working-class environment. Perhaps Piaget took only the mentality characteristic of a certain social setting (for example, in the case of "magical explanations") as the true characteristic of childhood.

Second, we find that Piaget often interrogates children about phenomena of an order that even adults cannot respond to satisfactorily, phenomena which are the objects of myths and fairy tales. Finally, we see that Piaget has always interpreted the child's responses as explanations that the child judged as sufficient for the phenomena in question. He construes them as a *representation* of the world belonging to the child. He constructs the child's conception of the reality of nature to justify the response given by the child. But does the child have only our notion of

sufficient explanation? Is it not precisely the absence of this viewpoint of sufficient explanation that defines the child?

Our interest in this idea is from a methodological point of view: making something explicit is not simply to state more completely, but to transform. The word "belief" has many meanings (Janet has noted this). Sometimes, when reading Piaget, we are led to think that the word "belief" always signifies the same thing.

With regard to Piaget's interrogation of children about phenomena even adults are at a loss to explain (cf. Wallon op. cit.), we can again consider Wallon's notion of *ultra-things:* will we take the child's conceptions of the cosmological (that is, what is outside the scope of his experience) as characteristic? Ultra-things are horizons of reality that the child does not doubt, but toward which he cannot take an objective or objectifying attitude. However, the child can take an objective attitude to things that are within his or her reach. Since this idea concerns the configuration of the child's universe, it is structural. Piaget seems to crystallize what is only a contact with phenomena, and not (as Piaget assumes) something yet observable.

Wallon tells us that an exterior horizon (distant things: e.g., the mountains, the sky) exists for the child. We might add that an interior horizon close to the structure of visible things (ultra-things and infra-things which dwell in a diffuse state; in other words, in a state of noncondensation) also exists. The child's thought would thus open onto a double horizon not filled with objects. (The object is something I survey, something before me. A small island that I fly over is an object. If I am on the island, it surrounds me; I am taken into it, and it is no longer an object.)

The child's experience is made up not only of objects, but also of ultra-things. Hence, we must not translate responses which concern the zone of ultra-things into the language of things. The same observations can be made concerning the child's notion of time and space. Objective space and time are not those in which I am inserted; I am free in relation to them. If children do not yet have this objective thought, then they do not experience an empty spatial framework.

As regards time, in some experiences children seem to accord themselves a kind of preexistence. They are not subsequent to their parents (Wallon). Some children consider the leaves of spring to be the old leaves returning. For them, life signifies a cyclical eternity. (In their drawings, children subjectively mix what, in fact, has been successive. This is the graphic narration of which Luquet speaks.) Wallon suggests that it is not a question of a simple ignorance of time, but of another structure of time.

The same is true of space. We conceive of an indefinite series of sizes. For the child there is an absolute size, and past this measure, noth-

ing is any larger. There is a sort of threshold. Once the threshold is surpassed, one is in the absolutely "large" (i.e. the field, the house, the sun is "as large as a house"). However, with regard to the things in the field of experience, the child conceives, like us, a series. It is with ultra-things that the absolutely "large" emerges.

We could say that things predominate in the adult's experience, while ultra-things predominate in the experience of the child. This would permit the child and the adult to understand one another, and would permit the psychologist to conceive of them other than as separated by an absolute impermeability.

XIII. Children's Drawings

A. The Methodological Errors of Luquet

We can find indications in Luquet's observations that would lead us to very different conclusions than his own.[39] First, the drawing is a game. It is not considered an explicative schema; it has nothing to do with the architect's drawing. The drawing has a reality of its own for the child.[40] Children draw like they sing. There is a pleasure in signifying for the sake of signifying. Second, Luquet considers the drawing and the one who draws as interdependent (the child wrongly assumes that someone imitates the composition of his drawing: "It is not your drawing, it is mine"). One draws like one signs, without concern for typical representation.

Sometimes there are two types of drawing: that of the child's communication with the adult and that of the child's communication with himself. The child abbreviates the drawing: "this is much quicker like this." It is a different attitude than that of the painter, since the child does not observe the thing. In this case, we are not mistaken in claiming that the child's drawings compare favorably to the adult's drawings, which are often an explanatory schema, an abbreviation of the thing. Drawing is as much an expression of oneself as it is an expression of the thing.

Further, we find in the child a very strong sentiment that the thing as a thing has an absolute unity which we can comprehend only successively and progressively. Here again, the adult is less realistic than the child. For example, the adult will depict a piece of furniture on paper as it can be seen from his point of view at the moment. Thus, there is no real simultaneity of the latent object and its context; the adult's drawing is, in this respect, more subjective than that of the child.

Adults are, at the same time, more objective and more subjective

than children. The adult regards the paper as prepared to receive *his point of view* of the thing at this moment. The adult takes into consideration the temporal perspective. The child seeks to grasp the singular core present at every moment of history.

B. Luquet's Interpretations

What does Luquet deduce from his observations? He concludes that the drawings of the child are in principle realistic (they are neither schematic nor idealistic). But insofar as children's drawings are very far from those of adults, he admits that this is a realism which cannot realize itself all at once. Thus, we find the following successive childhood stages in the direction of a systematic realism: (1) *fortuitous realism*, (2) *failed realism*, (3) *intellectual realism* (a reduction occurs: the child draws what he knows, not what he sees), and (4) *visual realism*. Only this last is the sole activity considered worthy of the name of drawing. Luquet does not place the relation of drawing and object in question. The drawing is defined by what the adult draws. According to Luquet, the child's drawing is a *failed* adult drawing. Luquet's explanations concerning the "imperfections of the child's drawing" are completely negative (e.g., lack of attention, synthetic incapacity, etc.). But are the drawings of the child truly failed attempts or, rather, might they in fact be *something other*?

Children (and certain painters) shock Luquet by drawing circles for cheeks, by painting faces without contours, and by placing the eyes of people outside the head (but is not the gaze *between* the eyelids and things?). Yet it has never been said that painting must be the notation on paper of what is seen at a certain moment from a certain point of view. For instance, even a photographic perspective is not a perceived perspective.

A conception of drawing as the notation on paper of what is seen at a certain moment from a certain point of view would imply an external relation between the drawing (the sign) and the thing (the signified). The notion of this relation must itself be different in the child. The drawing is not for the child a *screen;* it is a *mediation*, an introduction to the thing.

Luquet's interpretations are, above all, negative. Luquet explains the child's drawing as an *inattention* to this or that, or the child's *synthetic incapacity*, his inability to connect the parts of the object that are joined in reality. From this perspective, therefore, the child must strive to report on paper the spectacle offered by things in a more or less faithful manner. This negative interpretation proposes that the "true drawing" is already being given to the child if he would pay sufficient attention. Luquet proposes that the child does not look as one ought to look. The

object is permanent: it is the same for the child and the adult and wholly ready to be perceived by the child if he wants to look at it.

C. Gestalt Theory's Critique

The postulates which we find at the bottom of Luquet's interpretation have already been criticized by Gestalt psychology. We can express this criticism in the following way: for any given object, all perceptions that result from it must be in principle the same. The variations between the child and the adult's perception are only attributable to differences in attention. This concept of attention is constructed to account for the differences between the perception of the child and the adult, to account for the gap between the object as I ought to perceive it and the object as I in fact see it. This notion of attention appears connected to the hypothesis of the object's constancy. If we renounce the latter, then the meaning of the notion of attention must change.

Gestalt theory has brought to light the existence of a structuration that belongs to individuals (either adult or child). If we reject the hypothesis of the object's constancy, then attention to an object is reduced to an abstract name for designating the changes of structuration that intervene in our perception. Attention is no longer a form that more or less lights up an immutable field but rather a restructuring power, one that makes the components of the landscape that did not exist reappear phenomenally. Thus, instead of a clarification of preexisting details, a *transformation of the object* occurs.

This new interpretation acknowledges, first, the child's drawing is an initial manner of structuring things and, second, the movement from childhood drawing to adult drawing is another structuration. For Luquet, on the contrary, as long as we open our eyes, perception (and thus drawing) is unquestionable.

D. Comparison of the Relation Between Childhood and Adult Drawing

Corrections made by Luquet at the end of his book. Let us turn our attention toward Luquet's corrections at the end of his book. Luquet envisages the following hypothesis in a few "repentance sentences." He asks if the child's drawing is not *another manner of synthesizing* rather than a synthetic incapacity. "There is another synthesis besides the visual synthesis." The adult's visual synthesis is an abstraction since it "subtracts from the object everything that one cannot see." The adult synthesis is incomplete because it presupposes that I am limited solely to my point of view. If we

seek to examine the positive meaning of the laws that children impose upon themselves when they draw, we notice that they correspond to a synthetic attitude. In a particular drawing, such an attitude aims to reunite elements in the represented object. The aim of the child's drawing is, therefore, to present the unity of the thing, while the adult gives an account of only one of the perspectival visions of the object. For example, flattening in the drawing has no other purpose than to reveal the simultaneity of the attenuated elements: to show all the possible perspectives that one could take toward the object.[41]

The relation between the child and adult's drawing may be similar to *the relation between one language and another.* For instance, regarding language, consider the question: "Doesn't intellectual realism merit standing alongside visual realism as Arabic stands with English?" Luquet wants to provide an explanation for the fact that many civilized peoples, and not just the uncivilized, never come to understand perspectival drawing. Thus, the resistance of the child's perception to the adult expression of space is no longer interpreted negatively like the shadow in front of the light. Luquet maintains that we ought to accept the existence of one manner of synthesizing in the face of another.

The problem of perspective in drawing. The relation of the aforementioned perspectival perception to the child's perception is equal to the relation of a reduced vision and a richer vision. Perspectival perception results from an analytic reduction involving a point by point transcription of our contact with things: one must isolate the object, reporting the object's appearance on a scale of measures, and translating onto paper what corresponds to a series of views. In free perception, appearances are completely different. One must close an eye in order to have a projection of the object on a plane, since things have depth when seen with two eyes. This is why *one translates but does not express in perspectival drawing.* Perspective is only a partial account of depth on a plane; all drawing is, under these circumstances, an impoverishment of the perceived. If the drawing is thought to be a trace of the object on paper and not a substitute for the object, then the flattening is legitimate. In the perspectival drawing of the cube, the sign is conceived as distinct from the signified thing, but there are exact, precise relationships between each part of the thing and each part of the drawing. In the flattened drawing, the sign does not substitute itself for the thing. It is only a simple *introduction* to the thing; it represents its faces such as they are viewed from all points of view. Within this drawing lies a desire to show that all the sides are well ordered, since "they are all in the thing at the same time." This flattened drawing transports me into the thing for what it is in itself, whereas the perspectival drawing substitutes a manageable equivalent of itself for the thing.

E. Comparison of the Relationship Between Adult-Child Drawing and Italian-Modern Painting

In Italian painting, the painted thing is substituted for the thing seen: "The painting must compete with nature" (Malraux). From this comes the idea of a finished painting, a masterpiece, and a painting that simply arises from certain techniques. This explains how many painters could work on the same picture. Thus, theoretically, to paint is nothing more than the application of some techniques and does not involve a personal operation, since the ideal of painting would be to replace nature. Classical painting relies above all else on the *senses* of the spectators, these being considered the same in all people. One must be able to convince the spectator; the painting must not reflect an idea of subjectivity.

Starting with Manet, a new idea of painting and another idea of expression appear. As Baudelaire says, there are paintings which are finished and which have never been made. It is no longer a question of reuniting the object in all its detail by a correspondence between all the elements of the thing and all the elements of the drawing. It is a question of drawing a certain number of traits or movements where we will recognize not the visible aspect of the thing, but rather its internal movement. In this case, the drawing is very much like a sketch. One finds sketches which seem to be pictures already made; thus, painting becomes a signature. When considering things, painters bring to life their *contact* with things in their drawings, rather than things themselves. The signature is more an emblem than a word. Thus, the painter brings forth on the canvas not an imitation of the thing, but something like a diagram of a relation we live with the thing, a registration of the echo the object awakens in us. Under these conditions, the painting will have something to do with the moment of life when it was made. These pictures are dated, whereas the classical ones stand outside of time. To paint is to react to things in a fashion that is not always the same. A career of painting is not a series of advances toward a "masterpiece," but rather a becoming [*devient un devenir*].

In conclusion, we can say that we are in the presence of *two very different conceptions of expression.* The first suggests that we express the object by the intermediary of an impersonal apparatus: the senses. The aim of painting consists in rendering the object in its plenitude as an object, and it is through this plenitude that communication with others occurs. The second concept says that we always have a personal contact with things. To communicate an object to others means marking down on paper our symbol of coexistence with the thing, a symbol which offers itself to the spectator's gaze in calling on him to take it up again. The painting does not simply enter through the eyes; the spectator must place him-

self there. The picture only indicates a movement. We must go beyond the picture toward a meaning which is not objectively contained in it.

However, it is necessary to make a remark on this subject. The classical conception of painting has never been followed to the letter by great painters, such as Leonardo da Vinci. For him, all the elements of his picture must be joined by "sfumato."[42] Theories of painting are only applicable if the painter was first of all painting. Therefore, the question at hand is more one of a comparison between certain conceptions of painting and the practice of painting, rather than of a comparison between two sorts of painting.

The child's drawing is thus more or less subjective than the adult's. There is a subjectivity in the child's drawing in the sense that it is indeed the child's contact with the thing which he attempts to render. However, the child also seeks to give us the real presence of the thing. The adult's drawing is, in a sense, more objective, but all the same it fails to give us the reality of the thing. The adult does not give us the situation with the thing as it is lived, but rather offers this situation projected onto paper as a simple "perspectival view." Thus, we discover more objectivity in the adult's drawing but less access to the thing's reality because the adult's drawing is a point of view on the thing and not the total thing in its imperious simultaneity. We are not, therefore, dealing with the relation between more or less successful efforts; the perspective drawing of the adult is only a particular case of the expressive mode of which the child offers us another example.

We must reject the postulate which maintains that the construction of a drawing amounts to nothing more than the construction of an equivalent of the object on paper. The essence of drawing is not the construction of a projection. We must reintegrate the more general mode of expression that describes the drawing as a trace on the paper left by our very communication with things.

The drawing is, in some ways, a particular case of writing [*l'écriture*]: it is no more necessary to think of the drawing as the projection of the thing on paper than it is necessary to assume that the child's "A" must look just like the letter "A." For the child, the drawing *may signify* a manner different from projection, in a way different from what we have been taught by geometry. It will not be an imitative relation between the drawing and what it represents. If the child's drawing was the fabricated projection of the object, how could one explain its unfaithful nature? Luquet attempts to explain this "infidelity" of the child's drawing by declaring the child incapable of synthesizing. But this synthetic incapacity would not suffice to explain certain things: for example, the fact that a child, who sees his hand all the time (and the hands of all the people he hugs),

draws fingers which extend to the top of the arm. The child would do nothing so inexact if his *goal* was exact replication. The same holds for the mouth drawn above the nose: a synthetic incapacity cannot explain such complete disjunctions. *The drawing is a total and global relation with the object:* the child who draws a dog, placing the tail before the head, offers a graphically rendered account of the impression the dog presents. For the child, it is not a question of giving a representation conforming to the visual appearance, but rather of offering an affective and active account of the animal's physiognomy. Moreover, a "visual aspect" for the child does not exist (we never thought about the five senses before we were taught about them in school): the child has an idea of things, not of vision. What we must do is trace back what reveals something of the child's experience in seeing this thing (e.g., the woman sitting on a chair). In this way, we discover how the child feels the right to schematize and symbolize in this manner.

When speaking of the universal drawing of the stick man [*bonhomme*], Luquet tries to see the general characteristics of the child's drawing. One can explain the "stick-tadpole man," but not the "stick man shaped in a U" whose body constitutes a concentric circle around the head. Behind the stick man shaped in a U lays the power of constructing symbols that, like the symbols of writing, manifest an attachment to a cultural whole (one that is tied to the child's insertion in his natal cultural milieu).

The child's drawing is a *contact* with the visible world and with others. This relation with the world and with other people far precedes the spectator's [*spectaculaire*] attitude: the attitude of indifferent contemplation (the relation of spectator to spectacle is realized in the adult's drawing).

Prudhommeau had the idea of putting the drawing in the context of the child's total activities.[43] The first intentional drawings retrace the child's first steps. The progress which occurs thereafter takes place in connection with the child's motility (motility, like drawing, is a relation with the world). Progress in the child's drawings is a projection of the child's own progress in relation to the world (evidently, there is always a delay: the drawing following after the lived experience). In many respects, the stick man picture is the child himself. In the profile of the stick man, for example, the child sees *the man* through the profile; the profile is not a "pose." The realization of the profile arises in connection with the manner in which the child lives his relations with others. Children begin to draw the stick man in profile when they want to express the happy man in relation with another.

Prudhommeau also notes the correlation that exists between the appearance of visual realism and the acquisition of reading and writing.

The notion of the relation between sign and signification is implied in the classical perspective: the child must separate the sign from what it signifies. The drawing achieves its status via the polymorphous self-other [*moi-autrui*] relation.

Importantly, these conclusions must be pushed to their end. The question that comes to mind is: given that the child has senses like us, is not the child's relation with the world like ours, a relation of contemplator and contemplated world? The answer must be "no."

We need to get rid of the idea that distinguishes what is sensory from what is not. The sensory is implied by a relation with the world that *is not* a sensory relation, but is a *total and affective* relation with things. The qualities of perceived things (the various functions called sensory) are particular modalities of this contact with the world. Psychophysiology depends on this idea that we can in any case speak of a separate sensory functioning. We should not even make this concession: any quality (e.g., hot, cold, humid, etc.) reveals a certain mode of the incarnate subject's synchronization with the world (cf. Bachelard's psychoanalysis of water and air).[44] Color is, in itself, the bearer of an affective halo (Goldstein). Something yellow makes our vision vibrate in a certain manner. Every color is able to point out to us a relational mode which either conflicts with the world or does not; we either detest or like a color.

Let us consider two examples from Sartre. First, take his analysis of honey.[45] Each quality of honey is a mode of being. Its properties (viscosity, sweetness, etc.) appear to be autonomous. However, in fact, the object itself has its unity. Honey defines itself by its visible aspect; it takes on different forms in space and subsequently loses them (a small mountain on the plate which collapses an instant later). The touch of honey, the child observes, has a rather ambiguous nature, neither solid nor liquid. It is neither dense nor heavy. A faithfulness like that of a dog suggests itself; there is a docility and sly appropriation of the possessing by the possessed, *because the honey sticks to the fingers and one can no longer get rid of it* (whereas one expected to reduce it to slavery). The taste of honey is sweet. What can one say about its flavor? Honey has an indelibly soft but insistent flavor. A relation exists between this palatable quality and its tactile quality: each quality cannot be taken to be a little, opaque islet. We can only give a dynamic description of the mode of existence: viscosity and sweetness are two honeylike manners of the being that is called "honey."

Similarly, we find the same descriptions in *Sartre's analysis of lemon.*[46] The yellow of the lemon is not a subjective mode of apprehension; it is the lemon. The lemon is extended throughout its qualities: it is the acidity of the lemon that is yellow; it is the yellow of the lemon that is acidic.

They are not juxtaposed qualities, but through each of them we read all the others. Sartre asks, "What is the metaphysical coefficient of the lemon?" This problem must be elucidated by psychoanalysis. The metaphysical tenor of each object is a mode of articulating being.

The unity of the thing is comparable to that of a complex. For example, there is a connection between the taste of *mille-feuille* cake and the way that the icing breaks under the teeth.[47] If we are given black salmon to eat, we would consider it to be bad. In the writings of Francis Ponge, we find analyses of the shrimp, the orange, and so forth, and, in particular, of a pebble.[48] The wind and the sea are, as it were, already referred to by the pebble, and the pebble itself is a complex which must be illuminated. Ponge observes things in the impact they have on him and not as exterior to him. The pebble that he analyzes is the pebble of the child (we ourselves are obliged to return to our childhood impressions of the pebble in order to recover the poetry of it). Therefore, the symbolization in the pebble is of a whole series of behaviors, as well as the evident relation between certain persons and the pebble. We thus understand that a spectator's conception of perception would not permit us to truly comprehend things.

Returning to the drawing, we understand how the drawing could express all the child's personal conflicts, since our senses are our apparatus for grasping the meaning of behavior. For example, all the affective relations between a child and his father could be projected onto the child's drawing of the stick man. Françoise Minkowski attempts to catch in the drawing a mode of apprehension, a mode of representation of things (e.g., schizoid type: Seurat; epileptic type: Van Gogh).[49] The psychoanalysts seek in the drawing an evocation of a particular drama, they seek messages that concern the child's relation with the world. Whether one speaks of sensoriality [*sensorialité*] or personality, the general structures are always the same. For instance, one can never say: "here the sensorial ends, here the personal begins . . ." Luquet explains the *defects of proportion* in the child's drawing by appealing to the child's synthetic incapacity. Psychoanalysis sees in them the relative importance of men and women for the child: certain affective relations with the father and the mother. In the case of the stick-tadpole man (the importance of the head), psychoanalysis sees a "displacement toward the top," and so forth.

Luquet maintains that the phenomenon of *tacit correction* (e.g., "No, it is a house; no, it is a boat," etc.) occurs because of inattention. Psychoanalysis considers it an expression of the polyvalence of everything given to the child's awareness and of the existence of a kind of censorship in the child. In other words, there is an opposition between what is seen and what should be seen. Psychoanalysis takes *flattening* to be an autistic phe-

nomenon: the desire to coincide with the thing without passing through the mediation of a particular perspective.

In conclusion, we can note that, in reality, these different efforts all move in the same direction. They all exhibit a suspicion with regard to a conception which considers our perception and the child's relation with the world to be contemplative functions. In addition, they are also suspicious of any conception that the child's world leads to the adult world. The child is, at the same time, very close to and very far from the adult: very close, in that the child's experience indeed makes a whole; very far, because the child's polymorphous contact with the world has a different structure than the adult's contact (when the latter form involves representations).

XIV. The Mirror Image

A. Two Ways of Understanding Development

1. *In relation to the general problem of the psychology of cognition.* The questions posed by classical psychology are: how does the child move from a conception of the image as the object's "double" to the physicist's conception? How is it that there is a *reduction* of the image until it is no more than the detached skin of the object itself? How does the child succeed in organizing his experience? We also find this methodological attitude in Piaget. In effect, the problem that he poses incessantly is that of the appearance of the intellectual realm out of an initial disorder. For him, cognitive development is the progressive realization of an experience where all elements are united. But psychology reveals another field for research different from the cognitive form insofar as the latter does not give the body a central function. This other possible form involves the correlative development of the lived body [*corps propre*] and relations with others.

2. *In relation to the dynamic of general development.* From this perspective the body is no longer only one of the elements involved in the development of the child's intelligence; it is not simply one object among many. The restructuration of experience becomes a central phenomenon, and the development of the body (and concomitantly, that of the personality) is as important as intellectual development. It is only a question of different names for a single developmental dynamism. Thus, we have, on the one hand, investigations attempting to understand the child's performances by connecting them to the development of the intelligence, and, on the other hand, contemporary research uncovering a direct link

between children's intellectual progress, their relations with their bodies, and with other people: correlative developments.

B. Wallon's Mirror Image

Wallon considers the relevance of the mirror in animal behavior. He cites the case of a duck in Turkey who, following the death of its mate, took to standing before a crude mirror. He interprets this behavior by maintaining that the animal has before its image, as it did before its mate, a "feeling of being complemented."

In the child, Wallon notes that the child develops a notion of the image of the bodies of others. At first the child does not understand the difference between the image and the object, and then the child constitutes the relation between the image and the reality which corresponds to it. As a result, one author cites the case of an infant who at about six months of age turned around from the [mirror] image to the model. This is the beginning of recognition, but it is still rather playful and not thoroughly accomplished.

Therefore, something takes place in the human child that does not occur in the animal. The image of one's own body comes late compared to the image of others; it is more difficult to acquire. In certain dreams and in certain hypnagogic states (e.g., in drowning) the subject has self-images of an often extraordinary intensity. The mirror image has this same sort of oneiric character for the child.

We find a similar belief ubiquitously at play in the primitive. The subject possesses many images of the person, images which have an existence independent of one another. One finds a belief in the simultaneous quasi-plurality of different images. For the child, there can be in the father's mirror image a phantom that has a certain degree of reality. Even for adults, the image is not a simple sign of the reality it represents; they are not insensitive to the destruction of photos of themselves. Also, when adults have their pictures stolen, they have the impression that a small piece of themselves has been taken.

For Wallon, the child's construction of the image is interdependent with the one he makes of space. The adult denies this double localization: an object can only occupy a single point in space. In the adult, spatiality involves a series of relations. In the child, space is a quality adhering to the image. How does the transition to the adult conception come about? It is a question of the growth of the intelligence that constructs an ideal space upon this first layer of experience. This intellectual operation is one that involves both the reduction of the pseudo-reality to the image and the integration of the mirror image with the object of which it is

only a reflection. In fact, some of the facts that Wallon brings into play drop out with this interpretation. Furthermore, there is a disagreement between this solution and the facts.

C. Critique of Wallon

Does Wallon pose the problem correctly? Is there actually a double total-ization in the child? Doesn't his thesis imply that the points of the adult's objective space are simultaneously distinct and confused? Wallon falls prey to the very danger that he himself has pointed out; he interprets the child's experience in terms of the adult's. For the child, the visual space (of the image) and the kinesthetic space (where his body resides) are not comparable. There is no true duality for the child; this notion belongs to the adult's thought. Thus, no reduction takes place permitting the con-vergence of two givens into one via some sort of intellectual effort. The child must come to understand that there are two points of view about himself and that his body which feels is also visible, not just for the child, but also for others. Thus, we discover the interdependence between the development of the specular image and the development of relations with others. The child has to learn to see himself as a role.

This acquisition is neither instantaneous nor complete. It is not, thus, a question of an intellectual process, for in this case we would either understand it or not understand it. But the development of the mirror image involves all sorts of transitions and lapses. Thus, it not only involves the intellectual comprehension of the phenomenon, but the reorgan-ization of the personal life and relations with others as well. However, despite the fact that we may disagree with Wallon's interpretation, it has produced a great number of facts.

D. The Importance of Mirror Image in the Child's Development

1. *The visual image that the child has of his body is extremely incomplete.* The in-tellection of the mirror, then, is going to consist in the completion of this general schema of the body. At each instant we have a global conscious-ness of the correspondences between the tactile and visual aspects of the body. Understanding the mirror image means integrating new givens into its schema. Therefore, the child is going to assume, to take upon himself, *the image of the mirror, an operation which is much more concrete than* the one described by Wallon. An integration of eccentric givens takes place, givens considered as valuable as those of vision. A restructuration of the corporal schema also occurs.

2. *The body is placed under the jurisdiction of the visible.* Children start

seeing themselves through the eyes of others by renouncing to some extent kinesthetic and other sensations. Wallon criticizes the notion of cenesthesia. This adult notion has no corollary in the child's experience. Wallon replaces it by the notion of the postural schema: consciousness of the body and that of external things are interdependent. For example, awareness of the hand and its usage are confused; the hand serves to grip objects in the vicinity which are "*manipulanda.*" Consciousness is not closed in on itself, but open onto the outside.

The development of the mirror image and the global image of the body is intimately caught up in relations with others. The postural schema is also what allows me to comprehend the postures of others. "Postural impregnation" is the consciousness of our bodies as the capacity for mimicking and enacting attitudes occurring in the outer world. (For example, Wallon shows, in the child who watches an animal and then imitates it, a "postural integration" of the animal's behavior.)

One can also speak of a "gathering" that permits us to prepare to imitate what we see, as well as an "intimate formulation" of a person's conduct (Wallon): the attempt to understand his attitude with our body. Syncretic sociability or "transitivism"—the rupture or the absence of divisions—is a phenomenon of childhood.

Wallon's great merit, then, is to have placed the development of mirror image in this perspective. Moreover, he rejoins the psychoanalysts who give a special signification to the conquest of the "visual." Thanks to the mirror image, the child assumes a new form of existence. Children grasp themselves as capable of being seen, and so they behave differently toward themselves. A passage takes place from the body as lived to the body as visible and perceived. Different sensory givens represent different modes of life.

XV. Imitation

In his book, Guillaume has done well to criticize, in a pertinent fashion, the way the question of imitation has been posed.[50]

A. The Position of Intellectualist Psychology

There is no gesture without *representation*. In order to acquire language, we must have representations and verbal images. All the troubles of aphasia are interpreted as "loss of the verbal image." We find a prejudice of the same sort concerning imitation. The capacity to recognize the gestures

of others with our bodies exists, on the condition that the motor conduct which takes place within the subject-model can be *represented* to us (just as I can move my body because I represent it to myself). We must have this schema in three dimensions: (1) the visual observation of the model, (2) the interpretation through motor language, and (3) the application to my own body as a kinesthetic and motor activity.

B. Guillaume's Position

Guillaume states: "Consciousness ignores the muscle" (we do not need to be aware of the muscles set into play in order to change our posture). Might it be, then, that we possess our bodies as a means other than one involving representations?

The problem concerns the intermediary between the kinesthetic impression I have of my own face [*visage*] and the visual impression that I receive from others. In fact, there are four phases of this process (according to the classical schema): (1) the face seen by others, (2) the internal understanding of movements, (3) the kinesthesia of my own face, and (4) the visual aspect of the face. If it is true that "consciousness ignores the muscle," we do not go through two of these four phases.

Guillaume sees the matter this way: when I imitate, it is not others that I imitate, but their behavior in relation to objects. It is the objective results of actions that are imitated, not gestures. For example, when the child imitates someone who writes, it is by accumulation [*par surcroître*] that the imitation of movements arises. But then how is it that the child can imitate relatively simple gestures that do not have "results"? How, starting with results, does the child manage to imitate people?

C. The Fragility of Guillaume's Thesis

The thesis does not permit us to respond in a satisfactory fashion to the two preceding questions. It falls back into a type of associationalist theory when it tries to find a response to these questions. It resolves them in the following way: imitation takes place in the absence of a result much like a conditioned reflex (however, at the end of a certain amount of time, if the unconditioned stimulus does not present itself again, the conditioning begins to diminish . . .).

If we accept this associationalist theory, no behavior will be investigated on its own terms (moreover, all associationalist theory tends to show that people do not know what they do). Even if we admit that imitation is the imitation of results and actions in the world, it is already imitation of someone, of a human action, of a human trace. The result could

only be obtained by starting with a certain style of conduct, and we must seek the meaning of this conduct.

Guillaume extends the suggestions he has made by the idea that the self and others are not opposed. Rather, it is necessary to ask why children only imitate in the way that they do. Children do not think of themselves, but rather of what interests them, since they are ignorant of the frontiers which separate the self and others and they are indifferent about themselves and others. The self ignores itself insofar as it is the center of the world. It is imitation that will bring about self-consciousness. The child is radically altruistic and individualistic at the same time, because of this lack of differentiation with regard to others. In fact, it would be better to say that the child is neither truly altruistic nor truly individualistic for precisely this reason.

One objection to Guillaume is that since there is no self and others, the first imitation could not be taken as a goal. Therefore, in what manner could the "virtual self" (as nonconscious) of Guillaume present the possibility of a realization of consciousness? If it is imitation which engenders this, then it has great value! Is it others [*autrui*] who set us on the path toward things and not vice versa? Is it "the other" [*l'autre*] who enables us to have a truly objective vision of a world which does not exist for me alone? Actually, these two circuits are not alternatives: relations with others and relations with the world are correlatives, and Guillaume's attempt is futile to the extent that he believes one arrives at "the other" solely via things.

D. Conclusion

The lesson of all this is that there is a new notion of *genesis* in psychology. It seems that in psychology certain elements are deduced from others. An example of the old notion of genesis involves the idea of the genesis of the perception of space. Now psychology (influenced by psychoanalysis) allows the possibility that space is, at the same time, tactile and visual, and thus no longer consists in explaining one content by another. It has moved beyond these kinds of quarrels which fill its past history. Genesis is conceived as multidimensional restructuration on the basis of initial givens within a total life (from the beginning) that rebuilds itself on other bases in the midst of the child's self-development. From the beginning, the child's field is not simply a field of objects; it is *already* a field of beings. It is true at one and the same time that adult functions are already represented in the child, but are not present in the same sense. It is analogous to a game of chess; all the pieces are there at the start and yet the face of the game changes.

XVI. Relations Between Intellectual and Other Psychic Functions

The problem's difficulties. It is difficult to conceive of degrees of intelligence, or admixtures of intelligence and something which is not intelligence. Intelligence seems to obey a law of all or nothing. A psychology which strives to reattach the subject's behavioral elements to other elements can only come to terms with this problem with difficulty.

We rediscover the following *philosophical dilemma.* Either intelligence is a function radically distinct from sensibility (some type of original function which escapes psychology), or intelligence is connected to other psychic facts, in which case it is a by-product. *This is the conflict of psychologism and logicism posed by Husserl.* Is not all psychology of intelligence necessarily psychologism, since it makes intellectual facts appear as dependent upon preintellectual operations (i.e., perception and sensation)? For example, for the English empiricists the act of conceiving is the result of previous perceptions. This idea renders the field of psychology homogenous, but it effaces the originality of the intellectual operation, making it a particular case of sensation.

But if we consider the intellectual operation intrinsically, it seems that conceiving must be altogether different from perceiving and sensing. It is the same triangle to which I relate myself intellectually (but not perceptually) today and in six months; the intentional object remains the same. The intellectual is without place, without date; it goes beyond time and the succession of psychological events. There is, therefore, no psychology of intelligence. Thus, the problem of a psychology of intelligence lies in defining intelligence by demonstrating *its* originality and inserting it among the other psychological facts.

A. The Contribution of Gestalt Theory

1. *The general attitude among Gestaltists (Koffka).* There are forms in the psyche, internal collections in which the property of each element is inseparable from the configuration of the whole. Thus, we leave the field of psychologism behind. If we are dealing with indecomposable totalities, psychology ceases being empiricist, ceases inserting these wholes into a succession of psychological facts. This conception is also far removed from logicism. The intrinsic signification is tied to the concrete aspect (that is, to the factual givens) that the figure presents simultaneously. The psychology of form will not continue to separate the various events of psychic life from one another. It reattaches the order of meaning to the concrete configuration of elements set into play.

2. *The problem of intelligence.* The psychologists of form study the operation of intelligence at the very moment that it takes place. For example, Wertheimer's work studies the process of conclusion in productive thought.[51] The following two examples further our studies into intelligence.

First example. Given A = B, B = C; in order to conclude that A = C, there must be a double process of putting into form followed by a third process of recapitulation. A is one element or moment of the configuration B. B is an element or a moment of configuration C. A is conceived as the mediation between the two.

Second example. The sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. The demonstration can be compared to a double process of formation like that of perception. The *imperfection* of this analysis is its assumption that the essential part of intellectual work has already been accomplished. Retrospectively, the explanation is quite obvious. But one does not see how, at the point of departure, the *Gestaltung* is established. How has the result been found? Intellectual development manifests itself amid these questions.

The problem of "insight" or perceptual clarity (clairvoyance) involves the intelligent subject's capacity to perceive a meaning in a given figure or situation that resolves the difficulty in which they find themselves. Why, in the second example, does one have the idea of tracing a parallel and extending one of the sides? Why do certain elements place themselves in relief, elements in which one divines their possible and wholly new role by resolving the problem that has been raised?

Must every study of intelligence not face the fact that at certain moments the mind perceives relations which it did not see before? Between two such moments, there is no transition. One finds oneself in the presence of an "all or nothing." The problem of the genesis of the anterior or final state must be resolved.

Wertheimer has tried to correct the schematic aspect in the first statement of his explanation. In the geometry problem, we do not perceive the solution immediately; but, at a given moment, we know that the difficulty is on this or that side of the figure. The apex C of the triangle seems particularly interesting to us. Everything takes place as if the intrinsic relations that seemed afterward to be the basis of the demonstration operated on us, attracted us, even though they have not yet been thematized in the mind. Insight is that quality by which the given intellectual situation becomes capable of stimulating a reorganization of the elements that comprise it. This requires, as Goldstein puts it, that the intrinsic relations have acted as dynamic relations, as vectors. The intrinsic relations manifested by the demonstration emerge once the elements

are given. There is a bringing into form in intelligence just as there is in perception. However, if everyone is capable of perceiving, not everyone is capable of constructing an intellectual organization. Therefore, organization is of a different sort.

3. *The homogeneity and difference between perceptual and intellectual processes.* Köhler studied the *differences* between animal and human intelligence in his study of the intelligence of chimpanzees.[52] Chimpanzees are capable of conferring new meanings on objects which are not naturally connected with them (e.g., they use a stick to get bananas). The old and naturally established totality is destroyed in order to establish a new one. This operation merits the name of intelligence. *However,* this form of intelligence is different from human intelligence in the following ways: first, *optical contact is necessary.* The stick must not be too distant from the goal to be attained for the animal to think of using it. The relation of means to goal cannot be stretched to infinity. The animal does not make use of time and space in the way that humans do. Second, one object cannot take on two roles at the same time. The box can have two significations, but only alternately; for example, it is either a seat or a ladder. The animal does not identify the object via the two meanings. The box does not remain the same throughout its two functions. Chimpanzees do possess intelligence, but it is an intelligence which is expended in the moment. Moreover, in humans, we find the restructuration of structures: a number of significant totalities are reassembled into a single whole or, inversely, a plurality of aspects can be perceived as part of one single thing.

We understand, then, the criticisms that have been directed at Wertheimer. *To reason is not just to perceive relations between two objects; it is to perceive between them a new or third relation.* Psychology cannot give us any satisfaction to the extent that it reduces the problem of reasoning to a perceptual structuration.

B. The Evolution of Gestalt Psychology

In general, the initial position of Gestalt psychology invokes the "fittingness" of certain elements to provoke a new structuration.[53] But this is not an objective fact. These elements play a role only if we are in the act of conceiving a relation (Koffka). The initial position also invokes *the realization of an equilibrium.* The realization of an equilibrium as the resolution of a problem would be comparable to a melody. However, the equilibrium is not the same in intelligence as it is in perception.

If one projects a circle which is not completely closed onto a screen, one perceives a perfect circle (this is true for everyone). The equilibrium is obtained by the gathering of two given forces, one preponderant and

one remote. The conditions of this equilibrium are not all givens, since some are introduced by the subject. They are defined by curiosity, by the questions that the subject poses, and by internal conditions.

The final position of Gestalt psychology states that intellectual facts are not cut off from others. The solution of "insight" is motivated by certain perceptual organizations. If I concern myself with the angle, it is not by accident. It is neither a blind procedure nor a clairvoyant one. I sense that it is a question of angles. Likewise, in the relations of language or thought, we work on the words which help us and serve to support the work of thinking. The aid that they offer us is comparable to that given to us by the position of angles in the figure.

C. Theory of Intelligence

We could, therefore, construct a theory of intelligence which does without logicism and psychologism. Every step in intelligence points to the next, which in turn incorporates the preceding one. But at the same time, contingent givens come into play; thus, we avoid psychologism.

There is a final unity of reasoning, but one which is not realized prior to the culmination of reasoning. It is retrospective in the same sense that Bergson speaks of the retrograde movement of truth. To us, truth does not appear to be born with the intellectual act that perceives it; it seems anterior to us. Similarly, there is a *retrospective recapture* of the perceptual givens by intelligence, which makes the perceptual givens appear to carry within themselves the intellectual operation.

1. *Difference between perceptual and intellectual processes.* Intelligence is not perception. There is a difference between the reorganization in the field of the perceptual act and what occurs in the field of the intellectual act. The reorganization in intelligence is not inspired by the same givens as perception, but rather is a response to questions the subject poses to him or herself. Two structures which follow one another are not independent; they appear to be two aspects of a single reality. The identification between the point of departure and the point of arrival is essential to all geometric demonstration.

In perception, the structuration is inspired by the givens. What recommends this or that transformation of a figure are the very properties of the sensible figure. Whereas, in intelligence, any suggested transformation of the givens of a problem is only effective if whoever is carrying out the transformation has set for him or herself a certain intellectual task and already has the solution in view. The transformations are authorized by sensible givens, but are not themselves perceived. If the structuration were imposed by intelligence, then everyone would be equally

capable of the reorganizations. The figure's elements are placed into perspective from the viewpoint of the solution. Therefore, an *anticipation of the solution* is at play: the solution manifests its effectiveness before the transformation has occurred; a result that is not yet present is already operational. The immanence of the result in the inquiry constitutes that mystery which is intelligence. What the intellectual act is, then, cannot be explained by the way in which the individual uses certain elements of the figure. This "insight," this anticipation of the result, utilizes a series of "accidents" (reminders) which are taken up again in the intellectual act.[54] Though never entirely accounted for by the givens, it is motivated by them.

2. *Homogeneity.* Despite the originality of intelligence, it remains homogeneous with perception, for it never totally surpasses the structural givens as they appear in perception. One cannot isolate the process of reasoning from the sensible givens at play because it supports itself on them at every moment. It is only after the fact that one is able to interpret the results in a purely formal fashion.

Wertheimer tells us that Gauss's theorem reveals how intelligence cannot separate itself from the perceived elements upon which it works.

Take the series of the first ten whole numbers:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Their sum $S = n + 1 \ (n/2)$

Gauss arrived at this result by realizing that the series in question is composed of a certain number of pairs, each pair being equal to $n + 1$, such as $10 + 1 = 11$. Thus $9 + 2, 8 + 3, 7 + 4 \ldots = 11$. Moreover, the number of pairs is equal to half the last number of the series, that is, 5.

This response offered by Gauss is indeed *a formalization*, since it expresses a relation that could be applied to results other than the present one. But Gauss effectively depends on this particular series in order to discover his theorem.

The breakdown of this series of whole numbers into couples presupposes a constant intuition of their structure: the relations of a number with those that follow and precede it. Each number is a higher unit than the preceding one. Thus, if one begins with the pair $5 + 6$, the pair $4 + 7$ must be equal to it, because if one has deduced a unit from 5 to get 4, one has added a unit to 6 to get 7. The intellectual process is contained within a certain manner of perceiving the number series. But the final expression does not give us the notion of intellectual labor, for the double function of "n" disappears. In other words, "n" is not employed in the same

sense in n/2 and in the sum of n where it represents the number of terms in the series; whereas in n + 1, it represents the last number of the series.

All of this leads us to a different notion of truth, a structural conception of truth. Intelligence is an active reorganization of the elements of the field, but one which takes hold by a deepening of relations already sketched in the perceived world.

3. *Comparison with Piaget's conceptions.* We find that for Piaget, intelligence is different from perception, for it realizes an absolute decentralization, an indifferent equilibrium. In perception, on the other hand, as soon as the observer changes places, the perceived spectacle changes its aspect. Thus, there is a relativity of the field in relation to the observer and never a decentering of the field. Intelligence can only define itself by finding an equilibrium, a reversibility in all relations, an absence of point of view, or an absolute objectivity.

But, doesn't this conception of intelligence represent a limit state that is never attained? From the perspective of the Gestalt theory, one can never arrive at this indifferent equilibrium. Intelligence *always* remains a form, although a very superior one. Every definition of intelligence which would place it in an order completely divorced from the perceptual order renders it inaccessible to all psychology. Intelligence surpasses perception, but it does not destroy it.

8

The Experience of Others (1951–1952)

[I. The Problem of Others]

Our problem has only existed in this form for a hundred years. Why? In certain philosophies, there is no problem of the other.

Absolute empiricism. For such a philosophy, the ego [*moi*] is reduced to a series of conscious states that I grasp in myself. The other constitutes another psychologically distinct series that is inaccessible to my own. Thus, the other's position appears to be inconceivable. But for a consistent empiricism, we can no more affirm the ego than affirm the other, given that one only has the experience of a series of rolling states and not of the ego itself. However, such a philosophy is certain of nothing. Any philosophy that makes such enunciations is contradicted when calling itself empirical.

Purely reflexive conception. The mind is capable of seizing itself with an absolute certainty; I find myself as an absolutely active subject, and the ego would only be in each case assimilated to an individual in a local and temporal situation: the ego is pure coincidence with itself. Mind is defined by self-consciousness. The ego occurs in the domain of value. Others do not reside in their bodies; this would be incompatible with the conception of mind. Also, the mind, by definition, cannot see itself from the exterior (*the ego can only come across itself in experience proper*). Thus, in such a philosophy what we call the experience of the other is purely and simply meaningless. I think that the other is for himself as I am for myself (Descartes, *Meditations*).

There is a problem of the other when I do not reduce myself to a series of psychological experiences but when, however, I cannot attribute to myself the equality of an eternal and unique subject; whereas we can acknowledge this singular relationship between a mind and this corporal apparatus that bears it (Husserl).

When we have left these two points of view, there is the real problem of the other. There is an incarnate mind with which one can enter into contact. Thus, our problem could be considered as a mirror of the problem of the ego. It is linked at the same time with *the problem of the world*.

We come to see that as with the problem of the world, the problem of the other does not arise in any case, in any situation. This problem does not present itself, properly speaking, in radical empiricism, where the world is only a simple heading of classes to designate the series of psychological states; nor does it present itself in absolute rationalism, where it is possible to install oneself in the position of God and observe the totality of Being. The concept becomes problematic when one notes that the world is a totality that one cannot totalize. (For instance, in Kant the conceived world is a limit idea under which we designate an indefinite and open series of experiences tied together by rational connections.)

The notion of experience (*Erfahrung*) brings to light what is original in our relationship with being; the same is true for the other becoming a problem. It is not necessary to pose this question absolutely, but as a progressive experience. In reality, the two problems are not only parallel, but are connected internally, since all evidence is that in the world we have the chance to have an experience of the other. Hence, it is not for us to presume certain conceptions of the ego or the world and to see what thereby results from their relation to the other, but to examine how to conceive of the world so the other is thinkable.

Let us thus return to this state of ignorance of the problem of the other in order to make more precise why it is deprived of sense. The central attitude from which there is no longer a problem of the other is the one that consists in saying that passivity for the mind is absolutely unthinkable. The mind makes a unity out of the multiplicity that constitutes the object. (In order that I can see a piece of paper, I must not be an element of the paper.) It is myself who represents the passive me, confuses me with my body, but I am not the body.

The immediate consequence of this theory is a certain conception of the object as entirely defined by its parts (Descartes: *partes extra partes*). The ego becomes conceived not in an intimate sense, but as a pure "I" without content and nonindividuated in time. The other is thus not incarnate and situated: the problem disappears. In this way, Kant did not perceive it was a problem to go from what is true in his consciousness to what is true in all consciousnesses. He does not think of the other or the ego itself [*moi-même*] as being situated. In such a conception, there is no philosophical problem; there is only a psychological problem (*the analysis of space*). The other is a problem of simple content and not a transcendental problem of structure.

In the final analysis, the other is not a problem because such a philosophy has truly purified object and subject. There is no longer a possibility for a representation like that of the other who is a subject-object being. We do not have resources that can say what a representation that

does not resist reflection is. Thus, in a sense, such a philosophy renders our problem chimerical and inexpugnable. When we try to show a reflective philosophy that these object-subjects are all the same part of our experience, they ask: how can such a meaningless thing be part of our experience?

Descartes mentioned this problem briefly, but if we consider the entirety of his philosophy, he was right to not insist upon it. It could throw a light on the union of soul and body because the identity in God of the essence and existence makes us grasp a possible solution. Descartes brings us back to the presence of the world in the fifth and sixth *Meditations*. In his philosophy, the world has a sense because it is created by God. But the modern Cartesians cannot link the return to the world because they have not posited God; thus the world has no sense. If we want to have a positive attitude toward the world without postulating an infinity that offers the solution to all problems, we must think about the inherent paradoxes in this world, in particular that of the other.

II. Initial Description of the Problem

The goal here is to describe the world's objects with their subjective roots so as to recapture the consciousness of our real [*véritable*] contact with the world: *to see how the world speaks to us of mankind* [*l'homme*].

Let us start with an example that is used in objectivist conceptions: *the perception of a cube.*[1] It is easy to show that the cube is the object of a judgment where the distinction between each who judges and what is judged stays decided. In effect, we only have a successive vision of faces of a cube; if I believe I see a cube it is because, in me, the mind rectifies the appearance in order that I perceive. From this point of view, to see does not have any sense; as soon as there is a vision of the cube, our gaze is inhabited by the mind's inspection. This classical analysis brings up a difficulty. It supposes, at least ideally, that we have a certain perspective view on the cube and that from this view an intellectual grasp permits us to reconstitute it.

But is this how things happen in perception? Let us look at a man far away. We cannot say that this man is as big as a fly. In distance, height and largeness are not homogenous; it is the dimension of nonpresence [*inactualité*]. This man is a presence who, at the moment, is far away, but over there is experienced as if I saw him nearby. In free perception, there is absolutely no common measure between a near object and a faraway object, because they are situated in two different dimensions.

The route toward the horizon does not really shrink; it is only after analysis that we can say that this spectacle carries characteristics that give it this description. But the perception of the object is different from what our analysis ascribes to it later. The object (in the etymological sense of a thing spread out in front of my gaze) is encircled by an interior and exterior horizon (Husserl). These horizons announce an open and indefinite series of complementary perceptions that we can acquire if we change our point of view. Perception is the synthesis of all possible perceptions. This synthesis is actualized by the power that I possess to move myself.

The perceived thing is a system of experiences: if I make such a movement, I will obtain such a result. It is my corporality that makes possible the system of "*Wenn . . . so*" [if . . . then]. It is not a system of relationships between objective variables. Perception operates on the connections between me (as having a body) and the world.

The thing appears to me in certain perspectives. The perspectivism of our perception is not expressible by an objective relationship between sizes; it is not comparable to the schema that geometry gives me. In perception, my body plays the role of absolute measure, but it is not the measurer, it makes measurements possible. *Distance is not an objective magnitude.* Distance is the degree of precision of my gaze's hold on the thing. In a sense we are less able, than in the classical view, to affirm that we immediately reach the thing. In another sense, we affirm it more because it is insurmountable.

Classical analyses give us perception as a third witness between the object and he who perceives. We are placed in the position of a subject who is a pure spectator. All this causes us to define the perceived thing as a *physiognomy* (gestalt). Since Spinoza, it was admitted that perceiving a circle could not be anything else than intellectually reconstructing the circle. In reality, we apprehend the physiognomy of a circle that gives us its curves without implicating its intellectual formation. The circle is a certain manner of showing proof of our general relationship to space as it is founded by the gaze that we fix on things. It has its own manner of connecting the bonds that we have with things; therein we find its physiognomy. We set down certain levels that represent our anchorage in the world (horizontal, vertical, near, far from the object, clear or muddled vision) that the physiognomy can vary. The thing is entirely structured by our relationship of being incarnated in the world.

The world only has signification because it has a direction. All localization of objects in the world presupposes my locality. In a sense, the object of perception does not cease to speak to us of mankind; it expresses us as incarnate subjects. *The object is already in front of us as an other: it helps us thereby understand how there can be a perception of the other.*

Moreover, we are not only a sensory body, but also a body that carries techniques, styles, behaviors that all correspond to a superior layer [*couche*] of objects: the modalities of our corporeal styles give cultural objects a certain physiognomy. The concept of cultural object, not really considered in classical theories of perception, today takes on significant importance.

Tools address themselves to my activity. Even the sensory perception occurring between me and the object already unleashes a physiognomic relationship. It suffices that the utensil is recognized for a minimum of sensory perceptions and then its utility is imposed. The perception of the utensil tends to become a special category of perception (such as in Heidegger's discussion of "*zu Handen*" [ready-to-hand] and "*vor Handen*" [present-at-hand]).[2]

Let us analyze a cultural object that is prior to the zone of language: the perception of a painting without any human figures. A painting is the manifest trace of a certain cultural relationship to the world. Someone who perceives it also perceives a certain kind of civilization. In the case where art has sought to be as little subjective as possible (such as in Italian painting in the Renaissance), even within this desire, art is the expression of a certain manner of being human [*homme*]. The planimetric perspective, invented to achieve this goal, is an energetic way of equalizing the world because it permits the coherent representation of the multiplicity of objects without letting one infringe upon the other. The painter resolves to no longer sacrifice one object to another. However, thus understood, painting expresses a certain objectivizing attitude toward the world.

In Panofsky's *Perspective as Symbolic Form,* perspective is not natural, it is biased.[3] Many systems are possible (Greek painting employed an angular perspective). Once acquired, this image of the world seems natural. We end up perceiving according to this system. Painters who for the first time have employed perspective are thought to have discovered it in the things and not invented it. Thus, in order to establish that perspective is a symbolic form, we must show the implications of this perspective. The expression that is realized in the perception of painting is the anthropological appearing as a property of nature.

Greek painting privileges the body, and spatiality is not known except as a gap [*écart*] between two bodies. Space is an aggregate; in Greek paintings there is no unique vanishing point [*fuite*] but many axes of disappearance. What we read in paintings of this genre is this attitude *toward the world that expresses a certain incoherence and some oneir*ism. This perspective gives the perception of a certain style of being that appears to us retrospectively. It is us who speak about an "*Unfestigkeit*"

[roughness, instability]. Maybe the Greeks did not experience this, but we cannot suppose for a moment that they did not have this feeling at all.

Artists have already presented a certain sentiment of the world. They looked for something that would complete their expressive system of space. It is the entirety of interior tensions within their sentiments that orients them. Roman painting utilizes a more perfect system of painting on a curved surface. The problem is present in the paintings, but only speculatively. The painting of the Middle Ages "fills" the paintings instead of looking for them to represent a view of the world. The problem of perspective is in its latency here; it is still present, since new art introduces, despite everything, certain relations with color between the objects. It corresponds to a metaphysics of light. Byzantine painting discovers the expressive value of the line. It is faithful to Greek painting, but does not have enough Greek inspiration. The problem of perspective is not clearly and concisely taken up. At once, Roman art surpasses and conserves antiquity. It conserves it in uniting spatiality and corporality on the surface. It surpasses it in affirming the possibility of graphic expression with the line.

Panofsky's analysis warns us against the two errors in the interpretation of art. (1) It would be wrong to imagine that in order for painters to reach a conclusion, a world spirit exists (Malraux's "superartists").[4] We are not dealing with an unconscious history that, unbeknown to them, directs painters. We must understand that painters work and do not think about universal history. (2) We must not believe that the development of painting is random. Something guides painters in their work. The problem is felt vaguely as an unresolved situation. A kind of rationality of painting exists. We cannot speak of the "superartist," nor can we speak of a "historical current." Yet every painter is part of the same pictorial world, a problem present in all of us. In a painting, we read a silent history wherein the problem's cadence is inexplicit.

Dürer enlarged our definition of perspective (*Durchsehung* [overlooking]). From the moment when one creates the idea that the painting must signify the world, it ceases to be an element of the world. If we consider the painting as a cultural being, it no longer resides on its surface; its objects are spaced out in different depths, completely implying a world conception. The painting is made in order to convert the world into its meaning. The pictorial painting does not reside in a point of space of the canvas. It appears in that point, but it is not that point.[5] The world is something to construct.

Like his contemporaries, da Vinci dreamed of a universal language: the painter does not need an expressive art. By conforming to the laws of perspective, the painter can build the beautiful. Their project was that

of a painting that gives an absolute object in relationship with a feeling about the world. But such a view is an illusion; painting is a connection with a certain style of mankind [*homme*]. In his analysis, Panofsky shows that the above cannot guarantee that their kind of painting would follow. Great illusionists employ perspective. However, they do not give us the object but, on the contrary, they deform our perspective (Tiepolo's ceilings). Laws can be used to express an appearance.

Rembrandt used neither orthogonals nor parallels in the frontal plane; his paintings give us the impression of turning in on themselves. In Italian painting, on the contrary, objectivism takes perspective away. Their interiors resemble buildings with one side removed. Thus, we can see how perspective itself is ambiguous. It is subjected to two criticisms: an excess of subjectivity and an overly narrow rationalism (such as the critique of modern painters). These two critiques are just and not at all contradictory. In order that painting solves this dilemma, it is necessary to renounce the conception that perspective is a sufficient process. Perspective must be considered as one of many elements of the creative effort.

From the beginning, Cézanne did not use perspective and wanted to render the object with color. But in his last period, he partially observed perspective. Contemporary painting tries a different expressive style, one that consists in making the subjective and objective aspects inseparable. (For instance, in Braque the objects bleed, they have a complex, Freudian value.)

The planimetric perspective is one of the symbolic forms by which men have tried to conquer the world. The world returns to us our own image; we perceive in a cultural object a certain human atmosphere, a relation to exterior and interior life. Their anthropological significance is not a state of the soul, but a certain articulation of the interior on the exterior of the culture and individual, as in Hegel's *Aesthetics,* where he argues that painting is the sentient subjectivity. Painting is defined by the commitment to renounce the third dimension, by which the work of art is no longer something that exists in itself (like the statue). The painting's contents only exist for the subject, for the spectator. "We could say that the spectator is there from the beginning . . ."

III. [Gestalt Psychology's Approach]

We have tried to clarify above how the object is already in front of us like the other. In this sense, the perception of the other does not pose a problem different from the one that any object creates. For the Gestaltists, the

perception of the other follows the same conditions as the perception of a square. Certain physicochemical exterior *stimuli* combine to constitute the perception of a man. This is a highly abstract conception. In fact, the perception of the other is not only the operation of exterior *stimuli;* it also depends largely on the way in which we have established our relations with others before this perception. It has roots in our psychological past. Each perception of the other is never simply a momentary modality. Thus, it is not about a pure reception of a certain content that would be given at any rate, but it is always a deeper relation, a relation of coexistence with the aspect of the other. We discern a certain intention in the other's behavior such that we are ourselves plunged into a certain human drama that codetermines this perception.

The merit of Gestalt psychology is to bring to light the perception of the other not as an intellectual construction but as a *direct contact with the other.* But is it able to withdraw the sense of this perception? Because of the ontology of form, does it not always lead to a massive content which enters our consciousness without invoking our collaboration? We must analyze this *Gestaltung* (form-making). We cannot stick to limited givens.

A. Arnheim's work

One of these experiments consisted in correlating the signature or writing with the portrait or name of famous people.[6] The results showed that there exists without doubt a pairing too accurate to be attributed to chance. (Good responses are two and a half times more numerous, something simple probability would not give us.) These results are much better if the subject's attitude is more spontaneous. Errors almost always arise from someone who is trying to concentrate his attention on a detail (for example, the loops on da Vinci's signature). It is curious to see that if we explain the person's error, he will produce a kind of intuitive perceptual reorganization. Thus, it is about a global and physiognomic perception and not about an inference.

Another experiment consisted in interpreting the expression attached to photographs. We can look at the portrait analytically or globally. The view of an isolated part of the face rarely permits a correct interpretation. For the same eyes, for example, the rest of the face being hidden, one obtains absolutely opposite responses according to the subjects. Two different physiognomies which have the same chin are seen differently, but the two subjects make the precise differentiation about the chin. *The dynamic consists in a reciprocal action of the parts of a face on another face.*[7] Cuvier's research finds the same meaning. When two parts of the face are electrically stimulated, two incongruous responses occur on

two different parts on the face (for instance, sadness and smiling). If one then covers the smiling half on the photo, the expression of the eyes has an accusatory sadness and vice versa. We are dealing with a space of intuitive evidence; the eyes' expression is ambiguous. The total expression is constructed by simultaneous contributions of all the parts, it is decomposable. Let us cite again the famous photograph of a tortured Chinese in the work cited above. The tortured person's expression appears to our, nonaverted, eyes to be one of joy and serenity. From the above, we can only conclude that there is no absolutely characteristic expression of joy and of sorrow.

Kandowski and Ivan Mozzhukhin, directors in Russian cinema, have conducted similar experiments using cinematic techniques.[8] Projected on the screen are successive still photographs of very different objects due to their affective value. It is remarkable that when the same photograph of a face is followed by that of a small child, it will evoke a vital sympathy, and, on the contrary, when it is followed by a coffin, sadness will be evidently expressed.

Between the gaze and the object that precedes it on the film, an intrinsic relation exists, exploited in the cinematic technique (we are presented with one or the other). Fundamentally, this is comparable to the relation between the feeling we have about our body and the sentiment that we have about the space around our body. Globally grasped, we cannot conceive of them without a perception of a certain orientation of the principal objects around us. The same goes for the other: an intrinsic relation exists between the other's body and how he sees it. Koffka's statement, "A face must be considered as a frame extracted from a film," must be taken literally.[9]

Does this motivate Arnheim? His only conclusion is that a face is a gestalt. Only, we do not always know what this gestalt is, and we risk supposing a certain mystical intuition of the other or a sort of telepathy. In order to avoid these consequences, we must ask if we are permitted to recognize different givens (writing, portraits, and signatures). Arnheim responds that they are a common gestalt. But what does this mean? It is not about the production of a characteristic impression of the person each time an element of his behavior strikes us. The perception of others functions both too well and too poorly for this to be true. It is here, as in the acquisition of a habit, that we find what kinds of movements we are able to respond with in what situations. There is no real permanence of a certain gestalt, but rather a recognizing of a certain style. But to speak of style is to speak of language. The *"innere Sprachform"* [inner speech form] is a certain organization of a system of signs, permitting a relationship of place with the interlocutor. To understand a style is not to subsume

the object in understanding a category, but is fundamentally to take up a certain practical intention. This intention flows within the physiognomic givens and recovers a certain number of aspects that participate in the other's body as in my own. It remains for us to analyze this type of blind recognition of the other's expression.

B. Wolff's Experiments

Wolff explores experiments regarding the relationship between the perception of profiles, hands, stories, voices, and characters.[10] He partly confirms Arnheim's results in showing that in 77 percent of cases the testing is correct between the voice and the character, even though the probability is only 33.3 percent.

He also shows us something new. For fourteen subjects, he introduces the subject's own voice. The voice of the subject himself is recognized only two times (once clearly and once where the recognition is indirect). He repeats this experiment, this time forewarning the subject. In one case out of two, the stranger's voice is known, but only in one case out of five is one's own voice known. However, at the same time, the subject uses a behavior absolutely special regarding his own voice. He always judges it more favorably or less favorably than on average with the other subjects' voices (the first tendency is more frequent and more defensive).

Can we suppose that this judgment corresponds simply to optimism or pessimism? There is no reason to think this; it is only in the presence of his own voice that the subject tends to exaggerate. Or do subjects particularly love or hate what resembles them? The experiment proves the negative. Wolff concludes that the subject behaves differently toward his own voice; he cannot be neutral toward his own voice. The voice does not seem normal. It is a kind of quasi-recognition of self by self, favorable or unfavorable, according to whether the subject is peaceful or having difficulties. In this latter case, the interior tendencies make him reject his own voice like he rejects himself. Another proof of the implicit recognition is that the subject enjoys the details and takes the psychological judgments much more seriously in his own voice than in that of a stranger's. The experiments that use hands and narratives have pretty much the same results, despite the recognition of one's own being more frequent.

How can we interpret these facts? If there is no recognition of one's own voice, we could say that it is prevented because the appropriate stimuli are not given, but this is not the case. Is it because the subject hears his voice from the exterior for the first time? But we are capable of recognizing an imitation of ourselves. Is it because of an affective resistance? But why not also block the recognition of our hands and our narrations?

Wolff concludes that, while objectively the same, it is the distortion produced by the loudspeaker, indicating that I am more sensible when it is my own voice, since it is more familiar to me.

All these explanations are weak. We cannot reason by analogy with the hands and the imitation of ourselves as Wolff has done. Our voice appears to us much more than our hands. In an imitation of us we are presented with a more complete tableau of our behavior. For a final explanation, there is not only a deformation, a nonrecognition of my voice, there is an unconfessed recognition; we cannot explain it by a pure absence of a gestalt. The subject has a differential behavior in relationship to his voice; the ambiguous recognition supposes many layers of consciousness. I do not recognize myself; I cannot place myself in this voice and animate it, since it is offered to me for the first time, as it is offered for another as a sonorous totality. It must cease to be something that I do to become something that I can hear. (Such as when Malraux says in *Man's Fate* that we hear our voice with our throat and hear the other's with our ears.) These facts are only explanatory if we consider the perception of a voice only as a response to a question. In a conversation, everything happens as if the words carry meaning with them when they fire a question at us; we simply fire one back.

Gestalt theory has taken the vocabulary of cerebral traces and spoken of previous configurations, thereby explaining recognition. In the example above, there is a nonrecognition of one's own voice because the two forms (interior and exterior) do not correspond to each other. There is a difference between intellectual recognition that sees itself and this kind of resurgence that I execute toward a physiognomic expression that I do not know to say is mine. This is the difference that Wolff *negates*. Between me and this expression that is presented to me, a kind of instinct inserts itself. I perceive the physiognomy of my voice because my experience intervenes in this perception; there is already a kind of reading of these stimuli aided by my voice. We can say that it is a prelinguistic deciphering.

When we inform subjects that their voices are being recorded, their attention in listening is modified. We must continue to admit that an immediate, unmotivated perception transports us to the other, something like telepathy. However, we must make its sense more precise, since it depends on a certain syntax of expression that is not an arbitrary intrusion or miraculous power that transports me into the other's space. In language, for example, the auditor goes beyond the established sense of the words (usage does not explain language with literary value). The perception of the other is really the perception of his behavior.

The perception of the other evokes the constructs of particularly

extravagant theories. Among such theories (of which there are many), we can look at Klauss's theory in *Race and Soul,* which is an introduction to the sense of corporeal form.[11] He advocates a mimetic method in order to understand the other. Some people are gifted with an intuition of the other that makes them perceive their character and race. Race is truly an "Idea" in the Platonic sense. In order to make a true racial psychology, we must get over this perception. It is not the number of particular cases that is decisive, but the choice. The human body is the stage on which expressions appear; it is the style that creates the perception of race. Nevertheless, there really is a perception of expression; psychology is the reading or perceiving of behavior.

Goldstein sketches a phenomenology of gestures and expressions.[12] He remarks that if phenomenology does not proceed with an addition of facts, it asks for an intuitive effort, lending itself, after the fact, to verification. Goldstein obtains with this theory a total sense of behavior and not an occult theory as in Klauss. Goldstein reintegrates gesture into the total attitude of the organism toward its environment, in place of searching for a hidden principle in which all is written in advance. The hubris of maintaining that we have never been transported in the other protects us from abuse.

Ludwig Klages, a theoretician of German graphology, works on principles which would permit some rather extravagant conclusions.[13] He purports to capture the sense of a mode of behavior that is accessible to us by an intuition about which we can say nothing. There exists a connection in nature between an affective state and its corporeal expression; he thus arrives at a kind of symbolic realism. We must raise against this idea a number of original images prepared by nature to express such a sentiment, such as emotion. Klages forgets the extraordinary equivocality of physiognomy.[14] There is no adherent sense in an expression; the precise content of a gesture is the reference to the situation. Reading an expression is only possible in reference to a complete situation, something very different from any mystical power. (In our infatuation for psychology there is something on this level: a certain occultism. We imagine that to know the other, it suffices to pass tests, read a little book about graphology, and to finish off, we dive into psychoanalysis: the key to dreams!) No, true psychoanalysis calls for a wise theory of the other: *to perceive the other is to decipher a language.*

In the face of authors who throw away the expressive value of gestures, must we study those who, on the contrary, negate any kind of expressive value for the other's behavior? For the Cartesian tradition, gestures are only expressive because on the one hand, my corporeal organization is tied to purely contiguous motor expression that comes to des-

ignate certain emotional states, and on the other hand, the accumulation of certain behaviors is a social phenomenon. This tradition is hostile to giving an expressive value to gestures, since this would be to admit an internal connection between my body's movement and the psyche, confusing the frontiers of soul and body. The meaning of our gestures is thus reduced to the observed contiguity between these and those emotional states. Thus, the relation of the sign to the signified is a received relation to an elaboration in which I have no role.

The problem is often posed in these terms. Either the gestures signify by themselves something and the psychology that they express must be really tied with these gestures, inseparable from the apparition of these sentiments (Gratiolet denies any possibility of an experimental intervention to produce the expression outside of an emotional state), or, we admit the possibility of such an experience; it is about a purely exterior connection.[15] (In the Cartesian tradition, interest in the automatons is rarely equivocal, since they would not be far from recognition. Hypothetically, they have rejected this theory.) The problem is badly posed. Gestures are expressive in the manner of a language, but this does not signify that they would only be identical with lived experience.

In his experiments, Duchenne de Boulogne noted a solidarity between facial muscles, but he remarked that the appearance of total contraction was what he saw in his perception.[16] Dumas conducted several experiments on the senses. *Let us look at his demonstrations: in electrifying the facial nerve, Dumas obtained a smile.* There is, he explained, a synergy, a natural connection of muscles that reaches gestures, and not a regulation by the quality of the emotions. Between joy and the smile, a purely exterior relation exists. The experiment fails with anger, laughter, and tears, which are more complex, and one cannot produce them by electrification, since one would need to intervene in psycho-reflex reactions. Thus, there is no muscle of expression but muscles which, without any expressions, are affected by diverse manners throughout the emotions; a social regulation of expressive behavior also intervenes.

This is an interesting mechanist analysis of physiological nature. But what is the meaning of an act that I produce by applying an electrical current to an organism? The current is not the cause of the gesture. It is the body's functional totality which is capable of smiling, and not the facial nerve. Full expression only appears with the total behavior of an organism. A living body is always behaving: it is a phenomenal body. Emotions are not provoked by stimuli but by situations, totalities that are only meaningful for a life.

Dumas posed the problem in psychophysical terms: the smile is a motor reaction. We must see the relation between the physiological and

the psychological series, they are constantly modeled on one another. Today we see joy as a behavior, a relationship to the world. Cerebral excitation is what underlies the behavior's realization. It is thus impossible to pose the problems as Dumas did. An internal relationship exists between the expression and what it expresses, a meaningful relationship: smiling behavior and the state of joy represent the same attitude toward the world. We have tried experiments with transplantation on apes modifying their nerves and, after a brief time, a new adaptation reduces the effect of the operational intervention to nothing at all. The animal corrects very quickly because it perceives the discordance. This is comprehensible if we admit that what is effective in my eyes' movement is the relationship between my eye and the perceptual field it explores. The reorganization of the neural function is quasi-independent of any anatomical dispositions. Dumas accepted the postulate that the body is a pure object. Today, the organism is considered as a lived experience in its relationships with the world. The soul extends itself throughout the body. The body is inhabited by meaning. A certain magical relationship is already realized in the interior of the perceptual world. Our image of the pure object is in reality a myth; the object is always an object along with the living bodies that surround and perceive it.

Dumas' sociologism comes to complete his mechanistic explanation. There would be signs that would be conventional signs of certain psychological attitudes. Dumas finds it hard to comprehend boredom; it is difficult to rediscover natural expressions in what cannot be natural as natural. He formulates the idea of a first layer which is overlaid by a second conventional or social layer. In fact, there are no purely natural expressions, nor are there any purely social or conventional expressions. Saussure showed that nothing is fortuitous in language: it is a totality.[17] The use of each sign has a relationship with all the others. In this sense, signs are not conventional. A meaningful relationship exists between different expressions: a certain expressive type is given, a genealogy is established between the different expressions the subject produces. We must thus research at the interior of a culture's expression a systematic unity.

Dumas only gives us a phonetic of expression as a part of linguistics. What characterizes a language is the system of phonemes, the principle of how the language modifies the voice, how language constructs and invents differential signs.

Darwin tried to restore expressive phenomena and hereditary phenomena. He negated the actual expressive value of our gestures. For Klages, expression is a "kind of parable of action." Expression is not simply a kind of rough action; it is a commentary on the action that

expresses it indirectly with a certain freedom. Darwin also sensed this idea. The phylogenetic theory is a projection into the past of sense given to emotional behaviors. In expression, the body plays the role of a certain meaningful symbol of which it tries to be the emblem. We say that the sense of expression is what appears at the intersection of expressive gestures understood according to the fundamental processes in a determined culture.

We must reject the idea of a telepathic perception of the other. But how is it possible to not see something magical in the relationship between consciousness and body? To eliminate this contradiction, we must make clearer the difference between invoked magic as a real force and "magic" that is given to us in the perception of expressions.

We will proceed by stages to examine lived experience and the expression of gestures. First, particular cases represent extreme existential modalities: (1) the relationship between the lived and gestures in mythical consciousness, in cases where one communicates one with the other in the imaginary (dramatic expression) and in the life of societies similar to our own. (2) What is the other? (3) The passage from the philosophical plane (philosophy of the experience of the author, in particular Sartre) to the confrontation with the preceding phenomena.

IV. Examination of the Lived and Gestural Expression

A. In Mythical Consciousness

In societies rich in myths, an almost identical relationship exists between what is experienced and what is signified.[18] Mauss and Granet have insisted on the existence in a great number of societies of an obligatory expression of sentiments. Everything happens as if it was impossible to establish a divide between what is lived by the individual and what is expressed by him. This conventionality and this regularity in no way exclude sincerity. We do more than just have sentiments, we attribute them to others. Fundamentally, between the attitude of these populations and that of the civilized, there is no believable difference. Essentially, when we perform a ritual behavior, it is as much to demonstrate our own feelings as it is to display them for others. In these societies, subjects identify with each other, they live the rite. The ritual is not an exterior language-signal to what is signified. It is an emblematic language where signified and signifier are not separate. We could imagine when looking to psychoana-

lytically interpret the relationship of sign to signified, where nothing is immediately disclosed, we could imagine a kind of institutional repression. The subject throws himself in the rite to avoid abandoning what he feels. But it would be necessary to abandon all explicative social value about consciousness.

Granet's studies show that in classical China a language of sadness exists with absolutely obligatory themes.[19] It concerns itself with "traditional improvisations." Again, sincerity is not in question. A psychoanalyst could not speak of repression; it is our civilization that dictates our feelings about the Chinese. The movement toward the ritual represents the horror that could be inspired by lived sentiment if they are demonstrated, but these sentiments are no longer felt. The ritual is assumed positively and the subject uses it like an art form. Technical conventions in traditional improvisation do not exclude the sincerity that one seeks; personal innovation gives behavior a positive character. In the work of ritual, everything has a gradation that is the order of personal science; when the rite loses its compulsive character it is truly assumed. It is in the individual's style where true innovation can occur. We cannot say that style stands apart from expression (for instance, the expression of sadness is a way of being sad).

In these kinds of cases, a suppression of consciousness for the rite does not exist. The mode of expression becomes a mode of feeling. There is no longer an opposition between the natural and the cultural. Granet appears close to coming across the notion of role, not felt as a natural role or as a conclusion, but as lived within the myth. Thus, if gesture is by itself expressive, what can we say about the varying expressions of sentiment within cultures? All civilizations do not have the same reactions. Moreover, we could object that this connection between the symbol and the lived only exists in a preconscious state in ritualistic civilizations. However, we find this connection between lived and gesture exists in certain acts in our own social life: the dramatic arts.

B. Dramatic Expression

All Chinese theater operates on the same principles as the expression of emotions in human life. The Chinese actor is much different than our own; their costumes and their colors are stereotypical. Even physiognomic proportions are fixed by use. For a Chinese actor to express is thus something totally different for a Western actor; it could seem as if expression is absent in Chinese theater.

In Indian theater, cues with set meanings are used. To indicate a sense is not to make it appear, it is more an announcement than an ex-

pression. Moreover, we must note an extremely strong belief in the reality of the mythical person whom the actors interpret (to play it so brings the God to life). Thus, its sense has no relation with the facts of expressions. But the problem entirely rests on true and sincere beings at the interior of this symbolic, fixed setting. Thus, we can expect to find in our own theater something of this fusion between the lived and the expressed.

At first glance, there would not seem to be a comparison between dramatic expression and stereotypical cues. Instead of expressing something in terms of established symbols, a character's expression is created with his body. The connection is no longer immediate; rather, to be successful, the public must be created with each new play. Expression will form a momentary or durable intersubjectivity. Sometimes it is said that psychology is substituted for myth (Nietzsche).

Dramatic expression does not consist in looking for signs whose meaning would be given apart from them. In fact, the direct relationship between the use of the body and the play's meaning remains a magical relationship. It is about obtaining equality [adéquation] between behavior and sense that would, at the same time, exist equally between the public and the spectacle; the attitude remains to be invented. The relationship between the way of acting and the play's sense is not guaranteed by an intellectual analysis. Therefore, we can admit that the expressed and the expression are reciprocal and indiscernible; they reciprocate each other like the meaning of a poem that is reciprocated in poetic expression. The play's execution is a true re-creation. We would like to explore this modern "magic" more closely.

In The Paradox of Acting, Diderot had a similar view: "The true creator is cold and calm, an attentive imitator, a reflective disciple of nature," but between his initial idea and his expressions there exists a difference which we must grasp. His thesis is that the actor can only live his role as he lives in his everyday life. He does not believe in the role's reality, he understands what he does, his emotion comes from the head and not from the heart. This comprehension of the role is not a conventional imitation; it is a certain operation of a prelogical character. The actor assumes the role—"the actor turns into a ghost"—it is an expressive operation where the body lends itself to express a role other than the one with which it is normally joined.[20]

The discussion about the actor's sensitivity, or lack of sensitivity, is a poorly posed problem. The actor experiences the irreal or the imaginary, he is summoned entirely to produce these roles that in fact live in the irreal (if he cries, he seizes his tears as analogous to real tears). It is the character who is realized in the actor, it is the actor that derealizes [s'irréalise] himself in his character.

We say that to express is for the body to play a certain role in the sense that it could have lent itself to other roles that it habitually uses. The actor very attentively perceives the other's expressions permitting his own dramatic expression of the other. Dramatic expression is not really intellectual and analytical; it is a kind of knowledge that orients the actor toward his first connection with the manuscript. In theory, this all happens with concepts; however, the testimony of great actors contradicts this thesis. Lacking sensitivity and not intelligence, we find that Jouvet tells us similar things as Diderot does. A quasi-intellectual operation, however, is not an operation of intelligence. This double aspect of the actor's profession—intellectual and corporeal—poses the problem that interests us.

The actor's emotion is an imaginary emotion; it substitutes the imaginary for the lived. The imaginary situation, however, never becomes equivalent to a real and lived situation. To express the emotion is to momentarily inhabit this phantom in which the principal traits are fixed by the manuscript. We see now that the actor is neither characterized by intelligence nor sensitivity, but he is someone capable of derealizing himself in a role. Thus, dramatic expression would no longer be comparable to words in language that have a rigorously defined sense, but to the use that we make of certain words in language. The writer is not content to use the signs of language according to their grammatical value, but instead makes the collection of syntax have a use such that the unedited signification appears to the listener. Dramatic expression consists in speaking with the body, to construct with the body's possible movements an original assemblage that renders the play's meaning. The role is not given in advance in any way that clearly differentiates it from the ritual.

Let's make clearer the nature of the act by which the actor's body becomes capable of interpreting a role. We always rediscover this contrast between a passionate attitude and cold reason. "The actor's joy appears at the second when I embrace the situation, broiling with passion and cold precision" (Lucien Guitry). The act by which the actor assumes a role is very well described by Julien Berthot in "Actes du personnage."[21]

The character's genesis includes the following two phases. (1) *Abstract construction.* It is necessary above all for the actor to grasp the dynamic of the role. The role appears amid other roles, situated throughout the play, affected with a certain density. To deliver a new analysis from the point of view of one's own character becomes a certain manner of acting and no longer, as before, the power to act. Therein intelligence takes place, but a very particular kind of intelligence. Through this dramatic analysis all the characters are seen and understood in their behaviors. Intelligence is already close to dramatic performance. (2) *Concrete construction* involves the passage from a read piece to an acted piece. The author

does not give the actor a character he has to conform to, but a role. Out of this role, the actor constructs a character since in the discipline of art, only the performance counts.

Once finished with analytical work, everything remains to be done. The actor still does not know how he will play his character. He finds some expressions that correspond to his intention. He discovers an attitude where he recognizes an entire style of being within a detail. He learns to modulate his language to be his characters. The actor relies on his body exactly like the painter relies on his body when he paints; the painter carries his body and it allows him to function. An expression in the street that the actor recognizes as having the same style as the character he will play supposes a similar operation. The actor must invent scenes and play them out while thinking about them. This expectation, this effort to assume the role, is not a logical operation.

We could compare this case to simpler ones such as habit and imitation. For a long time, it was held that the theory of habit was faced with the alternative of corporeal mechanism or intellectual operation. The important fact to note is that these two theories are equally distant from each other, thus permitting the progress that has occurred in the last twenty-five years. We cannot speak of automatism, since in such a case habit would only function in precise conditions. It is a fact that habits are plastic and neither the situations nor the corporeal instruments are fixed once and for all, such as in habit transfer. Furthermore, habit is not subjugated to strictly defined situations. Habit is an aptitude to respond to a certain type of situation by a certain kind of solution. The habitual operation is thus at once corporeal and spiritual; *it is an existential operation.* An actor learning a role is only a very complex case.

Similarly, as long as imitation is posed in classical terms, it remains irresolvable. As the witness to a movement, I become capable of creating it myself. In order that I see myself, I would need a double consciousness that I lack regarding the muscular contractions of the model and how I can myself perform this series of movements.

Today the problem is rightly surpassed by the notion of *structure.* The functioning other's body brings about, through its movements, a displacement of certain corporeal forms whose apprehension is not the simple sum of the perception of observed movements. My body is also not given to me as a sum of sensations but as a whole. A form, common to both visual and tactile perceptions, is the link through which they communicate. All happens as if the intuitions and motor performances of the other are founded in a kind of intentional encroachment, as if my body and the other's form a system.

These analyses of imitation make us understand the actor's project

when his body inhabits a role not normally his. What I learn to consider as the other's body is a possibility of movements for me; we can thus say that the actor's art is only a deepening of an art that we all possess. My body schema directs itself to the perceived and imaginary world. The spectator does not see the text. The imaginary begins to be taken as real through a perfect lapping over of the text's meaning and the actor's behavior. The spectator and the actor are rejoined in this unconventional role, in the suppleness and precision with which the actor "renders" his role.

Thus, there is magic in the theater. The actor's acting is a gestural language that secretes its own signification. It is not only magic because of the sense within the actor's body, but also because the actor's body stops being something that signifies, because the actor involves my own body in his gesticulations; the sense of his acts is not in a mind but is the virtual foyer of his gestures: this is precisely what we call "drama." Thoughts about the role exist only in gestures, on stage only behaviors are seen and thus all thoughts are behaviors. Objects are only present in a drama insofar as they are integrated in the author's gestures. It is the pregnancy of sense of the role in the behavior that truly makes the great actor. In the great actor, a kind of implication of other actors exists (as in Moreno's auxiliary egos).[22] Dramatic magic consists in how at the time that the actor's body is present, everything else is raised to the imaginary by connections established between objects.

Theater's signification must remain oblique or lateral: all gestures have a sense which is indicated but not signified as if by a clue. The magical fundament is in the intentionality that connects our bodies to the world. This is only partially used in the gestures of most people; the actor's gestures make imaginary objects appear. This magic is not a physical force that operates on us like a pharmaco-dynamic agent, but rather it remains in what the gestures make emerge from the surface of the world of objects: objects that do not exist and yet are as significant as seen objects. The magic fills in [*ménage*] the gaps where others' behaviors become visible.

This magic can explain the very ambiguous feelings between the actor and his public; we always find both admiration and loathing. We despise the actor most because we thought he was a god, perhaps due to the movement of transcendence that represents the bodily expressive signification, explaining the hero-worship of actors and at the same time their exclusion from normal civil rights. The actor has a symmetrical attitude about the public. As the writer fundamentally creates a reader in his manner and establishes a unique relationship, the reader loves and detests the writer insofar as the writer always already had the initiative. The reader creates a myth of the writer as with a myth of the actor. This

inhumane attitude has the virtue of the expression that results in the writer having a dishonest prestige and the reader being deceived.

However, the magic of expression is obtained precisely by this work. The actor's body becomes capable of assimilating the functional style of the character and is founded on a direct contact, a direct apprehension of this role.

C. In the Life of Societies like Our Own

Do we find something analogous—the individual's projection in an imaginary role—in the domain of real life? At the end of *The Imaginary* Sartre affirms the above because, according to him, all consciousness is a consciousness that imagines, that takes consciousness of the world. In a certain way it is surpassing, although we can never surpass this world toward nothingness (on this point, Sartre provides justification to Bergson's analyses). We thus separate a part of ourselves from this operation on the world which is constituted by perception. Even here, there is an image. All imagination is negation of the world grounded in the world. Imagination brings about a kind of distension of my relations with the world; all consciousness is thus necessarily imaginary consciousness.

If this is true, if all consciousness of the world is at the same time imagination of the world, it is impossible at the interior of consciousness to not encounter the imaginary. We come to say that all life is the invention of a role that only exists by the free decision that I give it. Vocation always consists in the free decision to derealize oneself in a role. Gide distinguished between imaginary love and real love; for Sartre there is *no difference in consciousness, reality and appearance are confused.* In effect, consciousness is defined by its self-presence; it follows that the problem of sincerity disappears because profoundly, I am nothing. Insincerity only exists for those who do not derealize completely in their roles. Authenticity consists in giving without pause to the role that one had decided to play (in *The Red and the Black,* for instance, seminarians perform acts of piety that they do not inhabit. Stendhal says this is insincerity; Sartre says no, it is a discordance between two realities).

Actually, Sartre admits essential differences between the expression in the imaginary and expression in life. To live is not to derealize in an imaginary role; imagination in life is less constant than for the artist. The imaginary is of two sorts, two phenomena of different orders, such as in the hidden aspects of real landscape that I have before my eyes, on the one hand, and, on the other, the evocation of an absent friend. On the margin of what I perceive, a quantity of elements of the nonperceived world exist, but they are taken in the context of existing things, this zone

of marginal perception makes a whole with perceived zones. Also, doesn't this case exactly blend into the definition of the imaginary? In the imaginary itself, there is a margin between the perceived and the existing. If there is a role-creation, this role is subdued to take into account what I previously did, a certain conditioning tied to my past. Why this semi-will? This experience is only conceivable if I am able to make other decisions on the basis of the already escaped past. In life, a freedom never exists that does not start from a working situation. Maybe self-expression exists as a creation only on the condition of being in a sense expressive of what we have already accomplished.

My freedom is related to what I am going to do. I stake myself on what I do when I act. If living is inventing, it is inventing from certain givens. In El Greco's work, for example, we can say that his past was given to him so he could create the work he did, but we could also say that the givens of his childhood appear to us retrospectively as anticipations of his work. There is a circular relationship from work to life and from life to work. In an individual's life, some fruitful moments exist where the individual is particularly expressive, where the individual adds unexpected meaning. With certain events from his past, the individual uncovers a meaning that favors something that surges within or around him. Thus, our self-expression is an exchange between what is given and what will happen. When it is about expression in life, expression must take account of other people. In Sartre's recent writings, there is a certain tendency to conceive of all givens as coming from others. Thereby he rejoins, in a certain sense, Alain's famous analysis of love who himself took up Pascal's idea that "one never loves someone, one only loves qualities."[23] Alain admits that everything that goes beyond the love of qualities is a construction according to which I determine that I am in love. The "I love you" has no meaning; one cannot give oneself to another by oneself. The subject's freedom captivates itself by surrendering to the image of himself which he gives to the other with words (such as how Macbeth was dominated by the idea "You will be King").

Sartre seems to adopt this analysis in his own way. Loves belongs to the for-others and not to the for-itself: "To love is to want to be loved" he says in *Being and Nothingness*.[24] We create the role of the lover and we play it. These analyses are valid if they want to say that the role is not written in advance, that it is not fated. But are they not also correct if they signify that we create this role ex nihilo? Where does the disposition to love begin? In perception, is there not already an oath that precedes those oaths that can be exchanged? When I perceive someone, my perception affirms itself in such a way that it can be revealed as illusory or valid. If we know how to quiet ourselves, would there be any more passion? It is not because

we stop speaking to others that we stop talking to ourselves. We would have to silence the interior voice: we would have to stop perception. In the smallest perception, there are signs. To perceive is already to anticipate something and, in a sense, each form announces a development. An avowed love becomes bodily. In this, the movement toward language only prolongs the movement of life. Our words construct a myth of the myself that develops as I am myself an expression.

There is also a retrospective illusion as there is a prospective illusion of the for-itself. I cannot pretend that this creation of me by me in life is without any relation to what is given. I could not dream of subtracting myself totally from interpretation by others. There is already a kind of presence of the other in me. We can compare this relation with a theater hall in which the actor performs and the public observes without feeling involved. The difference with what happens in life is the same as the difference between pretending to sleep and sleeping. Love consists in loving. The entire difference between theater and life is that one's role in life is subjected to certain past relations with others. Hence, something is measured in the spectator-actor relationship, whereas in life there is no limitation of responsibilities, as there can be in aesthetic life, between me and others. We are so intimately engaged with others that the closer we get, the less any limit is possible. In the theater, we can always start again. For myself, everything I do is absolute. In life, we can never begin again. This absoluteness of life can be negatively translated: what is secondary for me is essential for others. Or it can be positively translated: only other people can respond to my intentions. In any case, life unfolds for real, whereas relations between writer and public are always "as if."

Self-expression in life is comparable to the behavior adopted in playing a role. Through such a behavior, I notice an initiative in the process of creating connections. Only in fertile moments do I have the impression of perceiving not only a role, but that I am in the presence of someone, the manifestation of an other. The perception of others is that of a freedom that takes place through a situation and, at the same time, transforms that situation. *One does not love only qualities, but one loves only through qualities.* But then others, as living human beings, are always menaced by the possibility of stereotyping that encloses their roles. It is possible to disappear and to only leave one's role. Others can appear to me as they really are, but they are also presented to me as hidden. Others can only show through themselves; they appear as a living sense, a sense that conserves or degrades itself.

In this entire analysis, we underline that the perception of others is the perception of a freedom that shows through a situation. We can only remark how much the perception of others becomes more and more

comparable to langúage. Indeed, there are both languages in danger of becoming stereotypical and fertile languages.

D. Language

We must now deepen our understanding of linguistic phenómena. What occupies us is not language properly speaking, but language as a phenomenon of communication. Such a language employs signs that follow rules that are not yet confirmed. The interlocutor, to the degree he understands, surpasses what he already knew, the meaning of a language is open. It expresses in communicating a movement of thought.

Logicians take constitution or objective language as fundamental. Also, for Piaget in *The Language and Thought of the Child,* we find that language is only the communication of an inert message that does not call the listener. But this underestimates every mode of communication of a poetic character. This prejudice in favor of objective language must be avoided. If we can show that language of things is not primary, but is founded on an expressive operation in which there is a call from me to the other, we will be able to provide more profound descriptions than the ones made previously. We will be able to discover the essential of the linguistic phenomenon. If we can show that the personal component of language is always present from the start, we will have been justified in our reference to language.

We will utilize the so-called structuralist conceptions of language insofar as they implicitly contribute to the philosophical intuitions that concern our subject. Structuralists have been concerned with a specific problem: the meaning of sound.[25] From the moment when the child begins to speak, we observe a phenomenon of *deflation.* We see many sounds disappear that were previously present. The child even eliminates certain elements of babbling that would be useful in the construction of language (for instance, the typical confusion between T and K). Still, the child retains some sounds that do not appear in his system, but remain marginal. He doesn't employ them unless he daydreams. Therefore, there is a kind of *segregation* that occurs as soon as the child is placed in a communicative attitude with others.

Numerous explanations of this phenomenon have been attempted, but they do not seem solid. For Jakobson, this kind of choice can only be explained by the fact that the sound becomes meaningful. The sound, from the moment it becomes a part of language, takes on a meaning insofar as it is part of a system of sonorous variations determined by definite principles. In order to differentiate one from the next, signs become significant (such as in Saussure's diacritical sounds).[26] The power

to structure signs appears as the foundation for the sign-signification relationship: not an external relationship, but one that refers back to the fundamental relationship between signs. The listener's thought follows the differentiations in the structure of language. By coinciding with that structure, thought passes from language to what it means.

The phoneme has only a diacritical function. Phonology stands below the level where the act of fundamental signification is realized. Indeed, the child integrates the internal differentiations of the language spoken around him. He is in a state of expectation about meanings that come about by an act that, we must note, is discontinuous. In idiomatic structure, the phoneme is the sound or opposition of sounds that is sufficient for distinguishing between two words. In German, for example, such an opposition exists between "R" and "L": *Rand* [border] and *Land* [land], *führen* [to lead] and *fühlen* [to feel]. In Japanese, *tsuru* has three meanings according to the relation between the first and second "U." Either it is acute or grave or both have the same pitch. The phonemic opposition is like a scale on which we play melodies that have silhouettes. The word becomes a drawing behind which there is a drawing hand.

Phonemes are not elements, pieces of speech. They are oppositional and distinctive principles that enter into the composition of all words but which remain organizational principles. The phoneme is a function and not a psychological atom; it is a structure. To claim that the sign is structuration is to claim that it is at the same time both meaning and sound. The signifier-signified is transformed into a relation between what I say here in space and what I say structurally. It also implies a perpetual reference to the institution of language.

Sometimes we employ this formula: language is neither produced nor perceived. It must preexist. We see here the necessity of distinguishing speech and language. Speech consists only in utterances; the fact that words are said in this order, in this cadence, and thus that language is not perceived but immediately used every time I speak. We could even compare language to the value of a monetary unit that has neither a physical reality nor a psychological reality, but rather an abstract and fictive size.

The authors of the structuralist school offer a general method that permits us to access every reality of language. They have attempted to reinterpret all the sciences of language in the same terms. This is not an attempt to reduce linguistics to phonology. However, the authors think that it is about two paths to access a singular structure of language. Jakobson speaks of reciprocal arousals [*suscitations*] of grammatical phenomena and phonemes. However, there is an autonomy in each order in the sense that the contribution of one to the other is efficacious only if the

change to the other order has been prepared. Each domain infringes upon the other.

This idea of structure is very rich. It implies that if we extend his way of approaching language to all language's reality, we are brought to generalize the sign-signification relationships. The process is the same for the relationships of thought and the language that expresses it (comparable relationships to those of wind and the lake's surface). There is no exterior coordination, but a reciprocal animation of one by the other.

In conclusion to this study, we will give some facts that have been illuminated by this research. The child's acquisition of language brings to light the loss of language; this is what makes us rejoin contemporary theories of aphasia. What is essential to aphasia is the shrinking or impoverishment of sounds which can be distinguished functionally. What counts is the insertion of the vocal utterance into the power of speaking. (Goldstein: "the word is emptied of its sense.") The word becomes empty when it ceases to be structured; it no longer has any distinctive linguistic value. Aphasia is the changing of the phonematic system's structure. There are different levels, but it is always the same power of symbolic formation that is the cause. The clinical distinction between aphasia and apraxia is understood as soon as the structural function is understood. Jakobson goes further in following the same idea. There is the possibility of understanding the modification of the universe of thought by the modification of language.

In the dream, for example, the phonological system loses its precision. Thus, there are alterations of the system that duplicate differentiations in thoughts. All the differences that Freud made between the first and second account amounted to the fact that the first account is inevitably inexact, since it recounts what was dreamed in an undifferentiated system. We can extend the same idea of structuration into the entire universe of thought.

Notes

All notes or additions to notes made by the translator in the lectures appear in brackets.

Translator's Introduction

1. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language,* trans. Hugh Silverman (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1979); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Experience of Others," trans. Fred Evans and Hugh J. Silverman, *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry* 18 (1982–83): 33–63.

2. Merleau-Ponty pays particular attention to Róheim, Mead, Kardiner, Linton, and Erikson.

3. This discussion will be familiar to readers of Merleau-Ponty's first book, *The Structure of Behavior,* published in 1942.

Lecture 1: Consciousness and Language Acquisition

Hugh Silverman translated this lecture previously as "Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language."

1. [Aphasia is the loss or impairment of the power to use words as symbols of ideas resulting from a brain lesion.]

2. [Stendhal, *The Charterhouse of Parma.*]

3. [Kurt Goldstein (1878–1965) was a neuropsychologist who greatly influenced Merleau-Ponty's critique of various "intellectualist" styles of psychology. Goldstein concerned himself with various breakdowns that occurred after serious brain damage due to injury or illness. Importantly, he studied not only the resulting disabilities, but the ability of the organism to reorganize and readjust itself after a trauma. This indicated to Merleau-Ponty that any attempt to localize and quantify abilities would fail to capture the organism's dynamic and spontaneous power of reorganization. For Goldstein on aphasia, see *Language and Language Disturbances* and *The Organism.*]

4. [Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics.*]

5. [Gustave Guillaume (1883–1960) was a French linguist who employed a phenomenological approach to language. See his *Foundations for a Science of Language.*]

6. [Jean de la Bruyère (1645–96) was a French essayist. His most celebrated work is the 1688 text *Caractères*.]

7. [Jean Paulhan (1884–1968) was a French writer, editor, and famed literary critic. He was the director of the *Nouvelle revue française* from 1925 to 1940 and 1946 to 1968. Among other authored books, he edited works by the Marquis de Sade with Maurice Blanchot. For this reference, see his *Jacob Cow le pirate*.]

8. [The psychologist Wolfgang Köhler (1887–1967) was one of the founders of the Gestalt school of psychology. Koffka and Köhler were the subjects of a series of influential experiments in 1912 conducted by Wertheimer. The findings led them to stress a holistic approach to perception in which psychological phenomena cannot be interpreted as combinations of discrete sensory givens. Köhler's work on primate intelligence was of particular importance to Merleau-Ponty in the Sorbonne lectures. See his *The Mentality of Apes*.]

9. [The psychologist Kurt Koffka (1886–1941) also helped found the school of Gestalt psychology. See his *The Growth of the Mind*.]

10. [Agnosia is the partial or complete loss of the ability to recognize familiar objects, especially by seeing, hearing, or touching, and is usually a result of brain damage.]

11. Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*.

12. [The German psychologist William Stern (1871–1938) developed a "personalistic psychology" based in part on Alfred Binet's studies of children's intelligence. He worked on ways to group individuals based on personality types and norms. See his *Psychology of Early Childhood*.]

13. [Henri Delacroix (1873–1937) was a French psychologist who studied with Henri Bergson and was influenced by the work of William James. He wrote on the psychology of religion as well as the study of language. See his *Le langage et la pensée* and *L'enfant et la langage*.]

14. [Edward Sapir (1884–1939) was an influential linguist-anthropologist trained by Franz Boas. His work on phonology is particularly renowned. See his *Language*.]

15. [Wilhelm Thierry Preyer (1841–87) was a professor of physiology at the University of Jena who introduced the experimental method and outlined developmental approaches to physiology. See his two volumes of *The Mind of the Child*.]

16. Grégoire, "L'apprentissage de la parole" and *L'apprentissage du langage*. [Grégoire was a Belgian linguist.]

17. [Paul Guillaume (1878–1962) was a French Gestalt psychologist. See his *Imitation in Children*.]

18. [Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) was a German philosopher and psychologist. He established the first experimental laboratory for experimental psychology. He is often called the "father of experimental psychology." See his *Principles of Physiological Psychology*.]

19. Bühler, *Sprachtheorie*. [Karl Bühler (1878–1963) was a speech psychologist and psychiatrist.]

20. Cassirer, "Le langage et la construction." [The whole issue has been republished as *Essais sur le langage*. Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945) was a neo-Kantian philosopher; his work on a philosophy of symbolic forms and his philosophy of culture is particularly renowned. See his *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*.]

21. Delacroix, *Le langage et la pensée*.

22. Stern, *Psychology*.

23. Keller, *The Story of My Life*. [The story where Helen Keller realizes the significance of the sign when feeling water being poured on her hand is on page 36.]

24. For instance, take the observations of Jean Piaget, most notably in his *The Child's Conception of the World*. [Jean Piaget held a professorship of child psychology at the Sorbonne from 1952 to 1963.]

25. [Carl Stumpf (1884–1936) was a German philosopher and psychologist who studied with Franz Brentano and was the *Habilitation* director of Edmund Husserl. Stumpf developed a descriptive psychology by carefully studying sense perception.]

26. [Alice Descoeudres (1877–1963) was an expert in child pedagogy; see her *Le développement de l'enfant*. For a text in English, see her *The Education of Mentally Defective Children*.]

27. [Joseph Vendryes (1875–1960) was a linguist who specialized in Celtic languages. See his *Language*.]

28. [Martha Muchow (1892–1933) was a German child psychologist and worked with William Stern. See her *Aus der Welt des Kindes*.]

29. [David Katz (1884–1953) was an experimental psychologist. See his and Rosa Katz's *Conversations with Children*.]

30. The study appeared in Sweden in 1941. See Jakobson, *Child Language*.

31. [Nikolai Trubetzkoy (1890–1938) was a Russian linguist and philosopher who helped found the Prague school of linguistics and greatly influenced the work of Roman Jakobson. See his *Introduction to the Principles of Phonological Description*.]

32. Trubetzkoy, *Introduction*.

33. See my course below, "Structure and Conflicts in Child Consciousness."

34. Bühler, *Sprachtheorie*.

35. Guillaume, *Imitation in Children*.

36. [Husserl, *Ideas: Second Book*, 270.]

37. [Finnbogason, *L'intelligence sympathique*. The book was published in 1913, but it is cited as being published in 1914.]

38. Husserl, "Fifth Cartesian Meditation."

39. [Husserl, "Fifth Cartesian Meditation," §50, 108–11.]

40. Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*.

41. [Proust, *In Search of Lost Time*.]

42. Alain, *Propos sur la peinture*. [Alain (1868–1951), né Emile August Chartier, was an influential French rationalist philosopher.]

43. Dumas and Ombredane, *Nouveau traité de psychologie.* [Georges Dumas was a psychologist and André Ombredane was a psychiatrist.]

44. [Wolff, "Selbstbeurteilung und Fremdbeurteilung."]

45. ["Logical positivism" is in English in the original.]

46. Malraux, *The Psychology of Art.* [André Malraux's (1901–76) diverse career included many authored books and a long political career, including being a minister of information under Charles de Gaulle.]

47. Piaget, *The Language and Thought of the Child.*

48. Diderot, *The Paradox of Acting.*

49. Sartre, *The Imaginary.*

50. [Lacan, "The Mirror Stage." Merleau-Ponty was one of the first to lecture on Lacan's work to a general university audience.]

51. Bühler, *Sprachtheorie.*

52. [Georges-Henri Luquet greatly influenced Merleau-Ponty's understanding of childhood drawing. In particular, he cites in the lectures Luquet's 1927 book *Children's Drawings.* Merleau-Ponty speaks extensively about childhood drawing in the lectures "Structure and Conflicts in Child Consciousness" and "Method in Child Psychology."]

53. [Piaget, *Language and Thought of the Child,* 99–103.]

54. ["The man I love" is in English in the original.]

55. [Maurice Blondel (1861–1949) was a French Catholic philosopher who wrote extensively on religion and philosophy. His work is often characterized as "new theology." See his *La pensée.*]

56. E. Minkowski, *Lived Time.* [Eugène Minkowski (1885–1972) was a psychopathologist whose innovative phenomenological analysis of schizophrenia emphasized the schizophrenic's lived experience.]

57. Lagache, *Les hallucinations verbales.* [Daniel Lagache (1903–72) was a French psychoanalyst and psychiatrist; the work mentioned here is largely a phenomenological analysis of verbal hallucinations.]

58. [See Merleau-Ponty's earlier (1945) famous discussion of phantom limbs in the chapter "The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology," pages 73–89 in *Phenomenology of Perception.*]

59. Gelb and Goldstein, "Über Farbennamenamnesie"; Hochheimer, "Analyse eines Seelenblinden." [Adhémar Gelb (1887–1936) was a colleague of Goldstein and himself a Gestalt psychologist. Wolfgang Hochheimer (1906–91), a German psychologist, was a student of Max Wertheimer, Gelb, and Goldstein.]

60. [Anarthria is the inability to articulate remembered words as a result of brain lesion. See Marie, *L'aphasia.* Pierre Marie (1853–1940) was a French neurologist.]

61. See Goldstein's article "L'analyse de l'aphasie et l'essence du langage" in the special issue of the 1933 *Journal de psychologie.* [This article has been reproduced on pages 259–330 in Goldstein's *Essais sur le langage.*]

62. Goldstein, *Language and Language Disturbances.*

63. ["Instrumentalities of speech" is in English in the original.]

64. ["*Innere Sprachform*" means "internal speech form." Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) was an extremely influential German philosopher and linguist who first made his mark as a diplomat. See his *Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development.*]

65. [Jespersen, *Language.* Jens Otto Jespersen (1860–1943) was a Danish linguist.]

66. ["Pas" is the second word (along with "ne") used to negate a verb. "I like you" is "je t'aime;" "I don't like you" is "je *ne* t'aime *pas.*" The noun "pas" also means footstep, stride, or gait.]

67. [Géza Révész (1878–1955) was a Dutch-Hungarian experimental psychologist. See *The Origins and Prehistory of Language.*]

68. [Vendryes, *Language.*]

69. [Aron, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History.* Raymond Aron (1905–83) was a French philosopher and sociologist.]

70. [A *semanteme* is a word that expresses a definite image or idea. A *morpheme* is a feature of language that shows the relations between nouns, verbs, adjectives, and concrete adverbs, and/or is a meaningful linguistic unit that contains no smaller meaningful parts.]

71. [Fula is a West African language.]

72. [The aorist is the past tense in Greek with an inflectional stem added to a tense stem.]

73. ["*À*" is typically translated as "to," "on," or "at."]

74. [In French, nouns have a gender—masculine or feminine.]

75. [A translation would be "gooseberry jam" or "gooseberries jam."]

76. [G. Guillaume, *Foundations.*]

77. [Vendryes, *Language.*]

78. [In the lectures, we find "*polyrésie,*" but surely it is "*polysémie.*" "Polysemy" means a multiplicity of meanings.]

79. [Merleau-Ponty uses the numerals 1900, but he is likely referring to different ways of stating the year, such as when we say "nineteen hundred and ten" versus "nineteen ten."]

80. [Vendryes, *Language.*]

81. [G. Guillaume, *Foundations.*]

82. [An isogloss is a boundary line between places or regions that differ in a particular linguistic feature, such as by dialect.]

83. [Ganser syndrome is a type of disorder where the patient gives wrong, but related, answers to questions about his or her symptoms that show the patient understands the question. But the patient is, on some level, refusing to or unable to reply correctly. The German psychiatrist Sigbert Ganser, after whom the disorder is named, considered it a kind of hysteria.]

84. [Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics.*]

85. [Michel Bréal (1832–1915) is considered to be the father of semantics. See his *The Beginnings of Semantics.*]

86. [G. Guillaume, *Foundations.*]

87. Bossuet, *Discours;* Hegel, *The Philosophy of History.* [Bossuet (1627–1704)

was a French bishop and theologian who argued, among other things, that kings received their right to rule from God.]

88. [In volume 1 of *Capital* Marx writes, "Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power," 824.]

89. [De Beauvoir, *The Second Sex.* De Beauvoir writes, "Woman is determined not by her hormones or by mysterious instincts, but by the manner in which her body and her relation to the world are modified through the action of others than herself," 725.]

Lecture 2: The Adult's View of the Child

1. Rauh, *L'expérience morale.* [Frédéric Rauh (1861–1909) was a professor of philosophy at Toulouse, the Sorbonne, and the École Normale Superieure. *L'expérience morale* focuses upon the idea of living experience as guiding moral intuition.]

2. [Merleau-Ponty could be referring to Descartes' discussion of freedom and God's power. For example, take his work in *Principles of Philosophy* where Descartes says: "We may attain sufficient knowledge of this power to perceive clearly and distinctly that God possesses it; but we cannot get a sufficient grasp of it to see how it leaves the free actions of men undetermined." Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy,* 206.]

3. Freud, *Totem and Taboo.*

4. Freud, *Moses and Monotheism.*

5. [Jung, *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious.*]

6. Politzer, *Critique;* Lacan, "The Family Complexes." [Georges Politzer (1903–42) was a Marxist philosopher who was greatly interested in psychology. His critical interpretation of psychoanalysis greatly influenced Merleau-Ponty's understanding of Freud. He was executed by the Nazis in 1942.]

7. Lacan, "The Mirror Stage."

8. Friedrich Engels, *The Origin of the Family.*

9. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right.*

10. [Hélène Deutsch (1884–1982) was an influential psychoanalyst who was analyzed by Freud and was one of his first disciples to concern herself specifically with the analysis of women.]

11. [Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* §§173–80.]

12. [Mrs. Mazzetti was an Italian-American single mother of several young children living in poverty. Deutsch describes how Mrs. Mazzetti invested her own frustrated ambitions onto her children, pushing them to extremely high standards. See Deutsch, *The Psychology of Women,* vol. 2, 298–302.]

13. Lévi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship.*

14. [Mme. Lefebvre killed her daughter-in-law, who was five and a half months pregnant. Marie Bonaparte (1882–1962) wrote an article about this case for the initial publication of the *Revue française de psychanalyse.* See Marie Bonaparte, "Le cas de Mme Lefebvre." Bonaparte, a psychoanalyst and the great-grandniece of Napoleon I, helped Freud flee Vienna in 1938.]

15. [Malinowski, *The Ethnography of Malinowski*. Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) was a widely influential Polish anthropologist. His ethnography on native peoples in Melanesia was some of the first to attempt to capture people in their everyday life: their culture, system of economic exchange, and their relationships.]

16. Lacan, "The Family Complexes."

17. Lacan, "La famille." in *Autres écrits* (Paris: Seuil, 2001) and "The Family Complexes."

18. [Lacan, "The Mirror Stage."]

19. Lacan, "Presentation on Psychical Causality."

20. [Klein, "Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict," 190.]

21. Freud, *Totem and Taboo.*

22. [De Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, 238–39.]

23. Simmons, *Sun Chief.* [*Sun Chief* is the autobiography of Don Talayesva, a Hopi from Orabi, Arizona. It was recorded in an extended series of interviews by Leo Simmons.]

24. [Psychasthenia is a psychological disorder characterized by phobias, obsessions, compulsions, or excessive anxiety. This term is no longer used by standard psychiatry.]

25. Malinowski, *The Ethnography of Malinowski.* [Mlle Grandjean must have been a student in the course.]

26. Malinowski, *The Sexual Life of Savages* and *Sex and Repression.*

27. [Ernest Jones (1878–1958) was a psychoanalyst, colleague, and biographer of Freud.]

28. Kroeber, "Totem and Taboo."

29. [Géza Róheim (1891–1953) was a Hungarian professor of anthropology whose work has a psychoanalytic focus. His fieldwork in central Australia was funded by Marie Bonaparte.]

30. [The famous anthropologist Margaret Mead (1901–78) greatly shaped Merleau-Ponty's work in the lectures. See lecture 7, "Method in Child Psychology."]

31. [Abram Kardiner (1891–1981) was an American physician, psychoanalyst, and culture theorist who, along with Ralph Linton, presented a theory of a basic personality structure.]

32. [Ralph Linton (1893–1953) was an American anthropologist who, along with Abram Kardiner, created the idea of a basic personality structure.]

33. [Erik Erikson (1902–94) was a developmental psychologist and psychoanalyst whose work on identity crises is particularly famous.]

34. [Wulf Sachs (1893–1949) was originally Russian but settled in South Africa as a psychoanalyst. His book *Black Hamlet* presented the idea of the universality of the Oedipus complex by analyzing a black South African.]

35. Balandier, "La collaboration de l'ethnologie et de la psychiatrie." [Georges Balandier (1920–) is a French anthropologist and sociologist. *Critique* is a monthly journal of book reviews started in 1946 by Georges Bataille. The article Merleau-Ponty refers to was not found.]

36. Benedict, *Patterns of Culture.* [Ruth Benedict (1887–1948) was an American anthropologist.]

37. Marx, *The German Ideology.*

38. [Cora Du Bois (1903–91) was an American anthropologist. See her *Social Forces in Southeast Asia.*]

39. Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers.*

40. [Rorschach tests are a method of investigating an individual's personality by presenting him or her with inkblots and asking for the individual's own interpretation.]

41. Guex, *La névrose d'abandon.* [Germaine Guex (1904–64) was a Swiss psychologist and psychoanalyst.]

42. [Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers.*]

43. Leighton and Kluckhohn, *Children of the People.* [Dorothea Leighton (1908–89) was an American medical anthropologist; Clyde Kluckhohn (1905–60) was an American cultural anthropologist.]

44. [Grace Arthur created a numerical scale for judging child intelligence nonverbally. The nonverbal tests were standardized in order to be a point of comparison with other verbal intelligence tests, and were intended to be used when language difficulties or speech or other defects were present. See Arthur, *A Point Scale of Performance Tests.* Florence Goodenough likewise created a measurement system to evaluate a child's intelligence nonverbally. Goodenough's 1926 text *Measurement of Intelligence by Drawings* standardized how to evaluate a child's intelligence by his or her ability to draw a man.]

45. [Projective tests are designed to test personality by presenting ambiguous stimuli. The most famous of these tests are the Rorschach inkblot tests. The T.A.T. test is the Thematic Apperception Test, where one is asked to provide a narrative to a series of ambiguous scenes of people. One analyzes the responses of projective tests by assuming that the responses help reveal issues that are largely unconscious to the subject.]

46. [J. L. (Jacob Levy) Moreno (1889–1974) was a Romanian-born psychiatrist who invented the practice of psychodrama and sociometry, a quantitative way to measure social relationships and psychological health.]

47. [Georges Gurvitch (1884–1965) was a French sociologist.]

48. [Nahum Shoobs was a psychodramatist and a teacher at a high school who focused particularly on the use of psychodrama in schools.]

49. [Mill, *A System of Logic.*]

50. [Brunschvicg, *L'expérience humaine.*]

51. [Sir Humphry Davy discovered and named potassium in 1807.]

52. [Marcel Mauss (1872–1950) was a French sociologist and anthropologist. See Mauss, *The Gift.*]

53. Gurvitch, "Microsociologie et sociométrie."

54. [Politzer, *Critique.*]

55. [Konstantin Stanislavsky (1863–1938) was a Russian theater director and actor who argued for acting to be more realistic and presented a rigorous system of training actors.]

Lecture 3: Structure and Conflicts in Child Consciousness

1. [Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939) was a French philosopher and sociologist who wrote notably on differences between "primitive" and Western mentality. See Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality.*]

2. [The psychologist Théodule Armand Ribot (1839–1916) brought the study of English and German psychology to France. He established the chair of experimental and comparative psychology at the Sorbonne and founded the influential *Revue philosophique.* See his *Diseases of the Will.*]

3. [Merleau-Ponty's first (written in 1938, published in 1942) book, *The Structure of Behavior,* deals extensively with the notion of structure.]

4. [Wang, "The Significance of Early Personal History."]

5. [Merleau-Ponty will refer to Henri Wallon more extensively below in this lecture in section VII: "The Child's Representation of the World."]

6. Politzer, *Critique.*

7. Dolto, "Cure psychoanalytique." [Françoise Dolto (1908–88) was a child psychoanalyst who worked with Jacques Lacan to help create the École freudienne de Paris.]

8. [Goldstein, *The Organism.*]

9. [Merleau-Ponty is referring to the studies conducted by the English neurologists John H. Jackson and Sir Henry Head. Jackson was one of the first to do functionalist studies of the cortex. Head, whose work Merleau-Ponty cites at length in *Phenomenology of Perception,* published many of the early major articles on the phenomenon of aphasia. See Head's *Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech.*]

10. [The Babinski reflex, also known as the Babinski sign, was discovered by the French neurologist J. F. F. Babinski. He found that it was possible to distinguish between organic and hysterical paralysis by observing the reactions of the toes when the sole was stimulated.]

11. Piaget, *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child.*

12. P. Guillaume, "Le développement du langage."

13. [Claparède, *Experimental Pedagogy.* Edouard Claparède (1873–1940) was a child psychologist.]

14. [Koffka, *The Growth of the Mind.*]

15. [Piéron, "Le problème du mécanisme physiologique"; "L'analyse des temps de reaction." Henri Piéron (1881–1964) was a French scientist who worked on neurochemical explanations of behavior, in particular, the study of sleep.]

16. D. Katz, *The World of Touch;* "Structure du monde du toucher."

17. [Goldstein, "Zur Problem der Wirkung."]

18. Déjean, *Étude psychologique; Les conditions objectives.*

19. [Tabes is the wasting that accompanies a chronic disease; ataxia is an inability to coordinate voluntary muscular movements that is symptomatic of some nervous disorders.]

20. [Merleau-Ponty wrote extensively about the role of spatial perception and habitual action in the *Phenomenology of Perception.* In particular, see chapter 3, "The Spatiality of One's Own Body and Motility," 98–147.]

21. [P. Guillaume and Meyerson, "Recherches sur l'usage."]

22. [The following remark on the future structure of the course was inserted. Since the course does not take this projected path, I have removed it from the main text of the translation:]

Plan: Part One: Structure of Child Consciousness (Study of the Child's Relations with Nature)
   a) The child's perception of the world
   b) Magic, symbolism, games, oneiric (species, causality, thing).
   c) Representation of the world: animalism, "artificialism," "realism"

Part Two: Conflicts of Child Consciousness (Relations with Surroundings)
   a) Sexuality
   b) Study of the child's relations with others
   c) Socialization of the child

Conclusion: Situation of the Child in Relation to the Adult

23. [Piaget, The Child's Conception of the World.]

24. P. Guillaume, "L'intelligence sensori-motrice."

25. [Leibniz, "Preface" in *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, 41–63; and "On the Method" in *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 363–66.]

26. Koffka, *The Growth of the Mind.*

27. Goethe, *Goethe's Theory of Colours.*

28. [Wertheimer, "Experimental Studies on the Seeing of Motion."]

29. P. Guillaume, *Psychologie de la forme.*

30. Meili and Tobler, "Les mouvements stroboscopiques."

31. P. Guillaume, "L'intelligence sensori-motrice."

32. Meili, "Les perceptions des enfants."

33. Koffka. "Psychologie."

34. Goldstein, *The Organism.*

35. [Michotte, *The Perception of Causality.*]

36. Piaget et al., "Introduction à l'étude."

37. [Likely Merleau-Ponty is at least referring to a piece by Piaget, Albertini, and Rossi: "Essai d'interprétation probabiliste."]

38. [Merleau-Ponty is referring to Delboeuf's illusion: the inner of two concentric circles is compared with a series of independent circles to determine the error of estimating the size of the inner circle when the circumference of the outer concentric circle is varied systematically.]

39. Wertheimer, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Gestalttheorie.*

40. Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes.*

41. [A tachistoscope is an apparatus for presenting visual stimuli for a short and carefully timed period. Most tachistoscopes operate either on a shutter system like that of a camera, or on a principle of selective illumination.]

42. [Claparède, *Experimental Pedagogy.*]

43. [Here is missing the February 2, 1950, course notes on the subjects of constancy of size and constancy of colors.]

44. Michotte, *The Perception of Causality.*

45. Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.*

46. [See Merleau-Ponty's 1947–48 lectures on Malebranche, Maine de Biran, and Bergson. See Merleau-Ponty, *The Incarnate Subject.* See also Merleau-Ponty's reading of Hume in "The Primacy of Perception," 12–42.]

47. Lewin, "Kriegslandschaft." [Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) was a German psychologist considered to be the founder of modern social psychology.]

48. [Maine de Biran (1766–1824) was a French philosopher who is rarely read in English language philosophy. He was greatly influenced by Locke's empiricism, and his most discussed work is his theory of habit. See his *Influence de l'habitude sur la faculté de penser.*]

49. [Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 213–66.]

50. Read, *Education Through Art.* [Herbert Read (1898–1968) was a poet, literary and art critic, and essayist.]

51. [Prudhommeau, *Le dessin de l'enfant.*]

52. Luquet, *Children's Drawings.*

53. [René Zazzo (1910–95) was a French child psychologist.]

54. [Épinal images were popular prints, often sold by peddlers, notably produced in the town of Épinal in northeastern France in the nineteenth century. The prints are brightly colored and primitive in style. Many include words and images together.]

55. [The lecture notes cite an article by Kurt Lewin entitled "Über die Nicht-Existenz der Aufmerksamkeit" ("The Nonexistence of Attention") that was to have appeared in *Psychologishche Forschung.* However, no such article can be found. For Lewin's theory in English, see his *Field Theory in Social Science.*]

56. [One can see a later interpretation of photography in Merleau-Ponty's "Eye and Mind" in *The Primacy of Perception,* 159–92.]

57. See the discussion of Meili and Tobler above.

58. Prudhommeau, *Le dessin de l'enfant.*

59. Goldstein and Rosenthal, "Zum Problem der Wirkung."]

60. [Bachelard, *Psychoanalysis of Fire,* 12.]

61. [See Jean-Paul Sartre's discussion of honey in *Being and Nothingness,* 776–77.]

62. [Sartre, *Being and Nothingness,* 769.]

63. [Francis Ponge (1899–1988) was a French poet and essayist. See his *The Nature of Things.*]

64. F. Minkowski, *De Van Gogh et Seurat; Van Gogh, sa via, sa maladie et son oeuvre;* Prinzhorn, *Artistry of the Mentally Ill.* [Françoise Minkowski was a French psychiatrist and psychologist. Her husband was Eugène Minkowski and their son, Alexandre Minkowski, was also a celebrated child psychiatrist. Hans Prinzhorn (1886–1933) was a German psychiatrist and art theoretician whose text including art from the mentally ill was particularly influential.]

65. Morgenstern, *Psychanalyse infantile.* [Sophie Morgenstern (1875–1930) was a French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst who especially focused on the psychoanalysis of children.]

66. [Politzer, *Critique.*]

67. [Taine, *On Intelligence.* Hippolyte Taine (1828–93) was a highly influ-

ential French theorist who wrote on art, politics, literature, history, psychology, and sociology.]

68. [Engrams, or memory traces, are hypothetical changes in neural tissue postulated in order to account for the persistence of memory.]

69. Piéron, *Thought and the Brain.*

70. Alain, *Système des beaux-arts.*

71. [Sartre, *The Imaginary.* See also Merleau-Ponty's review of Sartre's text in 1932. Merleau-Ponty, "On Sartre's Imagination," 108–14.]

72. [Pierre Janet (1859–1947) was a French psychiatrist and psychologist. Janet called for an integration of medicine and psychology, drawing attention to the psychological underpinnings of various symptoms.]

73. [Lewin, "Psychoanalysis and Topological Psychology," 67–74.]

74. Sartre, *The Emotions.*

75. Cf. Alain, "man is a sorcerer for man."

76. Sartre, *The Imaginary.*

77. Guex, *Névrose d'abandon.*

78. Cf. when Gilberte first meets the young girls [Proust, *In Search of Lost Time,* vol. 2.]

79. Piaget, *Play, Dreams and Imitation.*

80. Wallon, *Les origines de la pensée.* [Along with Piaget and Freud, Henri Wallon (1879–1962) remains one of the most influential figures in French child psychology.]

81. Piaget, *The Child's Conception of Physical Causality;* I. Huang, "Children's Explanations of Strange Phenomena."

82. [Raspe, "Kindliche Selbstbeobachtung und Theoriebildung."]

83. [Wallon, *Les origins de la pensée.*]

Lecture 4: Child Psycho-Sociology

1. P. Guillaume, *La formation des habitudes.*

2. [Merleau-Ponty could be referring to Noah Webster (1758–1843), who had a theory of learning language. He was particularly famous for his attempts at spelling reform. See Shoemaker, *Noah Webster.*]

3. [Wertheimer, *Productive Thinking.*]

4. [Merleau-Ponty talks at length about Moreno's work in lecture 2, "The Adult's View of the Child."]

5. [Descartes, "Second Meditation," in *Meditations on First Philosophy,* 30.]

6. [Descartes, *Optics.*]

7. [Malebranche, *The Search After Truth,* 35.]

8. [Merleau-Ponty could be referring to Kant in the "Transcendental Deduction," where Kant distinguishes between the thing-in-itself and appearance. The appearance, however, is not just a mass of sensations but a perception that is always already subject to the categories and hence to the transcendental apperception (unlike a mere mass of sensations). See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* §§13–27, 141–203.]

9. [Alain, *Éléments de philosophie.*]

10. Wolfgang Köhler, "Über unbermerkte Empfindungen."

11. [Bergson, *Matter and Memory.*]

12. [Husserl, *Logical Investigations,* vol. 2.]

13. [The Würzburg school was led by the psychologist Oswald Külpe (1862–1915). Formerly positivist in their leanings, the Würzburg experimenters found how many aspects of thought differ from sensations and discussed a purposiveness to thinking.]

14. ["Hypothetico-deductive" means relating to the scientific method in which hypotheses suggested by the facts of observation are proposed and consequences deduced from them so as to test the hypotheses and evaluate the consequences.]

15. [Montaigne, *The Complete Essays,* 818–19.]

16. Piaget, *Psychology of Intelligence.*

17. Piaget, *Psychology of Intelligence.*

18. [Piaget et al., "Introduction à l'étude."]

19. [Claparède, *Experimental Pedagogy.*]

20. [Ewald Hering (1834–1918) was a German physiologist and psychologist who studied the phenomenon of color perception. He argued against purely physicalist views on color perception. See his *Outlines of a Theory of the Light Sense.*]

21. Katz, *The World of Touch.*

22. P. Guillaume, "L'intelligence sensori-motrice"; "L'intelligence et la perception."

23. [Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes.*]

24. Gurwitsch, "Le fonctionnement de l'organisme d'après K. Goldstein." [Aron Gurwitsch (1901–73) was a philosopher and psychologist who was inspired by Edmund Husserl and Gestalt theory to develop a phenomenological psychology.]

25. Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Theory.*

26. Déjean, *Les conditions objectives de la perception visuelle.*

27. Piéron, *Thought and the Brain.*

28. [Johannes von Allesch was an early Gestalt psychologist.]

29. [Chevalier, *L'habitude.* Jacques Chevalier was a French philosopher.]

30. P. Guillaume, *La formation des habitudes.*

31. Wertheimer, *Productive Thinking.*

32. See the analogous thesis of Edmond Goblot in *Traité de logique.* [Edmond Goblot (1858–1935) was a French logician, philosopher, and sociologist.]

33. [Wertheimer cites the story of the mathematician Gauss, who as a young boy was given this long sum of numbers and quickly deduced the answer. See *Productive Thinking,* 109–10.]

34. Gurwitsch, "Goldstein's Conception of Biological Science," 69–88.

35. [Goblot, *Traité de logique.*]

36. [Although the lectures say Dr. "K" Stern, Merleau-Ponty is likely referring to the educational psychologist Dr. Catherine Stern. She was an assistant of Wertheimer when he was at the New School in New York. See Stern, *Children Discover Arithmetic.*]

37. [Marx and Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," 500.]

38. [See Deutsch, *The Psychology of Women*.]

39. [De Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*.]

40. Freud, "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex."

41. Malraux, *The Psychology of Art*.

42. Mead, *Male and Female*.

43. [Deutsch, *The Psychology of Women*.]

44. [Perseveration is the uncontrollable repetition of a particular response, such as a word, phrase, or gesture, despite the absence or cessation of a stimulus.]

45. Deutsch, *The Psychology of Women*, vol. 1, 100–101.

46. [Hélène Deutsch refers to the Russian painter and princess Maria Bashkirtseff's life through her *Journal of a Young Artist* in *The Psychology of Women*, vol. 1, 97. See also Bashkirtseff, *Journal of a Young Artist*.]

47. Deutsch, *The Psychology of Women*, vol. 1, 105.

48. Deutsch, *The Psychology of Women*, vol. 1, 138.

49. [Wallon, *Les origines de la pensée*.]

50. [See lecture 1, "Consciousness and Language Acquisition."]

51. [Goldstein, *Language and Language Disturbances*.]

52. Deutsch, *The Psychology of Women*, vol. 1, 222.

53. Wallon, *De l'acte à la pensée*.

54. Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo* and *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*.

55. [No record of a work by Elsa Róheim could be found. Merleau-Ponty does refer above to the work of the psychoanalytic anthropologist Géza Róheim.]

56. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion; Civilization and Its Discontents*.

57. Jones, "The Island of Ireland," 95–112.

58. [No reference to a Kissling in England on traitors was found.]

59. Odier, "Le complex du petit profit."

60. [Fromm, *Greatness and Limitations of Freud's Thought*.]

61. Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*; Fromm, "Conditionnement social de la thérapeutique analyste." [This article or book by Fromm could not be located; see Erich Fromm, "Über Methode und Aufgabe einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 1 (1932): 28–54.]

62. [Roger Bastide (1898–1974) was a French psychologist and anthropologist. He wrote on race relations, the sociology of mental illness, and applied anthropology. See Bastide, *Les problèmes de la vie mystique*.]

63. Mauss, "Rapports réels et pratiques de la psychologie et de la sociologie."

64. [Thanatomania is death by suggestion or a suicidal mania.]

65. Head, *Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech*.

66. Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers*.

67. Dufrenne, *La personnalité de base*. [Mikel Dufrenne (1910–95) was a French existentialist philosopher.]

68. Lévi-Strauss, "Introduction à l'oeuvre de Marcel Mauss" in Mauss, *Sociologie et anthropologie*, ix–lii.

69. Mauss, *Sociologie et anthropologie*, 26.

70. Mauss, *Sociologie et anthropologie*, 27.

71. Mauss, *Sociologie et anthropologie*, 30.
72. [Erikson, *Elements of a Psychoanalytic Theory*.]
73. [Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*.]

Lecture 5: The Child's Relations with Others

William Cobb translated part of this lecture as "The Child's Relations with Others" in *The Primacy of Perception*.
1. [Luquet, *Children's Drawings*.]
2. [See lecture 1, "Consciousness and Language Acquisition."]
3. Frenkel-Brunswik, "Intolerance of Ambiguity." [The child psychologist Else Frenkel-Brunswik's (1908–58) article on ambiguity was very influential, spurring many to investigate how prejudice and difficulties in processing perceptual ambiguities are related.]
4. [Klein, "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States," 287–88.]
5. Rostand, "Grammaire et affectivité."
6. P. Guillaume, *Imitation in Children*.
7. P. Guillaume, *La formation des habitudes*.
8. Wallon, *Les origins du caractère*.
9. [Stern, *Psychology*.]
10. [Myelination is the acquiring of a medullary sheath, which is the layer of myelin surrounding a medullated nerve fiber.]
11. [Wallon discusses this example in *Les origins du caractère*, 218–19.]
12. Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes*.
13. [Autoscopy is a visual hallucination of one's body image.]
14. [Apraxia is the loss or impairment of the ability to execute movements (as in manipulating objects) without any muscular paralysis.]
15. Lagache, *Les hallucinations verbales*.
16. Lacan, "The Mirror Stage."
17. Lacan, "The Mirror Stage," 76.
18. Bühler, Hetzer, and Tudor-Hart, *Soziologische und psychologische Studien*. [Merleau-Ponty refers to a French translation, *Étude sociologique et psychologique de la première année*. Charlotte Bühler (1893–1974) was a German child psychologist who worked on a theory of a "core self." Her husband was Karl Bühler.]
19. [See Hegel's master-slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 111–19.]
20. E. Köhler, *Die Persönlichkeit*.
21. [See lecture 3, "Structure and Conflicts in Child Consciousness."]
22. E. Köhler, *Die Persönlichkeit*.
23. Wallon, "La maladresse."
24. [Here Merleau-Ponty writes "id" in three languages, "*le Ça*" (French), "*das Es*" (German), and "the Id."]
25. Freud, *Essais de psychanalyse*. [This discussion probably is referring to *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.]

26. Freud, *Three Essays.*

27. Freud, *Essais de psychanalyse.*

28. A. Freud, *The Psychoanalytical Treatment.*

29. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* and *The Ego and the Id.*

30. [A. Freud, *The Psychoanalytical Treatment of Children.*]

31. Glover, "The Significance of the Mouth in Psychoanalysis"; Abraham, *Psychoanalytische Studien.*

32. [Harpagon is the lead character in Molière's play *The Miser.*]

33. [Klein, *The Psychoanalysis of Children.*]

34. [A. Freud, *The Psychoanalytical Treatment.*]

35. [The conflict between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein is the "ego psychology" (Anna Freud) versus "object relations theory" (Melanie Klein) debate. Merleau-Ponty is referring to the "Controversial Discussions" that the British Psycho-Analytical Society held between 1941 and 1946 on these two debating theories. See King and Steiner, *The Freud-Klein Controversies.*]

36. Guex, *La névrose d'abandon.*

37. Klein, *Contributions to Psychoanalysis.*

38. Klein, *Contributions to Psychoanalysis,* 379; *The Psychoanalysis of Children,* 189.

39. Klein, *The Psychoanalysis of Children,* 208.

40. Klein, *Contributions to Psychoanalysis.*

41. Klein, *The Psychoanalysis of Children,* 179.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 190.

44. Klein, *Contributions to Psychoanalysis,* 378.

45. Klein, *The Psychoanalysis of Children,* 283.

46. Klein, *Contributions to Psychoanalysis,* 367–77.

47. Glover, "Examination of the Klein System."

48. [Abraham, *Psychoanalytische Studien.*]

49. Klein et al., *Developments in Psycho-Analysis.* [Paula Heimann (1899–1982) was a psychoanalyst who worked with Melanie Klein.]

50. [Lewin, "Psychoanalysis and Topological Psychology."]

51. Spitz, "Hospitalism"; "Hospitalism: A Follow-up Report"; A. Freud and Burlingham, *Infants Without Families.*

52. ["Nursery" and "Foundling Home" are in English in the original.]

53. [Hetzer and Wolf, "Baby Tests."]

54. Isaacs, *Social Development of Young Children.* [Susan Isaacs (1885–1948) was a psychoanalyst who focused on child development and wrote much about nursery school education.]

55. [Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.*]

56. Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers.*

57. [The Porteus test (or Porteus Maze Test) was developed by the psychologist Stanley Porteus (1883–1972) to test intelligence nonverbally. The test is to draw a line through increasingly complicated mazes.]

58. Mead, *Male and Female; Coming of Age in Samoa; Growing Up in New Guinea; Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies.*

59. [Lewin, *Field Theory in Social Science.*]

60. ["Boarding school" is in English in the original.]

61. [Mead, "The Mountain-Dwelling Arapesh," in *Sex and Temperament,* 3–165.]

62. [Mead, "The Lake-Dwelling Tchambuli," in *Sex and Temperament,* 237–75.]

63. [Mead, *Growing Up in New Guinea.*]

64. [Mead, "The River-Dwelling Mundugumor," in *Sex and Temperament,* 167–236.]

65. [Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa.*]

66. [Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers.*]

Lecture 6: Human Sciences and Phenomenology

John Wild translated part of this lecture as "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man" in *The Primacy of Perception.*

1. See the special 1949 issue of the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* dedicated to the revision of the fundamental notions of physics of Le Roy, Poincaré, and Duhem.

2. [Husserl, "Philosophy of Arithmetic," 56–11.]

3. Husserl, *The Crisis.* [Merleau-Ponty writes "Belgrade," but in actuality Husserl gave the lectures that formed the basis for *The Crisis* in Vienna and Prague in 1935.]

4. Jaspers, *General Psychopathology;* E. Minkowski, *L'évolution psychiatrique.* [Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) was an influential German psychologist and philosopher.]

5. [Husserl, *Ideas,* §§51, 58, 79.]

6. Husserl, *Ideas: Second Book.*

7. [Husserl, *The Crisis,* §9.]

8. [Sartre, *The Emotions.*]

9. Janet, *De l'angoisse à l'extase.*

10. [Husserl, *The Crisis,* §9.]

11. Brunschvicg, *L'expérience humaine.*

12. [Goldstein, *The Organism.*]

13. [The German reads "Afterword to My *Ideas,*" which is translated as a preface in Husserl's *Ideas,* 5–22.]

14. Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," 71–147.

15. Husserl, *Logical Investigations,* vol. 2, 493–529.

16. Pos, "Phénoménologie et linguistique."

17. [Vendryes, *Language.*]

18. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic.*

19. Husserl, "The Origin of Geometry." [Edmund Husserl's "Origin of Geometry" had appeared in the 1939 *Revue internationale de philosophie.* Merleau-Ponty was very familiar with the entire contents of this journal (which included articles by Eugen Fink, Jan Patocka, and Ludwig Landgrebe).]

20. [Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) was a German philosopher who is most noted for his theory of heurmenutics which greatly influenced early Heidegger. See his *Selected Works, Volume I: Introduction to the Human Sciences.*]

21. Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mythology*. [For the letter Husserl wrote to Lévy-Bruhl, see Husserl's *Briefwechsel.*]

22. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic.*

23. Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy.*

24. Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics.*

25. Heidegger, *Being and Time,* 29.

26. ["Élan vital" is a fairly untranslatable term typically left in French. It means something like "vital momentum."]

27. Bergson, *Creative Evolution; The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.*

28. [Politzer, *La fin d'une parade philosophique.*]

29. Watson, *Behaviorism.*

30. [Tolman, *Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men.* Edward Tolman (1886–1959) was an American behaviorist who critiqued Watson and B. F. Skinner for their more radical behaviorist views.]

31. René Descartes, *Optics.*

32. [Katz, *The World of Color.*]

33. [See Merleau-Ponty's posthumously published discussion of red in "The Intertwining—The Chiasm," in *The Visible and the Invisible,* 131–32.]

34. ["Daltonian" refers to the theory of John Dalton (1766–1844), an English chemist and physicist who worked on atomic theory and color blindness. Merleau-Ponty is likely using the term "Daltonian" to refer to people with color blindness.]

35. Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science."

36. Goldstein, *The Organism; La structure de l'organisme.*

37. [Head, *Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech.*]

38. [Hemianopsia is the loss of half of one's visual field.]

39. [Fuchs, "Eine Pseudofovea bei Hemianopikern."]

40. [Stein, "Pathologie der Wahrnehmung."]

41. Pavlov, *Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes.*

42. Piéron, "L'attention, l'habitude et la mémoire."

43. [Von Monakow, "Die Syneidesis, das biologische Gewissen."]

Lecture 7: Method in Child Psychology

1. [Valéry, "Literature," in *Selected Writings of Paul Valéry,* 119–42.]

2. Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality.*

3. Mannoni, *Prospero and Caliban.*

4. [Ribot, *Diseases of Personality.*]

5. [Charles Blondel wrote an influential book on Proust and psychology. See his *La psychographie de Marcel Proust.*]

6. [E. Minkowski, *Lived Time.*]

7. [Taine, *On Intelligence.*]

8. [Freud, *Three Essays.*]

9. [Lévi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship.*]

10. [See Stendhal, "Concerning the Education of Women," 151.]

11. [Moreno, *Psychodrama.* See also lecture 2, "The Adult's View of the Child."]

12. [Lagache, *Les hallucinations verbales.*]

13. [Wallon, *Les origines de la pensée.*]

14. Piaget, "Recherches sur le développement des perceptions."

15. [Luquet, *Children's Drawings.*]

16. [Lewin, "The Conflict Between Aristotelian and Galilean Modes of Thought in Contemporary Psychology," in *The Complete Social Scientist: A Kurt Lewin Reader,* 37–66.]

17. [Alfred Binet and Théodore Simon created a famous test that measured intelligence in children. See Binet, *The Development of Intelligence in Children.*]

18. [Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers.*]

19. [Poincaré, *Science and Method.*]

20. [Husserl, *The Crisis,* §9.]

21. P. Guillaume, *Introduction à la psychologie.*

22. Mead, *Male and Female.*

23. Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers,* 101–70.

24. [Mead, "The Mountain-Dwelling Arapesh."]

25. [Mead, The Lake-Dwelling Tchambuli."]

26. [Mead, *Growing up in New Guinea.*]

27. [Mead, "The River-Dwelling Mundugumor."]

28. [Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa.*]

29. [Hall, *Morale, the Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct.* G. Stanley Hall (1844–1924) worked in both child psychology and pedagogy.]

30. [De Beauvoir, *The Second Sex.*]

31. [Hélène Deutsch, *The Psychology of Women.*]

32. [Merleau-Ponty refers to Stendhal's *Lamiel* in a number of places, most notably at the end of "Eye and Mind."]

33. Deutsch, *The Psychology of Women,* vol. 1.

34. [Piaget, *The Child's Conception of Physical Causality.*]

35. [Plato, *Republic,* book 7, 523b–24c.]

36. Huang, "Children's Explanation of Strange Phenomena."

37. [The words in quotation marks are in English in the French text.]

38. [See also lecture 3, "Structure and Conflicts in Child Consciousness."]

39. Luquet, *Children's Drawings.*

40. As a proof, consider the "graphic puns" of children.

41. Luquet, *Children's Drawings.*

42. "Sfumato" (spiritual smoke): perspectives of the plumes of smoke that trace the complicated curls of the opposition between clarity and obscurity.

43. Prudhommeau, *Le dessin de l'enfant.*

44. [Bachelard, *Water and Dreams; Air and Dreams.*]

45. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness,* 776–77.

46. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness,* 769.

47. [A mille-feuille (thousand leaves) cake is typically a sweet pastry made with multiple layers of puffy pastry.]

48. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Situations I.*

49. [F. Minkowski, *De Van Gogh et Seurat.*]

50. P. Guillaume, *Imitation in Children.*

51. [Wertheimer, *Productive Thinking.*]

52. Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes.*

53. ["Fittingness" is in English in the text.]

54. ["Insight" is in English in the text.]

Lecture 8: The Experience of Others

Fred Evans and Hugh Silverman translated this lecture previously as "The Experience of Others."

1. Jules Lagneau, *Célèbres leçons et fragments.* [Jules Lagneau (1851–94) was a French philosopher who influenced, among others, Alain.]

2. [Heidegger, *Being and Time,* §16.]

3. [Erwin Panofsky (1892–1968) was an art historian who is famed for his spread of the study of iconography.]

4. [Malraux, *The Psychology of Art.*]

5. Sartre, *The Imaginary.*

6. Arnheim, "Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen." [Rudolf Arnheim (1904–2007) was famous for his work in art theory, including the study of film.]

7. Dumas and Ombredane, *Nouveau traité de psychologie.*

8. [The French refers to two Russian film directors "Kandowski" and "Ivan Manchoukine." Given the context, Merleau-Ponty is likely referring to Lev Kuleshov and Ivan Mozzhukhin. However, the name "Kandowski" was so dissimilar from Kuleshov that I have left it as is.]

9. [Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology.*]

10. Wolff, "Selbstbeurteilung und Fremdbeurteilung."

11. [This reference could not be located.]

12. Goldstein, "Über Zeigen und Greifen."

13. Klages, *Vom Wesen des Bewußtseins.*

14. Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals.*

15. [Louis Pierre Gratiolet (1815–65) was a French scientist who specialized in anatomical research. Along with Paul Broca, he was an early researcher into aphasia. See his *De la physiognomie et des mouvements d'expression.*]

16. [Guillaume-Benjamin Duchenne de Boulogne (1806–75) was a French neurologist who was the first to describe several nervous and muscular disorders and, in developing medical treatment for them, he created electrodiagnosis and electrotherapy.]

17. Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics.*

18. Mauss, *Sociologie et anthropologie.*

19. Granet, "Le langage de la douleur."

20. Sartre, *The Imaginary.*

21. Berthot, "Actes du personnage."

22. [Moreno, *Psychodrama.*]

23. [Alain, *Les passions et la sagesse.*]

24. [Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 480.]

25. Jakobson, *Child Language.*

26. [Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics.*]

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Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), along with Sartre, introduced phenomenology to France. He held the Chair of Child Psychology and Pedagogy at the Sorbonne from 1949 to 1952. He then became a professor of philosophy at the Collège de France.

Talia Welsh is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.