Revolutions and the Collapse of Monarchy

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Human Agency and the Making of Revolution in France, Russia, and Iran

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I.B. TAURIS
LONDON · NEW YORK

Published in 2007 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd
6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU
175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010
www.ibtauris.com

In the United States of America and Canada distributed by
Palgrave Macmillan a division of St. Martin's Press
175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010

International Library of Historical Studies 42

ISBN 978 1 84511 292 9

A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

Library of Congress catalog card: available

Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall
camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

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PREFACE

My great interest in revolution emerged when as a boy I saw demonstrations in the turbulent period leading to the overthrow of 'The Shah', Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran and Light of the Aryans. The Iranian Revolution questioned many of the assumptions underpinning approaches to the study of revolution. When the revolution began, the Pahlavi state did not face financial collapse, a serious economic crisis, or defeat in war. A movement headed by religious clerics overthrew a 'modernizing' monarch whose army and repressive capacity remained intact. The French and Russian Revolutions stressed forms of universalistic modernity whilst the Iranian Revolution seemingly rejected them.

My study of the Iranian Revolution led to the examination of other great revolutions of the modern era and of general theories of revolution. The structure-human agency debate caught my attention. I noticed that within the human agency approach the role of the revolutionary leader, such as Lenin, and the role of societal classes, such as workers or peasants, had been systematically and/or in comparative terms examined. The role of the monarch remained on the periphery, reduced to undeserved secondary importance. Many structural approaches focus on the role and the actions of the state in the 'coming' of revolution without examining the pivot of that state, the monarch. Given this omission, it seemed that these approaches to revolution were incomplete and thereby unable to explain the occurrence and timing of the disintegration of the monarchical regimes in France, Russia, and Iran.

This book is a comparative study of the implosion of the monarchical states in Bourbon France, Romanov Russia and Pahlavi Iran which culminated in three of the great revolutions of modern time. The main aim is to determine the extent to which King Louis XVI, Tsar Nicholas II, and Mohammad Reza Shah made revolution in their respective countries. It follows that this book offers an alternative and, in some cases, complimentary, explanation to existing theories of revolution that focus on structural and impersonal causes of revolution. The overall approach of the book is that of interpretative political, comparative, and international history, centred on general theories of revolution and historical explanations of revolution.

What is new about this approach is the analysis in a comparative framework of the overall modus operandi of these three men and its impact on the effectiveness

of government. The modus operandi of Louis XVI, Nicholas II and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi shared certain characteristics which together created a hole in the centre of the government. It was this hole that paralysed the government and thereby made revolution. This book is not an attempt to explain revolution in terms of human agency alone or to deny the work done on the structural causes of revolution. Rather I attempt to integrate the modus operandi and idiosyncrasies of the monarchs and monarchical states with structural variables in order to determine the extent to which each of these men made revolution. In other words, I do not aim to present a theory of revolution based on human agency. Moreover, arguing for the systematic attention to the role of monarchs in revolution does not mean that the personality of the monarch of necessity was of equal importance in all cases of the overthrow of royal regimes.

This book has three new dimensions in regard to the study of revolution. Firstly, no comparison of the implosion of the French, Russian, and Iranian monarchical states has been undertaken. Secondly, a new structural element is added. It focuses on the monarchical institutions and their functioning as a potential cause of revolution, an issue to which previous structural approaches paid scant attention, in part for the important reason that very few political scientists are interested in the structure of old regimes. Thirdly, as mentioned above, the book's aim is to determine the extent to which each of these men made revolution. The systematic analysis of monarchs' modus operandi has not been fashionable, regarded as the study of unimportant elements in an ineluctable movement towards revolution and 'progress.'

This book grew out of a doctoral dissertation completed in the Government Department at the London School of Economics and Political Science. This labour of love would not have been possible without the help, guidance, and support of many people to whom I offer my deepest thanks. Specifically I enjoyed a great deal of intellectual (as well as personal) support from Mohsen Milani, Mahmoud Rasekh, Mohammad Reza Saleh-Nejad, Jubin Goodarzi, and Fred Halliday. Special thanks to Dominic Lieven, a dedicated PhD supervisor. I would also like to thank Sergei Spiridonov, Sasha Samolenko, Natasha Chapytkova, Irina Shulakovskaya, Georg Kleine, John Belohlavek, Larissa Nikolaevna, Roxana Djalili, Gordon and Angela Hamme, Linda Trautman, Razmik Panossian, Gwen Sasse and Massoud Jenabzade. Finally, thanks to my family and especially to my parents, Mohammad and Kathryn Shakibi to whom this book is dedicated, for their love and support.

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REVOLUTION: STRUCTURE AND HUMAN AGENCY

For my part I hate all those absolute systems that
make all the events of history depend on great first causes
linked together by the chain of fate and thus succeed, so to speak,
in banishing men from the history of the human race.
Alexis de Tocqueville

We are the pawns, and Heaven is the player:
...We move about the chessboard of the world.
Then drop into the casket of the void.
Omar Khayyam

Louis XVI, King of France and Navarre, Nicholas II, Tsar and Autocrat of all the Russias, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran and Light of the Aryans, have gone down in history as ill-fated men destined to watch helplessly as a revolutionary wave destroyed their respective ruling houses and monarchies. Eugene de la Croix's painting, *La Liberté Guidant le peuple* and the words of L'abbé Edgewood de Fumont to Louis XVI as he stepped up to the guillotine, 'Son of St. Louis, rise to heaven' symbolise well the images of revolution in the modern age. Under the progressive banner of a revolutionary leader, the masses rise to overthrow a decrepit, unjust and corrupt regime. The outcome is the execution of the symbol of that old order, the monarch, who failed to overcome the laws of progressive history. Leon Trotskii's famous rebuke to opponents of Bolshevik party plans succinctly describes the view taken by most on the role of monarchs in revolutionary situations. 'You are pitiful, isolated individuals. You are bankrupts, your role is played out. Go where you belong from now on—into the dustbin of history.'

Alexis de Tocqueville, the great French political thinker of the nineteenth century, provided the initial theoretical attempt to explain the first revolution of

the modern age. In *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution* he argued that the impersonal state and its structures created the revolution in France. Karl Marx, the German philosopher of the mid-nineteenth century and father of communist theory, saw revolution as an inevitable historical event rooted in the ineluctable changes in the mode of production. De Tocqueville's emphasis on the role of the state in the coming of revolution and Marx's declaration that revolution came as a result of structural forces outside the control of the state provided the framework catalyst for many subsequent social scientific theories of revolution. A third nineteenth-century intellectual, the Englishman Thomas Carlyle, advocated a different approach to understanding the past. 'The history of what man has accomplished in this world is at bottom, the History of the Great Men who have worked here.'[1] In the case of revolution, Carlyle's approach would consider decisive and paramount the role played by figures such as Lenin, Fidel Castro, and Ayatollah Khomeini.

This book combines reformed elements of these three broad and differing perspectives in order to construct a new approach to the study and understanding of the process that led to the implosion of the Bourbon, Romanov and Pahlavi monarchies. The importance and significance of this approach resides in the addition and application of the human agency perspective to the character of the monarch and his modus operandi. Critically, to understand fully the causes and the timing of the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions the vital link needs to be established and analysed between, on the one hand, the character, and modus operandi of Louis XVI, Nicholas II, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, along with their respective influence on policy making, and on the other hand, structural variables all of which transformed a *potentially* revolutionary situation into the revolutions that engulfed France in the eighteenth century, 1917 Russia and 1978-79 Iran. The structural variables/issues faced by these regimes did not by themselves create the revolution, but only the potential for revolution. The complex interaction between structural variables and the actions of the monarchs *made* revolution. The intention of this approach is neither to produce a universal theory of revolution in terms of personal human agency alone nor to deny the many important contributions made by previous works to our understanding of the potentially revolutionary situation. Instead the aim is to create a theoretical framework capable of integrating the idiosyncrasies and modus operandi of the monarchs and monarchical states with structural variables in order to evaluate in each case the extent of a monarch's individual contribution to the making of revolution. It is an attempt to explain the relationship between a set of variables one of which is human agency. The goal is not to prove that all revolutions have a similar set and balance of causes, and that the personality of the monarch of necessity was of equal importance in all cases.

As we have seen above, Carlyle argued that in order to understand the course of history, and in our case revolution, the personality, the biography of the greats must be studied. His 'great men' of history thesis was extreme for it took no account of the international and domestic forces contributing to the overall

environment in which political actors operated. Nevertheless, his insistence that human agency matters, that human choice is significant, cannot be easily discarded. Human agency means more than just political behaviour and action. It implies that a political actor enjoys free will and choice and thereby he/she makes decisions between various policy alternatives based on an interaction between conscious deliberation and elements of character The issue is determining the extent to which this human agency does matter.

The opposing side of the debate, structuralism, has its roots in Hegel, Marx, and de Tocqueville. Structuralism sees the explanation of policy decisions, political outcomes and events exclusively in terms of structural or contextual factors. Hegel believed that historical evolutionary laws or, just as importantly, the demands and needs of any period determined actions of political actors.[2] Therefore, during any period or in any circumstance the 'great man' has no power to choose between alternative paths as in reality none exist. History takes a pre-determined course. Hegel sees the 'great man' as only a symbol of his times and a manifestation of his culture who accordingly acts. No political actor can make history as he is propelled and limited by his day, age and culture which allows for only one direction of development. Hegel confesses that 'great men' in history do indeed appear on the political scene, but the momentous events making the political actor 'great' are still only a part of inevitable historical progress. Thus, if Ayatollah Khomeini had not been on the political scene in Iran and had not strove to overthrow the Pahlavi dynasty, someone else would have emerged to do what he did. The situation would have projected such a figure on to the historical scene. The study of the biography and the personality of a political actor, therefore, will tell us nothing about the causes of an event. Only by directing our attention to society and to culture through which progressive historical laws play out their role are we able to understand the causes of actions and events.

The issue of human agency remained, despite Hegel's exhortations. Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the structuralist camp itself gave further cause for its study. De Tocqueville argued that the causes of the revolution were 'state structural' given the state's attempts to centralise political power which resulted in a perpetual structural conflict between the Bourbon monarchy and its ruling elites. The political emasculation of the aristocracy and its sanction of the monarchy's establishment of a national tax sowed the seeds of 'almost all the vices and abuses which led to the violent downfall of the old regime.'[3] The French Revolution was a watershed in history because its object was 'not merely to change the old form of government but to abolish the entire social structure of pre-revolutionary France'.[4] His approach stresses that state structure and its impact on society, not culture or society itself, plays the decisive role in the emergence of revolution.

De Tocqueville, unlike Marx and other theorists, obtained experience in government before and during a revolution, that of 1848 in France when Louis-Phillipe was driven from his throne. Writing years later about France's latest revolution, de Tocqueville stressed once again his structural perspective. But his participation in political life taught him that non-structural factors perhaps more

than structural ones brought about the overthrow of the July Monarchy. 'The prince's bad government had prepared the way for the catastrophe that threw him from the throne.' He drew attention to the 'mistakes and mental disorientation of ministers.. the absence of the only members of the royal family who had either energy or popularity...the clumsy passions of the dynastic opposition,' and 'above all, the senile imbecility of King Louis-Philippe.'[5] He now stated that he hated 'those absolute systems which make all the events of history depend on great first causes linked to each other by a chain of fate and which thus, so to speak, omit men from the history of mankind. To my mind, they seem narrow under their pretense of broadness, and false beneath their air of mathematical exactness.' The great theorist came to the conclusion that whilst the structural conditions paved the way for revolution, these non-structural factors do also have a role. Taking his argument a step further, he incorporated contingency, pointing out that '... many important historical facts can be explained only by accidental circumstances, while many others are inexplicable. Chance...is a very important element in all that we see taking place in the world's theatre.' But, chance 'can do nothing unless the ground has been prepared in advance. Antecedent facts, the nature of institutions, turns of mind and the state of mores are the materials from which chance composes those impromptu events that surprise and terrify us.'[6] De Tocqueville most probably remained committed to a state structuralist point of view, but he could not resolve the tension between it and the role of human agency.

Marx based his analysis of revolution on structural causes outside the realm of the state, namely the shifting relations between the different socio-economic classes. He was more categorical than de Tocqueville, stressing that structure decidedly limits the action of political actors. In the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* he wrote his famous line 'Men make history, but they do not make it just as they please. They do not make it under circumstances of their own choosing.' After all, Marx saw in revolution the manifestation of the inevitable changes in the modes of production, the determining factor in history.[7] Humans do have a choice in situations in as much as they can decide to join this inevitable progression or struggle against it. Only by becoming one with these laws can humans count and be great. Marx's approach is '(s)tructural, in that it involves dynamics between structural forces;...non-voluntaristic, in that revolutions do not depend upon internal psychological states of members of any collectivity, but rather on the appearance of a revolutionary situation based on the differential rates of development of the means and relations of production;...'[8]

The contrast between the approaches of Marx and Lenin illustrate well the tensions between structure and agency in the making of revolution. Marx believed that revolution would come from below, the natural consequence of exploitation of workers and the contradictions in capitalism. Lenin, however, did not believe that revolutions just 'happen.' He stressed that a vanguard party dedicated to enlightening and revolutionising the masses could speed-up the course of history and 'make' revolution.

By summer 1917, after the implosion of tsardom, Lenin openly advocated the overthrow of the bourgeois Provisional Government. This position contradicted orthodox Marxism, supported by many Mensheviks, which called for a period of capitalism and bourgeois rule in order to lay the groundwork for the natural and inevitable change in the mode of production to socialism. Many Mensheviks, therefore, were unprepared to support Lenin's attempts to pull down the Provisional Government; some even joined the government that summer. They believed that Russia in accordance with Marxist theory had to go through a period of captialist-bouregois period in order to pass to the socialist mode of production.

Undoubtedly, Lenin played a decisive role in the events of October 1917. This placed Marxist and Soviet historiography in a complex position. In principle, Marxism denies human agency a role in the speeding up or slowing down of history. A political actor can play a 'great' role in history only if he joins the already existing and self-propelling forces of history. Lenin proved the opposite, showing that human agency, namely he and the vanguard party, can speed up the 'forces of history.' The idea that humans do not matter was thrown into doubt.

Trotskii in his *History of the Russian Revolution* paid some attention to this problem. Unsurprisingly, he had difficulty reconciling his belief in the determinism of Marxism and the role of humans:

> Lenin was not a demiurge of the revolutionary process...He merely entered into a chain of objective historic forces. But he was a great link in the chain...Is it possible...to say confidently that the party without him would have found its road? We would by no means make bold to say that. The factor of time is decisive here, and it is difficult in retrospect to tell time historically. Without Lenin the crisis would have assumed an extraordinarily sharp and protracted character. The conditions of war and revolution, however, would not allow the party a long period for fulfilling its mission. Thus it is by no means excluded that a disoriented and split party might have let slip the revolutionary opportunity for many years. The role of personality arises before us here on a truly gigantic scale. It is necessary only to understand that role correctly, taking personality as a link in the historic chain.

Clearly, the significance of situation and political actor is great. He confesses that without Lenin, the Party would have lost a golden opportunity to gain power. Yet, he returns to his structuralist approach by emphasizing that without Lenin the overthrow of the Provisional Government would have been only delayed. Despite this, the contradiction between these two issues remained unreconciled. He added further uncertainty to the determinism of structuralism after his experience in political life. "Where force is necessary, there it must be applied boldly, decisively and completely. But one must know the limitations of force; one must know when to blend force with a manoeuvre, a blow with an agreement."[9] Once again he is placing great importance on the political actor and his skill in managing a

situation and thereby influencing the course of events. This emphasis on situation and not on historical laws or structure in the making of an event is an important point. Proclaiming a law of progressive history whilst stressing the importance of a political actor's skill in a situation is not logical. Lenin crushed the sailors' rebellion in Kronstadt in 1921, but understanding the causes of this foreboding challenge to Soviet power reversed many policies in response. Both moves saved the newly born Soviet state. Nicholas II, on the other hand, used force to defeat the Revolution of 1905, but failed to learn its lessons, paving the way for 1917. Trotskii did not limit his discussion on this topic to the role of Lenin. He compared Nicholas II with Louis XVI.

> Louis and Nicholas were the last born of a dynasty which had lived tumultuously. The well-known equability of them both, their tranquillity and gaiety in difficult moments, were the well-bred expression of a meagreness of inner powers, a weakness of the nervous discharge, poverty of spiritual resources. Moral castrates, they were absolutely deprived of imagination and creative force. They had just enough brains to feel their own triviality and they cherished an envious hostility towards anything gifted and significant. It fell to both to rule a country in conditions of deep inner crisis and popular revolutionary awakening. Both of them fought off the intrusion of new ideas, and the tide of hostile forces. Indecisiveness, hypocrisy and lying were in both cases the expression, not so much of personal weakness as of the complete impossibility of holding fast to their hereditary position...The ill-luck of Nicholas, as of Louis, had its roots not in his personal horoscope, but in the historical horoscope of the bureaucratic-caste monarchy. They were both chiefly and, above all, the last-born offspring of absolutism...If Nicholas had gone to meet liberalism....the development of events would have differed a little in form but not in substance. Indeed it was just in this way that Louis behaved in the second stage of the Revolution, summoning the Gironde to power: this did not save Louis himself from the guillotine...[10]

Whilst agreeing that these similarities are striking, Trotskii concluded that they in the end counted for nothing in the evolution of history and the emergence of a revolution. He concedes that they were incompetent leaders, marching to the abyss 'with the crown pushed down over their eyes.' But given the inevitability of revolution caused by the changes in the mode of production, he pointedly asks, 'But would it after all be easier to go to an abyss which you cannot escape anyway, with your eyes open?'[11] Trotskii's denial of any significance for the role of human agency in the form of the monarch lies implicitly or explicitly in most social scientific approaches to the study of the causes of revolution. Human agency in the form of social classes, groups, and coalition building and more importantly revolutionary leaders, such as Lenin, are given theoretical and systematic recognition for having the ability to influence a situation. The negative or positive

role played by the monarch in events remains ignored or regulated to secondary causal status. Using Trotskii's language, should we not be asking to what extent did the 'incompetency' of these leaders make revolution?

The de Tocqueville and Marxian approaches although stressing different aspects of structural causes of revolution, failed to come to terms with the role of human agency. Modern social scientific theories on revolution have expanded greatly our understanding of revolution. Yet, they continute to grapple in one way or another with the issue of human agency (usually in regard to the role of masses or revolutionary leaders) and structure or have provided different structural explanations of revolution. We only briefly examine approaches to the study of revolution directly related to this study.

Samuel Huntington built on de Tocqueville's state structuralist approach in *Political Order in Changing Societies* when he discussed 'The King's Dilemma.' Monarchical systems were

> ...involved in a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, centralization of power in the monarchy was necessary to promote social, cultural, and economic reform. On the other hand, this centralization made difficult or impossible the expansion of the power of the traditional polity and the assimilation into it of the new groups produced by modernization. The participation of these groups in politics seemingly could come only at the price of the monarchy.[12]

Among the dangers of centralisation was the still further elevation of the absolute monarch's importance, and the weakening of alternative local sources of decision-making and legitimacy. Huntington then asks if there 'are any means which may provide for a less rather than a more disruptive transition from the centralising authority needed for policy innovation to the expansible power needed for group assimilation?' This question cannot be answered fully without consideration of the role played by the individual at the apex of the absolutist system; this is of particular importance given centralisation and reform from above in these three case studies.

However, Theda Skocpol in *States and Social Revolutions*, rejects the idea that the monarch would have any room for independent action.

> To explain social revolution, one must find problematic, first the emergence (not "making") of a revolutionary situation within an old regime. Then, one must be able to identify the objectively conditioned and complex intermeshing of the various actions of the diversely situated groups—an intermeshing that shapes the revolutionary process and gives rise to the new regime. One can begin to make sense of such complexity only by focusing simultaneously upon the institutionally determined situations and relations of groups within society and upon the interrelations of societies within world historically developing international structures. To take such an

> impersonal and nonsubjective viewpoint—one that emphasises patterns of relationships among groups and societies—is to work from what many in some generic sense be called a structural perspective. Such a perspective is essential for an analysis of social revolutions.[13]

On the issue of state collapse she holds that the structural conditions of the society and international system alone bring state collapse. '(O)bjective relationships and conflicts among variously situated groups and nations, rather than interests, outlooks, or ideologies of particular revolutions'[14] in the end bring revolution. The international system as shaped by uneven capitalist development and competing states must be regarded as a major cause of social revolution. As England underwent the first Industrial Revolution, 'the competition within the European states system spurred modernising developments throughout Europe.'[15] The old regimes' attempts to reform themselves led to an exacerbation of the contradictions within the state structure and to a fatal weakening of the state; in other words, the duality of structure and international pressures. However, she considers the breakdown of the old regime to be the result of international pressures, such as military defeat or imperial overextension, rather than the result of revolutionary agitation.

> Imperial states become caught in cross pressures between intensified military competition or intrusions from abroad and constraints imposed on monarchical responses by the existing agrarian class structures and political institutions...Their existing structures made it impossible for them to meet the particular military exigencies that each had to face.[16]

Yet as one critic put it: 'Because of her uncompromising stand against voluntarism, Skocpol forgets that human beings, thinking and acting, (however haphazardly) are the mediating link between structural conditions and social outcomes.'[17] She assumes that structures will dictate how people will act and react, reducing them to human exponents of her theory of revolution.

The approach to revolution in the 1980s and 1990s was more broad than before. Many turned away from the daunting task of creating a grand theory of revolution, preferring comparative and single case studies. Building on the criticisms of the theoretical approaches of previous generations of theorists, they not only sought out different forms of structuralist pressures, but also returned to themes such as the role of culture, ideology, and ideas in the making of revolution. The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 gave further momentum for a more 'holistic' approach to the study of revolution[18] since some of the basic assumptions of earlier theorists and in particular the structuralist approach did not have the capacity to explain the collapse of the Pahlavi regime. For example, peasant action, deemed necessary by Huntington and Skocpol for bringing about revolution, played no real role in the Iranian case where the countryside was relatively silent. The urban areas led the revolution. During the Iranian Revolution the proletarian

class played a minimal role, joining the revolutionary movement once the regime had already been weakened by months of urban unrest. In addition, the emergence of a revolutionary coalition consisting of groups from leftist to nationalist under the leadership of the clergy drew theorists attention to the personality of the revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and coalition building amongst disparate groups. The focus of many new theorists was to be on a 'constellation of factors and interaction among those factors' in the coming of revolution.[19]

Broadly speaking, in the twentieth century two schools of thought concerning the role of human agency in revolution emerged. Some theorists, such as Davies, Gurr, and Tilly directed their attention to the role of the masses in the revolutionary process, stressing that mass revolutionary action can be rational and rooted in real political, social and/or economic grievances. Others focused on the 'revolutionary personality', regarded as the key to the success of revolution. Structural causes might exist, as are disgruntled people, but without the revolutionary leader to unite and direct them, the revolution will not happen. A revolution needs 'the iron will, daring, vision of an exceptional leader to concert and mobilise existing attitudes and impulses into the collective drive of a mass movement...He articulates and justifies the resentment damned up in the souls of the frustrated. He kindles the vision of a breathtaking future so as to justify the sacrifice of a transitory present.'[20] Of course, the focus on revolutionary leadership must take place within the individual situation. But before analyzing the role of the revolutionary personality, we must examine the genesis of the crises threatening the regime. Such an examination inevitably returns us to the question of the monarch's character and modus operandi and the extent to which these two elements made crises eventually leading to revolution.

The absence of a systematic analysis of the role of the monarch's character and modus operandi in the 'making' or 'coming' of revolution links the approaches to the study of revolution examined. We can agree on the relative rationality of mass revolutionary action and the importance of the revolutionary personality in the organization and mobilization of the masses. But the link between government policies and the politicization of grievances must be established and analyzed in order to determine the extent to which government policies made revolution. In turn, any discussion of policy must include the influence of the monarch's modus operandi on government. The state centered approaches of theorists, such as Huntington and Skocpol, discuss the functioning of the state and the causes for its collapse without referring to the political actors running the government apparatus. More to the point, by ignoring the character and modus operandi of the pivot of that apparatus, any state-structured approach will remain incomplete. The aim of this book is to give appropriate attention to this neglected theme and present an approach, which in combination with previous works, takes into account in a systematic form the role of the monarch and his modus operandi. Whereas American reformer Wendell Phillips declared, 'Revolutions are not made; they come,' this work takes the position that revolutions are, to varying degrees, made or unmade by men, and first and foremost by the monarch.[21]

Structure, Human Agency and the Making of Revolution

Revolutionary struggle represents a war over control of the state whose collapse is required for the victory of the revolutionaries. The process (at least in its initial and intermediate stages) leading up to its collapse centers around the pivot of the state apparatus, the monarch. The state itself is not only initially a superior player in the political field, but initially determines, through policies and action whether a revolutionary situation emerges and the form the revolutionary movement takes. An examination of the state in this context consists of three different analyses.[22] First, the extent to which the state, meaning in this study the governmental apparatus and personnel, is independent of certain elite classes and society must be determined. This issue of state autonomy is of paramount importance for our cases studies given the reform and/or modernization from above policies pursued by the Bourbon, Romanov, and Pahlavi governments, which placed them in conflict with the interests of some elite groups. Secondly, the state's capacity to enforce its will needs to be examined. Taxing and fiscal systems, size and professionalisation of the bureaucracy, and military are subsumed under this rubric.[23] The monarch might be theoretically independent of elites and organized groups in society and wish to implement reform policies in the teeth of opposition, but lacking the institutional capacity to act, he is effectively paralysed. Also, the use of force is critically dependent on institutional factors as well as the willingness of the monarch to use force in defense of his authority.

Political culture plays a role in determining the level of state autonomy. Undoubtedly, French monarchical thought placed greater restrictions on the monarch's power than Russian monarchical thought. The wealth of the state is of vital importance. An oil-rich nation, such as Pahlavi Iran in the 1970s, finds itself enjoying much greater room for maneuver than one more dependent on extraction of resources from the populace and a venal tax system, such as the Bourbon state of Louis XVI.

The third and last issue is rooted in de Tocqueville's structural explanation of the French Revolution.[24] The stress here is on how the state 'help(s) to construct or constitute various agents of civil society that are (falsely) conceptualized as wholly exterior to the states.'[25] In other words, the state's form of governing, its policies, its reaction and interaction with various societal groups play a determining role in framing the eventual revolutionary discourse. To deny the state's influence on shaping the 'very identities, social ties, ideas, and even emotion of actors in civil society', which then play themselves out in revolution is difficult.[26] Examining the causes of revolution from this perspective is vital to understanding how grievances become politicized, how revolutionary ideologies take shape and why revolutionary strategies are accepted by diverse sections of society or, at least, they remain apathetic to a government under siege.

The significance and importance of this study lies in the addition of a modus operandi perspective which builds on these three issues. We cannot discuss these issues as if institutions and/or structures dictate how political players will act and react, reducing them to human exponents of this or that theory. Structural

approaches in general neglect the structural dynamics of the absolutist state itself and of its institutions. These dynamics are very important in understanding why revolution occurs though they too do not in themselves determine outcomes in all instances. The very nature of absolute monarchy makes the issue of personality crucial, since in such regimes the monarch's power for good or ill was very great. Any understanding of the role that structural/institutional factors played in the making of revolution and the disintegration of the old regime would be incomplete without an examination of the role of individuals. Revolution does not just 'come' as a result of listed structural causes.

Political scientists studying revolution argue that area specialists and historians on revolution advance 'more causes for an outcome than are needed to explain it', thereby destroying the chance to tease out common themes. The contrary scholars would reply that the political science approach fails 'to capture the nuances of individual events or periods, ...and therefore fails to understand in totality the causation of the event. [27] As one historian noted, 'The law of gravitation may be scientifically proved because it is universal and simple. But the historical law that starvation brings revolt is not proved; indeed the opposite statement that starvation leads to abject submission is equally true in the light of past events. 'You cannot so completely isolate any historical event from its (particular) circumstances as to be able to deduce from it a law of general application. An event is itself nothing but a set of circumstances, none of which will ever recur.'[28] Although this is true to an extent, in dealing with any historical event, and especially revolution, a distinction must be made between primary and secondary causes. If this is not done, themes essential to understanding the event in a broader context are lost. One becomes tossed about in a sea of information, facts and events and therefore unable to draw comparisons between periods and come to overall conclusions.

In this study primary causes fall into two categories--'structure' and 'human agency' (the monarch). The structural and personal variables presented later in this work are considered primary causes. Together they constitute part of a multicausal explanation for the overthrow of these three regimes; in other words these variables jointly created the revolutionary situation. Structure has a broad definition in this work, covering all impersonal/structural variables linked to the series of events that culminated in the overthrow of the French, Russian, and Iranian monarchies. Before launching into a description of how the argument is laid out a brief look at the historiography of approaches to the overthrow of Louis XVI, Nicholas II, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi is necessary.

The historiography of the French Revolution reflects well how the debate over the inevitability of the revolution and the role of human agency was approached by scholars.[29] Jean Jaurès in the nineteenth century and Georges Lefebvre and Albert Soboul in the twentieth provided a Marxist interpretation of the Bourbon monarchy's implosion.[30] *Quatre-Vingt-Neuf* written by Lefebvre became the standard leftist approach to the origins of the French Revolution. He considered the emergence of capitalism in Bourbon France and the consequent rise of an

increasingly powerful bourgeoisie, in other words the beginnings of the change in the mode of production, as the revolution's greatest cause. Historians with rightist beliefs, such as Pierre Gaxotte and Bernard Fay, rejected the Marxist interpretation, refusing to regard the revolution as inevitable.[31] For them, the real problem was the failure of certain political actors to take steps required by the situation. But they tended to pay inadequate attention to structural and impersonal variables and exaggerated Louis XV's or Louis XVI's room for manoeuvre, in the process weakening their argument.

The Marxist interpretation began to crumble with Alfred Cobban's work which showed that the politically or economically declining class of officers, lawyers, and professional men, and not the businessmen of commerce and industry constituted the revolutionary part of the bourgeoisie.[32] At the same time many of the bourgeoisie strove to enter the noble class when most wealth was still non-capitalist. The disunity within the individual classes and the links between classes were factors that could no longer be ignored. The image of a monarchy besieged in 1787-1788 by a united and revolutionary Third Estate could not be maintained. With this in mind, one needed to approach the causes of the revolution, namely the emerging enmity between the Second and Third Estate from a different angle.

George Taylor provided the most radical answer. He believed that the break-up between the two groups and the consequent radical reforms symbolised by the Tennis Court Oath were the result of a political crisis that had struck the monarchy. 'It was essentially a political revolution with social consequences and not a social revolution with political consequences.'[33] The severe weakening of the crown by political battles and the collapse of the state brought social revolution; the social revolution did not collapse the state.

The debate over the role of the Enlightenment in the French Revolution is as old as the revolution itself. On the one hand, the climate created by the Enlightenment played a role in the origins of the revolution, especially in sowing a good degree of discontent amongst members of the elite, including the Third Estate, with the Bourbon state. On the other hand, to pinpoint how Enlightenment thought brought about the collapse of the state is difficult. Two of the major works on this theme concluded that the climate of ideas did not play any direct role in the collapse of the state.[34] Only after the severe weakening of the crown by political forces did ideas become a force in the hands of the emerging group of revolutionaries. '...there was nothing uniquely dangerous or malignant about the thought of the eighteenth century, and it posed no serious threat to the old order until that order had begun to collapse for other reasons.'[35]

The search for the origins of the revolution has not established with any degree of certainty that the events of this period were wholly economic, for as subsequent research has shown the economic structure of Bourbon France, especially in the agrarian sector, remained essentially the same for a good part of the nineteenth century.[36] Labrousse in his great statistical work showed that the French economy grew sluggishly during most of the reign of Louis XVI with very little, if any, serious peasant unrest, save the Grain War. However, the particularly bad weather

of 1788 and 1789 destroyed huge amounts of crops, depriving the lower classes of needed income and driving up the prices of food stuffs. Up until that time the peasants played no role in the political crises afflicting the crown. But with the failure of the 1788 harvest, peasant unrest grew precisely at a time when the power of the monarchy had been seriously weakened. The peasant revolts of 1789 were not based on any ideological thought emerging from the Enlightenment, but were very similar to previous revolts. The danger for the government was that at a time of political trouble in the centre, inclement weather had greatly worsened the economic situation in the country, thereby bringing the peasants into the political arena. This potent mixture played no small role in the eventual collapse of the Bourbon state.

The political crises of 1787-1789 played the determinative role in the crown's loss of legitimacy and authority in the eyes of both the Second and Third Estates, in its weakening to the point where it could not handle peasant unrest emerging from structural and meteorological conditions, and the gradual entrance of Enlightenment ideas into the political arena. We are, therefore, forced to study the genesis of this political crisis, which means examining not only the institutional character of the state, but also Louis XVI's modus operandi. Any discussion of the political crises must focus, but not exclusively, on the attempts to change the country's fiscal system and the bankruptcy that precipitated the collapse of the state. In short, this work takes the position that the origins of the revolution were initially and primarily political.

Before the collapse of the USSR the debate over the causes and course of the Russian Revolutions of 1917 was framed by the Cold War and the official Soviet version, which was intended to give the Bolshevik regime legitimacy.[37] According to this account, historical laws and class struggle governed the revolutionary process. At the centre of this process were the Bolshevik party and Lenin.

The argument was not just over the inevitability or legitimacy of Bolshevism but also whether the Western political tradition, namely constitutionalism and democracy, and liberal capitalism were viable in Russia. The western version, broadly speaking, focused on 'the likelihood of renewed rebellion by the peasantry; the dynamics of working class protest; the prospects for the consolidation of the Empire's middle classes into a formidable social and political force; the solidity of the tsarist forces of repression; and the effect of Russia's entry into the First World War upon socio-political condition in the Empire.'[38] The first generation of western scholars focused on debunking the belief that the Russian Revolutions were law-driven and inevitable. Believing that the revolution was the result of the 'untenable' strains of the war and of the last tsar's incompetent leadership, this generation viewed the period of 1907-1914 as one characterised by growing economic, social, and political stability. Their work was based on the assumption that before the outbreak of the First World War tsarist Russia was travelling along the same route taken by other European countries which led to a constitutional monarchy. Also within this school 'political actors have an independence and causative importance of their own.[39]' Bernard Pares wrote, 'The cause of the ruin

came not at all from below, but from above.'[40] In the liberal view the masses are seen as an irrational and destructive group. Consequently, the people played a secondary, subordinate role in the events leading up to the Bolshevik seizure of power.

In the 1960s a 'revisionist' school emerged. It examined more deeply imperial history and focused above all on the social history of the masses. This school's aim was to penetrate the world of low politics and examine developments in the factory, in the village, in the barracks and trenches. Ultimately, they wanted to gauge the extent to which real men and women on the ground had an influence on events and how they in turn influenced their leaders. They took seriously the aspirations of the masses and credited them with an independence, sense of direction and rationality of their own.[41] By looking at the situation from below it emerged that the likelihood of peaceful constitutional development in Russia at the time was not that great whilst the possibility of socialist and even Bolshevik revolution existed. The broad conclusion was that the possibility of revolution was existed, but it was not inevitable.

Clear-cut schools of thought on the causes of the Iranian Revolution, similar to those dealing with the French and Russian Revolutions did not emerge. This is attributable to the already extensive social scientific literature existing at the time of the revolution which seemed unable to provide answers to what had happened in Iran. A mass movement under the banner of religion and headed by what had been considered an unenlightened part of Iranian society, the clergy, overthrew a monarch whose stated goals were the economic and social modernisation of the country. The role of ideology and the clergy made some structuralists rethink aspects of their approaches. Skocpol, whose structuralist theory insisted on the 'coming' of revolution and seriously downplayed the roles of human agency and ideology, whilst trying to fit the event into her original theory, now declared that this revolution 'was deliberately and coherently made.'[42] After all, the collapse of the Pahlavi regime was unanticipated given the absence of a deep economic crisis, war, or military debacle. Many specialists came to insist that a holistic approach be taken. Most works on the Iranian Revolution propose a rather broad and multi-causal approach whilst differing with each other over the relative causal weight of factors. Many of these approaches take something from the four major themes discernable in the literature on the Iranian Revolution. [43]

According to the official Iranian government interpretation the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty was due to the organisational and mobilisational capacities of the clergy who had fought against monarchical despotism since Iran's first constitutional struggle in 1906.[44] As in the Soviet case, the victors received the right to construct history. Nevertheless, the idea that the 1978-79 revolution represented a form of continuity in Iranian history had its adherents. Nikki Keddie in *Roots of Revolution* stresses that the revolution was the outcome of an historical struggle in between the clergy and government for ultimate control of state power.[45] A second discernible strand of thought is more sociological, focusing on the role of class, especially the lower classes, and modes of mobilisation within the

framework of social revolution. The issue of the rapid character of the shah's modernisation plans which either excessively disequilibriated the system or failed to open up the political system despite the very real economic growth and expansion of the educated classes is at the centre of many of these works.[46] The last strand of thought stresses the 'anti-modern' character of the revolution. It considers the revolution to be the manifestation of a general popular will to maintain the old social structure seemingly threatened by the Pahlavi state. The revolutionary movement was a reaction to modernisation, which above all the clergy and traditional businessmen, the bazaaris, feared. Said Arjomand, whilst pressing for this interpretation, stresses that the revolution succeeded because of a collapse of authority which begs the question of the state structure and the shah's modus operandi.[47]

Given the surprising collapse of the regime and the ascendancy of the clergy, the role of human agency received a good degree of attention. Some drew attention to the role of the shah, whilst most focused on the charismatic personality of Ayatollah Khomeini. As more memoirs and information on the running of government during this period have become available it is now possible to determine in greater detail the extent to which the shah's personality and modus operandi played a role in making revolution.

The layout of this book is built to a great extent around the three forms of analysis of the state outlined above and the added human agency perspective. Chapter II examines the structural factors constituting the environment in which these men operated. It makes a determination of the degree of state autonomy and state capacity. Completing the analysis of 'structure' the second section of Chapter II brings into the analysis the reality of structural changes and challenges emerging in the international system. We must keep in mind that structure should not be viewed as only an obstacle to action; it is also its enabler.

Chapter III combines narrowly biographical approaches of these three men, with an examination not only of the influences from the familial environment but also those of the contemporary socio-political environment as a whole in which these men grew up and operated[48].Their upbringing, socialisation during childhood and youth, and relationships within the familial environment will all be examined but only briefly, as background factors rarely directly cause behaviour but rather constitute an input in the forming of attitudes and views which in turn play a large part in political behaviour. The goal here is to analyse the personality and character of Louis XVI, Nicholas II and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in order to make sense of their views, decisions, and modus operandi.

For purposes here the overall make up of a person is character. This term encompasses an individual's attitudes, worldview, problem-solving styles, emotional composition, and various habits, skills, and abilities. When evaluating a political actor's character and leadership skills the following are taken into account in this book: (1) values, (2) views regarding himself and his ability to have an impact on the socio-political environment in which he finds himself, (3) aspirations (4) interests (5) ideology (6) motivations (7) conception of reality (8)

experience 9) education, knowledge and skill, (10) brain power, and (11) milieu. Rudolf Rezsohazy has grouped these factors under the term *outillage culturel* in the following manner:

> (a) The factors, such as values, aspirations, interests, ideology, and motivation, which give orientation to action.
> (b) The psychological factors and sentiments, such as will, determination, belief in the justice of a cause, fear, despondency, fatalism, which support or block action.
> (c) The cognitive factors, such as knowledge, intelligence, skill, conception of reality, which permit the political actor to diagnose problems, formulate plans of action, and to act (intelligently).[49]

Physical and medical factors also play into character and are exhibited in political behaviour. Personal temporary determinants of political behaviour manifested in a person's momentary states such as partial understanding or misconception of the situation, temporary moods and feelings and by whom the political actor is surrounded at any specific moment also play roles. Therefore in any political situation behaviour is determined by the enduring traits of a person, his character, and by momentary states within a specific situational and environmental context. The sources of man's behaviour (his observable action) and his subjective experience (such as thoughts, feelings, and wishes) are twofold: the external stimuli impinging on him and the internal dispositions resulting from the interaction between inherited psychological characteristics and experience with the world. I avoid the use of broad labels to describe the character of these men, where possible. For example, the portrayal Nicholas II as a weak and indecisive man reveals only half the picture. When his most cherished beliefs were under threat the last tsar could be stubborn and decisive, even casting aside pleas from members of his family.

History bequeathed to these men positions from which the extent of their political skill would reverberate throughout the state structure. 'Skill is of the utmost importance since the greater the actor's skill the less his initial need for a favourable position or a manipulable environment and the greater the likelihood that he himself will contribute to making his subsequent position favourable and his environment manipulable. By the same token a singularly inept actor may reduce the manipulability of his environment.'[50] What is skill? In short it is the ability to analyse complicated situations, the ability to manage people and bang heads together in order to get strong-minded ministers to work together, and the ability to recognise more often than not good advisors and advice. In addition to skill, the question arises of strong nerves, will-power, and seeing through policies to their conclusion.

Chapters, IV, V and VI, bring together our two forms of causal factors, structure and human agency, in an analysis of the emergence and exacerbation of our primary causes. Whereas chapter II analyses 'structural factors' comparatively

these three chapters individually analyse respectively the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions, with comparisons made within the body of the separate chapters. When examining the governmental process during the reigns of Louis XVI, Nicholas II and Mohammad Reza Shah we must keep the following in mind. Were there other paths? Why were certain paths chosen over others? What factors played into the decision-making process?

In conclusion, it is by now obvious that the analysis has three basic forms, structural factors, encompassing elements from state-centred analysis, human agency, and situational contexts. The three cannot be separated from each other when attempting to understand any event.

The French, Russian, and Iranian Revolutions are unique as each gave birth to a specific revolutionary ideology which in turn influenced both the international system and the domestic politics of many countries. Consequently, these revolutions have often been the target of those wishing to prove socio-structural and deterministic interpretations of the events which engulfed these monarchies. Skocpol's work in particular became a classic comparative and structuralist study of revolutions, with emphasis on France, Russia, and China. This study tests broadly the structuralist/deterministic thesis, of which Skocpol is a leading proponent, by taking the French and Russian revolution, but adding a third case study, Iran. This examination is of particular importance given Skocpol's difficulty in squaring the fall of the Pahlavi regime with her theory.[51] Therefore using the French, Russian, and Iranian cases in the determination of the role of human agency, namely the role of the monarchs, in the making of revolution is appropriate.

To varying degrees Bourbon France, Romanov Russia, and Pahlavi Iran faced the same international pressures that led to attempts to reform aspects of their economic, institutional, or social structures. The efforts and consequences of reform presented these monarchies with similar domestic challenges, often, but not always, rooted in overriding institutional obstacles and the political and economic interests of certain groups. These monarchies had somewhat similar ideologies and governmental structures that placed the monarch in the centre of the political system, demanding that he, or someone appointed by him, prevent the emergence of a hole in the centre of government by co-ordinating ministers and policy making.

Despite very different cultures and somewhat different contexts these three political systems were sufficiently similar to make comparative institutional and biographical approaches valid and useful. Differences in time and place are important. Yet, whether in 1775, 1900 or 1975 the role of the monarch in the governing of the country was equally crucial given the position he occupied in the system. The hole in the centre of the government, a consequence of the modus operandi of these three men, binds these three cases together. It made revolution.

2

STRUCTURAL FACTORS OF REVOLUTION

This chapter focuses on the structural factors that contributed to the socio-political and economic reality faced by these monarchs but by themselves did not dictate the outcome of events. The focus falls on three forms of structural factors: (1) monarchical ideology and government; (2) the challenge of the international system; and (3) reform and domestic challenges. This division reflects the domestic and international structural themes binding together these three case studies. Specifically, the Bourbon, Romanov, and Pahlavi regimes faced similar issues in regard to effective governance, the dynamics of an increasingly competitive international system and the challenge of reform. By drawing out these similarities as well as differences, this chapter provides a sketch of the socio-political environment in which Louis XVI, Nicholas II and Mohammad Reza found themselves at the time of ascending the throne. These men did not operate within a vacuum but within a system having certain ideological, dynastic, and structural realities that created *restraints* as well as *possibilities*, but did not completely determine their actions. Conclusions need to be made on the degree of state autonomy and state capacity if a determination is to be made of the extent of these monarchs' ability to exercise an impact on events.

Structural Factor: Monarchical Ideology and Government

Bourbon France never had a written constitution defining the powers not only of the king, but also of the other governmental organs, particularly the parlement. Therefore, when studying the political system of Ancien Regime France a myriad of theoretical and philosophical works disagreeing to an extent on monarchical powers and rights face us. The reign of Louis XI (1461-83) marked the beginning of the French royal state and strong monarchical rule. Apologists for the monarchy stressed that the king's 'sovereignty is not any more divisible than a geometric point' (Le Bert 1632). Claude de Seyssel (1515) wrote that religion, the Fundamental Laws, and adherence to the 'happiness' of the people moderated the French absolute monarchy. Jean Bodin (1576) wrote that monarchical government, approved by God himself and justified by history, created the

conditions for the best state possible. The king's power was absolute in the sense that divine sanction absolved the ruler from legal restrictions. The absence of a constitution or clear conventions created conditions in which supporters and critics of absolutism claimed to offer the correct interpretation of the powers of the monarchy.

In the last half of the sixteenth century the term *'les lois fondamentales'*, political customs with roots from the twelfth century, came to describe the first laws of the kingdom. They were viewed as 'anterior and superior to the king;'[1] they restricted monarchical power. The more relevant ones to this study stated that: (1) the king could not change the borders of the country; (2) the kingdom was independent of the person of the king; (3) the king ruled *par la grâce de Dieu*, to whom he alone answered; and (4) the king ascended the throne not by wish of his predecessor, but rather according to the natural law of the kingdom.

French political thought under the Bourbons distinguished the state from the person of the king. He was held responsible for the government of the kingdom, but the land and property of the realm were considered a separate independent entity. Due to the conventions associated with feudalism and Roman law the king could not simply seize his subjects' property. In this regard France differed from pre-Petrine Russia, where property rights were significantly weaker. These were two important elements for the emergence of natural law, an essential precondition for the concept of political sovereignty.

Apart from these laws there was rarely agreement on the extent of the king's power. It was accepted, however, that the king received all of his power from God. In 1614 after the assassination of Henri IV the deputies of the Third Estates called for the entire Estates-General to establish a new fundamental law according to which the king was 'sovereign in his state, holding the crown from God alone,' and that 'there is no power on earth, be it spiritual or temporal exercising any authority to overthrow the king.'[2] The king dominated the political scene as the only source of legitimate political power. Not surprisingly, the conception of the separation of powers did not exist in Ancien Regime France.

The word '*absolue*' did not mean despotism. In France rule of law and custom existed. Works of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries on royal power stressed that the responsibility of the absolutist monarch was to protect his subjects' rights, liberties, and property. French kings believed that despotism plagued Russia and countries in the East, such as the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran. The political system was a complex set of institutions and corporate bodies enjoying legal status which the king would have trouble openly infringing. Such viewpoints exercised an influence on Louis XIV, Louis XV, and Louis XVI. They tried to ensure that their actions could not be described as 'despotic.' For example, Louis XIV greatly reduced the powers of the Parlement of Paris, but maintained the institution itself, fearing the label 'despot.' Importantly, the ambiguity over the monarch's legitimate powers meant a degree of instability was built into the system. It required skilful handling, thereby increasing the importance of the personality of the monarch.

The Russian autocratic order can date its origins to the rise of Moscow under Mongol rule. The Time of Troubles ended with the election of the first Romanov tsar, Mikhail, by a Zemskii Sobor in 1613. The reign of Peter the Great (1689-1725) marked the beginning of Russia's Imperial Age. Russian autocratic political thought had varied forms, but in contrast to Bourbon France broad agreement on the monarch's basic powers existed. In brief, the tsar had the ability to overcome society more easily than French kings simply because the basic tenets of autocratic thought rejected the notion that the monarch should consult social groups or other forms of organised societal elements. Moreover, institutional constraints on monarchical power did not exist. French absolutist theory preached that authority could not be shared, but in reality it was negotiated between networks of influence and power at court. In Russia theory of autocratic power and the reality of the tsar's exercise of that power were much closer.

According to the official conception of the autocracy all political power and legitimacy emanated from the autocrat. No power equal or above him, save that of God himself existed. The tsar, like the French king, was God's representative on earth, the people's link with the Almighty. To reject his power and ignore his commands meant refutation of God himself. Romanov Russia during the reign of Nicholas I in response to political challenges in the post-French revolution period gave form and legal definition to the autocratic power. Article I of the Fundamental Laws of 1832 commanded people, 'to obey his power, not only out of fear, but also for conscience's sake,' as God himself commanded obedience to the tsar. This power was 'indivisible, constant, sovereign, sacred, inviolate, responsible to nobody, omnipresent, and the source of any state power.'[3] By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the notion of autocratic power was recognised as unlimited and arbitrary, but not inherently despotic. This autocratic power did not exist in a vacuum, ignoring all customs and even law. Although the Russian Fundamental Laws of 1832 declared that the All-Russian Emperor was an autocratic and unlimited monarch, most educated Russians and the elite did not support the concept of completely unrestricted and naked arbitrary power. Whereas the French believed their monarchy was not autocratic in the eastern sense, most Russians believed that an inherently selfish power was typical of absolute monarchies which protected only the interests of the elite. The autocracy's claim to be a supra-societal entity, immune to any class or group interest and able to ensure justice and the protection of all within Russian society constituted the base of its legitimacy. This emphasis on the monarch's role as the guarantor of truth, and on rendering and maintenance of justice is seen in all three cases; it was a bedrock of French, Russian, and Iranian monarchical ideology despite the differences in degrees of real monarchical power.

The Iranian monarchy was much older than its French and Russian counterparts. Since the establishment of the Achaemenid Empire in the sixth century B.C. by Cyrus the Great, Iran's monarchical order underwent many dynastic changes and a change of state religion. At times several dynasties simultaneously ruled in various parts of modern-day Iran or the 'Iranian'

monarchy itself disappeared. Therefore, one dynasty could not be regarded as synonymous with the Iranian monarchy, whilst the Bourbons and Romanovs could be and were so considered, adding to their legitimacy. In the pre-Islamic period the Iranian religion, Zoroastrianism, established the divine right of the Iranian monarch and his supreme authority.[4]

The Safavid dynasty (1501-1736) established a ruling ideology and system which exercised great influence on the Iranian monarchy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first Safavid shah, Ismail I, established Shi'ia Islam as the state religion. Shi'ism makes no provision for the structured religious hierarchy characteristic of Christianity. Members of the clergy obtaining the title of *mojtahed*, a rank reflecting a deep knowledge of the roots of Islamic law, receive the right to interpret and re-interpret divine laws and doctrines (*ijtihad*). Such an approach could only lead to conflict as each *mojtahid* could give his own interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence. In addition Shi'ism called for all believers to follow a single *mojtahed* and his judgements, even if these judgements conflicted with the government. According to Shi'ism the *mojtahed* were representatives of the Hidden Imam, who most importantly did not relinquish his temporal power. Therefore, the *mojtahed* in principle could symbolise to a great degree legitimate authority. The assumption was that the religious order had bestowed certain temporal power to the shah who protected the theocratic social order and religious interests in society in the absence of the Hidden Imam. The state existed to implement and enforce the laws of Allah while the shah held responsibility for the defence and propagation of the faith. He thus had the right to demand and expect the people's loyalty. This dynamic between the state and religion augmented and supported the shah's power. If the interests of these two parties collided, which increasingly happened from the middle of the nineteenth century, the shah in theory could lose a degree of his legitimacy.

In France religion, *La foi*, aided in the formation, fortification and exercise of royal power. In 1614 the Assembly of the Clergy proclaimed that the king was God's representative on Earth. Louis XIV wrote that 'we exercise on earth a function wholly divine,' and occupy 'the place of God.'[5] The fundamental text on this was *L'Epitre aux Romains* of St.Paul. 'There is no form of authority which does not come from God himself.'[6] Gallic Catholicism, which took definite form during and after the reign of Louis XIV, proclaimed that the French king was not dependent on the Pope or the Roman Catholic Church outside France for his power and legitimacy.

The clergy represented the first estate of the land. They received large tax exemptions, justified by the spiritual services they rendered. This did not mean they did not pay anything to the government. The Assembly of Clergy regularly presented the king with a substantial sum of money (*don gratuit*), the amount of which was usually decided between it and the crown.[7] The clergy not only strongly supported monarchy in almost all of its affairs, but also borrowed money for the king on its own credit. In return the clergy expected the monarchy to respect its exemptions and recognise it as the first estate of the land. When the

clergy felt that royal policies threatened any of its privileges, it put up strong opposition through the Assembly of the Clergy and its presence at court. The Iranian clergy too opposed government policies threatening their interests. Unlike the French clergy, the Iranian clergy, the *'ulama,* did not accept high state positions, remaining a separate societal entity.[8]

In Russia religion played a significant role in the legitimisation of autocratic power. Arguably, the Byzantine inheritance, namely Orthodoxy, rooted in the conception of the absolute ruler and divine rule, influenced Russian political culture and gave religious sanction to the autocratic power. Peter the Great succeeded in emasculating the church's power by making it a department of the government, the Holy Synod, which was headed by a secular figure appointed by the tsar himself. Consequently, the monarchy was able to take advantage of religious sanction without the problem of potential clerical opposition. This absence of any effective clerical opposition to the Russian monarchy greatly increased the crown's room for manoeuvre. The French and Iranian monarchies had to take into account and contend with relatively powerful religious forces which required greater political skill on the part of the monarch. On this issue, therefore, from a political and institutional point of view a Catholic monarchy had more in common with Shi'ia Iran than with Christian Orthodox Russia. Religion played a further role. Gallic Catholicism, Russian Orthodoxy, and Iranian Shi'ism became essential parts of the national identity, thereby playing directly into monarchical ideology and legitimacy.

At first glance that the Safavids introduced a state religion espousing a philosophy that could undermine the absolute power of the shah would seem short-sighted. The Safavids, however, constructed safeguards against clerical interference, aiming for a system which would resemble in its goals that of future Imperial Russia. In the first place, by successfully claiming to be descendants of a Holy Imam, Imam Musa, the Safavids were not affected by possible Shi'ia claims of the illegitimacy of the temporal government in the absence of the Hidden Imam. This also gave them the right to control the appointment of major religious leaders. Successive dynasties, unable to claim decadency from an Imam were deprived of this powerful prerogative. In a similar vein the Valois and Bourbons attached great importance to the fact that they descended from St.Louis for whom a national holiday existed from the seventeenth century. St.Louis was the 'prime example, even ideal, of a Christian prince used by preachers to stimulate zeal for the kings of France.'[9] Secondly, the Safavids employed the Sunni title, *zill Allah*, Shadow of God on Earth, in order to emphasise God's direct appointment of the Safavids as His representative on Earth and the dynasty's right to hold power independently of the Shi'ia clergy. The Safavids came to embody both the religious and temporal aspects of the Iranian state. Thirdly, during the initial period of Safavid rule Shi'ia *'ulama* were brought to Iran in order to spread the faith and to train an indigenous Iranian clergy. Therefore, the state exercised a great degree of control over the religious hierarchy. Despite the eventual emergence of an Iranian *'ulama* the Safavids for most of their rule maintained

effective control over the clergy's sources of funding which meant de facto control of the clergy. The incorporation of Shi'ia Islam into the body politic strengthened the potential for the emergence of a clergy independent of, and in opposition to, the government constituted the new characteristic of the Safavid state religion, effectively blurring the parameters of the relationship between the 'state' and 'religion.'

Monarchic thought in these three countries underwent changes, resulting from internal and external influences. In France the Enlightenment and the dark final years of Louis XIV's reign changed to a degree how educated society and the monarchs themselves regarded the Bourbon monarchy. One group believed in an aristocratic monarchy in which the king would rule with the advice and limitations of the first two estates of the realm. The other group supported a form of enlightened despotism according to which the king, holding supreme power, governed to the benefit of France and, when necessary, crushing vested interests. Russia's increasing contact with Western Europe in the period after the French Revolution raised doubts about the efficacy of enlightened despotism. In an attempt to combat the rising appeal of nationalism and of a more open political system in the aftermath of the Decembrist Revolt of 1825, Nicholas I's government constructed a new state identity based on the motto, 'Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality.' This uniquely Russian official nationality was to strengthen loyalty to the autocracy and defend it from possible republican influences. Nevertheless, tsardom found itself still under threat as the country underwent administrative reform under Alexander II and industrialisation and urbanisation under Alexander III and Nicholas II. In the wake of the Russian Revolution of 1905 the new Fundamental Laws allowed the tsar to retain the 'supreme autocratic power,' which, it was reaffirmed, God himself had commanded the people to obey. Yet, the emperor was no longer described as the 'unlimited autocrat' of all the Russias. In other words the political environment had changed. Louis XVI could not act in a way reminiscent of Henri IV, Nicholas II could not follow the example of Peter I, and Mohammad Reza Shah could not use a method of rule similar to that of his father, Reza Shah.

In Iran the changed conceptions of monarchical ideology amongst the educated layers of society culminated in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Given Iran's greater decline in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the consequent search for its causes monarchical ideology endured a major transformation from above with the emergence of the new Pahlavi dynasty. Reza Shah (1925-1941), wishing to free Iran from what he regarded as the baneful influence of the clergy and religion, tribal and nomadic independence from the central government, and foreign interference—all of which he considered to be causes of Iran's inability to modernise—reshaped monarchical ideology. The new dynasty propagated the view, increasingly popular in the last half century of Qajar rule, that Islam held much of the blame for Iran's backwardness. Having weakened the religious pillar of monarchical ideology, Reza Shah sought to create different symbols of loyalty to the crown. Pahlavi nationalism stressed the glory of pre-Islamic Imperial Iran.

This mirrors to a great extent the rise of great Russian nationalism during the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II, who seemed prepared to utilise it in a bid to strengthen the monarchy at a time of increasing pressure for political reform. In Pahlavi Iran and the later Romanov period the crown became associated with nationalism, whilst in France the Revolution promoted it.

The Pahlavi monarchy portrayed Iran as superior to her immediate neighbours and especially to the Arabs while placing loyalty to the crown and the motherland above religion. This new monarchical/nationalist ideology was also based on Iranian independence from the West. Open foreign influence in the country, characteristic of most of the Qajar period, disappeared. Here we see some of the same tendencies, albeit on a smaller scale, under Alexander III and Nicholas II, who endorsed the autocracy as the guarantee of Russia's physical strength and moral probity against the West.[10] Russian Orthodoxy constituted one of the pillars of the monarchy; the one census of the Imperial Era regarded someone as Russian if he or she was Orthodox. The other aspect of the new ideology was modernisation. Before the Pahlavi period society expected the monarch to administer society, not change it. In the footsteps of the enlightened despots of the eighteenth century, Reza Shah, and his son to a greater extent, conceived of an activist government determined to transform society. Modernisation had become, as in Russia, a government policy. But, a difference existed. Romanov monarchical ideology was not directly dependent on 'modernisation' as it came to be for Pahlavi ideology. Yet, the Romanovs' legitimacy was linked to maintenance of Russia's great power status. This status required modernisation from above.

According to French political thought the kingdom, the king, and the people were inseparable, in the image of the union of Christ and the Church in the *Epitres* of St.Paul. 'The king is the chief and the people of the three orders are the members and all together they form the political and mystic body of the country.'[11] Due to this vantage point above societal divisions, the king carried the responsibility to interpret the needs of the state, to render justice and to arbitrate. The people had only responsibilities, the most important of which was obedience. Louis XIV believed that his relation to his subjects mirrored that of God toward humanity. As the father of his people, he owed them love and protection and the duty to devote himself to their welfare, but they needed to maintain, in Louis' opinion, 'my own splendour of life, my own magnificence, and my own honour.'[12]

The paternal head of Russian society was the tsar, whose power was regarded as 'the only incorruptible power in the world, standing outside of any evil, partiality, or party.'[13] Karamzin, the court historian to Alexander I wrote: 'For lo, these many centuries, we have seen our monarch as our supreme judge and have recognised his benevolent will as the highest authority...In Russia, the sovereign is the living law: he shows favour to the good and punishes the wicked...In the Russian monarch all powers are joined; our government is paternal and patriarchal. Autocracy is the bulwark of Russia.'[14] The monarch's actions were based on truth which guided his conscience in ruling the state. The tsar did not support factions, groups, or partisan interests. Konstantin Pobedonostsev, tutor to the future

Nicholas II, stressed the link between power and truth. 'If truth is absolute and indivisible, so is power; if justice is universal, so is power.'[15] This power had the duty to sacrifice the interests of some people or classes if it benefited the country as a whole. Naturally only the monarch, due to his existence above the society, could define these interests.

The Iranian monarchical framework, like the Russian and French, emphasised the defence of the kingdom, rendering of justice, maintenance of internal order and even the expansion of the realm's boundaries as the shah's primary responsibility. Adherence to the monarchical order was engendered by the longevity of the monarchical system itself and by a handful of powerful and epoch-making monarchs such as Cyrus, Nader Shah, and Abbas I. Not surprisingly, in France and Russia as well larger than life monarchs such as Louis XIV, Henri IV, Ivan IV and Peter the Great towered over the history of their respective countries, legitimising the monarchy.[16]

The conception of the monarch and his people assumed two basic forms in all three countries; although in the Iranian case they emerged only during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah. In Bourbon France, on the one hand emphasis was placed on the traditional relationship between the people and the king based on a royal cult with its ancient customs and rites and the closeness of the king to the people outside the bureaucratic framework. On the other hand, the monarch-people relationship was seen in the framework of the royal function of leadership and co-ordination of the ever-expanding bureaucratic world.[17] The monarch stood at the apex of the administrative system and head of the armed forces.

The two names by which the tsar became known symbolised this duality in the Russian case. *Tsar batushka,* portraying the tsar as the Russian people's caring father 'who would correct the evils of his own government if only someone told him about them,' underlined the direct link between the monarch and his people.'[18] *Gosudar Imperator* emphasised the monarch's role as head of the Imperial Russian state. Peter the Great established this title in order to underline the change from the traditional Russian patrimonial form of government to a bureaucratic, semi-*Rechtstaat.*[19] The monarchist propaganda of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had very similar themes. This duality in all three cases represents attempts to make the needed transition to a bureaucratic monarchy, but yet retain and strengthen the old, traditional forms of adherence to the monarchical order. This more traditional interpretation of the monarch, namely the direct link between him and the people, strengthened as the monarchy began to feel threats to its power from both society and the bureaucracy.

Not surprisingly in all three countries the myth existed that ministers and bureaucrats were inherently obstructionist by following their own policies and selfish interests, whilst preventing the monarch from knowing the real problems of the people. 'If the king only knew' was a phrase heard in France, Russia, and Iran which reflected the divide in the minds of many between the monarch and the government. One seen as an enemy, the other as a caring father. Such a viewpoint could benefit the legitimacy of the monarch. Difficulty in divorcing the

legitimacy of the regime and the sovereign from the success or more importantly failures of the government was an inherent weakness of these regimes.

Societal structure in France and Russia have more in common with each other than either has with Iran. Nevertheless, significant differences in all three cases existed. In France each estate had certain privileges based on the roles it played in society. The nobility constituted the second estate of the realm, whose social position was originally rooted in fiscal exemption, symbols of nobility, and restricted employment. The nobles justified their tax exemptions and privileges on the basis that they fought for *la gloire du roi.* The nobility was a mixed lot. The old sword nobility, the traditional warrior class of the Bourbon state, was smaller in number than the fairly recently ennobled families, and especially those of the robe. The latter filled the middle and upper posts of the expanding bureaucracy. This division amongst the nobles, though quite strong before and during the reign of Louis XIV, weakened over the years. Many nobles supported the concept of an absolutist monarchy. Yet, a significant number of nobles believed in an aristocratic monarchy in which the aristocracy and its institutions, such as the Parlement, limited the sovereign's exercise of his power. Struggles between the Bourbon and the nobility centred on this issue which specifically plagued the reigns of Louis XV and Louis XVI.

To consider the French nobility a closed off caste would be a mistake. Many wealthy third-estate bourgeoisie eventually bought themselves passage into the nobility through ennobling offices.[20] Upon obtaining this status many detached themselves from any type of manual labour and lived off the income of their land. The eighteenth century also witnessed a significant increase of aristocratic involvement in business, including industry and finance. The nobility was helping set the pace in promoting economic change in its most modernising aspects. At the same time commercial capitalism was more in the hands of nobles than of the bourgeoisie.[21] Working with your hands and trading, however, were still considered beneath the position of noblemen in society; it was against the law for aristocrats to participate in such activities. Interests amongst the high nobility and the increasingly numerous and wealthy capitalist bourgeoisie were merging. The traditional interpretation that strong class antagonisms between the aristocracy and bourgeoisie were increasing no longer holds up. To jump ahead to the implosion of the monarchy, the revolt against the crown was led by a professional, but declining bourgeoisie, not by a rising bourgeoisie clamouring for political change. The divisions within these two societal groups were just as large, if not larger than the divisions between them.

Russian society was divided into estates (*soslovie*), similar to the estate system in pre-Revolutionary France. Each group received its definition from the state itself and had no recourse to any form of semi-autonomous body. At the top of this conception stood the Russian nobility, which never occupied the same place in political society, as its counterparts in France, Germany, or England. Due to a combination of historical factors a traditional and powerful landed aristocracy with its own historical and political legitimacy never emerged.[22] Although Peter the

Great recognised the existence of the old Muscovite aristocracy and the emerging service aristocracy, he made the aristocracy's continuing claim to privileges and status dependent on state service. Despite some changes under Catherine the Great the Russian aristocracy remained to a significant extent dependent on the state for status and wealth. But, wealth brought status and wealth was hereditary and largely private. Titles were also hereditary and, allied to wealth, they brought status. Despite an aristocratic core and social entrenchment beginning with Catherine the Great, the Russian aristocracy never wielded the same degree of political power as its French counterparts. The process under Alexander II leading to the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 revealed the extent of the nobility's political impotence. Although it can be argued that the terms of the emancipation were favourable to the nobility to a degree, the nobility itself proved unable to unite in opposition to Alexander's policy; a policy that struck directly at its prestige and livelihood. This occurred at a time when the professional non-noble bureaucrats were easing out the aristocracy from the high bureaucracy, a process which also took place in Bourbon France. Unlike France, the Russian state did not have to struggle with strong landed interests.

The Iranian elite consisted of two parts: one located at court and the other in the provinces. It had neither the organisational power of the French nobility nor the status and wealth of its Russian counterparts. Because of the shah's theoretical power over life and property and the long history of the rise and fall of dynasties a powerful and entrenched nobility did not emerge. An Iranian equivalent of Maurepas, Saint-Simon, Fleury, Sheremetev, or Vorontsov, let alone aristocratic organisations did not exist. Not since the Sassanian period did Iran have an entrenched and large hereditary noble class. The Iranian shahs never encountered a *fronde* or Decembrist revolt. The central elite was indeed dependent on the shah for its continued status and riches. To be sure, during the Qajar period families related to the dynasty itself, like the Farmanfarmaian, established themselves as aristocratic dynasties but they never had the political and financial power of a major French or Russian noble house. To enter the Iranian elite, especially in the Pahlavi period, was relatively easy. Slipping out of it was also easy. Entrance was based on either accumulation of wealth or promotion within the bureaucracy or military hierarchy. In short, French society was more aristocratic than Russia, which was more aristocratic than Iran with corresponding consequences for monarchical power in these countries.

In Russia a 'third estate' did not exist in any real numbers until the middle of the nineteenth century, and even then it never acquired the size and political and economic power of its counterparts in Imperial Germany or the Habsburg Empire. Before the period of industrialisation this 'middle class' consisted of merchants, professionals, and bureaucrats. As modernisation from above gathered momentum during the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II, the number of professionals and businessmen grew. The increasing educational opportunities, a process which began under Alexander I and accelerated in the later part of the century, not only increased the educational level of the growing middle classes, but

also produced a large student body and an intelligentsia, whose audience increased. This mirrors the process in Iran under the Pahlavis as the modernisation process took hold. The growth in the number of this class posed a challenge to the autocratic character of the Romanov and Pahlavi regimes which were under pressure from this class to open the political space. The dilemma was finding a way to incorporate these classes into the political system. The French monarchs faced a different problem. The professional middle class became a leading opposition force to the monarchy's attempts to push through institutional change.

Whereas the Bourbons were faced with the *philosophes*, the Romanovs had to contend with a larger, more radical group, the *intelligentsiya*, many of whose members viewed the autocracy if not with hatred, then with disdain. The Romanovs and Pahlavis were faced with a similar problem. On the one hand, modernisation required the spread of education and the enlargement of the professional middle class. On the other hand, the growing educated part of society demanded to have a voice in the running of government. The standard bearer of this movement was the intelligentsia. To some extent in France, but definitely in Russia and Iran the monarchical regimes faced an additional ideological challenge. Their relative backwardness ensured the existence of this intelligentsia which drew its ideas from more advanced societies, compared these with its own and to its countries' disfavour.

The peasants were numerically the largest group in Russian and French society. In Russia the elite feared a large scale peasant rebellion, such as the Pugachev revolt during the reign of Catherine II, which would engulf the entire empire. The French feared this less despite peasant hardship. In Russia some regarded these dark masses as anarchic and incomprehensible whilst others believed that the peasant was the carrier of the genuine Russian soul and culture. Many peasants were serfs until 1861, when Alexander II emancipated them. These reforms were never intended to be the last stop in peasant reform, but rather the first step.

Beginning with the emancipation of the serfs the tsarist government regarded the peasant as a possible bedrock of conservatism at a time of increasing pressure to open up the political system. To the minds of many if the tsar could maintain the loyalty of the peasants crushing urban disturbances would be easier. After all, the countryside saved the regime in Prussia in 1848. Some government figures believed that whilst workers and intellectuals by nature were in opposition to the government the peasants persisted in having great respect for the figure of the tsar. The peasants believed that the *tsar-batushka* would solve their land-hunger problem, whose solution the peasants saw in the land of the nobility. The peasant revolts up to and including 1905 were rarely directed against the tsar, but rather against local landowners and officials. Advocating the overthrow of the tsar was something alien to the peasant. During the Qajar period the vast majority of the population under varied types of living arrangements lived in rural areas. Peasants, despite great resentment towards the landlords, rarely revolted. Mohammad Reza Shah, like Stolypin, viewed the peasantry in the modern period as a pillar of support for the monarchy. He therefore implemented a massive land reform

programme designed to garner peasant support for the Pahlavi monarchy. The more important characteristic of Iranian society before the Pahlavi period at this time is the strong independence of a multitude of nomadic tribes over which the Qajars exercised very little control.

Government Structure

Challenges of state and institution building and making the bureaucracy of a supposedly absolute monarchy function effectively faced these three regimes. Louis XIV laid the foundation of a central bureaucratic government, though it is doubtful that it was the efficient and modern bureaucratic machine portrayed in certain works.[23] By the time of his death France had a regular standing army, a developed fiscal apparatus, specialised departments of state, and a venal bureaucracy. The expanding state ministries received increasing amounts of information from the provinces and sent directives to the non-venal local *intendants* who were charged with implementing policy emanating from the royal councils in which the king actively, at least theoretically, took part. The organs of the central government became a permanent fixture in the lives of Frenchmen and could not be easily dismissed.[24] Although at its highest levels the bureaucratic machine was still vulnerable to the effects of faction and the swings of court politics, an impersonal bureaucracy, in other words effective vertical forms of governance, dedicated to fulfilling the orders of the centre, began to emerge, which by the end of the seventeenth century could function without the daily involvement of the king. The bureaucratisation process had begun.

The governmental structure that emerged during the Sun King's reign, though impressive in many ways, represented to a degree a compromise with the privileged classes and the system predating it. Louis had created new structures, but did not completely eradicate the powers of previous structures or the structures themselves. Such a process fit Louis' advice to his son to avoid abrupt and therefore potentially destabilising change.[25] Since much authority in the Bourbon monarchy was negotiated, despite absolutist propaganda to the contrary, structural change had to occur slowly, avoiding alienation of too many vested interests at once. During Louis XV's reign the bureaucracy continued to expand and become more professional.

Peter I laid the foundation of the Imperial Russian government when he established the Senate and Administrative Colleges. Similar to the Bourbons, Peter wished to create a more efficient system capable of extracting the resources for war and governing the Empire.[26] At this point the government's machinery was primarily aimed at sustaining Russia's newly acquired position as a European power, on which the dynasty's legitimacy would increasingly be based. During the eighteenth century poorly defined judicial, executive, and administrative functions, lack of institutionalisation, and political culture resulted in a low level of co-ordination and a large reliance on the role of personality. Russia, of course, was not unique in this matter, given the relative lack of institutionalisation in most countries of Europe at the time. But in Russia it was more pronounced. During

most of the eighteenth century corruption, inefficiency, and inexperienced and poorly trained bureaucrats plagued the Russian government.

The next major governmental re-organisation occurred during the reign of Alexander I. Wishing to streamline the system and make it more efficient Alexander replaced Peter's administrative colleges with a ministerial form of government. The heads of the individual ministries would report directly to the tsar; a change which made the Russian government system at its highest levels resemble that of Bourbon France.[27] Vertically organised ministries improved the overall efficiency of the government as they became more specialised and modern during the nineteenth century. At the same time, the replacement of the colleges by the ministries made the problem of horizontal co-ordination of the state's highest servants more acute. In principle the tsar, like the French king, would serve as the co-ordinating point, the pivot of the system.

Iran was a different matter. The idea of ministerial government did not take hold until the mid-nineteenth century and only in response to the weakening of the Qajar state in the face of external challenges. The Qajar monarchy never underwent a period of bureaucratisation, as did the Safavids and Sassanians. The shah did have a first minister who provided money for the administration, the defence of the state, and the shah himself. In the second half of the nineteenth century Iran did have major ministries, but they were not the great tax collecting and information gathering bureaucracies of eighteenth-century France or late tsarist Russia. In 1858 Nasr al-Din Shah established six ministries: justice, finance, interior, foreign affairs, war, and religious foundations. By the mid to late-nineteenth century most of the few governmental posts which did exist, including governorships, local tax collectors, and customs officials, were venal and sold to the highest bidder given the state's desperate financial situation. Clearly, the Qajar centre had no real political infrastructure able to administer the kingdom, enforce its will and extract financial resources. The *'ulama* fulfilled many ecclesiastical and judicial governmental functions. During the Qajar period religious institutions stood against the state and were not wholly incorporated into it.

Whereas the Bourbon, Romanov, and even Ottoman bureaucracies could implement reforms and projects aimed at modernising the state from above, pre-Pahlavi Iran continued to lag behind. The Pahlavi dynasty, the first ruling house not to have any tribal origins, the traditional base of support for any new dynasty, needed alternative sources of power. The first pillar of power established by Reza Shah was a relatively strong central government bureaucracy capable of imposing its will throughout the country. The second was the emergence of a bureaucratic elite with strong ties to the Pahlavi-Iranian state. The army was the third. The army and governmental apparatus, which had failed to achieve any real degree of institutionalisation given Reza Shah's modus operandi and the shortness of his reign, seriously weakened once he left for exile in 1941.

In all three countries the monarch ruled with the aid of his various councils and ministers whose responsibility was not only to execute the decisions of the royal will, but also to help the monarch, through dissemination of information and

deliberation, to take decisions of state. Here, at the highest level of government, structure and human agency interacted.

In France the king's councils were attached to the person of the king and were consequently inseparable from him. At the meetings of these councils the king exercised his power, but at the same time the council could also try to limit his power by reminding him of certain limits placed on that authority.[28] By Louis XV's and XVI's reign, the king ruled France through two basic councils. The *Conseil d'en haut* whose members had the right to be called ministers, dealt with foreign policy. The *Conseil des Dépêches* dealt with the internal affairs of the country. Whilst the effectiveness of the vertical structure of the Bourbon state increased, horizontal co-ordination of the government remained in the hands of the king. He chaired the meetings of these councils (they usually met twice a week) where all decisions concerning foreign and domestic policy were taken. But, in the later years of Louis XV's reign and during the reign of Louis XVI decisions tended to be taken during the monarch's weekly *travails* or ad-hoc meetings with particular ministers. The decisions were then presented to the relevant council for rubber stamping. This tendency increased the importance of the king as the central co-ordinating figure in the government since only he knew what was going on in all the ministries.[29] If the king decided to exclude a particular minister(s) from either the formation of policy or the taking of decisions loyalty on the part of the excluded figures was not engendered. Such exclusion only encouraged ministerial intrigue and disunity. Opposing your rival's plans either from within the council or within the Parlement was a very effective method for disgracing your opponents. The king himself could put an end to this cause of intrigue through severe reprisals against any minister failing to abide by the council's decisions.

In a bid to crush faction Louis XIV insisted that once a decision had been taken in the council everyone was obliged to support it. Louis XIV dealt harshly with expressions of objection after the taking of a decision or any hint of seeking outside support for or against a certain measure. Once he severely reprimanded Colbert for continuing a discussion after a decision had been taken: "...do not risk angering me again, as after I have heard all of your positions and those of the other ministers and have taken a decision I never want to hear of it again."[30] The Sun King understood that only through grand shows of ministerial unity could the Bourbon government achieve a degree of success. Moreover, he knew that the king's strong, open and consistent support for his ministers engendered feelings of security amongst the higher servants of the state. Confident that a cabal would not remove them, Louis XIV's ministers concentrated more on the state's business and less on intrigue. Of course, faction and court politics did play a role in Louis XIV's France, but the king himself was at the centre of this network, balancing and crushing, when necessary, the various groups through effective use of patronage.[31] The Sun King had mastered the art of politics.

Six ministers constituted the highest level of government in Bourbon France: the Chancellor, the *Controleur-General des finances*, and the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, War, Marine, and the *Maison du Roi*. In principle the king filled

these positions with men of his own choosing. The responsibilities of the various ministers are evident from their titles, except for the Chancellor, who was the head of the country's judicial system. In order to ensure the independence of French justice the chancellor, though appointed by the king, served for life. The king could not remove him without a successful trial.[32] In the king's absence the chancellor chaired council meetings. He also had the responsibility for maintaining the government's vital relationship with the Parlement.

Since the kings of France considered foreign relations and the issue of war to reside in their own personal domain, they played a greater role in the formulation of foreign policy, or at least paid more attention to it. The office of the controleur general increased in importance as the monarchy's bureaucratisation process continued. As the provider of financing he began to have a voice in all domestic and foreign policy making.

Alexander I established eight separate ministries: education, commerce, finance, internal affairs, war, navy, foreign affairs, and justice. Ministries of Communication and Transport, Trade, and Agriculture were subsequently added. For the most part the demarcation between the ministries was rather clear, but some exceptions existed. As in France and Iran the ministers reported individually to the tsar on matters pertaining only to their respective ministry. Business involving more than one ministry was referred to the Committee of Ministers, which in turn made recommendations to the tsar.[33] The Committee, however, tended to examine administrative rather than major political matters. By the time of Alexander III's reign the autocracy was dependent on a 'new bureaucratic class' for the running of the government. The bureaucracy of Bourbon France had started to undergo this process, but it was never as large or specialised as the Russian. Institutionalisation and systemisation meant that the government could function to a great degree without the everyday supervision of the tsar.

After the Revolution of 1905, the tsar's prerogatives were wide-ranging and remained powerful.[34] He remained the source for legislative initiation for all state business and modifications of the Fundamental Laws. No bill could become law without his signature. He was able to rule by decree (article 87) when the Duma was out of session. Such decrees, however, could not change the Fundamental Laws, the State Council or Duma, or laws concerning the election to them. More importantly, the Duma upon its reconvening had the right to approve or reject these imperial decrees. Article 15 allowed him to declare states of emergency in provinces and suspend civil rights without reference to the Duma. The greatest weapon the tsar had in trying to keep the Duma manageable was his right to disband it, if and when it proved too unruly (Article 105).

Responsibility for the administration of the Empire remained with the emperor. Whilst he retained the supreme power in matters of administration, the monarch nevertheless delegated some limited power to subordinates both within the central bureaucracy in St. Petersburg and regional centres of administration to help him rule such a vast empire. Within the central administration the government, headed

by a prime minister, was appointed by, and responsible to, the emperor alone. In foreign and military affairs the emperor retained his supremacy.

Iran's bureaucratic machine and ministerial system did not take full form and have any real effectiveness until the middle point of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign. Since he essentially created the governmental structure that came crashing down in 1979, its examination is in the chapter on Iran.

Institutional Limitations on Monarchical Power

In these three countries some form of check, at least theoretically, on the exercise of monarchical power existed. In France the Parlement constituted this check; in post 1905-06 Russia and Iran limits on monarchical power were enshrined in a constitution. The skill with which Louis XVI, Nicholas II, and Mohammad Reza Shah handled this structural variable played an important role in determining the course politics would take and more specifically the extent of the monarch's real power.

The Parlements of France and especially the one of Paris, were one of the most important institutions of the Ancien Regime. The Parlement emerged during the thirteenth century from the *curia regis*, the original body through which medieval French kings took counsel and dispensed justice. Slowly the custom emerged that no law was considered valid unless it had been registered in the Parlement of Paris. This became the cause of a longstanding conflict between the crown and the Parlement. The Parlement argued that registration was part of a verification process by which the magistrates ensured that any proposed legislation did not contradict natural justice and the unwritten constitution, both of which were open to debate. The crown insisted that the registration process was a formality.

If the magistrates did find a problem they had the right to issue *remontrances*, which directed the king's attention to what they considered to be faults in current legislation in the hope that the king would take them into account and make the necessary changes. According to some political thinkers, such as Charles Loyseau, no law required the king to review *remontrances*; he did it out of good will. The magistrates believed it was their responsibility to enlighten the king, to put themselves between him and his 'self-serving' ministers, and to show him when his plans and legislation proved, in their eyes, to contradict previous legislation or constitute a threat to the public peace. *Pour le roi, contre le roi* became the controversial slogan for some. The Parlement, however, never considered itself to be in opposition to the king; the magistrates recognised that their authority was only an appendage of the king's God-given power.

The gradual arrogation by the Parlement of the right to register legislation represented the beginning of what the absolutists considered parliamentary interference in state affairs. In 1527 Francois I forbade the court to meddle in *des affaires*. When Louis XIII encountered parliamentary obstinacy, he told the magistrates: 'You are here only to judge master Peter and master John and I intend to keep you in your place; if you continue your machinations I will cut your nails to the quick.'[35] Although friction between the two parties always existed, their

encounters had a pattern. Frequently both sides would posture for some time and then compromise. Under Louis XIII, Louis XIV and during the premiership of Cardinal de Fleury under Louis XV, the government held sway over the magistrates through skilful handling of its relationship with the Parlement. At the same time when disagreements did arise these governments knew when to compromise or remain firm in confrontations with the Parlement.

The king did have recourse to a *lit de justice* if he disagreed with repeated parliamentary remonstrances. At this grand ceremony the king either descended upon the Parlement in Paris or summoned the magistrates to Versailles where he would personally order the registration of legislation. The power of the *lit de justice* derived from the general understanding that since the Parlement received its power from the king himself, in his presence the magistrates ceased to exercise that delegated authority. The *lit de justice* when used sparingly and appropriately constituted a powerful weapon for the king. The king could avoid the Parlement altogether and issue what was known as an *arrêt du conseil* which legally was equivalent to laws registered by the Parlement. The kings of France rarely took this option for it smacked too much of despotism.

The Chancellor was the titular head of the Parlement and was responsible for its relations with the crown. The First President of the Court, again a royal appointment, was the court's principal officer. He had the unenviable job of protecting royal interests in the Parlement by ensuring smooth passage of royal edicts, whilst acting as the chief representative of the court to the king. Such an assignment required great political skill at balancing interests, especially in light of the often contradictory interests of the government and Parlement. If he favoured royal interests blatantly he would lose the ability to influence his fellow magistrates. If he did not represent royal interests well enough he would have to deal with the wrath not only of the chancellor, but of the king as well.

Montesquieu as many others regarded the Parlement as an intermediary body between the king and society, preventing the monarchy from slipping into despotism. Since there was no written constitution defining which powers belonged to whom, quarrels between them frequently (especially after 1750) became discussions on the 'constitution' of the state and the legitimate power of the monarchy. Although the crown strove to extend its power over the obstreperous Parlement, it never challenged the right of registration, as such an action would have appeared despotic. The Sun King led the most successful campaign to reduce the Parlement's power. In 1665 he removed the designation 'sovereign' from its title. In 1667 he began to limit its right to remonstrance and by 1673 left it with the right to remonstrance only *after* the registration of legislation.[36]

The composition of the Parlement, whose office were venal and most importantly granted noble status, reflected the growing influence of the robe nobility and the bourgeoisie who sought ennobling offices. The Parlement did have a genuine *esprit de corps*, which was quite sensitive to perceived slights and infringements on its jurisdiction. Many of the conflicts between the crown and the Parlement did arise from thorny political issues. But most of the magistrates'

complaints dealt with what they perceived to be the curtailing of their judicial rights in favour of courts within the administrative part of the system. The government could not remove the purchaser of a seat in the parlements unless he was convicted of a crime or reimbursed the original cost of the office. In light of the financial difficulties of the Bourbon monarchy that the government would find the financial resources to remove troublesome magistrates en masse was unlikely.

For many many the establishment of the Duma as a result of the Revolution of 1905 was Russia's vital first step on the path travelled by the countries of the West. Despite the restrictions on it, the body did have some real power at the beginning. Many members of its members hoped at some point, preferably sooner than later, to widen the Duma's role in governing the Empire.

The Duma was elected for five years by a limited franchise. Its approval was needed for any bill to become law, but at the same time the representative body by itself did not have a real opportunity to initiate legislation. Its responsibility was the debate, amendment, and in the end approval or rejection of government initiatives. The political parties in the Duma started from a position of opposition to the government since the tsar regardless of the party composition in the Duma appointed the cabinet which was responsible to him alone. The government had to work with certain parties to form a majority if any legislation was to pass. The Duma did have power over the purse, but the court and certain military expenses were exempt from popular control. If needed the government could resolve budget fights with the Duma by enacting the previous year's budget. The Duma did have the right of interpellation of ministers, who were not obliged to answer or even show up. The tsar considered the first two Dumas overly hostile and disbanded them. The result was the so-called coup d'etat of 3 June 1907 and the establishment of a more restrictive franchise favouring the landed class. The government aimed to have a more conservative Duma with which it could work.

The State Council, the upper house of Russia's parliament, was an appendage of the tsar's power. Half of its members were chosen by the emperor himself who could drop any one of them from the list of active members at the beginning of the calendar year. The remaining members came from zemstvos, noble societies, academicians from the leading universities, and various other sections of upper educated society (article 12). Legislative projects and bills could not become law until the State Council, upon their receipt from the Duma, passed them. By choosing half of the council's members the emperor played a key role in determining the political leanings of the upper parliamentary house. Until the end of the Imperial regime, the State Council remained very sensitive to the tsar's wishes. When members directly or indirectly understood the emperor's wishes on a particular piece of legislation, they cast their votes accordingly. If he did not openly support a controversial legislative project or allowed the members to vote as they wished, it was most likely doomed.

In 1906 after a period of disturbances which rocked the Iranian capital and other major cities, Muzzaffar al-Din Shah issued a decree establishing a Constituent Assembly that culminated in the Iranian Parliament. The impotence

of the state to stop the economic and political decline of the country brought together varied groups from nationalists to members of the *'ulama*. They believed that the country's salvation depended on limiting the shah's power. The Constitution of 1906 would remain the theoretical basis of the Iranian monarchical system until the 1979 Revolution.

The monarch remained the head of state and governed the realm through his ministers. The ministers were responsible to the Majles, unlike the German and Russian imperial constitutions where the cabinet was responsible to the monarch.[37] State power was divided into three branches--legislative, executive, and judicial. The parliament consisted of two houses, the popularly elected Majles and the Senate. The Majles was elected on a restricted male franchise, which more often than not resulted in its domination by clerics, conservative landlords, and bazaar merchants. The Senate was given the right to review and approve legislation passed by the Majles and then present it to the shah for his signature. Similar to the Russian State Council, half of the Senate's membership was to be hand-picked by the shah himself. These upper houses provided the Russian and Iranian monarchs with an effective degree of authority over the newly emergent constitutional systems. During the Qajar period this body was never established. Mohammad Reza Shah finally convened it in 1949.

The Challenge of Governing

Louis XVI, Nicholas II and Mohammad Reza Shah stood at the centre of the entire governmental apparatus. Their role consisted of three basic but vital functions: (1) choosing ministers; (2) management and co-ordination of those ministers and the other highest servants of the state; and (3) policy direction, though this had different meanings in different periods. This challenge of governing at the highest levels of the state draws out the issue of human agency. Such monarchical regimes always had inherent political weaknesses. Firstly, to divorce the legitimacy of the regime and the sovereign from the success or failure of government was difficult. Secondly, chance and heredity chose the leader. For example, can anyone really argue that the late eighteenth-century generation of Habsburgs had to produce a Josef II or a Leopold II, at the same time that the Bourbons had to produce a Louis XVI? Thirdly, that even a competent and activist leader will find sustaining his vigour and effectiveness for life difficult must be taken into account.

Fourthly and most importantly, the dynamics of the system required a co-ordinating head. No monarch could ignore this structural reality. If the monarch failed to act as a co-ordinating head of government or refused to delegate that responsibility to a first minister, disaster could ensue. Louis XIII, the young Louis XV and Wilhelm I of Germany, wishing not to be the active pivot of the system, appointed powerful first ministers who carried out that role for them and thereby preserved a relatively effective government. If a monarch or a first minister ineffectively played this co-ordinating a hole in the centre of government emerged, greatly damaging, if not paralysing, the government. In brief, the monarch's

modus operandi set the working tone for the state's institutions. In this study the hole in the centre of government is a vital concept. The modus operandi of Louis XVI, Nicholas II and Mohammad Reza Shah shared this phenomena with disastrous consequences for the government's ability to act and react. This overriding theme ties together these three monarchs and revolutions. The point needs to be made that effective action by a monarch or his trusted right hand man could not guarantee overcoming the challenges threatening the regime's survival. But if *in the first instance* the ruler's modus operandi made a relatively effective response to these challenges impossible, then the danger of revolution grew enormously, if not making it inevitable.

'*Cherchez les capables*,' Konstantin Pobedonostsev urged his former student and now tsar, Nicholas II. Even an intelligent and active monarch could not hope to govern the realm without the guidance, knowledge, and administrative help of ministers. The competence of ministers became that much more important when the monarch lacked either interest in actively governing or the character needed to fulfil the responsibilities of the co-ordinating centre of the system. How the monarch chose his ministers also played a vital role. Understanding to what degree a monarch chose ministers according to his own volition and to what degree faction and familial pressures played a role in his choice is essential. This too depended on how many conceivable candidates the monarch personally knew or whether he had an effective secretariat. If a monarch bowed excessively to factional pressures in choosing ministers or he depended on others to request candidates, he could end up with individual ministers with greater loyalty to their sponsors than to the king. At the same time the monarch would at times need to include certain people in the ministry in order to maintain support of certain factions and groups. Only a skilled monarch could draw the needed fine line.

Ideally decisions were to be made within ministerial structures outlined above through deliberation, analysis, and consideration of consequences of any move. The reality then as it is now differs to a relatively large extent. Opinions clash severely creating great tension within ministries and cabinets, basic facts are disputed, as are goals, means and ends. Additionally, daily events are thrown at governments requiring in many cases immediate action and denying the time for deliberation. This reality made the co-ordinating function of the centre that much more vital to the relative smooth running of the government.

Louis XVI, Nicholas II, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi inherited positions with great theoretical and formal power but they needed to create authority in order to govern effectively. Authority here is defined as an effective relationship between the monarch and other people, most importantly with ministers and those around him. It allows the political actor to exert his own will, to command action, to cause desired outcomes, and persuade others to follow. To develop that authority one must be an effective leader, exhibiting the characteristics defined in the first chapter. In this sense Louis XIV, to an extent Louis XV, Alexander II, Alexander III, and the last shah were leaders and therefore wielded real authority. When

examining these three cases we need to determine to what extent did Louis XVI, Nicholas II and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi enjoyed such authority.

Obviously, the structure of the government and the machinery designed for decision making is only half the story. The performance of institutions depended greatly on the monarch's relationship with his ministers and how he managed and co-ordinated them. For any 'team' to be successful an effective leader is needed. Bureaucratic squabbles, personality clashes and ministerial infighting based on faction or genuine policy disagreements existed, as they do in every form of government. That ministerial struggles also reflected conflicting institutional views and perspectives on the state's interests, e.g. war versus navy, finance departments versus spending departments should not be forgotten. Inevitably too people seldom reach the top in politics without powerful egos, and aggressive and ambitious personalities. The centre point of any system holds responsibility to ensure that such egos and squabbles do not paralyse the state's capacity to act and react. This is true for any political system. Since ministers were ultimately dependent on the monarch for his political power and position they could not, individually or collectively formulate or execute any major policy without the explicit support of the monarch-chief executive. This support was needed not only in getting council approval of policies, but also in implementation either at court or in the country at large. If it became known or it was believed that the sovereign was only lukewarm to a minister's idea or to the minister himself, that minister would discover that he was without the means to accomplish anything, despite his official position.

A successful minister wishing to retain the monarch's favour had to expand his power and influence on him by limiting the influence of, or discrediting fellow ministers. Consequently, a monarch could end up with a group of men who rather than striving for a unified government, engaged in factional fighting and policy sabotage. This situation is attributable also to the absence of collective responsibility and/or institutional loyalty amongst the relevant actors. Most monarchs realised that a great degree of ministerial unity was needed if the government was to accomplish anything. This is particularly true as the bureaucratic apparatus grew and society became more complex.

Achievement of a unified ministry raised two important issues. Firstly, who would fulfil the role of the co-ordinating centre? There was no reason why a monarch himself could not fulfil the role of a first minister, engendering unity and co-ordinating the state's servants at the highest level. The modus operandi of Louis XIV, Alexander III, Mohammad Reza Shah, and Josef II are good examples of this type of rule. Alternatively, a first minister with the full and open backing of the monarch could play this co-ordinating role. If the monarch recognised his inability to fulfil this role or simply did not wish to, perhaps lacking interest, he could throw the full weight of the monarchy's power behind one man. This would be done to ensure government/ministerial unity in the absence of an active monarch. The relationships between Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu, Wilhelm I and Bismarck, Alexander I and Count A.A.Arakcheyev, and Empress Maria-

Theresa and Kaunitz are examples of this situation. Yet, a distinction needs to be made between a hole in the centre of the government where no coherent policy exists and perfectly clear policy which may at the same time be extremely stupid and based on false premises. Therefore, the issues of the ability to manage ministers and intelligence of the monarch or first minister are of vital importance. In monarchical France, Russia, and Iran examples of both these forms of governance are present. Louis XIV's modus operandi of a 'ruling' king became the example to which Louis XV and Louis XVI strove. Louis XIII's example of reigning whilst Richelieu ruled did not seem to his successors the ideal modus operandi of a true French king. The position of an official first minister had been filled only once after the reign of Louis XIV when Louis XV named Cardinal Fleury chief minister. Fleury, who received Louis XV's full support and official recognition, ran an efficient ministry.

During the last turbulent years of Alexander II's reign General Loris-Melikov received near dictatorial power from the tsar. Faced with increasing terrorist pressure and disappointment amongst the educated classes over the course of reforms Alexander II decided to act boldly by giving this man the power to crush the terrorist movement and make moves to reconcile the government with the rest of society. Eventually using the Ministry of Internal Affairs as his power base, Loris-Melikov was able to form a ministry of people sympathetic to his policies. The tsar in extra-ordinary circumstances decided to appoint, perhaps temporarily, his own Richelieu. Nothing in principle was wrong with this move. Either the tsar would play the co-ordinating role or delegate it to a first/major minister. Despite the growing size of the tsarist bureaucracy there was no reason one figure could not macro-manage it.[38] Reza Shah throughout his reign was the co-ordinating centre. He established more or less the broad parameters of policy, whilst using ministers to handle policy details.

If the monarch chose to fulfil the role of first minister and thereby involving himself in all aspects of policy making, he could find himself directly blamed for policy mistakes with the predictable consequences for the standing of the monarchy. The very fluid distinction between crown and government meant that the failure of policy could tarnish the legitimacy of both. When no other competing ideologies existed, the crown and government could survive for no other alternatives existed. But with the emergence of competing ideologies after the French Revolution association of a monarch with government policy could very likely be a source of weakness. A monarch by delegating the everyday running of government to a first minister who could then provide the needed ministerial unity, gives himself the option to make his first minister a scapegoat if and when policy proves to be mistaken and unpopular. The monarch would have a greater possibility to divorce the legitimacy of the crown from that of the government.

Secondly, a unified ministry could present a threat to the king's power, the so-called threat of 'ministerial despotism.' Monarchs rightly feared that ministers would either limit the flow of information to them or present a unified front to

them on various policy decisions with the aim of limiting their room for manoeuvre and obtaining their consent. In response, monarchs frequently employed a form of divide and rule in their dealing with the highest servants of the state. This policy required skill and adept politics on the part of the monarch. Louis XIV, though appointing men of different beliefs as ministers, made sure that no one faction monopolised his ear. He advised his son, "Allow only a limited amount of people into your affairs and discussions but do not let them imagine that they have the advantage of being in such a position to give you their likes and their good or bad impressions of people."[39] Alexander III resembled Louis XIV in this respect. The chanllenge of ministerial unity and the threat of ganging up presented not dissimilar problems to the Russian tsars. The issues of unity at the highest levels of government and 'ganging up' faced Russian tsars, French kings, and US presidents, amongst others; these issues are immune to time and space.

U.S. President Richard Nixon's building up of the National Security Council is a good example of a modern democratic leader trying to ensure that clear and varied policy choices reach the top. Nixon wanted all differences of view to be 'identified and defended, rather than muted or buried' adding that he did not want 'to be confronted with a bureaucratic consensus that leaves me no option but acceptance or rejection, and that gives me no way of knowing what alternatives exist.'[40] That which Nixon tried to achieve was also the goal of any proactive monarch,

Alexander II tended to appoint ministers who held diverging views either for the purpose of divide and rule or to obtain a variety of information, but in the end he co-ordinated them and provided a reasonable degree of leadership. Alexander III worked to improve communication between his ministers and at the same time provided leadership and guidance. Administrative changes under Alexander I, Nicholas I and Alexander II were designed to improve horizontal governance. Although the tsars complained of lack of unity amongst his ministers, they refused to institutionalise fully bodies, such as the Committee of Ministers or the Council of Ministers, which could have served as a type of cabinet and have improved horizontal governance at the highest levels. The tsars at times preferred to work with individual ministers through weekly meetings and thus the responsibility for co-ordination remained in the hands of the tsar. A similar situation emerged during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah. Serious, if not fatal, problems arose when the monarch could or would not fulfil the co-ordinating role in government, and refused to relinquish some control over the government to a capable first minister. But the position of first minister could create problems. Through growing popularity and bureaucratic power he could be regarded as overshadowing the monarch. An insecure monarch could very well find such a figure a direct threat to his position. In order to protect himself the monarch would create a degree of disunity in the ministry. If the monarch lacked skill, a hole in the centre of government could emerge.

Monarchs could resort to courtiers and unofficial advisers, to the great chagrin of their ministers, to escape or prevent the emergence of 'ministerial despotism'. At times these figures would constitute an alternative source of information and opinion, which in itself is not bad. But once a decision had been made the co-ordination of policy had to be maintained. Disaster ensued if the monarch on the advice of these unofficial advisors followed one policy while the government followed another contradictory one. Louis XV, frustrated by his foreign minister's failure to share his enthusiasm for close relations with Poland and Sweden, conducted a secret policy with these two countries (*le secret du roi*). At other times such figures close to the person of the monarch could wield more influence than ministers. This was one reason why ministers generally resented the monarch's private secretariat which regulated meetings with the monarch.

In France faction and the relationship between the court and the government were a powerful threat to the integrity and unity of the ministry. Factions battled not to promote or oppose a certain policy per se, but rather to ensure that they received positions and that their competitors did not. Louis XIV clearly recognised the threat faction posed to his authority and to the government's ability to act effectively. He strove to lessen, if not remove, the negative effect of court politics and faction on the conduct of state business. He chose men from the administrative nobility whose loyalty to the king and his wishes was greater and more reliable than that of courtiers. Ministers from this group did not have large family chains and patronage networks.[41] Conversely, the courtiers from the old 'war' nobility were much less dependent on the king for their position. At the same time Louis XIV satisfied the court grandees and factions with honours and various titles. By excluding them from the ministries he ensured that positions on the royal councils did not become trophies for the various factions, dedicated to their personal advancement. His successors did not follow this policy of excluding the grands seigneurs from the councils, with disastrous results. Additionally, by bringing into the ministry members of the court aristocracy Louis XV and especially Louis XVI exacerbated the relations between the robe and court nobility.

The tsars faced similar challenges in their co-ordination of ministers. But, Russia's bureaucracy by the mid to late-nineteenth century posed additional problems for the tsarist regime. The increasing professionalism and size of the bureaucracy seemed to represent a threat to the unlimited power of the autocrat through bureaucratic systemisation of business and control of the flow of information, let alone its specialised knowledge of areas. The bureaucracy began to have a sense of its own professional rights, *esprit de corps*, and of service to something impersonal such as 'the state' or 'Russia.' In other words, as the business of ruling an increasing complex society required greater degrees of specialised knowledge the less actual control the autocrat would have over *everyday* business and the greater his reliance on the bureaucracy to rule the country. Inevitably it seemed that these specialists could in the end dictate policy to an emperor unable to master the necessary specialised knowledge in all fields. This

reality the tsars knew and feared. As socio-economic changes began to have an increasingly powerful impact on the government, requiring it to address a growing backlog of problems, the greater the necessity for efficient government. But, the path to such a government led to routinisation of work at all levels based on bureaucratic laws and united ministers, which could represent a threat to the power of the autocracy. But as Alexander II and Alexander III showed, it was possible to be a relatively effective chief executive under these circumstances.[42] Mohammad Reza Shah had greater real control over both his ministers and the bureaucracy since he played a large role in Iranian institution building. This will be examined later.

The effectiveness of government depended completely in the first instance on the monarch's relationship with his ministers and bureaucracy. If, for whatever reason, the monarch's modus operandi created a hole in the centre of government and thereby effectively preventing the government's ability to operate, it would find itself unable to manage issues facing it. Revolution would then be made.

Structural Factor: The International System and External Challenge

The domestic structural variables of the monarchical state were not the only factors influencing a monarch's room for manoeuvre. Economic, political, and military changes taking place in the international system played an equally, if not more powerful, role. A regime can weaken itself by exhausting its economic, financial, and military resources in inter-state competition. In doing so the regime places greater hardships on the society it governs, creating dissatisfaction amongst the population. But on the other hand if a regime proves unable to meet the challenge of technologically and/or financially stronger states it will delegitimise itself. This type of 'competitive' relationship existed between Bourbon France and post-Restoration England; between Romanov Russia and industrialized Europe; and between modern Iran and the Great Powers of Europe and the USA. France and Russia launched reforms in an attempt to maintain their weakening great power status. Pahlavi Iran took the path of reform and modernisation in order to defend the country's independence from the technically and economically advanced countries of the West and from Russia/USSR.

Although competition within the international states system has existed since time immemorial, the character of that competition has changed. England's development of effective administrative and financial structures allowed her to challenge French hegemony. England then underwent the first Industrial Revolution, with all of its technological advances. These two developments created a new form of competition, which spurred economic and administrative reform throughout Europe and eventually the rest of the world. Hence the attempts by Bourbon France and Romanov Russia to initiate internal economic, institutional, and eventually political reforms designed to maintain their great power status within this international system of competing states. The Pahlavis built as one of the bases of their legitimacy the economic modernisation of the country with the eventual goal of maintaining the country's independence. These

attempts at reform not only exacerbated existing problems, but also posed new challenges to these regimes. Similar to France, Iran had to battle with vested interests, seemingly determined to block Pahlavi style modernisation. The steps taken by these regimes created or exacerbated domestic problems and challenges, thereby to a degree 'unbalancing' the system. Revolution, however, was not inevitable.

Through a series of wars under Louis XIII and Louis XIV France became the premier European power. This status brought to the Bourbon dynasty great legitimacy and *gloire*. France the great power and the Bourbon dynasty became synonymous. Inevitably, Louis XV and Louis XVI believed that they had the responsibility of sustaining this position. Yet, they did not believe that such a goal necessarily meant following the Sun King's foreign policy. By the end of Louis XIV's reign the increasingly expensive and seemingly endless struggle with neighbouring countries had exhausted the state and the people.

Louis XV did not thirst for *gloire*[43] as his predecessor had. He succumbed, however, to France's great power legacy and entered the War of Austrian Succession against his and Cardinal Fleury's better judgement. This war along with Louis XV's personal imprint on foreign policy laid the groundwork for the Seven Years War which proved disastrous for France and Louis XV. Not only was she defeated by Frederick the Great in a couple of spectacular battles,[44] but France also proved unable to defend her overseas empire in North America and India against the British. The Peace of Paris of 1763 dictated that France lose Canada, Senegal, St.Vincent, Dominica, Tobago, and Grenada; Louisiana was ceded to Spain. After this war, Britain replaced Habsburg Austria as France's main antagonist.

Louis XV's defeat in the Seven Years War convinced many that reform of the country's financial system was needed in order to defend France's great power status against ascendant England. Louis XV's Versailles looked in awe at England's effective fiscal system that allowed her to finance easily and relatively cheaply wars despite her smaller economy. Even before these two wars and in the wake of Louis XIV's death the government charged a Scotsman, John Law to establish an English-style banking system and thereby strengthen the French financial system. The experiment was a disaster and France reverted to her old ways. But the French did not rid themselves of their grudging admiration for the English financial system. The radical reforms in the aftermath of the Seven Years War, such as the freeing of the grain trade, reflected the urgency with which many viewed the economic and fiscal situation.[45] Moreover during the eighteenth century certain *lumières* and nobles, such as Voltaire and Montesquieu, began to admire aspects of the political system. Both Louis XV and Louis XVI inevitably disliked the Anglophiles in France. Any comparison made between the two countries inevitably attracted the king's wrath.

At a time when her financial system was proving unable to maintain great power status, France's geo-political situation took a turn for the worse, making the case for domestic reform that much more cogent. Louis XIV's foreign policy, whilst

assuring France's place as a hegemon, also succeeded in uniting many other states against French pretensions. The War of Augsburg (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1714) saw an alliance of European states, headed by England under William III, checking the Sun King's ambition. By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession France was exhausted and England and Austria became major powers in their own right, able to contain French ambitions on the continent. This occurred at a time when France's eastern allies, Poland, Sweden, and the Ottoman Empire, began to decline and the star of Imperial Russia began to rise.

The prospects for changes in the financial structure were inextricably tied to French foreign policy. If the state continued to participate in an excessive number of wars, it would prove unable to reform both the tax and financial system. As noted above, this link was already clear to many during Louis XIV's reign. France's defeat in the Seven Years War served to solidify opinion on this view. That the financial structure of the Bourbon state was too weak to support the pretensions of a state which sought to be a great power on land and sea became increasingly clear.

Russia's increasing contact with the West in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries became the catalyst for major economic, military, and bureaucratic reform initiated by Peter the Great. In a development parallel to that of Bourbon France from the period of Louis XIII, Peter the Great's military victories and reforms established Russia as a great European power, to which the legitimacy of the Romanov dynasty became directly tied. Russia's leading role in the defeat of Napoleon confirmed her status as a great power. When the country emerged unscathed from the turmoil of 1848 which saw rebellion and revolution in France, Prussia, and Austria amongst others, Russia was regarded the gendarme of Europe. It was Nicholas I's troops after all who crushed the Magyar rebellion and saved the Habsburg Empire from collapse. The Russian aristocracy took pride in belonging to this great state. For the Romanov dynasty there was no turning back. Regulation to second-rate status or a string of military defeats would have a direct and dangerous impact on the elite's loyalty to the crown. The similarity with Bourbon France is clear.

Russia's defeat at the hands of France, Britain, and the Ottoman Europe in its own backyard, Crimea, shocked the political elite. Whilst the Nicholaevan system administered Russia, the industrial revolution had taken off in the West whose economic and technical progress was painfully evident. The level of Russia's economic and technological backwardness vis-à-vis the West resembled that of the time before Peter the Great. The country was again forced to undertake internal reforms in order to maintain her status as a member of the great club of powers, membership in which had become part of the national elite psyche. At the same time her geo-political position worsened with the unification of Germany in 1871. Now an economically and militarily powerful country was on her borders.

Under Alexander II and Alexander III Russia maintained her status as a great power but concentrated on internal economic and administrative development.

Alexander II reluctantly fought the Russo-Turkish War, whereas Alexander III maintained peace for the duration of his reign. Alexander II and Alexander III understood that Russia had to avoid useless wars, in which possible defeat would engender dangerous domestic and international consequences.

Like Russia, Iran felt the influence of Western technological and economical superiority. Whilst Russia's encounters with Sweden, Britain, and France had convinced Peter the Great that Russia needed a degree of westernisation in order to become and remain a great European power, it was Iran's encounters with Tsarist Russia at the beginning of the nineteenth century which sparked talk of the need for reform. Iran's encounter with the West would set the framework for her political life until the Revolution of 1979 and afterwards.

With the collapse of the Safavid dynasty in the middle of the eighteenth century the Iranian Empire entered a period of decline. She lost two wars to Imperial Russia at the beginning of the nineteenth century. After the first war (1804-1813) Iran lost Georgia and Azerbaijan.[46] Iran's second defeat brought further territorial losses and an indemnity. Just as important, the government was forced to lower permanently Iranian tariffs on Russian goods, which consequently flooded the Iranian market (Treaty of Turkomanchai 1828). Along with this economic presence came Russian political influence on Tehran. Not to be outdone, Britain obtained similar trading rights. Massive amounts of British goods flooded the country. Iranian merchants, still required to pay taxes, suffered greatly from this. Iran's defeat in the mid-nineteenth century at the hands of the British over the question of Heart confirmed the country's seemingly unstoppable decline. By the 1860s reformists and other government officials, ashamed of the condition into which Iran had fallen, agreed that, 'Persia is in mortal danger,' and that she 'must modernise or lose independence.'[47]

In the 1870s the Qajar policy of selling concessions as regards, for instance, oil, telegraph, customs, and the financial system presented a new threat to the country's independence. This created great anger within society and increased calls for radical reform. Iran however maintained its independence because of Anglo-Russian rivalry. London was loathe to allow Tsarist Russia to exercise great influence, let alone colonise, a country so close to India, the jewel of the British Empire. At the same time, St. Petersburg could not allow the British to establish a permanent presence right on the Russian Empire's southern borders. On 31 August 1907 the Russian and British Empires signed the Anglo-Russian Entente which divided Iran into British, Russian, and neutral, Iranian spheres.

This balance of power came to an end in 1917 with the overthrow of the Romanovs and the consequent civil war that engulfed the former land of the tsar. Fearful of possible Bolshevik inroads into Iran and wanting to secure control over Iran's oil, the British hoped to push through the Majles the infamous Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 which would have turned Iran into a *de facto* British protectorate. To most educated Iranians the treaty represented the surrender to foreigners of what was left of the country's sovereignty. In such a political context in 1921 the last shah's father, Reza Khan launched a successful *coup d'état* against

the government, but not the Qajar dynasty itself. Mohammad Reza Shah thus described Iran's decline in the Qajar period.

> From the Treaty of Paris in 1857 to 1921 our unfortunate country had no government which dared to move one soldier, grant one concession, or pass one law concerning Iranians without the agreement, tacit or otherwise, of either the British ambassador or the Russian ambassador, or of both. Our policies-if such they can be called-were developed in the two embassies and the two governments barely disguised the fact that they considered Persia to be a sort of 'untouchable servant.' Their diplomatic communications were orders, which we carried out, in the event of our showing any sign of recalcitrance, they became threats.[48]

The catalyst for domestic changes in these three countries was defeat in war. The Seven Years War, the Crimean War, and the Iranian wars against Russia and foreign penetration into Iran graphically demonstrated for the elite of Bourbon France, Romanov Russia, and Iran that reform would have to be undertaken. As each of these countries embarked however haphazardly onto the path of reform, they looked to the current economic and political leader of the time as a possible model for change. In the French case this was England, specifically Whig England; for Russia it was the 'West;' and for Iran the economically advanced countries of Europe and the United States.

The issue of Westernisation/Europeanisation caused in Russia serious debates over the future development of the country. The war of words between the followers of westernisation and the Slavophiles represents well this problem. What would happen to Russian identity if she westernised? If she failed to Westernise, could Russia maintain her status as a great power and ultimately her independence? For many, Russia's economic and political backwardness was due to these true 'Russian' values the Slavophiles wished to preserve. The West had just as or more powerful impact on Iran given her greater political and economic decline. A look at the Iranian political and intellectual elite's debates about the West share much in common with the Russian. Some believed that a return to true Islamic values was the more appropriate path to strengthen the country while others supported westernisation. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century hostility to the West was associated in the public mind with defence of Islam. The concept of the state had little appeal in the main street, but the idea of Islam in danger at the hands of infidels requiring an immediate response hit a chord amongst the people. The elites however spoke of Iran's great imperial past.

Overt westernisation came much earlier and perhaps more easily in Russia, though Nicholas II seems to have been wary of western influences. He regarded the autocracy the bulwark against corrupt Western values. In Iran overt anti-westernisation was stronger in the twentieth century than in Russia. But this argument can be carried only so far. After all in Russia the countryside was un-

Western and Nicholas II tried to identify with it. To look forward, the Stalinist regime successfully and easily exploited anti-Western sentiment in mass culture.

The West, of which Bourbon France was a leading member, had an economic and political impact on Russia and Iran which spurred domestic reform. The challenges the West presented brought problems of identity and of economic and political change to Russia and Iran. France did not face such problems. The scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, modernity, and rational thought patterns were generated spontaneously from within France. She was the West. An Iranian or Russian might believe that he needed to become Western in order to be a 'civilised' modern citizen, whilst such a thought never crossed the mind of a Frenchman. Greater psychological problems, greater traumas about identity tied to modernisation existed in Russia and Iran.

Structural Factor: Reform and Domestic Challenges

This last section analyses the obstacles to reform, a process spurred to a great extent by the international system, the domestic consequences for the regime of reform and the political landscape as it existed when Louis XVI, Nicholas II, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi became monarchs. It is another look at state capacity and autonomy in the context of carrying out policies against the interests of certain elite groups and the political consequences. In France it was above all a question of making the machinery of government, in this case the fiscal system, more effective. It was not a question of modernising the society or economy. France, one of the oldest of the absolutist states had a venal financial and political administration which had to be modernised in order to compete with the second generation of absolutists states with more effective non-venal systems. But reforming the venal fiscal and political system meant overcoming key vested interests and in so doing neither de-legitimising the regime by recourse to policies seen as too close to despotism nor attacking too many vested interests at once.

In the Russian case the challenge became evident with the Crimean War. Improving the effectiveness of government was certainly an issue but not the main one. The government was only too effective at tapping society's wealth—the problem was that the society itself was not rich or 'modern' enough. So what was needed was major socio-economic reform, such as the abolition of serfdom, inculcation of legal principles, and industrialisation. The problem here was not that vested interests blocked reform, at least before 1907-1914. If anything quite the opposite: the state did impose reform on the elites but it was the consequences of these reforms, such as industrialisation, which created greater problems for the autocracy as the nineteenth century ended.

Iran combined Russian, French, and unique elements. The dilemma of modernisation was much closer to Russia, for example the same sort of battles between 'westernisers' and 'nativists' emerged. Modernisation from above created new social and political problems for the regime, as in Russia. But in Iran, as in France, conservative vested interests posed the most serious threat to the regime. The whole situation was more complicated than works such as Skocpol's would

lead us to believe. A high price was paid for modernisation from above even when it successfully imposed itself on society. She is right to stress the international factor and the domestic challenges to which it gives rise. Where she is wrong is to argue that these challenges are necessarily insurmountable. In reality, a key common factor in the three regimes' failure to surmount the challenges was failure of leadership, rooted above all in the personalities and methods of Louis XVI, Nicholas II, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

France

The tax system under the Ancien Regime consisted of a myriad of direct and indirect taxes which varied according to the region of the country, and the social status of the individual taxpayer. The *taille*, which was the main direct tax, was made permanent in the 1440s, from which date the idea of continued taxation began to be accepted.[49] Over the years newer forms of indirect taxation evolved. Tax exemptions and privileges were enjoyed, to varying degrees, by towns, regions, and members of the three estates. The indirect taxes fell on everyone equally, though as a percentage of income they were much more burdensome for the lower classes. Louis XIV established with the introduction of the *capitation* the principle that all had to pay direct taxes. Louis XV went even further by making the income tax, *vingtième*, permanent. These were great steps in taxing the nobility.[50]

The French kings also took advantage of venality as a means to finance their government and pursuit of *gloire*. By creating and selling more and more offices especially in the judicial and financial spheres, French kings found a ready source of money. Wealthy bourgeois saw the purchase of offices as a path to higher social status which they eagerly sought. The office was a lifelong distinction that carried with it a public function, which could either be conferred on a notable or make a notable of the man on whom it was conferred. Moreover, buying offices in the tax collecting agencies was a rather lucrative investment for the buyer. Louis XV and Louis XVI made attempts, at times successful, to limit the creation of new offices. That venality had reduced the king's control over his government, including the parlements, and therefore blocked his will became increasingly clear. Additionally, officeholders themselves tried to limit the number of offices created in order to protect the market value of their own office. Too many offices on the market brought the price of their 'property' or office down.

One of the most infamous and hated institutions under the Ancien Regime was the General Farm. The government contracted out to it the collection of indirect taxes--custom duties, royal tolls, the *gabelles*, the tax on tobacco, sales and excise taxes. The Receivers General, a rather loose-knit, but powerful group of venal accountants, collected the Crown's direct taxes, the *taille, capitation, vingtième*. Both groups advanced money to the Crown given the delays in collecting such taxes during the fiscal year or even after. By loaning the king his own money, financiers were able to make much money by taking advantages of the structural weaknesses of the system.

Before looking at the crown's attempts to control its own finances it is necessary to underline two aspects of the financial system of the Old Regime. First, a central budget laying out the fiscal year's income and expenditures never existed. The controleur general himself had a very difficult time ascertaining the state of the king's finances. Second, the vast majority of the crown's money never went into a central treasury, but rather remained in the individual *caisses* of the taxing agencies throughout the kingdom. A central Treasury in the modern sense of the word with a budget became a reality only in the closing years of the old regime and after the revolution.

Louis XIV in 1661 established the *Conseil Royal des Finances* over which the king himself presided. The Council placed control of all expenditure under the king's personal authority, at least in principle. The edict also dictated that the king's signature would be needed for all royal payment orders. Expenditure, however, was not limited or controlled; that would wait until the last years of Louis XV's reign.

Whereas before many believed that the fiscal system was essentially sound and the government only needed to extract additional resources from the privileged classes, towards the end of Louis XV's reign the belief that expenditure had to be dramatically cut and the structure itself reformed began to take hold. The reforms of abbe Marie Joseph Terray (1771-1774) are important for they aimed to reduce pensions and lower the running costs of the financial system through the establishment of a Treasury and non-venal fiscal system. In short he wanted to reduce, if not eventually eliminate, the role of financiers in the French fiscal system. While complete accounts of the government's budgets do not exist, the extant records provide sufficient information to show that Terray had succeeded in balancing the ordinary budget and had even began to retire some of the debt.[51]

Reform of the tax and financial structures was not only a question of structural change; it was also a political and even 'constitutional' question. Firstly, many viewed many of the privileges, i.e. tax exemptions, enjoyed by various societal groups and regions of the country, as liberties which the king could not rescind. Therefore any attempts to reduce them could lead to calls from some of the injured parties of despotism and thereby could undermine the ideological underpinning of the regime. Secondly, the cash-strapped king, in order to regain control over his financial structure, would need to buy back these venal positions. But given his constant need for money this was unlikely.

Any question of reform included the Parlement of Paris, whose political role increased in the absence of the Estates-General. The Grand Chambre, the most prestigious and senior of the Parlement's three chambers, had many ways at its disposal to coerce the lesser chambers into submitting to its leadership. Only under extraordinary circumstances, usually when the government maladroitly handled the Parlement, that the zealots proved successful in radicalising this body.[52] The crown, therefore, maintained a very close relationship with this chamber, lavishing patronage on the Grand Chambre's leaders who ensured the passage of royal legislation. Over time structural checks emerged in the system

which limited the potential for a serious disruption of this relationship. Nonetheless, the skill of the leading personalities in both government and Parlement played a deciding role in determining how this relationship between the crown and an intermediate body would work.

The role of the Parlement in the history of the Ancien Regime and especially in its breakdown has been the focus of heated debate since the nineteenth century. Some have championed the judges as protectors of French liberty and the rights of the small man in the face of an ever-growing royal bureaucracy and monarchy moving towards despotism. Others see the parliamentarians as hypocrites utilising the language of constitutionalism and fundamental laws, mixed with accusations of despotism, as weapons against reformist ministers, preparing to reduce the privileges of the first and second estate as part of their restructuring plans for the country's fiscal system. It was they, according to this view, who signed the death warrant of the Ancien Regime by opposing the enlightened ministers of Louis XV and Louis XVI. This black-and- white position has been slowly replaced by more judicious work which strives to determine what effect the parliamentarians exercised on the history of the Ancien Regime. Both sides of this debate show that reform of the tax or financial system depended on the state of the relationship between the crown and the Parlement. The two forms of change, a greater tax burden for the privileged classes and fundamental restructuring of the system itself would hurt vested interests, which could use the Parlement and the Assembly of Clergy to block the crown's efforts.[53]

The relationship between the Parlement and the crown entered a relatively more unstable period in the mid-eighteenth century, culminating in Louis XV's disbandment of the body in 1771 and the establishment of a non-venal system. Some interpreted this acrimony as a sign that the Ancien Regime could not solve its structural problems. The newest study of crown-parlement relations during Louis XV's reign arrived at a different and more convincing conclusion.

> For much of the decade after 1760 the crown was constantly teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, and it was materially and psychologically incapable of asserting its authority against the magistrates. The personality of Louis XV was a significant cause of these difficulties. After the death of cardinal de Fleury, the king's council had suffered from the absence of a central focus because, despite his intelligence and good intentions, Louis XV never ruled...his government was paralysed by internal feuds and dissensions. These problems filtered down inexorably into the Parlement of Paris, partly because ministers and courtiers realised that there was political capital to be made. Instead of being confined to their traditional sphere, the judges were encouraged to play a wider role...The problem was exacerbated by the inconsistency and even incompetence of royal treatment of the magistrature...Time was not being taken to manage the courts...[54]

That the king's personality and modus operandi played a key role in the maintenance or breakdown of relations with this body, on which administrative reform to a great degree was dependent is clear. Groups disconcerted with government plans for reform used constitutional rhetoric to defend their interests and block government moves.[55] Therefore, what might be seen as constitutional debates in the Parlement, were in fact part and parcel of any reform process, whereby those wanting change and those against it battled it out. In other words, it was a political process. This is not to say that the late Bourbon regime did not recognise the need to widen its social base whereby a greater part of the population could have a role in political life, for example a greater role in deciding how taxes were to be raised and the rate of taxation. The crown's implicit goal by the 1760s was to accomplish structural reform without excessively disequilibriating the political system. This would require skilful management of its relationship with the Parlement, avoidance of attacks on many vested interests at once, and a relatively unified ministry.

Russia

Defeat in the Crimean War convinced many people in and out of the corridors of power that the Nicholaevan system had proven unable to guarantee Russia's position as a Great Power. Alexander II's political, military, judicial, and social reforms, including the liberation of the serfs, constituted the first series of reforms from above in the nineteenth century. More importantly, Alexander II, not a reformer at heart, but convinced of the need to revamp the tsarist state, played a vital and necessary role in the great changes of the 1860s and 1870s. Despite periodic indecision, as reflected in the pace of reforms in the 1870s, Alexander II stayed the course of reform. To state that Alexander II's reforms not only laid the groundwork for the country's rapid industrialisation from above, but also for a civil society would not be a mistake.[56] This cycle of reform showed the great extent to which the tsar and his bureaucracy could take steps in the face of protests and opposition of vested interests. But, reform from above created political problems for the tsarist government. Parts of society began to expect an opening in the political system. The reformers themselves were uneasy over the future consequences of their policies and the faults in the reform legislation. Yet, they believed that a continuation of the reform path would provide the necessary opportunities to compensate for previous mistakes and concessions.

The autocracy, needing and seeking to catch up with the West, pursued a rapid, state-driven industrialisation policy during the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II. These men were not enthusiastic modernisers, unlike the last shah, but they recognised the necessity of modernisation if Russia was to remain 'great.' Sergei Witte led this rapid modernisation, believing that only through such a process could Russia retain her place as a great power and avoid an ignoble destiny as supplier of raw materials and natural resources to the more economically advanced nations. Beginning with a massive programme of railroad construction the tsarist state embarked on the path of industrialisation, whose consequences

would change the face of Russian society. The urban population tripled between 1860 and 1913. The number of wage earners went from 3,960,000 in 1860 to 17, 815,000 by 1912, which surpassed the rate of population growth.[57] The population of the empire in 1860 was 74 million; by 1912 it had hit 170 million. The expanding economy required a larger professional and white-collar class, which could emerge only with the expansion of education. The tsarist government now had to cope with the consequences of its economic policy: a growing working class concentrated in a small number of urban areas, a declining nobility (the traditional bulwark of the autocracy); and a growing middle class wishing to have secure civil rights and a greater say in the running of the state. Serious problems in the countryside remained as before.[58] Moreover, Russia underwent industrialisation/modernisation under the growing threat of social revolution, which made governing that much more difficult. The social and political consequences of this industrialisation policy would present the autocracy with its most serious problems.

Beginning with Radishev's *Travelling from Petersburg to Moscow*, a growing number of Russia's educated elite, looking West, began to show signs of dissatisfaction with the autocratic system of government, though not initially with the monarchy itself. First, noble officers, who had seen Western Europe during the Napoleonic Wars, launched the famous Decembrist Revolt against the new tsar, Nicholas I. The Decembrists for the most part held that Russia must adapt European political and economic models, though with a consideration of Russian conditions. As Western Europe continued to develop politically and economically during the nineteenth century increasing pressure was placed on the autocracy to relinquish prerogatives and allow some groups a say in government. The industrialisation process led to greater urbanisation and education amongst the people another idea from the West, that of a constitutional order, began to take hold. Of course this desire was apparent in urban areas and amongst the educated, the vast majority of the population, the peasants, were concerned with land.

Iran

The son of Fath Ali Shah, Crown Prince Abbas Mirza, decided to begin the regeneration and modernisation of his personal army after Iran's defeats at the hands of the Russians at the beginning of the nineteenth century. He brought in Western military advisors and technology and instituted Western military training. He even sent some students to Europe. The Crown Prince however soon came to the conclusion that military reform would not be fruitful without educational, administrative, and economic reforms. At the same time his limited military reforms came up against opposition from various sections of society, including the *'ulama*, who were the most vocal in their opposition. The use of 'infidel' instructors represented a potential threat to clerical control. Western drills and even standardised uniforms were viewed as 'infidel encroachments that might lead to greater Western incursions.'[59] As a result Abbas Mirza developed a distrust for the clergy and a keen attraction for Iran's imperial pre-Islamic past. If the clergy

proved unable to provide the needed intellectual and practical leadership for reform, groups would begin to look elsewhere for inspiration, either in Iran's past or to other contemporary ideologies from Europe.

As the country faced growing foreign and economic penetration, a worsening economic crisis, and fragmentation of the Iranian state, the relationship of the government with both the *'ulama* and various parts of society began to deteriorate. The growing conflict between the Qajar state and the clergy had two main causes, which reflected the problems in Iranian monarchical thought when the interests of the state and clergy diverged. On the one hand, the clergy opposed many of the few reforms proposed by the Qajar government. Education and judicial reform faced particularly bitter opposition given the Qajars' attempt to bring under state control these domains that traditionally were under the control of the clergy. The clergy feared loss of income and political power which would accompany the loss of control over the educational and court systems. Given their position in society and at court the clerics could put up effective resistance to reforms which they deemed detrimental to Islam and their own interests. On the other hand, the clergy condemned the Qajar dynasty's inability to prevent the penetration of foreign influence into the country. Whereas figures in the government and members of the small intelligentsia believed that Iran's salvation was dependent on adopting certain Western values and systems, some clerics argued for a return to traditional Islamic values as the path for Iran's regeneration. Moreover, educated society, a small part of Iran at the time, grew disenchanted with both the ineffective and apathetic Qajar despotism and with clerical attempts to prevent the few reforms which the government tried to implement.[60] The legitimacy of both parts of the ruling elite, state and mosque, suffered as Iran continued to decline.

The leading writers of the late Qajar period held both the despotic and inefficient Qajar government and the Islamic clergy responsible for the decline of the country.[61] The greater contact with the West had convinced many that European political structures, namely a constitutional system with an elected parliament, needed to be established in Iran. Yet, many also came to the conclusion that society would need to be educated to a degree so that a constitutional system could operate well. Whereas many clerics believed that the only way for Iran to escape from her present situation was to return to true Islamic principles, an increasing number of the non-clerical elite now saw the future in Europe. [62] The well-known reformist of the last half of the nineteenth century, Malkom Khan, wrote a succinct description of the reformers' interpretation of the situation in his work, *Shaykh va Vazir*. The shaykh asks, 'How is it at all possible to adopt the principles of these infidels?' The vazir replies:

> I do not deny that they are infidels. My only claim is that the strength of Europe comes from its unique mechanisms. If we wish to gain the same power, we must adopt in full their mechanisms and instruments. If we fail to do so, let us not fool ourselves into believing that we will be equal to them...The clergy must either permit us to adopt the principles of

> European strength, or summon squadrons of angels from Heaven in order to rescue us from European rule.[63]

Compare this to the words of a Russian advocate of westernisation: '...the path of education or enlightenment is one for all peoples; they all follow each other, one after another. Foreigners were smarter than Russians and therefore it is necessary to use their experience. Is it really logical to search for what has already come to light? Would it be better for Russians not to build ships, not to have a regular army, nor open academies, factories? What people have not taken something from another? Is it not necessary to compare in order to surpass?'[64] These two quotes reflect the problems for Russia and Iran in coping with the economically and technologically advanced countries of Europe. The basic and vital question facing Iran and Russia was and remains how to modernise without losing identity and losing legitimacy amongst the masses. The process of absorbing Western methods was more difficult in Iran given constant reference to her glorious past, which stood in sharp contrast to her condition in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the history of relations between Christian and Muslims. Malkom also recognised the opposition to reform from certain groups at the court. 'Those most hostile to the establishment of order in the country in the form of education and liberty of the people are the '*ulama* and grandees.'[65] Many including Malkom Khan, eventually came to believe that the hold religion and superstition had over the illiterate masses was still strong and thus came to the conclusion that, 'reformists should present all the innovations they wished to introduce in Islamic terms, and so make them more acceptable to people,' since the people believe that it is their 'religious obligation to oppose any idea imported from the West.'[66]

The closing decades of Qajar rule during which foreign interference in Iranian politics grew, the state continued to weaken. Due to large-scale foreign intervention in her domestic politics Iranian resentment against foreigners began to grow whilst the belief that no one could accomplish anything without foreign patronage strengthened. Iranians increasingly believed that their fate was ultimately in the hands of the great powers. Foreign economic intervention in the form of concessions proved to be a catalyst for the joining together of various sectors of society in opposing the shah's autocratic rule, which came to be regarded as the most pressing problem for the future of Iran.

The result was the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Many clerics believed that the nationalistic idea of a constitution and of sovereignty residing in the people contradicted Islam. They also understood that such a system represented a threat to their interests and state within society. Despite the support of some leading clerics for the constitution during these struggles, an increasing number of lay figures and intellectuals came to the conclusion that the ulama has a whole opposed political and social modernisation (westernisation as seen by many). This accounts for the latent anti-clerical character of Pahlavi ideology.

Once the religious forces, merchants, and the intelligentsia achieved limitation of the shah's power the 'coalition' collapsed. The result was a constitution which

tried but ultimately failed to accommodate the interests of both parties. The structure of the new system reflected the contradiction of interests of the coalition which secured the constitution of 1906. Sovereignty was redefined as a divine gift granted to the shah by the people, in whose hands sovereignty resided. However, this definition openly conflicted with Article 2 of the Supplementary Laws, which stated that any law passed by the popularly elected Majles could not conflict with the laws of Islam (*qawa'id*). The right to determine the compatibility of Majles laws with Islam was placed in the hands of a religious council which was made up of five members of the *'ulama* chosen by the Majles deputies from a list of eighty *'ulama* chosen by the clergy themselves. Therefore, according to this article, popular sovereignty did not exist since a small group of religious figures had the power to prevent the promulgation of laws passed by the popularly elected Majles. This body due to the political chaos in the period 1910-1921 and the emergence of Reza Shah, was never convened, to the great chagrin of the *'ulama.* But the article a part of the constitution. The *'ulama's* forced inclusion of this act reflected their uneasiness over the loss of political power the new constitutional order would bring.

The leader of the clerical opposition was Shaykh Fazulallah Nuri. He took active opposition in order to protect 'the citadel of Islam against the deviations willed by the heretics and the apostates', who with their 'inauguration of the customs and practices of the realms of infidelity' intended 'to tamper with the Sacred Law, which is said to belong to 1300 years ago and not be in accordance with the requirements of the modern age.' He objected to the idea that sovereignty belonged to the people, who through their representatives in the Majles could create and change law. Sovereignty belonged only to God, who through prophets, imams, and mujtahids established laws. 'We shall not tolerate the weakening of Islam and the distortion of the commandments of the Sacred Law.'[67] He believed that the will of the majority meant nothing in Shi'ia Islam where divine law reigned supreme. Whereas the constitutionalists and the reformers of the late nineteenth century attempted to present reform, including the introduction of Western concepts and technology, as a means to strengthen Islam, Nuri continually stressed the foreign aspects of the new constitutional system and the plans of the reformers, declaring that they were in fact antithetical to Islam. By 1908 he was openly stating that constitutionalism was contrary to Islam. Nuri's rhetoric found a good deal of support amongst clerics throughout the country and amongst supporters of the autocratic Mohammad Ali Shah. Nuri believed that the shah's autocracy was the best form of government whilst the Twelfth Imam was in hiding. He led a revolt against the constitutional system with the aim of restoring the autocratic Mohammad Ali to the throne. It failed. The conservative cleric was hanged.

The reformers met an unexpected problem that continued to face reformists in the remaining years of Qajar and the entire Pahlavi period. During the politically chaotic period after the Constitutional Revolution, when there was a proliferation of political groups and hence political disagreements, Majles Deputies began to

worry about their ability to pursue their other vital goal—construction of a viable state and social reforms. Many believed that the political pluralism for which they had fought would create too many obstacles for the achievement of their goals. Without a viable state and implementation of social reforms, Iran would fall victim to the threat posed by foreign powers, especially Britain and Russia. To their chagrin the more open political system not only gave people with many different ideas a platform and therefore clouded political aims, but also gave those whose interests would be hurt by reform a way to block changes detrimental to them. These vested interests could play on the ignorance and illiteracy of the people in order to block changes to the system. They found themselves caught between the desire to open the political system and check the absolute power of the monarchy and the urgency to reform and modernise the state, which it seemed demanded the use of such absolute but enlightened power. In the opinion of many only once people were educated could the system of 1906 work effectively.

Reza Shah, the father of Mohammad Reza, made modernisation and secularisation the guiding principles of his new Pahlavi dynasty. Mohammad Reza showed a degree of deference to the *'ulama* before and right after he became shah. As prime minister Reza Khan (as he was known then) toyed with the idea of setting up a presidential system, similar to the one established in Turkey by Ataturk. The *'ulama* opposed this move, fearing that after the establishment of such a system, the clergy would face extinction in political life. Soon after his coronation Reza Shah began to secularise Iranian society. In 1931 he outlined in a speech his basic thoughts on religion:

> Many people erroneously believe that the acquisition of modern civilisation is identical with pushing aside religious principles and the shar'ia. They believe in other words that civilisation is in contradiction with religion. Quite the contrary, even if the great Law-Giver of Islam himself were present today, he would emphasise the compatibility of his religion with the civilisation of today. Unfortunately, his enlightened thoughts have been abused in the course of time by some people (i.e the clergy). Consequently, we are facing at this time a stagnant situation. We should work hard to change this situation and backwardness. [68]

Reza Shah removed the clergy from most fields of political and economic activity. Education and law became the responsibility of only the government and a new legal system based on the French Code Napoleon was established. Reza Shah's modernisation programme aimed to establish a financial and transportation infrastructure and factories.

Despite support for his early moves Reza Shah eventually lost much popularity as a result of his increasing authoritarianism. The Majles became a rubber stamp and ministers became executors of the royal will. But to institute a democratic system in the Iran of the 1920s and 1930s where ninety percent of the population was illiterate and living on land either owned by tribes or landowners would have

been difficult. Reza Shah regarded modernisation and centralisation as his primary goals, not democratisation. Given geo-political and social realities at the time such a view could be justified. In any case during the inter-war period there were few countries in Europe, let alone the world, where an effective democratic-style system was operating.

3

THE MAKING OF MONARCHS

Louis XVI

Louis, the Duc de Berry, was born on 23 August 1753. He was the third son of Louis-Ferdinand the dauphin, son of Louis XV and Marie-Josephe the dauphine, daughter of Augustus III, Elector of Saxony and king of Poland. In 1750 she had given birth to a daughter. The Duc de Bourgogne, the eldest son of Louis-Ferdinand, was born in 1751. The future Louis XVI had two more brothers who eventually played roles in French history, the Comte de Provence (later Louis XVIII) and Comte d' Artois (later Charles X). Two more daughters followed, Clotilde and Elisabeth.

The Duc de Berry's oldest brother, the Duc de Bourgogne, was his parents' favourite. In the eyes of many he was intelligent and strong-willed. Many believed he would be an effective monarch. He was also arrogant and pretentious. Bourgogne kept a list of his more timid and quiet younger brother's faults. He frequently read them to Berry who, with tears in his eyes, 'Please, that fault I think I have corrected it.'[1] The death of Bourgogne from tuberculosis in 1761 devastated Louis, the dauphin and Marie-Josephe. Berry was now in direct line for the throne.

Unlike his other brothers, Berry had inherited his father's physique; he was chubby, lacked the grace and majesty of Louis XV and Louis XVI, and appeared to be clumsy. He was generally quiet. Yet, at times the young Louis showed that he was witty and unwilling to accept passively whatever his brothers did to him. Once after Louis mispronounced a word Provence remarked: Such barbarity, my brother. This is not pretty. A prince should know his tongue.' Berry shot back, 'And you my brother must restrain yours.'[2]

Even at this young age Louis exhibited his infamous silence which would drive his ministers mad. Louis' confessor abbé remarked on this silence and reticence, 'He never lets you know his thoughts.'[3] People openly said that whilst Artois and Provence were gregarious and well spoken, Berry preferred to sit and listen. Unfortunately for the boy, people, including his parents, took this silence as a sign of stupidity. His own father concluded that his son and heir was slow for his age.[4] After a meeting with the dauphin's family a contemporary wrote: 'We noticed that of the three children of France (Berry, Provence, and Artois) it is only Provence

who showed spirit and a resolute style. M de Berry was the eldest and the only one who appeared to be somewhat shy or embarrassed.'[5] Even Louis-Ferdinand seemed to favour Provence more than the heir. The young Louis perceived this general low opinion of himself circulating at the court. 'My greatest fault is a sluggishness of mind, which makes all my mental efforts wearisome and painful. I want absolutely to conquer this defect and after I have done so, as I hope to, I shall apply myself without respite to uprooting all the other faults which have been pointed out to me. I shall then reread my character in order to judge myself of my progress.'[6]

Under the Ancien Regime the education the dauphins received varied depending on the time, circumstance, and the dauphin himself. Some, such as Louis XIV and Louis XV, during their minority rule learned kingship first hand by observing the actions, policies, and modus operandi of those around them at court and in the government. Louis XVI, who was eighteen when he became king, received a formal education without the burden of kingship. Louis-Ferdinand wanted his son's education to teach him how to think and analyse and inculcate in him the dauphin's own belief in enlightenment and puritanical principles. Although the dauphin had doubts concerning the ability of Berry to follow his brother's example, he kept a close watch on the formal education of his son.

Duc de la Vauguyon was charged with Berry's education before and after Burgogone's death. Louis had a passion for history and geography. His study of the English Civil War, including the causes for the decapitation of Charles I, made a significant impression on him. 'In Charles I's place I would never have drawn the sword against my own people,' he declared.[7] As a student he showed a great interest in 'the concrete and the accountable'[8], whilst disdaining the *philosophes* and abstract thinking. He, nevertheless, seems to have read their works. As part of the heir's education Vauguyon and other tutors presented him with a myriad of maxims concerning kingship, human qualities, the history of France, and even other countries and their people to which Berry had to write replies expressing his thoughts on each.[9] They provide an intriguing and enlightening look at Louis' mind and opinions.[10]

Louis XVI was a religious man. 'To make God known is the root of all goodness and justice; to know God and to make him known are the science of government.'[11] On kingship there was no doubt in the young man's mind that God played the deciding role in his life. "I have a duty to God," he wrote, "to his choice to make me the King of France. I can only be great through God as he alone can represent grandeur, glory, majesty, and power and I am destined to be one day his living image on Earth."[12] One can only imagine how such a responsibility and belief impressed itself on Berry. God had given him his people to protect as his own children. 'That which a father feels for his children, a brother for a brother, and a friend for a friend, the prince feels for his subjects and every government action must be beneficial for humanity,' he wrote.[13] The young dauphin believed that 'the king is the only person capable of making the people happy,' and 'accepts kingship only for the love of the people...I therefore must

direct all of my plans (*vues*) by the sentiment of the most tender affection for my people, in the establishment and the maintenance of laws...in the choice of my ministers and to whomever else I convey the details of government.'[14] This concept of love between the king and the people made a deeper impression on Louis XVI than on his immediate predecessors Louis XIV and Louis XV. As king, Louis made several crucial political decisions based on this desire to be loved by the people. As he wrote during one of his lessons, 'A good king, a great king can have no other goal than to make his people happy and virtuous.'[15] He noted, 'I must always follow public opinion. It is never wrong.'[16] To imagine Louis XIV, Louis XV, or Louis XVI's contemporary, Josef II, making such a remark is difficult. That in 1789 the people in the streets no longer shouted, *"Vive le roi"* crushed him.

Thanks to his father, Enlightenment thinking greatly influenced Louis' moral education and thereby his politics. Vauguyon stressed to the young man that, 'You are absolutely equal by nature to other men and consequently you must be sensitive to all the bad and misery of humanity.' Louis responded, 'Ergo by origin all humans without exception are equal to me.'[17] Louis XIV or Louis XV would not have expressed a similar opinion. This education shows the contradictions in the position of the monarchy itself. Theoretically how could God's representative on Earth be equal with other men? What then distinguishes the king from his subjects?

On the subject of war, Louis showed that he did not wish to pursue *gloire* in the footsteps of Louis XIV. Here again are Enlightenment influences. A vain *gloire* of kings could no longer be tolerated. The true *gloire* was service to the public good. The young dauphin wrote that one should participate in a war in order to bring peace. Yet, one should fight only after long deliberation, where it is impossible to avoid that war, and 'for legitimate causes not only just, but important.' In addition, 'one should compare the advantages one gets from victory to the infinite difficulties result from it.' His writings also reflect a concern for civilian casualties and burdens caused by the excesses of war.[18]

Both his tutors and his pious father impressed the necessary qualities of a successful king on him. The dauphin stressed to Louis the need to be just: 'History is a continuation of great moral lessons,' he told his son, '...Be just in order to be free, be just in order to be powerful and be just in order to be happy.'[19] The need to be just was also applied to anger as well. The young Louis wrote that, 'The anger of a prince can be just, but it is always terrible; but only the prince can make sure that this anger is always just.' 'Just' applied to foreign policy. 'A king of France, if he is always just, will always be the first and most powerful sovereign in Europe and can easily be the arbiter of Europe.'[20] This desire to be just played a significant role in Louis' behaviour.

Vauguyon explained to him the important difference between stubbornness/harshness (*dureté*) which represented the worst vice of a prince, often called the strength of the weak, and firmness (*fermeté*) which is most necessary for a king. He was told, '*La Fermeté* is for men and especially for princes

a virtue so necessary that other characteristics are nothing without it. In short, a little piety, a little goodness, and a little justice without *fermeté* will have no effect...'[21] Louis noted that *fermeté*, 'is the courage of the heart which is attached to a useful project, ...love for the public good, which triumphs over the tendencies (*penchants*) attempting to push it aside.'[22] Louis believed that he had already acquired this *fermeté* which he considered to be 'the dominant trait of his character.'[23]

But to maintain, *fermeté* as opposed to *dureté* (in order to be just) he would first have 'to fill' himself with internal power (*la force*) and 'to persuade' himself that 'there is nothing that is just, honest and glorious which is impossible for me to execute.'[24] Louis also turned his attention to a flaccid monarch. 'The weak man sees nothing, he listens to everything. He does not act independently, people drive him, they lead him. He can have ideas, but he rarely has a conviction, everyone persuades him of everything. They prove nothing to him... He has no will and no determination and makes decisions only by an outside influence. He defers answers in order to free himself from the necessity to deliberate...He has no confidence in anyone...his timid and lazy soul abandons itself blindly to those who dare to gain hold of it.' The heir identifies the consequences for governance of a weak monarch. '(F)rom the weakness of kings are born factions, domestic wars, and upheavals which shake and ruin the state and knock it down immediately. If I could doubt this truth, I would only have to remember the history of all the nations.'[25] 'If the king is indecisive authority will always drift, license is encouraged, obedience breaks down, and the government, the throne and the monarch himself are debased in the eyes of the people.' He sums up his feelings. '(W)eakness, absence of courage and resolution destroy the prince's merits and render all his virtues and talents useless as he dare not decide anything, command anyone, refuse anyone, lead anyone, nor punish anyone.'[26] Clearly, Louis was cognisant of the phenomenon of the weak monarch and its impact on the state.

Louis' remarks on the role of the king in society as a whole and in the government in particular give the impression he understood the system and knew how to operate within it and to control it. His tutors and mother impressed upon him the necessity for the king alone to be the decision-maker and that no one could substitute for the monarch. Louis wrote, 'I believe that the king along with his ministers, with the king in the leading role, should work,' and govern.[27] For Louis XVI Louis XIV's modus operandi represented the best example. As the Sun King himself wrote to the duc d'Anjou. 'I finish (my letter) with one of the most important pieces of advice I can give you: do not fail to govern; be the master...listen to and consult your council, but you decide.'[28] Louis XVI wrote, 'If the weakness of a king makes him abandon the reins of government to an unjust and malicious minister, then the minister has no other interest than to take advantage.'[29] Here we see Louis' lifelong hostility to ministerial government and the idea of a chief or prime minister. Louis did not consider the relationship

between Louis XIII and Richelieu a worthy example of French monarchical government.

As king, Louis would prove to be a relatively hard worker, reading and studying the various documents and decisions sent to him. He stressed that, 'I must establish in time a body of principles in my soul (*ame*), which will enable me to bring closer (*rapprocher*) all which is presented to me; it is the certain means to give unity to my views and consistency to my endeavours.'[30] Louis understood the importance of his maintaining an opinion. '(I)he advantage which I must derive from my work (*mes occupations*) is to explain myself, to develop my activities and to strengthen my character and to accustom myself *to judge all and to decide all*, to expose my views with confidence and to never fear my ideas and to love those which contradict mine but to never change my opinion unless it has been demonstrated to me that the opinion of another is more reasonable than mine and more just than mine.'[31] The problem was that he could not make up his own opinion on many issues of the day.

On becoming king in 1774 Louis announced to his subjects that, ... 'knowing that (our country's) bliss depends principally on a wise administration of finance because it determines the most basic rapport between the sovereign and his subjects, it is towards this administration we will turn our first care and study.'[32] Louis believed that it was his duty not to waste public funds and to utilise them for the benefit of the people. He view of taxes differed greatly from that of his friends. Taxes are 'a sort of salary which the people pay to the State and not to the sovereign personally. Their (taxes') object is the defence of their (the peoples') lives and their well being. The prince who squanders funds (*les fonds consacrés*) is unjust, inhumane, and cruel.'[33]

Louis' father, the dauphin, died on 20 December 1765, of tuberculosis. 'Poor France', Louis XV murmured, 'a king of fifty-five and a dauphin of eleven!'[34] The old king began to take a greater interest in his young grandson, allowing him to attend his hunting suppers and to attend the lit de justice of the 7th December 1770 in the midst of the newest and final battle of his grandfather's reign between the crown and the Parlement of Paris. Five years later on 16 May 1770 Louis married Marie-Antoinette, youngest daughter of Maria-Theresa, Queen of Hungary and Bohemia and co-ruler of the Holy Roman Empire. It essentially represented a political alliance between the French Bourbons and Austrian Habsburgs. Though Louis did grow to love his wife, he took steps to prevent her from influencing major policy during the first twelve years of his reign. [35] She did, however, gain a certain degree of influence over the appointment of some ministers. Louis, who was suspicious of Austrian intentions and Josef II, understood that Vienna wished to use the queen as an instrument of Austrian influence on decisions.

Marie-Antoinette did not have the political skills of a Pompadour or Madame de Berry. She was uninterested in the nitty-gritty of everyday political infighting preferring to engage in social events and to pass time with her intimate circle. Marie-Antoinette once confessed, 'There has been no happiness for me since they

turned me into an intriguer...The Queens of France are only happy when they meddle with nothing, just keeping enough credit to set up their friends and a few devoted servants.'[36] She wished to be a source of patronage for those members of her circle. This required exercising some influence over the appointment of ministers. Her sporadic involvement in politics before 1787 reflected her personal like or dislike of a particular personality rather than of a specific policy. During the crisis years 1787-1790 when it seemed that Louis was losing control of the situation Marie-Antoinette did play a large part in court politics, eventually trying to steer her husband toward a more conservative position in a bid to preserve the old style monarchy.

There were very few, if any, people to whom Louis showed lasting and genuine amitié, though he was a very amiable human being. On his royal visit to Cherbourg he spoke with the officers and men there, 'with easy familiarity very much in the manner of twentieth century British royalty.'[37] He loved to hunt. When he did not want to face certain problems or he was taken over by lack of interest in affaires he would go off on a hunt. He loved to tinker with clocks, whose precision and regimentation, simplicity probably, proved more attractive to Louis than the messy business of factions, intrigues, personalities, and finance.

Louis very much loved his wife and children. He was one of the few Bourbon kings never to take a mistress, which explains how Marie Antoinette came to have some of the influence of a Pompadour. He was rather soft when it came to his surviving brothers, the Comte d'Artois and the Comte de Provence, though this did not prevent him from telling his 'unofficial' chief minister, Maurepas, never to discuss *des affaires* with them. Provence, dreaming of being monarch himself, resented Louis for becoming king. Artois preferred to follow his hedonistic tendencies, rarely participating in politics (at least until the immediate pre-Revolutionary period).

Louis XVI was a devoted monarch. He read all paperwork sent to him, though rarely writing his own comments on it. On topics he found interesting he was very well informed. Yet, he was easily bored during royal council meetings and even official engagements such as *lits de justices*, at times falling asleep and snoring quite loudly. He did not like ugly, open confrontations between ministers in his presence, regarding them as an affront to his position, though he appreciated reasoned and calm discussion. He also had a maddening tendency to respond to a minister's requests or policies with silence. 'Silence was the characteristic weapon of Louis XV and Louis XVI to cope with unwarranted pressure or embarrassment, or an unfair question (sic).'[38] Comte de Maurepas once complained to his good friend the abbe Veri, 'With his silence on important issues he evades me.' Turgot and Necker encountered this silence as well. The Austrian ambassador to Versailles wrote at the time of Louis XV's death that this young man had proven, 'impenetrable to the most attentive eyes. This method of being should come either from a large secretiveness or from a great timidity. I believe that the latter cause has been more influential then the first.'[39]

The tricky part for any minister was how to interpret and respond to it. Turgot erroneously took it as a sign of support. This silence reflected Louis' inability to express himself in a forthright and direct manner with his ministers, which is related to his lack of confidence in his own ability to make a decision on plans presented to him and to formulate policy. He himself said as much. 'He (a weak man) defers answers in order to free himself from the necessity to deliberate...he has no confidence in anyone'[40] and, I would add, himself. Louis after all had to hold his own with men, who were experienced, tougher than he was and had specialised knowledge. This situation only exacerbated his indecisiveness; a trait widely recognised at the time. Maurepas complained that Louis was swayed by the last person with whom he had spoken. The abbe Veri believed that the 'moral organisation of the King...makes any decision infinitely difficult for him.'[41] This indecisiveness made any minister's job that much more difficult. Even if one tries to debate the validity of these contemporary observations, the fact that the common perception was such caused damage to the king's reputation and conditioned how people would interact with him. Once people believed that Louis could be swayed they were more prepared to intrigue and form cabals to obtain their ends. The same situation emerged under Nicholas II.

Nonetheless, Louis understood the threat posed by intrigue and faction.

> All those who approach the person of a prince want to obtain his confidence and since they know that the prince can only have aversion and contempt for them they try not to appear so. If a prince stops at the skin and surface which is shown to him, he will perceive only the sentiments of virtue; if he probes deeper, up to the heart, he will see only excessive ambition, a base interest, an insatiable greed, an unrestrained desire to increase and advance at any price. Therefore a prince should think in general about this crowd of servitors and courtiers who surround him...It is without doubt that the greatest misfortune attached to the princes...(is to be) surrounded by courtiers, who flatter with the appearance of verity...[42]

Nicholas II and Mohammad Reza Shah would have agreed. Every monarch needed to keep an eye on the aims and behaviour of his ministers but at the same time manage them in order to ensure the relative smooth running of government. Louis concluded elsewhere that he could only avoid the baseness of court politics 'by adhering always to wise behaviour and leadership appropriate to my rank...by appearing in the end little touched by trivialities (*bagatelles*) and being occupied by great projects and important affairs.'[43] This illuminating passage shows that intrigue and faction at court disgusted Louis. One can sympathise with his opinion. But the structural reality was that his position as king and source of patronage placed him in the centre of such politics and intrigues. He had to deal with them if they were not to have a negative influence on the running of government.

Whereas Louis XIV and to a lesser degree Louis XV recognised and tried to deal with this problem of control of faction by essentially placing the king and the monarchy in the centre of court, Louis lived apart, avoided public ceremony and court life in the naïve belief that his model of morality would put an end to faction and intrigue.[44] Louis remarked that, 'I believe that the example of my manners, of my respect for religion, of my love for virtue, my horror of vice and my contempt for all sorts of baseness and indecency will form a more powerful form of legislation then would perhaps law....'[45] But, he failed to realise that the king had to be involved in such behind the scenes politics if he was to retain control over the elite. The British Ambassador to Versailles appreciated this:

> His Majesty wishes to place himself out of the reach of all intrigue. This, however, is a vain Expectation, and the Chimera of a Young, inexperienced mind. The Throne He fills, far from raising him above Intrigue, places Him in the Centre of it. Great and Eminent Superiority of Talents might, indeed, crush these Cabals, but as there is no reason to believe Him possessed of this Superiority, I think He will be a prey to them and find Himself more and more entangled everyday.[46]

As intrigue and cabals sapped Louis' authority and legitimacy the consequences outlined by the ambassador did indeed materialise to the detriment of the monarchy Louis did not understand the effect his actions would have on his authority. In addition, he very rarely gave initiation to any policy, especially in the domestic field, which in the end meant that policies would come and go with the ministers who drew them up. This was a phenomenon all too common in the twilight of the Ancien Regime and most probably reflected Louis' insecurity in his judgement which would in the end have a harmful influence on the running of the governmental machine.

Nicholas II

Nicholas Aleksandrovich was born on 6 May 1868. His father, the future Alexander III, had already become the heir to the throne due to his eldest brother's untimely death in 1865. He also inherited his brother's fiancée, née Princess Dagmar of Denmark, who became Maria Feodorovna upon her conversion to Orthodoxy and marriage to Alexander. Until his brother's death, Alexander III's education was mediocre and limited. He was also not known for his intelligence. The conservative Alexander III was to a certain degree estranged from his father, the tsar-liberator Alexander II. As tsar he aimed to undo Alexander II's 'great reforms', which he believed were shaking the foundation of the autocracy and of society itself.[47]

Alexander III with his imposing physical frame and rough manner was a larger than life figure for all of his children, but especially for his eldest son and heir. The young Nicholas, along with other contemporaries including Sergei Witte, regarded Alexander III as the quintessential tsar, as someone who had 'that tsar-

like nature' which was the sum of qualities that produces the impression of a powerful will.'[48] His great physical strength, which was capable of bending an iron poker into knots and holding up the roof of a collapsed train wagon, was matched by his decisive personality. When Alexander II's blood-drenched and mangled body was brought into the Winter Palace, the thirteen-year old Nicholas watched his father calmly leave to take control of the Russian Empire. His father's resolute and firm action taken at that moment of personal tragedy could only have made a strong impression on the new tsarevich.

Alexander III's reaction to the assassination of his father and to becoming tsar differed sharply from that of his son, Nicholas, who, unlike his predecessors, did not assume the throne at a time of crisis. Alexander I inherited the throne as a result of the murder of his father, Paul I, of which he was cognisant. Down the street from the Winter Palace Nicholas I faced the Decembrist Revolt on his accession. Russia was losing a war against three European powers in the Crimea when Alexander II became tsar. The news of his father's untimely death devastated the twenty-six year old Nicholas. He felt overwhelmed by events. 'What am I going to do...What is going to happen to me, to you, to Xenia, to Alix, to mother, to all of Russia. I am not prepared to be Tsar. I never wanted to become one. I know nothing of the business of ruling...I have no idea of even how to speak to the ministers.'[49] The death of a parent is indeed a heavy burden for most people. Yet, these remarks reflect a lack of maturity in Nicholas and a genuine fear of the responsibilities associated with being tsar. Whilst one can understand and even sympathise with his feelings, they nevertheless represent a mental unpreparedness for his new role. In comparison Wilhelm II of Germany as crown prince wrote on photographs of himself he gave to people, 'I bide my time.' To imagine Nicholas II handling the troubled successions of his four predecessors is difficult.

Nicholas struck a less than imposing figure in his duties at the beginning of the reign. Count V. Lamsdorff wrote in his diary in the year of Nicholas' accession, 'The young emperor evidently was shy about taking his proper place; he is lost in the mass of foreign royalties and grand dukes who surround him.' A year later he wrote, 'His Majesty still lacks the external appearance and manner of an emperor.'[50] Nicholas himself complained of the amount of work and people around him. 'My head was dizzy,' he wrote to Alexandra. 'Having to answer all kinds of questions' made him 'lose (his) head and balance.' People began to make unfavourable comparisons between him and his father. The impression emerged that Nicholas did not have that 'tsar-like nature.' In a system where the personality was so vital to maintaining people's loyalty and an equilibrium this development was potentially dangerous. Nicholas knew that unfavourable comparisons were being made as did Alexandra who consequently tried to stiffen his resolve.

Although the young Nicholas deeply loved his father, he grew up in awe and fear of this man, who became for him the measuring stick for everything he would do. This was particularly true during the first decade or so of his reign, during which Nicholas exhibited a great degree of insecurity in his new role as tsar. In a

letter to Queen Victoria the young Nicholas II remarked that despite the complexity of ruling and politics, 'I have always got the sacred example of my beloved father and also the result and proof of all his deeds.'[51] In a letter to his mother he wrote, 'Under Papa nothing of the kind would have happened, and you know how I maintain everything as it was under Him.'[52] Even twelve years after assuming the throne his father's example provided the rationale for refusing a request for a government subsidy to a member of the aristocracy. Nicholas remarked, 'I feel with all my being that dear father would have acted the same way...'[53] Nicholas, lacking an independent conception of the role of the autocrat and the autocracy as a whole, adopted that of his father.[54] Nicholas' failure or unwillingness to conceive of the role he should play within the government and a positive programme resulted in an undue and unusual rigidity in his views on the autocracy as defined by his father.

Alexander II had a similar relationship with his father. He wrote to his mother that, 'For me he (Nicholas I) was the personification of our dear fatherland.' The man, under whose rule the famous triad of 'orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality' became the slogan for the tsarist government, overawed the young tsarevich, who lived for his word of approval. He wrote to his brother that 'my entire soul belongs (to Nicholas I) and I will continue to serve (him) in my heart.'[55] As tsarevich Alexander was frequently criticised by his father for indecisiveness and idleness. Like Nicholas II, he too had ambiguous feelings concerning his future position. 'I wish I had never been born a tsarevich', he once sombrely declared. Thus, as heirs to the throne Alexander II and Nicholas II shared similar feelings, such as finding it difficult to break from their respective father's memory and image of power. Yet, unlike Nicholas, Alexander II introduced changes into the government structure and modified to a degree his own conceptions of the autocracy which differed from the example set by his father. For example by 1881 he recognised the need to form some type of consultative assembly. Granted Alexander II's changed view of the political system was limited, but it is such small steps that lay the groundwork for even greater change. Alexander III broke from his father's views and put into place a conservative policy. These men were also more mature and experienced when they ascended the throne than Nicholas was when he became tsar.

Alexander III seemingly did not have much faith in his son's judgement and ability to rule, even at the age of twenty-three. Finance Minister Sergei Witte once remarked to Alexander III that including Nicholas in some areas of government would be a good idea. In response the tsar retorted that Nicholas was nothing but a boy with childish judgements. Alexander used to tell the young Nicholas that he was a girl because of his tendency to run from fights and not take responsibility for mischievous behaviour. Nicholas himself understood all too well that his father had not prepared him. 'I know nothing. The late emperor did not foresee his death and did not let me in on any government business,' he remarked to his Foreign Minister, Nicholas Giers. Nicholas sister-in-law, Princess Victoria of Hesse remarked that, 'his father's dominating personality had stunted any gifts for

initiative in Nicky.'[56] This might be true. Yet, no evidence exists that shows that Nicholas ever had this initiative in the first place. As tsarevich he was appointed to the chairmanship of two commissions, but did not exhibit any real desire or interest in the business of running the state. He complained of the amount of documents to read and admitted that he took a couple for himself and threw the rest into the fire. When his tutor, the arch-conservative Konstantin Pobedonostsev, tried to introduce him to the workings of the government, the young heir became 'actively absorbed in picking his nose.'[57] At age twenty-three he was more known for playing practical jokes, than any political beliefs. In 1893 the wife of a general at court wrote in her diary, 'The tsarevich leads a very unserious life...He does not want to rule and prefers to marry.'[58] Even Empress Maria Feodorovna had doubts about her son's ability to govern the Empire. When he became tsar no one knew his political views. In contrast, Alexander III was isolated from government and his father, but nevertheless succeeded in initiating conservative policy, providing general government direction and in managing his ministers.

Nicholas had a strong relationship with his mother, despite the friction that eventually existed between her and his wife. Maria Feodorovna spoiled and babied Nicholas. She succeeded in instilling in her son diligence for work, but this was accomplished at the expense of imbuing him with the necessity to take charge of the government in the footsteps of his father. He was active and dutiful in a way similar to Louis XVI, reading papers conscientiously and trying to make decisions. But he did not initiate much policy. The appearance of doing something became more important than actually doing something. When Nicholas became tsar, the dowager empress exercised a certain degree of influence on him, playing a role in the appointment of Prince Svytapolk-Mirsky as Minister of Internal Affairs, the return of Witte to real power in 1905 and the retention of Stolypin in 1911. He was known to say too frequently, 'Ask Mama' or 'I will ask Mama.' This influence, however, was never absolute and declined over the years as Alexandra's increased.

Nicholas had a happy childhood. He saw his parents everyday (especially at bedtime), enjoying talks and meals with them. The familial environment was relaxed and warm. Connections with people outside of the family, even with the children of the leading families of the Empire were rare. Nicholas did play with the children of the aristocracy but remained an enigma to them. Lack of serious discussion characterised the familial surroundings. Alexander III and Maria Fedorovna did not usually have guests for dinner. The children's behaviour and the frivolous atmosphere reigning in the palace appalled Queen Olga of Wurttemburg (Alexander III's aunt), a frequent guest during the time of Alexander II. She remarked that during the reign of Alexander II, 'at these meals many interesting guests were present, who could talk about serious political matters. I am accustomed to this. And I don't like watching people throw pellets of bread across the table!'[59] Varied company and serious conversation also characterised the private lives of Alexander I and Nicholas I.

Nicholas grew up preferring the tranquillity of family life to the requirements of a social life. Family life protected him from the cold, brutal world of politics where loyalties and friendships came and went. Nicholas and Alexandra spent their free time within the confines of the family, shunning society at large, again like Louis XVI. Their decision to live most of the time in Tsarskoe Selo outside of the capital underlined their wish not to bother with the grandees of the Empire. The Royal Couple's dislike of high society was reflected in the dramatic reduction of royal balls, of which there were none between 1904 and 1917. As in the case of Louis XVI, balls and parties were part and parcel of the political system. They gave the monarch a chance to reinforce the crown's links with its own elite and the means to watch over and punish when necessary those who angered the monarch. Punishment usually took the form of social ostracism and bans from attending royal functions. At a time when connections with the monarch, either real or superficial, still carried symbolic weight, the monarch had plenty of opportunity to discipline people. It was not as if Nicholas did not recognise this. When King Gustav of Sweden visited Russia in 1908, Nicholas made a point of not introducing Witte to the king during a reception. Although the old aristocratic families were becoming less important and less easily controllable, Nicholas's preference for relative isolation weakened the real power of the monarchy. If he avoided relations with people of the nobility, little chance existed that he would expose himself to the emerging industrial elites. As in Pahlavi Iran, the new industrial elites sought recognition from the crown.

Alexander III too preferred the quiet and safe life at Gatchina, outside of Petersburg. But, he and the empress maintained residency in the Winter Palace from New Year's to Lent. During this period through magnificent balls they renewed the monarch's links with the Empire's elites. By failing to understand the importance for the monarchy of building and maintaining connections with the Empire's social and emerging industrial elites, Nicholas unwittingly weakened their loyalty to him and the dynasty. He had a strong distrust for members of high society and therefore tried to ignore it. In addition, Nicholas' awareness that members of the elite made unfavourable comparisons of him with his father only exacerbated his alienation from Petersburg society. In this he was similar to Louis XVI, but unlike his grandfather Alexander II, his cousin, Wilhelm II of Germany, and Edward VII of Britain.

Nicholas, like many monarchs, viewed change suspiciously. Whilst reviewing new military technology he remarked:

> Generally I oppose...innovations and I cannot understand the addiction of our military to replacing practically tested results by new untested ones. In my opinion one must above all be conservative and try to preserve as long as possible old traditions and institutions. Naturally this does not mean bringing back the gauntlet or flint rifles. No there is a limit to everything.[60]

Many monarchs at the time would have expressed themselves similarly. Unlike in 1780, a strong and correct sense existed that the future in general would be difficult to square with autocratic monarchy. At that time a Catherine II or Josef II could feel themselves to be both progressive and secure. Yet, Nicholas' weariness of new military technology was not a sign that he would be able to understand issues such as the labour problem, let alone the growing need to enlarge tsardom's social base. One can take comfort that at least he recognised to an extent the inevitability of change in military matters.

Alexander II was by no means a democratic reformer determined to establish a British style government system in the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, at key moments he overcame his indecisiveness and natural fear of change after examining the socio-political situation in the country. The result was a reform program (albeit at times inconsistent) that changed almost every aspect of Russian life. Nothing like it had been seen since the time of Peter the Great. Nicholas I, who is usually considered an archconservative, set-up eleven secret committees charged with looking into the paths and consequences of freeing the serfs. Although he stepped back from liberating them, he recognised the problem and conducted research into it. This work became the basis for the committees under Alexander II.

Throughout his life Nicholas made very few, if any, real friends. As tsar he surrounded himself with people of the same conservative, even reactionary views. Prince V.P. Meshcherskii, Nicholas Maklakov, Rasputin, and D.P.Trepov are good examples. These men did not influence Nicholas to rule or decide something in a manner to which he was not already sympathetic. Nicholas admitted these men to the 'inner circle' only because their political stance mirrored his own. Once someone expressed views at odds with Nicholas' coolness then characterised his relations with that person. The isolation had a further consequence on Nicholas' view of Russian society. He came to believe, more than any tsar of the nineteenth century that a special bond existed between the *tsar-batushka* and the peasantry, whom he considered to be true Russians. His ignorance of high society and the close contact he had with people of peasant stock, his servants, served to form this belief, which he carried to his dying day. It needs to be noted that this trend strengthened under Alexander III and was in part a common nationalist/populist trend on the European right as a whole. This naïve idealisation of the peasantry, however, only alienated the monarchy from many of its actual and potential supporters because it was used to justify not listening to the growing demands in the urban areas for change. These urbanites, the argument went, were not after all true Russians, as the peasants, constituting the backbone of the monarchy, were. Yet, there was no reason why Nicholas, whilst stressing the special links between the tsar and the peasants could not have taken his elites seriously.

The conspicuous lack of contact with people outside the family milieu was not made up by either a solid education or serious interest on the part of Nicholas towards his future duties. From the age of seven to ten Alexandra Ollongren taught Nicholas, along with his younger brother and the governess' son Vladimir,

general subjects. The curriculum included law, chemistry, physics, mathematics, modern languages, and history. Some of the best minds taught him. In contrast to Louis XVI's education, the instructors were told not to question the heir, but to lecture him. This approach differed from that used to educate Alexander II's first heir, who was subjected to questions and lessons focusing on analytical thinking. Nicholas did not seem to have the natural talent for this type of education. At age ten his education was entrusted to General G.G. Danilovich, who oversaw several tutors charged with teaching the young man a variety of subjects. Nicholas was not a stupid man. He spoke French and English fluently and was proficient in German. Even Witte, who was a harsh but fair critic of Nicholas II attested to his good memory and attention to detail. Yet, he lacked common sense, which his immediate predecessors, Alexander II and Alexander III had, and an inability to think conceptually, which he shared with his father. His tutor, Konstantin Pobedonostsev succinctly and correctly described his student. 'He (Nicholas) understands the significance of some isolated fact, without a connection to the rest and without appreciating the interrelation of other pertinent facts, events, trends, and occurrences. He sticks to his insignificant, petty point of view.'[61] The characteristic Pobedenostsev describes was the cause of many of Nicholas' major mistakes. Another part of his education included time in the military. He enjoyed the camaraderie of the officer corps, the drinking, and overall social life. Yet the relationships he formed there were superficial. He gave no one the opportunity to know the real him.

The influence of Pobedonostsev on Nicholas' education and attitude to change has been debated since the reign itself. Pobedonostsev was highly intelligent, but a cynic and arch-reactionary. He regarded parliamentary democracy as the 'great lie of our time.' He believed that in such a system the best people are not elected. Only the 'overly ambitious and impudent (*nakhalnii*) people' are able to attain political office. Whereas such people cannot provide the needed leadership and above-class overview essential to good government, 'Unlimited monarchy has been able to remove or reconcile all demands and needs...'[62] Better the absolute power of one with an above-class view, than the absolute power of the majority. He also believed that Russia was too diverse to form a nation-state and only the crown could prevent the empire from breakdown and chaos. These opinions essentially became Nicholas'.

Nicholas II enjoyed history. He sympathised more than anything else with the seventeenth-century tsar Alexis I and his non-bureaucratic patrimonial rule, which for Nicholas symbolised the true Russian monarchy. He longed for this period, which was not plagued by intellectuals, urbanites, workers, Jews, and agitators. He believed that Peter the Great's modernisation/westernisation policies had injected an alien element into Russian culture. During a discussion with General A.A. Mosolov over Peter the Great Nicholas remarked, 'Of course I recognise the many services of my notable ancestor but I would be untruthful if I said I shared your enthusiasm (*vostorg*) for him. I love this ancestor less than the others because of his fascination with Western culture and his trampling of pure Russian

custom.'[63] Nicholas even preferred the title *tsar*, to Peter's chosen one, *Gosudar Imperator*, which emphasised the monarch as the head of this new western-oriented Petrine state system. Nicholas was a Russian nationalist in the Slavophile mould. In comparison, when Russia crushed the Polish rebellion of 1863 Minister of Internal Affairs P.A. Valuev sadly remarked to Alexander II, 'Permit me to say that I feel that I love my country less...I despise my compatriots.' The tsar replied, 'I also feel the same.'[64] Such a remark would never have crossed the lips of Nicholas II.

Nicholas' idealisation of pre-Petrine Russia and low opinion of Peter's reforms is amply reflected in his views on the two capitals of the Russian Empire, St. Petersburg and Moscow. This says much about his vision of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. St. Petersburg, built on swampland conquered by Peter, represented, or was intended to represent, the new Westernised Russia and rejection of the old Muscovite culture which in Peter's eyes carried the responsibility for Russia's backwardness vis-à-vis the West. Nicholas II considered this move a threat to the real Russia. For him St. Petersburg represented blanket westernisation. Nicholas' alienation from Petersburg and what it represented strengthened his alienation from the entire governmental apparatus and the reality of the capital's all-important high and low politics. For example, if workers revolted as a result of horrific working conditions, if the burgeoning middle class clamoured for a change in the political system, and when consequently ministers warned of revolt and revolution, Nicholas could rationalise that they did not carry any significance since they did not represent the real Russia, but rather the debauched and deformed Petersburg society. To a certain degree, this is true. The urban society of places such as Petersburg did represent a minority of Russian society, but in the industrial age the urban areas had proved to be of vital importance for overall stability. Nicholas' attention was drawn repeatedly to this, but he ignored it. Yet, he did nothing to strengthen the position of the monarchy in rural areas on which he placed so much faith.

Nicholas preferred Moscow, the capital of old Rus, which he considered the heart of Russia. He was the first tsar in over fifty years to go to the old capital to celebrate Easter. Only in Moscow and certain provinces did Nicholas feel he could find that spiritual bond between tsar and *narod*, in which he placed so much faith. Even then, the regime became very unpopular with the Moscow elites as well. Nicholas to his detriment did little to develop or cultivate the liberal-nationalist-imperialist movement, which linked many Muscovite industrialists and intellectuals to important figures in the government.

In Nicholas' eyes (and not only his) the autocracy symbolised old Russia, ensured political unity to these varied lands, was the prime moving force in Russian history and distinguished Russia from the West. Changing this institution would equate with repudiating Russian history and turning one's back on one's ancestors. Therefore, Nicholas II regarded Alexander II's reformist policies as westernisation and responsible for the instability in the Empire and for the tsar-liberator's assassination. In contrast, he believed that his father had brought peace,

tranquillity, and stability to the country through strict and steadfast adherence to the unchanging principle of autocracy. Nicholas assumed that he must rule in the same manner.

Work was viewed as a chore which had to be quickly done so that he could return to the bosom of his family. As a child, Nicholas resented the fact that work prevented his father from spending more time with the children. As tsar he came to resent the amount of time work took him away from his family. Again this is Louis XVI. He enjoyed sports with them or reading to them at night. Family was situated in the centre of his life. When the February 1917 revolution occurred Nicholas gave more thought about the fact that his abdication would separate him from his son, than about the actual abdication itself. Fearing separation from his son, he shocked everyone (and broke the law) by abdicating for Alexis as well. He never enjoyed either policy discussions or written reports, both of which bored him terribly. By 1901 he became bored with chairing the Committee of Ministers and reverted to independent meetings with the ministers. He then tired of long reports. Consequently, certain ministers began to edit and shorten their reports to him, in the hope of retaining his attention. Some even replaced serious policy reports with court and society gossip.[65] His indifference amazed ministers. When they arrived for their weekly session, Nicholas preferred to talk about family life and other non-political irrelevant matters. Father Gregorii Shavelskii, who was with Nicholas during his time at Russian Supreme Headquarters during the First World War, wrote in his memoirs: 'Conversation with the tsar could not satisfy those who expected to find greatness and wisdom in his deliberations with him. On the other hand one could not but be touched by his simplicity and cordiality (*prostota i serdechnost*). The emperor never touches during the conversation either departmental or state questions. All of his attention is focused on the personality, with whom he is speaking by showing a real interest in his health, his family and even material well-being, etc.'[66]

Yet, Nicholas was conscientious. But by approaching his work as a routine chore, he failed to address larger policy issues, despite the fact he was well informed on events and problems in the Empire. The sheer number of details and other requirements of policy making overwhelmed him, if he indeed had the capacity to conceptualise in the first place. Recall Pobedonostsev's comment. Unlike Alexander III, Nicholas did not allow himself to be briefed in a systematic way; his distrust of people led him to discontinue the cutting of newspaper articles for his reading. He devoted most of his attention to diplomatic and military matters and the reading of documents on high domestic politics. There was very little coherent policy initiation and ministerial co-ordination. He much preferred playing with paper, writing out and addressing his own letters, organising his paperwork, which he permitted no one to touch. He preferred 'busy work' that gave the impression of real work, as it did not require much thinking, analysis, or decision making. Nicholas himself summed up his approach to ruling in a telling remark to his Foreign Minister, Sergei D. Sazonov just before the beginning of the

First World War: 'I, Sergei Dmitrivich try not to ponder about anything and find that this is the only way to rule Russia. Otherwise, I would have died long ago.'[67]

Some might say that Nicholas made this remark flippantly. Yet, his modus operandi shows he did not. This is not to say that many late-nineteenth- century monarchs were pensive and insightful. Some were, such as Franz Josef and even Wilhelm II, but Nicholas much less so. This was particularly dangerous given the tsar's great power and Nicholas' unwillingness to allow someone to rule on an everyday basis for him. Leading a hedonistic life and ignoring his duties never entered Nicholas' mind given his belief that he held responsibility before God for his actions and Russia. Yet, he felt overwhelmed by ruling, perhaps by his understanding of the problems facing Russia, and alienated from the government. This reaction is understandable given the huge and especially life-long responsibility he carried. Was it fair to expect one person to govern an entire life without becoming detached? For some, like Nicholas, detachment allowed them to maintain a degree of sanity. But Nicholas went too far in this direction. His excessive detachment was matched by his attention to busy work.

'If you find me so little troubled it is because I have the firm and absolute faith that the destiny of Russia, my own fate, and that of my family are in the hands of God, who has placed me where I am. Whatever may happen I shall bow to His will, conscious that I have never had any other thought than that of serving the country he has entrusted to me',[68] remarked Nicholas II at the height of the Revolution of 1905. Such passivity in the face of mounting political pressure and crises became one of the leitmotivs of Nicholas' reign. In Nicholas' view the human will was relatively powerless to affect the 'course of history' that emanated from God's will. To a significant degree he was a fatalist. At the beginning of his reign he wrote to his mother, 'I look submissively and confidently to the future which is known only to God himself. He always organises everything for our good, although sometimes his trials seem to us unduly heavy. Therefore it is necessary to repeat, "Such will be your will."'[69] In discussing some domestic projects with his Prime Minister, Peter Arkadevich Stolypin, Nicholas lamented that, 'None of my projects is successful. I have no success. And besides the human will is impotent...I have endured heavy tasks, but will see no reward on earth.'

As political and economic problems multiplied it seems that Nicholas' fatalism increased. One of his last foreign ministers wrote that Nicholas had a 'mystical submissiveness' to fate and a belief in his own unsuccessfulness (*neudachnost)*.[70] As Witte put it: 'The tsar believed that people do not influence events, that God directs everything and that the tsar, as God's anointed, should not take advice from anyone but follow his divine inspirations.'[71] Upon receiving news of the disastrous fall of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War his only public response was, 'Such is God's will.'[72] This expression and 'God please help us' (*Pomogi nam Gospodi)* were his automatic reactions to distressing news. In making the heavy decision to issue the October manifesto he wrote to his mother that, 'the only consolation is the hope that such a move was the will of God...'[73] Being very religious, he believed that this world, this life, was a trial before entering

God's world. Father Shavelskii noted that, 'Religion gave him (Nicholas) that for which he most of all longed and searched—peace of mind. He treasured that. He used religion...which strengthened his soul during difficult times and always awakened in him hope.'[74] Religion mixed with fatalism became Nicholas' means of handling and ignoring the increasingly ugly reality around him. In this respect he differed greatly from Alexander II and III.

Nicholas II was a virulent anti-Semite. He referred to Jews with the derogatory term *zhid*. He believed that the Jews were responsible for stirring up trouble in the country and leading the innocent Russian people astray. After the October Manifesto pogroms took place in various parts of the Empire. Nicholas wrote to his mother:

> a whole mass of loyal people suddenly made their power felt. The impertinence of the socialists and the revolutionaries had angered the people once more; and because nine-tenths of the troublemakers are Jews, the people's whole anger was turned against them. That is how the pogroms happened. It is amazing how they took place simultaneously throughout Russia and Siberia. Besides not only Jews were victimised, but some of the Russian agitators, engineers, lawyers, and such-like bad people suffered as well.[75]

As Witte tried to quell the rebellion of 1906 Nicholas wrote to his mother that no one believed in him any longer 'except perhaps foreign Jews (*zhidi*).[76] He supported anti-Semitic groups and even pardoned assassins of prominent Jewish public figures. During the celebrations dedicated to the bicentenary of the Battle of Poltava in 1909 Nicholas remarked to the French military attaché that since they were no longer in St. Petersburg no one could say that the Russian people did not love their emperor and that he is 'certain that the rural population, the owners of the land, the nobility, and the army remain loyal to the tsar; the revolutionary elements are composed above all of Jews, students, landless peasants, and some workers.'[77] Since the troublemakers were so 'small' in number and many of them were Jews, it was easy to rationalise the use of brute force and ignore many problems.

Nicholas held the view that the autocracy was the only force capable of maintaining Russia's independence and unity. Nicholas had a particular view of the autocracy that dated not so much from the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1853), but rather from the time of Alexis I in the middle of the seventeenth century. The recourse to Alexis was rooted in the naïve longing for the supposed harmony of pre-modern society. It represented a counteractive Slavophile response to the disintegrating pressures of modernity. Nicholas saw in this period the existence of a non-bureaucratic patrimonial state with the tsar at the head, personally ruling. The tsar should rule according to his divinely inspired instincts and feelings. In rejecting Stolypin's project to ameliorate the position of Jews in the Empire he wrote: 'Despite the most convincing arguments in favour of adopting a positive

decision in this matter, an inner voice keeps on insisting more and more that I do not accept responsibility for it. So far, my conscience has not deceived me. Therefore, I intend in this case also to follow its dictates...I know that you also believe that the tsar's heart is in God's hands.'[78]

Nicholas' adherence to the autocratic principle was linked to his view of his coronation and oath. His took very seriously his responsibility as the representative of God on Earth. In addition, he had taken an oath before his ancestors and more importantly before God himself to maintain the autocracy intact. To break this oath meant answering before him. As late as December 1916 when talk of revolution within society and whispering within the imperial family about removing Nicholas was rife, he rejected Grand Duke Paul Aleksandrovich's pleas to set-up a government that enjoyed public confidence. 'I took an oath for autocracy on the day of my coronation, and I must remit this oath in its integrity to my son.'[79] As God's representative on Earth, he should not take advice that contradicted his inner feeling and instinct, which in the end were manifestations of God's will. In the midst of the Revolution of 1905 when pressure was growing within the government itself for some type of constitutional change, Nicholas tellingly remarked that, '...all this time I have been tormented by the worry as to whether I have the right before my ancestors to change the limits of that power which I received from them...' He told his newly appointed Minister of Internal Affairs, Svyatapolk-Mirskii in October 1904—'You know I don't hold to autocracy for my own pleasure. I act in this sense only because I am convinced that it is necessary for Russia. If it was simply a question of myself I would happily get rid of all this.'[80] Nicholas' sense of inherited responsibility for Russia's fate, a belief that one had no right to shed that responsibility, and a conviction that there was no other person or type of political system that could take on the burden of responsibility without dooming the Empire to inevitable and speedy destruction forced him to adhere to the autocracy in a very strict form. Yet he was incapable of playing the autocrat's role.

Nicholas regarded the bureaucracy as a threat to his power, as did his predecessors and most Russian conservatives. The bureaucracy infringed on his vision of how government should be: 'He considered himself to be the chief of his people or a landowner on a grand scale...The huge Russian Empire was to him a sort of ancestral family estate, private property.'[81] During the tercentenary celebrations of Romanov rule, the dynasty in general and the tsar in particular was emphasised and glorified. Kokovstev, Nicholas' first minister, remarked in his memoirs that it seemed that the celebrations were suggesting that the government was a barrier between the people (i.e. peasants) and their tsar. To a much great extent than his predecessors, Nicholas considered protecting his people from his own bureaucrats his duty.

For monarchs the bureaucracy can represent a serious threat to their power through systemisation of the governing process, but it need not be that way. The bureaucracy at the highest levels can represent additional power for a monarch, as a provider of information and a variety of choices to a particular problem. In

addition, the monarch can set the broad outlines for policy; outlines based on reliable information and feasibility. Although Alexander III said he despised the bureaucracy and then drank champagne to its obliteration, he did not fail to provide leadership. One can understand and even sympathise with Nicholas in regard to the problems he faced from his own bureaucracy. But his reaction to it not only exacerbated existing problems, but, as we shall see, created new ones as the bureaucracy tried to function in the face of changes wrought by economic modernisation. The point here is that Nicholas allowed his dislike for the bureaucracy to prevent him from trying to control it, direct it, or even change it in order to make more responsive to his decisions.

Nicholas, like Louis XVI and Mohammad Reza liked the outdoors. Whereas Louis preferred hunting and Mohammad Reza preferred skiing and riding, Nicholas enjoyed chores such a chopping wood, swimming, and walking. These were attempts to escape albeit momentarily from the responsibilities as ruler. As mentioned earlier he did not have any friends with whom he spent some free time.

Nicholas' wife, Alexandra, played an important role in the life and reign of her husband. This opinion should not be taken to the point where she, along with the infamous Rasputin, are held responsible for the overthrow of the dynasty because of her baneful influence over the tsar. Alexandra only reinforced most of Nicholas' beliefs on the bureaucracy, St. Petersburg, society, and the autocracy. As a whole she did not impose on him actions or ideas against his will or push him into a direction towards which he was not already inclined with one big exception. She did strengthen Nicholas's backbone in 1915 when he might have given way. Her fault however can be that she was not a positive influence on her husband, like the Empress Farah in Iran or Empress Victoria of Germany, (husband of Frederick III and mother of Wilhem II), but rather strengthened his worst tendencies and beliefs.

Alexandra came from a small German principality, but was more English in her outlook than anything else. She was the youngest daughter of Grand Duke Louis IV of Hesse-Darmstadt and Grand Duchess Alice, who was the second daughter of the grandmother of Europe, Queen Victoria. Alexandra had a good relationship with Victoria, who took her under her wing after the death of her mother. Alexandra was a proud and strong-minded woman, though quite emotional at times and unstable. She devoted herself to the upbringing of her children. She herself changed their bed sheets, took care of them when they were sick; she was always there for them. She blamed herself for her son's haemophilia.

She and Nicholas loved each other deeply and were dedicated to each other. When he became tsar, Nicholas immediately began to complain that work was taking him away from his dear Alix. Like Nicholas, she hated Petersburg and its high society, knowing that society did not approve of her. Whilst Petersburg society could be frivolous and highly critical, Alexandra added to the acrimony by ignoring it and failing to create some type of base within it for herself and Nicholas. Her nervousness in front of large crowds appeared as coldness and aloofness, even arrogance. She knew Russian, but spoke with an English accent

and generally only with servants. Her French was better, but she felt most at home with English, the language in which she communicated with her husband. Hubby and wifey were their nicknames for each other.

Upon her conversion to Russian Orthodoxy, Alexandra became a very religious and spiritual person, praying frequently and believing in the power of prayer and miracles. Like Nicholas, she held a very fatalist view of the future. Upon hearing of the fall of Port Arthur she wrote to Nicholas, 'somehow I cannot grasp (the news of the fall)...But if it is God's will, we must bow our heads and bear this burden wh(ich) is overwhelming. Don't lose your faith in God, tho(ugh) He tries you beyond measure...'[82] She believed that life was a heavy trial all had to pass in order to ascend to heaven. This trial consisted of problems and sufferings that were a type of penance for pervious sins, which could be overcome only through faith. She saw the autocracy as the only true force in Russia capable of holding the country together and defending its independence. Once again like Nicholas, she regarded the peasants as forever loyal subjects of the tsar, as true Russians, whereas the urbanites and aristocrats could not be trusted and were out to destroy her husband's autocratic power. In a letter to her grandmother, Queen Victoria, she stated that, 'here we do not need to earn the love of the people. The Russian people revere their Tsars as divine beings, from whom all charity and fortune derive. As far as St. Petersburg society is concerned, that is something which one can wholly disregard. The opinions of those who make up this society and their *mocking* have no significance whatsoever.'[83] During the celebrations for the three hundredth anniversary of the dynasty in 1913, she remarked, 'Now you can see for yourself what cowards those state ministers are. They are constantly frightening the emperor with threats of revolution and here—you see it for yourself—we need merely to show ourselves and at once their hearts are ours.'[84] This quote reflects not only her inability to understand the realties of the situation in Russia, but also her dislike of ministers, whom she suspected of trying to dupe her husband and utilise his power in their own interests. This was particularly dangerous since she believed that her husband had a weak will. Alexandra lacked understanding of politics and the role of the elites in the running of the entire system and this in turn had a negative affect on how she attempted to influence Nicholas

She pushed her husband into showing a strong will with his ministers. 'Be more autocratic than Peter the Great and sterner than Ivan the Terrible, You and Russia are one and the same,' she exalted. 'Show your mind and don't let others forget who you are!' He signed off with, 'Your own poor little huz with no will Nicky.'[85] Whilst Nicholas did indeed have a weak will when it came to some policy decisions, he nevertheless was very strong-minded in regard to issues close to his heart, namely the autocracy.

Mohammad Reza Shah

Mohammad Reza and his twin sister, Ashraf, were born on 26 October 1919. At the time of the birth their father, Reza Khan, was commander of the Iranian Cossack brigade which despite its small size was one of the few potent military

forces in the closing years of the Qajar dynasty. Mohammad Reza's mother, later known as Taj ol-Moluk 'Crown of the Kings', had already given birth to a daughter, Shams, three years before. In 1922 she gave birth to what would be her last child, Ali Reza.

Reza Shah's origins are subject to debate, but he came from a poor village family. In 1900 he joined the Persian Cossack Brigade through whose ranks he worked. In 1920 he sent home the Russian commander of the Brigade and took control of it. Ahmad Shah approved Reza Khan's new status as head of the Brigade. Reza Khan was a self-made man, a village boy who subsequently became in chronological order, Commander of the Cossack Brigade, War Minister, Prime Minister, and then Shah of Iran.

During his childhood, his mother did not have enough money to send him to one of the local schools, *maktab*, the clergy ran. Consequently, Reza Shah did not learn to read and write until his twenties. Mohammad Reza's mother came from a relatively well-off family, which had emigrated to Tehran when Tsarist Russia annexed tracts of Iranian territory in the North Caucasus in 1826. She was fully literate.

Reza Shah towered over his children. In a country where most people were of short or medium height, Reza Shah's six feet and broad shoulders made him into a giant. Both Mohammad Reza and his sister Ashraf described the fear this man could instil in them. Whilst emphasising that Reza Shah never punished the children, Princess Ashraf remarked that 'his physical presence to us as children was so intimidating, the sound of his voice raised in anger so terrifying, that even years later as a grown woman I can't remember a time when I wasn't afraid of him.'[86] Mohammad Reza similarly described his father, but never in such frank and open expressions. 'Our love for him was full of admiration through we held him in respectful awe...it was his piercing eyes that arrested anyone who met him. Those eyes could make a strong man shrivel up inside.'[87] Mohammad Reza's second wife, Soraya wrote in her memoirs that he once remarked that 'Reza Shah was a very great character but we were all frightened of him. He only needed to fix his piercing eyes upon us and we went rigid with fear and respect. At the family table, we never dared express our own views. Indeed, we were only allowed to speak when asked a question.'[88] The shah's third and last wife, Empress Farah, recalled an incident when the eight-year old crown prince, Reza, in the middle of a meeting between the shah and a foreign ambassador in the Niavaran Palace, found his way into the office. The shah turned his attention to his son and quietly and calmly led him out of the meeting. He then turned to the ambassador and said that he never wanted him 'to feel the awe, the terror I felt for my father.'[89]

Mohammad Reza's relationship with his father and the hold it had over him after Reza Shah's abdication and then death is one of the keys to understanding the last shah's character. He grew up with a great sense of insecurity given the immense difficulty in satisfying the high expectations of his father. Both before and after his period of education in Switzerland Mohammad Reza's family life did not have the warmth and happiness that characterised the childhood of Nicholas

II and to a lesser degree of Louis XVI. Although Alexander III had a huge frame and appeared tough, he was warm in the familial environment. But Nicholas, like Mohammad Reza, feared his father. To the great chagrin of Taj ol-Molk in 1922 Reza Khan took a second wife whom he divorced in 1923. That same year he took a third with whom he ended up living. But, twice a week he spent the night at the house where Taj ol-Molk and the children lived. Not surprisingly tension and anger characterised the atmosphere during these visits.

The ascension of Reza Shah to the famed Peacock Throne changed the life of the six-year old Mohammad Reza. He was no longer permitted to live with his mother and sisters. He was placed in one of the palaces in the Golestan compound, where he lived with a butler and a French-born governess, Madame Arfa.[90] He was allowed one hour a day to spend with his mother and another hour with his father. In accordance with Reza Shah's wish that his son and now heir receive a proper education within the compound a military school was set-up. The crown prince, along with his full and half brothers and some twenty other pupils, spent six hours a day studying various subjects, including Persian language and history, and performing military drills.

In 1931 Reza Shah sent the young prince and his younger brother, Ali Reza, to Switzerland for further secondary education. At the time of his son's departure Reza Shah remarked to General Arfa, husband of Madame Arfa, that, 'It is very difficult for me to part with my beloved son, but we must think of the country. Iran needs educated and enlightened rulers; we, the old and ignorant, must go.'[91] Mohammad Reza's six-year stay in Switzerland is instructive in understanding his character. First, he was rather miserable during his time there. He had been sent with a supervisor who had strict orders from Reza Shah to make sure that he did not get into any trouble or danger. As an adult Mohammad Reza remembered that time of his life:

> I was like a prisoner...never allowed to leave the school grounds (alone)...When my comrades had free time, they would go merrily into town...During Christmas and New Year holidays they went to parties and balls...My friends were having fun, laughing, and dancing while I was sitting alone in my room...I had a radio and gramophone to keep me company, but what fun were they compared with the festivities my friends enjoyed? I think it was quite wrong, and now that I have been blessed with a son I won't bring him up that way.[92]

Despite these strong feelings and latent resentment, the young Mohammad Reza did not rebel; he accepted his fate and duty.

Secondly, Mohammad Reza was shocked by the amount of ignorance about his country. Most people had not heard of Iran. This exacerbated the young man's insecurity over the condition into which Iran had fallen. Like many Iranians of this period he was amazed at the extent of the technological and economic development in Europe and especially in Switzerland. For example, upon

returning to Iran six years later, he was amazed to find the port from which he left completely redone. He saw large paved roads, many new modern-style buildings, and electricity. All he could mutter at this sight were the words, 'It's like Europe.'

Thirdly, Mohammad Reza showed that he could be a soft and rather likeable person, who hated bullies. He never 'initiated a fight and almost always entered one in defence of weaker schoolmates.'[93] He remarked once that since 'I believe very much in the pride of the people' and 'that people should be equal, regarding the law, as human beings, when I see a stranger maybe pushing someone weaker or not being kind to him I get so angry and I am revolted—I can't stand that, that is really for me the hardest of things—to see people bullied.'[94]

Reza Shah had Mohammad Reza join a Tehran military academy for two years upon his return to Iran in order to shore-up his European education. To complete his passage into manhood Reza Shah arranged for his son and heir to marry the beautiful sister of King Farouk of Egypt, Fawziya. Until his abdication in the immediate aftermath of the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941, Reza Shah did attempt to introduce his heir to the business of governing Iran. They had daily discussions, in which Mohammad Reza had to answer a myriad of questions on various situations, real and hypothetical. More often than not Reza Shah just lectured the crown prince, leaving little room for discussion and debate. 'I and all the officials of my father's government,' Mohammad Reza Shah wrote years later, 'had such respect for him and were so much in awe of him that 'discussion' with him had none of the give-and-take the word implies. I advanced my views and made hints and suggestions, but discussion in any usual sense was out of the question.'[95]

The example of Reza Shah always loomed larger than life in the mind of Mohammad Reza. Although many people had grown disillusioned with Reza Shah toward the end of his reign, it was generally recognised that he had indeed saved the country from disintegration and had placed it on the path of economic and social modernisation. This reputation, which the government propagandised in order to give greater legitimacy to the Pahlavi dynasty, became a measuring stick for Mohammad Reza in evaluating his reign. One biographer of Mohammad Reza believes that, 'To him Reza Shah was the ultimate point of reference, the supreme measure of all values. He constantly asked himself what his father would have done in this or that situation.'[96] Once in 1975 Mohammad Reza Shah remarked to a minister that he had done more for the country than his father. The minister, at the time not understanding the meaning of these words, responded that although that was true, Reza Shah did not sit on the throne thirty-four years as Mohammad Reza had. The shah was not amused. In an interview with TIME magazine the shah once again revealed his tendency to compare himself with his father. 'With all the respect I have for Ataturk, he was living in his time, as my father was living in his time. Neither of them made land reform. But I have. Neither of them thought of workers participating in profits and being co-owners of factories(like I have).' Whilst acknowledging Reza Shah's 'ambitious and progressive projects' Mohammad Reza underlined the fact that his father 'had never promulgated any

comprehensive development programme such as our present Second Seven-Year Plan or the third plan...'[97] The shah once even went so far as to characterise his father's reign as a 'dictatorship'.[98] He did indeed admire his father's achievements and respected the extent of his power. Yet, he was determined to outstrip his father's accomplishments.

The belief that Reza Shah did not consider Mohammad Reza suitable to hold Iran together and provide the necessary leadership for the modernisation of the country lingered in the back of Mohammad Reza's mind. The oft-quoted passage from the last shah's book, *Mission for My Country*, was the first public manifestation of this phenomenon. Mohammad Reza describes a discussion he held with his father who at one point remarked that he hoped he would be able to bequeath to him a strong governmental apparatus which would be able to operate on a day-to-day basis 'automatically without the need of continuous supervision from the top.' The crown prince took the remarks as an insult, raising doubts about the father's confidence in his heir's abilities. 'What does he mean?' Does he think that if he were gone I couldn't take over and continue his work?' the young Mohammad Reza asked himself.[99] Mohammad Reza grew up, as did Nicholas, with the belief that his own father questioned his ability to carry on after him.

Unlike Nicholas II, who largely based his own modus operandi and policies on that of his father, Mohammad Reza Shah travelled his own path. In *Mission for My Country*, the shah stressed that his 'father possessed a very different personality from mine...My father's inborn characteristics served his country better then but, notwithstanding my admiration for him, I think that mine are of greater use for it now.[100] Mohammad Reza Shah did not allow his father's memory and policies to dictate, to frame his own approach to government. In this he was close to Alexander II, who broke with many of his father's policies. The goal for Mohammad Reza Shah was to outdo his father in dragging Iran into his version of the modern world.

Although the Pahlavi dynasty was a very new one, only sixteen years old at the time of his ascension, Mohammad Reza nonetheless identified with the monarchy in the same terms as a monarch from a long-standing dynasty, such as a Bourbon or Romanov. Recognising this newness of his dynasty and the belief amongst some of the traditional elite that the Pahlavis were not truly aristocratic, let alone 'royal', Mohammad Reza emphasised the longevity of monarchy in Iran. The frequent change of dynasty was presented as a fact of Iranian history and the Pahlavis were the latest in that long line of different royal houses. There was however a degree of insecurity and flashiness in the shah which was quite alien to Louis XVI and Nicholas II. This could have been a reflection of the different epochs as much as of the unique dynastic history of the Pahlavis. This insecurity was manifested in his massive celebrations in 1971 at Persepolis in honour of the supposed 2500th anniversary of the founding of Iran's monarchy. Mohammad Reza Shah emphasised the link between his dynasty and the founder of the great Achaemenid Empire and monarchy, Cyrus, as if he was trying to convince himself more than anyone else of his royal blood.

Mohammad Reza Shah believed that legitimacy for his young dynasty would result from a link between, on the one hand, the Pahlavis and, on the other, the traditions of the ancient Persian monarchy and economic and social modernisation. The masses were to transfer their primary loyalty from Islam to the idea of Iran, which in the shah's eyes the crown epitomised. The crown not Islam was to serve as the unifying force in a country with diverse religions and nationalities. This economic and social modernisation was implemented under the rubric of 'The White Revolution of Shah and People and 'The Great Civilisation.' Mohammad Reza Shah decided he would lead Iran's economic, technological, and social revolution. In one respect Mohammad Reza Shah was closer in philosophy to the enlightened despots of the eighteenth century, such as Josef II, Catherine II, Frederick II, than to Nicholas II. The monarchy, and specifically the monarch, would be the reforming, enlightening force in society. At the same time the idea of catching up with the West places Iran in Russia's category. The shah took his assumed role as leader of a revolution seriously. When a New York Times' article dubbed him 'Louis XIV' he took offence. 'The damn fool calls me Louis XIV. Yet I'm leader of a revolution; that Bourbon epitomised reaction."[101]

Like Louis XVI and Nicholas II, Mohammad Reza Shah fervently believed that a 'special bond' existed between him and his people. This was not an irrational belief to hold, as it was inherent in any monarchical ideology. He declared that he held 'the pulse of the people' in his hand and that 'such a special bond exists between me and my people' that 'no one would be able to break it' for the 'Iranian people now love me and will never forsake me.' He told an interviewer that 'In my own country I already hold the supreme rank and power dependent on law and upon the special ties which bind me to my people.'[102] In one of his more grandiose moments he declared that, 'As the commander of this eternal monarchy I make a covenant with Iranian history that this golden epic of modern Iran will be carried on to complete victory and that no power on earth shall be able to stand against the bond of steel between the shah and the nation.'[103]

The shah berated a Western interviewer, 'You Westerners simply don't understand the philosophy behind my power. The Iranians think of their sovereign as a father...The monarchy is the cement of our unity. In celebrating our 2500th anniversary, all I was doing was celebrating the anniversary of my country of which I am father. Now if to you a father is inevitably a dictator, that is your problem, not mine.'[104] He not only viewed his role as shah as a loving father, but also believed that the Iranian people expected him to act like the father of society. 'I think the people of Iran have always expected to find in their shah a leader or father or teacher.'[105] He therefore tried to project such image. He was 'bound and determined to appear imperial and act like a shah 'because "the people expect it."' A western painter, who had been commissioned by the shah to paint a portrait of himself, had an interesting encounter between the two shahs, one imperial and the other very human. When the painter asked him to pose, the shah responded that he was the father of his people and therefore wanted to look fatherly. He then assumed a rather rigid pose with one arm on the chair and the

other arm on the other arm of the chair, sternly looking ahead. The painter then told him to loosen up a bit and then said, 'Your Majesty your arm seems to be larger than I would think your arm should be.' The shah smiled and replied, 'Yes, I do it with bells. Would you like to feel?'[106] Many others commented on the shah's attempts to look imperial in front of groups of people and his more relaxed style when in the company of one or two people. His second wife, Soroya, wrote in her memoirs that she never saw him 'completely relaxed and open if there was a third person present.'[107] Before the more grandiose period of the 1970s the shah preferred buffet dinners, which allowed him to walk, with plate in hand, to various people and converse with them. Unfortunately, his attempts to look imperial only served to hurt his image amongst the people. As one person at court put it, 'The result (of these attempts) was the he always came off a bit stiff, despite his obvious warmth.'[108]

This attempt to look imperial created the dual impressions people had of Mohammad Reza Shah. For those outside the court Mohammad Reza Shah appeared imperial, distant, all-knowing and all-wise, full of confidence. Louis XVI and Nicholas II never succeeded in projecting such an air of strength and confidence. Many opposition figures saw the shah as inherently cruel and bloodthirsty, prepared to sacrifice the country's well-being for his personal advancement. Those close to him saw a degree of softness and shyness. He did indeed hate bullies and those who because of their position tried to take advantage of others or intimidate them. When one of his brothers publicly shouted at one of the shah's telephone operators for refusing to place a telephone call for him despite regulations stating that only the shah could use the palace's system, Mohammad Reza became infuriated. Without saying anything to his brother, he ordered that the telephone system from his brother's residence be removed. When Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi noticed that his deputy, Abbas Ali Khalatbary, had a signed portrait of the shah in his office, he had it removed. The shah found out about this and ordered Alam to have Khalatbary get the picture back and 'to warn Zahedi not be such an ass in the future.'[109]

By most accounts the shah was an intelligent man. A US general who knew him well commented, 'I became thoroughly convinced that he was probably one of the most brilliant men I had ever met. Near total recall, understood the essence of things quickly. Nice person truly interested in learning things.'[110] He hated speaking in front of crowds; his first reaction was to shun them. His poor public speaking, which he shared with Louis XVI and Nicholas II, only made him seem that more distant. He appeared to be decisive, but in reality vacillated when faced with strong opposition as in 1951-53, 1963, and 1978-79. He was also forgiving, perhaps enjoying the role of the benevolent father taking back those who had made mistakes in the past. Many people who had been in opposition, including ex-members of the Iranian communist party, were allowed into government service on the condition that loyalty to the throne was promised.

Integral to his understanding of the Iranian monarchy and his role as shah was the belief that God had chosen him to fulfil a special mission on earth. He

claimed that he had three visions of important Muslim religious figures, two of which appeared when the crown prince was in physical danger, once from typhoid and the other from a fall from a galloping horse. Reza Shah eventually heard about his son's claim that the religious figure, Abbas had prevented him from being injured during his fall from a horse. He became very angry, 'Rubbish sir,' Reza Shah told his son, 'If these religious figures could make miracles they would have saved themselves from being killed like chickens.'[111] Mohammad Reza continued to believe. 'From the time I was six or seven, I have felt that perhaps there is a supreme being who is guiding me.'[112] He clung to the view that these were signs that God protected him. Two failed assassination attempts strengthened this belief. 'Without divine favour my revolution would not have been possible. Without God's support I would be a man like all the rest. And divine assistance will guarantee the continuation of our work.'[113] He obviously shared this with Louis XVI and Nicholas II.

Mohammad Reza cannot be characterised as an irreligious man. He believed that 'a society devoid of religious beliefs and devoid of spiritual principles of individual and social freedoms' cannot endure and, 'moreover there is no beauty or attraction in it.' During his time in Switzerland he prayed on a daily basis. Upon becoming shah, he loosened many of the restrictions placed on the *ulama* by his father. Whereas during the last five years of Reza Shah's reign women were prohibited to wear the veil, under his son women had the right to choose to wear it. Reza Shah had limited religious celebrations such a Moharram and Safar. Mohammad Reza not only loosened many of their restrictions, but also supported the celebrations himself. Nonetheless, he had some clear ideas of the role religion and with it the clergy should play in Iranian society.

Mohammad Reza Shah wanted to eliminate clerical political power, to remove them from the political scene, whilst co-opting religion for his own power politics. He and his father regarded the *'ulama* as the main opposition force to modernisation and Pahlavi power. During the regime's dying days the shah succinctly expressed his personal opinion of religion to a famous Iranian sociologist: 'You must know that I am a deeply religious man. I have nothing against religion, but as we both know, in the past our clergy have exploited the superstition and ignorance of the illiterate. They have always tried to incite mass fanaticism for their own political ends. They have tried to bring religion into everything in order to gain power for themselves and in practice to drag the country backward. They have no interest in the progress and development of the country.'[114] In 1976 he told an interviewer: 'I know full well that as long as the mullahs are around there will be no possibility of (lasting) reform. My father and I have both suffered at the hands of these religious fanatics...The first step to (lasting) reform is the elimination of the mullahs.'[115]

The question of whether the state-secular issue could be described in such black-and-white terms will be addressed in subsequent chapters. The shah also regarded foreign intervention and the West as causes of Iran's inability to modernise in a timely manner. 'For Iran's decline we must, of course, blame the

nation's poverty and ignorance as well as the treachery of native politicians. But the main culprits were foreign powers.'[116] The situation in which Iran found herself in the twentieth century and the role of foreign powers in the internal politics of the country placed Iran in a different category from that of Russia and France.

'We are going to be a member of your club,' the shah told *Der Speigel* in 1974. The economic power, the living standards, and the technological achievements of the West made a strong impression on him; Iran had to copy these. But modernisation in his mind was synonymous with westernisation. In the late 1950s and early 1960s he spoke openly of 'westernisation', rather than 'modernisation.' In *Mission for My Country,* he named one chapter 'Westernisation: Our Welcome Ordeal.' The shah once stated that, 'Certainly, no one can doubt that our culture is more akin to that of the West than is either the Chinese or that of our neighbours, the Arabs.'[117] Iran was not to be compared to her 'eastern' neighbours, but to the more advanced West for that in the end was worthy of her. As the economy in the late 1960s and 1970s continued to experience strong growth, the shah increasingly predicted that Iran would attain Europe's living standards within a generation. In exile he wrote in his book with a degree of pride that the capital, Tehran, 'had begun to take on the look and style of a European capital.'[118]

Whilst the shah seemed to be a westerniser, Nicholas II was more of a Slavophile, fearing the erosion of Russian values and ideals in the face of Western modernity. Both men however were determined to match Western power. The shah, a strong nationalist and feeling increasingly self-confident by the late 1960s, frequently declared that Iran was not in reality following a policy of westernisation, but rather developing an Iranian 'third way' to the future. '...I say we do not have to copy anybody, any ideology. We have enough brains to devise what is best for ourselves...it would be beneath the dignity of a nation which had for several thousand years been the pioneer of thinking, philosophy, and religion, to wear anything borrowed.'[119] Such rhetoric was not unfamiliar in Russia during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though at that time it reflected less insecurity. The shah looked at the past glories of the old Iranian Empires and compared them with the situation in which Iran found herself in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Russia during the time of Nicholas II was not in a similar situation.

The shah was ashamed of the situation into which Iran had fallen and this in turn created great insecurity vis-à-vis the West. His insecurity led him to attempt to convince both Westerners and Iranians that Iran was in fact not only a part of the Western advanced world, but was even greater than it given her 'contributions' to world culture over the centuries. A basic contradiction characterised in his feelings toward the West. He stressed on the one hand that Persian 'culture is the oldest continuous one racially and linguistically linked to that of the West....'[120] That the West regard him and Iran as part of its technologically and economically advanced world was important to him. But on the other hand he would state, 'If you Europeans think yourselves superior, we have no complexes. Don't ever

forget that whatever you have, we taught you three thousand years ago.'[121] He did have a complex. This was not uncommon amongst educated Iranians at the time.

Mohammad Reza Shah was greatly bothered that Iran, with its culture and civilisation, had become so weak and backward. 'A gifted and individualistic people, we had disintegrated into lethargy and political and social anarchy.'[122] Given a long history of Russian, British and then US interference in internal Iranian affairs the shah was haunted by the thought that in the end they held power over the political destiny of the country. Since the reign of Nasr al-Din Shah in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Britain and Russia played very important roles in Iran's politics, making and breaking of governments through bribing political officials, orchestrating demonstrations, and using military force to achieve their ends. When Mohammad Reza said that 'They (foreign powers) instructed their agents not only to cultivate suspicion to such an extent that my people would come to consider foreign backing as the only means of achieving anything in the country, but to aggravate the inferiority complex which they deliberately created,' he was talking about himself as well as many Iranians.[123] Court Minister Alam wrote that, 'All in all his suspicions of the British are quite incredible; he tends to see their secret hand *(dast-e englisi)* behind virtually every international incident.' During a conversation with Alam over King Hassan II's political troubles in 1972 the shah asked rhetorically, 'But if it is the Americans who are to blame (for Hassan's problems), why is it that they have refrained from curbing my own independence?'[124] Yet, he told both Presidents Nixon and Ford that he would continue to increase oil prices despite their warnings. 'We can share many things with the U.S. But nobody can dictate to us.'[125] When Alam in 1970 told the shah that the British Ambassador advised Iran not to break off negotiations with oil companies over the price of oil Mohammad Reza became furious. 'The British advise me!...If they ever again have the audacity to advise me, I'll screw them so hard that they'll think twice before crossing my path again.'[126]

In *Answer to History* the exiled shah failed to recognise his mistakes leading to the Revolution of 1979, preferring to blame a vast Anglo-American conspiracy to remove him from the Peacock throne. 'I began to wonder if there had ever been any coherence to Western policy towards Iran beyond a successful effort to destroy.'[127] He complained bitterly of being isolated from his 'western friends' during the revolution and that it became painfully clear that 'the Americans wanted me out.'[128] Yet during the glory days of 1975 he remarked that, 'Now we are the masters and our former masters are our slaves. Everyday they beat a track to our door, begging for favours. How can they be of assistance? Do we want arms? Do we want nuclear power stations? We only have to ask and they will fulfil our wishes.'[129] Whilst the shah was not a puppet of any foreign government, he believed in the end that Washington and London had the power to overthrow him; they were still to a degree the very much unwanted masters to his mind. Such a mentality was completely alien to a Bourbon or Romanov monarch.

In exile the shah explained the reasons behind his modernisation from above. 'If our nation wished to remain in the circle of dynamic, progressive and free nations of the world, it had no alternative but to completely alter the archaic order of society, and to structure its future on a new order compatible with the vision and needs of the day.'[130] Therefore his goal was within twenty years 'to take Iran to the level of civilisation and progress that the most developed nations have achieved.' His long standing Prime Minister Hoveyda in the early 1970s described the shah's view:

> His Majesty believes that there is a bus that will leave for a marvellous destination at the end of the century. A few nations, the first class ones, will be on board when it leaves. A few others, the second class ones, will be taken for part of the trip only. Others, the third class nations, will simply miss the bus and get buried in the dust left behind. His Majesty wants Iran to be on that bus, among the first class nations. [131]

Peter I and Witte used similar rhetoric in justifying their reform programmes. To the shah's mind a country with the 'civilisation and culture' of Iran had no other fate than to become a second Japan. During the first period of his reign Mohammad Reza Shah complained that there was 'no honour' in being the monarch of such a non-modern country. He delayed his coronation until 1967, at which time he felt that Iran was on the path of development.

That Iranian economic and technological weakness during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had brought about foreign intervention in Iranian politics and the exploitation of her natural resources made a strong impression on the shah. Iranian military weakness had led to Iran becoming a theatre of action during the First and Second World Wars despite her proclamations of neutrality. Moreover, a weak Iran could not put up resistance to the prolonged Soviet occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan in 1945-1946. Remembering the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran the shah bitterly remarked to a journalist, 'You are lucky. You have not heard the sound of foreign tanks in Tehran.'[132] This humiliating period in Iran's history was not to be repeated. An effective army able to defend Iran from regional powers such as Iraq and at least delay a Soviet invasion had to be created. 'Just imagine a country of savages putting an end to an old people like us with all our future before us.'[133] Consequently, throughout his reign and especially after the oil boom the shah bought increasing amounts of military hardware. The armed forces, and especially the air force, were to reflect the stronger and proud Iran. The vast sums spent on the military caused much domestic grumbling.

The shah wanted to go into the history books as the man who modernised Iran, to be the greatest Iranian monarch since the founder of the Achaemenid Empire. Under the banners of the 'White Revolution of Shah and People' and 'Towards the Great Civilisation' he out his plans for the future. He was indeed optimistic about Iran's future. Rising oil revenues would be used to construct an industrial base which would provide the economic base once Iran's oil reserves had been

exhausted. Moreover, oil revenues would permit rapid industrialisation without undue reliance on Western finance. The shah's desire to be Iran's moderniser and the level of oil income initially determined the speed of the modernisation programme. Once the shah realised he had cancer and concomitantly oil prices skyrocketed he pressed his modernisation programme with greater zeal, pushing both the economic and social fabric of the country to the brink. 'God is with Iran for the first time in a long time. This is an opportunity that will not come twice. Today we have everything needed to make Iran great again. We have everything—except perhaps, time.'[134]

In the 1950s and 1960s the shah at least gave lip service to the idea of democracy in Iran. *In Mission for My Country* he defined modern democracy as consisting of three parts. 'First, there is political and administrative democracy. Second, there is economic democracy. Third, there is social democracy.'[135] However, he stressed the need for economic modernisation before democratic practice could begin in Iran. 'For a person wallowing in poverty,' the shah remarked with a degree of truth in a 1977 interview, 'political liberties only have a decorative value, if any.'[136] On this he would have found agreement with Nicholas II.

Regarding political democracy, he criticised communist countries for instituting a one-party state. 'In the elections (of communist states), if you can call them by that name, the voter has no choice, for the only candidates listed are those of the ruling party. Purely as a matter of form, the citizen is urged or ordered to go and vote; the authorities then triumphantly announce that, let us say, 99.9 per cent of the votes cast were for the ruling party. I wonder how many intelligent people were fooled by that sort of thing.'[137] However, in 1975 the shah instituted such a system, as we will see.

Economic democracy was essentially economic modernisation, which would raise the education and living standards of Iranians. He stressed that, 'Political democracy has no meaning unless it is complemented by economic democracy.' The shah believed that this economic modernisation would strengthen the people's loyalty to the crown. To achieve this economic democracy the government would need to act with speed and decisiveness, ignoring the pleas of hurt interest groups, both foreign and domestic.

> To carry through reforms one can't help but be authoritarian. Especially when the reforms take place in a country like Iran, where only twenty-five percent of the inhabitants know how to read and write...believe me, when three-fourths of a nation doesn't know how to read or write, you can provide for reforms only through the strictest authority—otherwise you get nowhere. If I had not been too harsh, I wouldn't even have been able to carry out agrarian reform and my whole reform program would have been stalemated.[138]

Nicholas II was the heir to a similar sort of traditions and of a society that had experienced them. For example, the propaganda surrounding Alexander II and his liberation of the serfs was similar to that surrounding the shah and his land reform of 1963. [139]

The shah, driven by the belief that Iran's oil reserves would be depleted by the 1980s, was torn between his need to modernise the country quickly, which required absolute authority, and his understanding that only some form of democratic reform could institutionalise the system and garnish needed popular legitimacy and pass on to his son and heir a more stable system. He remarked that, 'A country cannot be ruled by the force of the bayonet and secret police. For a few days, this may be possible. But not for all times. Only a majority can rule a society.' Therefore democracy 'has to come, gradually, in the future. But in an orderly manner.'[140] Unlike Nicholas II the shah recognised that the system of government would have to change, eventually. He had seen his father's institutions collapse after his abdication. 'My greatest hope is to leave my son a throne, although I am not certain that it's going to happen. Certainly, he's not going to be able to rule in the same manner in which I do. He's going to have to give a lot if he is going to rule.'[141]

Mohammad Reza had three wives. His first marriage to Princess Fawziya ended in divorce. His second marriage was to Soroya Esfandari, with whom he fell in love. She could not produce the needed heir to the throne and the shah reluctantly divorced her. In 1959 he married Farah Diba, who came from a prominent Azeri family. Farah Diba, who was fluent in English and French, represented a new breed of western educated Iranians. She was an art student in Paris when she met the shah, who was twenty years her senior. A year after the marriage she gave birth to an heir, Crown Prince Cyrus Ali.

Empress Farah was seen as having a positive cultural influence on the shah. For example, she emphasized the preservation of Iranian cultural monuments. As the shah began to prefer international travel and meetings with foreign leaders, Farah travelled Iran extensively and therefore understood better than the shah the reality of Iran. Once Farah drew the shah's attention to 'the government's lamentable attempts at propaganda and the inadequate attention paid to public opinion.' She also remarked that 'various government initiatives are no more than superficial window dressing.' She concluded that these factors can only reduce the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the people.'[142] He refused to listen. Farah recounted her attempts to give the shah a view of reality which differed from what many of his ministers presented:

> I saw the problems while His Majesty saw the achievements. In bed we would compare notes. I would report about what was going wrong in the regions I had just toured. His Majesty would try to dismiss my reports as exaggerated or one-sided. At time he would tell me that such minor problems were *des accidents de parcours* or the heritage of the past, and that all would be well in a few years time. Sometimes however, he would get

impatient and edgy. "No more bad news please!" His Majesty would command. And I would, naturally, change the subject.[143]

Mohammad Reza tended to ignore negative reports or opinions. Even when reading about the seventh-century Arab/Islamic invasion of Iran he remarked, 'I simply could not bear the humiliation. I tore those pages out of the book and threw them away. There is no need for us to focus on the negative aspects of our existence.'[144] Farah's travels and greater contact with the people made her a popular figure. Farah was never demonised to the extent that Marie-Antoinette and Alexandra were in their times, partly because they were foreign women. In Iran that place of honour was saved for the shah's twin sister, Ashraf.

Princess Ashraf was a controversial figure in Iranian political life. There were always rumours of her connections with drug runners and other types of questionable business. The shah expressed his feelings about his family in a telling remark to Minister of the Court Alam, who sparked his rage with a request from Princess Ashraf to be received privately either before or after the others at the 1976 Now Ruz (New Year's) ceremony. 'Who the hell do they think I am? They are a lot of good for nothings who'd be totally lost without me. I refuse to be treated this way. My sister need no longer attend the ceremony...These people are a selfish bunch. They don't give a damn for me. They forget that without me they would be utter nobodies.'[145] A Bourbon or a Romanov could not have possibly thought this way. The sense of dynastic right was far too strong. The shah however never put an end to their intervention in commercial business which heavily damaged the legitimacy of the dynasty. He did not like discussing politics with any members of his family, although he did see them at intervals over dinner at the homes of members of other members of the royal family. He never openly confronted them when displeased by their behaviour, political, business, or personal. Close officials such as Alam and even sometimes Prime Minister Hoveyda, were charged with dealing with familial matters, such as transmitting royal anger at members of the family. He hated confrontations in general.

He did not have a high regard for the elite of the country, whom he considered greedy and unreliable politically. He told Alam, 'Warn all those scum we see at palace dinner parties that they are not to discuss their private business interests with me. If they have requests they should do it via you, likewise if they have complaints.' Upon hearing of the affairs of one member of the elite he told Alam, 'Unless he curbs his greed I shall have him thrown out of the country altogether.' In 1977 Alam wrote in his diary. 'He (the shah) then told me he had good news. "I've decided to give up attending my sisters' dinner parties, and to cease inviting that bunch of creeps to the palace. They had begun to get on my nerves. Every time we played bridge or belote, and someone laid down a card, some other bloody fool would interrupt to ask a personal favour."'[146]

Similar to Louis XVI and Nicholas II he was not fond of intellectuals, Iranian or otherwise. 'I am worried about so-called liberals who will accept anything that comes from the other side. Anything that is Communistic, that is nihilistic, that is

OK. If a country sinks because of this attitude, then it becomes a very dangerous proposition.... I am talking about French so-called intellectuals, Dutch so-called intellectuals, Swedish so-called intellectuals. Maybe they think that the world must change and that before it changes, it must break completely. They have nothing to offer. No doubt there is an intellectual international.'[147] Iranian intellectuals were seen as overly critical, pessimist and not in touch with the reality of the country. He appreciated the skills of the professional upper and middle class and indeed sought them out if they lived abroad. He however strove to de-politicise them in order to control them. 'When you get someone that never has anything at all, you can give him a loaf of bread, he is glad to have a loaf of bread. But you give him ten loaves of bread he will wonder why he does not have twenty.'[148] The middle class therefore had to be watched and politically emasculated.

The shah was guided and blinded by one vision. 'I should utilise the present opportunity to construct a modern and progressive Iran on a sound and strong foundation, so that my presence should no longer affect the destiny of the country. For inevitably I will go sooner or later while Iran and its society will remain...To be first in the Middle East is not enough. We must raise ourselves to the level of a great world power. Such a goal is by no means unattainable.'[149]

4

LOUIS XVI AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE BOURBON STATE

S'il est une felicité pour un roi, s'il est une digne récompense de ses travaux et de ses soins, elle n'est autre chose que la satisfaction de faire le bien. Il doit, comme la Divinité dont il est l'image, trouver son bonheur en lui-meme, par la connaissance de l'ordre et de la justice qu'il maintien.
Louis XVI as dauphin

Tout ce que j'ai fait de bien a toujours été pour moi une source de maledictions et je n'ai été élevé un comble de la grandeur que pour tomber dans le plus horrible précipice de l'infortune.
Voltaire's Zadig

The first section of the following three chapters examines the modus operandi of Louis XVI, Nicholas II, and Mohammad Reza Shah. In the very personalised and semi-institutionalised system of absolute monarchy the structure was very responsive to the will and wishes of the reigning monarch or to their absence. Placed by fate at the centre of their government, these men determined the direction or immobility of the governmental apparatus by approving, executing, and sometimes initiating policy, or by failing to do so. Structure influenced the monarch, but the monarch also influenced structure. Well-established dynasties do not normally breed great innovators or revolutionaries, but there are instances in history when monarchs, such as Frederick the Great, Peter I and Josef II, have overcome to a large degree the societal 'conditioning' they received and have reformed and shaken up the governmental system; they influenced and changed the reality in which they lived. On other occasions, monarchs such as Louis XIII, Wilhelm I, Maria-Theresa, amongst others, provided legitimacy and support for highly innovative chief ministers. In monarchical regimes human agency matters. The Russian academician Yurii Lotman stressed, 'Politics and governing, like the writing of literature, is individualistic, requiring personality...It is said that history

travels along its own road, that there are no alternatives. This is not right. History (i.e. historical situations) always has alternatives. Even the alternative of passivity is a form of action in the broader historical sense.'[1]

A monarch can frequently have a negative influence as much as a positive one. An examination of the modus operandi of these three men, their relationship with their ministers and influence on government action will show that one common personal variable existed—a hole in the centre of government existed that effectively prevented the regime from addressing certain issues and created and/or exacerbated the structural variables, transforming them into primary causes of these three revolutions.

We must also take into account that leadership traits too depend on situations for these traits change. For example, Louis XVI used force against the common people at the beginning of his reign in the Grain War, but refused in 1788 when the survival of the monarchy was at stake. Nicholas II was strong-willed and efficient in regard to preserving his autocratic power. But he failed to provide the leadership required of an autocrat. The shah appeared decisive, all-wise and powerful as long as he felt no serious and widespread opposition to his rule. These traits disappeared as soon as real opposition appeared.

The remaining sections of these chapters through the use of narrative establishes and analyses the link between the primary causes of these revolutions and the monarch's character, modus operandi, and influence on the decision-making process in order to determine the extent to which each monarch was personally responsible for the making of revolution. Narrative is used here for several reasons. Firstly, it provides an understanding of the dynamics of the events leading to the transformation of the potentially revolutionary situation into a revolution. Revolution does not consist of impersonal forces interacting and in turn 'producing' a historical event. Secondly, narrative is often the best approach when weighing the role of human agency in the making of history. Thirdly, narrative allows us to examine the dynamics and sequence of events, actions, and reactions located in their own time and space and on their own terms. As we shall see, we are dealing with a particular set of actors at a particular time in a particular place. Yet, not only did these monarchs face similar challenges but also the emergence in all three cases of the 'hole in the centre of government' is an all-important common theme.

The narrative in these three chapters will show that-structure and situation alone did not determine the monarchs' actions. Rather reaction and decisions were a complex interaction between the 'reality' of the situation and the ruler's understanding and appreciation of that reality, and his personality. Moreover, to judge any political actor's eventual response, we must compare it with the normal expectations for reaction by other actors to the same stimuli. In other words, was the political actor's reaction 'rational' given normal expectations by other actors to the same stimuli? Lastly and most importantly, we must determine if genuine alternatives were available to the political actor. Success depends on 'concrete choices, which are situation specific....Any successful reform in a complicated

political situation requires improvisation and cannot be planned entirely in advance',[2] thereby making the personality of a political actor decisive.

The obvious needs to be stated. The likelihood of personal impact increases as the flexibility of the situation increases. The more options open to the political actor in regard to a particular problem or situation, the greater the role personality will play in the choice of action. An inflexible situation is one in which a mixture of personal and non-personal factors push the situation toward the same outcome so that a particular outcome can be expected to occur even if some of the contributing factors are removed. In other words a chain of events is decisively under way and almost certain to arrive at a particular outcome. The last variable examined in these three chapters is called the 'trigger'. Triggers are events that set the immediate revolutionary process into motion. Trotskii stressed that in such times individuals can play an especially decisive part. The 'trigger' period is always one of uncertainty, confusion and contingency. In such situations unexpected events (*fortuna*), insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices, and the talents and will power of individual political actors are frequently decisive. Recall Trotskii's remark about the use of force. To weigh the role of individual agency in the making of revolution, consideration of the 'trigger period' is crucial, though scholars intent on explaining the long-term structural causes of revolution often neglect it.

No single dogmatic answer to the problem of structure and agency as regards the coming of the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions can be found. In some contexts disaster was unavoidable, in others real possibilities to avoid disaster existed and were lost. In order to find an answer to this problem we must examine the link between our personal and structural variables in concrete individual cases. Chapters IV, V, and VI, examine the individual revolutionary crises and situations and the events leading up to them in order to determine (a) the extent to which the political actor contributed to the making of these crises; (b) what alternatives were available to the political actor and what costs were attached to these alternatives; and (c) the consequences of the political actor's decisions for the future.

Character and Modus Operandi: Louis XVI

Louis' decision not to choose a prime or chief minister demarcated the entire political field and constituted the base of his modus operandi until 1787 when events forced him to appoint one. To appoint a Richelieu contradicted his vision of what constituted the true modus operandi of a French king. Louis XVI was determined to rule in the majestic style of the Sun King according to which he would solicit and receive information from his ministers and then he himself would make the necessary decisions. Yet he lacked the self-assurance of a Louis XIV or Louis XV to make decisions and handle his ministers. He spoke in general terms of wishing to follow a path of reform, but did not have anything resembling an agenda. The English ambassador, Lord Stormont, observed:

> The strongest and most decided features in the King's character are a love of justice, general desire of doing well, a passion for economy and an abhorrence for all the excess of the last reign...He is eternally repeating the word economy, economy and begins to enter into the minutest of details...(However) Louis will accomplish little unless he falls into the hands of an enterprising statesman.[3]

This tension between wishing to rule in the manner of Louis XIV or Henri IV and lacking the self-confidence to do so was one of leitmotivs of Louis XVI's reign.

The day after Louis XV's death the young king decided to appoint an unofficial chief minister, a mentor, who could guide him in governing the country. Intrigue pushed him towards Jean Frederic Phelypeaux, the comte de Maurepas. He summoned the old man to him at Choisy. 'I am king; the word contains many responsibilities and obligations, but I am only twenty years old. I do not think I have all the necessary knowledge...I ask you to aid me with your advice and ideas.'[4]

Without knowing Maurepas' political positions or beliefs Louis turned to him for help; his name was on a list given to him by his father. Maurepas had been living in exile on his estate since 1748 when he was disgraced for apparently slighting the powerful Madame de Pompadour. He had great political experience and understood the game of court politics, but had also lost touch with the state of the government and politics. His long absence meant that he did not have a group or clan at court supporting him in the inevitable factional battles to gain and/or retain a position and patronage.

During their first meeting Maurepas laid out the part he intended to play for Louis. 'I will not be in the public view. I will work for you alone. Your ministers will work with you. I will never speak to them in your name, I will not take the responsibility to speak to you for them...I will be your man to you.' Louis responded that this was exactly what he wanted from him. Maurepas warned him, '...If you want to become you own prime minister, you can do it through work and effort and I will offer you my experience. But don't forget that if you cannot or do not want to be one it is necessary that you choose one.'[5] Maurepas understood that governmental effectiveness depended on a unified ministry under the leadership of a co-ordinating minister or monarch. Maurepas hoped to obtain that official position.

When Louis XV appointed Cardinal Fleury to the head of the ministry he wrote to the ministers, 'We order (name of the minister) to work with and despatch all affairs under the direction of (Fleury) and to carry out his instructions as if they were our own.'[6] Maurepas' enjoyed neither the power of an official ministerial position nor such open royal support. His position was inherently weak. Moreover, his overwhelming fear of enduring another disgrace and exile rendered him excessively fearful of any signs of ascendancy in the king's opinion of anyone but himself. Fearing for his position and influence, he moved against anyone who

appeared to have Louis' ear.[7] This situation weakened the effectiveness of horizontal government and increased the role of intrigue.

In a bid to shore up his unofficial position and increase his influence over the king and policy making Maurepas convinced Louis to restructure the way decisions were made. Under Louis XV the idea of ministerial government remained despite occasional breaks of unity. Maurepas decided that *comités*, made up of himself, the king and one or two other ministers would constitute the centre for decision making whilst the royal council would become a rubber stamp. The *comité* system demanded an effective and alert chief executive, be it the king or his chief/prime minister, if any degree of effectiveness was to be achieved. Such a figure was the only one in a position to co-ordinate and direct the government's business, which under Maurepas' system had been further broken into small, unrelated parts. But, Louis XVI's modus operandi and Maurepas' personality weakened the efficiency of government on a horizontal level. In the absence of competent management, the ministers had the opportunity to continue on their own paths, implementing their own, sometimes contradictory policies, whilst at the same time working to undermine those of rival ministers.

Under such a system the chances that a minister with a certain policy or agenda could persuade the king that they needed to be implemented was greatly increased as no preliminary, formal machinery for stopping him existed. In many cases ministers were presented with programmes and policies for rubber-stamping or were told of a policy's implementation without having had any say in its formulation or debate. Consequently, a minister who had been excluded felt no loyalty to that particular policy and in turn tended either to support it passively or actively intrigue against it, especially if the sponsoring minister was a rival. The already tenuous claim of ministerial unity was put under greater pressure. Maurepas convinced Louis of the need for this institutional change in order to prevent ministers, including some held over from Louis XV's time whom Maurepas considered hostile to his position, from influencing the young king and participating in policy making. Maurepas was not worried about the influence of others on policy making per se, but rather about anyone else obtaining influence over Louis and thereby threaten his position and power over patronage. Maurepas wanted to break up further the council in order to shore up his unofficial power and position.

Despite an awareness that decisiveness was a necessary characteristic of any French king Louis showed signs of chronic indecisiveness from the very first months of his reign. Over the question of his new ministry he continued to put off the final decision, unsure of the course he wanted to take at the beginning of the reign. The abbe Veri wrote in his diary that, "I see that M.de Maurepas is pretty exhausted with always having to pry decisions (from the king). It would be quicker to take them himself. I think that he could do it without displeasing the King and that he should do it for the public good.'[8] After much vacillation Louis decided on the composition of his ministry but only after a telling confrontation with Maurepas:

Maurepas began. 'The affair about which I must speak to you ...is important. It touches on your honour, that of your ministry and of the interests of the State. ...A month has been lost and time is not a thing which you can lose without doing harm to yourself and to your subjects. If you want to retain your ministers, say so; and do not let them look in the eyes of the populace to be near their end. If you do not want to retain them say so and nominate their successors.'

Louis responded, 'Yes, I have decided to change them. This Saturday after the *Conseil des dépêches.*'

'No not at all, Sire', Maurepas exclaimed. 'This is not the way to govern a state. Time, I repeat, is not a fortune which you can lose at your caprice. You have already lost too much to the detriment of business. ..It is necessary that you give your decision before I leave from here....By leaving your affairs in indecision and your ministers in contempt do you believe that you can fulfil your responsibility?'

'But what do you want', cried the young king, 'I am overwhelmed with work and I am only twenty years old. All of this troubles me.'

'It is only through decision that these troubles will cease. Leave the details and the papers to your ministers and restrain yourself to choosing good and honest men as ministers. You have always told me that you want honest ministers. Is Terray? If he is not then change him. This is your function....'

'You are right, but I don't dare. It has been only four months since I have overcome *my fear* when speaking with ministers.'[9]

The inexperienced and timid Louis wished to rule, but felt overwhelmed and suffered from insecurity resulting in indecisiveness, and perhaps even a sense of helplessness. His need to rely on Maurepas probably added to his feelings of uncertainty and also probably fuelled a degree of resentment. We can also deduce from this episode that Louis did not realise the consequences of his indecisiveness for his reputation and for the smooth running of government. On the contrary, Louis XV in the so-called coup of 1771 and Louis XIV clearly understood this. The Austrian ambassador wrote back to Vienna that 'the moral make-up of the king...makes any decision extremely difficult for him.'[10] As early as 9 August 1774 Veri tellingly wrote: 'If the (king's lassitude) gains the upper hand with his spirit of indecisiveness, M. de Maurepas would be forced to usurp, so to speak, the function of prime minister for decisions.'[11] Veri identified one of the key problems of Louis XVI's modus operandi. Any minister wishing to pursue a policy and govern would be forced to act like a prime/first minister given Louis' personality which prevented him from either fulfilling the role of the co-ordinating centre. But the problem not yet by Veri at this point was that he was unprepared to allow someone else to do it; there was a hole in the centre of the governing apparatus. The ambiguities in Maurepas' position and the paranoia it instilled in him only enlarged this hole for he would inevitably undermine any other minister who tried to fill it. The result was a reduction in the government's ability to act and react.

A reduction of the king's role in choosing people to fill posts in the ministry characterised Louis' reign. Despising court life, Louis withdrew into the bosom of his family and occupied himself with hobbies, such as hunting and tinkering with clocks. Consequently, he did not have a clear grasp of the major factions and personalities operating and battling at court for influence. His three predecessors understood that the dynamics of court politics could very well threaten their real authority and the ministry and therefore made moves to check the activities of the courtiers. In addition Louis XVI did not have a circle of friends who could have introduced new and competent people to him. He found himself dependent on already serving ministers or in some instances the queen to put forth candidates for ministerial positions. Although in Louis' mind he continued to control the appointment of ministers since he was the one who had to approve them, it was a mirage. In reality he had given up one of the most powerful instruments of faction control at the king's disposal—patronage. By no longer standing at the centre of the patronage network, Louis reduced his real authority. The emergence of a faction-ridden council was partly due to the fact that this or that minister did not feel primary loyalty to Louis, but to other personages, such as the queen, Maurepas, Turgot, or Necker, who had convinced him to appoint them in the first place.[12] The role of courtier ministers grew. The upshot was that the court began to view positions within the ministry as objectives to be won and withheld from opposing factions. As a result division and intrigue characterised Louis XVI's ministries.

Louis was aware that people perceived him to be indecisive and weak. When serious riots broke out over the price of bread in 1775 Louis and Turgot worked together to bring the situation under control. Louis' remarks on his own actions during them reinforce the image of a man battling with his insecurity, trying to be a king in the style of his illustrious great-grandfather. In a letter Louis lists for Turgot the orders he has given in order to maintain public tranquillity. This is a Louis in complete charge, in touch with everyone, demanding reports and alert. After a confrontation over this issue with the Parlement of Paris, during which Louis' steadfastness under pressure and determination impressed the body, the magistrates adhered to his command of non-interference. Louis wrote another letter to Turgot. 'It will be seen from all this that I am not so feeble as is believed, and that I know how to carry out that upon which I am resolved...The truth is that I am more afraid of one man than of fifty...'[13] He never overcame this fear. The crushing of opposition in the Grain War was a simple matter compared to the messy business of intrigue, factions, and plots at court which are not so easy to counteract and destroy especially under a monarch considered susceptible to them. He seemingly found difficult distinguishing the 'good guys' from the 'bad.' Interestingly Louis confessed that he is more fearful of one man, than of fifty. The sensitivity and dislike he would show to strong personalities within his ministry bear his statement out. Louis XIV's understanding of faction and the politics at court gave him the ability to defend relatively effectively his ministry from their baneful influences. Alienated by court politics, Louis XVI attempted to ignore

them in the hope that his good example would be sufficient to regulate them to the fringes of political life.

This approach is not unique to monarchies. When Jimmy Carter became president he proclaimed a new era in which the usual faction and party-ridden politics of Washington D.C. would no longer exercise a negative influence on US political life. He too chose to ignore the reality of behind the scenes politics, hoping that his 'good' example would prove strong enough to overcome such politics. The result was the almost complete failure of his domestic initiatives.

The widespread belief, especially amongst his ministers, that Louis was fickle in his relations with his ministers (and by definition policies) and susceptible to sustained pressure and rumour played a determinative role in the politics of the era. This state of affairs gave license to factions and more importantly led the ministers to engage in such activity in the hope that an enemy would suffer either a reduction in the king's esteem or disgrace and removal; ministers found themselves spending inordinate amounts of time fighting faction. Whereas under Louis XIV that the king himself appointed and dismissed his ministers regardless of the opinion at court was known, the opposite was true for Louis XVI. Maurepas, Vergennes, Turgot, and Necker all expressed worry about the king's support for them. A good example of the paranoia that characterised a minister under Louis XVI is Vergennes' reaction to hearing that the king had written a personal note to Breteuil, the French ambassador to Vienna. 'Vergennes was thrown into such a panic...convinced that this (the sending of the note) was a sign that Breteuil was about to be made foreign minister in his place. He begged Louis to tell him the contents of the letter. In fact it was all a false alarm. Louis had only wanted to know the details of a planned visit of Marie-Theresa to Brussels.'[14]

Structure and Agency: Louis XVI and the Parlement of Paris

The king's relationship with his Parlement was vital to the smooth running of government. We have already seen how and why Louis XV disbanded the old parliamentary system and established a new non-venal one with a greatly reduced capability to impede the government. The *Maupeou coup* is perhaps best seen as the crown's attempt to achieve centralisation and conformity in hope of pushing needed reform in alliance with parts of the Third Estate at the expense of certain parts of the aristocracy. Louis XV's destruction of the old venal parlements and Louis XVI's decision to recall them are major turning points in the history of the Ancien Regime.

Some considered Louis XV's move a dangerous step towards despotism given the elimination of the sole remaining intermediary body. In their view the Bourbon government suffered from a large loss of legitimacy, which only an Estates General or recalled Parlement could restore. Others however, including Voltaire, believed that the strike against the magistrates was needed as the body had become oligarchic in nature and determined to use constitutional rhetoric to defend its privileges, despite damage done to the state. The Parlement no longer played an intermediary role, but had become despotic itself. 'In particular, the

coup made possible a restoration of royal finances, a more equitable distribution of taxation and the provision of free justice.'[15] These achievements could not have been possible within the framework of the old Parlement. The coup represented the victory of those who believed in a form of enlightened despotism implementing needed structural change over those who believed in an aristocratic monarchy. Despite the victory of Louis XVI in 1771 over the Parlement the issue of expanding the popular base of the monarchy continued to be debated.

Maurepas wanted the recall of the old Parlement. He believed that the acrimony that characterised the later relations between Louis XV's government and the Parlement resulted from governmental mishandling of the magistrates, intrigue and lack of ministerial unity. Maurepas correctly regarded effective management of the Parlement by the ministry as one of the keys to managing the entire political system. Maurepas based his system on a close relationship between the crown and the Grand Chambre of the Parlement. The Grand Chambre would receive favours, such as additional legal work and subsidies, and in return it would ensure the registration of the government's edicts and maintain control over the other chambers of the Parlement. The breakdown of the relationship had little if anything to do with the fundamental questions of reform and vested interests. He was half right. Louis XV's government maladroitly managed its relationship with the Parlement. Maurepas hoped that under his guidance and leadership Louis XVI would create a unified ministry that would prevent a similar breakdown in the crown's relations with the Parlement. But Maurepas failed to understand that the thorniest issues between the crown and the intermediary bodies concerned reform, albeit piecemeal, and defensive moves made by vested interests. He, unlike other figures at court, mistakenly believed that the relationship between the government and the parlements had not fundamentally changed between 1754 and 1771. Yet, the years of political struggle under Louis XV had provided the magistrates with a good political lesson in opposition. To attain his goal Maurepas had to ensure the dismissal of Maupeou and Terray, who were considered by many as the architects of the new system. More importantly, these two men held powerful ministerial portfolios which constituted a threat to his unofficial position.

The ministry itself was divided on the recall. Maurepas, Miromesnil, Turgot, and Sartine supported the idea, whilst Vergennes and Le Muy, the minister for War, believed that the king's power would suffer if the *Parlement Maupeou* was dissolved.[16] The court too was divided. Louis' aunts, Adelaide and Victoire, *mesdames tantes*, the Comte de Provence, the king's second brother, and the rest of the *dévot* camp supported the *Parlement Maupeou.* They emphasised to Louis that recalling the old Parlement would damage his grandfather's legacy and strengthen the parliamentary threat to monarchical power. They essentially argued that, 'The return (of the old Parlement) to their duties cannot but make them proud...They cite the public good and claim that according to their principles by disobeying they are not really disobeying in reality. The people or rather the masses will go to their side and the royal authority will come to weaken by the weight of their resistance.'[17] Indeed Louis XVI, who as one contemporary stated, 'hates the

Parlement more than his grandfather did,' clearly supported the *Parlement Maupeou.* The young king thought highly of Maupeou who, in his eyes, had restored monarchical authority. Louis XV's coup of 1771 was seemingly secure in the hands of Louis XVI.

Maurepas admitted that Louis abhorred the Parlement and was even more stubborn than Louis XV when it came to that body. As dauphin Louis wrote, 'The magistrates can never be the organ of the nation in relation to the king and the organ of the king in relation to the nation.' He believed that, 'The magistrates do not need to be directed, but it is necessary often to contain them.' Nevertheless the old minister was determined to bring Louis around to his point of view. Having only recently returned from exile, Maurepas refrained from placing direct pressure on Louis. He feared Louis' reaction would be dismissal. He and the supporters of recall formed a comité, to the exclusion of the supporters of the Parlement, Maupeou, Vergennes and du Muy. Abbe Veri gave a detailed explanation of the comité's purpose and modus operandi:

> The comité of four ministers had frequent discussions before their meetings with the king. The aim is to persuade him that the result will be his own doing in order that he may have the degree of warmth and interest necessary in such large-scale operations...As the most important point of this decision is to make it seem that the decision itself came from the mind of the king and not from the Council of his ministers. As this decision is different from the ideas which he had before ascending the throne, he himself has admitted his astonishment: Who would have told me that in several years after attending the *lit de justice* of my grandfather, that I would be holding the one that I am about to hold?[18]

The issue at stake was a very complicated one; no matter how it was solved it would have great consequences for the future. Stormont wrote to London, 'It cannot, I think, be imaginable that the young king is able to take a comprehensive view of so extensive and intricate a subject, to form a decisive opinion upon a thorough exam of the whole. He must therefore lean upon the opinions and follow the wishes of others.' [19]

That infamous 'public opinion' as defined by the proponents of the recall also played a role in the king's decision. They argued that 'public opinion' awaited the recall of the old Parlement. After months of scheming by the comité Louis became convinced that 'The Parlements are never dangerous under a good government.'[20] As we will see later the hole in the centre of Louis' government had a disastrous affect on the 'goodness' and unity of the ministry and thereby destabilising the crown's relationship with the Parlement. In response to *dévot* arguments about the dangers inherent in such a move, Louis made a telling statement, '(such a move)...*may be considered politically unwise*, but it seems to me to be the general wish and I want to be loved.' Louis eventually dismissed the men 'with a heavy heart and against his better judgement.'[21] Thus the old Parlement

was recalled at a *lit de justice.* The *dévot* camp, horrified by this, grumbled about the young king's treason. Almost immediately after the *lit de justice* the magistrates began to show their rebellious side by remonstrating against the *lit de justice* itself and the restrictions placed on their political power. Louis' response to these early moves was not firm and decisive.

The crown's relationship with the Parlement during Louis XVI's reign was not as stable as some have portrayed.[22] Whilst Miromesnil did succeed in constructing a sizeable *parti ministerial* aimed at ensuring the passage of royal 'legislation', the crown never presented it (until 1787) with any radical reform packages, save Turgot's Six Edicts, which were abandoned after his removal, and Necker's experimental assemblies in several regions. Miromesnil told Louis what needed to be done to ensure stability in relations with the Parlement. 'Nothing disconcerts intriguers as much as the union of ministers with each other and with the first president. Troublemakers neglect no means in trying to weaken this union.'[23] But the hole in the centre of the government created by Louis' modus operandi unbalanced the monarchy's relationship with this body and limited fatally Louis political options, especially in relation to reform of the financial system.

On this issue of recall of the Parlement we see a more delicate side of the young king who genuinely wanted to do what was considered popular. Louis XIV or Louis XV would not have based such a politically important decision solely on vaguely defined public opinion. Louis' approach was not the way to rule a kingdom, especially one in need of serious reform. He himself knew and said that the Parlements under Louis XV had not only threatened royal power but also had blocked piecemeal reforms. The realists knew what consequences a recall would bring. Stormont wrote:

> The young king thinks that his authority is sufficiently secure by the regulations he has made. He may probably find himself deceived by the end of his reign...(The Parlement) will wait for circumstances, avail themselves of circumstances as they arise and whenever there are divisions in the Ministry, (these will) be an engine which one minister will play off another, and which an able and daring minister might perhaps wield in such a manner as to establish his own power on the ruin of the king's. [24]

Louis did not realise the ramifications of his decision. This inability or failure to understand the consequences of actions would become another leitmotiv of Louis' reign, reflecting his political naïveté which stood in contrast to his predecessors and contemporaries in Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Spain. One specialist of the period concluded that, 'in the long run the Ancien Regime could only be reformed over the dead bodies of the parlements.'[25]

Some contend Louis was correct in bowing to 'public opinion', in spite of the difficulties associated in defining and determining what in reality this public opinion was. However, the rather limited political discontent and strikes accompanying the expulsion of the old Parlement in 1771 had pretty much died

away. The new system was functioning and was not encountering any serious opposition. As one historian of the Parlements noted, 'popular demonstrations (at the beginning of the Maupeou Parlement) for or against the ministry or the Parlements were probably essentially manifestations of the long-standing endemic discontent with economic and social hardships.' In addition, 'There is no evidence to indicate that in 1770-1774 the political enlightenment of the elite was paralleled by a similar awakening of the lower classes.'[26] In the end it is difficult to find grounds to believe that a social explosion would have taken place if Louis had not recalled the old Parlement. Whilst confessing that the recall was a political mistake, Louis made the step, believing that it would make him popular and loved. In other words, the decision for the recall was not inevitable. It reflected the personal needs of the young king.

The recall also vividly shows how a group of unified ministers could gang up on a monarch. This apparent unity did not last given Louis' refusal to appoint a chief minister, his inability to fulfil that role himself, and the resulting insecurity and intrigue of Maurepas as he tried to maintain his unofficial and tenuous position.

By relying only on a *parti ministerial* in the Grand Chambre the crown needlessly annoyed the magistrates in the other chambers. Moreover, by relying exclusively on the Grand Chambre's ability to control the Parlement, the crown became susceptible to internal political battles within the Parlement as a whole. If the Grand Chambre, due to internal parliamentary squabbling, found itself unable to push the king's agenda the crown's real power significantly decreased.

Structure and Agency: Louis XVI and French Foreign Policy

Anglo-French competition continued with the new reign. Louis was keenly aware that British ascendancy during the reign of his grandfather had been achieved at the expense of the Bourbon realm. As a student he wrote that the "English are too proud, presumptuous, and jealous... (England) 'is the natural and hereditary enemy of our house.'[27] The man he chose to be foreign secretary, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, was determined to return France to the position she occupied under the Sun King. Vergennes, conscious of both British supremacy on the seas and the growing threat to French influence from the Russian Empire and Prussia, realised that France could not simultaneously compete on both these fronts. He decided to take advantage of the relative calm on the Continent and the rebellion in British North America to humble London. Once achieving victory against the British, he believed that London would be prepared to co-operate with Versailles in combating the rising threat of Russia and Prussia.

Vergennes stressed that the American Revolution presented France with an opportunity she had no choice but to seize. He rationalised French intervention on the side of the American colonists by reference to the 'natural animosity' between the two countries, England's previous victories, and offered the prospects of a share of American commerce.[28] The controller general, Turgot, spoke up against France's open intervention in North America. He insisted that France's

finances, already in a precarious state, could not afford such a costly entanglement. Turgot supported giving money and supplies to the American insurgents. He also questioned Vergennes' belief that England would inevitably attack France. Louis was initially undecided on the question of war. Despite the advice given to him by Turgot and his own knowledge of state finances, after a protracted period, the king decided for war. This decision was easier to take because 'his (Vergennes') program did not make any demands on the King' whereas 'the King did not have the strength to steadfastly support him (Turgot).' [29] French support for the Americans did indeed give the king the opportunity to strike back at a country he did not like.

Can we blame Louis for the decision? This was a chance after all to check England's growing power, which had humbled France during the previous reign. During the Seven Years War France had lost her North American 'Empire', why should the English not suffer the same? Whilst the arguments for war with Britain were strong indeed, there was nothing inevitable about France's entry. Louis understood in *realpolitik* terms the benefits to France for staying out of the war. 'In October 1776, the king told Vergennes that the recent English recapture of New York was good news. First, because it would commit George III more deeply to a war which he could not win, since even if he reasserted control, the colonies would be ruined and England too. Second, it would strengthen the North administration which was well disposed to France or, put another way, turned a blind eye both to French rearmament and to French clandestine help to the colonists for fear of bringing about a full-scale war.'[30] Louis however abandoned this analysis.

As Louis XV was pressured into entering the War of Austrian Succession, Louis XVI chose under pressure to fight Britain, against his better judgement.[31] The struggle between Turgot and Vergennes in the middle of which the young king found himself, symbolised the crux of the problem facing France since at least the time of Louis XIV. France sought great power status. Yet, her fiscal system could not provide the revenues needed to sustain this endeavour. In hindsight the decision for war was a bad one It is easy to understand why Louis decided the way he did, but nonetheless a more sophisticated ruler would have opted for Turgot's position. Louis at one time seriously did prefer the path of covertly supporting the American colonists and bogging England down in a war an ocean away. He however succumbed to Vergennes' pressure due to his insecurity in his own judgements and decisions and a desire to avenge the defeats of the previous reign.

Structure and Agency:'O bienheureux deficit, o mon cher Calonne'.

Camille Desmoulin

The fall of the Ancien Regime is directly attributed to the monarchy's inability to solve the financial question which had dogged it since at least Louis XIV's reign. Enlightenment thinking, social upheaval, defeat in war did not bring about the crown's implosion; the need for money did.

From an early age Louis XVI recognised the need for fiscal reform designed to lighten the lower classes' tax burden and increase that of the upper classes. This was in line with the viewpoints of Louis XIV and Louis XV. Louis' partial understanding of the ills of the financial system and insecurity in his opinions and judgements meant that any hope of serious reform would be in the hands of ministers. This is something not unique to any system of government where specialised knowledge is required for a task. Louis' job was to provide the consistent political backing and power to whoever was implementing fiscal policy. The reform plans of Turgot and Jacques Necker, although not perfect, would have prevented the type and scale of the financial crash which struck the monarchy in 1787 if they had been followed.[32]

There certainly were structural and ideological problems associated with reform of France's fiscal system which this section will cover. The causes for the dismissal of controleur generals and subsequent policy reversals will be the focus of the following section on politics. Louis' recall of the venal old Parlement made more difficult the process of change of the fiscal system. However as we shall see, Louis XVI and his modus operandi carry a great deal of responsibility for the failure of fiscal development which led to the crash of 1787. From a structural point of view there was nothing inevitable about the monarchy's inability to improve the fiscal system.

Four issues constituted the fiscal problems facing the crown: (1) inequalities in the tax system; (2) inefficiency and corruption in the fiscal system; (3) lack of a stable system of public credit; and (4) the excessive expense in running the venal system. Solving the financial problems facing the Bourbon state was problematic and created additional problems. Three basic challenges were associated with addressing the problems outlined above. Firstly, the question of taxation contained some constitutional issues, as outlined in Chapter II. Secondly, a debate over which course of reform to take existed. Crudely outlined, one side believed that the basic structure itself was in principle sound; it only needed some adjustments and rooting out of corruption, raising of taxes, primarily on the first and second estate, and controls on spending. This was the path followed during the reigns of both Louis XIV and Louis XV. By the end of Louis XV's reign a different approach emerged, given the evident failure to solve the regime's financial problems. It advocated an overhauling of the financial system including the elimination of venal posts, changing of tax allocation and collection, and stricter spending controls. In both cases vested interests would act to protect themselves. The crown would have to move adroitly and relatively slowly so as not to bring down upon itself simultaneously opposition of hurt interests.

Louis XVI sent Terray off into retirement at the beginning of his reign as part of his eventual decision to recall the old Parlement. He made Turgot *controleur general*, who greatly expanded reform and development of the country's economic and fiscal system. He supported many arguments put forth by physiocrats; he regarded financial problems as being fundamentally economic ones. He pushed for the encouragement of agriculture and trade. A free and prosperous economy

would furnish the revenue necessary to solve a large part of the king's financial problems. After a conversation with the king, who promised to support Turgot in all his endeavours, the new controleur general wrote him a letter in which he clearly laid out for the king the ills of the fiscal system, some of the steps needed to cure it and the type and scope of resistance to his recommendations. Turgot began with those now three famous lines:

> No bankruptcy, no increase of taxes; and no borrowing....No increase in taxes; the reason for this lies in the plight of your subjects, and still more in Your Majesty's heart. No borrowing because every loan diminishes the unanticipated revenue and necessitates, in the long run, either bankruptcy or an increase in taxes[33]...There is only one way of fulfilling these three aims: reduce expenditure below receipts, and sufficiently below to ensure....saving(s)...with a view to the redemption of long-standing debts. With such measures the first gunshot will drive the State to bankruptcy...It is imperative that Your Majesty insist that the heads of all departments should act in concert with the Minister of Finance. It is imperative that he should discuss with them in the presence of Your Majesty the urgency of proposed expenses (for his individual department). Most importantly it is essential, Sire, that as soon as you have decided what amount is strictly required for each department, you should forbid the officials concerned to order any new expenditure without first arranging with the Treasury the means for providing the sum. Without this mechanism each department will load itself with debts, which will always become Your Majesty's debts, and your Ministers of Finance will be unable to answer for this discrepancy between income and expenditure. Your Majesty is aware that one of the greatest obstacles to economy is the multiplicity of demands by which you are constantly besieged...

Further on Turgot underlined the debilitating effect that privileges and pensions at court had on the country's finances and on the already unbearable tax burden on the lower classes. The profit-sharing in tax collection, privileges, and the farming of taxes are 'the most dangerous and the most open to abuse. Every profit made on impositions which is not necessary for their collection should be devoted to the relief of the taxpayer and the needs of the State. Besides, such rewards of the tax-farmers are a source of corruption for the nobility and of vexation to the people...' Most importantly Turgot decried the state's dependence on financiers who, in his opinion, were in a very strong position to frustrate any reforms which would bring health back to the king's finances and improve the country's credit rating. At the end of this letter Turgot impressed upon Louis the inevitable wave of opposition his reforms will cause amongst the court and the financiers. He warned the king of the intrigues and slanders that would be directed against him as controleur general.[34]

The major structural challenge facing the Bourbon regime at this time was related to changing the machinery of government and to the difficulty of overriding vested interests. Turgot continued with the reduction of offices and began some badly needed economic reforms, such as liberalising the grain trade. His fiscal policy was quite successful. During his tenure the state had ordinary budget surpluses. He diminished the debt payable on demand to such an extent that interest rates the state had to pay lowered and the state's ability to borrow outside of France increased. One of the most important ways to create a second-generation non-venal system in France with minimal disruption was borrowing money during the transition period from non-French financiers. A government beholden to French financiers would prove unable to adapt a non-venal system because of the influence of *la finance* on the government through fiscal levers. *La finance* feared that improvement in the state's credit would provide Turgot with the opportunity to carry out further radical reforms, such as the eventual abolishment of the Farmer's General and venality.

Although the American War of Independence did not immediately eliminate this fiscal balance, its consequences were anticipated in the financial markets. Yields rose sharply after July 1776, and although they declined somewhat in 1777 they rose to higher levels in 1778. Turgot's successor, Clugny, who was the personal choice of the king, undid most of his predecessor's work. The rolling back of Turgot's reforms within months caused a serious deterioration in the crown's financial situation. Market confidence which Turgot had worked to regain collapsed. Banks and financiers, in and outside of France, refused credit and the deficit grew once again. Jacques Necker was chosen in the hope that he could obtain credit for the crown as the war with Britain began.

Necker began an ambitious program to take complete control of the fiscal system and institute major economies. Whilst hoping to overturn the inequality of the present tax system Necker recognised that without streamlining and restructuring the system itself, the government would be open to parliamentary criticism. The magistrates repeatedly complained that higher taxes were not the solution; the government would do better by rooting out corruption and implementing economies. Such a position resonated well amongst many in the educated class who would suffer financially from any changes in the tax regulations. Only once the king had put his own house in order could he to a great degree disarm the Parlements of this valuable propaganda weapon in the war over taxation of the privileged and upper classes. Toward that end Necker gave new impetus to the centralisation of the fiscal system which included making the Royal Treasury the central *caisse*. He reduced the number of *caisses* to facilitate the recording of royal funds throughout the kingdom.

Tax collection itself was streamlined and the contract with the Farmers General was renewed on much better terms for the crown. Necker hoped to eliminate eventually such contractual tax collecting agencies and venality in the system, which was now viewed as a drain on the state's funds. He began to break apart the General Farm and transfer its responsibilities to the crown. Terry and Turgot had

begun to eliminate venal offices, but Necker pushed forward with greater vigour. He abolished the intendents of finances and many more of the numerous treasurers and controllers for the military and royal households who had enjoyed considerable autonomy. Necker was implementing policies which would push France in the direction of obtaining the needed second-generation non-venal fiscal system already established in Austria, Prussia, and England. To his credit he realised that such reforms could only be implemented in a piecemeal fashion. Necker also recognised the need to centralise control over spending. In 1778 Louis signed a law requiring fellow ministers to submit their expenses to the *controleur general* for approval. The first steps to a hard budget were taken.

Necker's greatest achievement, which has been the subject of heated debate amongst historians, was his ability to finance the American War of Independence without raising taxes. Disaster did not ensue because Necker found the means to reduce other expenditures, producing savings of 84.5 million livres on ordinary accounts. He believed that any amount could be borrowed to pay for extraordinary expenses as long as the interest could be paid out of ordinary revenues. This he accomplished. That only one interest rate hike during his time in office occurred in May 1781-(the month of his dismissal) reflects the market's confidence in his overall measures.

Necker's successor, Jean-Francois Joly de Fleury put an end to these reforms, promoting instead venal officeholders as more useful to the state given their personal interest in the system. He argued that short-term credit of the government depended on the venal accountant with good personal credit. He appointed receiver-generals based on their wealth and credit rating. He also created and restored many venal offices. Consequently, the costs of tax collection increased due to decreasing efficiency and increasing expenditures given the interest paid on the officials' security bonds. Necker began to replace such figures with salaried employees who were cheaper and more efficient. By making the accountants and other venal officeholders the government's main and overriding source for short-term loans, Fleury made the crown dangerously dependent on them. He went a step further when he had Louis grant financiers admission to the *comité des finances;* their influence was now institutionalised. Whereas previously financiers could try to influence government policy through informal links at court and in the Parlement or fiscal levers, they were now in the government itself.

When it is stated that the Ancien Regime could not reform itself due to the power of *la finance*, only half the story is given. In the period before Fleury the state had much greater capability to override *la finance* opposition to its plans. It was only during Fleury's time that the power of the financiers was institutionalised which seriously limited the government's room for manoeuvre on the question of reform of the fiscal system. While Fleury restored a much more costly system of financial administration, the markets remained receptive to new government borrowing because he successfully raised temporary taxes. The Parlement protested, but registered them in the hope that after the war in America taxes would fall. This new revenue helped Fleury to cover the higher interest payments.

Yet in comparison to Necker's programme of permanent economies this was an inferior strategy, as it would be hard to convince the Parlement to renew temporary taxes or make them permanent when the war ended. The ministry did have plans to reform the direct and indirect tax system. However the shortage of bullion in France, caused by Paris' expenses in the American War, the interruptions of bullion transfer to France caused by the war, and the consequent crisis of the *caisse d'escompte* scuttled those plans.

Fleury recognised the necessity of some kind of central control over government spending if any degree of financial health was to return. His attempts to co-ordinate and control spending came up against the resistance of some ministers. The embattled controleur general complained to Louis, 'I have never been able to obtain a glimpse of naval expenditure. I have never been warned of the needs of each month before the end of the proceeding month. This conduct is against all the rules. It points to extreme disorder, and a desire to cause trouble.'[35] Despite additional pleas from Fleury to back his attempt to control spending, Louis remained on the sidelines. The king, who always talked about economies, enthusiastically approved Necker's legislation according to which all ministers had to submit expense figures to the controleur-general. Yet during Fleury's tenure Castries, the minister for the navy, was able to obtain Louis' approval to sell state bonds, which brought the naval share of the budget to twenty-five percent. It would require a strong personality to reject the excessive financial demands of the naval ministry. The argument could be used that France as a great power could not but afford such a navy in order to maintain her status and check the English. But, if the armed forces, a recipient of a large share of government money, were not forced to follow budgetary constraints Louis' calls for economy were meaningless. Perhaps Louis felt that the armed forces should not be subject to budgetary constraints. If this is so Louis completely misunderstood the situation and the country's finances.

Fleury resigned on 30 March 1783. Lefebvre d'Ormesson replaced him. When he launched the reform of the Farmers General *la finance* rightfully felt its position threatened. A delegation went to Louis and told him that if he did not put an end to this reform the entire system of credit would collapse. Louis gave in and the controleur general was removed.[36] This event showed the consequences of Fleury's institutionalising of *la finance* for the government's fiscal position.

D'Ormesson's successor, Calonne, reversed the 'blunders' of his predecessor and restored public confidence. By relying on his contact with *la finance* he opened a new *rente viagere* loan of 100 million livres. Paying 9% on one life and 8% on two, this annuity's yield was above the market interest rates and sold well in both France and the Netherlands. Calonne also restored and expanded venal offices. Although other finance ministers had in the past given some pecuniary favours to the court, Calonne gained a reputation for prodigality. The crown's expenditures greatly increased, as did gifts to courtiers; Artois and Provence alone received around 25 million livres. Calonne's remedy for the crown's financial problems consisted of economic stimulation brought about by government spending. He

increased freedom of trade within France, raised the number of free ports, and began negotiations on a new trade treaty with England. The controleur general also pursued a policy of public works and sought popularity by suppressing some indirect taxes.

The result was predictable. While expenditure continued to grow, revenues stagnated, producing large ordinary budget deficits. Calonne had borrowed 65.1 million livres, adding another 45 million livres in annual interest payments to the budget. The Parlement of Paris and even his fellow ministers began to worry about this inability to control spending and the huge amount of loans taken out in peacetime. Under duress the Parliament registered new loans in 1783, 1784, and 1785, but their acceptance was accompanied by dangerously increasing opposition to the crown's fiscal policies. That the Parlement would not register any new loans given the controleur general's indifference towards excessive expenditure and borrowing became clear. Faced with impending bankruptcy he went to Louis, explained the situation, and asked for the convocation of an Assembly of Notables.

Terry, Turgot, and Necker pursued essentially sound fiscal developmental policies. If the monarchy had adhered to their general program, it is doubtful that the regime would have faced the degree of crisis it did in 1787-88. Only gradual administrative tax reforms were necessary to save the monarchy, not the politically difficult, perhaps impossible, radical and all-encompassing reforms proposed in 1787 and after, by which time the monarchy was too weak politically and financially. The return of the venal financial offices under Joly de Fleury, Ormesson and Calonne allowed control of the fiscal administration to slip away even further from the crown. For a brief period the large capital inflows from Holland sustained Calonne's peacetime deficit spending, but international lending subsided when the absence of any policy to reduce the deficit became apparent. The Parlement would not register tax increases, and Louis XVI ruled out bankruptcy at the beginning of his reign. The shift to deficit financing was thus the crown's expeditious choice.

In addition to the problems with, and consequences of, his modus operandi, Louis XVI had a further negative impact on financial policy in two areas. Firstly, he failed to have a consistent opinion in regard to *la finance*. On the one hand he understood the role they played, both in collecting taxes and providing credit to the state. We have already seen the extent to which he feared a collapse of credit, especially in the post-Necker period. Louis even at times spoke positively of this group regarded by many as parasitic. 'I find in the series of administrators...in the principal families of the robe...and even of *la finance* of my kingdom, Frenchmen who would have done honour to any nation of the known world.'[37] Therefore his approval of the re-establishment and institutionalisation of the power of this group in the post-Necker period is understandable. But, on the other hand Louis permitted Turgot, Necker, and eventually Calonne to make bitter attacks on their positions. The reforms of Turgot and Necker, approved by Louis, would have meant the end of *la finance*'s hold over the crown's finances. By switching between

forceful attack on, and institutionalisation of, this group he only weakened the monarchy, politically and financially, pushing it to 1787. In the end, whatever financial policy the government followed, either support of old structure with *la finance* at the top or restructuring, the system could not survive unless Louis took control of the government's expenditures.

The other negative impact concerns financing of the navy. Louis loved the sea and was rather well informed on naval affairs. The only time he travelled in France was to go to Cherbourg to see the beginning of the construction of a massive port. Louis seemingly intended to rebuild the navy. This would explain his reluctance to move against naval ministers under Necker and Fleury who ignored any rules designed to limit financing or place naval expenditure under the control of the *controleur general.* Louis wanted to control overall spending, but passively refused to move against the navy, which was the second largest expenditure after debt repayment. Such an approach crippled the country's finances and made the failure of financial reform and the financial crisis of 1787 inevitable. Louis could have reduced naval expenditures to a more sustainable level without allowing the navy to rot, as it did during the last decade of Louis XIV's reign. Even after France and England made peace, Louis allowed naval expenditure to remain on war footing.

Louis' lack of control over expenditure led to a break with the Parlement. By not paying serious attention to the actions and expenditures of his ministers, such as Calonne who had succeeded in worrying all sides of the political divide with his borrow-and-spend policy with no accompanying reforms, Louis placed himself in the dangerous political and financial situation of 1787. He was facing bankruptcy and just as importantly a recalcitrant Parlement, unwilling to approve more loans. The following section shows the fall of certain controleur generals cannot be attributed solely or primarily to opposition to specific reform programs.

Structure and Agency: Governing and Politics under Louis XVI

Constitutional and institutional contradictions did present certain problems for any Bourbon government attempting reform of the fiscal and political system. It is difficult to argue however that they were insurmountable. Some specialists of this period stress that the 'institutional structures' of the Ancien Regime had ended up forming an inter-locking whole. This is true to an extent, but we must determine the extent to which Louis XVI's modus operandi and the politics of the period hold responsibility for the failure of the attempts to pursue further development of the fiscal and political system. There is no denying the reality of the ideological and constitutional opposition to tax reform. Tax exemptions for the estates and towns were viewed as liberties granted to them by the kings. Therefore, issues of equitable taxation and alteration of privileges came to be viewed as a constitutional issue for many. The Bourbon government faced a problem over consent to taxation, but that is only part of the picture.

As the monarchy demanded what seemed to be an ever-increasing amount of money from the country, the 'people' or rather the Parlement had no idea of the government's expenses. This led to complaints about corruption and extravagance

within the state structure, which the magistrates believed needed to be weeded out before new taxes should be imposed. By propagating such an argument the Parlement could make themselves the champion of the people by insisting that the monarchy clean up its own house before coming to the already exhausted people for more money. The magistrates could win the propaganda war. In the process they protected their own privileges.

The major confrontations between the king and Parlement were over institutional or religious matters. Financial issues, at least before 1787, did not constitute an insurmountable problem as long as they were separate from other ongoing religious or institutional struggles with the Parlement. Typically the government would propose a certain amount of taxes and loans, the Parlement would send minor protests and then a compromise would be worked out. When a *lit de justice* was needed to register financial edicts or reforms the uproar would die down faster than over more contentious issues.

The problem facing Louis XVI was two-fold. During the reign of Louis XV the traditional decision-making apparatus of the Bourbon monarchy, centring on the king and his council, was under increasing stress as it attempted to deal with its growing number of functions. The danger for the regime however was elsewhere. In the absence of an effective king or co-ordinating centre, in the form of a first minister or council, power was monopolised by the ministers and their court supporters, who were in practice accountable to nobody. The danger increased when courtiers were appointed ministers, which led to closer links between the government and court, something Louis XIV and Louis XV (most of the time) attempted to avoid. Under Louis XVI court factions came to regard ministerial portfolios as desirable trophies.

The previous section examined the benefits of Turgot's and Necker's plans and how they would have prevented the type and severity of the financial crisis that hit the monarchy in 1787. Attributing Necker's and Turgot's fall to strong opposition to their reformist endeavours is well known. But a closer examination of the personal battles and politics behind the scenes indicates that the removal of these men was due more to the king and his modus operandi, rather than to growing opposition at court and in the parliament to their programmes though this no doubt existed. The failure of reformist programmes and the fall of ministers was the result of a hole in the centre of government rather than of ideology or constitutional battles.

Louis XVI conditioned his government's economic policy by forbidding both bankruptcy and the raising of the lower classes' taxes. This left any controleur general with limited options when it came to revenue: (1) borrowing on the money markets; (2) reduction in expenses; and (3) structural reform of the financial system. Turgot became controleur general on Maurepas' suggestion once Louis had decided to remove abbe Terray. Upon becoming controleur general Turgot had a meeting with Louis in order to lay out his plans of reform and to ensure that the king knew and supported them. During the meeting Louis stated that he believed that Turgot was honest and that he had *fermeté*. He added he could not

have made a better choice. Turgot responded, 'It is necessary, Sire, that you give me permission to place in writing my general ideas, and I dare say my conditions under which you will help me in this administration; ....' 'Yes, yes, ' answered the King, 'just as you wish. But I give you my word of honour in advance to follow all your ideas and to support you always in the courageous lines which you will take.'[38] Turgot, in the letter to Louis quoted above, warns of the opposition his plans and reforms will cause amongst the vested interests. Turgot, already having some doubt about the king's commitment to him and his work, is seen trying to prepare Louis for the pressure that will come down on him.

On Turgot's appointment we can make several observations. Louis, who was without any plan to remedy the financial and economic situation of the country, did have good intentions. He seemingly hoped that Turgot would prove successful in reforming the financial system. Louis' decision to give verbally his complete support to Turgot did have a positive effect on the new controleur general. As was the case with Maurepas, Louis appointed and gave his full support to a minister before knowing his policies and beliefs. The giving of such support to Turgot was bound to have ramifications within the ministerial milieu. Maurepas' jealousy about his inherently weak position strengthened, despite the fact that Turgot was appointed on the recommendation of Maurepas himself. Turgot's appointment raised many people's hopes that the Bourbon regime would be able to reform itself.

Turgot and Maurepas succeeded in putting together a ministry consisting mostly of figures they liked. The king was resistant to some of them, but did not try to fill the vacancies. He had placed himself in a position in which he had to rely on the suggestions of others. The initial co-operation between Maurepas and Turgot did not last very long. In the time up to the controleur general's dismissal the two men united only when an external force, usually the queen, threatened the power and influence of the ministry as a whole.

The co-operation between Turgot and Louis during the *guerre des farines* exacerbated Maurepas' jealously and fear at losing his position and influence. The *guerre des farines* began with the registration of Turgot's legislation freeing the grain trade in the kingdom which resulted in rises in the cost of bread and subsequent riots. Turgot, who was in Paris took charge of the operations there, whilst Louis managed the situation in Versailles. The two men were in daily contact. The king showed uncharacteristic firmness and decisiveness in dealing with the disturbances, ignoring pressure from courtiers to abolish the edict of free trade and showing a great willingness to use force. The *guerre des farines* exercised an impact on ministerial dynamics. Having worked with the king to put an end to this crisis, Turgot was now his right hand man and the dominant figure in the royal council. Maurepas felt sidelined. Turgot also convinced Louis to replace Jean-Claude Lenoir, *Lieutenant-general de police*, a Maurepas appointment. This Maurepas did not forget. Maurepas had lost an ally within the ministry. More importantly, his power of patronage was under question. In pushing for the man's dismissal

Turgot was hoping to get the appointment of someone capable of handling effectively the demands of that office.

After the Grain War Maurepas began to intrigue against the controleur general, even openly remarking that he had been deceived when he advised Louis to appoint Turgot. When examining Maurepas' behaviour and indeed the behaviour of any of Louis' ministers we must remember that the king rarely showed any outward signs of support. Unlike the time of Louis XIV where ministers worked with the confidence that the king supported them against intrigue, Louis' ministers spent much time on intrigue and protection of their own political position; national interests were either excessively confused with the personal or were of secondary importance. Stormont noticed during the beginning of Turgot's tenure as controleur general that 'The whole is so fluctuating that no minister can one day to the next be sure of the ground he stands on.'[39] The knowledge of the king's character gave encouragement to intriguers and weakened his own ministers, perhaps increasing their neurosis.

The problem was again the hole in the centre of the government. Louis given his personality and Maurepas given his personality and unofficial position could not play the vital role of co-ordinator within the ministry. Turgot consciously or unconsciously, moved to fill this hole in the centre of the government in order to push through his policies. Turgot's character however had a role to play as well. Turgot had strong convictions and a great degree of energy. The problem sometimes was his belief that he was always right and therefore did not need to compromise or play the game of politics. More importantly Maurepas' intrigues and maddening tendency to bend before vested interests had fatigued Turgot and pushed him into trying to fill the hole at the centre of the government. Even the abbe Veri, a friend and confidant of both men, blamed Maurepas. 'Maurepas preaches economy in public; he preaches it privately with the king; but all these vague speeches do not carry the weight of vigorous resistance upon a given point...he (Maurepas) is the one to blame, or at least, nature has not endowed him with the vigour that his position requires.'[40]

The controleur general continued with his reforms, the most famous and controversial being the Six Edicts. Only two months after the *lit de justice* that registered these far reaching measures Turgot was forced to resign. The period leading up to his fall gives us a perfect example of why reform was so difficult given Louis XVI's modus operandi.

The two most contentious of the six edicts were abolition of the *corvée*[41] and its replacement by a tax applicable to everyone except the clergy[42] and abolition of the Parisian guilds. These reforms were indeed radical. A tax to be paid by all and abolition of guilds struck at the heart of the corporate organisation of Ancien Regime. Before Turgot began to present the edicts one by one to the council, he had discussed them with the king who gave them his explicit approval. Upon presentation to the council the leader of the opposition to the edicts became Miromesnil, the *garde des sceaux*. The arguments he used against Turgot's reforms epitomised the typical conservative response to change of the Ancien Regime's

structure. For Miromesnil and the rest of the conservatives the abolition of the *corvée* and the guilds represented the beginning of the end of the social structure since the reforms blurred the lines between the estates by making taxes applicable to all. Moreover, the abolition of the guilds promised to destroy the monopolistic hold of various families on the entrance of people into certain commercial and artistic fields. After the debate on the Six Edicts, Louis himself took all the relevant papers and arguments and studied them alone. Soon after, he re-affirmed his support for Turgot's edicts. Despite all the rhetoric that the edicts would destroy the old social structure Louis decided to back what were radical reforms.

Miromesnil, having lost the battle in the comité with the king, began to stir up opposition to the reforms amongst the magistrates before the edicts were sent to them. The *garde des sceaux* secretly informed the m of his opposition to the edicts. Maurepas criticised the edicts in public. Any trouble Turgot encountered with his edicts pleased Maurepas and fed his hope that the controleur general would be weakened. The Parlement's ability to oppose effectively the crown was dependent on the weakness and disunity of the ministry. The body in any case would have opposed the moves, but Miromesnil's intrigues and Maurepas gave it strength and consequently it sent *remontrances.*[43] The king, after reading them, replied, 'I have examined with great care the *remontrances* of my Parlement and they contain nothing which was unforeseen and no reflections which are not considered..There is no question of a humiliating tax, but merely one of a small imposition to which every one ought to be honoured to contribute.'[44] The magistrates, fully aware of the divisions within the ministry, began to write new remonstrates. Louis was not pleased. He called a council meeting to discuss the escalating crisis and courses of action. Maurepas met privately with Louis before the meeting in order to persuade him to back down and not hold a *lit de justice.* Maurepas knew that rejection of the Six Edicts by the Parlement or a climb down by the government would result in Turgot's eclipse or disgrace. At the council everyone save Turgot and Malesherbes, minister for *Maison du Roi,* advised the king to back down, but to no avail. Louis showed backbone and held a *lit de justice* on 12 March 1776 and the edicts were registered.

After Maurepas' failure to talk the king out of the *lit de justice* Lord Stormont wrote, 'He is so much hurt with the ascendant M.Turgot has upon this occasion, for which, however, he has nobody to blame but himself, that he talks of asking leave to retire to Pontchartrain. If he had opposed the Edicts at first, his judgement would have turned the scale, but he wished to take a middle way, and was probably in the hopes that Turgot would find himself entangled and be forced to relinquish his projects without his interference.'[45] Maurepas' decision to take the middle way reflected clearly the way he regarded his position. He could not bring himself to support the Edicts given the discomfort of seeing Turgot's influence on the rise. But, if his opposition was too forceful he could damage his relations with Louis. He needed to work for the controluer general's defeat for it would have resulted in Turgot's disgrace or at least a weakening of his influence. Maurepas was prepared to sacrifice the king's authority, let alone reform, in a bid to retain his

own position and the patronage with it. It did not happen. Stormont, however, believed that events could turn against the controleur general: 'M.Maurepas will not only remain where he is, but probably be more alert than he has been of late, watch the growth of Turgot's credit and throw secret obstacles in his way.'[46]

Malesherbes believed that the intrigues of Miromesnil greatly enflamed the parliamentary opposition to the edicts through his 'hidden contacts among the parliamentary' body which he used 'to undermine Turgot's operations.'[47] Miromesnil's opposition was rooted in a serious disagreement with Turgot over the content of the reform package. Nevertheless, a Louis XIV or even Louis XV would have been aware of these alignments within the ministry and would not have permitted or tolerated such plotting against a decision taken in council. Maurepas opposed Turgot because of the latter's growing political strength. Yet, one cannot blame him entirely, as it was the king's personality and modus operandi which greatly exacerbated Maurepas feelings of insecurity in his ambiguous and unofficial post. During the crisis Louis' outward signs of support for his mentor lessened which in turn created great anxiety on the old man's part. This was a recurring problem under Louis XVI.

The fall of Turgot was the first blow since the recall of the Parlement to the cause of serious reform during Louis XVI's reign. The actual causes of his eventual downfall are not known. We can only piece together the events and intrigues which took place after the *lit de justice* of 12 March 1776. An examination of the dynamics leading to Turgot's forced resignation and specifically to the disintegration of his relationship with the king is vital for an understanding of the causes of the hole in the centre of government throughout Louis XVI's reign. A pattern is seen in Louis' modus operandi that prevented both the emergence of a strong figure capable of creating the conditions for a relatively unified ministry and competent government.

In the aftermath of the registration of the Six Edicts Maurepas continued to write letters to the king underlining his fear for the kingdom if they were carried out. The letters themselves were of no real significance but they are indicative of the campaign Maurepas had launched against the controleur general in defence of his own position. The mentor now supported and funded a pamphlet war against the embattled Turgot and made sure that the king knew of the rumours and pamphlets. He also began a whispering campaign against Turgot with the king. He stressed the threats the controleur general's plans posed for the country and monarchical authority and carping about Turgot's character. Maurepas conducted, 'a secret war, carried out by psychological means, a war of attrition in the mind of the king.' [48] On two vital occasions Maurepas schemed against Turgot in the hope to clip his wings and increase his own standing.

Maurepas' relations with the queen were not very good at the beginning of the reign when both he and Turgot moved to block her attempts to influence the appointment of ministers. But, Maurepas and the queen began to make overtures to each other as Turgot's stock rose. In late 1775 Marie-Antoinette attempted to have the Princesse de Lamballe appointed to the position of surintendante of the

queen's household. Initially Maurepas, because he feared the queen's influence over appointments and patronage, and especially Turgot were against this appointment, as it would have greatly complicated the controleur general's attempts at reforming the queen's household. Yet, in a move to strengthen his own position with the king and the queen (Louis apparently wanted a reconciliation between the two) Maurepas approved the appointment of the Princesse de Lambelle and in the process weakened Turgot's influence. The abbe Veri accused the mentor to his face of having undermined the controleur general's position.

Maurepas struck the second blow to Turgot's position when Malesherbes resigned from the Maison du Roi. Before the expected resignation Maurepas made a deal with the queen according to which after Malesherbes' expected resignation Maurepas would nominate a protégé of Marie Antoinette to the Maison. When Malesherbes did resign in the beginning of 1776 Maurepas broke his agreement with the queen and put forward the name of his nephew, Jean Antoine Amelot de Chaillou, to the post. Naturally Marie Antoinette was infuriated, but in the end did get some conciliatory awards for Sartine, her candidate. Turgot knew immediately what the mentor was up to. Such a strategic move on the part of Maurepas left Turgot isolated in the ministry. Malesherbes was now the controleur general's only real ally. The end was imminent. Vergennes, the foreign minister, also began to object to Turgot's apparent imperialistic side, though his real reason for wanting to remove the controleur general dealt more with the latter's opposition to French intervention in the American War of Independence.

Turgot's relations with Louis himself also began to worsen. The king found his style fatiguing and at times overbearing. He failed to realise that the hole in the centre of government, the on-going battle with Maurepas and a finance minister's absolute need to control expenditure exacerbated Turgot's style. In Turgot's mind Maurepas was the king's mentor. But, he, Turgot, had received the king's support to carry through far reaching reforms. Even before the *lit de justice* registering the Six Edicts Louis gave a hint that his relations with his controleur general were a bit frayed. After a Council meeting the king let it slip that it seemed to him that Turgot believed that, 'It is only his (Turgot's) friends who have merit and it is only their ideas which are good.' [49]

In the immediate aftermath of Malesherbes' announcement of resignation the king's attitude towards his controleur general dramatically changed. Louis began to employ his characteristic silence with Turgot; the forced resignation was now only a matter of time. In a series of letters to Louis Turgot explains his reasons for disapproving of Amelot's appointment, supporting that of the abbe Veri, and for his confrontations with Maurepas. On 30 April Turgot, already feeling the inevitability of his disgrace, wrote a long letter to the king, extracts of which are enlightening:

> I cannot express to Your Majesty the profound wound which was inflicted unto my heart by your cruel silence...Sire there are people who are attached to their places through honours and profit. ....(I am) A minister who loves his master and has the need to be loved...Sire I had believed that Your Majesty, with the love of justice and goodness engraved in your heart, merited to be served through affection. I gave myself up to such a service; I have seen my reward in your happiness and that of your people. I have braved the hatred of all those who profit from abuses....What is my reward today? Your Majesty sees the impossibility for me to resist those who block me...Your Majesty does not give me either help or consideration...Sire I did not deserve this; I dare say it...You are twenty two years old and the Parlements are more animated, more audacious, more alive with Court cabals then they were in 1770, after twenty years of enterprises and success...Your ministry is also divided, is more weak than that of your predecessor...[50]

He then discussed the roles of Maurepas and Miromesnil in the creation of the troubles facing him. He accused Maurepas of complaining about, and intriguing against, his policies. 'I would not be astonished to learn that your confidence has changed, since M. de Maurepas, who tells every one he fears my systems, will undoubtedly have told Your Majesty...' He denounced Maurepas for following the advice of Miromesnil who feared the appointment of Veri to the Maison du Roi as it would have threatened the position of the *garde des sceaux's* position. The controleur general also recognised the role personality played in this entire scenario, writing that the weakness of Maurepas' character, his inability to remain loyal to a policy or person, deference to his wife's demands, and petty fears stood in contrast to his own stronger character.

> My own character, which is firmer than his, must naturally place him in the shade. My external timidity perhaps gave him, especially at first, some consolidation; but I have reason to believe that quite soon he came to fear that I would obtain Your Majesty's confidence independently of him.' 'Never forget Sire, that it was weakness that placed the head of Charles I on the block. You are believed to be weak Sire ...You yourself have said Sire that you lack experience; that you need a guide...[51]

While writing in such a frank manner to Louis probably did little to help his cause, Turgot's appraisal of the situation was dead right. Louis did not break his silence. Twelve days later Turgot was forced to resign. The very same day, 12 May, Malesherbes handed in his resignation to the king who tellingly responded, '*Que vous êtes heureux! Que ne puis-je moi-même quitter ma place!* Veri wrote:

> The personal inclinations of the king, which M.de Maurepas has reinforced but not produced, were the real cause of this event...If one adds the tenacity

> of this minister(Turgot) in wanting the assistance of his equals for the goal he saw clearly ahead, the advice he gave the King when his colleagues opposed him, and his desire to have colleagues who were of his opinion it is easy to see that the young man was bound to feel importuned in the end which made Louis say: '*M.Turgot veut être moi, et ne veux pas qu'il soit moi.*'[52]

One can agree with Veri that Maurepas alone did not create Louis' negative feelings towards his controleur general. Conversely, if Maurepas had been more secure in his position and therefore had not worked against Turgot, they together could have engendered ministerial unity and brought some substantive changes to the fiscal system. But Louis XVI's modus operandi could not accommodate a strong and goal-oriented minister, or a dominant controleur general. Louis had determined that he would be the centre of the governmental apparatus in a theoretical and actual way, but failed, or did not try, to fulfil the requirements of such a post, thereby creating a hole in the centre of government. The position of Maurepas was thus weakened not only by the king's ambiguous position, but also by the ambiguity of his own position as mentor or unofficial chief minister. By not setting a clear line of direction in the ministry, Louis fed Maurepas' neurosis. Maurepas consequently sacrificed everything including the state's interest in a bid to maintain and bolster his position in the eyes of the king and queen. Even when Louis was supporting a particular minister the sense existed that he would back off at any instant. Contrast this with the position of Fleury under Louis XV who ensured that all knew and understood his complete confidence in the cardinal. Fleury fulfilled his role as the co-ordinating centre, without fear of losing the king's support or the danger of intrigues. In fact, 'Aware that there was little chance of unseating the cardinal, the court cabals were rendered relatively powerless. Fleury was therefore able to position himself outside and above factional groups.'[53] Maurepas never had such sign of support and consequently became a major intriguer in order to protect whatever he did have. Thus Maurepas, who lived in constant fear of disgrace, would not risk his neck which was required for pushing programmes put together by ministers, such as Turgot. Turgot was destined to work within such a milieu. It was only natural that his stronger personality coupled with his fiscal and reformist goals would result in Turgot himself being seen as trying to become a prime minister. Veri wrote: 'Only the king or M. de Maurepas can force departmental reduction and that is what they are not doing. M.Turgot wanted to carry out their function and he even made himself odious even to M. de Saint Germain whom he got appointed.'[54] The controleur general believed in his reforms and the righteousness of establishing a strong central figure who would keep an eye on the finances and policies of his fellow ministers. Also Louis' tendency not to choose ministers himself gave further room for intrigue and factional fighting as the battle between Turgot and Necker over appointments shows. The opposition to Turgot's reform did not play a direct role in the controller general's disgrace. Ministerial politics and Louis' personality did.

Jean Etienne Bernard Clugny replaced Turgot as controleur general. His five month tenure (he died in office) is important for our purposes given the license he received from the king to un-do Turgot's reforms, for which Louis had fought bravely just seven months before. This reflects Louis' lack of understanding of the financial situation and policy. Although the change of a minister and a consequent dramatic reversal in policy is not unknown in other countries it would become the leitmotiv of Louis XVI's reign. This lack of an agenda, conception of how to formulate policy, and the way ministers were chosen and removed was most probably a reflection of his inner insecurity in his judgements and intuition. To jump ahead he once again supported Necker's and Calonne's reforms.

After the death of Clugny Jacques Necker, a Protestant Genevan banker, took over the responsibilities of the controleur general, but was not named as such. His religion barred him from officially holding the title of controleur general, a place in the Conseil d'Etat, or even countersigning *arrêts*. Nevertheless the government needed a banker to hold the position in order to raise the state's credit rating which had fallen with the ousting of Turgot and loans for the struggle with Britain over American independence.

Necker's major accomplishment was the financing of the American War for Independence without resorting to increases in taxes. His reforms of the political and financial structure of the Ancien Regime also made him a hero to some and an evil foreigner to others. He was guided by the principle that the collection of taxes and the systems of pensions had to be reformed, whilst venality and superfluous offices (of which there were many) had to be reduced with the ultimate aim of abolition. This he believed would increase the king's income and enable the government to win the argument for raising taxes on the upper classes and reducing their privileges by deflecting criticism of the crown's handling of finances. By putting royal finances and the existing tax collection in order he also hoped to increase the kingdom's credit rating and make it financially stronger and able to borrow abroad in order to confront the Parlement and venal fiscal officeholders. It must be remembered that under Louis XV it was the government's need for money which usually caused a government back-down in the face of parliamentary opposition during the latter half of his reign. The suppression of the Parlements in 1770 was successful as the government was not facing a political and financial crisis as it had in 1754, 1757, and 1763 when it was forced to back down.

Necker's attempts to reduce existing pensions, to limit the number and amount of new ones, to remove slowly superfluous venal offices and replace them with paid officials caused much opposition to him and his policies. Yet as long as he had the support of Maurepas Necker could carry out reforms in the face of the growing hostility of officials, financiers, (*la finance*) and even the king's brothers. At first Necker and Maurepas had good relations, but they quickly deteriorated as Necker, in the footsteps of Turgot, began to act increasingly like a prime minister. This was only natural as pointed out above given the personalities of both the king and Maurepas and the consequent hole in the centre in the centre of government.

Their weaker characters paled in contrast with the dynamism of Necker. Even by 1780 Louis had still not shown any real desire to rule the country or to put his imprint on any policies. In reality it was Maurepas, Vergennes, and to a great extent Necker who made many decisions to which the king simply gave his approval. 1780 was the year when life would turn sour for Necker, though he started it off well enough. He began some of his greatest reforms during this year: the dismemberment of the Farmers-General, further reductions in the number of venal offices, and reform of the Maison du Roi.

Veri wrote that year: 'Unless the king reduces departmental expenditure to a sum inferior to the revenue, the post of controleur general is untenable for long.'[55] The king or someone with his complete and solid support were the only figures capable of pursing reforms and budgetary reductions. And this is where things began to go wrong. Sartine, the minister for the Navy and Necker never had good relations. Contemporaries report that there were many altercations between the two men at council meetings over increasing amounts of money for the navy. Funding for the navy went from 34 million livres in 1775 to 169 million in 1780; the American war accounted for the huge increase. Necker at the same time was trying to co-ordinate governmental expenditure and root out corruption and superfluous offices within all departments. This caused jurisdictional clashes within the ministry. Louis, as the chief executive, was the only one in a position to solve such problems; this was his job as he himself indicated when dauphin. The causes for the last battle between the two men centred on Necker's edict of 18 October 1778, which Louis openly supported and signed. This edict forbade individual departments or ministries to issue notes on their own credit without authorisation of the director general of finances. This was done to reduce and co-ordinate expenditure. Too many times in the past these notes caught a controleur general unaware. He had to honour them despite their issuance without his knowledge as a default would have resulted in a severe loss of confidence in the crown's financial health. Sartine ignored this new law and continued to issue his own notes of credit to supplement the already high levels of funding received from Necker.

In October 1780 Necker learned that Sartine had issued four million livres of such notes without his authorisation. He promptly brought this to Maurepas' attention who promised to look into the matter. Necker soon after learned that Sartine had issued an additional seventeen million livres worth of these notes and had tried to hide their issuance. For the directeur general this was the breaking point. If Louis and Maurepas allowed Sartine to continue with his infringement of the law and to escape the consequences of his actions Necker's authority would be destroyed. Fellow ministers would see no reason to conform to this new law or to any other of Necker's initiatives. Maurepas' failure to 'look into' the matter and apparent apathy to the problem of management made Necker's position untenable. It was evident that as long as the hole in the centre of the government remained, the government's financial situation could not be improved, despite the king's seemingly desire to do so.

Necker wrote to Maurepas, 'It (the 21 million livres of notes) was a bombshell as much unexpected as incredible.'[56] He then announced that he could no longer work under such circumstances. Either he would go or Sartine would—this was the question posed to Louis and Maurepas. Necker's threat at resignation is understandable as it appeared to be the only way to get Louis or Maurepas to impose some kind of authority on the ministers, and on Sartine in particular. The king's note to Maurepas on this is illuminating and also indicative of the relative anarchy reigning in the ministry. 'Should we get rid of Necker? Or should we get rid of Sartine. I am not displeased with the latter. I believe however Necker is more useful.'[57] This statement is remarkable for two reasons. The question of Necker's retirement at this point is puzzling and telling. A minister had broken the edict of 1778 by issuing notes of credit without authorisation from the controleur director. This was an open breach of ministerial unity and an undermining of the director general. Necker was implementing Louis' policy on financial reform and restraint.

Secondly, Louis' note shows that the real issues seem to have escaped him. He makes no effort to try to reconcile the two men by perhaps making Sartine follow the edict. Necker is not viewed as a capable minister carrying out the king's policies, but rather someone who is 'useful.' Sartine was eventually dismissed (13 October 1780), with some help from the queen. Necker suggested as his replacement the marquis de Castries, who was an ally of the directeur general and Marie-Antoinette. Maurepas, who was ill in bed, could do nothing to stop an appointment which he regarded as a threat.

In December of that year, Necker, with the help of Marie-Antoinette persuaded Louis to replace Maurepas' cousin and the good friend of his strong willed wife, the prince de Montabarey, the minister for war, with the Marquis de Segur. Montabarey's tenure at the war ministry, like that of Lenoir, another of Maurepas' allies pushed out by Turgot, cannot be described as exemplary. The loss of control over appointments and the growing power of Necker stunned Maurepas. This was a call to arms. Just as Turgot had presented a threat to the mentor's power and a rival centre, Necker was now doing the same. The old man, dreading a second disgrace, went into action.

In a repeat of Turgot's experience, Necker seemed at the height of his powers only months before his disgrace. Louis himself told Necker that he was pleased that he (Necker) had so many enemies because, 'if you had fewer, your merit would be less.' He added, 'It is of no importance that you have so many enemies. I will defend you.'[58] At the same time Necker was under serious attack from pamphleteers, who launched a series of offensives against him and his policies. He was accused of everything from charlatanism to corruption in handling public affairs to even working with the English. Maurepas covertly directed a pamphlet campaign against Necker using the money of the farmer general Augeard, whose interests Necker also threatened.[59]

In response to what he considered his weakening position Necker issued, with Louis' authorisation, the famous *Compte rendu au roi pour l'année 1781*. The Compte

was essentially a list of Necker's accomplishments and an announcement of his reformist intentions after the war. It was an immediate best seller. For the first time in the history of France the king was making public his expenditures and income. Conservatives were shocked. They considered such information to be a state secret and the king's personal affair. Whilst the publication of the Compte did not endear Necker to the conservatives, it brought him fame amongst the public at large and helped to bolster his position vis à vis Maurepas and certain vested interests.

Maurepas enlarged his cabal and pamphlet war against the directeur general, which now included Radix de Sainte-Foix and Bourboulon from the camp of the comte d'Artois and Cromot du Bourg, superintendent of finances for the comte de Provence. Maurepas' inability to convince the king not to authorise the Compte's publication reflected his wavering influence and Necker's increasing popularity. Maurepas sensed that Necker would eclipse his position as the unofficial first minister, especially if Louis gave Necker power over the budget. Necker also made the mistake of not mentioning Maurepas in the Compte, who now believed that Necker wanted to take the credit for what the ministry had done in this field.[60]

Later, during the ongoing pamphlet war, Necker's secret and highly controversial memo to the king on provincial administrations was leaked and published on 20 April 1781 thanks to the intrigues of Provence who was egged on by Cromot du Bourg, a member of Maurepas' cabal against Necker.[61] In this memo Necker severely criticises the royal administration, the Parlement, and the intendants. He calls for a radical overhaul of royal administration by suggesting the formation of local assemblies whose powers would supersede those of both the magistrates and the intendants. The royal government would therefore be able to expand its social base. Groups in Parlements and many intendants came together against the directeur general. Within the ministry they were lining up against him, with Maurepas at the head. Vergennes, who was never a strong supporter of the director general, decided that it was time for him to go given Necker's desire to see France end the war with England. He also did not approve of his structural reforms. Miromesnil, forever the conservative, found Necker's policies and intentions dangerous for the Ancien Regime.

Necker, hoping to get a strong sign of support from the king in order to bolster his weak position resulting from the pamphlet war, the leaking of his memo, and disunity in the ministry, presented to the king three requests. He asked for control of the treasuries of the marine and war (to which Castries and Segur agreed), to be admitted as a permanent member of the *Conseil d'En haut* so that he could defend his policies within the ministry from enemies, and the establishment of his provincial assemblies in several regions, by a *lit de justice* if necessary. Maurepas egged Louis into not granting Necker his demands. He complained of Necker's desire to dominate the political scene. Louis agreed, 'This is too much. This man wants to be placed next to me!'[62] He refused to grant Necker his main request, entrance to the *Conseil d'En haut.* The king offered him grandes entrées, which

gave him the right to sit in the king's cabinet rather than having to stand in the ante-chamber, entry to all comites of the secretaries of state and the king's assurance that all provincial administrations would be set up. Necker was prepared to accept these conditions, which did go far in strengthening his position, but was dissuaded by Maurepas, who 'desperately wanting a refusal...diluted and belittled the concessions.'[63] Necker, who was unaware of Maurepas' intrigues against him, refused them and gave his letter of resignation. Necker holds responsibility for his loss of office as he allowed himself to be taken in by Maurepas. Louis had made considerable, even surprising, concessions to him, although the root of the problem remained, namely the lack of an effective centre and an intriguer as unofficial first minister. Moreover, Louis, was responsible for this state of affairs given his ignorance of Maurepas' intrigues or, if he knew, for ignoring it. In a way, it is naivety and the inability to judge people that is the issue. Apparently Maurepas was prepared to resign if Necker had not gone.[64] Nevertheless, that Louis made these concessions to Necker indicates his intention to retain the reforming minister in the face of threatened interests. Opposition to reform was not the primary cause of Necker's fall. It was rooted in Louis' personality and the dynamics of his modus operandi.

Necker's immediate successors, Jean Francois Joly de Fleury (1781-1783), and Lefebvre d'Ormesson (1783) both struggled with the ever increasing financial problems of the crown without any guidance or help from the king. Upon appointing Fleury Louis' only wish was for the new controleur general to maintain credit. The damage done by a reversal in fiscal policy did not bother him. Fleury, who came from one of the most distinguished robe families, did not agree with his predecessor's political and financial reforms. He immediately went about undoing Necker's reforms, whilst strengthening the old venal system supported by the Farmers General and Receivers General, bringing back offices abolished by Terray, Turgot, and Necker. He opened the coffers to the court once again, though he hoped to limit the size of new pensions. The king's brothers, Provence and Artois, who had disliked Necker for his attempts to limit royal pensions and grants, profited handsomely from the change.

After the death of Maurepas in 1781 Louis did not change his method of governing. He continued to meet ministers one by one at their travails, but the hole in the centre of the government remained. On 20 January 1783 England and France ended the war between them. One month later Vergennes was given the title *Chef du Conseil royal des finances*, which made the foreign minister a replacement for Maurepas. Vergennes, however, never had the influence over the king or the power within the ministry that the old mentor had acquired. Louis remained the theoretical centre but increasing lack of direction and co-ordination marked this period. Whilst one can claim that the time from Maurepas' death to the Assembly of Notables was the period of Louis 'personal rule' given the reduced authority of Vergennes, the king continued to lack interest in governing.

Joly de Fleury tried to grapple with the increasing financial problems of the kingdom. Although he believed that the old venal/financier system was the best

for France, he understood that some type of central control over the expenditures of the other departments was needed if financial health was to be achieved. The controleur general convinced Vergennes to form a *Comité des finances*, which was to consist of Vergennes, Miromesnil, and the controleur general and be presided over by the king. The heads of the other departments were to submit their regular accounts and plans for future expenditure to this *comité* whose establishment constituted the first real steps to the formulation of a budget, as laid out by Necker and Turgot. Fleury knew that the hole in the centre of the government had permitted chaos in control of expenditures of the individual ministries. This *comité* was to fill this hole. He wrote to Louis, 'Only Your Majesty and the creation of the comite can give me enough power to regulate past and future expenditure and remit all pretensions.'[65] In practice the three men discussed issues beforehand and then presented a united front to the king, who then almost always gave approval. This of course was exactly why most monarchs feared such bodies. Yet, Louis liked this system, as it put no real pressure on him to decide or formulate policy, but created the mirage of a king in charge. Monarchs could never hope to challenge the knowledge or self-confidence of a ministerial cabal. Such a state of affairs would have been fine if this ministerial 'cabal' was pursuing a sensible policy.

The controleur general ran into opposition from the Ministers of War and Navy, Segur and Castries. They came from the sword nobility and were not prepared to be subordinate to robe nobles, such as Miromesnil and Fleury. The requirement to submit expenditures and plans to a *comité* of robe nobles infuriated Segur and Castries. They began to cabal against the controleur general. Castries as an ally of Marie-Antoinette, complained to her regularly about the situation. The queen then began to put pressure on Louis for Fleury's dismissal. These same men were prepared to allow Necker to take control of their treasuries. This current rise of tensions is attributable to personality clashes and faction and not to policy.

Castries continued to spend 200 million livres a year, or nearly half the royal revenue after interest payments, on the navy. On 19 February 1783 Castries precipitated a crisis by obtaining from the king registration of a *lettre de change*.[66] Fleury believing the navy issued some 50 million lives worth of unregistered letters, feared that the appearance of registered ones would cause a flood of similar demands, which he could not hope to meet. The controleur acted. On the 22 February he from Louis an *arrêt du conseil* suspending unregistered *lettres* for a year. Fleury followed this advantage up. He sent Castries a letter requiring him to submit his accounts to the *comité des finances* as stipulated by the *arrêt du conseil*. Castries continued to ignore it. Fleury felt that he was under siege. He wrote to his brother, 'I have done my duty in warning of all the problems and of the consequences of all these intrigues...everything appears calm, but the cabals are continuing.'[67] A few days after writing these lines, the controleur general added, 'our master still does not have the necessary experience to stop having his hand forced by intrigue.'[68] These moves infuriated the naval minister who suspected a plot on both the part of the king and Fleury to undermine him. That he suspected

a plot says much about a minister's relations with Louis XVI. He intended to resign and said so to the queen, who persuaded him to remain for an extra week so that it would not appear that he was resigning over the king's new method of ruling (i.e. *the comité des finances*). Marie-Antoinette wanted time to ensure the disgrace of Fleury as well. Louis conceded that both ministers should go.[69] This delay proved to be a gift for Castries as Fleury, taking into account the signs of lessening support, resigned. Castries remained at the marine for another four years and continued to spend huge amounts of money and in the process helped bring about the crisis of 1787.

The dynamic of the relationship between Louis and Fleury was typical of the king's relationship with other ministers. The first is Louis' apparent detachment from the realities of both the factions at court and the politics going on inside his ministry. The king himself supported the idea of the *Comité royal des Finances*, but failed to support his controleur general when he tried to establish some kind of control over expenditure. As Veri himself once mentioned, the king was the only one who could co-ordinate, review, and determine the spending of the various departments. If he did not do it, he needed to delegate the job to someone else, with the full and firm backing of the monarch himself. Though the two ministers, Castries and Segur, were eventually forced to submit their accounts to the comité after the resignation of Fleury, the spending levels were never reduced or reviewed. Characterising the present situation the Austrian ambassador to the Bourbon Court wrote to Josef II, 'the mediocrity of the present ministers, their disunion, the king's temperament, which makes all decisions infinitely difficult for him, are powerful arguments for the necessity of an active (ministerial) preponderance (i.e. an effective first minister).'[70]

The queen's influence also increased. She played the key part in the disgrace of the controleur general by convincing Louis that Castries should not go, but that Fleury should. Even the combined influence of Fleury and Vergennes could not break Castries who remained under the shield of Marie-Antoinette. Despite rolling back Necker's reforms and supporting the old financial system, Fleury encountered cabals and intrigues that led to his downfall. The factional fighting during his tenure was not over radical fiscal reforms; it was the result of personality clashes and unabated struggles for patronage. The alignments at court and more importantly the hole in the centre of government, and not so much policies caused the disgrace of these ministers.

Fluery's successor, Lefebvre d'Ormesson, faced similar problems. His fall was the result of three factors on which the king exercised a direct or indirect influence. Interestingly, Louis ordered Castries and Segur to submit their accounts to the comité after their initial refusal to d'Ormesson to do so. D'Ormesson's main policy was the rescinding of the lease of the general farm. Financiers and venal officeholders, fearing the consequences of such a move for their interests, implicitly threatened Louis that if he allowed this policy to be implemented, credit would collapse. Such a radical move for the time did create a wave of opposition though it could have been accomplished. Vergennes helped bring down the

controleur general. Their relationship had soured over d'Ormesson's discovery of some financial impropriety on the part of Vergennes. There was also a cabal to replace him with Charles Alexandre Calonne.

Calonne's tenure at the finance ministry has been the subject of great academic debate. Some see him as the great reformer, who tried to save the monarchy through the implementation of far-reaching administrative and financial reforms, in spite of his disastrous spending in the years leading up to 1787. Others see him as a profligate spender who supported the old system of venality and patronage and stopped the reform process of Turgot and Necker, and therefore holds a certain degree of responsibility for the crisis of 1787.

Louis XVI believed he alone ruled the country. The reality was something quite different. A *comité de gouvernment*, consisting of Vergennes, Calonne, and Miromesnil, ruled the realm with the king's authority. Vergennes and Calonne became allies and perhaps even friends. At one point they even tried to convince Louis to remove Miromesnil and replace him with Chretien Francois de Lamoignon, a liberal and reform minded first president of the Parlement of Paris. The other ministers, Segur, Castries, and Baron de Breteuil at the Maison du Roi, were essentially excluded from the immediate ring of decision making which did nothing to ensure their loyalty either to the king or policies. The most politically troublesome of the three was Breteuil.

Breteuil, a close ally of the queen, planned to *faire regner la reine.* Vergennes at the height of his influence could not prevent his appointment in 1783. Louis disliked Breteuil but caved in to pressure from Marie-Antoinette.[71] Suspicion and dislike of Breteuil united ministers who rarely achieved such unanimity. By appointing a man he did not trust and then excluding him from his inner circle Louis caused Breteuil to intrigue against those whom he considered to be his enemies, namely Calonne and Vergennes, and to retain and strengthen the queen's interest at the expense of all else. After all, he understood that he owed his position to her. To this end he utilised his position at the Maison du Roi, which meant that he was also minister for Paris, to put himself in constant contact with the magistrates of the Parlement of Paris. With Louis' tendency to ignore the cabals and intrigues at the court and within his ministry, this was a recipe for political trouble. During this period the battles at Versailles spread and infected the rest of the central political structures. Breteuil 'inflicted decisive, if not mortal damage to the monarchy'.[72] In three ways he hurt the crown: his purchase of a palace, Saint-Cloud, for Marie-Antoinette; his role in the infamous Diamond Necklace Affair; and his war with Calonne that spilled over into the Parlement.

The purchase of Saint Cloud out of public funds for the queen created an uproar and damaged her reputation. Such a purchase was usually made for the dauphin, but not the spouse of the monarch. Breteuil did it to increase his credit with the queen. The purchase infuriated Calonne as Breteuil went ahead with it without his approval. Not only did this further sour the relations between the two ministers, but also relations between Calonne and the queen, who took offence at such anger against her protégé. Louis remained out of touch and oblivious.

Breteuil did have a theoretical right to use the funds for his ministry in such a manner. None of the controleur generals had yet succeeded in bringing the treasury of the Maison du Roi under their jurisdiction.

The Diamond Necklace Affair cemented the negative popular image of Marie-Antoinette. The scandal began when a self-proclaimed illegitimate descendent of Henri II, Jeanne de Valois, Comtesse de la Motte, and her cohorts conceived a plan to steal a valuable diamond necklace owned by the Court Jeweller, Bohmer.[73] The plan was simple: The 'gang' convinced Prince Louis de Rohan, cardinal-archbishop of Strasbourg, that the queen wanted him to purchase the necklace on her behalf without telling the king. De Rohan, who for a variety of reasons had been sidelined by the royal couple and Marie-Antoinette in particular, was keen to regain royal grace. In the gardens at Versailles, Prince Louis de Rohan met a prostitute disguised as the queen, who presented him with promissory note, which read *Marie-Antoinette de France.* At this point Rohan should have realised it was a forgery. That queens signed with only their baptismal name was common knowledge.[74] Rohan passed the promissory note to Bohmer who then gave the cardinal the necklace. Having received the necklace, Mme de la Motte bought a chateau and her husband went to Britain to sell the gems. After some time Bohmer, believing the queen's signature to be real, presented the cardinal's promissory note to her. The reaction was predictable: Marie-Antoinette flew into a rage and demanded that justice be done and her reputation restored. The queen's antipathy for the cardinal did not help his case.

In a rare demonstration of decisiveness, albeit under the influence of the queen, Louis had the cardinal arrested while he was performing mass. Despite Rohan's story Louis believed him to be guilty. Marie-Antoinette demanded and received permission to attend any council meeting during which the affair would be discussed. The decision concerning the venue of the cardinal's trial compounded the politically unwise arrest of Rohan. Vergennes, Castries, and Calonne tried to persuade the king that Rohan should be tried before a special commission, and not the Parlement. Breteuil argued that the cardinal's request for a trial in the Parlement be granted. He believed that he could deliver a guilty verdict given his connections in that body which included members of the *parti ministerial.* Breteuil probably hoped that by delivering a victory his position with the royal couple would strengthen. It indeed would have been a coup for him.[75]

Though the king had staked his reputation on the conviction of Rohan, Vergennes and Calonne fought for the opposite side. Understanding a guilty verdict would strengthen their mutual enemy's hand, they worked to prove the cardinal's innocence. Such an outcome would mean the end to Breteuil's ministerial career and a dangerous element in the ministerial milieu. Additionally the queen's known enmity for these two ministers and her consequent intrigues against them with the help of Breteuil, which in their minds, given Louis' character, made their positions vulnerable, provided even more reason to check her ambitions.[76]

Whilst Breuteil allowed valuable witnesses for the defence to escape from France, Vergennes and Calonne were successful in bringing then back whose testimonies played no small role in the acquittal of Rohan. More ominously both sides began to rip apart the *parti ministerial.* Calonne used the debts owed to the crown by several magistrates to influence them to vote for acquittal. At the same time Breteuil was using financial means to influence certain magistrates to ensure a victory for himself. Thus, Louis was funding both sides in the conflict; this was a consequence of his modus operandi. Mercy wrote back to Vienna that, 'At least a dozen of those who voted for Rohan's innocence directly benefited from Louis' patronage.'[77] The pattern is all too familiar. A hole in the centre of the government, Louis' inattention to the importance of the king's control over patronage and the unchecked cabals and factions brought disaster.

After the cardinal's acquittal the expected disgrace of the man who believed he could deliver a guilty verdict, Breteuil, did not materialise, testifying to the influence the queen had over the king regarding some ministerial appointments. His continued presence in the council led to greater divisions and factional fighting at the highest level of government where both sides focused on defeating the other to the detriment of the king's authority. Inevitably Marie-Antoinette's negative feelings for Calonne and Vergennes only increased.

The battle at Versailles over Rohan resulted in the disintegration of the *parti ministerial* and the government's relations with the Parlement and in the exacerbation of the conflicts amongst the Parlement's magistrates. The lower chambers of the Parlement began to challenge more openly the senior magistrates, most of whom had strong connections with the crown. The grand chambre, that bedrock of Miromesnil's relationship with the Parlement, began to lose control of the rest of the chamber. In addition, the battle between Calonne and Breteuil continued to spill over into the Parlement. Breteuil was intent on obtaining Calonne's disgrace. Towards this end during the Diamond Necklace Affair and afterwards Breteuil converted what was left of the *parti ministerial* into his own base of support in the Parlement which could oppose Calonne.[78] In a defensive move the controleur general divided and destroyed the *parti ministeriel* during the same period. Miromesnil watched helplessly as the base of support he had built up for the government disintegrated before his eyes. He wrote to Louis several times about this disastrous factional war between the two ministers and informed him that he was losing control of the Parlement.[79] He specifically drew his attention to Breteuil's factional intrigues against Calonne.

That between January 1785 and December 1786 Breteuil politically attacked Calonne four times did not move Louis to dismiss him. Yet, he also did nothing to reconcile the two sides or launch some type of damage control. Although the financial policies of Calonne had indeed begun to worry the magistrates, the war between Calonne and Breteuil made it impossible for the crown to retain any type of support, let alone majority, for either further loans or taxes, or reforms. Such a situation then forced Louis and Calonne to look for alternatives (i.e. the Assembly of Notables) when the financial crisis came and drastic reforms were needed.

In sum, an intensification of intrigue and factional fighting marked the period from Calonne's appointment to the convocation of the Assembly of Notables in 1787. As one specialist on the era has written concerning the growing political instability of this period: 'The seat of the problem lay at Versailles itself, in the ministerial upheavals and realignments...In a sense, stability was never regained, since factional warfare on the conseil became endemic. Most disturbing of all was the way in which these conflicts came to draw in the rest of the political nation—public opinion, finance, and the magistrature.'[80] The king's political options were dwindling at a time when the mistakes in his financial policies over the previous twelve years were creating a financial and political crisis capable of rocking the foundation of the monarchical order. This reduction of political options was a direct consequence of the patterns in Louis' modus operandi and the hole in the centre of the government.

During the summer of 1786 Calonne recognising the consequences of his accumulation of debt and the defects of the present financial system worked on a memorandum entitled *Précis d'un plan d'amélioration des finance.* He presented it to Louis on 20 August. The memorandum outlined nothing less than a fiscal and administrative revolution. Calonne proposed the abolition of internal customs barriers, eventual abolishment of the *gabelle* and *taille*, freeing up of the grain trade and commutation of the *corvée.* The centrepiece of the reform package was the abolishment of the *vingtièmes* and the imposition of a single land tax payable by all classes. No exemptions and privileges based either on region or social standing were to be granted. A three-tier assembly system would administer the tax. Membership to these assemblies would be based only on land ownership. Calonne feared that any assembly based on the traditional division into estates would work to undermine the tax to the benefit of the upper classes. Louis studied the memorandum and came to identify with it completely. He wrote to Calonne, 'I did not sleep last night, but it was because of joy.'[81]

As the Ancien Regime began to unravel Louis XVI made several crucial mistakes, elaborated below, which contributed greatly to the weakening of monarchical power and the emergence of new political actors. Consequently, Louis XVI increasingly suffered at the hands of events, over which he gradually lost control.

Firstly, Louis was prepared to support Calonne's far-reaching reform plan. But, it called for too many reforms at once. Louis XV and Louis XIV understood that the structure of the Bourbon state could handle only slow, piecemeal reform; too many interests could not be threatened at once if a degree of political stability was to be maintained. Louis XVI did not understand this. The problem was that Louis had played a leading role in the creation of a situation in which it seemed he needed to attack all interests at once. He had brought the regime to a dead end. In order to obtain approval of these wide-reaching reforms both Calonne and the king decided to work outside the traditional governmental institutions and were prepared to utilise a form of class warfare. Calonne told Louis: 'If there is a clamour of vested interests, it will be drowned by the voice of the people which

must necessarily prevail, particularly when, by the creation of the assemblies...the government has acquired the support of that national interest which at the moment is powerless and which, well-directed, can smooth over all difficulties.'[82] When it seemed that these vested interests in the Assembly of Notables would succeed in blocking the reform programme, Calonne and the king turned to the people. A pamphlet was written and read in the pulpits across France. Some of the lines included: 'People will doubtless pay more, but who? Only those who do not pay enough...Privileges will be sacrificed...yes, as justice and necessity require. Would it be better to heap even more on to the non-privileged, the people?'[83] To Louis and Calonne's chagrin there was no response from the under-privileged. The upper estates were infuriated. Castries told Louis, 'How can one exaggerate the seditious distribution of it to the pulpits across France and dissemination of it amongst the people? Would Your Majesty not be alarmed to see his subjects worked up against each other? I must warn Your Majesty that things are going to get more and more difficult...'[84]

Secondly, Louis allowed a long discussion of the plans amongst Calonne, Vergennes, and Miromesnil in a bid to convince the latter to support them. This delay cost the monarchy precious time as the crown needed to push Calonne's plan in the Assembly of Notables sooner rather than later in order to avert the appearance of begging in the light of impending bankruptcy. Calonne hoped to avoid this scenario for he understood that the monarchy would succeed only if it had a decent degree of financial strength. If the deputies felt that the crown was desperate they would put up more resistance demanding greater concessions. Moreover Vergennes died during this delay, depriving Calonne of a powerful and skilled ally during the coming battle for the passage of his programme in the Assembly.

One of Calonne's biggest problems was the divided ministry which eventually played a key role in his inability to see his programme to the end. Louis tried to convince Miromesnil to support Calonne's programme but he excluded Castries, Segur, and Breteuil from the entire process, thereby ensuring their opposition. Whilst Castries and Segur seem to have limited their oppositional activities to voicing severe criticism of Calonne to the king, Bretuil and Miromesnil did not. It has been suggested that Louis had no choice but to exclude them from the process if he wanted to avoid major dissension during the debates in the ministry over the reforms. And if he removed them from the ministry they could have worked with the Assembly of Notables against the crown. Whilst this might be true to a degree, it misses the point. The dynamics of Louis' modus operandi had been such that instead of limiting the baleful and disastrous effect of intrigues and promoting unity it encouraged disunity and allowed people like Castries, Miromesnil and Breteuil, opponents of the king's policies in some cases intriguers, to remain in the ministry before 1786. That Louis was aware of Miromesnil's intrigues against Turgot is not known. If he did not know, he should have as it was his responsibility to co-ordinate ministers and ensure relative unity. He did know that

Miromesnil was against reform which he expressed in letters to the king and at the ministerial council.

As Calonne and Louis worked to push through this controversial legislation, Breteuil and Miromesnil worked openly against it. Miromesnil organised opposition in the Assembly by informing the first presidents of the Parlement of decisions on Calonne's programme taken in council in order to give them the opportunity to organise opposition. Louis knew what Miromesnil was up to because he was reading the post of the first president.[85] But he did nothing to counter it. Breteuil, in addition to stirring up opposition to Calonne in the Assembly, worked with a group of speculators, headed by the Baron de Batz, to undermine Calonne's attempts to maintain confidence in the bourse and public credit.[86] If it could not be maintained, the crown would face defeat on all sides. This state of affairs is sadly reminiscent of Turgot's and Louis' experience of trying to push through the Six Edicts and of the consequences of the unchecked divisions in the ministry between Calonne and Breteuil in the period to 1786. The contrast between the modus operandi of Louis XVI and that of Louis XIV and Louis XV is stark. His predecessors, let alone his contemporaries would not have allowed ministerial intrigues to work against policies to which they had openly attached their name and therefore honour, as Louis XVI did. These open attempts at sabotaging the programme in the Assembly of Notables did not bring an immediate response from Louis. He waited until Calonne's plans were dead before removing both Miromesnil and Calonne.

Louis and Calonne would have inevitably faced opposition to parts of the programme given its scope and attack on vested interests. Additionally, Calonne had enemies in the Assembly many of whom felt uncomfortable with either Calonne's previous fiscal or political policies. Yet a majority of the deputies in the Assembly of Notables were not inherently against the programme[87], but the divided, leaderless ministry's inability to govern made them easy prey to opposition rhetoric, especially from Comte de Brienne. Louis also made a mistake when he refused to pack the Assembly of Notables with known supporters, as Richelieu had done when he had convened it. Calonne pushed for an Assembly in which members of the Third Estate and the court nobility would constitute the majority, believing these two groups would enable him to override the opposition of vested interests.[88] Miromesnil was against 'packing' the Assembly.

Louis failed to provide effective leadership within the ministry during the crucial first couple of months of the Assembly, in which the entire programme began to fall apart. Calonne, like many others, knowing of Louis' reputation for climb-downs, told him that if he intended to back down in the face of resistance it would be better not to introduce them at all. Despite Louis' belated recognition of the need for a united ministry for the success of the reform programme, he made only limited steps in that direction. Whilst he replaced Miromesnil with Lamoignon, he proved unable to retire the other major intriguer, Breteuil. This was a complete failure of leadership.

Louis dismissed Calonne in the hope he would be able to salvage parts of the reform package. This was a first. After the forced resignations of Turgot and Necker, he allowed policy to flip-flop. The difference in dynamics between Louis' relationships with Calonne on the one hand and with Turgot and Necker on the other says much about his modus operandi. In the first place Calonne's personality did not rub Louis XVI the wrong way in which Turgot's and Necker's eventually did. The real difference was the absence of Maurepas in the ministerial milieu. Maurepas worked against Turgot and Necker, by poisoning the king's mind and co-ordinating intrigues against them. The increasing intrigue and the permanent hole in the centre of the government that characterised Louis' modus operandi forced Turgot and Necker to act increasingly like a first minister. These attempts ended in their exit from the government.

Calonne's situation was completely different. There was no Maurepas, no first minister, either poisoning the king's mind or intriguing against him and/or working against his policies or frustrating him. Bretueil certainly intrigued against him, destroying the crown's relationship with the Parlement in the process, but he could not damage Calonne's standing in the king's eyes. Bretueil did not have a special relationship with Louis. In fact, the evidence shows that Louis disliked him, tolerating him because of the queen. Maurepas could and did influence him, effectively poisoning his mind against rival ministers. Poisoning Louis' mind against Calonne was beyond Bretueil. At the same time Calonne not only enjoyed a good relationship with Vergennes, he was also a member of the three-man group that took all major decisions. This inner core also worked against Breteuil, Calonne's enemy. This type of support Turgot and Necker never had.

The fall of Calonne and the subsequent collapse of his programme in the Assembly of Notables broke Louis. He was unable to understand why such a 'just' programme had failed and instead brought more troubles for the beleaguered crown. When Calonne had presented the programme to him, 'He became enthused by the ethos of fairness about the reforms, which were designed to alleviate the lot of the common people, to whose welfare Louis was sentimentally attached.'[89] His resultant depression caused him to pay even less attention to events around him. At a time when the government needed more than ever a steady hand, the system's linchpin went into further isolation. Mercy wrote back to Vienna that Louis was frequently visiting the queen's chambers to cry over the state of the country. He increased his hunting, eating and playing with clocks. This mental state only worsened as events continued to go against the monarchy.

Calonne's successor, Archbishop Lomenie de Brienne, became the closest to an official first minister Louis ever had. The king wrote, 'The present situation demanding that there should be a *common centre* (italics added) in the Ministry to which all parts relate, I have chosen the Archbishop of Toulouse as my *minister principale*...consequently my intention is that you give him prior notification of important matters about which I need to be informed either by you and him together or in your working session with me.'[90] He finally understood the need to

for a unified ministry and to fill the hole in the centre of government. But at this point authority was already ebbing away from the crown.

By July in face of government requests for extension of the stamp duty the Parlement, still smarting from Louis' attempt to bypass it by convening the Assembly of Notables, began to push for the convocation of the Estates-General. The Parlement intended to hit back at Louis for convoking the Assembly of Notables. The crown's latest battle between the with the Parlement ended with the magistrates' exile to Troyes (15 August-20 September). Due to impending bankruptcy Brienne reached a compromise with the magistrates. According to it, Louis would preside over a Royal Séance at which the government would agree to convene the long dormant Estates General in exchange for approval for a 500 million livre loan. Passage was assured, but debate had to be open and a vote to take place. There were some obstreperous speeches. Louis, who had fallen asleep at one point during the Séance, towards the end unexpectedly announced, 'Having heard your opinions, I find it necessary to establish the loans provided for in my edict. I have promised an Estates General before 1792, my word should satisfy you. I order my edict to be registered.' The deputies listened in shock. Finally the duc d'Orléans stammered, 'Is this then a *lit de justice*?' Louis, caught off guard, stammered, 'No it is a Royal Séance.' 'Then Sire this strikes me as illegal...it should be stated that this registration has been affected by the express command of Your Majesty.' Louis a bit shaken up and battling with his inability to speak publicly, murmured, 'Think what you like, I don't care...Yes it is legal because I want it.'[91] The séance ended in chaos and no registration. The subsequent exile of Orleans sent shock waves through the elite for he was a member of the Royal Family. This episode worsened the crown's relations with the Parlement and its elites. Valuable political capital was needlessly wasted. The crown did obtain the loans desired since the returns offered were attractive to financiers. The crown therefore had the needed cash to push on, but little political capital with the Parlement. The increasing isolation from the Parlement required the monarchy to take drastic steps to strengthen its own political authority. Brienne wasted six months before pushing for reform and moving against the Parlement. With his May Edicts Brienne tried to launch a Maupeou coup against the Parlement. The intention was the removal of the judiciary from politics and conferring their powers on a new body and the standardisation of law and law making within the kingdom. Due to several causes, growing disturbances in the provinces, bad weather that disrupted tax collection and a hostile and exiled Parlement, Brienne was forced out of office. The bankruptcy more than anything else put an end to Brienne and his reform plans. Louis XV succeeded in crushing parliamentary opposition in 1771 because the crown was relatively financially solid.

The resignation of Brienne increased the king's depression and loss of direction. Necker was then pushed on him; the man he swore he would never accept again. 'I was forced to recall Necker; I didn't want to but they will soon regret it. I'll do everything he tells me and we'll see what happens.'[92] These were hardly the words of a leader with a sense of how to deal with a situation. Louis implicitly decided to

sit back and watch events; everything would now be the responsibility of Necker. Given Louis' hands-off approach the appointment of Necker was a mistake given his own hands-off approach to the situation. He regarded himself as a caretaker until the Estates-General was convened. Louis made another mistake when he permitted Necker to recall unconditionally the return of the exiled Parlement which weakened further the monarchy.

Louis' next and last major mistake that poisoned the political environment, dealt with the question of *doublement* of the Third Estate. While the Assembly of Notables debated the procedures surrounding the convocation of the Third Estate, the king and his minister debated the issue of *doublement.* The bone of contention was over the amount of deputies sent by the Third Estate to the Estates-General and the voting arrangement of that body. The Third Estates, by 1788 the bulk of the population in wealth and in numbers, claimed *doublement,* i.e. representation equal to that of the other two orders combined and to make this effective, individual voting by head rather than by order. Louis supported the Third Estate's position, overriding the objections in his council and turning against the upper two estates. Both the protagonists in the council and Necker attest to the king's prejudice against the nobility and the clergy. Even before the Assembly of Notables Louis complained about the upper classes to Miromesnil. 'The nobility pay nothing; the people pay everything.'[93] The council issued a *Resultat du Conseil* according to which the number of deputies from the Third Estate would be doubled, but no provision was made over vote by head or by order. This put the crown on the winning side of the argument against the Parlement which upon its return from exile registered the edict convening the Estates-General, but added 'according to the form employed in 1614.' The magistrates had rejected *doublement* and openly supported the old electoral system which benefited the first two estates. Overnight they lost their popularity.

Louis failed to take advantage of this opportunity to seize the political initiative allowing the issue to simmer. This is surprising given Louis' resentment in regard to the magistrates. When a group of magistrates came to Versailles requesting certain constitutional guarantees for their positions Louis rebuffed them. 'I have no reply to make to my Parlement; it is with the assembled nation that I shall concert the appropriate measures to consolidate permanently public order and the prosperity of the State.'[94] The issue centred on how voting would take place in the Estates General; either by estate or straight vote. If voting was conducted by estates, the Third Estate would prove unable to have any affect on the proceedings, despite their larger numbers in society. When the Estates-General opened the deputies debated the issue as nothing could be accomplished without agreement on voting procedures. By rejecting a possible alliance with the Parlement, the king needed to work to consolidate his position with the Third Estate. After all, in 1787 by supporting Calonne's reform programme and attempting to incite a form of class warfare, Louis had shown himself willing to battle with the excessive privileges enjoyed by the first two classes. If ever this was the time to act. Louis, however, remained silent. The consequent radicalisation

amongst some of the members of the Third Estate began to worry conservatives. Many members of all estates looked in vain to the crown for leadership on this issue.

This continued government inaction led to the announcement by the Third Estate of a National Assembly and then the Tennis Court Oath. Ironically the day on which the exasperated Third Estate decided to make a move and declare itself the National Assembly Necker, but not Louis, decided that it was time to make an announcement over the voting procedures. At the Council, Necker proposed that voting by head would decide matters of general interest, including the organisation of future Estates-General, whilst voting by estate would make judgements on ecclesiastical and feudal matters. This was essentially a yes to *doublement.* The conservatives were against such support for the Third Estate. No one, including Louis, voiced objections to them. Louis' instincts were to support the Third Estate and *doublement.* According to Necker, the king was about to approve the measures and close the meeting

> when suddenly we saw an official in attendance enter; he approached the king and whispered to him and immediately His Majesty rose, instructing his ministers to remain where they were and await his return. This message, coming as the council was about to finish, naturally surprised us all. M. de Montmorin, who was sitting next to me, told me straight out: Everything is undone; only the queen could have allowed herself to interrupt the Council of State; the princes must have got round to her and they want, by her intervention, to postpone the king's decision.[95]

Louis returned and postponed a final decision. Necker returned to Paris from where he sent the king a note in the hope of salvaging his programme. He understood the conservatives had surrounded the king and were pressuring him to decide against *doublement.*

> This morning the queen and his brother (probably Artois) went to see the king and asked him what he was planning to do; he seemed as usual very uncertain and said that really the matter was not worth worrying about; that since previous Estates-General had not at all acted uniformly in procedural matters one could let them arrange it as they liked. 'But look,' they replied, 'the Third Estate has just declared itself the National Assembly.' 'Its only a phrase.' 'It has passed a resolution declaring the present form of raising taxation illegal in the future.' 'Heavens,' the king replied, 'he who pays the piper calls the tune and since they are the ones paying taxes I am not surprised that they want to regularise the way they are raised.'
>
> A deputation from the Parlement having failed to move the king, M. le Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld accompanied by M. l'Archévêque de Paris appeared in their turn. Turning on the emotion, they threw themselves at

> His Majesty's feet and besought him in the name of Saint Louis and the piety of his august ancestors to defend Religion, cruelly attacked by the philosophes who counted among their supporters nearly all the members of the Third Estate.

Then the queen followed by Mme de Polignac who was wheeling the children entered the scene. Marie-Antoinette

> Pushed the children into the arms of their father, beseeching him to hesitate no further and to confound the plans of the enemies of the family. The king, touched by her tears and by so many representations, gave way and intimated his desire to hold a Council on the spot...the king will issue a declaration which will satisfy the nation, order the deputies to work in their respective Chambers and severely punish the meddlers and intriguers. You may rest assured that he will not budge and a royal session is announced...[96]

They eventually convinced Louis to change his position. He now supported voting in common on matters of general interest, but suggested that motions should only be carried by a two-thirds majority and insisted that the organisation of future Estates should be decided by the orders sitting separately. He had completely reversed himself creating a sense of betrayal amongst the members of the Third Estate. Louis' decision was not inevitable; he made it under the pressure and emotion of this staged scenario. He who had implicitly looked for a political alliance with the Third Estate by supporting the policies of Turgot, Necker, and Calonne, failed to make that step at this crucial time. Fatal damage was done to Louis' legitimacy. From this point on he was a minor figure in the unfolding events.

The Third Estate now attacked the king's authority. Necker's version would have won over enough moderate opinion and in any case was better than the conservative one which led to revolution. If he had continued to support Necker's proposals or remained loyal to his beliefs, there were enough members of the Third Estate to support him. The comtesse d'Adhemar wrote

> We never ceased repeating to the king that the third estate would wreck everything—and we were right. We begged him to restrain them, to impose his Sovereign authority on party intrigue. The king replies: 'But it is not clear that the third estate are wrong. Different forms have been observed each time the estates have been held. So why reject verification in common. I am for it.' The king, it has to be admitted, was then numbered among the revolutionaries—a strange fatality which can only be explained by recognising the hand of Providence.

Later on

> The king paid no attention to the queen's fears. This well-informed princess knew all about the plots that were being hatched; she repeated them to the king, who replied: 'Look, when all is said and done, are not the third estate also my children—and a more numerous progeny? And even when the nobility lose a portion of their privileges and the clergy a few scraps of their income, will I be any less their king?[97]

The fury on the part of the Third Estate, the growing economic crisis due to a severe drought, and the consequent limited politicisation of the peasant class mixed with Louis' confusion made him a victim rather than a player in the events which led to his execution.

5

NICHOLAS II AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE ROMANOV STATE

I adhere to autocracy not for my own pleasure. I act in this spirit because I am convinced that this is necessary for Russia, but if it were for myself I would get rid of it will all pleasure.
Nicholas II

He is an unfortunate man! Painful and pitiful! He is in a blissful state of...fatalism! Lord, Lord have mercy on us.
Grand Duke Sergei, Revolution of 1905

The immediate socio-structural causes of the fall of the Romanov Dynasty in February of 1917 fall into two categories. Firstly, in February 1917 the workers, one of the newest classes in tsarist Russia, revolted against the government which came to be identified as the protector of the factory owner. Secondly, the success of these worker revolts represented the alienation between Nicholas II on the one hand and the elite and the vast majority of the members of the Russian elite and civil society on the other. [1] The structural origins of this growing gap between the state, headed by Nicholas II and these civil groups, are rooted in the consequences of modernisation from above.

The labour problem played a direct role in the overthrow of the tsarist regime in 1917. Tsardom's agrarian problems were indeed real and serious, but they did not play a direct role in the events of February 1917. It was only after the collapse of the tsarist political order and the structural re-organisations undertaken by the Provisional Government that order began to break down in the countryside, gradually increasing before and especially after the Bolshevik coup of October 1917.

Character and Modus Operandi: Nicholas II

Nicholas' overriding goal from which everything else flowed, was preservation of the autocracy in the way in which he received it. He believed that the autocracy was Russia's God-given form of government for whose preservation he alone was responsible to the All-Mighty. 'I am responsible before God and Russia for everything that has happened and will happen, and it does not matter whether the ministers will be responsible to the Duma and the State Council. I will never be able, seeing what the ministers will be doing against Russia's welfare, to agree with them, and to console myself with the idea that this is not the work of my hands, not my responsibility.' He himself stressed that to accept the concept of reigning but not ruling he would have had to be a different person, to have been brought up differently.[2] He did not regard the preservation of the autocracy as an end in itself. Rather he regarded the autocracy as the basic guarantor of political stability, as the means to preserving the multi-ethnic empire, to enhancing prosperity and to ensuring Russia's international security and status. His adherence to the autocracy had its own internal logic. In response to the whispers that Alexander III's death might lead to a loosening of the authoritarianism of the past reign Nicholas' reaffirmed his father's conservative approach.

> It has become known to me that recently in some zemstvos some people have been taken with the senseless dreams about the participation of the zemtsvos in the running of domestic rule. Let all understand that I, dedicating all my strength to the good of the people, will from the beginning preserve the autocracy as fiercely and unbendingly, as my late unforgettable father.[3]

The content and tone of this speech caused offence in conservative and reformist groups and deepened the gap between the tsar and the elites. Even the arch-conservative Pobedonostsev expressed shock at the speech, considering it a bad political move that could only agitate needlessly public opinion. This event was indicative of two recurring themes of Nicholas II's reign. Firstly, Nicholas' choice of words and the overall content of the speech reflected his political naiveté and lack of savoir faire, as Pobedonostsev correctly noted. Secondly, this position became the leitmotiv of his reign. Nicholas became tsar at a time when Russia did not face any major internal or external crisis; it appeared that the autocratic rule of his father had indeed secured and maintained stability. This helps explain his rather laid-back, conservative approach to policy in the 1890s.

Nicholas II began his reign reaffirming his predecessor's policies; Louis XVI did the opposite by recalling the Parlements. Nicholas was overly suspicious of any political changes seeing in them threats to the autocracy. This is understandable to a degree as Nicholas lived in the post-French revolution age, in which a war existed between the autocracy (but not necessarily the monarchy) and the forces of political change. This 'war' took a heavy toll on Nicholas who increasingly felt overwhelmed by the challenges he faced in his attempt to preserve the autocracy.

Nicholas II was rather shy, sensitive and not self-confident. He strongly disliked politics, politicians, and bureaucrats. These are rather unfortunate characteristics and dislikes given his lifetime job as the co-ordinating centre of the governmental machine. The similarity with Louis is obvious. Nicholas knew that he could not behave like his straightforward father, who, as an effective co-ordinator of the state's highest servants, enjoyed shouting at people and knocking heads together. Efficient and strong-minded ministers would inevitably lose Nicholas' trust and support. He preferred to work with people who lacked real talent for they would not aggravate his sensitivities vis-à-vis his power and inability to govern. Nicholas II expressed such fears to Kokovtsev in the immediate aftermath of Stolypin's death and in the process made a telling comment about his own personality. 'He dies in my service, true, but he was always so anxious to keep me in the background. Do you suppose that I liked always reading in the papers that the president of the council of ministers had done this...The president had done that. Don't I count? Am I nobody?'[4] This is why Stolypin's political death preceded his physical one. To imagine Alexander II or Alexander III asking if they count is difficult. This obvious insecurity manifested itself in how Nicholas chose his ministers most of the time. He based his choice more on the candidates' personality rather than on their views. The 'ambiguities and inconsistencies are so pervasive in all of Nicholas' appointments as to appear almost purposeful.'[5]

Nicholas did not appreciate the importance of the co-ordinating role the autocratic system dictated the monarch play or of leaving the running of government to a first or chief minister. Nicholas, like Louis XVI, created a hole in the centre of government. He seemed to expect the ministers and the bureaucracy to function without direction from the top. The bureaucratic machine indeed functioned relatively well and was manned by capable people at the middle and upper levels.[6] After all this system produced the Great Reforms of Alexander II's reign, implemented a vast industrialisation programme from above, and Stolypin's reforms. It put together the constitutional system that emerged after 1905. Yet, the effectiveness of the bureaucracy was directly dependent on the situation in the centre of the government at its highest levels. In 1905 he complained to his mother that 'Everyone is afraid of taking courageous action; I keep trying to force on them...to behave more energetically. With us nobody is accustomed to shouldering responsibility. All expect to be given orders, which they disobey as often as not.'[7] On several occasions Witte tried to impress on Nicholas the need for him to provide some degree of leadership. 'These questions can only be properly solved if you yourself take the lead in this matter, surrounding yourself with people chosen for the job. The bureaucracy itself cannot solve such matters on its own.'[8] 'Only the sovereign can....draw up the intelligent views which will lead to the common goal and inwardly harmonise all activities of the central and local government agencies.'[9] Nicholas failed understand this, regarding the bureaucracy as a threat to him and his power. He became proactive only in defence of the autocracy.

Nicholas, like Louis XVI, was wary of ministers with strong personalities seeing in them threats to his position. This sensitivity resulted from the last tsar's insecurity and excessive fear of falling under the influence of a certain minister or clique. Nicholas' jealousy of his autocratic power and fear of manipulation on the part of ministers was greater than Louis' was. For example, in 1899 he discharged Minister of Internal Affairs Goremykin for advocating the establishment of zemstvos in the Empire's western border lands. Witte, in a bid to remove a rival, described the plan to the tsar as a threat to his autocratic power. This episode would set a tradition for Nicholas' reign; a person at court or within the ministry could play on his insecurity and fear of possible infringement of the autocratic authority to gain the removal of a rival. Many contemporaries understood that Nicholas was susceptible to influence and slanders against ministers. Conservatives knew that they could stifle the efforts of reformist ministers through Nicholas himself. This in turn strengthened ministers' insecurity and weakened in some cases their initiative for they feared for their positions. Consequently, in many cases ministers became exhausted and disgusted with government and Nicholas II's modus operandi. One only has to think of Maurepas and the attacks on Turgot, Necker, and Fleury, and Calonne in order to draw comparisons between these two forms of rule.

Whether he gave a major figure in the ministry the power to implement a single policy is only part of the question. Did Nicholas' modus operandi permit the emergence and relatively durable existence of a united ministry? On the one hand, Nicholas believed that having ultimate responsibility for Russia, he had to maintain complete control in his hands. But, he lacked the ability and confidence to play the essential role of co-ordinator of ministers. On the other hand, he would not permit the emergence of a Bismarck or Loris-Melikov who as first ministers with the full backing of the tsar co-ordinated ministers and policy. Consequently, a hole in the centre of the government, a phenomenon unknown since at least the reign of Catherine II, emerged at a time of growing social and political tensions. This similarity with Louis XVI's modus operandi is obvious. The consequences were the same as well. Whenever a strong-minded minister with a vision or particular policy appeared he inevitably attempted to fill this hole and become a co-ordinating figure within the ministry in order to ensure efficiency and implementation of his plans. This in turn aroused Nicholas' sensitivities to perceived threats to his autocratic power.

Alexander II was known for having ministers of different opinions and for choosing very intelligently at times his subordinates. He differed from his grandson in two vital ways. Firstly, during the period of the Great Reforms, and especially during the preparation for the emancipation of the serfs, Alexander II followed a general policy line. He did not participate in the drafting of many of the Great Reforms, but he succeeded in managing this process by skilful playing of the reformers and the conservatives within the government.[10] He did not manage his ministers poorly. Moreover, when the political situation in the country began to deteriorate in the late 1870s he eventually acted decisively by appointing Loris-

Melikov virtual dictator of the country, with the goal to crush the revolutionary terrorism but at the same time push forward reform in order to maintain the support of educated public opinion. Alexander II even appointed ministers at Loris-Melikov's request.

Nicholas maintained a great distance from his ministers, never warming to them. General Mosolov noted that, 'He could part with the quietest ease even from those who had served him for a very long time. The first word of accusation breathed in his presence against anybody, with or without evidence was enough for him to dismiss the victim though the charge might have been a pure fabrication...He was distrustful like all weak people.'[11] Nicholas' distrust of his ability to govern and of his ministers led him to find alternative sources of advice, such as A.M.Bezobrazov and the infamous Prince Meshcherskii.[12] Whilst this in principle is not a bad move as any chief executive needs to obtain information from a myriad of sources, Nicholas several times followed two or three diametrically opposed policies at the same time. The ministers, aware of this, frequently felt unstable in their positions and superfluous. Most importantly, Nicholas was contemptuous of his ministers. In the lead up to the Russo-Japanese War he allowed his government to follow one policy, whilst at the same time supporting the Far East policy of Bezobrazov, which contradicted government policy. War Minister Kuropatkin tried to convince Nicholas of the danger in such a modus operandi. In an interesting exchange between them, Kuropatkin complained that, '(your) confidence in me would only grow when I ceased to be a minister.' Nicholas tellingly responded, 'It is strange, you know, but perhaps that is psychologically correct.'[13]

Political figures on both sides of the political divide bitterly complained of Nicholas' disregard for his ministers, his inability to support them and to follow a positive programme.[14] Pobedonostsev decried an autocratic power that did not know what it wanted and failed to provide for unified ministerial government and instead seemed to encourage bureaucratic infighting and ministerial rivalry. This is classic Louis XVI. In refusing Nicholas' offer of the premiership Peter Durnovo, a known conservative, succinctly described to him what would happen if he accepted: 'Your Majesty, my system as head of government and Ministry of Internal Affairs cannot provide quick results, it can tell only after a few years during which there will be complete agitation: dissolution of the Duma, assassinations, executions, perhaps even armed uprisings. You, Your Majesty, will not endure these years and will dismiss me; under such conditions my stay in power cannot do any good and will bring only harm.'[15]

Nicholas II, again like Louis XVI, had a reputation for changing his mind. V. Lambsdorff observed as early as 1896 that the young tsar 'changes his mind with great speed' whilst another minister remarked, 'God preserve you from relying on the emperor for a second on any matter; he is incapable of supporting anyone over anything.' Minister of Internal Affairs Sipyagin bitterly stated that, 'one cannot rely on the Emperor...he is treacherous and untruthful.'[16] Every minister hated leaving Nicholas alone with a rival minister for fear of a complete reversal of

policy. His tendency to change his decisions resulted from an impressionable mind incapable of analysis and a politeness that prevented him from openly disagreeing with people. Nicholas hated to disagree with any of his ministers to their face for fear of hurting their feelings. Therefore, when a minister presented a policy to the tsar, it could very well seem that the monarch did support him, when in reality he disagreed with it, simply had not yet thought through the matter or heard alternative views. This disagreement with a minister usually took the form of non-implementation or changing of the mind (or what seemed to be a changing) by the tsar hours later. Nicholas himself succinctly summed up his approach: 'Why are you always quarrelling? I always agree with everyone about everything and then do things my own way.'[17] This gained him a reputation for being treacherous. Wilhelm II in a period of lucidity more accurately described this situation in the aftermath of the Treaty of Bjorko debacle. 'The tsar is not treacherous, but he is weak. Weakness is not treachery, but it fulfils all of its functions.'[18]

Other monarchs, such as Alexander II and Alexander III, were not with their doubt in regard to their ministers and members of the court, and at times condemned the system. Yet, unlike Nicholas II, they did not withdraw from it. They sought to govern it or put strong people in place to deal with it. Unlike his predecessors and the last Shah of Iran, Nicholas II was not a proactive monarch, failing even to take steps to improve the efficiency of the autocratic government. Alexander II was a proactive monarch, as was Nicholas I, frequently regarded an archconservative. In the aftermath of the Decembrist Revolt Nicholas I took charge of the interrogations of the conspirators in order to discover the causes of this first elite-led rebellion against the monarchy. 'The new tsar was able to get an better understanding of the entire condition of Russia in a few months than did his predecessors had managed to do in decades.'[19] He took into account what he had learned from the Decembrists, pondering over the country's social and administrative structure. Many of the ideas for Alexander II's reforms emerged from the various commissions charged with studying pressing issues, such as the emancipation of the serfs, established by Nicholas I. 'In social relations he was perhaps as progressive as the situation required.'[20] Whilst reaffirming the power of the autocracy, Nicholas I did not shy away from administrative innovation in order to improve the efficiency of his government.

The base of the government system remained as before, but once beginning to rule the huge empire without the participation of society, Nicholas I moved to make more effective the central governing mechanisms. That is why during his reign a large number of new departments in already established institutions and new chancelleries, commissions, emerged. At the same time this was the era of special committees created to deal with individual policy questions.[21] Nicholas II showed no interest in administrative innovation and in tackling social problems as they began to pose a threat to political stability. This clearly set him apart from most of his predecessors.

During the reign of Alexander III, Maria Fedorovna maintained the throne's connections with the social elite and thereby ensured the centrality of the monarchy within this societal layer. Nicholas II, however, detached himself both from court and society, which as a result he increasingly failed to understand. Nicholas and Alexandra preferred the happiness and tranquillity of family life to engagement with Russia's high society. The number of royal balls, dinner parties, and other such engagements fell. At approximately the same time the wife of King Umberto I of Italy, Margherita, danced with leftist deputies at royal functions despite the monarchy's intense dislike and fear of the Left. 'Such modest acts of gracious consideration created much good will.' The king himself encouraged his wife.[22] Nicholas II was unwilling and/or unable to make such goodwill gestures, to the ultimate detriment of the monarchy. Even Nicholas I often invited ministers and other members of the elite to private family dinners where issues were discussed, although he preferred to be the first one to pose questions.[23] Towards the end of his reign Nicholas confirmed his isolation, 'Do you think that someone can influence me? That I would succumb to pressure? The Empress and I see no one, discuss nothing with anyone. Only we together make decisions.'[24] That such active engagement alone could have strengthened the monarchy during this period of industrialisation it debatable. Yet self-imposed isolation from court, society, and the new industrial class rendered him ignorant of current societal trends and new ideas and weakened elite loyalty to the dynasty.

Nicholas also lacked political skill. His rare policy initiatives and/or interventions, such as Russia's Far East policy, support for Izvolskii's plan on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and interventions in the legislative process during the Stolypin years, all fared badly and more importantly had great consequences for the country's political situation. I am not condemning the interventions in the running of the government as such, as every monarch frequently acts in a similar way in order to remind others of his supreme authority. A Louis XIV or Alexander III could pull this off for they had political skill, Nicholas could not, as we shall see below.

When examining the impact of Nicholas II's character on Russian politics the following needs to be kept in mind: (1) adherence to autocracy as the best and only means to govern Russia; (2) his fatalism, which was a escape mechanism for his inability to rule; (3) his failure to conceptualise the role of the monarch in the autocratic system and to understand the managing role the tsar was supposed to play which had a negative influence on horizontal governance; (4) his insecurity as tsar which caused him to follow a policy of divide and rule amongst his ministers without playing the central decision making role given him by the system; (5) his strong belief that he was responsible to God for maintaining the integrity of the autocracy for his son and heir; and (6) his lack of political skill in managing his ministers and in his personal policy initiation and implementation. All of these characteristics added unbearable chaos to an already stressed political system. That the monarchy under Nicholas II, even under the best circumstances, would

have been able to transform itself into either an effective enlightened despotism or a semi-constitutional system was highly unlikely.

Structure and Agency: Nicholas II and Russian Foreign Policy

The tsars, considering foreign policy their own domain, directed it themselves. Their opinions and actions had an overwhelming affect on the course of Russia's relationship with the international system. Nicholas II was no exception in this matter. He read the foreign ministry daily reports and diplomatic and military-diplomatic correspondence. He also met with the minister of foreign affairs on a regular basis.

Seeing the economic and political potential in the rather undeveloped far east of the Empire, Nicholas believed that a great part of Russia's future was there. During the Revel meeting Nicholas told Wilhelm II that he had an intense interest in East Asia and viewed the strengthening and widening of Russian influence in this area as one of the assignments (*zadacha*) of his rule.[25]

Russia's unintentional march to war with Japan reflected the negative role of Nicholas' modus operandi and personality. He simply never established what exactly Russia's policy in the Far East and in regard to Japan would be. There are three basic points concerning the outbreak war between Russia and Japan: (1) Nicholas failed to co-ordinate policy; (2) he failed to judge the reactions of key players, especially the Japanese, to Russia's moves in the area and her contradictory policies; and (3) he failed to weigh up accurately the costs and benefits of the policy, as well as Russia's strengths and weaknesses.

During the early period of Russia's involvement in the Far East the finance minister, Sergei Witte, and Kuropatkin tried to persuade Nicholas II to adopt their respective policies in the Far East. This harmful interministerial struggle ended when these two men joined forces to combat an extra-ministerial clique, which in their opinion was pushing Nicholas into following a reckless plan in the Far East that would lead to war with Japan. Many regarded A.M. Bezobrazov, the head of this clique, and certain other figures, whose presence and policies were labelled *bezobrazovshchina*,[26] as a destructive influence on the tsar. Bezobrazov advocated a more aggressive Far East policy and bitterly criticised the ministers for ignoring Russia's 'interests' on the Korean peninsula and Japanese 'expansionism.' With the personal support of the emperor this clique followed a policy in the Far East which was in direct contradiction to Russian government policy.

Witte's exasperation with the lack of top-level coordination and its dangers led him to demand from Nicholas a general ministerial discussion on foreign policy. The meeting took place on 26 March 1903 and was chaired by the emperor. Witte and Kuropatkin, with the aid of the foreign minister, all of whom were now advocates of a moderate, less provoking Far Eastern policy, succeeded in overturning the influence of the *bezobrazovshchina*. However, in characteristic form Nicholas changed his mind in favour of the clique's policies after Kuropatkin was sent to the Far East to implement this new policy. The chaos continued as

Kuropatkin followed the policy agreed at the meeting of 26 March and Bezobrazov followed another. Another conference on foreign policy convened which resulted in a further surprising victory for Bezobrazov. To the fury of the ministers the resolutions of the conference of 26 March were overturned. Nicholas had three telegrams sent to the Minister of War, in which he changed the objectives of the mission and in effect stated the exact opposite of what was decided earlier. Kuropatkin and Aleeksev, on scene in the Far East, were ordered by the tsar to work with now State Secretary Bezobrazov in expanding holdings in Manchuria and the Pacific Ocean. This change reflected the on-going battle in St.Petersburg, and the hole in the centre of the government created by Nicholas' modus operandi.

His habit of rapidly changing his mind had played a key role in the Russian acquisition of Port Arthur, one of the key bones of contention between Petersburg and Tokyo. After the Germans had seized the Chinese port of Kiaochow in 1897 M.N. Muravyov, the Russian foreign minister, suspected that London would take advantage of the situation to seize Port Arthur for itself. He wanted to prevent this expected move by having Russia occupy the port first. The matter was discussed during a meeting chaired by the emperor in November 1897. Witte and a majority of the ministers, including, crucially, the naval leaders, did not support Muravyov's plan. Nicholas supported the majority view, but two weeks later changed his mind after conversations with the foreign minister. 'This pattern of behaviour...drove his ministers to despair.'[27]

Witte and Kuropatkin recognised that the tsar had some type of 'grandiose' schemes for the Empire in the Far East[28] and that, 'he thinks that he is right anyway, that only he understands the questions of Russia's glory and well-being better than we do. Therefore, each Bezobrazov that goes along with him seems to the sovereign to understand his scheme more correctly than we do, the ministers.'[29] Kuropatkin added that 'the sovereign had taken the new course without consulting his ministers, despite their opinion, trusting the gang of Bezobrazov, supported by Plehve.'[30] Even Bezobrazov himself remarked on 'the duality in the conduct of our policy in the East: official tsarist and unofficial tsarist.'[31] Through June, July, and August 1903 Russia did not have a policy for the Far East as Nicholas failed to make any decisions,[32] to the amazement and growing suspicion of the Japanese. To quote Kuropatkin again, 'Nobody knew whom to obey, where authority lay...all of this had a pernicious effect on the legitimacy of power...'[33] He was complaining about a hole in the centre of government.

Consequently, the threat of war increased with Japan with which the Russians had been holding negotiations over their respective spheres of influence in the Far East. Already in November 1902 Witte wrote to Count Lamsdorff, the foreign minister, that a victory in a war with Japan over distant Korea would be very costly and would generate little support from society. The real danger presented itself in the 'hidden dissatisfaction' of Russian society, which was already making itself felt in peace time and could only be strongly exacerbated during a war.[34] As early as

1902 Witte strongly expressed to the tsar his reservations concerning the 'paradoxical image of a spreading empire threatened by growing social unrest at home and the absence of a coherent policy in an increasingly hostile foreign environment.' He stressed the need to make some kind of concessions to the Japanese or come to some kind of agreement with them in order 'to avoid a further deterioration of relations.'[35] Kuropatkin as well told the tsar that a war with Japan would be extremely unpopular. He warned Nicholas that anti-government forces would use the opportunity to whip up revolutionary fervour, especially if the populace were required to make sacrifices in the case of a needless war with Japan.[36] He also tried to get through to Nicholas that Russia had to be very careful about its moves in the Far East and how other countries, including Japan, perceived them. Nicholas continued to ignore these warnings, simply stating that, 'All the same it is a barbarous country.'[37] The determined Nicholas brushed aside any warnings of domestic tension, partly because he miscalculated Japanese reactions.

The incoherence and contradictions of Russia's Far East policy exasperated the Japanese who were willing to negotiate and work out spheres of influence. The long delays in receiving confirmation of Russia's standing on this or that issue, the refusal to make any serious concessions to the Japanese, an unwillingness to work with them, and the confusion at the centre, emanating from Nicholas himself led the Japanese to conclude that St. Petersburg was employing a delaying tactic in order to enlarge and entrench Russia's position in the Far East to the detriment of Japanese interests. The result was the surprise attack on the Russian naval fleet at Port Arthur in February 1904.

Nicholas holds responsibility for the start of this easily avoidable war and for the impact of the consequences of Russia's defeat had on the international system and Russia's domestic scene. Nicholas' role in the events leading to war, which reflects several important aspects of his modus operandi, can be summarised as follows. Firstly, whilst the ministers could blame the Bezobrazov clique for the inconsistencies in Russian Far Eastern policy, the problem was Nicholas himself. He had certain ideas on how to address the Far Eastern question, but proved unable to stand-up to his ministers, who advocated a differing approach. He therefore found an extra-ministerial group, which advocated similar ideas. Louis XV's *secret du roi* comes to mind. Bezobrazov's 'influence' over tsarist policy in this area was the symptom, not the cause of Nicholas' more aggressive line. Although Nicholas never made a firm decision on the shape and form of the Empire's policy, Bezobrazov would never have had the ability to follow through on his ideas if Nicholas himself did not already have sympathy for them.

Secondly, Nicholas' support for Bezobrazov reflected a deeper problem in his modus operandi. Nicholas had trouble on a personal level in imposing his will or policy on his ministers when they disagreed with him. But, he was not prepared to give up his plans, for he believed that to a great degree Russia's future was in the east. He used this extra-governmental group to implement his policy, whilst allowing his government at the same time to follow a different policy. This was

evasion rather than management, creating the conditions for policy confusion and a seemingly leaderless government. Nicholas failed to a get a grip on the bureaucratic machine that ran his Empire. Or perhaps he felt he could not and therefore did not try. The result was chaos. Also, on a larger scale, Nicholas concentrated on one area of policy to which he was committed without thinking realistically about its links to overall state interests.

Thirdly, his detachment from his ministers, even his disdain for them, meant that he tended to ignore the very often responsible and realistic assessments of the political situation given to him by men such as Witte and Kuropatkin. Regardless of information sent to him, however reliable, Nicholas would 'stick to his own petty point of view', in the words of Pobedonostsev. The fourth point deals with political skill and acumen. Whilst Nicholas, as the Russian autocrat, had the 'legal' right to conduct foreign policy in such a manner, he was ill-equipped mentally to be an Alexander II or Alexander III in this field. He lacked the ability to recognise the consequences of his actions, including how others would interpret them, and to think in terms larger than his own goals. By moving blindly and without consideration he blundered into war. The even more basic point is simply that Nicholas was wrong. He misinterpreted the situation in the East despite ministerial attempts to show the dangers in the tsar's policy, underestimating Japanese power and exaggerating Russia's.

The war brought the Revolution of 1905 which almost led to tsardom's collapse and did lead to the establishment of a semi-constitutional system. The effect of Russia's defeat on the European states system played a large role in setting off a chain of events leading to August 1914.

Consequence 1: The First Moroccan Crisis

Even after the Japanese debacle Nicholas did not learn his lesson immediately. During his meeting with Kaiser Wilhelm II in the midst of the Russo-Japanese war he signed the infamous Treaty of Bjorko. According to the treaty if one power was attacked by a third power the other would come to its aid and that neither side would settle for a separate peace. Nicholas placed the whole basis of Russia's security and foreign policy, namely the alliance with France, under threat. Wilhelm II easily understood this. Nicholas had once again acted without a grasp of international realities, including France's position, without an understanding of the consequences of his steps, and without consulting his foreign minister. There was no excuse that this was an arcane field of policy in which the emperor was uninformed. This step illustrates the problem with Nicholas and his modus operandi. When Foreign Minister Lamsdorff read the text of the treaty horror overtook him. He told Nicholas that the treaty had to be broken, which Russia did to Berlin's chagrin.

Russia's effective removal, albeit considered temporary, as a full member of the Club of Great Powers due to her major defeat and subsequent revolution destabilised the European state system at an already delicate period. Before the Russo-Japanese War St. Petersburg's financial reliance on Paris was more than

made up for by her military power, which served as a check on possible German or Austro-Hungarian pretensions. Defeat in the war with Japan had a direct impact on the Franco-Russian relationship, making France the senior partner. Paris, talking of a fifteen-year absence of Russian power in Europe, looked to strengthen the entente with her traditional enemy, Great Britain. Paris and London transformed their extra-European agreement of 8 April 1904 into an Anglo-French entente operating in Europe itself. Russia could not influence these events as the defeat in the war had fatally reduced her ability to balance between Germany and Great Britain and use Franco-German differences to her benefit. In other words, Russia's room for manoeuvre and her ability to form her own foreign policy were decidedly limited. France was therefore in a position to impose her terms on Russia during the First Moroccan Crisis (1906).

The Madrid Convention of 1880 of which France was a signatory, guaranteed the independence of Morocco. At the close of 1904 the French foreign minister, Theophile Delcassé, persuaded the French government to pressure the Moroccan sultan to agree to certain 'reforms', which would increase greatly France's position vis-a-vis other European powers. Delcassé made a point to discuss this reform package with the other signatories, Britain, Italy, and Spain, save one, Germany. In response to this calculated rebuff, the Germans demanded the resignation of the French foreign minister and an international conference to settle the Moroccan issue. Delcassé's stubbornness worried his colleagues in the Council of Ministers, who believed he had gone too far in provoking Berlin. He was forced into retirement. This concession thrilled the Germans. Yet, they pressed on, advocating a conference in the hope of reducing French pretensions in Morocco. The French believing that the resignation and some accompanying concessions were enough, denied the need for a conference. At the same time London, fearing humiliation of her new ally, pledged her support for the French cause. In the end Paris agreed to an international conference, intent on pushing through her 'reforms' for Morocco.

Foreign Minister Lamsdorff wrote to the members of the Russian delegation before the opening of the conference that they, 'should announce to the French delegation at the opening of the Conference that we are ready to take on ourselves the role of mediator.'[38] The Russians, still annoyed with France's lukewarm support for their Far Eastern adventure, did not regard the Moroccan crisis as vital to their national interest. They saw no need to hurt their relationship with Berlin over it. Maurice Bompard, the French Ambassador to Russia told Witte that France expected Russia to support her openly and without reservations. Witte retorted that, 'there would be nothing more dangerous than such behaviour from our delegation. Of course the delegation will support you, but not in the form you wish.'[39]

The Moroccan crisis broke out during Franco-Russian negotiations over loans, desperately needed by the Russian government to crush the 1905 Revolution, avoid bankruptcy, and face the new Duma from a point of strength. All consequences of the Russo-Japanese War, themselves a result of Nicholas II's

modus operandi and views. Paris linked the completion of the loans negotiations to the successful conclusion in France's favour of the Moroccan crisis itself.[40] Witte wrote to Kokovtsev that 'The French government is using the negotiations over the loans to pressure us into not only supporting them at the Morocco conference, but also to get at the German emperor himself.'[41] But Nicholas II was already prepared to play the part France wanted in order to obtain the loans badly needed. Unknown to Witte the tsar told Kokovtsev, the leader of the team negotiating the loan:

> Do you think it might help matters if I entrusted to you to apprise the French government of the particular importance I attach to the success of your undertaking and I would be ready on my side to support the French government in whatever form it most desired at the present time?...our help might be particularly helpful to her. They are about to open the conference. I believe the French government might find my support very useful.[42]

The Algeciras Conference opened on 16 January 1906.[43] London and Paris regarded German demands as extreme and provocative, as did most countries. Russia to the great surprise of the Germans very strongly and openly supported the French, ditching and destroying any plans to play the mediating role she wanted only two months earlier. The conference ended with a French victory and German humiliation. Russia received her French loans.

Germany felt bitter, especially towards Russia, and that its fear of isolation was becoming a reality. Berlin now believed that Petersburg did not value their bilateral relations. Indeed France in the west, Russia in the east, and rich Britain all worked against Berlin at the conference. 'Fine prospects! In the future we can count on the Franco-Russian Alliance, the Anglo-French Entente and Anglo-Russian entente, with Spain, Italy, and Portugal as appendages thereto in the second line,' wrote Wilhelm II on a dispatch to his Chancellor, von Bulow. Bulow wrote back that 'our relations with Austria-Hungary have now become more important than ever, since that state is our only reliable ally.'[44] In a sign of what would come within two years in Bosnia, Wilhelm thanked Count Goluchowski for Austria-Hungary's support, for playing a 'brilliant second' to Germany. 'You can also be certain of similar service from me in a similar situation.'[45] By losing her independence in foreign affairs after 'Nicholas' war and revolution, Russia found herself needlessly entangled in extra-European competition for colonies between Germany and France which had dramatic consequences for the geo-political situation in Europe.

Consequence 2: The Bosnian Crisis

After Bjorko Nicholas seemed to have learned some lessons. He subsequently always conducted foreign policy via the Foreign Ministry. But he continued to resist the idea that foreign policy was the legitimate concern of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. This led to trouble over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Stolypin,

its chairman, was attempting to ensure not only that this body would collectively make decisions based on reports given by ministers and subsequent debates, but also that ministers would remain united and adhere to decisions taken in council. The Council of Ministers had decided to pursue a conciliatory foreign policy with the other Great Powers in order to reduce tensions across Russia's borders. Stolypin, Minister of Finance Kokovtsev, and the Chief of Staff Palitsyn amongst others agreed that a good deal of time would be needed before Russia could pursue any serious foreign policy goals. Stolypin believed that twenty years of peace was needed to put Russia's domestic and military house in order in the aftermath of defeat and revolution.

Despite this, by late 1907 Foreign Minister Izvolskii began to focus attention on the Straits question. After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 warships were banned from entering the straits which meant Russia could not deploy naval forces outside of the Black Sea. After encountering opposition to his plans, Izvolskii went straight to Nicholas II and received his permission to follow them.[46] On 21 January 1908 Stolypin with the support of the other ministers expressed strong displeasure with the foreign minister's continued pursuance of a dangerous policy that contradicted that of the ministry. Izvolskii brushed this aside as the tsar privately continued to support him.

At this time the Austrian Foreign Minister Aerenthal began to consider Izvolskii's previous offer of linking Russian acquiescence of Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Vienna's support on the Straits question. Through an exchange of letters and finally negotiations at Aerenthal's castle, Buchlau, the two foreign ministers essentially came to agreement on this offer. Before Izvolskii could inform London, Paris, and Stolypin of the 'agreement' between the two countries, Aerenthal announced the annexation and Russia's support of it.[47] The more judicious Stolypin realised almost immediately the consequences of Izvolskii's move. He stated that the Bosnian question had been considered a general European one until Izvolskii's note to Austria suggesting an exchange of support. Russia was now seen as a traitor to the Slav cause by openly putting her own interests above those of fellow Slavs.[48] Nevertheless Russia, France and Britain did oppose the annexation, which drew the attention of Germany. Wilhelm II was initially furious with the Austrian move given German attempts over the last decade to present itself as an ally of the Ottoman Empire; German support for the Austrian move was not guaranteed. This anger subsided when it seemed that the entente powers were uniting against the Dual Monarchy. The memories of the humiliation and isolation of the Algeciras conference came to the surface. Berlin, knowing that Russia was in no condition to fight, pushed her against the wall, essentially threatening war if Petersburg did not acquiesce to the annexation. Russia backed down, humiliated at home and in the international arena. Nicholas II wrote to his mother: '..the form of the German government's approach to us was rude and we shall not forget it!!'[49]

Isvolskii's strategy's fatal flaw was that he and Nicholas did not consult Stolypin, who understood the domestic and international realities better, or take into

account domestic restraints and possible reactions to such a policy. The other problem was that both Izvolskii and Nicholas II failed to think through the international and domestic implications of openly supporting Austria's move and benefiting from it. Whilst Nicholas was, in principle, constitutionally within his prerogatives when he supported Izvolskii's strategy, he violated the spirit of the purpose of the governmental reforms of 1906. Understanding the opposition to these moves, Nicholas had even ordered Izvolskii not to discuss their plans in the Council of Ministers, even if asked.[50] Moreover we once again must question Nicholas' political skill. He had a goal, the Straits, and failed to take anything else into account. The parallels with his Far Eastern policy are striking, as well as the consequences. He remarked to the personal representative of Wilhelm II, 'My thoughts have always been with the Straits...'[51]

Consequence 3: Armaments, Russia and the First World War

The Bosnian crisis had several consequences for Europe's international relations leading up to 1914 and decisively contributed to the destabilisation of relations between Europe's leading continental powers. Russia found herself humiliated in the eyes of the world and the government lost domestic legitimacy. The new foreign minister, Sazanov, had already given notice that further attempts to bully Russia would lead to war. She could not back down again. St. Petersburg had two basic responses. Firstly, the government enlarged the re-armament programme in order to overcome quickly the military weakness brought about by the war with Japan and revolution. 'It was Russia...that can be said most accurately to have begun the land arms race...'[52] The success of Russia's armament program was not lost on the Great Powers. British foreign minister Grey wrote that, 'the army is improving everyday...(it is) only a matter of time before (it) becomes a match for all of Western Europe.' [53]

Secondly, Russia created the Balkan League and began to make moves to limit what Russia considered Austrian aggrandisement in the Balkans. This is not to say that Austria and Germany did not contribute to the increase in tension and distrust in the Balkans. However, it was Russian weakness after the Russo-Japanese War that created a situation, in which Berlin and Vienna had the opportunity to expand its influence in the area. As a whole before the Bosnian crisis Petersburg had two options for a Balkan policy. Russia 'could seek agreement with Vienna to maintain the status quo' or she 'could attempt to build up support in the Peninsula against Russia's old Habsburg rival. The effect of the annexation crisis...was to push Russian policy very strongly in the latter direction' [54] which set the stage for a Romanov-Habsburg conflict. The way in which the annexation crisis played out was not inevitable. It was the consequence of Nicholas' clumsy intervention in foreign affairs. Russia's post-annexation policy fed the German-Austrian paranoia concerning encirclement and subsequently had consequences on Berlin's and Vienna's perceptions of international relations and the next war, if and when it came.

In the period before the Moroccan and Bosnian crises German foreign policy centred on naval development and confrontation with London. Now, Berlin, increasingly worried about the prospect of having to fight a two-front war, began to pay much more attention to the expansion of the German army. In 1912 a new military law passed through the Reichstag in face of growing German fears at Russia's rapid military build-up. This policy shift, resulting from growing fears of isolation and defeat by a coalition of powers in a land war, strengthened Berlin's link with Vienna, her only 'true' ally, and hence to the multi-empire's diplomatic confrontations with Russia in the Balkans.

By the time of the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 relations were such, the history between the entente and central powers was such, that it would have indeed been difficult for Russia to back down in face of German demands as in 1908. Germany, along with the Austrians, do indeed carry blame for starting the war in 1914. Vienna and Berlin gave Russia no incentive to call off her mobilisation; the memories of 1908 were still fresh. Yet, the collapse of Russian power in 1906 created to a great degree the dynamics of the situation in which they operated. Each crisis in the period 1906-14 resulted from the disequilibreated system emerging after the Russo-Japanese War and contributed to the worsening situation. Nicholas II's folly, the Russo-Japanese War, helped spark a chain of events leading up to the First World War whose burden brought down the three-hundred-year old Romanov dynasty.

Structure and Agency: The Labour Question

Nicholas II's handling of the labour problem provides an example of almost all the negative aspects of his modus operandi and personality. In order to maintain Russia's standing as a great power Alexander III and Nicholas II were forced to modernise from above. This state-inspired industrialisation brought into existence a working class, Marx's proletariat, and a large class of industrialists. The dramatic enlargement of the working class presented the tsarist government with labour problems encompassing political and social issues which became fatal to the regime because of its failure to maintain a degree of support amongst the elite and growing professional classes in the urban areas. The regime simultaneously lost support from above and from below. All the responsibility and blame for the exacerbation of the worker problem does not belong to Nicholas II. No utopian answers to the labour question existed. The goal was to ameliorate and manage the problem so that it did not become politically catastrophic. The labour problem existed in all countries undergoing industrialisation during this period; it was a problem rooted in the differences in interests and worldviews between industrialists and workers

Imperial Germany is frequently cited as an example whereby a semi-constitutional system succeeded to a great degree in calming the radicalisation of the working class through an effective mixture of social welfare and independent unions. The comparison between it and Russia is weak however. The German economy and capital were much wealthier than Russia's were. The Imperial

German government could construct a relatively generous welfare system. But the history of trades unions in Germany should be considered in examining Russia. The 'success of unions in ameliorating conditions has been an important factor in inducing workers to accept, or at least tolerate, the prevailing arrangements.'[55] Comparing Russia to Italy is probably more useful. Italy and Russia, both peripheral European powers, had in appearance similar political systems after 1905. Both countries embarked on the path of industrialisation later than Northern Europe and were playing the game of economic catch-up. Italy was too poor to establish a German style social welfare system. Although Italy's semi-constitutional system and trade union rights did not eliminate the radical workers' movement (was that possible in any case?), it never became as revolutionary as Russia's was before the beginning of the First World War. Therefore, whilst Russia might have been too poor to establish a German style social system, such a situation did not mean that the workers' movement in Russia would inevitably become radicalised along the lines seen in 1916-1917. The possibility existed in the post-1905 system for the establishment of more than a basic social welfare system and semi-independent trade unions.

Since the Industrial Revolution came to Russia in the late nineteenth century, her early and most difficult stages of capitalism, when working conditions were particularly wretched, co-existed with not only a developed socialist thought, but also with a radical intelligentsia prepared to play on the state of labour conditions in an attempt to revolutionise the workers and bring them into the political battle with tsardom. Such a situation not only made the case for the urgency of timely reform stronger, but also paradoxically had the affect of hurting the chances of serious reform, such as the establishment of independent or semi-independent trade unions and collective bargaining.

Broadly speaking, tsarist labour history can be divided into two periods. Before the Revolution of 1905 one can say that the battle between the workers and capital had few signs of the struggle for civil rights; the focus was the on improvement of working conditions. At the same time the question of labour unions was sensitive given autocratic ideology according to which horizontal connections between the classes as well as the autonomous organisation of individual social groups themselves were not permitted. Society was to be based on each individual class' or group's relationship, vertically, with the autocracy, whose responsibility it was to regulate relations and mediate between the groups in society. Discussion of allowing workers to form some type of organisation, through which they could express their grievances to either the state or factory owners raised the ire of many conservative figures who viewed such moves as a threat to the regime's principles. This in addition to the specific difficulties of implanting capitalism in Russia made the government's job of limiting class warfare and protecting the workers difficult. In the post-1905 period in principle workers had obtained their civil rights, the right to organise unions, and even strike. The reality however as we shall see was quite different. Additionally, the concentration of Russia's workers in several urban areas, especially in Saint Petersburg and Moscow, greatly increased the

threat posed by worker discontent to the regime. [56] Workers, who never made up more than ten percent of the entire population, constituted a serious threat out of proportion to their numbers.

The emergence of these two classes, working and industrialist, with competing, and even irreconcilable demands on each other placed the autocracy in an unenviable position. Embodied by the tsar it claimed to be the upholder and defender of all the classes' interests. Thus, the autocracy faced loss of legitimacy, especially in the eyes of the workers, if their working conditions and material situation did not improve.

Many scholars have addressed the question of why the working class in general becomes radicalised. N. Pearlman believes that state policy plays the leading role in determining the future of a labour movement. Barrington Moore places emphasis on the violation of the social contract that exists between the working class and higher authorities, private or governmental, as the reason for worker radicalisation.[57] Martin Lipset and Richard Bendix underline the importance of integration.[58] They argue that once workers acquire a stake in the system in which they can obtain a degree of material improvement of their conditions through some sort of labour movement the attractiveness of radicalisation dwindles. These approaches, though emphasising different issues, are not exclusive and in the end are dependent on the approach the elite groups would take to meet the challenge from below. In Russia this meant the autocracy and to a lesser degree Russian industrialists.

From the late 1870s to the beginning of the twentieth century the overall thrust of tsarist labour policy was based on assumed patriarchal relations between the government and factory owners on the one side and the workers on the other. It was recognised that the emergence of a working class in Russia would constitute a great threat to the autocracy given the proliferation of socialist thought within Europe. The autocracy was to place itself between the factory owners and the working class, whereby harmony would be achieved by meeting the 'realistic' needs of the workers.[59] Such an approach mirrored the overall political paternalistic philosophy of tsardom. Yet at the same time the government, fearing any rural or urban unrest, intended to use force whenever necessary to crush strikes and other types of worker upheaval.

In the pre-1905 period Nicholas' modus operandi, namely the hole in the centre of government and views on social monarchy, exercised a deleterious influence on the labour issue. As far as can be determined by the evidence, Nicholas at the time of his accession did not have any views on the worker question. After all, Alexander III's policy of *popechiteltsvo* (tutelage) mixed with suppression of strikes did seem to be successful to a degree. But, the growing size of the urban working class as industrialisation took off in the beginning of Nicholas' reign and the consequent increase of strikes led to an exacerbation of the interministerial struggle between the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del-MVD)* and the Ministry of Finance over the course of labour policy. Whilst this struggle did represent a traditional bureaucratic battle for more power of one

ministry at the expense of the other, it also reflected the genuine differences in their respective policy goals and their understanding of the causes and solutions to the worker problem.

The MVD's prime responsibility was the maintenance of public order throughout the Empire. It viewed public manifestations with a great degree of suspicion. Many aristocrats, who believed that the autocracy had a responsibility to look after the well being of the less fortunate staffed the MVD. There many regarded worker disturbances to be the logical consequence of the labourers' poor working conditions and pay and therefore saw the factory owners as exploiters. For example, MVD reports from 1899, 1900, and 1901 concluded that conditions of factory life held prime responsibility for worker unrest and the political advances of the revolutionaries. Therefore, *popechitelstvo* mixed with repression constituted the base of the MVD's policy on labour. This policy, however, angered both the workers and the emerging class of industrialists. From the workers' point of view, the government made promises to improve their situation, but they were inconsistently kept. Workers then went on strike with economic demands only to be met with government repression. The regime's legitimacy suffered as a result. Yet, the MVD would place ever greater amounts of pressure on factory owners to improve working conditions or pay improved wages at the time of the strike or soon after the government had suppressed the workers.[60] A common grievance was the shortening of the work day. The problem was that in the absence of any type of worker organisations through which the workers could make their voice heard, strikes were the only means for expressing grievances and demands. As labour unrest and the strike movement grew, especially in 1902-1903, society at large and the MVD in particular began to question seriously this approach.

In response the MVD, especially during the tenure of the conservative Plehve, organised several investigations into the causes and possible solutions to the emerging threat posed by urban worker unrest. Broadly speaking the committees proposed three solutions: (1) legalisation of worker delegate representatives or unions which could express the workers' complaints in a legal manner, thus leaving strike activity as a last resort; (2) granting of the right to strike to workers in order to achieve economic goals; and (3) transfer of the Factory Inspectorate, over which the Ministry of Finance and MVD fought, to the latter since the former favoured industry too much. What is surprising is the appearance within the MVD of calls for the legalisation of unions and of strikes. Plehve voiced support for these changes 'Little by little, I think it is possible to broaden the rights of the workers and to satisfy many of their demands.' But he remarked to Iuzhov, who had researched the labour problem for the government and made several recommendations, that, 'It is impossible to do any of the things you have proposed while all the workers are not in my department. Therefore, I shall immediately commence with efforts to transfer the Factory Inspectorate from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance to that of the MVD.'[61] In the same vein the Interior Minister had plans to create a Department of Labour within the MVD whose responsibility would be the labour movement. Given Nicholas' modus

operandi Plehve was correct in believing that managing the labour movement could be successful only if one ministry was responsible.

The Ministry of Finance's primary responsibility was the rapid industrialisation of Russia. In 1882 the MoF was given control of the Factory Inspectorate which was to serve as the backbone for the management of labour relations. The inspectors were charged with gathering statistical information for the Ministry, ensuring compliance with labour legislation, and acting as a middle man between management and labour in a bid to reduce worker tension and strikes. The Factory Inspectorate, however, spent the vast majority of its time trying to prevent strikes. Until 1903 Sergei Witte dominated the MoF. His initial approach was based on two assumptions: (1) a working class per se did not exist since most of the workers were newly arrived peasants who maintained ties with their village and worked in the cities for only part of the year. This implied that communal land-tenure was their welfare system; and (2) paternalistic relations, such as those which were assumed to exist between landowner and peasant, had carried over into the factory and therefore rendered government *popechiteltsvo* superfluous. Witte also regarded the cheap labour provided by the peasants as an important element of Russian industrialisation and in attracting foreign capital.

After the large Petersburg strikes of 1895-1896 Witte came to the conclusion that greater government interference in the labour question was needed in the form of legislation, but not to the extent deemed necessary by the MVD. In a letter to striking workers in 1896 the Minister of Finance declared that, 'the law defends the workers and indicates the path by which they can discover the truth if they feel themselves to be injured...The government will occupy itself with the improvement of their situation and the lightening of their work insofar as this is beneficial for the workers themselves.'[62] Witte feared MVD interference and its form of *popechitelstvo*, which he believed hurt the interests of the industrialists and therefore the state. In addition, being a bureaucrat with a strong personality he was loath to cede any authority to a rival ministry. If there was to be any labour legislation, his MoF would propose and implement it. He began to work toward this end. Some legislation was passed.[63]

At the same time Witte began to increase the number of factory inspectors and re-organised the inspectorate in order to improve its efficiency and expand its functions. The prevention of strikes through early detection of workers' grievances received top priority. Witte, like Alexander II, possessed the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. By the late 1890s he began to tell Nicholas II that strikes were an inevitable part of industrialisation, concluding that the regime should not take such an oppressive line towards strikes, whose causes he believed were more economic than political. Such an opinion naturally aroused suspicion in the MVD in the 1890s, though by the turn of the century they too were coming to the conclusion that sporadic tutelage and repression were not the best ways forward. However, the acrimony already existing between the two ministries reduced the ability of both to launch any serious policy initiative. Witte's first goal was to neutralise the MVD as a threat to his position before addressing the labour

problem. He succeeded in getting Interior Minister Goremykin removed and replacing him with an ally, Dimitrii Sipyagin, who was subsequently assassinated. In his place Nicholas appointed Plehve, a known opponent of Witte, as part of a broader policy to weaken Witte's influence and strengthen the regime's defences against growing domestic opposition.

In 1901 Svyatopolk-Mirskii, assistant Minister of the Interior, personally investigated worker disturbances that had rocked the capital in the summer of that year. In his report to Nicholas II he stressed that the main cause of the disturbances was poor labour conditions. He believed that the workers should be provided with insurance and the right to elect representatives who could then bring to the state's and management's attention their grievances.[64] Soon afterwards Sipyagin visited major industrial areas in order to review the workers' conditions and the effectiveness of governmental organs in the factories. In his report to the tsar he too came to the conclusion that through a policy of *popechitelstvo* the government could avoid the lion's share of labour difficulties. He tried to drive home the point that 'passive neutrality', i.e. government inaction in terms of progressive labour policy, as a policy was dangerous for the worker's well being and political stability. The government could not in any way leave the fate of the workers to the industrialists and to free market liberalism. His suggestions mirrored those of Svyatopolk-Mirskii. Sipyagin stressed that the government could make a majority of the workers supporters of the regime if it tackled many of their reasonable complaints.[65] Nicholas II wrote on this report that it would be 'very desirable that measures now be taken for the proper settlement of the questions outlined here.'[66] He established a conference in March 1902 to consider Svyatopolk-Mirskii's and Sipyagin's recommendations. Witte opposed them. Nothing substantial emerged from the conference. Despite his approving words on Sipyagin's report, the tsar failed to attend the meeting. Left to themselves the bureaucrats and ministers could not come together. Nicholas holds the blame for this gridlocked situation as he failed to approve any policy or impose co-ordination on his ministers. Granted Witte had a strong personality, which made it difficult to impose policies on him. But by this time Nicholas was already distancing himself from him, as seen in the appointment of Plehve as minister of the interior.

In response to the growing acrimony between the two ministers and a request from Witte, Nicholas in 1898 established the first of many committees that would examine two key questions causing this ministerial conflict. That a minister had to convince the tsar to convene such a committee makes a telling comment on Nicholas' modus operandi. Nicholas II did not decide to address this conflict which was hurting his government's effectiveness, or the labour problem as a whole. In comparison the Employment Protection Conference of 1890, which set the guidelines for the social welfare policy pursued by Baron von Balepsch 'sprang from the personal initiative of H.M. the Kaiser.'[67] Nicholas II did not have the interest let alone initiative to deal with this problem. Under the chairmanship of Pobedonostsev, the committee was to determine the demarcation of

responsibilities between the organs of the Ministry of Finance and Interior on the ground and the limit of governmental interference in the economic relations between the factory owners and the workers. The setting of wages by the government was one of the key questions to be addressed.[68]In other words the future scope of *popechitelstvo.* Although Nicholas knew of the problems both in regard to the divisions within his ministry and to questions concerning the limit and extend of *popechitelstvo,* he neither attended the meetings nor gave any indication of how he wanted to have these issues resolved.

Without a lead from the centre, the tsar, the committee divided into camps, and proved unable to take decisive action. As long as the hole in the centre remained the committee could not attempt with effective policymaking to manage the labour problem. Nicholas continued to ignore the increase in strike activity and the ministerial battle between the MoF and MVD. The MoF complained that the MVD's factory police tended to use excessive force on the workers in the suppression of strikes in the first instance in order to ensure tranquillity. Only afterwards they investigated the causes and then put pressure on factory owners for changes in the working conditions, even if this went against the law.[69] The Ministry of Finance blocked the MVD's attempts to ameliorate the causes of the discontent, the workers' conditions. The workers themselves, the inspectors stressed, began to lose faith in the government as a whole and the inspectorate in particular since any time they began a strike with economic demands, they were met with force. The use of such force not only destroyed any chance the factory inspector had of obtaining the workers' trust, but also gave the impression that the government was siding with management. The inspectors consequently asked Witte for permission to allow the election of factory elders (*starosti*) from amongst the workers so that worker grievances and demands could be voiced before the outbreak of industrial action and the subsequent appearance of MVD police.

Despite their broad agreement that secured the passage of the watered down *starosti* law, Witte and Plehve continued to intrigue in the hope of eliminating their rival. Both men several times informed Nicholas of the battle between the two ministries and of the damage this was doing to the government's efforts to deal with the labour problem. The conflict came to a head once again in 1903 when Nicholas convened yet another commission to deal with this interministerial struggle By the time of this commission Plehve was pressuring Nicholas to hand over control of the Factory Inspectorate to the MVD. Witte, on the other hand, wanted to stop MVD interference in the labour policy. The leaderless committee, reflecting the divisions within itself, failed to impose a clear-cut decision. The emperor continued to remain detached from such disputes. However, Plehve's poisoning of the tsar's mind eventually succeeded and Witte was removed. To be sure, Nicholas was never favourably inclined towards his finance minister, who did not help his own cause by opposing the emperor's policy in the Far East.

This is not a problem exclusive to monarchies. For example, US president Jimmy Carter failed to show decisive leadership during most of his administration. This indecisiveness is clearly seen during the Iranian Revolution. By August 1978

Carter had two policy options in regard to the growing rebellion in Iran. The National Security Council suggested that the USA openly and strongly support the shah even to the point of condoning military force to restore order. The State Department wanted the administration to 'work toward some kind of coalition government, which would have to include Khomeini's supporters.'[70] Carter allowed the NSC and the State Department to fight openly over US Iran policy, whilst he himself failed to take a stand. Zbignew Brzezinski, the head of the NSC, believing that the State Department was motivated by a personal animosity towards the shah, slowly closed it out of the decision-making process. The State Department then became a centre of leaks to the press, which damaged the royal government in Iran. Carter did very little to reconcile the two. By vacillating he lost the opportunity either to help the shah or portray the USA as friendly to the new revolutionary forces and government. Carter failed to take a stand. The result was a complete disaster for US policy in Iran.

The launching of the Zubatov experiment in government/police controlled unions makes a telling commentary on Nicholas' view on the labour problem, his political acumen, and his modus operandi. The idea for such unions came from an ex-revolutionary and subsequent head of Moscow's secret police, Sergei Zubatov. He came to the conclusion, as did the Ministry of Finance and MVD, that the government's present uncoordinated approach to the labour problem would only exacerbate the situation. The Zubatov unions would serve the twin goals of creating an outlet for the workers' desire to express their grievances and demands through some type of worker organisation, and generating support for the tsar, who would be portrayed as the defender of the workers' interests. Permitting the establishment of such unions would give the government the possibility to control the labour movement and give it the means to detect at an early stage the causes of worker unrest. The government would be theoretically in a position to prevent strikes through satisfaction of such demands before strike activity began. As Zubatov himself put it in a letter to the head of the Moscow police, D.P.Trepov:

> If the petty needs and demands of the workers are being exploited by the revolutionaries for such basically antigovernment ends, should not the government act as quickly as possible to remove this useful tool from the hands of the revolutionaries and appropriate it for its own purposes?... repression alone is not effective; one must remove the very ground from under their feet.

Some officials in the MVD supported Zubatov's initial activities. However, Zubatov's organisation of peaceful workers' demonstrations in favour of the autocracy led Sipyagin, who feared any public gathering to oppose the scheme.

The project horrified Witte which had been initiated without his knowledge. The *zubatovshchina* represented an implicit recognition by the government of the existence of a proletariat and more importantly of the justness of its dissatisfaction

with present conditions. With what was in fact governmental legitimation of their demands and the knowledge that the tsar was on their side, the workers could become more aggressive. More worrisome in the eyes of Witte and others, the government had now placed itself openly and directly in the middle of the relations between workers and management and therefore became fully responsible for the condition of the workers. As a result any unresolved worker issue would not be blamed on the factory owner or factory inspectorate in the first instance, but on the government for failing to fulfil its own promises with a consequent loss of legitimacy for the monarchy. But given tsarist ideology and mass expectations, the 'liberal' strategy of letting the industrialists and workers resolve their disputes for themselves was always going to be difficult to 'sell.' The movement, radicalised by its own rhetoric, ran out of control of its governmental initiators and was terminated.

Though there are no notes or letters in the tsar's handwriting expressing open backing for Zubatov's radical project, we can assume that Nicholas II did support it. He was the only figure in the government who had the power to overrule two of the most powerful ministers in the Empire, and to continue such a project. Only protection at the highest levels could have ensured its existence. Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, the governor general of Moscow and the tsar's uncle, who actively supported the scheme, convinced Nicholas of the virtues of Zubatov's plans. One of the strongest advocates of *zubatovschina*, D.P.Trepov, head of the Moscow police, became governor-general of St.Petersburg and one of Nicholas' closest advisors during the 1905 Revolution. If Nicholas had been hostile to this policy, he not only would have stopped the plan, but also would not have appointed one of its most vocal supporters to such sensitive posts.

Nicholas supported the project because his and Zubatov's conception of the autocracy's role in Russian society coincided completely. The Zubatov organisations would cement the union of tsar and people in the new world of industrial relations by placing stress on paternalism and social monarchy. In Nicholas' mind the Zubatov unions would be the urban equivalent of the commune. Moreover, securing the regime's support among the masses would make less necessary dangerous liberal concessions to the elites. The idea is not that far-fetched. Mohammad Reza Shah followed a similar course in his labour policy. As a result workers played a relatively small and belated role in the Iranian Revolution.[71]

Instead of working through the traditional bureaucratic structures, the ministries, to address the growing worker unrest, Nicholas supported the Zubatov programme. Unfortunately, he did not unite the government behind this policy which led to three contradictory governmental policies on the labour problem. Nicholas continued to allow the MVD and the Ministry of Finance to pursue a self-defeating battle for control of labour policy whose effect was only to radicalise the workers' movement. Nicholas failed to create conditions for the emergence of a single labour policy or to centralise decision-making and policy implementation in one ministry or in himself. When we recall Nicholass Far Eastern policy in the

years before the outbreak of war with Japan, we see a pattern. In the first place instead of working through the bureaucracy to implement his policy, in both cases he worked outside of it, whilst at the same time allowing the ministers to go their own way. Secondly, we must find fault with Nicholas' political acumen, which supported policies that helped bring greater chaos to the government and country and ended in disaster. The issue is not whether Nicholas was acting unusually by operating outside the traditional bureaucratic structures, but rather that such actions worsened the situation, rather than helping it. Nicholas' instincts were social monarchy, but even here the initiative came from elsewhere. Once the social monarchy and Zubatov unions failed Nicholas had no answer and simply left the initiative to others. Yet, given the reality of politics, the governmental milieu, Nicholas' modus operandi, and the bureaucracy this was a recipe for disaster.

The workers' revolt began in earnest after the infamous Bloody Sunday, which took place on 9 January 1905. The march on the Winter Palace was led by Father Gapon, who worked for the secret police in a continued version of the failed Zubatov experiment. Whilst holding Nicholas accountable for allowing the existence of Gapon unions might be unfair given the relatively small size of the unions and the weight of other issues, the tsar nevertheless must carry responsibility for the disorganisation in the government's labour policy. That the workers, with Gapon in the lead, intended to march on the Winter palace, with portraits of the emperor, in order to present a petition to him reflects the durability of the workers' belief that the tsar-*batushka* looked after them and their interests. In this petition they informed Nicholas of their wretched situation in the belief that the corrupt bureaucracy had either misinformed him of their problems or simply had not drawn his attention to them. The demonstrators included demands for such things as a constituent assembly,[72] civil liberties and the eight-hour workday (a very common theme), among others. The unarmed demonstrators were met by the army, untrained in civil disturbances, which fired into the crowds, killing hundreds.

The subsequent societal, and especially worker response, to the killings further destabilised the political situation. Sympathy strikes broke out in Moscow, Odessa, Warsaw, Riga, Vilnius, Saratov, and Kiev about which MVD informed Nicholas on a daily basis. The worker question appeared on the top of the political agenda alongside discussions about governmental changes and land reform. In order to make sense of Nicholas' approach to the labour problem it is necessary to understand his interpretation of Bloody Sunday and of worker disturbances in general during this vital period.

The tsar primarily blamed the Interior Minister, Prince Svyatopolk-Mirskii for the ineffective use of force against 'outside agitators' who had succeeded in whipping up anti-tsarist rhetoric amongst the traditionally loyal masses. In his famous message to a group of workers who visited Tsarskoe Selo after Bloody Sunday in an attempt at reconciliation between the 'workers' and the tsar, Nicholas announced: 'I believe in the honourable feelings of the working people and in their

unshakeable devotion to Me and therefore I forgive their guilt.' In his remarks Nicholas showed his mindset and lack of any conception or awareness of the workers issue. He went on to assure the workers in the same address that he 'know(s) that a workers' life is not easy' that 'much must be improved and straightened out'...and that 'because of (his) care for the working people' he would ensure that everything is done to improve their existence and to guarantee in advance legal paths for the expression of their most pressing needs.' Nicholas not unexpectedly preferred to believe that revolutionaries determined to overthrow the regime had coaxed the workers into betraying their loyalty to the throne. Therefore, these subversive elements 'always have compelled and always will compel the authorities to resort to armed force, and this inevitably produces innocent victims as well.' [73] Nicholas rationalised the use of force against workers' throughout his reign without trying to understand the causes of the upheavals. Even if he did understand them, he did not act to address some of them. He did sometimes support positive action but not often enough, not decisively, and often wrong-headedly. The use of force perhaps can be used to crush radical elements and immediate threats to the throne, but action needed to be taken to ameliorate the causes of the discontent.

Nicholas took no action on this issue but the highest echelons of the bureaucracy, Kokovtsev at the MoF, the MVD, and now D.P.Trepov, reacting to the hole in the centre of the government, began independently of each other to formulate a governmental labour policy. Soon after Bloody Sunday, D.P.Trepov, now governor-general of the capital, proposed to Nicholas a plan according to which the emperor would set up a special commission, headed by an independent figure, whose members would be representatives from the bureaucracy, workers, and the industrialists. Their goal would be to investigate the causes of worker unrest and propose solutions aimed at ameliorating the situation. Minister of Finance Kokovtsev objected to this move. In a series of reports to Nicholas he laid out his opinions on the causes of the present situation.

Kokovtsev blamed the unchecked bureaucratic infighting over labour policy for the government's consistent inability to address effectively the labour problem. Half-measures and contradictory policies followed simultaneously had done much to tarnish the government's legitimacy and wear down the patience of the workers.[74]The MVD's haphazard and, more often than not, destructive interference in local factory affairs caused the workers to lose whatever trust they did have in the Factory Inspectorate. Kokovtsev warned the tsar that 'the interference of the police in strikes is always accompanied by arrests and internal exile', which creates the impression that 'the government is taking the uncharacteristic responsibility of protection and defence of one of the fighting sides, that is the factory owners.' Consequently the workers are forming the opinion that the government is 'the enemy.' 'All the built-up frustrations (on the part of the workers), and sometimes the bitterness is transferred from the factory owners onto the government.' [75] This situation stymied the efforts of the MoF to implement long-standing plans for medical insurance, some type of workers

organisations, strike regulations, and a shorter workday.[76] Kokovtsev, echoing Witte, also tried to convince the tsar that 'strikes are a completely natural phenomenon, connected with contemporary economic conditions of industrial life' and therefore they cannot be 'eliminated with force'. He drove the point home that the causes of strikes were, 'often local in nature.' Strikes 'up to this point have not had any connection with social and political currents, and therefore do not give cause for fear concerning social order and peace.'[77] Kokovtsev underlined that factory owners violated job agreements at least three times more often than the workers. Once again the causes of the workers' discontent were laid before Nicholas, as was the Ministry's labour policy. In regard to Trepov's proposal for another commission, Kokovtsev argued that it was precisely this type of ad hoc commission which had stalled progress on the issue. He did not discount the usefulness of such commissions out of hand, but quite rightly recommended that the bureaucratic infighting must end with a clear demarcation of responsibilities and clear direction from the top (Nicholas) before anything could be done. Kokovtsev was implicitly alluding to the hole in the centre of government. Naturally, Kokovtsev claimed that the responsibility for labour policy resided with his ministry since the Factory Inspectorate, which was charged with the labour question according to the law, was under the aegis of the MoF.[78]

During an audience Nicholas agreed with Kokovtsev, only to change his mind the next day after a discussion with Trepov. In the end the emperor gave permission for the convening of both Kokovtsev and Trepov's[79] commissions. During and in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution of 1905 Nicholas set-up a total of four commissions to investigate the labour problem. This proliferation was the result of bureaucratic infighting over the course of labour policy; it did not reflect Nicholas' desire to obtain varied information. The decision itself need not have been a bad one. It gave Nicholas the opportunity to hear varied opinions on ameliorating the labour problem. Alternatively given the obvious need for quick action Nicholas should have convened and chaired a commission drawn from both ministries responsible in one way or another for the labour question and then imposed a policy and demarcation of responsibilities. Indeed that is what Kokovtsev wanted. In any case Nicholas paid no attention to the conclusions of the commissions and failed to impose any labour policy or to give one figure with imperial backing the responsibility for it. This was another example of a hole in the centre of government.

Within the bureaucracy as a whole there was a keen understanding of the dynamics of the worker problem. The Ministry of Trade and Industry, now in charge to a degree of the labour question, did succeed in pushing through some labour legislation.[80] The Ministry originally envisioned bills for insurance during illness, insurance against accidents, invalidism, and old age, revision of rules for the employment of industrial workers, reduction in working hours, an insurance savings fund, creation of business courts, improved industrial inspection, and establishment of workers' housing. Further legislation concerning unions and the right to strike were drawn up, although the new Fundamental Law in principle

made provisions for them. In the end the Ministry in 1908 presented four bills concerning workers insurance against accidents and illness to the Duma for discussion in its Labour Commission and eventual ratification. The other ambitious and needed provisions lapsed due to pressure from industrialists, bureaucratic infighting and a noticeable lack of support or interest from the driving forces in the government, namely Nicholas II and consequently Stolypin. The legislation took four years to work itself through the bureaucracy, Duma, and the State Council, overcoming both bureaucratic inertia and infighting and industrialist opposition.

The eventual passage of these four bills showed that whilst the industrialists could prevent some bills from being presented to the Duma and delay the passage of those which were presented, they themselves were divided on the most appropriate course to address the labour problem. Therefore, to consider them a monolithic and powerful interest capable of dictating to the government is problematic. They were able to influence events when the government and the tsar failed to show the necessary decisiveness and unity in addressing the worker problem. If the government showed backbone, the industrialists were unable to prevent the emergence of worker legislation. For example, many industrialists were against the provision which required them to provide medical facilities and care for their workers; it was decried as bureaucratic and a needlessly heavy financial burden for them; some even called it a new tax. There was acrimonious debate on this issue, but the government, united on this one issue, won out.

The belated passage of limited worker legislation hurt the government's legitimacy amongst the workers. More importantly, Nicholas' undermining of the post-1905 system meant that trade unions were never given the opportunity to grow roots, therefore destroying any affect they might have had on limiting the radicalisation of the working class. By effectively blocking the establishment of trade unions Nicholas solidified the view that strikes were a political matter, contrary to the advice given by many, including Witte, Trepov, and Kokovtsev. The government's response to the growing strike problem was clumsy force which exacerbated the situation. The 1912 massacre at the Lena Gold mine and more importantly the government's less than conciliatory reaction to it were further examples of Nicholas and his government's failure to address coherently the labour problem. Consequently, those not insignificant elements within the workers' movement who initially supported working within the system as it emerged in 1906 despite its limitations, found themselves increasingly isolated within their own camps. The radical elements within the labour movement were able to garner more support as an increasing amount of workers, who initially viewed revolutionaries/radicals with great suspicion, came to the conclusion that the removal of the political structure constituted the only viable way to achieve a genuine and permanent improvement of their lot. Nicholas succeeded in driving these two groups together.

Italy provides an interesting comparison at this point. Unlike Nicholas II, King Vittorio Emanuele III had sympathy for strikers. He believed that they were

protesting against those who did not do their duty towards the their workers. 'He could not regret a movement that had for its goals to shorten the work hours and ameliorate the conditions of labour.'[81] Whilst Nicholas II before and after the Revolution of 1905 sanctioned the use of force against workers, Vittorio Emanuele rarely did. He simply believed that the use of force generally made the situation worse and he himself preferred to reduce penalties placed on striking workers and to use the royal prerogative to pardon strikers.

In 1901 and 1902 massive strikes occurred in Italy. The king and his head of government, Giovanni Giolitti, did not use force against the strikes but insured that property was not damaged. Vittorio Emanuele, who felt no warmth for Giolitti, backed him in his attempts to pass labour bills which were presented and passed within a three-year period. The Parliament passed laws on accidents at work, on female and child labour, on work contracts, night work, industrial tribunals, amongst others. The king supported Giolitti's belief that given the growing class differences the government needed to take a more impartial position, pay greater attention to elementary education and convince the working classes that the government was not necessarily their enemy. More importantly the government favoured the development of mutual co-ops, local unions in order to divide the worker's movement by creating a labour 'aristocracy' in these organisations. With a stake in the system these 'aristocratic' workers could help the government to limit the radical movement which could pose a threat to political and economic stability. This approach had achieved a number of successes by 1908-09.[82] All of this in a country which started industrialisation in the 1880s like Russia and was poorer than Russia.

Despite the dramatic upsurge in strike activity in the three years before the beginning of the Great War, Nicholas continued to show no interest in the problem which meant the government did not act on it. The government continued to alternate between force and small concessions which satisfied neither the worker nor factory owner. As a result workers became more militant and, as *Okhranka* reports stated, economic demands were giving way to an ever increasing amount of political demands as both revolutionaries/radical workers and plain workers began to sense that achievement of their economic demands was tied to a change in the political structure.

In addition to the festering grievances from the pre-war years, worker agitation during the war years revolved on three issues: (1) the deterioration of wages in the face of inflation; (2) the long working hours; and (3) the increasingly worrisome food supply. Every country experienced some type of serious worker unrest during the war. Nicholas II's low legitimacy and the absence of any labour organisations, which could have acted not only as a shock absorber and channel for worker dissatisfaction, but also as a link between the government and the workers, meant that strikes and demonstrations were the only conduits for workers to express their past and present grievances. Unlike Imperial Germany, let alone Austria, Russia failed to make any concessions to workers during the war,

which added to the dissatisfaction and left the government with only one answer—repression. This approach led to February 1917.

Structure and Agency: Nicholas II as a Constitutional Monarch

The lessons of the 1905 Revolution were clear. Firstly, the regime was isolated in society, even from its elites. Nicholas II himself lost much legitimacy and proven himself in the eyes of many to be unable to govern either in an autocratic way in the manner of Alexander III or take the country forward politically. Moreover the government had to contend with competing interests whilst attempting to retain support in the country. That massive land reform and satisfaction of workers' demands, a process which would alienate many amongst the landed aristocracy and industrial elites, would in fact strengthen lower class support for the regime, was unknown. At the same time the government had to contend with the belief both in the bureaucracy and in society that a new wave of revolutionary activity could be expected if such reforms were not taken. The regime needed to expand somewhat its social base. The issue was to what extent was it possible to integrate peasants and workers into the system without threatening the position of key vested interests which had become stronger after 1905-1906.

Secondly, peasant loyalty could not be guaranteed unless massive land reform was implemented. Peasant revolts during the Revolution of 1905 and the radical character of the peasant deputies to the I and II Dumas, who demanded the expropriation of landowners' land testified to the regime's troubles in the vast rural areas. Thirdly, many were convinced that the lack of ministerial co-ordination (the hole in the centre of the government) was one of the major contributing factors for the outbreak of the revolution. With the establishment of the constitutional monarchy emerged the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, a first/prime minister. The Council of Ministers was to function like a cabinet, discussing policy and taking decisions to which all ministers were to adhere.

Nicholas however failed to learn these lessons, despite the events themselves and the judicious advice given to him by certain figures in the government. He continued to believe in the peasants' love for him, despite the peasant revolts for land and his refusal to implement massive land transfer from the landowners to the peasants. The last Shah of Iran at least understood that he needed to implement some form of land reform in order to establish and/or strengthen links between the crown and the peasantry. By maintaining his belief in peasant love for the figure of the tsar, Nicholas believed he could ignore most of the demands of educated society and the workers. The last tsar never accepted the constitutional system, civil rights, and importantly the need to win support of educated public, creating the conditions for the loss of support from below and from above.

Nicholas regarded the establishment of the constitutional system as a serious mistake which had been forced on him by Witte and others in a moment of panic. He had broken his inviolable principle to maintain the autocracy. The basic point

is that Nicholas did not believe that a semi-parliamentary system could govern the Empire. His refusal and inability to take into account some of the causes of the Revolution of 1905 meant that he continued to believe that a large handful of people had unjustly inflamed the masses.

> The Act of 17 October I granted quite consciously and I have firmly resolved to carry it through to fulfilment. But I am not convinced that it is necessary for me to renounce my autocratic rights and to change the definition of the Supreme Power which has stood for 109 years. It is my conviction that for many reasons it is extremely dangerous to change that article and to accept its reformulation...I know that if Art I remains unchanged that will cause discontent and entreaties. But must one consider from what quarter the reproaches will come. They will of course come from the so-called educated element, the proletariat, and the third element. But I am convinced that eighty percent of the Russian people will be with me, will give me support, and will be grateful to me for such a decision.[83]

Feeling no adherence to the post-1905 system Nicholas used the strong powers at his disposal to undermine it. He began to act on his rightist tendencies as the memories of the 1905-1906 days faded and, as it seemed to him, lasting stability had at long last returned to Russia. He maintained close contacts with rightist, early proto-fascist monarchic groups, which made him feel that the vast number of people supported the autocracy and disliked the new system. More importantly Nicholas worked to undermine ministers, specifically Stolypin, Kokovtsev, and Krivoshein, who tried to co-ordinate the Council of Ministers and rebuild the government's links with society, and the entire post-1905 system. Stolypin's position in the aftermath of the revolution of 1905 was difficult, but not impossible. The party breakdown in the III Duma was as follows: The Octobrist party—164 seats; parties of the right—127; Kadets—54; leftists—33; and Social Democrats—17. The Octobrist Party contained a large left and right wing, which made the group a bit unwieldy at times, especially as relations with the government worsened. Although the Octobrists did not have an absolute majority, they were Stolypin's base of support in the Duma. With the help of rightish Kadets and some of the parties of the right the government could form a majority which would permit Stolypin to push forward his program. The Octobrists' political views were more liberal than Stolypin's, given their hope to expand the Duma's powers. But they and the government held similar opinions on social and economic programs. It is for this reason that Alexander I. Guchkov, the Octobrist leader, decided that his party's actions would be based on co-operation with the government, rather than on opposition. This was done in the hope that some form of permanent co-operation with the government would evolve.

Stolypin could expect support at times from some members from the right, but as a whole the more radical right represented an opposition block. They disliked the new system, seeing in it not only an infringement on the autocracy, but also

the eventual end of their political and economic dominance in the country. The leftist parties too would provide no support for the government, nor did Stolypin want it. His goal was to create a bloc of moderates from both the left and right, who, he believed, represented the opinions of the majority of literate society. The problem was that workers and peasants never remotely voted Octobrist and the Kadets had far wider support than the Octobrists in educated society as a whole. In short even within the framework of the semi-constitutional system the regime's links with society as a whole were weak.

Stolypin realised that the monarchy would have to enlarge its social base if it were to survive. He hoped to accomplish this through social, economic, and limited political reforms, which at the same time would strengthen Russia. The arenas for this co-operation would be first the Duma and then local government, the zemstvos. Whilst on the one hand he did not believe that Russia was ready for a full constitutional monarchy, given the low level of education amongst the people at large, especially the peasants, he nevertheless recognised the need to include more people in government.[84] He accepted the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers on two conditions. He asked that reactionary ministers be removed from the council and that he receive the right to appoint ministers who shared his views. Secondly, he stressed the eventual formation of a coalition government which would include members of the opposition. He understood the need for united government and for inclusion of a broader range of political views within the ministry itself. He also knew that the greatest threat to his united ministry would come from political reactionaries and the tsar.

Nicholas was always wary of ministers with strong personalities and of attempts to unify the ministry and fill the hole in the centre of government. Moreover he was suspicious of Stolypin's growing stature. These feelings made him more susceptible to the whispers of conservatives, who continually told him that Stolypin was a threat to the autocratic power. The right at court, in the State Council, and in the Duma used both their positions within the new system and links to the tsar to attack Stolypin, whose reforms and more importantly evolving relationship with the Duma seemed to threaten the economic and more importantly political power of the land-owning classes. One structural problem was that the regime, weakened by war and revolution and disillusioned because of the failure of its pro-peasant electoral strategy of 1905-06, fell back on an alliance with the gentry, who ironically now had more political power than at any previous time. But the landowning class was bound to be a key victim of modernisation and had a big vested interest in blocking many reforms. But in the post-1905 period Nicholas and the large landowners came closer together in the face of what they considered to be a mutual threat from liberals and the lower classes.

Nicholas utilised the State Council as a brake on both the Duma and on Stolypin. Enjoying the right to appoint half of the members of the upper house, he gave an increasing number of seats to conservatives and decreased the number of seats held by liberals and moderates. 'The State Council's move to the right occurred first and foremost in its appointed half. The number of rightists grew

and already by 1909 they represented significantly more than half of the appointed members of the State Council.'[85] This was the direct result of Nicholas' policy of undermining the new system and Stolypin. He understood well the power of appointment to the State Council. In 1916 he formed a liberal State Council, when pressure was building up on him. In January 1917 he strengthened greatly the rightist faction given what he considered the dangerous growth in strength of the Progressive Bloc. Nicholas was shrewd; he knew how to defend his power. The continual decline in moderates and liberals in the State Council forced Stolypin to move right as well in order to maintain some degree of support for the government.

The first political crisis that reflected the depth of the conservative intrigues against Stolypin and the tsar's increasing fear of his stature was the Naval Staffs Crisis. In July 1908 the Duma passed a Stolypin bill, which sought the organisation of a naval general staff along with the appropriate funding for it. The bill then went to the State Council where the conservative bloc rejected it. The conservatives claimed that the bill violated Article 96 of the Fundamental Laws, which stipulated that the organisation and running of the armed forces were the prerogative of the tsar alone. The Duma therefore should have concerned itself only with the appropriation of the bill and not with the organisation. The bill was sent to the Duma, which subsequently passed it once again and returned it to the State Council. This time the State Council passed the bill due to Stolypin's immense pressure and reliance on ministerial votes in his favour.

The conservatives were not prepared to give another victory to Stolypin, against whom the intrigues now intensified. Not only did the conservatives maintain the position that the new law infringed on the tsar's authority, they now attacked Stolypin directly for allowing such a bill to have been presented. Stolypin's absence due to illness further weakened his position. The conservatives presented their case to Nicholas who already felt overshadowed by his chairman and was suspicious of any sign of possible infringement on his authority. He refused to sign the bill. Stolypin considered this campaign of intrigue as a 'low and base' move by the extreme right to destabilise his position with the tsar and the Duma. British observers supported this view.[86] Nicholas had dealt a blow to his own chairman. Despite Nicholas' declaration that he still had confidence in Stolypin the Right understood well the dynamics of Nicholas' support for his first minister. The conservatives understood that intrigues and rumours of a threat to the autocratic authority could weaken Stolypin in Nicholas' eyes.

The increasing conservatism in the State Council, due to Nicholas' appointments forced Stolypin increasingly to put aside or emasculate his legislative projects in order to satisfy the conservative State Council, which became a graveyard for a huge number of reforms—everything from additions to the agrarian reform to education. Stolypin's gradual and forced turn to the right and the State Council's inattention to bills already passed by the Duma put his working relationship with the Octobrists under increasing strain.[87] Stolypin himself became

increasingly frustrated with the attacks on him from the right and the tsar's seeming complicity in it.

The Western Zemstvo Crisis of 1911 was the culmination of conservative intrigues which caused the failure of the 3 June system. As part of his reform package Stolypin proposed the establishment of zemstvos in the western borderlands of the Empire, where Polish landowners were dominant. Stolypin attached a new franchise to the bill in the hope of giving the Russians the possibility to dominate the zemstvos. The new Russian-dominated zemstvos in turn would then send representatives to the State Council, who would replace the conservative Polish landowners already there. These new representatives more likely than not would be supporters of Stolypin; they would not be natural allies of the conservative land-owning class already dominating the State Council. After much haggling the Duma passed the bill, although it did not represent fully Stolypin's original programme. He and the opposition were prepared to make compromises, of which Nicholas was cognisant. The conservatives in the State Council saw in the Western Zemstvos Bill an opportunity to weaken, perhaps fatally, the chairman's political clout. They more than anything feared the application of such a franchise on the entire zemstvo system for it would effectively end their political dominance.[88]

In the beginning Nicholas II supported the bill and told the right to vote for it. If the tsar let it be known that he supported a measure and wanted to see it passed, the conservatives, especially the appointed ones, would ignore their 'conscience' and vote as wished by the emperor. Despite Nicholas' words of support P.N. Durnovo and V.F. Trepov, both of whom led the attack on the Naval Staffs Bill, worked ceaselessly against the bill in the hope of politically paralysing Stolypin or obtaining his removal.[89] Together they persuaded Nicholas to announce that he would allow the members of the State Council to vote according to their conscience. Stolypin went red with anger when the unexpected defeat came. This ignominious defeat at the hands of the conservatives with the blessing of the tsar pushed Stolypin to the brink. Whilst he was enraged by the defeat, he was more worried by the endless intrigues and the complicity of Nicholas.

Stolypin decided for drastic action. He wrote to Nicholas complaining of 'the insuperable obstacles in my path...the walls of which I cannot surmount. I mean the artificial obstructionism created for me in the State Council. The tireless activity of P. Durnovo in the direction continues.'[90] The day after the vote Stolypin had an audience with Nicholas. He complained of the intrigues against him. Nicholas responded, 'Against whom? You or me?' This statement speaks pages about Nicholas' view of his own government. He did not consider the government and its policies as an extension of himself. Therefore, he was very ambiguous about their fate. In fact he saw both as threats to his power. Stolypin tried to explain to Nicholas the impossibility of separating the two and the consequences for the government's effectiveness and for Russia of such a view, but to no avail. Nicholas failed to see this division.

Stolypin threatened resignation unless Nicholas exiled the two conservative intriguers, disbanded the Duma and made the bill law. Stolypin also wanted Nicholas to condemn the conservatives' intrigues and to make a statement which 'would prevent others from taking the same road' as these two men.[91] Stolypin wanted nothing more than the open and strong support of the tsar. Nicholas gave in.[92] However the result of this incident was greatly worsened relations with the Duma, the State Council and with the tsar himself. In Kiev in front of Nicholas and his family Stolypin was assassinated in September 1911, by which time he was already politically dead.

In the post-Stolypin period the separation between Nicholas and the elites picked up momentum given the tsar's continued undermining of the post-1905 system. V.N Kokovtsev became Chairman of the Council of Ministers after Stolypin. He was an example of an efficient, reliable bureaucrat though he was less charismatic and impressive in person than Witte and Stolypin. For the remaining years of his reign Nicholas avoided the appointment of any commanding figure to the position of first minister. In addition, Nicholas created fatal dissension and inter-ministerial battles by appointing ministers who were clearly antagonistic to the idea of united government, reform, and Kokovtsev himself; Nicholas worked to undermine Kokovtsev. Nicholas did not take into account the first minister's opinions or government policy when he made appointments. As Nicholas appointed more conservatives to the ministry the intrigues and cabals against Kokovtsev multiplied. With the appointment of N.A. Maklakov, against the strong objections of Kokovtsev, the concept of a united ministry died. Maklakov, who 'came to office with a clear mandate from Nicholas to launch a counter-attack against the civil and political rights gained by society since 1905'[93], consistently worked against Kokovtsev, creating chaos within the ministry.

This counter-revolutionary policy exacerbated political tensions in the country and damaged further the dynasty's legitimacy in the major urban areas amongst both the workers and the elites. Nicholas was purposely undermining Kokovtsev and the concept of united government in order to achieve his one domestic goal, preservation of his autocratic authority. In his memoirs Kokovtsev reflected that by 1912 he was isolated and even helpless given the lack of support from the emperor and the increasing division within the ministry. 'Nominally I was considered the head of the government, directing its activities, and responsible for it to public opinion. In reality, one group of ministers was completely indifferent to what was going on around them, whilst another group was conducting a policy clearly hostile to me and weakening gradually my position.'[94] Yet, Nicholas made no moves to assume the role of co-ordinator. The result was once again a hole in the centre of government and consequent paralysis.

Nicholas preferred this scenario. He eventually found Kokovtsev tiring and perhaps threatening with his talk about united government. In January 1914 due to right-wing intrigues Nicholas replaced Kokovtsev with a man who epitomised the old guard, I. Goremykin, who had complete and blind loyalty to the tsar and to

the autocracy. This was the sign of Nicholas' triumph over the new system. Although it is difficult to make a direct contact between Nicholas and these intrigues (though in some instances it can be made), he holds responsibility for creating the conditions in which they could not only flourish, but also succeed.[95] Most importantly, Nicholas undermined strong chairmen and then from 1914 appointed weak ones but he lacked to ability to co-ordinate the government himself.

Unlike Nicholas II, Vittorio Emanuele I 'usually had sufficient practical sense to be pleased that ministers could take an unwelcome load off his shoulders.'[96] The tsar could not accept such a view. His modus operandi did not even permit the emergence of the German model whereby the chancellor was dependent on the monarch but did have the power and ability to co-ordinate civilian government. Both Wilhelm II and Austro-Hungarian Emperor Franz Josef never undermined their chief ministers to the degree Nicholas undermined Stolypin and after him, Kokovtsev. For example, when Franz Josef found out that Chief of Staff Conrad von Hotzendorf was constantly criticising foreign policy and intriguing against the foreign minister he took action. He summoned Hoetzendorf and blasted him for his actions. 'These incessant attacks on Aerenthal, these pinpricks, I forbid them...The ever-recurring reproaches regarding Italy and the Balkans are in the end directed at me. Policy—it is I who make it...My policy is a policy of peace,' which Aerenthal is pursuing. The chief of staff was duly removed from all government activities.[97] The Habsburg emperor's method for dealing with intrigues contrasted starkly with the rather flaccid and even duplicitous approach of Nicholas II. Franz Josef not only identified with his government's policies, but also considered an attack on them as an attack on himself. Nicholas II never thought in such terms.

Nicholas by appointing conservative majorities to the State Council undermined the Council of Ministers and succeeded in essentially destroying the government's links with the Duma and thereby bringing the system to a near halt. When Kokovtsev complained of this to the tsar, the latter responded, 'Your relationship to the Duma, peaceful and non-party, is the only correct one, in my opinion. It is already showing its beneficial effect on the internal life of the country in a general calming down and decline of 'politicking.'[98]

In the closing months of the Kokovtsev ministry (October 1913) Nicholas wrote Maklakov:

> I also consider it necessary and proper that the Council of Ministers should immediately discuss the idea, which I have long pondered, of changing the article of the Duma statues by virtue of which, if the Duma does not accept amendments made by the State Council and will not ratify them, the bill lapses. Since we have no constitution in our country, that is completely senseless. If instead the opinions of the majority and the minority are presented to the Emperor for his choice, that will be a good way of

returning to the previous tranquil course of legislation and moreover in the Russian spirit.[99]

In the end nothing came of this as the Council of Ministers and even conservative elder statesman Mikhail Akimov rejected the idea. But the letter says much about Nicholas' views on the post-1905 system. He never accepted it. In comparison, Vittorio Emanuele I on whom was forced a constitution 'adjusted to the fact that by 1861' these constitutional institutions were necessary 'without which the system would not work.'[100] In theory, Nicholas could have followed the path of this Italian king.

The consequences of the hole in the centre of the government and failure to continue with positive policies were far-reaching. Deputies on the left and right lost confidence in the government and more importantly in the tsar, whose links with the moderate sections of society weakened further. The IV Duma worked in an atmosphere of pessimism and apathy as the deputies came to the conclusion that there was nothing they could do to change the situation. Increasing numbers of Duma members failed to show up for sessions. This malaise filtered down to the burgeoning educated middle and upper classes. Nicholas' legitimacy fell to new depths as the country's problems remained un-addressed. At the end of the year marking the Tercentenary of the Romanov Dynasty (1913) the speaker of the Duma told Nicholas: 'Each minister has his own opinion. For the most part, the cabinet is divided into two parties. The State Council forms a third, the Duma a fourth, and of your own opinion the country remain ignorant. This cannot go on, Your Majesty, this is not government, it is anarchy.'[101] Given Nicholas' value system, he had triumphed. He blocked the movement towards a more open system and emerged as the only political figure on the scene. In the process his links with all sections of society were weak and could not withstand any serious pressure.

Nicholas maintained this modus operandi during the First World War. With the announcement of a state of war between Russia and Germany the elites and educated society rallied around the throne. The socialist A.S.Zarudnii remarked that, 'Being a pacifist, with the start of war I became a passionate patriot and supported the war until victory was achieved. I said this and acted on it. I gave my loved grandsons and sons...I tried to inculcate in them the necessity to fight this war and be happy.'[102] Many in the elite however had strong doubts about victory given Nicholas' modus operandi and his record as monarch. Witte succinctly described the thoughts of many in the ruling class. 'Nicholas has a chicken's brain, has no (political) sense and does not know how to pick people...there is nothing left for you to do except to wait our sad fate.' He felt Russia would not win. [103] For the first six months or so of the war Russia did not fare badly, having won some major military victories, though there was the massive defeat at the Battle of Tannenberg. By spring 1915 discontent with the government and Nicholas began to spread as Russia began to suffer new defeats in the face of ammunition shortages, incompetent military leadership, and governmental chaos. The growing

tension was expressed in three basic demands: reopening of the Duma, increasing societal participation in the war effort given the obvious inability of the government to manage it, and replacing some of the more unpopular ministers. Whilst dismissing the four most unpopular ministers, Nicholas chose to ignore the pressure for including social participation in the war, i.e. establishing a government of public confidence, insisting that he and he alone was responsible for conducting the war. The continuing defeats on the front and the hole in the centre of government brought by summer 1915 even greater pressure on Nicholas to form some kind of ministry of public confidence and to broaden society's participation in the war.

A large majority of members from across the political spectrum in the Duma formed a 'Progressive Bloc' whilst a group of dissatisfied industrialists formed the War Industries Committee. Both groups increasingly criticised the government for its poor performance; with Goremykin as the chairman the hole in the centre of government continued to exist. On the street there were damaging rumours of betrayal of Russia by leading figures in the government and more importantly suspicion fell on that 'German woman', the empress.

By May Russia began to retreat further in the face of the mostly German onslaught. Society and Duma members began to blame the more unpopular ministers in the government. In mid-May the speaker of the Duma, Mikhail Rodzianko asked the tsar to remove the more unpopular ministers given rising political tension and the defeats. Eight ministers began to push for some type of reconciliation with society for they felt no support from society and the distrust of the emperor. Moreover, the ministry continued to suffer from the consequences of a hole in the centre of government as ministers fought to have Goremykin replaced by an effective chairman. Nicholas dug in his heels, but only temporarily. In July strikes began to break out in major cities, the retreat continued, and the pressure increased for Nicholas to do something.

In August 1915 Nicholas had before him a clear choice. He could extend a hand to educated society, to the majority who were prepared to work with him at the moment and form a ministry of public confidence. He could dismiss the more unpopular ministers, work with the growing Progressive Bloc and with the various groups wanting to contribute to the war effort and work within a new ministry. Krivoshein tried to impress on Nicholas the danger of disregarding completely public opinion and the necessity for co-operation between the elites and government during the war.[104] By doing this not only would he in the end improve the war effort, but deflect criticism from himself. Of course there were liberals who wished to use this opportunity to expand the Duma's powers, but more were worried by the threat of defeat in the war and the rising societal tensions which could be eventually expressed in revolution. Figures from across the political spectrum warned Nicholas of revolution. By making concessionary moves Nicholas could narrow the growing gap between himself and the elites. Alternatively he could continue to make some minor concessions in order to lower temporarily the political pressure, and later, ignoring educated public opinion, take

them back. The result being maintenance of his absolute authority and, given his modus operandi, the hole in the centre of the government. To no great surprise Nicholas chose the latter path. Nicholas' frame of mind is symbolised by comments made to General Alekseev in 1915. The Union of Zemstvos and Union of Towns which hoped that the government would set-up a ministry of public confidence and participated in extra-governmental war efforts met in Moscow. General Alekseev asked the emperor if greetings should be sent. Nicholas replied: 'Is it worth it? All this work is a systematic attempt to undermine my rule. I understand these things well. They should all be arrested, not thanked.'[105] Alekseev worried by the increasing numbers of strikes in the rear and consequences of such a situation for the war front and the domestic situation recommended to Nicholas that steps be taken to provide cheap food to the workers and other life necessities. Not surprisingly, the tsar ignored these repeated warnings which played no small part in Alekseev's and the military's increasing disenchantment with Nicholas.[106]

After securing the Duma's passage of bills in autumn 1915 Nicholas prorogued it and rejected any reconciliation with the moderates both in and outside of the government. He refused the idea of a ministry of public confidence and removed three 'liberal' ministers, Samarin, Alexander Krivoshein, and General Aleksei Polivanov. Polivanov, who proved to be an excellent minister of war attracted the Emperor's wrath because of his close ties with the War Industry Committee, another extra-governmental war effort organisation.[107] He turned his back on the elites and educated political opinion, losing both. This is classic Nicholas. In this regard he differed greatly from his predecessors. In 1881 Loris-Melikov, in a bid to isolate the radical left and attract support for the monarchy amongst educated and elite society, proposed to Alexander II the establishment of consultative bodies. Representatives elected by the zemstvos and city councils, and officials appointed by the government would serve in these bodies which would discuss current economic, political and fiscal issues but in only in an advisory capacity. Alexander II's reaction to a proposal that gave society a more active participation in political affairs makes was telling:

> Gentlemen, that which is proposed to Us is the Estates-General of Louis XVI. One must not forget what followed. But, if you judge this to be of benefit to the country, I will not oppose it.[108]

Alexander II respected the elites. He recognised the need to maintain their loyalty, but also that of the growing educated class. However grudgingly, he understood the need to stretch a hand to them in order to maintain stability and isolate the radicals. Quite the opposite with Nicholas II. Whilst Nicholas might have succeeded in neutralising elite threats to his power, he also set the stage for their impotency in the face of radical movements, which emerged during and after the collapse of the dynasty. Once the people began to make demands on the streets, it was too late to rely on the Progressive Bloc.[109]

Moreover, in 1915 Nicholas against the wishes of his ministers decided to take up the supreme command of the armed forces, removing Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. Nicholas believed that he should be with his troops, though he did not intend to take part in tactical and strategic military decisions. Aleksandra's fear that in the case of victory Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the commander of the Russian armies on the German-Austrian front, would eventually overshadow the emperor and therefore perhaps present a threat, prompted the move. The idea did have its merits. The emperor could escape to the front, playing no military role but covering a Romanov grand duke's replacement by a more competent military leadership and at the same time persuading himself that he was doing his duty. After all was not Alexander I with his troops? Meanwhile he could leave the capable Krivoshein in charge in Petrograd to co-ordinate government and work with the elites. But one cannot help the feeling that Nicholas wanted to 'escape' to the front, wanting to rid himself of the problems of governing during this critical and difficult period. He once wrote to Aleksandra that he was resting at the front, where there were no ministers and endless problems. Minster of Finance Bark remarked in his memoirs that, 'Unfortunately the apathetic attitude of the emperor to the rear inspired him to a certain indifference as regards the tasks of government.'[110]

Nicholas' greater mistake was to leave the politically inept empress in charge of the government in Petrograd, his fear and dislike of ministers was that great. The hole in the centre of the government grew to spectacular dimensions. Ministerial turnover reached unprecedented levels whilst it seemed to most that Alexandra, Rasputin, and a small clique were running the country, or rather betraying it to the Germans. She had neither the ability nor the support in the government or in society to rule. Nicholas had placed the monarchy in an impossible position. Not only would the tsar himself fall under criticism for the domestic situation, but also any military defeats would now be linked to the crown. He had needlessly clouded the division between the government's legitimacy and that of the crown.

Throughout 1916 pressure on Nicholas from all sides increased to form a ministry of public confidence in order to put an end to the hole in the centre of government and the de-legitimisation of Nicholas II. Even members of the royal family began to exhort Nicholas to make some concessions to the elites. In November 1916 Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich met with him to describe the present situation and urge him to form this ministry. Nicholas simply listened and made no reply. The grand duke in reply to this silence said: 'I would be more pleased if you swore at me, struck me, kicked me out than with your silence...Can you not see that you are losing your crown? Grant a responsible ministry...you just procrastinate. For the moment there is still time, but soon it will be too late.'[111] At the beginning of the war the elite, having experienced some eighteen years of Nicholas' rule had serious doubts about his ability and his modus operandi in time of this great war. His failure once again either to provide leadership or appoint competent ministers (and to attempt to work with the Duma and non-governmental organisations), in other words the hole in the centre of

government, made the idea of a palace coup or military plot attractive to many in the elite.[112]

On the 23 February 1917 demonstrations and strikes, rather familiar events in wartime Petrograd, broke out once again. On that day *Okhranka* agents reported back in alarm that the strikers and demonstrators this time 'showed great stubbornness.' Crowds dispersed by the police or Cossacks simply regrouped. [113] By the 25 February scenes across the city became more threatening. Most distressing for the government were increasing reports of Cossacks refusing to break up columns of demonstrators. Upon learning of the disturbances Nicholas who was en route to military headquarters near the front, ordered the Petrograd authorities to use force to crush them. On the 27 February the capital's garrison mutinied; Petrograd was moving closer to the abyss. The commander of the Petersburg garrison, General Khabalov, wrote to Nicholas's headquarters: 'I implore you to report to His Imperial Majesty that I could not fulfil the command to restore order in the capital.'[114] Nicholas then ordered General Ivanov to march on the capital with fresh troops. However on 1 March General Alekseev, the acting commander-in-chief, blocked this move. He feared that the mutinies in the capital would spread in the army if it were used against the crowds to defend a tsar in which few, if any, had confidence Alekseev was convinced, as the political elite were in the capital, that Nicholas would have to abdicate if complete political catastrophe in the country and military catastrophe on the front were to be avoided. So low was confidence in Nicholas II. Already at the end of 1916 military commanders were contemplating a 'regime change' and were conspiring with Grand Duke Nicholas.[115] In short the elite, and first and foremost the military elite, convinced Nicholas of the need to give up the throne. On the day of his abdication Nicholas wrote in his diary: 'Treachery, cowardice, and deceit all around.'[116]

Nicholas' 1915 decisions and the sequence of events leading to his abdication in 1917 bring out the points I have been making so far, namely total alienation not only from society, but also from the majority of his own leading military and civil officials and a hole in the centre of the government. Nicholas clung obstinately to the principle of autocracy without being able to play the needed co-ordinating role. He was convinced that any concessions would doom the autocracy and lead to social revolution. Hence his refusal to establish a 'responsible' government, which lead to his complete isolation from society. Crucially, Nicholas lacked a sense of political judgement and reality and an understanding of the importance of elites. At the same time he did not listen to the advice of his most professional advisors, such as Krivoshein and Bark, and instead turned to Alexandra and those advisors who shared his own view of autocracy. The result was catastrophe for him and his dynasty.

6

MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE PAHLAVI STATE

I am going to go faster than the left. You're all going to have to run to keep up with me. All the old economic and political feudalism is over and done with...What could a (man) do left with one-tenth of a hectare of land? No, that is not the fate of my people, to live like miserable beggars.
Mohammad Reza Shah

I am devoted to my country because that is the most beautiful thing that can happen. What can I take with me when I die? A small piece of cloth perhaps. But that is all. That is why I must take history with me.
Mohammad Reza Shah

Structure and Agency: International Challenge

An examination of the international challenge begins this chapter as Iran suffered a much greater decline in its fortunes than did Louis XVI's France or Nicholas II's Russia. Consequently, the greater the link in Iran between the international challenge and domestic politics, and her greater vulnerability to foreign influence. This decline exercised a powerful influence on the personality of Mohammad Reza Shah.

'When I took the throne at age twenty-one, I found myself plunged into a sea of trouble', he noted when reminiscing of the initial period of his reign. He ascended the throne in the aftermath of the 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran and the forced abdication of his father. The Allies hoped to use Iran as a supply route for the desperate USSR which was facing single-handedly the Nazi juggernaut.[1] The Allied Occupation caused great economic and social hardship. That he could do nothing infuriated the shah. 'During the occupation I was full of sorrow and had many sleepless nights. I opposed it both in principle and practice, for to me it seemed a wholly needless infringement of our independence and sovereignty.'[2] When at the end of the war the USSR refused to remove its forces from Iranian

Azerbaijan as previously agreed, Iran and the shah could do nothing; that strong US support would bring about a Soviet change of heart was the only hope.

With the abdication of Reza Shah and the weakening of the central government Britain and the USSR began once again to meddle in Iran's domestic political life. 'Their continual interference in our political life', the shah later wrote, 'thoroughly disgusted me and my people.'[3] When the British Ambassador asked the shah to increase greatly the volume of currency in circulation 'for the convenience of their troops' he and his Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam, refused. The British then sent troops into Tehran, ostensibly to prevent rioting, but in reality to send a message to the Majles which subsequently approved the increase. The result was even greater inflation. The British and Soviets bribed Majles deputies and funded political parties which served as their mouthpieces in the Iranian government. These foreign powers do not alone carry the responsibility for this state of affairs for they found Iranians willing to work with, and support them. This behaviour angered and saddened the shah, who consequently never lost his mistrust of politicians; a feeling he shared with Nicholas II. This foreign influence and the corruption of many deputies rendered the Majles unable to govern in already very difficult circumstances.

Despite this foreign intervention the period ending in 1953 was characterised to a degree by the emergence of semi-democratised institutions, such as political parties, trade unions, and a relatively free press. But the seemingly lack of political direction in the Majles, foreign influence, both during and after the Second World War, made a great impression on Mohammad Reza Shah who could only look on:

> In Parliament, charges and counter-charges were made; but no coherent programme emerged...Instead, Parliament interfered in executive and even in judicial affairs...such a chaos had come to my country's political life that perhaps it would have been understandable if, at that juncture, I had become permanently disillusioned with the democratic process.[4]

The shah concluded that the greatest threat to Iran's long-term independence was the country's economic and military weakness which only rapid modernisation from above could check. He believed, as many did right after the emergence of the Constitution of 1906, that democratic procedures posed an obstacle to the country's rapid regeneration.

By the mid to late-1940s Mohammad Reza Shah hoped to utilise US financial and military aid and political support for the strengthening of his position vis-à-vis domestic opponents and for the protection of Iran from external threats, namely from the USSR. Whilst US and UK organisational and technical aid contributed greatly to the overthrow of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, it was only after this event that the US became a major player in Iran's political life. Subsequent to Mossadegh's overthrow, US military and economic aid helped the shah to overcome many internal obstacles to the establishment of a strong monarchy. To

ensure political stability, the CIA and Mossad trained the shah's secret service, SAVAK.

The US organised and executed coup in 1953 against Mossadegh had three consequences. Firstly, the image of the US and the shah was badly tarnished. Secondly, US-Iranian relations came to play a very important role in domestic politics. Many in Iran came to believe that Mohammad Reza Shah ruled the country only because of, and with US support. The Pahlavi government's decision in 1963 to grant extraterritoriality to US military advisors and their dependants in exchange for a US loan strengthened this impression. Thirdly, despite his talk of independence in the back of his mind Mohammad Reza Shah believed that in the end the US could, if it so desired, dislodge his regime. After all his father had come to the throne thanks to British non-interference. In 1941 Britain and the USSR had overthrown him and he, Mohammad Reza, became the second Pahlavi shah because the Allies had no one else to put at the head of the Iranian state. Again in 1953 thanks to British and US intervention the Pahlavi monarchy succeeded not only in eliminating the Mossadegh threat, but also in constructing an authoritarian state.

Given this the shah concluded that the perception of strong US support for his regime played a role in strengthening his internal position. The Iranian mass media emphasised news relating to US-Iranian relations and more specifically Washington's direct links with the shah. Whilst he believed this approach strengthened the regime, he made himself and the country's domestic political scene dependent to a degree on changes in the US administrations. He also unwittingly added to the perception that he was a US puppet. The calls during the revolution of 1978-79 for independence reflected the extent to which the shah's public reinforcement of his close links with the US hurt his image as the defender of Iranian interests. Yet the mass media, again partly reflecting the shah's views, bitterly attacked what were viewed as US imperialist policies, such as the war in Vietnam. This only served to tarnish the US image in Iran further and by default that of the shah. This was a major mistake of the Pahlavi propaganda machine. The shah was not a puppet. He remarked to Assdollah Alam, his Minister of Court and confidant, 'We are not Saudi Arabia. We are not a colony of the US.'[5] Understanding the important role foreign support played in Iran's political life, the shah retained close control over Iran's relations with the US and UK. The shah, who ensured that only he would benefit from relations with them, tolerated no politician with links to either of these two powers. In fact all Iranian ambassadors were forbidden to have direct contact with the rime minister.[6]

The US-Iran link played a role in the crisis years 1977-1979. When Jimmy Carter who ran on a platform of human rights in foreign policy, was elected president the perception was that Washington had fallen out of love with the shah. This played no small role in changing the perception of the shah's invincibility amongst some people and groups. Before the Carter administration assumed power the shah began a limited liberalisation policy. Some believed that he undertook such steps in response to US criticism and pressure and therefore they should not be

taken seriously; if and when US policy changed, the shah would revert to his old ways. The shah felt insecure in his relationship with the Carter administration. For example, he was offended for example by the lateness with which he received greetings from the new president, taking this as a sign of a cooling in relations between the two countries.

Once disturbances broke out and began to spread throughout 1978 the shah looked to the US for support. Washington seemed not to have any policy on Iran given the confusion and disorder within the Carter administration.[7] This in turn depressed the shah, who came to believe that the US no longer wanted him, and contributed to his indecisiveness. No Bourbon or Romanov would have dreamed that he needed the support of a foreign power to act or to protect the crown's authority. The shah's predicament reflected to a degree the reality of Iran's economic and military vulnerability in a world dominated by two great hegemons. Yet this mental dependence of the shah on the US was also the result of his character. Whilst the US indeed helped strengthen his regime in the ten years after the Mossadegh period, by the late 1960s there were no concrete grounds for shah to believe that he was dependent on the US. He had psychologically tied himself to the US.[8]

Structure and Agency: Mohammad Reza Shah and Modus Operandi

The shah, unlike Louis XVI and Nicholas II, was faced not only with the daunting task of maintaining the integrity of the monarchy, but also with the task of rebuilding the state's institutions and military following their collapse in 1941.

During the period 1941-1959 Mohammad Reza was just one political actor amongst many and therefore did not exercise power in the same fashion as his father. The monarchy's weakness was most clearly seen in its relations with the previously subservient Majles and premiership. The relationship between the shah and his first prime minister, Mohammad Ali Forughi, greatly resembled that of the young Louis XVI and Maurepas. Yet whilst Forughi was pro-court and helped the young Mohammad Reza become shah and remain on the throne, the prime minister was determined to limit the powers of the monarchy. The Majles, however, swept Forughi out of power in 1942 and now in accordance with the 1906 Constitution played the deciding role in choosing prime ministers who more often than not excluded the new monarch from any serious decision making. Forughi's replacement, Ahmad Qavam merely informed Mohammad Reza of decisions already taken. When the young shah sent Princess Ashraf to this powerful prime minister asking him to step down given his inability to rescue the country from its present plight, Qavam retorted: 'This is not Reza shah's time. I am in this post not because your brother put me there but because I have a majority in the Majles.'[9] General Ali Razmara, who was assassinated in 1951 by a member of an Islamic extremist group, was another prime minister it was said the shah feared. Whilst at times men who were close to the shah did indeed become prime minister during this period, strong-willed men who in the shah's eyes at least had questionable loyalty occupied that post as well.

Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh represented the greatest threat to the shah's power before the Revolution of 1978-79. Mossadegh's nationalist sentiments and support for the nationalisation of Iran's oil industry made him popular. Years later the shah recalled the Mossadegh era. 'No the worst years of my reign, indeed of my entire life, came when Mossadegh was Prime Minister. The bastard was out for blood and every morning I awoke with the sensation that today might be my last on the throne. Every night I went to bed having been subjected to unspeakable insults in the press.'[10] Mossadegh had been a deputy in the Majles for a decade before the shah reluctantly appointed him prime minister in 1951 in the aftermath of Razmara's assassination. The new prime minister succeeded in undoing the work the shah had done in the establishment of greater monarchical authority. When Mossadegh asked the shah to transfer the portfolio of Minister of War to himself, he refused suspecting that his prime minister was determined to end the dynasty. Due to the international situation, the reality of domestic politics in Iran, serious mistakes committed by the prime minister, and of course foreign intervention Mossadegh was overthrown in a coup'd etat in 1953 and the briefly self-exiled shah returned to Iran as an 'elected king.'

Mossadegh's great popularity shook the foundations of the Pahlavi throne and increased the shah's paranoia concerning the popularity of members of his government. He subsequently would ensure that no one in the country could obtain popular acclaim for domestic policies or for their own personal initiatives. Everything had to be seen as coming from the shah. He could endure only passive figures around him. He could not tolerate a Turgot, Necker, Witte or Stolypin, even to the extent to which Nicholas II and Louis XVI tolerated them.[11] For example, in 1973 Assadollah Alam, his close friend and court minister, asked the shah for permission to establish a charitable institution, the Alam Foundation along the same lines as the shah's Pahlavi Foundation. The shah 'approved the idea, but only after considerable hesitation. His reluctance surprised me, and I am led to assume that enlightened and warm-hearted though he is, he cannot abide being upstaged by anyone.'[12] When Dr. Fallah, the head of Iran's oil negotiating team in 1973, the year of the huge increase in oil prices, had prepared a report for distribution on a certain aspect of a previous day's proceedings during which the new posted price was decided, the shah was displeased. Alam recorded in his diary that "...when I turned up for my audience at ten, HIM waved the document at me, saying, 'Tell Fallah that I want my own statement distributed, not this thing of his." Nobody is allowed to steal HIM's thunder."[13]

The shah's insistence to be in the centre of the country's political life, to assume credit for everything, was politically dangerous. By purposely blurring the line between the crown and the government, if and when policies became unpopular or were shown to be wrong, both government and the legitimacy of the Pahlavi dynasty would suffer. To leave open the option for blaming and firing ministers and thereby reducing the crown's vulnerability to popular anger would have been a batter approach. To an extent possible the monarch needs to separate the legitimacy of his dynasty from that of the government. Additionally, such an

attitude did nothing to encourage intelligent, independent-minded ministers to take any real initiative in governing. Decision making and policy formulation and promotion were left to the shah who could not possibly have all the necessary knowledge. Serious political mistakes therefore had a greater chance of being made.

Mohammad Reza's relationship with the highest servants of the state changed over time. The first twenty years of his reign there was collective discussion and decision making in regard to most major issues. This modus operandi began to change in the 1960s. Cabinet government operated more or less as it should, whereby all issues were discussed and debated for overall approval. A minister in Razmara's cabinet in the 1950s and who subsequently became prime minister recalled:

> Razmara tried to ensure that all issues were discussed in the government...importance was given to obtaining the views of the ministers. If the ministers agreed they would sign for its approval. If we agreed, we wrote 'agreed.' If we disagreed, we wrote 'disagree.[14]

The shah viewed himself as the wise father using the expertise of his ministers and technocrats to modernise the country whilst at the same time keeping them and their egos in line. Alam recorded, "HIM said, 'I have issued orders for the dismissal of the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Housing. They're both idiots, swapping insults (at an inter-ministerial meeting) and then running to me to tell tales on one another. I simply can't stand for this sort of thing."[15]

Mohammad Reza maintained a degree of suspicion when it came to his ministers and their intentions. On the one hand he did indeed recognise their importance in running the government and in modernising Iran. On the other hand he feared falling under the influence of fellow Iranians, whom he generally suspected of tainting their information to him in order to fit their particular goals. 'I know that advisers', he wrote, 'no matter how technically competent they may be, sometimes make the national interest subservient to their own. Furthermore they are prone to try to funnel all information through themselves and to seal off independent intelligence channels.'[16] The shah claimed that he consequently expanded his sources of information, especially when confronted with a complex problem, in order to examine all possible solutions. 'I am a great believer in a plurality of administrative channels and in having alternative channels always available. I obtain information from different sources.'[17] In response to Alam's expression of worry about the flow of information, the shah snapped, 'I already get reports from different sources. I know everything.' Alam answered, 'Don't place so much confidence in their reports. Each source colours reports to its own benefit.' The shah did not appreciate Alam's comments.[18]

Louis and Nicholas both harboured suspicions over the intentions of their highest servants. Upon the death of Vergennes Louis XVI cried that he had lost the only minister who had never deceived him. Recall the tsar confessing that he

would trust Kuropatkin more if he were not a minister. In all three cases the monarchs' relationship with his ministers was seriously flawed causing great damage to the running of government. Whilst not unjustified in some cases, the monarch needed to confront and manage the men serving him in order to ensure a relative a smooth operation of government.

By the late 1960s/early 1970s the shah's modus operandi began to change. According to figures close to him, such as Empress Farah, Minister of the Court Alam, and Prime Minister Hoveyda the shah refused to listen to 'bad news' or 'pessimistic expressions.'[19] He openly rejected observations and judgements that contradicted his own. In response his ministers stopped giving him reports reflecting the reality of the country's situation. Instead he obtained report after report containing good news about Iran's continuing accomplishments. This had a deleterious effect on the effectiveness of his government and intelligence service, SAVAK. For example, when a SAVAK bureau chief wrote in the midst of the economic malaise of the mid-1970s a report on rising living costs, inflation, scarcity of foodstuffs, and speculation and the effects they were having on the regime's legitimacy the SAVAK chief, General Nassiri summoned him:

> While very much appreciating your research efforts, I must tell you that HM doesn't like it at all when I submit reports on topics he has not asked me about...What I am trying to say is why prepare documents which I'm obliged to bring to HM's attention when I know that he's not the least bit interested in them.[20]

Nassiri went on to say that in the end he could not present any report to the shah for which he had not expressly asked. Consequently, the intelligence services supervised areas and groups the shah believed to be a threat, such as the Communist Tudeh Party or other nationalist secular groups.[21] SAVAK found reporting to the shah on societal cleavages and other possible causes of unrest difficult, it not impossible. The shah unwittingly emasculated his intelligence services. Quite the opposite was true in Russia, where *Okhranka* reports were hard-hitting, describing well the feeling on the ground level. At the same time the shah increasingly did not want to hear criticism and words of disagreement from his ministers. For example, the shah showed his displeasure with those who had voiced reservations about certain aspects of his 'The White Revolution' by easing them out of government. Yet he frequently complained that his ministers did not voice their opinions. To a US general he remarked:

> You will never appreciate how valuable you are to me. In a monarchy it's often hard for the top man to get his subjects to be completely candid. They frequently work very, very hard and in fact almost without exception work hard at telling me exactly what they think I want to hear. You tell me exactly what you think and I know that. I know you don't have a bone to

pick. You're not trying to sell me anything...I can't get anyone to disagree with me.[22]

Whilst the shah was indeed perceptive in noting this weakness he failed to understand that he held a great degree of blame for such a state of affairs. His ministers were responding to the expectations the shah himself placed on the system. In the first place the shah's complete and total identification with major governmental policies lessened the chances of any minister voicing opposition. Criticising a policy meant criticising the monarch. More importantly, no reward existed for pointing out problems or alternative solutions and being the bearer of bad news. Alam even believed that economic reports might not be 'all that true and designed to please' the shah.[23] The Iranian situation in this respect is very different from that of France and of Russia for most of Nicholas II's reign. Louis XVI received reports from ministers such as Turgot, Necker, Fleury, Calonne, and Brienne which were not designed to fit into their perceptions of Louis XVI's thinking. Up until the resignation of Kokovtsev, Russian ministers did not flinch from, if not disagreeing with the tsar, at least telling him bad news. In 1915 many ministers, fearing revolt from below and a serious break in relations between the government and elite, openly pressured the tsar to make concessions. The difference is partly attributable to the lack of an esprit de corps in the newly emergent Iranian bureaucracy. However, this explanation can go only so far. The emerging bureaucracies of Louis XIV and Reza Shah did not suffer from this specific form of systemic breakdown to the same degree to which that of Mohammad Reza Shah did.

The shah was essentially a weak man trying to project a strong image. He appeared decisive when there was no strong opposition, namely during the period 1963-77. His insecurity and weakness appeared when the regime faced an open enemy, forcing him to rely on others to act to protect his throne. To understand the success of the revolutionary movement in Iran during 1978-1979 one must take into account the fatal mixture of the shah's concentration of power in his own person and his indecisiveness when faced with open confrontations. During the three major crises that threatened the Pahlavi throne—1951-53, 1963, and 1978-79—the shah proved unable to take the necessary decisions to save his dynasty. The *coup d'etat* which overthrew Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 was organised and executed by the US, Britain, and royalist supporters in Iran, but without any direct input or support from the shah. During one of the many sessions in which certain figures tried to convince the shah to act against Mossadegh, he said that 'he was not an adventurer, and hence, could not take the chances of one.'[24] CIA agents described these repeated conversations with Mohammad Reza as 'frustrating attempts to overcome an entrenched attitude of vacillation and indecision,' describing him as '...a creature of indecision, beset by formless doubts and fears.'[25] When it seemed that the coup had failed the shah and Queen Soraya fled the country; he did not put up any fight to protect his throne.

During the 1963 uprising led by Ayatollah Khomeini the shah once again revealed his incapacity to take the necessary measures to protect his power. Initially he did nothing to counter the demonstrations. 'What shall we do?' the shah repeatedly asked, Alam, the prime minister at the time. With the riots spreading Alam summoned the military commanders to his office in order to give instructions to clear the streets at all costs. The generals questioned the prime minister's legal authority to issue such orders since he held neither the post of commander-in-chief of the armed forces nor any rank within the military structure. Alam then telephoned the shah: 'Your Imperial Majesty, the riots are becoming more severe and beginning to spread to other cities. I have the commanders of the security forces here and believe you should command them to stop the riots by whatever means necessary.' 'You mean open fire?' 'That is the only way, Your Majesty.' After a considerable amount of time the shah responded, 'But, Mr. Alam, many may be killed.' 'Yes, Your Imperial Majesty, but there is no other way to restore order.' 'Mr. Prime Minister, if that is your judgement and *you are prepared to take the consequences of your judgement, you may proceed.*'[26] Despite the obvious threat to the regime, the shah was not prepared to order and take responsibility for the use of force. Per Alam's orders the security forces were sent in and the streets were cleared.

The shah's timidity is also seen in his relations with ministers. Mohammad Reza, like Louis XVI and Nicholas II, hated open confrontations and firing people in person. 'His Majesty's desire to dismiss Zahedi was communicated to the general through the court minister. Zahedi then asked for an audience which was instantly granted. 'I have come to ask Your Majesty's permission to retire,' the prime minister said. 'Well,' the shah replied, 'how could we decline a request from so loyal a servant as Your Excellency.'[27] General Fereydoun Djam, the chief of staff of the armed forces, arrived one day for his weekly meeting with the monarch when he was simply told by a courtier, 'General go back and send your number two. You are relieved.'[28]

Nicholas II and Louis XVI equally disliked 'firing' in person. Louis XVI, once deciding that a certain minister needed to go, would stop seeing him, subjecting him to his infamous silent treatment until the minister requested his resignation. That a tsarist minister could have a rather pleasant audience with Nicholas II only to return to his office to find a request for his resignation was a common belief at the time. Moreover, these three men strongly disliked heated arguments in their presence. Louis XVI was known to turn red with embarrassment at such scenes. Nicholas fled the room when Witte and Khilkov argued. This represented a certain softness in these three men which was not characteristic of Reza Shah, Louis XIV, and Alexander III who had no problem with firing ministers.

After the Allied Occupation the shah attempted to strengthen his institutional power. In the aftermath of a failed assassination attempt in 1949 he proved politically strong enough to establish the Senate, half of whose members he himself chose. He also changed Article 48, which in its original form gave the monarch the right to dissolve the Majles if the government and a majority of the

Senate agreed. In the new version he obtained the right to dissolve the Majles whenever he wished with the provision that he issued a *farman* for new elections and for the convening of a new Parliament within three months. This change rendered useless articles 15 and 38 designed to protect Majles deputies from royal pressure. Throughout this period the shah tried to buttress his domestic and international power with the armed forces, on which he focused much of his attention.

The creation of SAVAK with its internal security section in 1957 gave the shah even greater control over the country. SAVAK came to represent the worst of the Pahlavi regime. Its chief had audiences with the shah every Monday and Thursday and reported directly to him. During the same period Mohammed Reza Shah, fearful of a possible military coup, increased his control over the armed forces through the establishment of the 'Second Bureau' which supervised their activities. An Imperial Inspectorate was also established ostensibly to control corruption within the government, but was in reality a mechanism for the shah's control of the state. The heads of these three organisations acted independently of the government and reported directly to the shah.[29] They became very sensitive to his attitude and wishes which weakened their effectiveness. These organisations, at least at the top level, most probably reflected the shah's desire to have flexible and loyal institutions which he could use to control the bureaucracy and secure his own power, but were not to be alternatives to the bureaucracy itself. By 1962 the shah had devised institutions that greatly increased his control over the state, society, and armed forces.

The shah seemingly used corruption as a method of control over members of the elite. Whilst he did express in private conversations his dislike of corruption and his wish to eradicate it from the system, in some cases he had an idea of what was going on.[30] Such information could be used against possible opponents and to keep members of the elite in check. Alam recorded in his diary: 'Ayatollah Milani's son has been arrested in Iraq for opium. HIM responded, "Make sure he is released but at the same time collect enough evidence so that we can jog his memory in the future; these religious types can be so frightfully forgetful."'[31] However, the extent of the spread of corruption during the oil boom caught Mohammad Reza off guard. Corruption whilst part of Iranian life for ages was not a direct cause of the regime's downfall, it did play a large role in damaging the shah's legitimacy. The Royal Family's links with various business enterprises caused the most damage to the dynasty's legitimacy.

During the period 1959-1963 the premiership became an appendage of the monarch. Hossein Ala and Dr. Manucher Eqbal, who were in office during the 1950s, were the first examples of prime ministers subservient to the shah. Ali Amini (1961-63) was the last prime minister to have a degree of political independence. The shah later complained of intense US pressure to appoint him.[32] Amini, who had been Iranian ambassador to the United States, was regarded there as capable of pushing through reforms Washington deemed necessary to avoid a social explosion in Iran. Amini, who 'felt that strong government and reform were

possible only with a lengthy, and technically unconstitutional period of rule without elections or a Majles',[33] put as one of his conditions for acceptance of the post the dissolution of the Majles and rule by Imperial decree. He showed a reforming zeal. His Agricultural Minister, Hassan Arsanjani, became popular through his travels around the country and his radical programme of land reform which envisioned breaking-up the large landowners' estates and giving the land to the peasants. But the prime minister appeared to be too independent of the shah and perhaps too popular abroad. Mohammad Reza became angry on his visit to the US in 1961 because, as he put it, 'wherever I went people kept asking after the health of my Prime Minister as if I personally was of no account.' When a US official stationed in Tehran remarked to the shah, 'Well Your Majesty you have a Prime Minister who has shown a good deal of courage.' The shah asked, 'In which way?' 'Well he placed a number of generals under arrest. That does require some courage.' Mohammad Reza, obviously not amused, answered, 'He did not place the generals under arrest. The commander-in-chief places generals under arrest and I am the commander-in-chief.'[34]

Amini resigned due to the shah's refusal to reduce expenditures on the armed forces. This was the last time an Iranian prime minister would resign over a disagreement with the monarch. Amini's replacement was Asadollah Alam, a capable man completely loyal to the shah, who from this point forward served in reality as his own prime minister. The shah then removed the increasingly popular Arsanjani after the minister organised a Congress of Rural and Co-operative Societies in Tehran which thousands of workers and peasants attended. Arsanjani and the role he played in land reform disappeared from official publications.

Although the appointment of Alam marked a further step towards the shah's consolidation of power over the premiership, the shah himself *for most* of the period 1962-late 1960s continued to listen to discussion and debate. The cabinet more or less operated as a collective unit, discussing most areas of policy and making amendments when necessary. The shah was satisfied with setting the direction and larger details of policy, whilst letting ministers, and most importantly, the Planning and Budget Organisation to tend to details. During the 1960s, 'free debate was encouraged, except on the issues of foreign policy, security and the armed forces which were considered sacrosanct by the shah (as by Louis XVI and Nicholas II). In the meetings he chaired, the Economic Council for example, the shah attempted to reach a consensus; even in private audiences he avoided imposing his own view on his ministers.'[35] For example, once the shah decided to pursue a policy of economic modernisation and growth he was faced with a serious struggle between the Minister of Finance Abdul-Husain Behnia and Arsanjani on the one hand and the PBO director Safi Asfia on the other, which 'paralysed economic policy making and bogged down the High Economic Council—on which the shah presided—in endless and at times heated altercations over who should determine Iran's economic policy.'[36] Mohammad Reza, fearing this continued debate would only exacerbate the growing economic crisis and create a political crisis, decided to act. He decided to support openly and

vigorously the PBO plan for an economic super ministry a step which most importantly 'also encouraged other bureaucracies to assist the new bureaucracy.'[37] The minister in charge, Alinaqi Alikhami received broad powers from the shah to design and implement economic policy and to make laws and even institutions that were relevant to the goal of economic development. The shah was 'willing then to "reign" and to allow the Minister of Economy to "rule" in the economic sphere, providing legitimacy and space for policy making.'[38]

The Majles too fell under the shah's control. The first Majles elections after the coup d'etat of 1953 were blatantly rigged, which became a trademark of the last shah's reign. Although he announced in 1958 that he had 'a ten-year programme of reforms'[39] in the 1950s the shah did not have sufficient power to break away completely from the *ulama* and the old political elite, which included many large landowners. The shah tried to reduce their influence in the Nineteenth Majles by bringing in many moderates and technocrats on whom the government could rely and who relied on the government. At the same time he ensured the defeat of the few remaining nationalists and liberals. Nevertheless, the Eqbal government encountered strong landowner and clerical opposition to its land reform bill. The shah had the bill withdrawn. The economic situation continued to deteriorate and the need for economic and social reform became clearer. With a security apparatus in place, a good degree of US support and pressure for economic change and a reform programme designed to attract the support of the lower classes the shah by the early 1960s moved towards reform.

He instituted the Melliyun (Nationalist) Party headed by Eqbal and Mardom (People's) Party headed by Alam. Eqbal's open rigging of the 1960 elections resulted in the annulment of the election results and the eventual dissolution of the Majles. In a conversation with a non-Iranian academic in 1963 over elections the shah explained his reasons for not allowing real opposition into the Parliament:

> I asked the shah, "Your Majesty, we have this electoral campaign. Will you allow the opposition to be represented in the parliament?" He said, "Oh sure, we have the Melliyun and the Mardom Party." I said, "Your Majesty, I know very well that both parties are loyal parties to you, and the Mardom Party is not really a real opposition. The real opposition is represented by other people...(like) National Front people." He said with a degree of annoyance, "...why do you want to impose the American type of democracy upon Iran?" I said, "...I'm asking these questions only out of my genuine interest in Iranian stability, in Iranian security..." "Well" he said, "All right, I'll explain it to you. Why does not Baqai'i (an Iranian opposition figure) come to me and ask me to do certain things? Instead of coming to me, he is agitating out in Kerman or other places, going out to the streets. And look at these people in the National Front. How can I trust these people?" I then said, "The point is, do you prefer them to voice openly their grievances in the Parliament if they are elected—if you permit them to be elected—or to

> go and agitate in the streets, and to repeat the Mossadegh era?" And he said, "Now look. If they come to the Parliament, there may be very few of them—perhaps four or five—but you remember what happened during the Mossadegh era. The original National Front was composed of five, six, or seven deputies in the Parliament, and you know what they brought about. The oil crisis, because they could agitate in such a way in the Parliament as to suborn it and subdue it...First of all, if they are admitted to the Parliament...they will raise the question of the Iranian-Soviet-American relations and try to reverse the course we have already taken...They will try to re-open the oil question, that after the years of travail, three years between '51 and '54, we finally managed to resolve, now they will re-open this question and open a Pandora's box for oil troubles...They will question the whole political system in Iran as it exists. This is why I am critical of their possibility of being in the Parliament.[40]

In 1963 he dissolved the *Mardom* party and established the *Iran-e novin.* Amir Abbas Hoveyda, who served as prime minister from 1963 until 1977, headed it. Despite the party's small technocratic membership thanks to vote rigging it always won large majorities in the Majles elections. From the vantage point of the late 1960s the shah looked back at the first eighteen years of his reign. 'The parliaments were controlled by feudal landlords and capitalists who used the Majles for their own purposes. This small and usually corrupt minority was almost always in the service of foreign interests...As a result elections were always accompanied by every manner of trickery, corruption, intimidation, abuse, not only during the voting itself, but even at the stage of counting votes. Unfortunately for twenty years of my reign I had to deal with such parliaments.' 'Finally I became so exasperated that I decided we would have to dispense with democracy and operate by decree.'[41] When a New York Times interviewer reminded the shah of charges that the members of the Majles in 1963 had in reality been picked by the government,[42] Mohammad Reza retorted: 'So what. Was it not better that this organisation did it than let it be done by politicians for their own purposes?'[43] Again he would have found common ground on this point with Nicholas II. To the shah's mind his decision for reform and modernisation outweighed any consideration for democratic systems in which vested interests could prevent or at least slow down needed changes; this was the same problem reformists faced in the immediate aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Modernisation from above made necessary centralisation of the state to a degree unseen in Iran's modern history. In 1969 Alam hinted to the Shah about the need to open up the system so that it could achieve a degree of institutionalisation before the shah was no longer around.

> I agreed (with the shah) that harsh measures were needed to push the country forward, but now that things are moving in the right direction, it is time that authoritarianism was relaxed and HIM allow the elections to

> become a genuine expression of public opinion. HIM's leadership has rescued the country from chaos; our foundations are secured...The shah listened to all of this with evident attention, but in reply he said: "Without constant vigilance, the whole structure will still collapse." "True enough", I said, "but all the more reason to strengthen our national institutions...We...must allow the people a role in national affairs...Everything will run smoothly enough during your own lifetime, but without this change who knows what our nation may face in the years to come.[44]

The last shah believed that political debates at this period in Iran's history would create only political instability given the country's high illiteracy rate and the lack of consensus and would inhibit his modernisation goals, especially in the initial years of the White Revolution. He remarked once 'How can you hope to build-up a nation by fragmenting its politics into opposing camps? Whatever one group builds, the other will endeavour to destroy.'[45] That the shah crushed opposition groups without distinction gave Khomeini the opportunity to become the head of the revolutionary movement. What follows is a brief look at political groups which ended up playing a large role in the events of 1978-79.

The establishment of the two-party system could not have taken place without the gradual and fairly complete weakening of other political organisations which were more often than not rooted to a degree in secularism. Mossadegh's nationalist and secularist movement, the National Front, endured close SAVAK surveillance and harassment, which led to its political emasculation.[46] The shah feared the organisation's basic platform and its potential clientele, the middle class, of whom he was already suspicious because of their insistence on adherence to the Constitution of 1906 and political liberalism. Despite the internal divisions within the group the National Front had great potential to be a powerful force in Iranian political life. This the shah recognised.

The Islamist-nationalist Liberation Movement headed by Mehdi Bazargan, who became the prime minister of the Provisional Government, split from the National Front in 1961. The formation of this group deprived the National Front of its links to the *ulama*. Bazargan and the movement supported the Constitution of 1906, the institution of the monarchy, and both religious and political reform in the country. In spite of its relatively small size, the Liberation Movement could have fulfilled an important role in Iranian politics by linking together adherence to the Constitution of 1906 and thereby the monarchy with reformism and religion. It could have served as a buffer against the 'radicalism of the left and the fanaticism of the right. By suppressing the Liberation Movement, the Shah's regime severed the bridge between the Shah and the reform-oriented segment of the middle class.'[47]

This gradual erosion of the independence of the premiership and the Majles was accompanied by a new official policy of modernisation, a key aspect of Pahlavi ideology. 'The White Revolution of Shah and People' tied the monarchy to the

idea of massive social and economic reform. White was chosen to emphasise the bloodless character of these massive changes and to distinguish the 'shah's revolution' from red communist revolution and black reaction (the clergy). Women's emancipation, land reform, workers' shares in factories were some of the initial provisions of the White Revolution. During the remaining fifteen years of his reign the shah added provisions, ranging from free primary education, to social security and workers' insurance. These material advances were to garner additional support for the dynasty and, in effect, make-up for the limited political freedoms in the country. The reform process itself was coined a national resurgence *(rastakhiz)*, to which no true Iranian could express opposition.

Whilst the White Revolution emphasised the peasant and worker and the material benefit the changes would bring them, the shah was careful not to weaken his links with the country's industrial and landed elites. Not wishing the complete alienation of groups whose interests the White Revolution hurt, he worked to accommodate many of them to the new circumstances. The shah wished to maintain the crown's above class position as the final arbiter between competing societal groups. By adapting such an ideology the regime showed its unwillingness to utilise the differences in socio-economic class to generate support. Given such dynamics the shah therefore had to take care during this period not to alienate too many societal groups at once, a problem faced by Louis XVI in his attempts to reform the fiscal system.

The White Revolution also represented a new development in the position of the monarchy in Iran. By launching his Shah-People Revolution, Mohammad Reza became a political leader and not just the monarch. He placed the monarchy in the centre of the country's political life, which in turn reduced the majesty of the monarchical position and gave opposition figures a ready target. The shah had a contradictory approach. He hoped to retain the above-class element of monarchical ideology. Yet, the White Revolution placed the crown in the centre of the country's political life with the obvious dangers. Given the lack of consensus in the Iran of the late 1950s/early 1960s over the future development of the country it could be argued that the decision to take the lead was needed at the time. The danger was that by continually bypassing the Constitution of 1906 the shah could damage the legitimacy of the system if and when policy mistakes accumulated and caused a crisis. The White Revolution itself did indeed generate additional support for the monarchy in the 1960s, as evidenced by the limited opposition to it during the 1963 uprising led by Ayatollah Khomeini. The shah confidently remarked. 'The Revolution we have done no one has done before and therefore the country and regime are safe.'[48] It was during the last part of the reign (1971-1979) that the shah lost his balance and these contradictions came to haunt him.

In 1971 at Persepolis, the capital of the first Iranian Empire, the shah opened ceremonies celebrating the 2500th anniversary of the Iranian monarchy. This huge celebration whose guests included many world leaders or their representatives was his attempt to place the new, modernising Iran on the world's map. The decision

to hold the celebrations in the first place was a reflection of the shah's growing confidence in himself and his place in Iranian history. The emphasis on the Iranian monarchy's longevity and the Pahlavi link with it served as the second plank in the shah's conception of his legitimacy. Non-Islamic nationalism based on ancient Iranian Empire and socio-economic modernisation were the primary components of the new Pahlavi ideology.

The shah's growing confidence, which reached its peak with the oil boom, is the basic factor in any attempt to understand the period 1971-76 and the eventual collapse of the system. His statements about Iran's future and the state of the West became increasingly arrogant and facile. He chastised the West for its style of life and moral depravity whilst telling the Iranian people that Iran would join the ranks of Japan by the 1980s.

> *The Guardian:* Your Majesty, on what do you base your prediction that within a generation, Iran will be one of the five most advanced countries in the world?
> *Mohammad Reza Shah*: Energy, diligence of our people, our hegemony. Of course, a few demonstrate. Just imagine Iranians, if they are Iranians, demonstrating against their leader after what we have done for the country. It is true hegemony that we have in our country. Everybody is behind their monarch, with their souls, with their hearts.[49]

The shah now took centralisation a step further. Whereas broadly speaking in the period ending in the late 60s centralisation meant concentration of power in Tehran, in the hands of ministers and the shah, it now meant greater concentration of power in his hands. Everything was to go through him.[50] The complete concentration of power in his hands made the system too rigid, extremely vulnerable to the personality of the shah and therefore weak. Once he became paralysed the whole structure would collapse. The shah assumed greater control over the day-to-day ruling of the country at a time when the economic and social modernisation of the 1960s had created a more complex society. Alam suggested to the shah that he set up a secretariat and advisory council to aid him in making decisions and governing. The shah was against this idea. Effective government and power could only be maintained with a degree of decentralisation. Mohammad Reza ignored his own advice of 1960.

> We have also been encouraging what I consider to be a very desirable movement towards a more provincial and municipal autonomy. When the people of a province, or of a city within a province, are forced to refer all their problems through the local bureaucracy to Tehran, two evils result: routine administrative operations are reduced to a snail's pace, and the people's civil spirit is stifled because they don't decide their own affairs. Accordingly we are delegating more authority to provincial officials, and are

> encouraging city officials to assume more direct control over schools, hospitals, orphanages, public utilities, and general municipal affairs.[51]

Compare this with the reality of mid-1970s Isfahan and its local government.

> Hesitancy of almost all the councillors to discuss policy problems as opposed to achievements can be explained by the fact that they perceived their primary status as that of spokesman or advocates for others. They did not have the kind of active decision making role which would encourage them to confront municipal difficulties openly...they saw themselves as an embattled group scorned by the people and left defenceless by Tehran.[52]

The shah's over confidence accompanied a change in how he related to his ministers and governing in general. He had a growing disregard for the views of others, and especially his Iranian ministers and advisers. Alam, Abdolmajid Majidi, head of the Planning and Budget Office, A.A. Hoveyda, Fereydoun Hoveyda, the Iranian Ambassador to the UN, General Pakravan,former head of SAVAK, amongst others noticed this change.[53] When A. Hoveyda became worried about the ever-increasing amounts being spent on armaments and realising that he could not do anything about it, he went to the US ambassador, Douglas MacArthur III. He hoped that the US diplomat would be able to convince the shah to cut back somewhat his purchases. 'You know, Doug, HM doesn't like to have negative views from any member of his cabinet.'[54] By the late 1960s ministers and other high ranking officials were no longer prepared to voice reservations in regard to policies; they had to do this in order to remain in their posts.

A.A. Hoveyda mentioned to his brother that the shah no longer listened to people: 'discussions get on his nerves.' Pakravan complained that the shah only wanted ministers to carry out orders. Alam, amongst others, tried to draw the shah's attention to the negative consequences of his modus operandi, trying to convince him of the need for 'special advisers to study each problem and submit their findings to HIM, just as they do in other countries.'[55] However, the shah, confident in his abilities, would not hear of it. "'Did anyone ever 'advise' me to achieve the many great things I have done for this country?", the shah once retorted. "Of course not YM" Alam replied, "but the issues facing you today are of much greater complexity. No one could cope with all of them single-handed", I then reminded him that at present each minister receives his orders direct from HIM. Once such orders have been issued the minister in question quite naturally tends to ignore the wider aspects of government policy. On occasion this has led to something little short of chaos and has severely disrupted the co-ordination of any overall policy.'[56] The shah once again rejected the idea of a 'government within a government' consisting of a powerful secretariat. He tellingly remarked that such a body would lessen his workload, and then, 'What would I do with the extra time? I can't just laze around or just end up dealing with family politics. It is better that I work.'[57]

The shah's growing tendency to ignore advice that contradicted his own views and to brand such views as pessimistic or negative ossified the Pahlavi system. Many in the government fell into line and told him what he wanted to hear. As one Iranian academic told the shah in the closing days of 1978, 'The elite believes it is doing you a service by informing you of only those things which fit in with your policies.'[58] This was because the elite gained from telling the shah what he wanted to hear. The opposite was true in France and Russia, even under Louis XVI and Nicholas II. Recall Turgot's letter to Louis XVI pointedly telling him that he was weak and seen as such by the elite. At one point during the Revolution of 1905 in Russia Witte presented Nicholas with two options: either introduce major political changes such as a constitutional system or crack down with incredible force. Nicholas turned to his uncle Grand Duke Nicholas, offering him the position of virtual military dictator. The Grand Duke placing his revolver on the table refused and threatened to shoot himself right there unless Nicholas chose the path of reform. The tsar backed down. This problem that emerged in the shah's modus operandi is not unique to the monarchical system; rather it is a reflection of the personality of the person at the centre of government. Given the dynamics of Jimmy Carter's modus operandi, '...competing interests often tried to win his support by offering advice they thought he wanted to hear rather than recommendations worked out after careful deliberation.' Hamilton Jordon, Carter's chief of staff, told the president, 'A great premium is placed on anticipating what you want instead of providing you with frank and hard analysis,'[59] which damaged greatly the president's ability to determine a policy recommendation's viability vis-à-vis the reality on the ground. At times the shah even expressed negative opinions of Alam and Hoveyda. After a discussion over possible Soviet bugging of the shah's conversations with them at Nowshahr on the Caspian the shah told Alam, 'Neither of you ever has anything important to say to me.'[60]

In 1974 the chief of the general staff, General Azhari made a report to the shah criticising the tactics of SAVAK and underlining the present weaknesses in the regime: inflation, corruption, SAVAK errors, and the stagnation in the government. The shah disregarded the report on grounds of its 'pessimism.' A group of intellectuals sent a similar report to the Hoveyda for transmission to the shah. Hoveyda heavily criticised it and consequently the shah never saw it.[61] Western leaders who lavished praise on the shah strengthened his belief in his superhuman powers. On one of his visits to Iran Henry Kissinger announced that, 'We've come to learn from this experienced world leader, share views with him and learn his insights into the world to help us.'[62]

The charade of the two-party system also came under increasing strain. The *Iran-e Novin* party under the leadership of the long-standing prime minister, Hoveyda, continued to win absolute majorities in the rigged elections. Hoveyda and his party stressed their link with the shah and support for all his policies. The official opposition party, Mardom, in reality had no role to play for it could not criticise the party in power for its policies without antagonising the shah.

> HIM is furious with a recent speech by Nasser Ameri, leader of the Mardom party, calling for health care and university education to be entirely state-funded... "Why, asked HIM, should the children of the wealthy be exempt from university fees?"...On the other hand, as he made plain in his address to the education conference at Ramsar, he's fully in favour of scholarships for the most gifted, regardless of a student's family background. "Why don't those damned politicians ever read my speeches?", he complained. "And why on earth don't they make an effort to grasp the principles behind the policies we've adopted?" That is all very well, but what on earth is the role of an opposition leader if he's not to criticise the government and promise better ways of doing things? ...If the opposition is merely an exercise in window dressing, I can see no point in carrying on with it...[63]

Mardom would have to be restricted in its criticism of the government's performance for if the performance of Hoveyda's government was indeed put under question people would arrive at the following logical question: If the government's performance is bad why has the shah tolerated it for such a long period of time? The crown had become excessively politicised due to Mohammad Reza Shah's desire to be in the very centre of the country's political life and ' grab at each new success, each new burst of popular approval, as an opportunity to consolidate his own personal power' as he himself put it.[64]

Ignoring comments that the rigging of elections hurt his standing the shah took a further step. In 1975 he dissolved the two-party system and established a one-party state. After attributing Iran's success to himself he stressed the need for everyone to participate in the modernisation of the country taking place under the aegis of the new party, *Rastakhiz*. Everyone at the age of eighteen would become a member. He stated that Iranians at this time had to express their political views, which he divided into three categories. The first category consisted of those people who accepted the basic principles of the new party: the monarchy, the 1906 Constitution[65], and the White Revolution, and actively participated in the country's renewal. The second group consisted of those who neither openly supported the principles of the party nor opposed the regime itself. They could benefit from the country's economic progress, but should not expect to hold political power. The third group consisted of a small minority of people who opposed national renewal. With his now characteristic excessive self-confidence he stated at the press conference:

> A person who does not enter the political party is either an individual who belongs to an illegal organisation, or is related to the outlawed Tudeh Party, or in other words a traitor. Such an individual belongs in an Iranian prison, or if he desires, he can leave the country tomorrow, without even paying exit fees and can go anywhere, because he is not an Iranian, he has no nation, and his activities are illegal and punishable according to law.[66]

The party had two wings, each headed by men close to the regime. Hoveyda, the head of the now dissolved *Iran-e novin* party became the general secretary of the party. The establishment of the party came as a complete surprise to most ministers and those at court. The shah in justifying his decision told Richard Helms that it was 'silly to have two'[67] parties when he already supported only one. Compare this policy decision with the shah's remarks on a single party made in *Mission for My Country* (1962):

> So I consider that my role as King requires that I encourage parties. If I were a dictator rather than a constitutional monarch, then I might be tempted to sponsor a single dominant party such as Hitler organised or such as you can find today in Communist countries. But as constitutional monarch I can afford to encourage large-scale party activity free from the straitjacket of one-party rule or the one-party state. As a symbol of the unity of my people, I can promote two or more parties without directly associating myself with any.[68]

The move from an official two-party system to a one-party state only weakened the shah's links with society and made Iranian political life more of a charade. Whereas, arguably, there had been cause to centralise power and manipulate elections when the government decided to attack special interests in the shah's drive for modernisation and reform, the time had come to loosen up to a degree the two-party system which everyone knew was controlled by the shah. After the establishment of *Rastakhiz* the shah confessed in an interview:

> ...We are not cheating in elections anymore. Nobody has to cheat. Because with the three principles really accepted by all the people—The Imperial Order, the Constitution, and the Revolution of Shah and People—really our people accept that, we don't have to cheat now. 'Who did cheat?' 'The parties.' 'All the time?' 'In the past, yes. Now we don't have to cheat.' 'It was taken for granted that everyone cheated?' 'Surely...[69]

To the shah's mind the biggest threat to the country's stability was communism, which he believed was the result of material deprivation and not political conditions. Hence his focus on the material benefits of the White Revolution and its ability to satisfy the population's needs. When asked about a two-party system in June 1975 by *Time* magazine the shah responded:

> If the ticket and platform of a second party could be really different, eventually it might come to that. But the only other platform might be Communism. What could another party offer? Less, yes; more, no. We have really attained the fringes of the most advanced socialism without its pink colour. Everybody will have a share, enough for a decent living...But you cannot prevent differences in any society, Communist or non-Communist.

> We are doing more than any other country I know, without being pinkish. Until now we could not afford (to legalise the Communist Party) because of our geographical location. When we establish the solid society that we are planning, we might eventually reconsider. If he is in his right mind, who is going to be a Communist in this country?...Everyone in this country of sound mind has occasion to express himself openly. Is shouting 'Down with the Shah' the only kind of freedom? The people of this country will not accept this. Maybe 1,000 or 1,500 will, but the rest will not. People can express their views on any subject, but we will not tolerate any Iranian betraying his country—and I don't mean betraying the monarchy.[70]

The founding of the single party, *Rastakhiz*, was just one example of the shah's new arrogance and self-confidence. His book *Towards the Great Civilisation* reached new heights in Pahlavi propaganda. 'No profound change can come about in our country outside the framework of the monarchical order...(T)he monarchic regime as soul, essence, source of energy and foundation of the national sovereignty constitutes the solid basis of the great civilisation and the strong custodian of all its values and its material and moral values. This regime will guide and protect the destiny of the Iranian people in the most brilliant period of their history.' The shah then added his own statements to the book, ' I have guided my people along this wonderful path of Destiny because I felt that only that path could insure their dignity and happiness. Having an absolute faith in this, it was my duty to set the nation such a goal, not only as the person responsible for its destiny but also as the father, guide, and friend of every Iranian.'[71] The celebrations in 1976 marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Pahlavi dynasty and the thirty-fifth year of the shah's reign gave further expression to Mohammad Reza's grandiosity and underlined the growing gap between him and the Iranian people. In an act designed to underscore the centrality of the monarchy in everyday life the shah decided to change the country's calendar, which under the Pahlavis was the Iranian solar calendar based on the Prophet Mohammad's fight. The Iranian calendar now dated from the founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great. Overnight the country went from 1354 to 2535 to the bewilderment of the people.

In the period 1971-1976 the shah weakened his system. Believing that the country was on the right track in all fields he became less tolerant of dissent. He gave SAVAK greater license to maintain control within society. The stories of SAVAK's methods, true or not, dealt a blow to the shah's legitimacy because they smacked of arbitrariness. By forming *Rastakhiz* the shah openly abandoned the 1906 Constitution and opted for arbitrary political rule. In the 1960s he was prepared at least to give it lip service. In the early 1960s many people, including many in the educated part of society, hoped that once the shah pushed through what he considered to be the more contentious part of his reform he would make steps toward the opening the system. But once the major parts of the 'White Revolution' were in place, the shah did not open the political system. This step only generated greater opposition or apathy vis-à-vis the Pahlavi regime amongst

many groups. Yet his modernisation programme had greatly expanded the number of educated people, who began to feel that they should have a say in the running of government. Because of his increasing hold over the political life of the country which meant greater violations of the 1906 Constitution the shah became overly dependent on the regime's economic achievements for his legitimacy. At the same time the arbitrariness of SAVAK and the political system under the single party hollowed the regime by not allowing a greater number of elites to have a real stake in the system.[72]

Structure and Agency: State vs. Religion?

In these three countries the monarchy's plans to address the international challenge hurt the economic and/or political interests of certain groups that had been staunch supporters of the crown. The ideology and economic modernisation programme of the last shah attracted opposition of many quarters within both the clergy and the traditional merchants. Louis XVI faced a similar coalition consisting of clergy, financiers, and a declining class of professionals. The breakdown in relations between the Pahlavi government and clergy was not inevitable.

In the midst of the political instability at the beginning of his reign, Mohammad Reza reached out to the *bête noir* of his father, the *ulama*. To be sure the new shah was more religious than his father. He relaxed many of Reza Shah's prohibitions on religious ceremonies and holidays and removed the ban against women wearing the veil. Whatever form Mohammad Reza Shah's real feelings on the clergy took, he recognised that the *ulama* was the only group in the 1940s and 50s prepared to work with the monarchy. He hoped to use them to augment his own power base. In fact, the *ulama* under the leadership of Ayatollah Kashani played a leading role in defeating its one-time ally, Mossadegh, and defending the monarchy. The shah based his relationship with the clergy on three considerations: (1) the perceived communist threat to the country; (2) the pursuit of modernisation and reform; and (3) the preservation and expansion of the power of the Pahlavi dynasty over Iranian society. To the shah's mind goal number two could not be accomplished without a strong Pahlavi monarchy able to break opposition to reform.

The shah believed that religion and the clergy could provide the best defence against communism. Yet, he needed to emasculate the political and social power of the clerics whom he considered an enemy of modernisation and Pahlavi power. To his mind Iran's social and economic modernisation could not be secure whilst a powerful and independent clergy existed. By influencing clergy the shah hoped to augment his own power and therefore refrained from destroying them altogether. In order to ensure a degree of passive support on the part of the clergy the Pahlavi government gave millions away in gifts to the *ulama*. This practice, which had been utilised by the authorities since the introduction of Shi'ism, was terminated in 1977 during the government's belt-tightening. Many, including the shah, believed that this move destroyed whatever control the government had over many members of the clergy and pushed them into the arms of *ulama* radicals.[73] With this money, the *ulama* enlarged the traditional religious

infrastructure of mosques and seminaries. Regarding communism as the most dangerous threat to his rule and the clergy as the greatest threat to the modernisation of the country, the shah came to interpret all opposition to his rule as communist or religious and therefore not representative of general popular feelings in relation to his policies. He convinced himself that he did not need to pay attention to any public grumbling. By the 1970s he believed that the impressive economic growth over the previous decade had neutralised to a significant degree the communist threat. He therefore began to make political moves which seemed to the clergy to be aimed at expanding state control over religion and undermine the remnants of clerical power.

The clergy was divided in their approach to the regime. As a whole the Shi'ia *ulama* during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah were socially and politically conservative. The social aspect of their conservatism eventually led to a loss of support amongst certain groups of people, though many respected the piety of certain clerics. The politically conservative clerics supported the idea of clerical interference in the political life of the country when religion seemed to be under threat. This group preferred to focus on seminaries, the education of future members of the *ulama*, and spreading the word of God. A second group was neither supportive of nor in opposition to the regime. It supported the Constitution of 1906, hoping for the establishment of the religious council which would give the clergy a veto over legislation contradicting their interpretations of Islam. The members of this section of the orthodox clergy had at one time or another been in open opposition to acts of the Pahlavi government, such as land reform, female suffrage, or family law. They also found growing western influence and moral decline as issues both the government and religion had to address. They wanted to exercise some type of influence on the Pahlavi government on questions dealing with religion, though by the 1970s hopes for this had faded. 'Even if this group participated in the revolutionary movement of 1977-1979 and used its enormous organisational power to mobilise the masses, it was not until the very last stage of the movement that, under pressure from the fundamentalists, it reluctantly joined forces with them to demand the demolition of the monarchy.'[74] The third and smallest group, was in direct opposition to the shah, especially from 1963 onwards. Ayatollah Khomeini became its leader.

The first major confrontation between the shah and the clergy came in 1959-1960. Ayatollah Borujerdi, the recognised clerical leader at the time, called land reform anti-Islamic and used his allies in the Majles to block it. As in 1963, the clergy would try to support the land owners not so much out of sympathy for their plight, but out of the fear that having broken the back of the landed aristocracy the shah would go after their lucrative endowments. The shah, not feeling politically strong enough to confront the clergy, had the bill withdrawn. In November 1962 Prime Minister Alam by putting forward the Local Councils Election Bill according to which women would have the right to vote and a government official would take his oath of office on any holy book provoked the clergy. Ayatollahs Golpaygani, Shariatmadari, and Khomeini protested against the

granting of voting rights to women and the replacement of 'Holy Quran' by 'Holy Book.' Khomeini, upon hearing of the government's plans to allow non-Muslims to hold local governmental positions and women to vote, stated... 'the son of Reza Khan has embarked on the destruction of Islam in Iran. I will oppose this as long as the blood circulates in my veins.'[75] Pulpits across the country were used to stir up opposition to the government. Alam backed down and removed the bill.

The shah then launched his White Revolution and organised a referendum for its acceptance by the Iranian people. The clergy again protested against the land reform and female suffrage. To a private request from one ayatollah not to take these steps the shah tellingly responded: 'I will have to carry through these reforms, come what may. If I do not I will be swept away and others (communists) will take my place who believe in neither me nor in your ideology and will destroy these mosques over your head and get rid of you.'[76] Khomeini, who took charge of the opposition at this point, declared the use of a referendum to be anti-Islamic. The government and mass media portrayed the clerical opposition as 'black reactionaries.' Khomeini attacked the shah:

> Let me give you some advice, Mr. Shah! Dear Mr. Shah, abandon these improper acts I do not want people to offer thanks should your masters decide that you must leave ...You wretched, miserable man, forty-five years of your life has passed. Isn't time for you to think and reflect a little, to ponder where all of this is leading you, to learn a lesson from the experience of your father? [77]

The next day the government arrested him. He was eventually released, but not allowed to return to Qom where his seminary was situated. Khomeini did not cease his anti-government activities. When the government granted capitulatory rights to US advisers working in Iran Khomeini once again attacked the shah. Demonstrations took place in Tehran, Qom, Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashad, and Tabriz. They did not attract a significant degree of support and the government crushed them. In fact there were counter-demonstrations of women who protested against the clergy's position on women's suffrage. In some cases members of the *ulama* had their turbans ripped off their heads.[78]

At a ceremony dedicated to presenting land deeds to some peasants the shah responded to the clergy's attempts to incite revolts in the country:

> They were always a stupid and reactionary bunch whose brains have not moved...Black reaction understands nothing...its brain has not moved forward for a thousand years. They think life is about getting something for nothing, eating and sleeping...sponging on others and a parasitic existence...In the six points of the White Revolution there is an idea suitable for everyone. What we are doing today is not behind other nations. If anything it is more advanced...But who is opposing it? Black reaction, stupid men who don't understand and are ill intentioned. The Red

> subversives have clear intentions and by the way I have less hatred for them. They frankly say they want to hand over our country to foreigners, without lying or hypocrisy. This black reaction formed a small and ludicrous gathering from a handful of bearded, stupid bazaaris to make noises...they don't want to see our country develop...they oppose reform because they will then not be able to deceive anyone...these men are a hundred times more treacherous than the Tudeh party...(they are like) a numb and dispirited snake and lice who float in their own dirt. If these sordid and vile elements with their reactionary friends do not wake from their sleep of ignorance, the fist of justice, like thunder, will strike their heads in whatever cloth they are, perhaps to terminate their filthy and shameful life.[79]

Some of the comments were too harsh to be published in the national press. The shah, once encountering such clerical opposition to what he considered enlightened legislation came to believe that the entire reform project, the country's future, and his power would not be secure as long as the *ulama* remained 'backward' and powerful. His attack on the clerical establishment as a whole, 'dragged the clergy even deeper into the political field...He invited them.'[80] The shah understood well the radicalism within this group. He had lost one court minister and two prime ministers at the hands of radical Islamist assassins with ties with some leading ayatollahs in. The shah viewed the clergy, not religion, as an open enemy of his regime and his modernisation programme. He also had doubts about the extent of their religiosity. 'All those (clerics) who beat the drum of Islam (*sang-e Islam be sine mizanand)* are not at all religious.'[81] This battle for power and popular legitimacy between two pillars of the Iranian political order, the crown and a part of the clergy, mirrored the struggle between the French crown and the Parlement of Paris under Louis XV. The shah's speech cited above, reflecting this 'war' between the conservative clergy and the Pahlavis, is similar in content to Louis XV's famous speech at *La séance de flagellation* at which he slapped down the obstreperous magistrates who in the king's view were using constitutional populist rhetoric to defend their political and fiscal privileges.

> I will not tolerate the emergence in my kingdom of an organisation which could degenerate into a confederation of resistance...nor the introduction within the monarchy of an imaginary body which could trouble the monarchy's harmony. The magistracy does not in any way form a body, nor an order separate from the three estates of the kingdom. The magistrates are my officers charged with handling for me the responsibility of rendering justice to my subjects, a function which attaches the magistrates to my person alone...It should not be forgotten that the sovereign power resides in my person alone whose actual character is the spirit of council, justice, and raison. It is because of me that my courts exist and have power. The latitude of that power which is exercised in my name, resides in my and

> therefore it can never be used against me. It is to me alone that the legislative power belongs without dependence or division.[82]

Vital parts of the monarchical body politic in France and Iran provided much of the basis of the eventual revolutionary rhetoric. This opposition to the crown emerged as a response to the French and Iranian monarchies' centralisation and reforms which hurt vested interests. These vested interests used religious and state constitutional rhetoric in their attempts to block reforms. When Louis XVI pushed through Turgot's Six Edicts the Parlement of Paris voiced its opposition in typical religious terms: 'The responsibility of the clergy is to fulfil all the functions relating to education, religious service and contribute to the relief of the poor through alms. The nobility devotes its blood to the defence of the state and assists in the sovereign's councils. The last class of the nation cannot render to the state similarly distinguished duties and has as its duty the payment of tribute, industry, and labour.'[83] Tsardom of the late nineteenth century did not experience such strong opposition from within the traditional structure itself, though there was agrarian opposition to Witte's policies.

Throughout the 1960s the Pahlavi government continued to pass legislation which the *ulama* found to be in contradiction to Islamic law. The shah gave women the right to sue for divorce, raised the legal age of marriage for both men and women, gave secular courts the power over family disputes, and pursued a policy to widen work and education possibilities for women. Many Iranian women indeed supported these moves by the regime and considered the clergy too conservative on this issue.

In exile Khomeini railed against the shah and his policies. In 1971 Khomeini declared that the monarchy was incompatible with Islam, which made him the first major religious leader to call for the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy. Through a series of lectures which were eventually published Khomeini laid forth his plan for an Islamic government at the heart of which would be the institution of *velayat-e faqih*, rule of Islamic jurisprudence, which came into existence after the overthrow of the monarchy. By offering an alternative to the monarchy the ayatollah had distinguished himself from the other major political groups which hoped to work within the framework of the 1906 Constitution and maintain the monarchy. By continually violating the 1906 Constitution the shah gave Khomeini the opportunity to become the populist, fighting despotism.

The shah announced in 1971, 'It is not improbable that we will create a religious corps in the future so that if some of the students of the religious sciences have to perform their (military)service, they can do it (within the framework of the corps). Just as we say religion must be separated from politics and a few years ago we saw the results of mixing the two and just as we are insistent in that respect...so, too we encourage people to piety and religion. No society is truly stable without religion.'[84] The creation of the religious corps, whereby young people could fulfil their military service by teaching religion, or rather the Pahlavi version of Islam in the villages and other rural areas convinced many clerics that the shah was

determined to create a society with no place for them. An increasing number of clerics became worried about the state of Islam under the Pahlavi regime and the westernisation of the country. In 1974 Ayatollah Ghaffari died whilst in custody. The bazaaris, fearful of their livelihood in the face of the shah's economic modernisation, became allies of the clergy. These opposition groups were not prepared to take on the Pahlavi state whilst it seemed strong.

The revolutionary Islamic discourse as it evolved in the 1960s and 1970s was not a pre-existing anti-temporal ideology based on Shi'ia political thought. Rather it evolved and changed thanks to the contributions of figures such as Khomeini, Jamal Al-e Ahmad, and Ali Shariati. 'In sum, revolutionary Islamic discourse was produced and formed, as it were, as a result of the propaganda warfare and back-and-forth arguments between the state ideology and the opposition within the changing conditions of the post-coup period.'[85] For some groups one of these conditions was the growing fear that Iranian culture might vanish or suffer serious harm in face of the shah's modernisation/westernisation programmes.

The new political reality in Iran after 1953 is vital to any understanding of the emergence of political Islam in Iran. In the aftermath of Mossadegh's overthrow, the shah with the help of the US established an authoritarian system which moved to crush all secular and semi-secular opposition in the country, from communist to national secularist. The consequences of this policy were numerous and dangerous for the Pahlavi regime. The resultant vacuum in the political arena outside of the government deprived the shah of possible allies in political battles with any future conservative Islamic opposition to reform and created a situation in which the clergy came to be seen as the only and leading opposition group to the shah's increasing authoritarian ways. One of the reasons Khomeini's uprising in 1963 failed was that the National Front, the party of Mossadegh, was not prepared to work with what was considered conservative clerics. After all, Khomeini was battling against reforms which the National Front supported. By destroying these groups the shah eliminated the very groups that were ready to support the 1906 Constitution and were against a theocracy. He played the leading role in pushing the political discourse into the religious sphere by both the systemic repression of the non-religious political groups and his blind westernisation which exacerbated greatly the Iranian identity crisis. Both the modernisation/westernisation and the elimination of the secular groups were policy choices made by the shah reflecting more than anything his personality. There was nothing structurally inevitable about them.

Structure and Agency: Mohammad Reza Shah and Modernization

The White Revolution of Shah and People constituted the framework of the shah's modernisation programme. The shah believed that by economically and socially modernising Iran he could strengthen the crown's support amongst the lower classes for they were to be the biggest beneficiaries of the reforms. The shah unveiled the first six principles of his White Revolution in 1962: female suffrage, land reform, privatisation, nationalisation of forests, workers' profit

sharing programme, and the creation of the Literacy Corps. The principles were overwhelmingly approved in a referendum, which was dogged with charges of rigging. The most controversial were land reform and women's suffrage.

The land reform destroyed the landed upper class as an independent political force in the country. From its ranks, the shah created a semi-industrialist class dependent to a significant degree on the state for capital and business opportunities. He also practically eliminated absentee land ownership. Overcoming entrenched landed interests can be considered one of his greatest successes. The three phases of the land reform created a petty landowning stratum in Iranian society. The shah hoped, as did Stolypin, this group would provide the necessary stability in the countryside. These petty landowners did not rise in defence of the regime but at the same time, countryside and rural peasant action played virtually no role in the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty.[86] However the government's attempts to reorganise the agricultural sector of the economy disequilibriated the countryside, forcing many young men, some with their families, into the cities. Enduring economic struggles and a different, urbane culture contrasting greatly with the environment in which they had grown up, these young men presented a threat to stability in many cities, and especially Tehran. The Pahlavi bureaucracy spread into the countryside with the creation of state credit banks, the Health Corps, Literacy Corps, Village societies, the Houses of Justice and finally the Religious Corps.

Even before the Mossadegh period the shah had hopes of laying the infrastructure for the economic modernisation of Iran. In 1949 the Plan and Budget Organisation was established and charged with creating five-year plans. The PBO was to be independent of the state machinery and under a director who would report to the shah and the Majles. The Third Development Plan (1963-1967), 'the first effort in the direction of comprehensive planning', became one of the most successful plans of the Pahlavi period. During these years Iran experienced strong growth, thanks to both the plan and some fortuitous circumstances. The productive capacity of both the agricultural and industrial sectors was significantly raised. The director of the PBO from 1973-1977 believes that, 'Iran's economic miracle occurred between 1963 and 1973—in fact before the increase in oil revenues. We achieved extraordinary growth.'[87] The growth rates of this period—1964/65 8.7%, 1965/66 10.9%, 1966/67 8.5%, 1967/68 15.3%, 1968/69 6.3%, 1969/70 11.4%---attest to this judgement. More importantly the PBO and the government, recognising the economic and political problems engendered by inflation, succeeded in keeping the money supply under tight control so that that average inflation rate was 1.25%. This anti-inflationary policy reflected the shah's thinking as well. He 'had a particular sensitivity to price increases...'[88]

The shah did not actively participate or meddle in the planning process or in the execution of the First, Second, or Third Plan. 'The role of His Majesty in the Third Plan as much as we could see was very little...During the period of the Third Plan His Majesty attended only one session of the PBO where he was

informed of the basic principles of the Third Plan.'[89] He was content to set the broad parameters of policy, but more or less at this time allowed the technocrats to execute policy coherently. 'The shah at one point believed that economic policy had to be carried out in light of developmental capacity and monetary and technology capacity as well as human resources.'[90]

The Fourth Development Plan (1968-1972) which became the most successful of the development plans continued the work of the Third, but in a more efficient manner and with greater comprehensiveness.[91] The focus of the plan, industrialisation, reflected the shah's interest.[92] By this period he was convinced that not only was economic growth generated by industrialisation a desirable goal, but that Iran would need to construct a strong industrial and export sector which would provide the base for the country's economy in the post-oil era. Despite setting this goal the shah did not interfere in the drawing up of the plan and its implementation. During this plan the growth rate averaged 11% per annum and the living standards of the population on the whole increased. As in many economically developing countries the gap between the rich and power grew, but the situation of the poor in Iran did improve significantly.

The success of this and the Third Plan boosted the shah's self-confidence. He came to believe that Iran's economic success was due to him alone. The original Fifth Development Plan (1973-1977) proved to be much more ambitious in its targets than the previous two plans. This already ambitious plan was revised in the light of the sky-rocketing of government oil income. The original Fifth Development Plan envisioned oil revenues of $24.6 billion over five years, which was based on 1972-1973 oil income of $2.2 billion. By 1974 Iran was bringing in $18.5 billion in oil revenues *annually*.

'We have the money. Now we must use it to fashion "The Great Civilisation', the shah told Alam at the onset of the jump in oil income.[93] The shah's belief that money was the only obstacle to modernisation of the country guided him into making several decisions, which in the end destroyed the fragile economic and social equilibrium at a time when he made several poorly judged political decisions that. The result was a weakening of his regime.

In 1973 the shah received a report detailing the prospects for Iranian economic development. The PBO warned policy makers that financial resources could not alone bring rapid industrialisation, that Iran's income was subject to the changeable demand of world supply, and that natural gas income would not make a large contribution to the country's income. It stressed that Iran, given the reality of her infrastructure and human resources, could not become by the end of the Christian century the world's fifth industrial power. 'This conclusion would lead the shah to accuse the PBO, as he had always done, of being unduly pessimistic. It would lead him to almost completely disregard all the conclusions of the report.' Lastly, the report tried to turn the shah's attention to the need to resolve major infrastructural bottlenecks and shortages of power if strong economic growth was to be sustained.[94] The report stressed the limits of Iran's capacity to absorb even higher rates of economic growth.

The meeting with the shah took place in March 1974. Instead of a presentation by the PBO and then a discussion the shah outlined his plans for Iran's 'great jump' forward, ignoring the advice of his economic advisers against pouring all oil revenues into the economy. Those advisors and ministers warning against aspects of this plan the shah labelled pessimists unable to understand the reality of the country. When it was pointed out to him that Iran did not have the absorptive capacity for such a large amount of capital, not enough trained workers and specialists, sufficient infrastructure and trucks, and high port capacity, he retorted that, 'if manpower was short it would be imported; if ports could not handle the anticipated inflow of goods, than a crash programme to improve throughput should be instituted immediately; and if inflation were to pick up, then Iran would deal with this crisis in an innovative manner.'[95] The shah abandoned his sensitivity to inflation.

> Those that had doubts in the end stood silent, out of fear, or in the belief that the realities of the situation would impose their own logic on the new Plan. The shah genuinely seems to have believed that the problems underlined by Majidi could be solved and were subordinate to the lofty objective of accelerating the occasion of self-sustaining economy, independent of oil. He told the assembled dignitaries at Ramsar: 'The Great Civilisation' we promised you is not a utopia either. We will reach it much sooner than we thought. We said we will reach the gates in 12 years; but in some fields, we have already crossed the frontiers.[96]

This is a classic situation in which many different paths were available and one was chosen based on the personality of the monarch. Two dynamics were at work. First was the shah's determination to go down in history as the man who modernised Iran within his lifetime, combined with the belief that the previous economic and social successes were due to him alone. 'I have great hopes. We must make this country into one of the most powerful in the world and not only in the Middle East. There is no reason for it not to happen. We have the means and the power. Could someone else have done what we have done?'[97] This blinded him to the judicious advice that was given to him. In 1960 the shah would have most likely listened to his advisers. By 1973/74 he was no longer prepared to do so. Secondly, as noted above, the way in which the shah had constructed and operated his system convinced most people not to disagree with his positions and opinions. Compare this to the ministerial opposition to Nicholas II's idea to transform the Duma into a consultative assembly. Conservatives as well as liberals did not shy away from voicing strongly their opposition to it and Nicholas gave way. Under Louis XVI and Nicholas II ministers were more prepared to express their opinions to the monarch than most people in the Pahlavi system by the late 1960s.

The infusion of this money disequilibriated the economy and reaped political consequences. Public spending increased by 142%. GNP grew in leaps and

bounds—1973/74 34%, 1974/75 42%, and 1975/76 17%.[98] Imported goods flooded into the country which lacked the necessary infrastructure to handle such large volumes. Consequently, shortages of all kinds of goods, from building materials to certain fruits emerged as the economy tried to satisfy simultaneously wealthier consumers and demands for developmental projects. The country's infrastructure could not manage. Inflation hit every sector of the economy. Official rates for 1974 and 1975 were 18% and 24% respectively, but real inflation was much higher. In Tehran and other major cities rents sky rocketed; even the modest rises in wages could not keep up. More and more personal income was being devoted to rent and food. Some estimates put the rise in the cost of living between 1975 and 1977 at 200%, although this might be slightly exaggerated.[99] The result was general discontent, especially amongst the lower and even the middle classes which inflation hurt the most. Iran had not experienced such inflation since the early 1960s.

The shortage of trained labour was addressed with a flood of foreign workers, with Westerners and in particular Americans snatching up the best-paid positions. This created fertile ground for resentment. In the first place these foreign workers received much higher salaries than their Iranian counterparts who were doing the same type of work. Secondly, these highly paid foreign workers preferred to live in the nicer parts of the cities and especially Tehran, which drove property values in these areas out of the reach of most middle-class Iranians. They therefore had to look elsewhere within the city which had the affect of driving up property values across the city. Thirdly, many of the foreign workers, and especially US ones, tended to ignore societal norms and clashed with Iranians. The shah received the blame for this.

This economic bonanza also had political consequences. The shah could now 'hover above society,' at which height he could ignore the pretensions of many groups and act arbitrarily in the economic and political field. Whereas during the 1960s the regime followed a sound economic policy and treated the private sector with due respect, now the shah, believing that growth was self-sustaining due to oil income alone, worked against the interests of the private sector. This inevitably weakened its links with the monarchy.

The shah's and the government's response to the growing economic malaise only exacerbated both the political and economic situation in the country. The shah refused to accept the idea that the country's inflation and the economic overheating was due to excessive government spending. Money continued to be poured into the economy, in the belief that capital would solve all the bottle-neck problems. The shah based his reactions on the belief that money could solve everything. Inflation he attacked with political methods.

The shah blamed the business community in Iran for the massive rise in prices. price rises. He established price controls based on pre-inflationary prices on twenty thousand products and commodities. The minister of commerce, with the aid of young Rastakhiz members, was given the power to arrest merchants, industrialists, retailers, shopkeepers, and bazaaris whom they found guilty of

raising prices and in effect of damaging the 'Shah-People Revolution.' Some 10,000 people were either fined or arrested and tried in a humiliating court procedure. Some of the biggest industrialists in Iran, such as the president of Pepsi-Cola Iran and the head of BMW Iran were arrested. This 'economic' arbitrariness brought a dramatic collapse in business confidence in the Pahlavi state which had been successfully cultivated over the previous fifteen years. Investment, foreign and domestic, fell dramatically as did the shah's legitimacy. In 1976 more than $2 billion was transferred out of the country. The policy was a complete failure. The shah had needlessly antagonised one of the key pillars of his support. In exile he admitted this one mistake. [100]

The shah's legitimacy was also seriously damaged in the eyes of the urban lower and lower middle classes which were greatly affected by the inflation. Once he obtained this vastly higher oil income the shah increasingly made grandiose promises to the Iranian people on everything regarding their social and personal welfare proclaiming the emergence of the 'Great Civilisation.' The governmental bureaucracy had neither the administrative capacity nor the human or technical resources to satisfy these promises. But people's expectations continued to rise despite the very improvements in their lives. In 1976, for example, when Hoveyda and Majidi went to open a new hospital complex in Kashan, consisting of three new hospitals and modern equipment, they encountered complaints about lack of a purification system for drinking water and periodic power cuts. At the time Majidi thought: 'Ten years ago Kashan had nothing—not enough food, no hospitals, no drinking water whatsoever. People expected everything soon.'[101] But in the end the shah's lofty goals could not be fulfilled given the very real obstacles faced by the bureaucracy. The ultimate failure only served to aggravate tensions for there was a widening gap between his promises and the reality of the people's situation.

In 1976 the shah was shocked to learn that Iran had to borrow on the international market once again in order to make ends meet. In a ministerial meeting dedicated to Iran's financial predicament the shah was 'depressed and despondent.' He asked his ministers, 'What happened that we all of a sudden fell into this situation?' Everyone was silent. Then Majidi spoke up. 'We were like the people who used to live in a village. There was not too much rain, but one could survive. Everyday they prayed for rain. All of a sudden it rained so much that a flood appeared and wiped everything away. But fortunately the people lived. We wanted a little more money, we got all that money. Now we have none.' Majidi recalled that, 'The shah did not like this remark at all. He got up and left the room. Then everyone attacked me.'[102]

The shah responded to the new situation in two ways. Firstly, he changed government policy 180 degrees. The message to the government was now to economise in everything. Half-completed projects could be continued, but everything else had to be delayed until the implementation of the Sixth Plan. The shah however continued to spend on the armed forces at previous levels which created resentment. The message to the people was different as well. Whereas only

a year previous he promised the Iranian people European living standards, he now told *Keyhan*, 'Till now we have not asked the people for sacrifices. Instead we kept them wrapped in cotton wool. Things are going to change now. Everyone will have to work harder and be ready for sacrifices in the national interest.' In 1978 the government deficit ballooned to $7.3 billion.[103] Secondly, he searched for scapegoats. The Imperial Commission was set-up to investigate the government bureaucracy in order to find those responsible for corruption, the delays in implementing the shah's programmes, and governmental waste.

> The policy decision to set up this Imperial Commission, to try to lay the blame for the faulty policies on those who only obeyed orders, could only cast doubt on the one who gave the orders. The public trials of high government officials in a televised forum for all to see could only create resentments on the part of the bureaucratic class or stir up watchers' resentments against the shah and his government. In a sense, the shah had placed himself on trial, and through the media ensured that the message would go out clearly and far. [104]

For at least the last fifteen years Mohammad Reza Shah let the Iranian people know that he deserved the credit for the government's achievements and that nothing could happen without his approval. People knew that the ministers were just fulfilling orders and that the shah made all major, including economic, decisions. He had blurred too much the line between the government and himself personally and thereby could not escape unscathed.

By mid-1977 the shah, realising the seriousness of the economic and political problems generated by the boom and bust cycle he had created with massive public spending, decided to change his government. He removed Hoveyda and made him minister of the court, replacing the dying Alam. Jamshid Amuzegar, an economist, became prime minister. He made deep cuts in government spending which resulted in a dramatic decline in economic growth. Given the strong economic performance over the previous decade this decline resembled for many a serious recession. The economic malaise which had taken over primed many people to succumb to revolutionary rhetoric of the *ulama*. In the period 1946-1968 a strong correlation between political violence and rising living costs existed. The magnitude of the political violence was 'dependent also upon the nature of the political regime's response to economic hardship and the degree of the legitimacy which it enjoys among the population.'[105] By 1977 belt-tightening which had a greater effect on the less well-off classes characterised the government's response to these economic difficulties. The regime's legitimacy hit a low point.

Iran was a rentier state, vulnerable to changes in the demand and price of oil. To stress this rentier status as the single structural cause for the economic malaise of 1975 when oil revenues did not meet projections misses the point. Iran was to varying degrees dependent on international market trends which played an important role in her economic situation. Iran under Mossadegh and in the

1960s was more sensitive to the oil market, than the Iran of the oil boom. By the 1970s Iran had more means to insulate herself, once again to a degree, from fluctuations in the price of oil. The first PBO report to the shah stressed the mercurial character of the oil income and strongly recommended taking this into account when making projections for Iran's economic growth. It advised investing the excess cash abroad or placing it in reserve. This advice the shah decided to ignore. The adoption of such a policy would have helped cushion Iran from the shortfall in oil income in 1976, ensuring that changes in the oil market would not have such an adverse affect on the economy and material well being of the less well off.

1977 brought uncertainty to the Iranian political scene. Firstly, Jimmy Carter, emphasising the issue of human rights in US foreign policy, became president. For the first time since the Kennedy Administration rumours abounded in Iran that Washington's support for the shah had weakened and that pressure would be placed on him to implement political reforms.

Secondly, the shah instituted a liberalisation programme already towards the end of 1976, before Carter's inauguration but after his election. Without doubt the Pahlavi regime felt the reverberations of the change in US foreign policy, however this should not be taken too far. The shah changed course after he realised that the 'big push' in the economic development of the country had failed in its economic goals and in institutionalising the Pahlavi state. The shah knew he was dying and was worried above all else by the smooth succession of his son, Crown Prince Reza. He reiterated the purposes for the liberalisation programme in an interview, 'When my father went, I saw that everything crumbled in twenty-four hours. I am trying to establish a machinery.'[106] The US ambassador, William Sullivan, wrote that the shah 'felt...that it was essential for him to move rapidly to establish a democratic political system that would sustain his dynasty after his departure.'[107] Foreigners close to the shah also believed that whilst Carter's new foreign policy did play a role in the implementation of the liberalisation programme, the shah was more motivated by the future of his dynasty after his death. His illness reminded him of his mortality. This was a man who understood that some form of liberalisation and greater adherence to the 1906 Constitution were needed in order to legitimise further the Pahlavis.

One problem was the timing of this liberalisation process. By announcing a liberalisation process after the election of Jimmy Carter he created the impression that he was responding to US pressure and not acting out of his own good will thereby strengthening the impression that he was a US puppet and did not believe in a policy of liberalisation. He did this when dissatisfaction with the government was high amongst many parts of the population due to economic malaise, inflation, corruption as well as political frustrations. To have instituted such a programme when the government could have benefited from a buoyant economy and low inflation would have been more fruitful for the shah.

The other danger consisted in the form this liberalisation took. The shah promised to create 'a free political atmosphere' in which there would be free

elections and no press censorship.[108] Many professional organisations, such as the Iranian Writers Association, and the Association of Iranian Jurists, sent open letters with criticisms and demands to the prime minister. But the shah made no serious moves to open up the system. There were no free elections. He continued to appoint and dismiss the government, and *Rastakhiz*, remained the only legal party. The shah had created the worst possible situation. He gave the people the right to criticise openly the regime whilst holding back the right for them to participate in government. He maintained all power in his hands. In the process the opposition became bolder, although not revolutionary. Students, intellectuals, and some professionals dominated this protest movement, demanding changes within the current structure under the guise of the 1906 Constitution. Whilst these groups planned their reforms, more radical forces within the Islamic movement and guerrilla organisations began to mobilise.

In the beginning of 1978 General Nassiri, the head of SAVAK, notified the shah about a printed announcement of Ayatollah Khomeini on the occasion of his son's death. Khomeini stated that his grief 'paled in comparison to the grief he felt for all the crimes committed by the Pahlavi regime in Iran.' The shah became furious and ordered the writing and publication of an article against the exiled ayatollah.[109] The shah rejected the first draft on the grounds that it was not harsh enough. He approved a second draft and had it sent to the Ministry of Information. It was published in *Ettela'at*, one of the main dailies.[110] The article claimed that Khomeini was as an agent of imperialism and of Indian descent. Three of Iran's grand ayatollahs, Shariatmadari, Marashi, and Golpayegani, demanded the retraction of the article from the government. Two days after the article's publication the *ulama* organised a demonstration in the holy city of Qom. In a sign of support the bazaaris closed their shops for the day. When police arrived on the scene the demonstration turned violent. More than a dozen people were killed and several hundred injured.[111]

According to Islamic tradition the fortieth day after the death of a martyr must be celebrated. A demonstration was organised in Tabriz in February. Once again the rally turned violent when troops were sent to prevent the demonstrators from entering mosques. The crowd then burned several government office buildings, cinemas, liquor stores and a bank and tried to enter the centre of the city. Some protesters were killed and hundreds were arrested, but calm was restored. Shariatmadari condemned the use of violence by the police, but importantly did not condone the violent actions of the crowd. Khomeini however praised them and legitimised the use of violence against the regime. Deaths from this protest gave cause to plan additional rallies on the fortieth day. This cycle continued throughout the spring and summer as disturbances spread to other cities. The pulpits were used to attack the shah and galvanise the population against the government.

Whilst it seemed that the shah continued to have the situation under control his characteristic indecisiveness when confronted with such opposition began to have a deleterious effect on the government's response to the disturbances. Even in

spring 1978 there were no mass demonstrations, partly out of fear of government reprisals, partly out of suspicion of those leading them. He continued with his liberalisation process, having the Majles pass legislation setting forth the conditions for the holding of free elections in February 1979. Yet, it seemed that he was not making any true steps towards that goal. At the same time, he refused to use systematic force to crush the disturbances. The shah who had appeared for very long time the epitome of the decisive leader was now all of a sudden seemingly vulnerable and indecisive. The radicals were not prepared to allow this opportunity to pass.

The need for decisive action increased in the summer of 1978 as the result of two incidents, which led to the further spread and intensification of the revolutionary disturbances. In August 400 people burned to death in a fire in the Rex Cinema in Abadan. When the people tried to escape they found the doors locked. Rumours abounded that SAVAK had orchestrated the fire, whilst the government blamed Islamic Marxists.[112] Then the Iranian equivalent of Bloody Sunday of the Russian Revolution of 1905, Black Friday, occurred on 8 September. The opposition had planned a large demonstration, which was to start in Zhaleh Square. Some of the commanders of the army feared that such a demonstration would cause general chaos and the government's loss of control. Sharif-Emami and the shah bowed to this pressure and imposed martial law in the evening of 7 September. The demonstration was to begin early the next morning. Unfortunately, many of the rank-and-file did not know that martial law had been imposed. Differing accounts exist on how the violence started. Some state that, 'Because the demonstrators ignored the curfew restrictions, the police opened fire into the crowd.'[113] However, western journalists at the scene and others contend that this was not a planned attack, but rather occurred as the result of haphazard confrontations between the soldiers and the leaders of the demonstration[114] The 'troops withdrew two or three times before they were finally backed into a corner and opened fire. Crowds were attempting, or at least crowd leaders were attempting to provoke a confrontation and two or three times the troops under orders had backed away in order to avoid confrontations with the rioters. Finally they were backed into a corner.'[115] The number of killed has always been in dispute, ranging from government claims of 86 to opposition claims of 3,000. The confrontation was a blow to the shah and his regime. The bloodshed and the degree of hatred aimed at him shocked him.

Even at this time the opposition was divided between the Khomeini radicals and guerrilla movements who wished to dislodge the Pahlavi dynasty and some moderate clerics and National Front supporters who wished to obtain the shah's adherence to the 1906 Constitution. At this moment the shah needed to act decisively. He either had to relinquish part of his power and come to an agreement with the still majority moderate forces or use systematically the armed forces to crush the opposition. A member of the National Front who held several meetings with the shah about the unfolding crisis told the beleaguered monarch: 'Notwithstanding the fact that we have travelled a long way with the

revolutionaries, both religious and secular, a considerable part of the National Front is prepared, despite everything, to support your regime or even that of your son, on the condition that you very clearly acknowledge the right of the people as they are defined in our constitution...otherwise (we) will find (ourselves) irredeemably distanced from you and compelled to fight the monarchy.'[116] The shah failed to take advantage of this, although the level of support the National Front had at this point is questionable. If he chose to make some real concessions he could then use force to destroy the radical elements determined to overthrow the dynasty, claiming they threatened the national security of the country. He however chose none of these paths.

The new Sharif-Emami government, appointed in late August 1978, tried to appease the revolutionary forces with a myriad of concessions: a new ministry for religious endowments, the closing down of night clubs and discos, lifting of censorship, an anti-corruption campaign, dissolution of the *Rastakhiz* party, and pay rises for government employees. Some of the opposition groups rejected these moves, whilst others, including Ayatollah Shariatmadari gave them conditional support. They were waiting for changes in the way political power was held. If anything these moves convinced many of the shah's indecisiveness and weakness. He was clearly at a loss and losing control of the situation. In addition, by this time revolutionary Islamic ideology began to take over the entire movement.

The shah's appointment of a military government under General Gholam Reza Azhari in November reflected once again the monarch's indecisiveness and loss of direction. The shah proclaimed to the country that a military government charged with establishing order in the country was in place. Yet he ordered his generals to avoid bloodshed, stating that he did not want to see even a 'nose bleed.' He refused to permit the government to fulfil its assignment. The result was demoralisation throughout the system, especially at all levels in the army. Several days after the installation of the Azhari government the shah made a televised speech which only convinced the opposition that victory was theirs and that the need to compromise with the monarch did not exist, and disheartened the regime's supporters both inside and outside the government.

> In the climate of liberalisation, which began gradually two years ago, you rose against oppression and corruption. The revolution of the Iranian people cannot fail to have my support as the monarch of Iran and as an Iranian... The waves of strikes, most of which were quite justified, have lately changed in their nature and direction, causing the country's economy and the people's lives to be paralysed...We exerted all our efforts to establish the rule of law and order and peace by trying to form a coalition government, but when it became apparent that there was no likelihood of such a coalition, we had to appoint a caretaker government...I once again repeat my oath to the Iranian nation and undertake not to allow the past mistakes, unlawful acts, oppression and corruption to recur but to make up for them...I have heard the revolutionary message of you people, the

> Iranian nation. I am the guardian of the constitutional monarchy, which is a God-given gift entrusted to the shah by the people...Understand that along the road of the revolution of the Iranian people against oppression, corruption, and colonisation, I am with you...I request that all of you think of Iran. All of us must think of Iran.[117]

The shah justified the revolution and admitted the charges thrown at him by the leaders of the opposition. At the same time Azhari began to arrest members of the elite in the hope of satisfying public opinion. Amir Abbas Hoveyda, General Nassiri, Dariush Homayoun amongst many others found themselves in jail whilst hundreds of political prisoners, die-hard enemies of the regime were released. These arrests shocked the elite, who, unprepared to become scapegoats, began to pack their bags. The government also arrested the more moderate opposition figures. The shah had decided not to work with them.

The shah could have made a different speech outlining some serious political concessions within the framework of the 1906 Constitution which still gave the monarch a good deal of power, whilst at the same time warning that order had to and would be maintained, by force if necessary. Many at the time expected him to crush the uprisings. The question of whether force would have succeeded or not misses the point.

The shah's refusal to order the systematic use of force to crush the revolution has been the cause of some debate over both his personality and the likely effect force would have had on the course of events. Many people at the time were surprised by the shah's unwillingness to use force, given the events of 1963[118]and the image of strength the shah himself projected. This reluctance has been attributed to the shah's wish to have a green light from Washington to crush the revolution; without it he would not take responsibility for the blood letting. This might be true, but more to the point was that his refusal to use force was rooted in his personality and the changes which Iran had undergone since 1963, as well as in the scale of the disturbances.

When examining the shah's behaviour during this time we must remember four vital issues. Firstly, the shah sincerely believed that a strong bond of love and respect existed between him and his people. He saw himself as the father of this ancient country, for whose well being he was responsible. In this he was no different from Louis XVI and Nicholas II. Secondly, Mohammad Reza believed his regime's propaganda that proclaimed the emergence of the 'Great Civilisation' for which the people were grateful to him. When the BBC remarked that the shah would have no problems crushing an rebellion given the size of the army. The shah growled to Alam, 'Bastards! The workers and peasants are too satisfied to make a revolution.'[119] The spilling of blood could not sit well with the belief that Iran had already constructed her form of modernity, the Great Civilisation, under the leadership of the shah.

Thirdly, as the size and scale of the demonstrations grew, the deeper the shah's shock and depression over what was happening, for this contradicted everything

in which he had believed. Initially, the shah saw the disturbances as the work of an all too familiar minority, consisting of 'black reaction' (the clergy) and 'red traitors'(Marxists). To the shah's mind the vast majority of people could not and did not have sympathy for such groups, which he believed were either prepared to take Iran back to the Dark Ages or turn her over to the USSR. Therefore he could rationalise the use of force during the initial period of the revolution. This was also his rationale in allowing SAVAK to imprison and torture political prisoners. As he stressed in a 1974 interview, 'I am not bloodthirsty. I am working for my country and the coming generations. I can't waste my time on a few young idiots.'[120] Yet, the reality and possible exaggeration of SAVAK's methods only damaged seriously the shah's legitimacy and played a not insubstantial role in the motivation to rebel.

When the disturbances began to include an increasing number of people with different backgrounds the shah lost his direction. As he told one Iranian academic, 'You're a sociologist. You try to understand why the people behave the way they do. Can you explain to me why they shout, "Death to the shah?" What have I done to them?' Why is the more prosperous section of society unhappy? It is dissatisfied? What about? About the good living standards it has achieved in so short a time? About the trips it can now make? About the strength of our currency?...'[121] He asked the British Ambassador, Sir Anthony Parsons, '...why was it that the masses had turned against him after all that he had done for them.'[122]

Fourthly, refusing to believe that he had made mistakes and that genuine grievances existed the shah began to suspect that some groups, namely leftists and religious conservatives, were working with the U.S. and Britain to destabilise the country. He claimed that 'the West created an organised front against me to use whenever my policies diverged from theirs.'[123] 'The fact that no one (from the U.S. side) contacted me during the crisis in an official way explains everything about the American attitude...The Americans wanted me out.'[124] He exhibited similar feelings almost a year before the overthrow of Mossadegh. Understanding that the British intended to topple the nationalist premier the shah sent a message to London via Washington:

> He (Mohammad Reza) is reported to be harping about the theme that the British had thrown out the Qajar dynasty, had brought in his father and had thrown his father out. Now they could keep him in power or remove him as they saw fit. If they desired that he should stay ...he should be informed. If on the other hand they wished him to go he should be told immediately so that he could leave quietly...Were they behind the present efforts to deprive him of his power and prestige?[125]

Therefore, the shah's decision not to use force in 1978-79 might also be linked to his belief that foreign powers, namely the US and/or Britain were behind the attempts to stir up the people against him in a bid to remove him. The Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of the 1950s and the one of the late 1970s were one in

the same. To what purpose would using force against the people serve if the real power brokers had decided to overthrow the dynasty?

Nicholas II too refused to believe that his people could reject him. He blamed Jews and enemy agents for stirring up his normally loyal people against him. When the shah received reports that in the distant city of Borazyan there were riots he sadly commented, 'Even in Borazyan. *They* have brainwashed my people.'[126] Such words could have easily come from Nicholas II's mouth.

The basic dilemma remained—to use force or not. During an audience with the shah in the dying days of the regime a U.S general asked why he had lost control of the situation. Mohammad Reza Shah 'turned and stared at Ambassador Sullivan for what seemed like a very long time...He turned and looked at me with a very solid stare through his thick glasses. Finally he said, "Well you don't really understand. Your Commander-in-Chief is different from me. I am a Commander-in Chief who is actually in uniform and as such for me to give the orders that would have been necessary..." He stopped and asked, "Could you as Commander-in Chief give the orders to kill your own people?"'[127] In exile he justified his reasoning. '...a sovereign may not save his throne by shedding his countrymen's blood. A dictator can...But a sovereign is not a dictator. He cannot break the alliance that exists between him and his people.'[128] The shah understood that the absence of the threat of the systematic use of force made a decisive contribution to the increasing number and size of demonstrations. In exile he wrote that, 'the one mistake was to adopt this policy...because then the opposition saw that now we were surrendering under duress and pressure and they decided they could go all the way.'[129] He forgot the advice he had given Alam. 'Iranians are this way. If you make any concessions to them, you're finished. If you show resistance, you win.'[130]

Louis XVI found himself in the same situation. Hard-liners on the right as early as 1788 began to pressure him to put himself at the head of his troops and crush disturbances not only in Paris, but in the provinces as well. Brienne and the *garde des sceaux* Lamoignon stationed troops in Paris in May 1788 when Louis XVI promulgated the May Edicts part of which aimed to destroy permanently the Parlement's ability to 'obstruct policy by manipulating their rights of registration and remonstrance.'[131] The government feared that the Parlement would stir up popular revolt against such an open attack on their interests. There were no orders to attack gatherings of people. In fact, intendants in the provinces, where there were large scale disturbances wrote back to Paris that '...(we) never complained that we had not enough soldiers, decisive orders were what were needed most of all.'[132] The far-reaching fiscal and economic reforms of Brienne and Lamoignon failed not in the face of popular revolt or the break-down of the armed forces, but because of the government's bankruptcy, which required reconciliation with the Parlement in order to achieve funds. It was Maupeou's ability to remain financially afloat during his coup against the Parlements in 1771 that ensured success.

Louis XVI again summoned troops to Paris in the summer of 1788 on occasion of the *séance royale* at which he would give his judgement on the question of

doublement. Yet, Louis rejected calls to use the soldiers to crack down. He wrote to the commander of the troops, Baron de Besenval: 'Give the most precise and moderate orders to the officers commanding the detachments which you may have that they are only protectors and to avoid with the greatest care getting involved in any quarrel or to engage in any combat with the people unless the people begin to commit excesses or pillage which threaten the security of the citizens.'[133] Nevertheless, the presence of these troops created unease over Louis's intentions. In response to the National Assembly's request for information concerning these troops Louis tellingly answered: 'It is impossible to believe that the orders that have been given to the troops are the cause (of disturbances in Paris). 'That have been given', Bailly wrote in his diary. 'He does not say "that I have given."'[134] Louis refused to confess that he had ordered the troops to take-up positions around the capital. His wording and actions reflected his unwillingness to use force to shore up the monarchy, despite a willingness to do so during the Grain War.

There is a debate as to why Louis did not use the army to restore monarchical authority in the summer of 1789. If ever there was a time to do this, it was then. After all he had used a great deal of force during the Grain War at the beginning of his reign. The queen and the aristocratic party put great pressure on him to use force at this time to disband the Estate-General and institute a form of military rule in order to restore monarchical authority. But the duc de Broglie, an experienced but overly cautious old marshal, advised the Louis that given the present situation he could not guarantee that the troops would be able to take Paris if the need arose. Without questioning him Louis took his advice. The Russian ambassador wrote back to Petersburg: '*Le pouvoir royale n'existe plus.*'[135]

In the end Louis, similar to the shah, rejected the use of systematic force, yet like the shah in 1963, the French king used force against another insurrection in 1775. But in Louis' mind what was the difference between the 1775 War of Grain when political stability was under threat and 1788-89 when the crown was under threat? Louis' decision not to use force in the latter period was not inevitable; it reflected his personality. When rejecting the use of force in 1789 he said: 'Luckily there was no blood spilt and it can never be said that French blood has been spilled on my orders.'[136] In 1792 Louis looking back at events in 1789 remarked: 'I know when I missed the moment. It was the 14 July. I should have run away then and I wanted to'.[137] He did not regret that he did not use force to preserve monarchical authority, but rather the fact the he did not just leave. One is reminded of the shah's flight after the apparent failure of the coup against Mossadegh.

Nicholas II's situation in 1917 was quite different from those of the shah in 1978 and Louis XVI in 1788-89. Nicholas was prepared to use force to crush the disturbances in the capital to preserve the autocracy. After all Russia was fighting a war. But the initially weak and un-coordinated response to the demonstrations was a key reason why the crowds were able to move into central Petrograd. Once the garrison in the capital mutinied, the military command pressured the tsar to

abdicate, fearing the use of additional troops to crush the rebellion would lead to the collapse of the army itself and to Russian defeat in the war. The shah's and Louis XVI's dilemma over force resembled the one facing Nicholas II in 1905. The tsarist government was indeed on the defensive by the autumn of 1905. Witte, convinced that serious political concessions were needed to turn the tide obtained from the stubborn Nicholas the October Manifesto which guaranteed civil rights and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Contrary to expectations the situation worsened as disturbances spread; it seemed the regime would fall. Nevertheless, it survived due to a mixture of massive repression of radicals and mass demonstrations and concessions: namely the government continued moves to establish the new constitutional monarchy. In 1905-1906 tsardom's effective use of force and concessions provided it with a second chance. However, this scenario was not available to the shah and Louis XVI because these men could not, due to their psychology more than anything else, give the order for systematic use of force against the people in order to save the regime.

These three men suffered from depression during the closing years of their rule, which played no small role in the immediate events leading to the implosion of these monarchies. After the failure of Calonne's reforms Louis XVI began to pay less attention to affairs, preferring to hunt and play with his clocks more often. Mercy wrote to Josef II, 'Against such ills the king's low morale offers few resources and his physical habits diminish these more and more; he becomes stouter and his return from hunting is followed by such immoderate meals that there are occasional lapses of reason and a kind of brusque thoughtlessness which is very painful for those who have to endure it.'[138] The comte de Montmorin, the foreign secretary, remarked that when he was discussing events with Louis 'it seemed as if he were talking to the king about matters concerning the Emperor of China.'[139] The queen wrote: 'As you already know I have been very much worried about the king's health; ...it is really the overflowing of his cup of sorrows that makes him so ill.'[140]

The recollections of Nicholas II's mental and even physical condition after assuming command of the Russian army tell a similar story. In 1916 he went to Kiev to see his sister and mother. The empress dowager was worried by his excessive silence, whilst Grand Duchess Olga remarked that he was very 'pale, thin, and tired.' The French Ambassador Paleologue commented that his 'despondency, apathy and resignation can be seen in all his actions, appearance, attitude, and all his manifestations of the inner man.' By December 1916 the ambassador recorded that...'Nicholas II feels himself overwhelmed and dominated by events, that he had lost all faith in his mission or his work, that he has so to speak abdicated inwardly and is more resigned to disaster and ready for the sacrificial alter.'[141] Count Pavel Benkendorf told the court physician that 'His Majesty is a changed man...He is no longer seriously interested in anything. Of late he has become quite apathetic. He goes through his daily routine like an automaton, paying more attention to the hour set for his meals or his walk in the garden than to affairs of state. One can't run an empire and command an army in

the field in such a way.'[142] Kokovtsev wrote in his diary after meeting with Nicholas at the beginning of 1917: 'His face had become very thin and hollow. His eyes had become rather faded and wondered aimlessly from object to object instead of looking at the person with whom he was conversing. The whites were of a yellow tinge...For a very long time he looked at me in silence as if trying to collect his thoughts or to recall what had escaped his memory.'[143]

The descriptions of the shah were similar. Between January and December 1978 he lost one-third of his weight. One visiting U.S. official reported back to Washington that 'This man is a ghost.' Sir Anthony Parsons, the British ambassador, was 'horrified by the change in his appearance and manner. He looked shrunken, his face was yellow and he moved slowly. He seemed exhausted and drained of spirit.'[144] Everyone reported on his pale features and inability to focus; though at times he did appear to have recovered his spirits.

The many years of governing began to tell on the mental state of these men. Louis and the shah both felt they had given ruling the country their best shot, only to end up with growing rebellion. Depression was the response. Nicholas II felt overwhelmed by the problem of governing and managing the bureaucracy while remaining true to the autocracy. The challenge of managing a war on top of these other responsibilities finished off his mental state. In all three cases the collapse of the man predated the collapse of the state. Precisely at the time when greater attention and political skill was needed to avert a complete catastrophe these men were mentally incapacitated, depressed, and exhausted.

The shah decided by the middle of December to leave the country. Some National Front leaders were willing to work with him on the condition that he stay in the country. He refused, probably piqued that his people were rejecting him. He probably also hoped that the US and perhaps the UK, along with the military would re-establish order after which he would return to the country. But the experience of the past year during which all of his beliefs about Iran, Iranians, and his link with them had proved to be misguided to a great degree had broken him. He felt he had done the best he could in modernising the country and working 'for the benefit' of the people and the result was widespread demonstrations and expressions of hatred for him. Like Louis XVI and Nicholas II, he just gave up.

It was now only a matter of time before the monarchy collapsed. The shah left the country in January 1979 after having installed a new government under Shahpur Bakhtiar. This government fell in the beginning of February with the return of Ayatollah Khomeini and the victory of the opposition forces.

7

THE MAKING OF REVOLUTION

In my life I have come across literary men who write histories without taking part in public affairs, and politicians whose only concern was to control events without a thought of describing them. And I have invariably noticed that the former see general causes everywhere, whereas the latter, spending their lives amid the disconnected events of each day, freely attribute everything to particular incidents and think that all the little strings their hands are busy pulling daily are those that control the world's destiny. Probably both of them are mistaken.
Alexis de Tocqueville
Recollections of the 1848 Revolution

France of Louis XVI, Russia of Nicholas II and Iran of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi differed in eras, in problems facing the regimes, and to a degree in government structure and ideology. At the same time the position these monarchs occupied made the effective functioning of government completely dependent on their modus operandi. Fate condemned these men to be CEO's of very large and complicated institutions for life. Whatever their great differences in personality all three monarchs had a strong sense of their own personal obligation and responsibility to rule as well as reign. Consequently the monarchs' personalities and opinions/values played a determinative role in the making of revolution.

The most obvious difference between these three cases is the eras in which each man reigned. Specific to this discussion is the role played by the concept of 'revolution.' De Tocqueville noted that when Louis XV and Louis XVI tinkered with the structure of the Ancien Regime '(i)t never entered their heads that anyone would dream of dethroning them. They had none of the anxieties and none of the cruelty inspired by fear that we find in so many rulers of a later day, and the only people they trod underfoot were those they did not see.'[1] They did not feel that they were trying to beat a revolutionary clock. In one way this helped the cause of reform. Louis XVI, not sensing any threat of revolution but feeling the need to alleviate the burdens on the lower classes, was more prepared than Nicholas II to support relatively radical political and structural reform measures.

Again De Tocqueville noted, 'During his entire reign Louis XVI was always talking about reform, and there were few institutions whose destruction he did not contemplate before the Revolution broke out and made an end to them...'[2] To be sure Enlightenment thought had changed people's views of the absolutist monarchy, but no revolutionary cells existed in Louis XVI's France. Thus, Louis never addressed his problems of state with the sense of urgency with which Mohammad Reza Shah, fearing revolution from below, addressed some of his country's problems.

Nicholas II and Mohammad Reza Shah lived in eras which only too well understood the concept of revolution. Late-nineteenth-century Europe still felt the effects of the French Revolution, the 1830 Revolution in France, the 1848 Revolutions, and the Paris Commune of 1870-1871. The events of 1789-1815 not only rocked the ruling houses of Europe, but also symbolised to statesmen and monarchs of the time the beginning of a life-and-death struggle between 'revolutionary forces' and the great European dynasties; monarchical positions would never be wholly secure again. Crucially, it was recognised that absolute monarchy was on the defensive, ideologically as well as politically. The awareness of a threat of revolution played a large role in the political choices made by the tsar and by the shah. The context was also different in that by the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries greater social modernity existed.

France, Russia, and Iran faced to varying degrees international challenges which forced them to undertake reforms. Like Russia, Pahlavi Iran chose the path of state-driven industrialisation, which modernised the country at a much quickened pace and at the same time created new political and social challenges for the monarchy. In an era when the role of government was much enhanced and social revolution was a danger, the challenge facing Nicholas II and Mohammad Reza was above all to modernise both society and economy. Louis XVI's challenge was to modernise the state's machinery. In a sense therefore Louis XVI's challenge was smaller and less dangerous than the challenges facing Nicholas II and Mohammad Reza. Lastly, all three men wished to assert their countries' position internationally for status and prestige became important elements of their ruling ideology.

Louis XVI's France was more secure with herself and her world position than either Romanov Russia or Pahlavi Iran were. Nevertheless, English ascendancy towards the end of Louis XV's reign at the expense of France had placed the island nation in the centre of French foreign policy and hence had an affect on domestic policy. Russia and Iran are closer to each other. They were both non-Western powers untouched by both Western Renaissance and Enlightenment thought and the Industrial revolution. They faced a politically and economically more powerful West. Of course, Imperial Russia was more economically and technologically advanced than Iran, but this was due to her earlier contact with the West more than anything else. The goal of modernisation from above of both economy and society in Imperial Russia and Pahlavi Iran was to ensure that the two countries would remain (as in the case of Russia) or become (as in the case of

Iran) a member of the club of advanced and industrialised countries of the West. France did not face such a huge challenge.

The Bourbons and the Romanovs were established ruling houses, which had played a major role in their respective countries' history. A Romanov or a Bourbon felt more secure in his position as monarch than either of the Pahlavi shahs. For many it was difficult to imagine Russia or France without a Romanov or a Bourbon. The Pahlavis were not only a new dynasty, but also were neither aristocratic nor tribal. Whilst clothed in the garb of the ancient Iranian monarchy, their modus operandi and use of ideology represented that of a modern authoritarian system. This difference, however, should not be taken too far. During the reign of Louis XIV we see similar uses of propaganda and ideology. After the French Revolution and especially after the Revolutions of 1848 the crowned heads of Europe drew upon not only traditional forms of monarchical authority, as Louis XIV did, but also upon modern forms of ideological propaganda in order to sustain their positions. The use of populist propaganda began to take hold in Russia under Alexander III and Nicholas II. The major difference between the Bourbon and Romanov houses on the one hand, and the Pahlavi on the other was the way in which people regarded the Pahlavis and how the Pahlavis viewed themselves. The image of an upstart, as in the case of the House of Bonaparte, could not be shaken off nor could the insecurity it entailed. The shah's situation was also more complicated. Middle Eastern monarchies had fallen, communism was both a neighbour and enemy, and the dominant ideology of the hegemon supporting him was democracy.

In a way France and Iran faced a similar challenge. There was a battle between social change and conceptions of constitutional liberty. Reform would come at the cost of arbitrary government overriding the written and 'unwritten' constitutions, the articulate will and 'historic' institutions of the country. Yet, 'liberty' would be preserved at the cost of perpetuating archaic systems of privilege, property, special rights, class structure and strong ecclesiastical presence in the state. [3] France's crisis was above all one of government. The basic issues were the achievement of fiscal development already accomplished by her neighbours, reform of state institutions, fiscal crisis and bankruptcy. Nonetheless, the Bourbon government under Louis XVI tried to broaden the monarchy's social base which was seen as essential in overcoming vested interests opposed to reform.

In Russia and Iran the process of modernisation and institutional development took place during the age of mass politics. The state-led modernisation pushed to the forefront the question of the relationship between the state and society. In Europe by 1900 and Iran by the late 1960s the issue was how to integrate not just new elites into the state, but also parts of the masses into the political system. This was not going to be easy in the Russian Empire and Iran given objective realities. However, the resolution of this dilemma was greatly dependent on the viewpoint of the monarchs. The Russian and Iranian constitutions laid the theoretical base for the assimilation and expansion of groups into the political

system. Whilst the real power of the monarchy would have diminished, its social base would have increased, providing a more secure link for the monarchy with society. Nicholas believed that any step in that direction would lead to the destruction of the Empire. It is fair to say that it would have proven difficult but not impossible to assimilate workers and peasants into the system without threatening key vested interests and without creating social unrest. The shah, after putting Iran on a fairly good social and economic path, came to regard himself and his absolute power as indispensable to the country's future. One cannot help but think that revolution would have been averted if the shah had made real steps to integrate to an extent the growing middle and upper classes into the political system (a move he supported for most of his reign), albeit with a consequent reduction in his real power. Ironically, he seems to have understood this, yet took steps in the exact opposite direction precisely at a time when it seemed he had succeeded in overriding the most powerful special interests which had blocked earlier reforms and gave grounds for belief in enlightened despotism.

There were no easy solutions to the problems faced by these regimes. Reform and change are difficult policies to follow in any polity. When determining the causal weight of structural variables two questions must be posed: Did the modus operandi of each monarch create the conditions for the emergence of appropriate policies and relatively effective co-ordination of ministers and policies (horizontal governance) which would have enabled these governments to address key issues? And when and how did these monarchs take decisions which directly influenced events, in situations where a quite different decision could have been taken? If we find that the monarch's modus operandi undermined the making of policy and that he took fatal decisions when other ones were available then we must come to the conclusion that the monarch played a vital and decisive role in the *making* of revolution. In other words the question is: What at the highest governmental level prevented these monarchies from ameliorating or managing key issues so that they did not become politically fatal and produce the unique and spectacular crashes seen in 1787, 1917, and 1979?

The existence of a hole in the centre of government is the most important theme binding these three cases together. More than anything else, this was a consequence of Louis XVI, Nicholas II, and Mohammad Reza's modus operandi. This common governing pattern effectively paralysed the governments, rendering them unable to respond to or ameliorate the issues facing them. Thus revolution was made. These monarchical systems faced the same challenge all governments face, namely effective co-ordination of the state's highest servants and policy, and the pursuit of appropriate policies. In absolutist systems this problem is more acute for three reasons. Firstly, given the lack of republican/constitutional forms of government there were few shock absorbers available to the regime during times of crisis. In other words, no easy distinction existed between state and government; the failure of policy could easily tarnish the legitimacy of the monarchical regime. Secondly, the system placed all responsibility for the co-ordination of ministers on the monarch. France and Russia had already undergone

bureaucratisation, which improved their state capacity and vertical governance of the country. In Iran this process had taken off during the time of the Pahlavis; the difference in the size and competence of Iran's bureaucracy between 1921 and 1978 was immense. One major difference was that Mohammad Reza Shah seemingly had much greater personal control over the bureaucracy than Louis XVI or Nicholas II. This is partly attributable to the fact that Mohammad Reza essentially created the system himself. But, personality played a greater role: he was simply a more proactive and effective head of government than either Louis or Nicholas. Thirdly, as society became more advanced and complex some link with at least part of society was needed in order to determine policy needs.

These bureaucratic systems had two characteristics. Firstly, despite the relative effectiveness of the vertical line in the bureaucracy, the latter could not function well without effective horizontal governance and coordination at the top. Bureaucratisation, the need for an increasing amount of specialised knowledge, and the emergence of a more complex society meant that the task of a modern monarch was far more difficult than in pre-modern times. Therefore, the establishment of an effective working relationship with the highest servants of the state and the effective management of policy became increasingly important. This necessity was not lost on either monarchs, the political elite, or the educated public. Secondly, the need for reforms and certain changes, which inevitably meant hurting the interests of some societal groups, increased the importance of effective horizontal governance. These bureaucracies could not take the necessary steps to change and reform institutions, the political system or society without leadership and/or support from the centre of the system, the monarch. 'It takes a king and even one of talent and strong character to produce dramatic changes. The rest of us, ministers, unsafe in our jobs, can only prepare modifications and plan obsolescence,' Miromesnil remarked to Veri.[4] If the king could or would not do this, then a minister with talent and with full royal support needed to fulfil this role. There was no guarantee that effective action by a monarch or his trusted lieutenants would overcome all the challenges which threatened his regime's survival. But, if in the first instance the ruler through his modus operandi created a hole in the centre of government and made an effective response to, or amelioration of, these challenges impossible revolution was made.

The modus operandi of these men shared certain characteristics, whilst differing in certain ways. Firstly, these three men excessively feared a strong first minister. Louis XVI, reigning in the shadow of the Sun King, was determined to present the image of the king-decision-maker and co-ordinator of the government. He therefore did not appoint a first minister until the closing years of the monarchy. Yet, he did not have the required initiative, self-confidence, stamina, and administrative capacity of his immediate predecessors. He battled with this problem throughout his rule. The ambiguous position of Maurepas reflected Louis XVI's inability either to rule himself or appoint a strong first minister. The character of Louis XVI combined with Maurepas' insecure position and personality created a hole at the centre of government.

The problem at the centre was two-fold. Given the absence of an effective managing centre within the ministry whenever a Turgot and Necker with a plan of action appeared on the political stage he would try to fill the power vacuum at the centre in order to implement his plans. This was only a natural reaction given the milieu. Yet, such a move aroused the personal sensitivities of the king or Maurepas with the obvious consequences. Implementation of the structural reforms put forth by Turgot and Necker was challenging even with a strong co-ordinating centre and united ministry. Nevertheless, structural reform was possible in the pre-revolutionary era. The problems within the ministry and specifically with Louis XVI's modus operandi created a hole in the centre of government which rendered the pursuit of Necker's and Turgot's plans impossible. Opposition of vested interests to their plans was not the prime cause of their loss of ministerial position. Louis' modus operandi, the hole in the centre of government, and resultant personality clashes hold responsibility.

Louis also paid little attention to the factions and intrigue at court and in the ministry. Consequently, they eventually took over the ministry, by Calonne's period rendering it unable to carry out its day-to-day business, let alone major structural reforms. Given the common perception that Louis himself was susceptible to intrigue, the ministers themselves spent increasing amounts of time participating in intrigue, either to defend themselves or attack a rival. As pointed out at the beginning factions were an integral part of life at court. The danger during Louis XVI's reign was the king's inability and/or unwillingness to manage them and guide them for the most part in one direction. Though the task facing Louis was undoubtedly difficult, it was by no means impossible. Nor was there anything inevitable in the Bourbons' failure to produce an effective ruler at this time. After all, in the same era, a range of monarchs from the Bourbon Charles III of Spain to the rulers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia were providing formidable leadership.

Under Nicholas a similar hole at the centre of government emerged. The last tsar, unlike Alexander II and III, felt uncomfortable around strong personalities, such as Witte and Stolypin, but he endured them for some time. Whilst Louis XVI unwittingly contributed to the downfall of Turgot and Necker through his flawed modus operandi, Nicholas II seemed more active in the weakening of the power and authority of his strong ministers. Nicholas was more motivated by jealousy of his own power and authority, and by insecurity, than by disagreements with their policies, though the latter certainly played a part as well. Nicholas feared any strong figure, regardless of political orientation, who could overshadow him and thereby pose a threat to his personal power. For example, he did not choose a strong-minded conservative to replace Kokovtsev. He chose the obsequious Goremykin. Even in appointments to the State Council Nicholas often refused to yield to conservative pressure to appoint certain people; he simply did not want to be seen as bending to anyone. Yet Nicholas too proved unable to form policy, as his father and grandfather had done. He felt overwhelmed by the bureaucracy and in the end seriously distrusted it. Whilst these are not uncommon feelings amongst

rulers, Nicholas failed to turn them to positive use by harnessing to any significant degree the bureaucracy to his own will and policy. The result was lack of co-ordination of ministers and policy; a hole in the centre of the government emerged. In addition, Nicholas preferred at times to work outside the bureaucratic framework with interventions which often contradicted his government's line. The Zubatov unions and his policy in the Far East are examples of this sort of activity with catastrophic consequences In these cases to some extent Nicholas was a more proactive leader than Louis: unfortunately, his judgement of men and policies, indeed of politics as a whole, was usually weak. He lacked political skill that was characteristic of his predecessors. Therefore, the initiatives he did take seldom, if ever, worked to his or Russia's good.

Mohammad Reza Shah too feared a powerful prime minister, but perhaps for different reasons. Nicholas and Louis did not want to become the front for a strong minister, who would in effect rule the country for them. Mohammad Reza Shah, representing a new, upstart dynasty feared for the continuity of his ruling house. A strong and powerful prime minister could not only challenge the shah's authority within the existing governmental framework, but also the dynasty itself—as Mossadegh seemed to have done. The shah also only had to look at the overthrow of the Hashemites in Iraq, the Afghan king, Zaher Shah, and his one time brother-in-law, Farouk of Egypt. The forces that overthrew these ruling houses came from within the state itself, not from a popular revolution. Louis and Nicholas never contemplated such a scenario possible. The last Pahlavi shah therefore constructed his system so that he alone would control everything. The shah even more than Louis or Nicholas surrounded himself with personalities who were dependent on him and unable to challenge him. Yet, unlike Louis XVI and Nicholas II, the shah proved to be a capable administrator and policy initiator; the ministers were left to implement. When Mohammad Reza Shah felt decisive there was relatively efficient co-ordination of the state's highest servants. When he was confronted with open opposition such as in 1953, 1963, and finally 1978-79 the hole emerged.

The issue is that in itself decisiveness is better than indecisiveness but it is no guarantee of intelligent and carefully considered policies. In fact, too decisive a personality can be much disinclined to consult others or take into account realities and opinions conflicting with his or her own viewpoint. There is a fine line. The shah crossed it. He had constructed a system of government so that it reflected his opinions, prejudices, and beliefs to an extent unknown in Louis XVI's France and Nicholas II's Russia. By the end of the 1960s ministers and even the special services more often than not told Mohammad Reza what he wanted to hear; he was not receiving accurate assessments of the country's problems and situation. In the governments of Louis XVI and Nicholas II there were figures prepared to relay to the monarch information and opinions on problems facing the state. Those monarchs, however, chose to ignore the often judicious advice they received. Nicholas in particular was mightily disinclined to believe advice he received which conflicted with his own preconceptions about Russia's needs and

realities. Even a cursory examination of the reports sent to Nicholas shows the high quality of the information he received. In Iran there was a different story. The political elite understood that the shah did not want any critical observations. If one wanted to advance one's career it was better to fall into line. As a result, the shah's conception of Iran's reality was dangerously distorted.

The shah was an interesting mix of Louis and Nicholas. The tenacity of Nicholas II in protecting his autocratic power was seen in the shah in pursuit of reformist/enlightened policies whose spirit was closer to the policies Louis XVI tried to and at times succeeded in implementing. Unlike Nicholas, the shah seemed to have resigned himself to the eventual emergence of a constitutional order. Naturally the problem was when. The shah, like Josef II or Fredrick the Great, took an active role in government for he believed that his reformist agenda could not be implemented otherwise. These three men were known for the amount of energy and attention they gave to affairs of state. The shah was a twentieth-century example of eighteenth-century enlightened despotism, determined to break down many old traditions and improve the social and economic conditions of his subjects. It was resistance to change rather than the dangers of change that concerned the shah, as it did Louis XVI and Josef II. It is no small wonder that Josef and the shah created their countries' first secret intelligence services, whilst implementing their 'enlightened' programmes. At the same time, the consequences of not changing, namely a communist revolution, played a role in pushing the shah into action.

The question of skill inevitably comes up. Louis XVI, who was insecure with his decisions and judgements, did not have the political savvy of Henri IV, Louis XIII, or Louis XIV. He did not have the ability to examine complicated situations and the consequences of his actions. For example the arguments for and against the recall of the parlement or for and against *la finance* seem to have gone past him. He also lacked great insight into human beings and how to manage them. Alexander II and Alexander III to differing degrees had political skill. Nicholas II, like Louis, suffered from a dangerous lack of it. It is difficult to imagine Alexander III accidentally bringing upon himself the Russo-Japanese War as Nicholas did. Nicholas frequently overestimated Russian power, whilst Alexander II and Alexander III understood the need for peace. It is also difficult to imagine Alexander II proving as unbending as Nicholas II in the face of socio-political pressures. More importantly, it is unlikely that Alexander II or even Nicholas I would have taken the path Nicholas II chose in 1915. The tsar-liberator took Russia's elites seriously and did not dislike them or seek refuge for his isolation in populist myths. In short, Nicholas, to a greater degree than Louis XVI, chose to ignore the reality of the situation facing him. Perhaps he felt helpless in the face of such problems. Nicholas II, like Louis XVI, also lacked the ability to 'bang heads' together within the ministry. The result was disunity and lack of policy direction at the centre on certain major issues.

Mohammad Reza Shah had greater political skill and a more dynamic and intelligent personality than Nicholas II and Louis XVI. Given the newness of the

Iranian bureaucracy and his personality, he proved relatively able to unite his ministers. This is not to say that there were no conflicts and intrigues. They existed. But, they were not permitted to damage fatally the state. The problem in Iran was not ministerial unity, but the shah's loss of political judgement in the 1970s, during a period of fast economic and social change, which led to the collapse of the Pahlavi state.

Louis, Nicholas, and Mohammad Reza reigned in the shadows of famous and strong predecessors, Louis XIV, Alexander III, and Reza Shah, and felt insecure in their ability to live up to these images. Louis and Nicholas knew that common opinion was that they were not up to the job. This insecurity played a major role in Nicholas' excessive jealousy of his power and position and in Louis' unwillingness to appoint a strong first minister. Louis, unlike Nicholas, was able to support policies quite distinct from those followed by Louis XIV and Louis XV. He had no qualms when it came to taking a different path (even if he did not fully understand the consequences of the reform plans and policies he backed). Nicholas, unable to conceive of his political programme, negative or positive, stuck to that of his father, whilst failing to establish an effective modus operandi. He also seemed to understand too well that any political concession would lead to further demands and changes, ultimately resulting in the fatal weakening of the autocracy. The events of 1905-06 only strengthened the last tsar's perception that a war existed between his concept of autocratic power and revolutionary forces. Thus, he undermined the post-1905 system. Nicholas was excessively obsessed, fixated on preserving the autocracy in the form in which he received it, because he sincerely believed that Russia could only be ruled by it. To his mind the only alternative was social revolution, collapse of the state, and chaos.

Mohammad Reza Shah feared revolution from below, but also the victory of communism, the legacy of the Russian revolution. He strove not only to modernise Iran, according to his conceptions, but also to provide a better economic situation for most of the population in order to avoid social/mass revolution and strengthen the monarchy. This was the logic of government policy in Russia after 1905 as well. By choosing the slogan 'The White Revolution of Shah and People', Mohammad Reza Shah emphasized that he would lead a peaceful social and economic revolution. The Iranian monarchy would be revolutionary. More importantly, he, not his father, would go down in history as the monarch who modernized Iran.

Both Nicholas II and Louis XVI seemingly fell victim to the influence of their wives. Marie Antoinette did not exercise effective influence on her husband until after the Assembly of Notables. It was then that she played her negative role, at times changing Louis' confused mind into a more conservative stance. Recall her role in the decision over *doublement.* Moreover, Louis did not stand up to her and her wishes to appoint and maintain certain people within the ministry even before 1788. These figures, above all Breteuil, played a major role in paralysing the ministry and worsening its relations with the Parlement. Alexandra strengthened Nicholas II's feeling in regard to the autocracy. She most probably played a

decisive role in the decisions of 1915, when Nicholas might otherwise have backed down. Both women believed they needed to stiffen the resolve of their 'weak-willed' husbands, especially at crucial times. In both cases their influence reached its peak in the monarchies' final critical period.

Nicholas II and Louis XVI had basically the same reaction to the court: they wanted to run away from it. This is not an unusual characteristic. Louis XV, Josef I of Austria, Fredrick I, II, and Fredrick William IV of Prussia,[5] and even Alexander III, were not particularly fond of the court, its ceremonies, and politics. Nevertheless, they attempted to maintain strong links with their courts and in the process strengthened the monarchy. In some instances the courts even became rather open, making them a meeting place for various elite groups and opening the monarchy to a range of non-noble or newly ennobled influences. We see this in the court of Wilhlem I and II, Mohammad Reza Shah, the Restoration court under Louis XVIII and Charles X, and under Alexander II. For example, the openness of the Restoration court 'contributed to the relative popularity and stability of the Bourbon regime until its last years', when Charles X attempted to increase the power of the monarchy. [6] Louis XVI's inattention to the court weakened the authority of the Bourbon monarchy. As we have seen, court intrigue was allowed to reach such a level that the ministry itself could not effectively operate. At the same time, Louis XVI's isolation from the court ensured that he would not be open to new and different influences, which could have had an important impact, especially in the closing years of the monarchy. Nicholas II failed to maintain strong links with the traditional elite and did not reach out to the emerging industrial, intellectual, cultural, and political elites. This approach led to Nicholas's isolation, as it did Louis' case. Louis Phillipe dispensed with a court almost entirely, which only intensified the alienation of several important elite groups from the regime. They therefore were not prepared to come to the Orleans' rescue during the 1848 days. Nicholas II's alienation from his elites had the same consequences in 1917.

Besides the dysfunction in the modus operandi of these three men, namely the hole in the centre of the government, and its consequences for relatively effective governance, the monarchs themselves took certain decisions which pushed events in a revolutionary direction. Louis XVI took the decision to recall the Parlement and to declare war against England and in support of the American colonists. Nicholas II holds direct responsibility for the Russo-Japanese War and its consequences. He also took decisions to support Izvolskii's plan in Bosnia and to allow State Council members to undermine Stolypin and the post-1906 system. Mohammad Reza Shah holds responsibility for his bad economic decisions in the aftermath of the oil boom, for the government's reaction to the consequent economic malaise, the apparent intensification of SAVAK activities in society and for the setting-up of a single political party. Structure did not dictate that these decisions. They were reflections of the character of these three monarchs.

During the closing years of these regimes Louis XVI, Nicholas II, and Mohammad Reza Shah made certain decisions which contributed to varying

degrees to exacerbating the immediate pre-revolutionary crisis and triggered revolution. Louis XVI's mistakes vis-à-vis the Assembly of Notables led to the serious weakening of the monarchy during a vital period. More importantly, Louis XVI's inability to go with his first instinct and openly support *doublement* poisoned the atmosphere and lost for the regime the support of the increasingly vocal and powerful Third Estate. After all, Louis by supporting the reforms of Turgot, Necker and Calonne had shown he wanted to make the social structure more equitable and to work with the lower estate and 'the people.' But, he caved in to conservative pressure at the last moment. His ill-timed and thoughtless remarks during the Séance of 1788 undermined Brienne's political deal with the obstreperous Parlement. Nicholas' refusal in September 1915 to work openly with the liberal and moderate groups in the Duma ensured that they would not support him in a serious crisis with the people. The tsar's relationship with his military commanders also came under more pressure. He compounded this mistake with his decision to go to the front and leave the government in the hands of the unpopular empress. This became the final blow to Nicholas' legitimacy; no one was prepared to defend him once disturbances broke out in February 1917.

The shah decided to make steps towards gradual liberalisation precisely at a time when the monarchy was enduring a period of greater unpopularity due to his mistaken economic policies. He personally ordered the publication of a newspaper article attacking Khomeini due to his harsh criticism of the Pahlavi regime. Lastly the shah, reverting to his familiar characteristic, proved unable to take any effective decisions to deal with the escalating crisis of 1978-79, which led to the rather quick overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty. The last shah's indecisiveness during the crises' of 1951-53, 1963, and 1978-79 created a hole in the centre of government precisely at a time when the regime was under direct threat. In none of these cases was there anything inevitable about the rulers' mishandling of the immediate pre-revolutionary crisis. Conversely there was nothing inevitable about Lenin's effective handling of the situation in 1917 and afterwards, as recognised by Trotskii. In other words, situational dynamics in the centre of which is the political actor, are the key to understanding the causes of events.

Existing theories individually cannot explain in totality an historical event such as revolution given their lack of attention to the issues drawn out in this book. I do not deny the importance of the causes they outline in our understanding of the outbreak of revolutions. I do doubt that in themselves they offer a complete and sufficient explanation. The present work focuses on the structural strengths and weaknesses of these monarchical regimes themselves. Weaknesses such as placement of responsibility on hereditary leaders; facing them with huge challenges as government and society grew in size and complexity; making possible the syndrome of the 'hole in the centre of government'; and making difficult a divorce of dynastic legitimacy from that of the government and its policies. These structural weaknesses although inherent in these systems of government could be checked by effective leadership and did not always or necessarily have a disastrous impact on the operation of government at the highest level. The roles of structure

and human agency (the monarch) did not exist in isolation from each other. Their interaction with each other creates historical events, such as revolution.

The phenomenon of 'the hole in the centre of the government', the common theme binding together these three revolutions, brought governmental paralysis and implosion. Hence, limited political violence characterised the struggle against them. The great violence associated with revolution took place after the collapse of these regimes.

This book stresses the crucial and decisive role of the monarchs' personality in the making of revolution. Given the dynamics of their personalities and modus operandi, Louis XVI, Nicholas II, and Mohammad Reza Shah created a hole in the centre of their governments and took certain decisions when alternatives were available. As a result, they effectively prevented their regimes from addressing and managing certain key issues and gave full rein to the structural weaknesses latent in these monarchical systems and paralysed their governments, thereby bringing upon themselves the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions.

NOTES

Chapter 1

[1] L. Trotskii, *Istoriya russkoi revolutsii*, Vol.II (Moscow, 1924), p.131. See: Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero Worship and the Hero in History*, (London, 1844); *The French Revolution,* (London, 2002 {1851}).

[2] See: S.Houlgate, *The Hegel Reader.*(London, 1998); G. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History.* J.Sibree, trans. (Buffalo, 1991).

[3] A. de Tocqueville., *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution.* (Paris, 1972). pp. 98-99

[4] Ibid , p.8

[5] de Tocqueville, *Recollections,* G. Lawrence, trans. (London, 1970), p.63.

[6] Ibid., p.62.

[7] See: Marx's preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,* reprinted in L.S. Feuer, *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy* (London, 1959)p.43; K. Marx, *The Communist Manifesto,* Penguin Edition (London, 1972).

[8] M. Kimmel, *Revolution: A sociological interpretation,* (London, 1990)p.18.

[9] Trotskii, Vol II, p.215.

[10] Ibid., Vol.I, pp.101-108.

[11] Ibid., Vol.1 p. 92

[12] S. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies,* (London, 1969), p.177.

[13] Skocpol, p.18.

[14] Ibid., p.291.

[15] Skocpol, p.21

[16] Ibid., p.285

[17] Kimmel, p.185.

[18] M.Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution.*(Oxford, 1988).

[19] Foran, p.18.

[20] R.D.Hooper, 'The Revolutionary Process,' *Social Forces*, 28(3).

[21] Quoted in Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions.* p.17.

[22] J. Goodwin, 'State-Centred Approaches to Social Revolutions: Strengths and Limitations of a Theoretical Tradition,' in *Theorising Revolutions,* ed. J. Foran. (London, 1979), pp.11-38.

[23] See: M.Mann, *Sources of Social Power,* Vols.I &II (London, 1989).

[24] See also: *Bringing the State Back In,* T.Skocpol, et als., ed., (Cambridge, 1985).

[25] Goodwin, p.13.

[26] Goodwin, p.14.

[27] Jack Levy, 'Explaining Events and Developing Theories: History, Political Science, and the Analysis of International Relations,' p.57 in Colin Elman ed et als, *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations,* (London,

2001).

[28] Trevelyn, p.35.

[29] This is not an attempt to present a detailed look at the historiography of the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions. The purpose here is to give a very broad sweep of the approaches to their causes and draw out themes relevant to this study.

[30] J. Jaurès, *Histoire socialiste de la Révolution,* (Paris, 1901-1904); G. Lefebvre, *La Révolution française* ; (Paris, 1951); A. Soboul, *La Révolution française* (Paris, 1989).

[31] B. Fay, *La Grande Révolution,* (Paris, 1959); P. Gaxotte, *La Révolution française,* (Paris, 1928).

[32] A. Cobban, *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution.* (Cambridge, 1964) p.67. See also: *Aspects of the French Revolution.* (St.Albans, 1971).

[33] 'Noncapitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French Revolution,' *American Historical Review,* 72(1967), pp.469-96.

[34] See: D.Mornet, *Les origines intellectuelles de la Révolution française 1715-1787.*(Paris, 1933); R. Chartier, *Les origins culturelles de la Révolution française.*(Paris, 1990); and D.Roche, *La France des Lumières.* (Paris, 1993).

[35] W. Doyle, *Origins of the French Revolution,* 2nd edition.(Oxford, 1988), p.26.

[36] E.Labrousse, *La Crise de l'economie française à la fin de l'Ancien Régime et au debut de la Révolution,*(Paris, 1944). R.Price, *The Economic Modernisation of France,*(London, 1975).

[37] See: E. Acton. *Rethinking the Russian Revolution* (London, 1990); *Istoriya kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza.*(Moscow, 1978) was the official Soviet version of the events of 1917.

[38] Acton, pp.55-56.

[39] Acton, p.14-5

[40] B. Pares, *The Fall of the Russian Empire* (London, 1939), pp.24-5.

[41] Some examples are: L. Haimson, ed., *The Politics of Rural Russia, 1905-1914* (London, 1979); Kaiser, D.H., ed., *The Workers' Revolution in Russia, 1917* (London, 1987); R Zelnik, *Labor and Society in Tsarist Russia: The Factory Workers of St. Petersburg, 1855-1890* (Stanford, 1971); and R. Manning, *Crisis of the Old Order in Russia* (Princeton, 1982).

[42] 'Rentier State and Shia'ia Islam in the Iranian Revolution,' *Theory and Society,* 11(3) pp.265-303.

[43] For a synopsis of the approaches to the Iranian Revolution see: A. Molajani, *Sociologie Politique de la Révolution iranienne.*(Paris, 1999), F. Nahavandi, *Aux sources de la révolution iranienne.* (Paris, 1988).

[44] A.A. Zanjani, *Engelab-e eslami va risheha-ye an.* (Tehran, 1375); N. Najafi, *Tarikh-e Iran: Tahavollat-e siasi.* (Tehran, 1383).

[45] S.Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period* (Albany, 1980); V. Martin, *Islam, Modernism, and the Iranian Revolution of 1906.* (London, 1989); Y. Richard, *Le Shi'isme en Iran: Imam et revolution.* (Paris, 1980); R.Khomeini, *Hokumat-e islami va velayat-e fagih* (Najaf, 1969).

[46] Some of the works are: A. Saikal, *The Rise and Fall of the Shah.*(Princeton, 1980); G.Sick, *All Fall Down.* (London, 1985); M.Parsa, *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution.* (London, 1989). E. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions.*(London, 1982); A. Hajmabadi, *Land Reform and Social Change.*(Salt Lake City, 1987); M.Moadell, *Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution.* (New York, 1992)

[47] S.Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown.*(Oxford, 1988); and ed., *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam.* (London, 1984); L. Sklyarov, *Iran 60-80kh rodov: Traditsionalizm protiv*

sovremennosti. (Moscow, 1993).

[48] Attention is not given to the rulers' psychology as such. The goal is not to explain the causes of a certain psychological trait.

[49] R. Rezsohazy, *Pour comprendre l'action et le changement politiques.* (Bruxelles, 1996) pp.226-279.

[50] F. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics.* (Princeton, 1987) p.147.

[51] Skocpol, 'Rentier State and Shi'ia Islam in the Iranian Revolution.' *Theory and Society,* 1982.

Chapter 2

[1] F. Bluche, *L'Ancien Regime*, (Paris, 1993) p.28.

[2] Y.M. Brucé, *The Birth of Absolutism: A History of France, 1598-1661.* (London, 1992), p.58.

[3] B.N.Chicherin. *Vospominaniya. Zemstvo i Moskovskaya Duma.* (Moscow, 1934). p.231

[4] M. Rezairad. *Maban-ye andishe-ye siasi dar khord mazadai.*(Tehran, 1374).

[5] M.Déon, *Louis XIV par lui-même.* (Paris, 1991), pp.159-179.

[6] Quoted in Bluche, *L'Ancien Régime.* p.18.

[7] Nevertheless the clergy still paid much less in tax. Additionally, when the clergy was dissatisfied with the monarchy or when the monarchy itself was weak, they gave small amounts to the Crown.

[8] The clergy however were not above taking money from the government in exchange for support or silence.

[9] Bluche, *L'Ancien Régime.* p.17

[10] Hosking, *Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917.* (London, 1998). p.3

[11] Guy Coquille, quoted in Bluche, *L'Ancien Régime.* p.117.

[12] Déon, *Louis XIV par lui-même.* p.95.

[13] Tikhomirov, *Monarkhicheskaya Gosydarstvennost.'* p.76

[14] Quoted in Lincoln, *Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias.* (London, 1978). p.16

[15] Quoted in Oldenburg, *Tsartsvovanie Imperatora Nikolaya Vtorogo.* (Petersburg, 1991, reprint of 1949 edition) p. 87-89

[16] The greatest Iranian epic poem, Ferdowsi's *Shahname*, is the best example of this tradition in literature.

[17] See: P. Burke, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV.* (London, 1992)., Apostolides, P.M. *Le Roi-machine: spectacle et politique au temps de Louis XIV.* (Paris, 1981)., Ferrier-Caverivière, N. 'Louis XIV et ses symboles dans l'histoire méttalique du règne de Louis-le-Grand.' *Dix-septième siècle,* 143:82.

[18] George Yaney, 'Law, Society, and the Domestic Regime in Russia.' *American Political Science Review.*

[19] On this topic see: R. Wortman, *Sceanrios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy.* Vols. 1 &2. (Princeton: 1995, 2000).

[20] W.Doyle, *Origins of the French Revolution,* p.120. See also: Chaussinand-Nogaret's, *La Noblesse au XVIIIe siecle,* pp.40-46, and Meyer, "La Noblesse Francaise," p.44

[21] G. Chaussinand-Nogaret, 'Aux origines de la Revolution: noblesse et bourgeoisie', *Annales, Economies, Societes, Civilisations,* XXX (1975).

[22] R.Pipes, *Russia's Rulers Under the Old Regime.* (London, 1970)

[23] For a summary of Louis XIV's reign see: Peter Robert Campbell, *Louis XIV*, (London, 1993) and D. Dessert, *Louis XIV Prend le pouvoir,* (Bruxelles, 1988).

[24] See: D. Parker, *The Making of French Absolutism,* (London, 1983) and Campbell, *Louis XIV.*

[25] Quoted in P.Gaxotte, *Letteres de Louis XIV.*(Tallandier, 1930), p.185.

[26] N.Eroshkin. *Istoriya gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii.* (Moscow, 1983)., G.Yaney. *The Systemization of Russian Government.* (Urbana, 1973)., D. Christian. 'The "Senatorial Party" and the Theory of Collegical Government, 1801-1803.' *Russian Review,* 38, 1979.

[27] The administrative colleges were not formally abolished at this time.

[28] Louis XV aptly declared 'My Council is neither a body nor a tribunal separate from me. I myself act through it.' Antoine, *Louis XV.* p.345

[29] This approach corresponded with the royal mythology that the king, standing above all, was the only one capable of interpreting the true needs of the state

[30] Louis XIV à Colbert, 24 avril 1671.

[31] N. Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism: Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy,* (London, 1992), R. Mettam. *Government and Society in Louis XIV's France,* (London, 1976) and *Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France,* (London, 1988)

[32] If the king wanted to avoid a trial he could send the chancellor into internal exile and appoint a *gardes des sceaux,* who would carry the chancellor's responsibilities. However the exiled chancellor would retain his position.

[33] The Committee of Ministers also administered the Empire during Alexander I's long absences during the Napoleanic War and peace negotiations.

[34] *Gosudarstvenii stroi Rossiisskoi Imperii nakanune krusheniia.* (Moscow, 1995).

[35] Quoted in: Robert Knecht, *Richelieu,* (London, 1991). p.137.

[36] The Regent d'Orleans changed this arrangement in order to obtain the Parlement's overriding of Louis XIV's will, which had designated one of the Sun King's bastard sons as heir.

[37] According to the Supplementary Laws (see below) 'no minister can divest himself of his responsibility by pleading oral or written orders from the shah.' In a further blow to the monarch's power, article 68 stated, 'If the Majles and the Senate find, by an absolute majority, itself dissatisfied with a particular minister, that cabinet or minister must resign.' Articles 18 and 19 took power of the purse away from the shah and gave it to the Majles, which formulated and approved the budget. According to Article 24 treaties and all types of concessions were subject to the approval of the Majles.

[38] Yaney, *The Sytemization of Russian Government.* p.307

[39] Jean Longnon, ed., *Memoires de Louis XIV,* (Paris, 1933) p.173

[40] Quoted in: J.McGregor Burns, *Leadership,* (New York, 1977), pp.412-413.

[41] In other words they were more dependent on the king, had fewer clients, and fewer links to court factions. This situation changed however as the robin nobility itself became more entrenched.

[42] It is true that Alexander II at times did waver between conflicting advisors.

[43] *Gloire,* as defined by Peter Campbell, is the reputation for noble deeds, honour, and feats of arms with contemporaries and posterity" and constitutes an essential part of a true aristocrat's life aims. Peter Robert Campbell, *Louis XIV* (London, 1993) p.150

[44] (Rossbach—1757 and Minden—1759)

[45] D. Hudson, 'The Parliamentary Crisis of 1763 in France and its consequences,' *Canadian Journal of History,* 7, pp.97-117; J.C. Riley, *The Seven Years War and the Old Regime in France: The Economic and Financial Toll,* (Princeton, 1986).

[46] Russia also obtained the exclusive right to maintain warships on the Caspian Sea.

[47] Quoted in S. Bakhash, *Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy, and Reform under the Qajars, 1858-1898*

(Ithaca, 1978). p.8

[48] M.R.Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country,* p.45

[49] However after a long campaign the nobility secured an exemption from it.

[50] This income tax was a bone of contention between the government and the Parlement, which sporadically tried to limit the verification process, but importantly not the tax itself.

[51] See: White, 'Was There a Solution to the Ancien Regime's Financial Dilemma?'

[52] See: Swann, *The Parlement of Paris, 1754-1774.*, Rogister, *Louis XV and the Parlement of Paris, 1737-1755.*, and Stone, *The Parlement of Paris, 1774-1789.*

[53] During the reign of Louis XV the crown rarely if ever had established a comprehensive plan of reform. That would wait until the reign of Louis XVI.

[54] Swann, *The Parlement of Paris, 1754-1774.* pp.362-363

[55] Ibid., Antoine, *Louis XV* (Paris, 1989); Baker, K.ed., *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture* (Oxford, 1987); B.Stone, *The French Parlement and the Crisis of the Old Regime* (London, 1986); J. Egret, *Louis XV et l'opposition parlementaire 1715-1774* (Paris, 1975); and *La pre-révolution française: 1787-1788* (Paris, 1962).

[56] Hosking, *Russia:People and Empire*, p.337

[57] *Rossiia 1913 god: Statisticheskii spravochnik* (St.Petersburg, 1994). p.147.

[58] There was land hunger, but it did not exist everywhere. As Peter Gatrell put it, 'in the centre, progress was peripheral, but on the periphery there was progress.' Peter Gatrell, *The Tsarist Economy 1850-1917.* (London, 1986) p.140.

[59] Keddie. *Roots of Revolution: An Interpretative History of Modern Iran.* (London, 1981). p.39

[60] 'Society' in the Iranian context of this period applies only to the educated classes and certain tribal leaders. The vast majority of peasants and nomads had little contact with the government and little more with religious figures.

[61] For an introduction to Persian literature of this period see: H. Kamshad, *Modern Persian Literature.* (Bethesda, 1996). N.I. Prigarina, ed., *Istoriya Persidskoi Literaturi XIX-XX vekov.* (Moscow, 1999)

[62] Whilst Malkom Khan was probably the most virulent supporter of Westernisation, other thinkers such as Mirza Husein Khan, Mirza Saleh Shirazi, Mirza Aga Khan Kermani, Abd al-Rabin Talebov, and Mirza Fath' Ali Akhundzadeh shared his anti-ulama sentiments.

[63] Quoted in D. Menshari, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, (London, 1992), p.37.

[64] N.M.Karamazin, *Pis'ma russkogo puteshestvennika,* (Leningrad, 1984), pp.252-256, quoted in *V Poiskakh svoego puti: Rossiia mezhdu Evropoi i Aziei,* (Moscow, 1997)

[65] Menshari, p.41.

[66] Ibid., p.21.

[67] Quoted in Arjomand, p. 51.

[68] *Ettela'at, Havades-e yek rub-e qarn,* (Tehran, 1329). p.156.

Chapter 3

[1] Samuel Padover. *The Life and Death of Louis XVI.* (New York, 1939) p.10.

[2] Evelyne Lever, *Louis XVI.* (Paris, 1985) p.33.

[3] John Hardman, *Louis XVI.* (London, 1993) p.21.

[4] Lever, *Louis XVI*, p.55.

[5] Duc de Croy. *Journal,* fevrier, 1762.

[6] Louis XVI, *Les Reflexions sur mes entretiens avec M. le Duc de La Vauguyon.* p. 15

[7] L. Nicolarclot. *Journal de Louis XVI.* (Paris, 1873) p.58.

[8] Padover, *The Life and Death of Louis XVI.* p.35.

[9] *Les Reflexions sur mes entretiens avec M. le Duc de La Vauguyon* and Pierrette Girault de Coursac, *L'Education d'un roi: Louis XVI*: (Paris, 1972).

[10] There is some controversy over whether Louis actually wrote his own maxims in response to those presented to him. De Coursac believes that Louis in fact wrote his own. Others have their doubts. They stress however that Louis learned of the state institutions, the responsibilities of a future king, and his necessary characteristics on the basis of these maxims.

[11] Louis XVI, *Reflexions,* p.23

[12] de Coursac, *L'education d'un roi.* p.123.

[13] Louis XVI, *Reflexions,* p.96

[14] Ibid., pp.125, 132.

[15] Paul and Pierrette de Coursac. *Louis XVI à la Parole.* (Paris, 1997).

[16] Hardman, *Louis XVI*, p.35.

[17] Louis XVI, *Reflexions,* pp.20-22.

[18] Ibid.,, p.112.

[19] Ibid., pp.20-22.

[20] Ibid., p.152.

[21] BN MSS, ff 4428, pp.19-20.

[22] Ibid., p.141.

[23] Louis XVI, *Reflexions*, p.141.

[24] Ibid., p. 152.

[25] Ibid., p. 155.

[26] Ibid., p. 181.

[27] P. and P. de Coursac. *Louis XVI à la Parole.* p. 38.

[28] J.Longnon. *Memoires de Louis XIV.* (Plon, 1933) p.141.

[29] Louis XVI, *Reflexions sur mes Entretiens.* p.131.

[30] Ibid., p.24.

[31] Falloux XVIII p.154 (151) de Coursac.

[32] de Coursac. Louis XVI: A la Parole, p.44.

[33] Falloux, pp.95-96.

[34] Padover, p.19.

[35] Marie-Antoinette complained of her inability to influence Louis. She wrote to her brother, Josef II, 'The King's natural distrust was confirmed in the first place by his governor before my marriage, M de La Vaugyon frightened him about the empire his wife would want to exercise over him and his black mind took a pleasure in frightening his pupil with all the lies invented about the House of Austria.' Hardman, p.25.

[36] Madame Campan. *Memoires sur la vie privée de Marie-Antoinette, Reine de France et de Navarre.* (London, 1823) 2 vols., II, p.29.

[37] S. Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution.* (London, 1989). pp.58-59.

[38] Hardman, *Louis XVI.* p. 194.

[39] Lever, *Louis XVI.* pp.108-109.

[40] Louis XVI, *Reflexions sur mes Entretiens,* p.151.

[41] Quoted in Hardman, *Louis XVI.* p.119.

[42] Louis XVI, *Reflexions sur mes Entretiens,* p.252.

[43] Ibid., p.179.

[44] At the same time the broader social and intellectual trends were pulling the social elite towards Paris rather than Versailles.

[45] Ibid., p. 84.

[46] Lord Stormont to London 8 June 1774, PRO SP78.

[47] Moreover the tsarevich was appalled by his father's affair and eventual morganatic marriage to Princess Catherine Dolgorukaya. He considered this to be a disgrace for Russia and the dynasty.

[48] E. Radzinksii, *The Last Tsar* (London, 1992) p.55.

[49] Alexnder Milkhailovich, *Once a Grand Duke.* (New York, 1932) p.168-69.

[50] V. Lambsdorff, *Dnevnik* 13.11.1894, 27.1.1895.

[51] Nicholas II to Queen Victoria, 10.10.1896. TsGOAR, f.601, op.1, d.1111, l.136.

[52] Nicholas II to Maria Feodorovna, 29 January, 1897. TsGOAR, f.65, op.1, d.619, l.61-62.

[53] *Krasnii Archiv.* Nikolai II to Marii Fedorovny, 25.6. 1906, p.193.

[54] Andrew Verner. *The Crisis of Russian Autocracy: Nicholas II and the Revolution of 1905.* (Princeton, 1991).

[55] I.U. Gerasimova. *Krizis pravitelstvennii politiki v godi revolutsionii situatsii i Aleksandr II.* (Moscow, 1962). p.94.

[56] Quoted in Lieven, *Nicholas II.* p.30.

[57] Quoted in Marc Ferro, *Nicolas II.* (Fayard, 1990) p.16.

[58] V.Ananich (ed.), *Nikolai II.* (St.Petersburg, 1994). p.14.

[59] V.N. Lamsdorff. *Dnevnik*, p.91-92.

[60] Quoted in Verner, *Crisis of Russian Autocracy,* p.25.

[61] Wolfe, *Autocracy*, p.72.

[62] Oldenburg, *Tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaya II.* (Reprint, St.Petersburg, 1998). p.39-48.

[63] General A.A. Mosolov, *Pri Dvore Poslednego Imperatora* (St. Petersburg:, 1992, reprint of 1921 edition) p.80.

[64] P.A. Zayonchkovskii, ed. *Dnevnik P.A. Valueva* (Moscow, 1961) Vol.2, p.151.

[65] See: Lieven. *Nicholas II.* pp.105-106, 115-116.

[66] Father Georgii Shavel'skii, *Vospominanie poslednego protopresvitera russkoi armii i flota.* p. 125. Many others made this observation.

[67] B.V. Anan'ich, ed. *Nikolai II,* p.6.

[68] Baron R.R. Rosen. *Forty Years of Diplomacy.* 2 vols, London, 1922., Vol. 2, p.26.

[69] Nicholas II to Maria Fedorovna, GARF, f.642, op.1, d.2325, l.24.

Paleologue, M. *Imperatorskaya Rossiya v Epokhye Velikoi Voyni.* (Berlin, 1923). Vol.2, p.142-143.

[71] *Krasnaya Letopis,* 1, 10, 1924, p.267.

[72] Nicholas II. *Dnevnik*, p.568.

[73] *Krasnii Archiv.* Nikolai II to Marii Fedorovna, 10 October 1905, p. 188.

[74] G.Shchavelskii, 'Nikolai II', *Novii Zhurnal*, 34, 1953, p.185-186.

[75] E.Bing,ed., *Letters of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Marie.*(London, 1937) pp.187-88.

[76] *Krasnii Archiv.* p. 187 Nikolaii II to Marii Fedorovna, 12 January 1906.

[77] Lieven, *Nicholas II.* p.167

[78] V. Kokovstov, *Iz Moego Proshlego*, Vol. 1, p.167.

[79] Princess Palei, *Moi Vospominania o russkoi revolutsii*, (Leningrad, 1925)p.339.

[80] Svytapolk-Mirskaya, p.34.

[81] Peter Bark. *Vozrozhdenie.* (Moscow, 1924). p.22-3.

[82] Alexsandra to Nicholas, 19-20 December 1904, TsGOAR, f.601, op.1, d.1148, ll.161-64: N 207

[83] V.Gurko, *Features and Figures of the Past.*(Stanford, 1939). p.69-70.

[84] Figes, *A People's Tragedy.* p.12.

[85] TsGOAR, f.640, op.2. d.137.

[86] Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, *Faces in a Mirror,* (New York, 1980), p.9.

[87] Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History,* (New York, 1980), p.54.

[88] Queen Soraya Pahlavi, *Ma Vie,* (Paris, 1963) p.22.

[89] Farah Pahlavi, *My Thousand and One Days: An Autobiography.* (London, 1978), p.92.

[90] She insisted that he speak only French with her. Years later Mohammad Reza Shah would write, 'To her I owe the advantage of being able to speak and write French as if it were my own language; and beyond this, she opened my mind to the spirit of Western culture. She also introduced me to French food. I shall always remain indebted to Madame Arfa.' *Mission for My Country,* p.52 .

[91] Hasan Arfa, *Under Five Shahs,* (London, 1966). p.266.

[92] M.R.Pahlavi, *Mission For My Country,* p.64.

[93] Taheri, *The Unknown Life of the Shah.* p. 35.

[94] M.Laing, *The Shah.* (London,1977). p.189.

[95] Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country,* p.64.

[96] Taheri, *The Unknown Life of the Shah.* p.84.

[97] TIME, 09.06.75, p.33.

[98] Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country,* p.44.

[99] Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country,* p.49.

[100] Ibid., p. 76.

[101] A. Alam, *Yadashtha-ye Alam.* (Tehran, 1999) Vol.IV, p.287.

[102] F. Hoveyda, *The Fall of the Shah,* (New York, 1980). p.118.

[103] Quoted in DeVieller, *The Imperial Shah.* (Boston, 1976). p. 87.

[104] Quoted in Laing, *The Shah.* p. 223.

[105] The Oral History Archives of the Foundation for Iranian (OHFIS). Lehfeldt, p.19.

[106] Ibid., R. Arndt, p.20.

[107] S. Pahlavi, *Ma Vie.* p. 112.

[108] M. Farmafarmanian, *Blood and Oil,* (New York, 1999), p.290.

[109] Alam, *Yadashtha-ye Alam. Vol.III.* p.323

[110] OHFIS, Col. G. Yatsevitvh, p.19.

[111] Taheri, *The Unknown Life of the Shah.* p.29.

[112] Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country,* p.55.

[113] F.Hoveyda, *The Fall of the Shah.* (London, 1980).p.26.

[114] E.Naraghi, *Des Palais du chah aux prisons de la révolution,* (Paris, 1991), p.15.

[115] Taheri, p.193.

[116] O. Warin, *Le lion et le soleil,* (Paris, 1976). p.113.

[117] TIME, 28.06.76.

[118] Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History,* (New York,1980) p.65.

[119] TIME, 09.06.75, p.33.

[120] Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country,* p.68.

[121] Oriana Fallaci, *Interview with History.* (New York, 1979).

[122] Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country,* p.12.
[123] A. Boulignac. *L'homme qui voudrait être Cyrus,* (Paris, 1988) p.56.
[124] Alam, *Yadashtha-ye Alam. Vol.II.* p.256, p.269.
[125] Newsweek, 16.08.75.
[126] Alam, *Yadashtha-ye Alam. Vol. III.* pp.173-74.
[127] Pahlavi, *Answer to History,* p.165.
[128] Pahlavi, *Answer to History,* p.23.
[129] Alam, *Yadashtha-ye Alam. Vol.III.* p. 342.
[130] Laing, *The Shah.* p.224.
[131] M. Heikal, *The Return of the Ayatollah: The Iranian Revolution from Monarchy to Khomeini,* (London, 1981), p.81.
[132] Taheri, *The Unknown Life of the Shah.* p.84.
[133] *The Economist,* 31.10.70.
[134] Alam, *Yadashtha-ye Alam, Vol.III.*, p.294.
[135] Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country,* pp.169-194.
[136] Kayhan, 27.08.77.
[137] Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country,* p.162.
[138] Fallaci, *Interview with History.* pp.273-274.
[139] Wortman, *Scenarios of Power, Vol. 2.*, pp.59-9, 284-89.
[140] Laing, *The Shah.* p. 87.
[141] OHFIS, Lehfeldt, p.144.
[142] Alam, *Yadashtha-ye Alam.Vol.III.* p. 150.
[143] F. Pahlavi, *My Thousand and One Days.* p. 167.
[144] Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country,* p.98
[145] Alam., Vol.III, p.476.
[146] Ibid., p.236, 307, 453.
[147] TIME, 09.06.75.
[148] OHFIS, Lencenzowski, p.23.
[149] Ibid., p.336.

Chapter 4

[1] Quoted in: V. Mironov, *Istoriya Gosudarstva Rossisskogo,* (Moscow, 1995) p.16.
[2] A. Shleifer and D. Treisman, *Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia,* (London, 2000) pp.4-8.
[3] Lord Stormont, 18 and 25 May 1774, PBO 265
[4] Quoted in Lever, *Louis XVI.* p.98.
[5] Veri, *Journal 1774-1780,* ed. De Witte, J. 2 vols. I, pp.93-98.
[6] Quoted in Hardman, *Louis XVI,* p.40.
[7] Duc de Levis, *Souvernirs et portraits, 1780-1789.* (Paris,1815), pp.3-5. Also Baron de Besenvalwrote that M.Maurepas, 'is a consummate master of court intrigue, skilled in politics, but indifferent to everything except his personal credit and the type of person...' Besenval, *Memoires,* Vol.I, p.336.
[8] Quoted in: Lever, *Louis XVI.* p.149.
[9] Veri, abbe de, *Journal,* vol.1, pp.184-186.

[10] A. d'Armuth and J. Flammermont (eds), *Correspondance secrète du Comte de Mercy-Augenteau avec l'Empereur Josef II et le Prince de Kaunitz,* 2 vols, (Paris:1891), Mercy to Josef II, 16 December 1781.

[11] Veri, I, p. 159, quoted in Hardman, *French Politics 1774-1789,* (London, 1995) p.119.

[12] Hardman has showed that throughout his reign Louis was responsible for at least three appointments, at the most five. The majority of appointees originated in various factions, to which these appointments had loyalty. See: *French Politics, 1774-1789,* (London, 1995).

[13] Ibid., p.186.

[14] Price, p.40.

[15] Hardman, *Louis XVI: The Silent King,* (London, 2000) p.30.

[16] Turgot had some reservations and therefore wanted to see strict limitations placed on the new Parlement's powers.

[17] Lever, *Louis XVI.* p.134. Pamphlet written by Comte de Provence.

[18] Veri, I, p.202.

[19] Stormont, 10 August 1774.

[20] Lever, *Louis XVI,* p.178.

[21] Hardman, *Louis XVI,* p.35.

[22] For example see: W. Doyle, 'The Parlements of France and the Breakdown of the Old Regime, 1771-88,' *French Historical Studies,* VI (1970), 415-58.

[23] Quoted in Hardman, *Louis XVI,* p.56.

[24] Stormont, 16 Nov 1774, PBO 271

[25] See: Hardman, *Louis XVI.*

[26] Echeverria, p.229.

[27] Hardman, *Louis XVI: The Silent King,* p.12-15.

[28] J.Dull, *The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774-1787* (Princeton, 1975) p.10.

[29] Hardman, *Louis XVI,* p.66. See also Dull.

[30] Hardman, *Louis XVI: The Silent King,* p.67

[31] The eventual arguments put forth by Louis to justify France's entry into the war mirror Vergennes' position. Ergo one can assume that Vergennes' attempts to convince the king had the desired effect in bringing his mind over to the foreign minister's way of thinking. See: Price.

[32] See: E.N. White. 'Was There a Solution...' J. Bosher, *French Finances 1770-1795,* (Cambridge, 1970); M.Morineau, 'Budgets de l'Etat et gestion des finances royales en France au dix-hiutième siècle,' *Révue historique* 536 (1980).

[33] Bankruptcy in this context meant forcing down the interest rate on the Crown's debts.

[34] DuPont De Nemours, *Oeuvres de M. Turgot, précedées et accompagnées de memoires et de notes sur la vie, son administration et ses ouvrages.* Vol. IV, pp.109-113:

[35] Joly de Fleury to Louis XVI, undated, BN Coll. J. de Fleury 2487, of.137.

[36] Louis wrote to Vergennes, 'I do not doubt M.d'Ormesson's zeal for my service, but if credit is destroyed, his good intentions cannot take its place.' Price, *Preserving the Monarchy.* p.108.

[37] Quoted in Hardman, *Louis XVI: The Silent King,* p. 56

[38] Veri, I, 182-187.

[39] Stormont, 13 March 1774, PBO 267

[40] Veri, I, p. 222.

[41] The *corvée* was essentially forced peasant labour on the construction and maintenance of roads in the kingdom. The Third and Second estates were exempt from the labour *and* paying tax to maintain them. The *corvée* was also one of the most hated forms of tax in the eyes of the peasants who were taken from their fields to fulfil the obligation.

[42] The clerical exemption was a concession to Miromesnil during heated discussions over this move.

[43] The magistrates stated that inequality between men was of divine origin. They believed that to establish between men an equality in rights and to destroy the necessary distinctions would lead to disorder and then produce the overthrow of society, whose harmony 'can be maintained only by the grandeur of authority, pre-eminence and distinction which tie each to his place and guarantee all states from confusion.'

[44] Veri, I, 419-420.

[45] Stormont, 13 March 1776.

[46] Stormont, 20 March. 1776.

[47] Hardman, *Louis XVI*, p.51.

[48] Edgar Faure, *La Disgrâce de Turgot.* (Paris, 1961) Vol.II, p.287.

[49] Veri, Vol.I, pp.317-318.

[50]Ibid., p.413.

[51] Ibid., pp. 450-57.

[52] Veri, I, pp.447-448,

[53]Lewis, p.205

[54] Veri, *Journal,* cahier 109, quoted in Hardman, *French Politics 1774-1789.* p.50.

[55] Veri, Vol. II, p.157.

[56] ANK 161, No.2

[57] Veri, Vol.II, p.376.

[58] Lever, p.309.

[59] E. Lavisse, *Histoire de France.* (Paris, Hachette, 1909). Vol.9, p.87.

[60] Maurepas openly mocked the *compte* and the blue paper on which both the compte and fairy tales at the time were written. He went around asking, "Avez-vous lu le compte bleu?".

[61] Lever, *Louis XVI.* p.361-362.

[62] Marquis de Segur, p.411.

[63] Castries, *Journal,* I, pp.72-75, quoted in Hardman, *French Politics,* p.61.

[64] D'Angiviller, *Memoires,* 114, quoted in Hardman, *French Politics.*p.61.

[65] BN, Joly de Fleury, 1442 fo. 10.

[66] The lettres de change were used to purchase supplies overseas during a war; capital and accrued interest were discharged together after the conclusion of peace.

[67] Joly de Fleury (3 November 1782) BN 2484, fo.241, (8 November 1782) 2485, fo.6.

[68] Joly de Fleury (10 November 1782) BN coll. Joly de Fleury 2485, fo. 11.

[69] Fleury had indeed talked about retiring given his age. Nevertheless the intrigues forced him into retirement earlier than he wanted.

[70] Mercy-Argenteau, *Correspondance secrète...*, vol.1, p.79.

[71] As minister, Louis severely rebuked him in front of his fellow ministers on several occasions. Such actions were out of character for Louis.

[72] Hardman, *Louis XVI,* p.79.

[73] He had made the necklace, consisting of 579 large diamonds, in the hope that Louis XV would purchase it for the Madame du Barry. To his great disappointment the king refused. One can only imagine Bohmer's desire to sell a piece of jewelry valued at 1.600.000 livres.

[74] As Louis himself told him when the scandal broke: 'This is neither the handwriting of the Queen, nor her signature: How could a prince of the House of Rohan have believed that the Queen would sign *Marie-Antoinette de France*? Everyone knows that queens only use their first, baptismal name when signing.' Lever, *Louis XVI.* p.341.

[75] In addition to political motives, Breteuil also had a long-standing grudge against Rohan for replacing him as ambassador to Vienna during the reign of Louis XV.

[76] It seems that Calonne wanted the acquittal so that he could leave the ministry of finance for the Maison du Roi before the impeding financial crisis hit.

[77] A. Arneth et als., ed., Vol.III, pp.32-34.

[78] Calonne was already disliked by many magistrates for his position during the parliamentary crisis of 1771.

[79] Miromesnil to Louis XVI (17 December 1785) AN K 163, no.8.5, (11 Deecmber 1785) AN K 163, no.8.4, (8 December 1785) AN K 163, no.8.21.

[80] Price, *Preserving the Monarchy.* p.132.

[81] Quoted in: J.-C. Petitfils, *Louis XVI* (Paris, 2005) p.537.

[82] ANK, 164.4. There were other aspects of Calonne's programme which aimed to improve the economic health of the kingdom.

[83] Quoted in Hardman, *Louis XVI*, p.119.

[84] Ibid., p.119.

[85] Besneval, *Memoires,* Vol. II, pp.213-214.

[86] Hardman, *French Politics 1774-1789,* p.84.

[87] See: Egret, *La pré- Révolution française.*

[88] Calonne believed that the court nobility would be more susceptible to crown patronage during the proceedings.

[89] Colin, p.381

[90] Castries, *Journal,* II, fo.392.

[91] Guy-Marie Sallier-Chaumont de Laroche, p.128.

[92] Ibid., p.126

[93]Brienne, *Journal,* p.63. Quoted in Hardman, *Louis XVI,* p.86.

[94] Necker, *De la Révolution française*, 1797, I, p.252.

[95] Necker, p.253

[96] Adhémar, *Souvenirs sur Marie-Antoinette*, p.171-175.

[97] Adhémar, ed., Vol. III, pp.156-158.

Chapter 5

[1] L. Haimson. 'The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917.' *Slavic Review,* 23 (1964), 24 (1965).

[2] S. Vilchkovskii, "Prebyvanie Gosudaria Imperatora v Pskove', *Russkaya Letopis.*(Paris 1922) (Vol. III) pp.169-170, Szeftel 410-411.

[3] Quoted in Oldenburg, *Tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaya II.* p.47.

[4] Kokovtsov, *Iz moego proshlego.* p.282-283

[5] Verner, *The Crisis of Russian Autocracy.* p.59

[6] See: Lieven, *Russia's Rulers Under the Old Regime.* (London, 1989)

[7] *Krasnii Archiv,* 221 (1927) pp.173-74, 10 Nov 1905.

[8] Witte, p.84

[9] *Journal of Modern History,* 26 (March 1954) p.60-74

[10] See: Rieber, ed., *The Politics of Autocracy.* p. 244., Mosse, *Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia.,* D. Orlovskii,*The Limits of Reform.* D.Saunders, *Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform.*

[11] A. Mosolov, *Pri dvore poslednogo tsaria.* (Moscow, 1991). p.76

[12] One cannot really call them alternative sources of information. They served rather as reinforcers of Nicholas' feelings.

[13] Dnevnik Kuropatina, KA 2, p.57-58

[14]The reformists complained of his inability to follow their line consistently. The conservatives decried his inability to unite the government during a time of growing social problems and political instability.

[15] Kryzhanovskii, *Vospominnaniia,* p.75

[16] Quoted in Warth, *Nicholas II.* p.35

[17] Quoted in: Lieven, *Nicholas II.*, p.106

[18] Quoted in Warth, *Nicholas II.* p.77

[19] A.Rozen, *Zapiski dekabrista* (Irkutsk, 1984), p.137.

[20] D. Saunders, *Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform 1801-1881.* (London, 1995) p.143.

[21] V.Klyuchevskii, *Kurs russkii istorii* (Moscow, 1997), Vol. 2, p.187.

[22] D.Mack Smith, *Italy and Its Monarchy.* (London, 1989), p.72.

[23] Viskochkov, pp.348-349.

[24] *Chrezvychainaia Sledstvenaia Komissiia,* Vol. 1 (Leningrad, 1925) p.36

[25] Quoted in Oldenburg, *Tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaia II.* p.212. One contemporary close to the court wrote in his diary, 'In pushing an active foreign policy in the Far East, he (Nicholas) saw a real chance to strengthen the power of the empire and bring himself a great degree of glory. 'Dnevnik A.A. Polovtsova', *Krasnii Archiv,* 1934, T.6, p.67.

[26] The word *bezobrazie* in Russian means disgrace, scandal, or ugliness.

[27] Lieven, *Nicholas II.* p.97

[28] Dnevnik Kuropatkina, *Krasnii Archiv,* 1922, t.2, pp.31-37.

[29] Dnevnik Kurpatkina, KA 2, 30

[30] D.MacDonald, *United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914.* (London, 1992). p.55.

[31] 'Dnevnik Kuropatkina', 2, p.34.

[32] In August 1903 at a special ministerial meeting Witte, Lambsdorff, and Kuropatkin Nicholas to hold back from any active policy in Korea, which would lead to a 'dangerous confrontation with Japan, war with whom... lead to a disaster for Russia.' 'Archiv Vneshii Politiki Rossiiskii Imperii, f. Kantselyarya', Op.470.1903, d.35., l.108-118.

[33] 'Dnevnik Kuropatkina', p.59

[34] MacDonald, *United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914.* p.27

[35] Ibid., p.26

[36] *Krasnii Arkhiv,* 2, 90 p.71

[37] Ibid, p.80

[38] See KA, vol.4/5, p.10-11.

[39] Quoted in: A.V. Ignat'ev. *Vneshnaia Politika Rossii v 1905-1907 gg.* (Moscow, 1986) p.84

[40] See: AVPR, Chancellery fond, 1905, d.40, l.128

[41] Ignat'ev, *Vneshnaia Politika Rossii v 1905-1907 gg.* p.85.

[42] Kokovtsev, p.90.

[43] In addition certain figures in the Russian government, worried that French confidence in Russian worthiness as a partner, hoped to utilise the Moroccan crisis to prove that Russia was indeed a valuable ally.

[44] Eugene N. Anderson, *The First Moroccan Crisis 1904-1906.,* (Chicago, 1930) pp.398-399

[45] F.Bridge, *The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers, 1815-1918.* (New York, 1990). p.232.

[46] Chief of Staff Palitsyn believed that the straits issue, with its unforeseen consequences, should not be raised while Russia was so weak. Kokovstev argued that at the present time and for the foreseeable future Russia needed to cope with the consequences of her greatly weakened international position and give up temporarily plans for an active policy over the Straits and the Near East. Stolypin himself added to the chorus of disapproval.

[47] There is still some debate over what was said at the castle and the terms of the agreement.

[48] MacDonald, *United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia.* p.141

[49] Nikolai II Imperatritse Marii, 19 March 1909., KA , pp.188-189

[50] After the crisis broke Stolypin did indeed ask the foreign minister about his activities, to which Izvolskii replied that he could not discuss it by order of the tsar. Stolypin's face went red.

[51] Quoted in: V.A. Emets et al., *Istoriya vneshnei politiki Rossii:Ot russko-frantsuzkogo soiuza do Oktyabrskoi revoliutsii.,* (Moscow, 1999), p.245.

[52] Stevenson, *Armaments and the coming of war: Europe 1907-1914.* p.413

[53] Quoted in: William C. Wohlforth, The Perception of Power: Russia in the pre-1914 Balance., *World Politics*

[54] Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War.*p.37.

[55] V. Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organisation in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914.* (London, 1983). p.5

[56] The situation was particularly dangerous in Saint-Petersburg, the centre of heavy industry, whose population had much more workers, in real and proportional terms, than any other city in Russia.

[57] B. Moore. *Authority and inequality under capitalism and socialism.* (Oxford, 1987).

[58] R. Bendix and M.S. Lipset. *Class, structure, and power: Social stratification in comparative perspective.* (London, 1967).

[59] *Bumagi N.X.Bunge,* TsGIA RF, f.1622,1, d.721

[60] Paradoxically the MVD was known to force factory owners not to make concessions to the workers out of fear that if workers in different factories or industries came to understand that strikes could in the end pay off they too might halt work in order to obtain redress.

[61] E. Judge, *Plehve.* (Syracuse, 1983). p.128

[62] TsGIA RF, f.23, op.30, d.25, l.112

[63] One of the key grievances in these strikes was the long work day, lasting in many cases fourteen hours. Once the strikes had ended Nicholas II, at the request of Witte, established a special committee to examine the length of the work day. The workers had demanded an eight-hour day, only to receive a reduction to eleven and half hours.

Nicholas signed the bill into law in 1897. Witte also pushed through the State Council a bill requiring factory owners to compensate workers permanently injured or the immediate family of a worker killed on the job.This bill was passed in 1903.

[64] 'Rabochii dvizhenie na zavodakh Peterburga v mae 1901 g.,' *Krasnii Arkhiv*, 1936, n. 3(76), pp.52-66

[65] J.Schneiderman. *Sergei Zubatov and Revolutionary Marxism.* (London, 1976) p.42-43

[66] Morskoi, p.87

[67] Quoted in John C.G.Rohl, *The Kaiser and His Court: Wilhlem II and the Government of Germany,* (Cambridge, 1990), p.124. Granted the Kaiser abandoned the project several years later because he felt the workers' had not responded in a positive manner. The point here however is that he was concerned with the problem and devoted some attention to it.

[68] TsGIA RF, f.1282, op.1, d.696, l.37

[69] In some instances the MVD approach was blamed for exacerbating the situation by whetting the workers' appetite.

[70]Kaufman, p.95.

[71] The Shah's labour policy before the oil boom was successful. After the oil boom it became easier for the government to throw money at the labour challenge..

[72] This was a demand of the far left, which had infiltrated the Gapon unions.

[73] Pravitelstvennyi Vestnik, 20 Jan 1905

[74] Kokovtsev stressed that the Zubatov organisations, for example, had tried only 'to counter revolutionary propaganda', but in the end had not strove 'to improve the conditions of the workers.' The MVD had become a victim of its own demogogy and in the end had produced the exact opposite result wanted.

[75] '*Rabochii Vopros v komissii V.N. Kokovtsova,* pp.168-171.

[76] Kokovtsev proposed the following reforms, which had been worked out within the Ministry of Finance: (1) The formation of hospital fund, supported by both worker and factory owner contributions; (2) the formation of local boards at the enterprise level, whose membership would include both workers representatives and factory owners, 'for the discussion and resolution of questions concerning hiring, firing, and the improvement of the workers' conditions; (3) the reduction of the working day from 11.5 hours to 10 hours and reductions for workers working special kinds of shifts; (4) a rethink on the laws concerning strikes and the premature breaking of working contracts by factory owners.

[77] The report also stated that when political control was weakened or absent the strikers themselves, 'often take it upon themselves to maintain order and security, setting up guards and even entering into struggles with criminal scum of society, defending their factories and the security of the neutral public and its property.'

[78] See Kokovstev's report of 16 January 1905, 9oe ianvaria 1905, 'KA 11-12 (1925):1-23. There are also reports dated 14 and 19 January. The Council of Ministers supported Kokovstev's interpretation of the worker problem announcing that, 'for the proper solution to strikes, emerging exclusively from economic causes, it is imperative that the workers are provided with some sort of organisation and that they know exactly their responsibilities and rights...' Of course it is up to debate whether it was possible to distinguish whether a strike was economic or political in nature for it seemed, as Kokovstev pointed out, workers were beginning to regard the government itself as part of the problem, and not the bearer of solutions. But there was still time to avoid the complete merge between these two trends , which proved fatal during the war years.

[79] Trepov's commission became known as the Shidlovskii Commission, after the chairman, Senator Shidlovskii.

[80] For a discussion of this process see: Ruth Amende Roosa, 'Workers' Insurance Legislation and the Role of the Industrialists in the Period of the Third State Duma', *Russian Review*, pp.410-452

[81] D.Mack Smith, *Italy and Its Monarchy.* p. 185

[82] See: S.Bersteen and P.Milza, *L'Italie contemporaine du Risorgimento à la chute du fascisme.* (Paris, 1995). By the beginning of the war certain elements within the workers' movement began to radicalise and some of the more moderate labour leaders began to be sidelined. However these events were tied to Giolitti's controversial war in Libya and the failure of moderates to condemn it. The limited radicalisation in the years leading up to the First World War was not primarily attributable to the conditions of the workers. In any case the Italian workers before and during the war did not attain the level of radicalisation which characterised the Russian workers' movement.

[83] 'Byloe', 4 1917, p.206-207

[84] It is important to note that the regime in 1905 was happy to advocate a peasant franchise when it was convinced that the peasants would vote the way it wanted.

[85] See: A.P.Borodin. *Gosudarstvenii Sovet Rossii:1906-1917.* (Kirov, 1999), p.118.

[86] Quoted in: M.Conroy, *Petr Arkadevich Stolypin.* (Blouder, Co, 1976)p.167.

[87] '...an alliance of important elements in government and society, centring on Stolypin and the Octobrists, was in fact emerging from the electoral law of 3 June and preparing far-reaching, if gradual, changes but that the operations of this alliance were gradually restricted and then stifled by the resistance of small but politically powerful groups close to the monarch with an interest in preventing change.' See: G. Hosking, 'P.A. Stolypin and the Octobrist Party', *The Slavonic Review*

[88] A.S.Korros, ' The Landed Nobility, the State Council, and P.A. Stolypin (1907-1911)'

[89] A.Avrekh, 'Vopros o zapadnom zemstve i bankrotstvo Stolypina', *Istoricheskie Zapiski* 70 (1961) p.91-109

[90] Iz peripiski P.A. Stolypina c Nikolaem Romanovim, KA 30, p.86

[91] Quoted in Oldenburg, *Tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaia II.* p.457.

[92] The Empress Dowager also played a large role in convincing Nicholas to retain Stolypin.

[93] Lieven, *Nicholas II*, p.185

[94] Kokovtsev, *Iz moego proshlogo*, vol.2, p.109.

[95] It was known that Nicholas was subsidising right wing groups, met with them, and read religiously reactionary papers, such the infamous *Grazhdanin.*

[96] Mack Smith, p.92.

[97] F. Conrad von Hoetzendorf, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit III*, p.282. Hotzendorf was indeed recalled a couple of years later, after the death of Aeranthal. This move however reflected changes in the Empire's foreign policy as the situation in the Balkans seemed to deteriorate.

[98] Quoted in : Hosking, *The Constitutional Experiment*, p.197

[99] *Padenie Tsarskogo Rezhima,* vol. 5, pp. 195-196, Quoted in Hosking, pp.202-203

[100] Mack Smith, p.8.

[101] M. Rodzianko, *Krushenie Imperii.* (Rostov-on Don, 1919). pp.52-53

[102] TsGIA RF, f. 857., 1.41

[103] TsGIA RF, f.541, 1, 4

[104] Gurko,*Features and Figures of the Past.* pp.579-81.

[105] Lemke, M. *250 dnei v tsarskoi stavke.* (Petrograd, 1920). p.631.

[106] Manikovski, M. *Boevoe snabzhenie russkoi armii v mirovuiu voinu 1914-1918gg.* (Moscow, 1930), Vol. 2, pp.342-43.

[107] Krivoshein was not removed properly, resigning after witnessing the removal of his other 'liberal' ministers.

[108] A.Leory-Beaulieu, *L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes* .(Paris, 1882) Vol. II, p.599

[109] T.Riha, ed., *Readings in Russian Civilization, Vol.2: Imperial Russia, 1700-1917.* (London, 1967) p.235.

[110] Ibid, p.221

[111] F. Golder. *Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917.* (London, 1927). p. 244-45.

[112] For a good examination of the state of the elite in the war years see: I.L.Apkhipov, *Rossisskaya Politicheskaya Elita v Fevrale 1917* (St.Petersburg, 2000).

[113] 'Fevralskaia revoliutsiia v dokumentakh', *Byloe*, 29, 1, 1918. p.163.

[114] *Krasnii Archiv*, 21, 1927, pp.15-16.

[115] P.Gatrell, *Russia's First World War.*(London, 2005), p.101.

[116] *Krasnii Archiv*, 20, 1927, p.137.

Chapter 6

[1] London and Moscow believed that Reza Shah maintained too close relations with Nazi Germany.

[2] Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, *Mission for My Country,* p.78.

[3] Ibid., p.76

[4] Ibid., p.77.

[5]Alam, Vol. 4, p.60.

[6] This explains, as we shall see, the eventual forced retirement of General Zahedi and then Ali Amini. The passivity, lack of open aspirations in the political field and of intentions to establish a special relationship with western powers and especially the United States explain the longevity of the premiership of Amir Abbas Hoveyda. Homoyoun, p.22.

[7] B. Kaufman, *The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr.,* (Kansas, 1993).

[8] For a closer look at the phychological make-up of the last shah see: M. Zonis, *Majestic Failure.* (Chicago, 1990).

[9] Taheri, *The Unknown Life of the Shah.* p.78.

[10] Alam, *Yadashtha-ye Alam. Vol 2.* p. 135.

[11] Figures in the government and at the court did have some influence over the shah, but it was minimal when compared to the power of others over Louis and Nicholas.

[12] Alam, *Yadashtha-ye Alam, Vol. 2.* p. 145.

[13] Alam., *Vol.II,* p.296.

[14] Ladjevardi, H.ed., *Khaterat-e Jafar Sharif Emami: Nakhostinvazir-e Iran,* (Harvard Oral History Project, 2000), p.113-114.

[15] Alam, *Yadashtha-ye Alam. Vol. I.* p. 339.

[16] Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, *Mission for My Country,* p. 322.

[17] Ibid., pp.321-22

[18] Alam, *Vol.II,* p.64-65.

[19] See: F.Pahlavi, *My Thousand and One Days*, Alam, F. Hoveyda, D. Macarthur III, J. Miklos, and Djam.

[20] E. Naraghi, *Des palais du chah aux prisons de la revolution.* (Paris, 1991) p.180.

[21] Or SAVAK would investigate or write a report, but the shah would never see it.

[22] IOHP. General Williamson, pp. 58-59, 107

[23] Alam, *Vol.1*, 257.

[24] Ibid., 'Trying to Persuade a Reluctant Shah.' See also: CIA Report, 'Stability of the present regime in Iran.' 1958/08/25, NSA #362.

[25] E.Sciolino,'The C.I.A. in Iran,' *The New York Times,* 15 April 2000.

[26] M. Zonis, *Majestic Failure,* p.137.

[27] Taheri, *The Unknown Life of the Shah.* p. 150.

[28] HIOHP, Djam.

[29] SAVAK was nominally under the control of the Prime Minister, but this was never the case. Mohammad Reza Shah kept it under his control.

[30] The shah however rarely, if ever, granted an audience to Parviz Sabeti, the head of SAVAK's Third Division, which combated corruption. 'His office monitored the activities of the Iranian political, economic, and military elite for any indication of graft, paybacks, dummy partnerships, ..'etc. See: A.Milani, *The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution*, (New York, 2000), pp.222-223.

[31] Alam, *Vol.II.* p.268.

[32] Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History,* p.22-23. Although many US officials deny that there was ever any direct pressure on the Shah to appoint .

[33] Keddie, *Roots of Revolution.* p.154. Also see: H. Ladjevardi, *Khaterat-e Ali Amini,* (Harvard Oral History Project, 1995, 1997)

[34] IOHP, General 'Tiger' Gordon. p.32.

[35] A. Alikhani, in the Introduction of *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diaries of Iran's Royal Court.* p.8.

[36] See: Vali Nasr, *Politics within the late-Pahlavi State: The Ministry of Economy and Industrial Policy, 1963-1969,* Middle East Studies 32 (2000) 97-122.

[37] Ibid., p.101.

[38] Ibid., p.101.

[39] *Time,* 3 November 1958.

[40] IOHP Lenczowski, pp.29-31.

[41] *Time,* 6 October 1967. The shah was discussing his decision to dissolve the Majles at the beginning of Amini's tenure.

[42] The candidates had been picked by the new party, Iran-e novin and not directly by the government.

[43] *New York Times,* 25 September 1963.

[44] Alam, *Vol.1.* p.318.

[45] Ibid., p.552.

[46] Whilst the leadership of the National Front during this period no doubt carries much responsibility for the downward spiral in its political fortunes, the Shah did much to ensure its exclusion from Iran's political life. Since this movement under Mossadeq almost cost him his throne he remained suspicious of it.

[47] Milani,*The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution.* p.81.

[48] Alam, *Vol.1*, p.159.

[49] *The Guardian,* 19 January 1974.
[50] Even a question regarding the reduction of bus fares after some student demonstrations in Tehran had to be decided by the Shah. A. Milani, *The Persian Sphinx.* p.246.
[51] Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, *Mission for My Country,* p.175.
[52] Ann Schulz, 'Councillors and the Dilemma of Representation: The Case of Isfahan,' p.147.
[53] See: Alam. F. Hoveyda, F. Pakravan, Macarthur III, A. Afkhami, Alavi-Kiya, Majidi, K. Farmanfarmanian, Gudarzi, Naraghi, and Homayoun.
[54] MacArthur, p.143.
[55] Alam, *Vol.III,* . p.133.
[56] Ibid., p.168.
[57]Ibid., Vol. II, p.313.
[58] Naraghi, *De la palais du chah aux prisons de la révolution.* p. 23.
[59]Kaufman, p.34.
[60] Alam, *Vol.III,* . pp.431-32.
[61] H. Nahavandi, *Iran: Deux Rêves Brises,* (Paris, 1981), pp. 61-98.
[62] IOHP, Bolster, p.236.
[63] Alam, *Vol.11,* p.295.
[64] Ed. A. Alikhani ,*The Shah and I.* Introduction, p.9
[65] The problem was that the Constitution of 1906 was not being honoured by the Shah.
[66] *Kayhan,* 8 March 1975.
[67] IOHP, Helms,p. 28.
[68] Pahlavi, Mohamamd Reza, *Mission for My Country,* p.173.
[69] Laing, *The Shah.* pp.220-221.
[70] *Time,* 9 June 1975.
[71] See: *Tamadon-e Bozorg,* (Tehran: 1355)
[72] It is interesting to compare the Pahlavi system with the Islamic Republic in this regard. The system which came into place after the revolution has many more 'shock absorbers' which make the Islamic Republic less susceptible to crises. Whilst the religious leader indeed holds supreme power, power and responsibilities are diffused throughout the system, thereby creating more political actors with a stake in the system.
[73] There is controversy over the amount of money passed to the clergy, though the existence of special funds with which to buy-off members of the clergy did indeed exist.
[74] Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution.* p.85.
[75] Baqer Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah,* (London, 1999), p. 75.
[76] H.Ruhani, *Nehzat-e Imam-e Khomeini,* vol.1, (Tehran, 1360) p.22.
[77] Ibid., p. 25.
[78] *Le Monde,* 24-25 March 1963.
[79] Ruhani, pp.262-263, 265
[80] A.Houshangmehadvi, ed., *Engelab-e Iran be ravait-e radio bbc.*(London, 1372).
[81] Alam, *Vol. 1,* p.160.
[82] Quoted in Antoine, *Louis XV,* pp.851-853.
[83] Quoted in F. Bluche, *L'Ancien Regime,* pp.67-68.
[84] S. Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran.* (Albany, 1980).p. 23.
[85] Mansoor Moadel: *Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution.* p.153.

[86] It might have been possible for a more active leader in 1978-1979 to mobilise the countryside, as in 1848 and 1871.

[87] H .Ladjevardi,ed. *Khaterat-e Abdolmadjid Madjidi* p.113-114

[88] A.Milani,*The Persian Sphinx.* p.217

[89] H.Ladjevardi,*Khaterat-e Abdol Majid Majidi.* pp.93-95.

[90] Houshangmehdvi, p.148.

[91] Razavi, *The Political Environment of Economic Planning in Iran.* p.183.

[92] Ibid, p.31

[93] Alam, *The Shah and I.* p. 365

[94] Razavi, p. 68-69

[95] Ibid., p.74

[96] Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power* (London: 1978), p.80

[97] Alam, Vol. IV, p.16.

[98] *The Economist,* 28 August 1976.

[99] Chahpour Hagighat, *La Révolution Islamique,* (Bruxelles, 1989), p. 18

[100] Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, *Answer to History,* p.126

[101] *Khaterat-e Abdol Majid Majidi.* p. 54-57

[102] *Khaterat-e Abdol Majid Majidi.* p. 200

[103] *Bank-e markazi-ye Iran,* (1979)

[104] Razavi, *The Political Environment of Economic Planning in Iran.* p.93

[105] Farhad Kazemi, 'Economic Indicators and Political Violence in Iran 1946-1968,' *Iranian Studies,* Winter/Spring 1975, pp.70-86.

[106] *The Economist,* 16.9.77

[107] W.Sullivan. *Mission to Iran.* (London, 1980), pp.167-68.

[108] The regime took some important steps. In November 1977 legislation was passed according to which prosecutors had to complete preliminary interrogations within twenty-four hours of arrest, the accused had the right to civilian counsel and a trial in public. The shah announced that political prisoners would not be tortured and ordered SAVAK to be tolerant to a degree of political dissidents. The Red Cross visited jails and westerners were allowed to attend the trials of dissidents.

[109]A.Milani, *The Persian Sphinx.* p.285-286. There is also a different version concerning the reasons for the shah's anger. It would seem that sometime in late 1977 or early 1978 Mohammad Reza Shah heard one of Khomeini's tapes in which the exiled Ayatollah denounced and severely criticised the shah. 'The shah, who was in the habit of responding to criticism whatever the source called together people to write a response to Khomeini's tape.' IOHP, Homayoun, p.42

[110] *Ettela'at,* 7 January 1978

[111] The police had to use bullets as Iran's request for tear gas had been delayed by human rights activists in the US State Department. Iran finally received their order of tear gas in November 1978 by which time it was too late. See: Milani, *Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution.* p.113

[112] After the revolution this incident was investigated by the Interior Minister of the Islamic Republic which found that the fire had been the 'mistake of militant youths', supporters of Khomeini.

[113] Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution.*p.117

[114] BBC documentary, *The Last Shah.* 04.96.

[115] OHFIS, Oney, p.117
[116] Naraghi, *Des palais du chah aux prisons de la révolution.* p. 20:
[117] Speech quoted in: *Dastan-e Engelab,* 'Payam-e radio-ye shah 15 Bahman 1356,' (BBC Persian Service, 1993)
[118] It was not commonly known that it was Alam who ordered the troops onto the streets during that crisis.
[119] Alam, Vol. III, p.181.
[120] *Le Monde,* 29-30 June 1974
[121] Naraghi, *Des palais du chah aux prisons de la révolution.* p.86
[122] Sir Anthony Parsons, *The Pride and Fall.* (London, 1980).p.84
[123] Pahlavi, *Answer to History.* p.22
[124] Ibid., p.165
[125] British Embassy in Washington to Foreign Officce, London, 21/5/1953.
[126] Taheri, *The Unknown Life of the Shah.* p.274
[127] Huyser, *Mission to Tehran,* p.78
[128] Pahlavi, *Answer to History,* p.79
[129] Interview in *The Washington Post,* 27 May 1980.
[130] Alam, Vol.II, p.18.
[131] Doyle. *Oxford History of the French Revolution.* P. 82.
[132] Ibid., p.85.
[133] De Coursac, *Louis XVI à la parole,* p.191.
[134] Bailly, *Mémoires,* I, 367-68. (Paris, 1821), p.367-68.
[135] Lever, *Louis XVI.* p.517.
[136] Ibid., p.516
[137] Ibid., p.514.
[138] Hardman, *Louis XVI.* p.126
[139] A de Bacourt, ed., *Correspondance entre de Comte de Mirabeau et le comte de la Mauch.* (Paris, 1851) Vol II, p.212.
[140] La Rocheterie, ed., *Marie-Antoinette, Lettres.* 11, 23,
[141] Paleogue, III, pp.48, 149-150
[142] G. Botkin, *The Real Romanovs,* (New York, 1931) p.125
[143] Kokovtsov, II, pp.478-80.
[144] Parsons, *The Pride and the Fall.* p.71.

Chapter 7

[1] De Tocqueville, *Ancien Regime*, p.133-34
[2] Ibid., p.207
[3] See: S. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies.* (London, 1968), pp.177-237.
[4] Veri, MSS, *Journal,* cahier 109, quoted in Hardman, *French Politics.*
[5] James A. Sheehan, *German History, 1770-1866*, (Oxford, 1989), pp.291-310.
[6] J-François, *La Cour de France.* (Paris, 1987), pp.223-225.

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--Gudarzi, M.
--Hashemi-Nejad, M. Gen.
--Helms, R.
--Homayoun, D.
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--Komer, R.
--Lehfeldt, W.
--Lenczowski, G.
--Macarthur, Douglas III
--Madani, S.A. Admiral
--Majidi, A-M.
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--Naas, C.
--Nasr, S-H.
--Niyazmand, R.
--Oney, E.
--Pahlavi, Princess Ashraf
--Parsons, Sir Anothony
--Pejman, I. Col.
--Pur-Shoa, A.
--Radji, P.
--Rambod, H.
--Ramsbotham, Sir Peter
--Rusk, D.
--Samii, A-H.
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--Afshar-Ghassemlou, A-K, minister of foreign affairs
--Aghayan, F., senator
--Alamouti, M., Majles deputy and journalist
--Alikhani, A., minister of economy
--Alavi-Kia, H. Gen., deputy chief of SAVAK
--Amini, N. Tehran mayor
--Amirazizi, S. Gen., interior minister
--Amirteymour, M-E., labour minister
--Azar, M. minister of education
--Baghaie-Kermani, M., Majles deputy
--Behnia, A., minister of roads
--Daftari, M. Gen., national police chief
--Derakhshesh, M., minister of education
--Djam, F. Gen., chief of Supreme Commander's Staff
--Dolatshahi, M. Majles deputy and ambassador
--Fartash, A. Gen., Imperial Guards
--Firouz, M., minister of labour and propaganda
--Gharib, H., chief of protocol, Ministry of Court
--Habibolahi, K. Adm., naval commander
--Hashemi, M. Gen., SAVAK counterespionage
--Hasheminejad, M. Gen., Imperial Guards Commander
--Kalali, M., secretary general of Iran Novin party
--Keshavarz, F., minister of education and Tudeh leader
--Khosrovani, A. minister of labour
--Khosrovani, P. Gen., head of Tehran gendarmerie
--Kia, H-A., head of military intelligence
--Mahdavi, E., minister of agriculture
--Mahvi, A., businessman and advisor to the Shah
--Mehbod, A., diplomat and advisor to the Shah
--Pejman, I. Col., SAVAK director-general
--Pirasteh, M., minister of the interior
--Toufanian, H. Gen., military procurement head
--Zahedi, A., minister of foreign affairs and ambassador to the US

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