

Migration Literature and Hybridity

The Different Speeds of Transcultural Change

Sten Pultz Moslund

Migration Literature and Hybridity

Also by Sten Pultz Moslund

MAKING USE OF HISTORY IN NEW SOUTH AFRICAN FICTION: An Analysis of the Purposes of Historical Perspectives in Three Post-Apartheid Novels

LONDON: Migrant City

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

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To Marie and Martha

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Introduction

The acceleration of migration and movement

To Salman Rushdie, 'the distinguishing feature of our time' is 'mass migration, mass displacement, globalized finances and industries' (Rushdie, 2002, 425). This is a formula that has acquired a central position in contemporary literary and cultural studies where the second half of the twentieth century is emphasised as an epoch-making era in which mass migration and global movement has been picking up speed and volume. The conjunction of several historical events are often pointed out as lending credence to the claim. Among these are the massive diasporas caused by the Second World War, the demise of the British empire and the subsequent migration from the former colonies to the West. These events were followed by an accelerated globalisation of the world economy, creating a tremendous, highly mobile international work force and an enormous traffic of illegal immigration as a consequence of the growing maladjustment between the developed and the underdeveloped regions of the globe. Finally, the increased speed and capacity of modern means and modes of communication and transportation, such as international air travel, telephones, satellite TV and the Internet, is seen as having intensified the mobility around the world of people, commodities, capital, information and all sorts of cultural texts.

So, our age is supposed to be an age of unparalleled mobility, migration and border crossing. Reading the literature of globalisation, the whole world appears to be on the move. It is the grand spectacle of a virtual surge of people flowing across the surface of the globe: refugees, exiles, expatriates, international vagrants, guest workers, immigrants, globetrotting travellers and package tourists, wanderers of all kinds

crisscrossing the planet and all its national, ethnic, cultural, social and linguistic borders. It seems that we are witnessing a massive international and transnational defeat of gravity, an immense uprooting of origin and belonging, an immense displacement of borders, with all the clashes, meetings, fusions and intermixings it entails, reshaping the cultural landscapes of the world's countries and cities.

Some of these processes have been under way for centuries: since the journeys of discovery and the European imperial expansion, and since the mass migrations to the Americas, the slave trade and the colonial system of indentured labour. The difference between then and now, however, is the scale and the speed of the process. At V. S. Naipaul's arrival in Britain in 1950 the immigrant population amounted to 25,000. Today it is 4.6 million (French, 2008, 67). Such numbers prompt Edward Said to say that we can see the truth of Paul Virilio and Gilles Deleuze's notions of 'nomadic practice' and 'counter-habitation' played out on 'the political map of the contemporary world' (see Said, 1994, 395, 402).

Accordingly, the human condition is no longer defined in the humanities by traditional identity markers like nationality, origin, settlement, dwelling, roots, birthplace or bloodlines. Ulrich Beck sees this as a long overdue rectification of a fundamental epistemological error in human thinking where such notions of fixed identities and relations caused 'the global historical norm of the permeation and intermingling of cultures' to be 'falsely portrayed as the exception' or 'completely erased from our consciousness' (Beck, 2004, 68). Now an advanced understanding of what it is to be human is allegedly expressed in the figure of the migrant, 'the "borderline" figure of a massive historical displacement', as described by Homi Bhabha, a figure who is supposed to be in a state of uprooted, nomadic, transnational and transcultural fluidity (Bhabha, 1994, 320). 'We pretend that we are trees and speak of roots', says Salman Rushdie, 'Look under your feet. You will not find gnarled growths sprouting through the soles. Roots ... are a conservative myth, designed to keep us in our places' (Rushdie, 1983, 85–6).

Not only is the migrant figure presumed to illuminate the long concealed truth of human nature, exposing how movement is the norm rather than the exception, and how we are fundamentally creatures of movement rather than settlement; the international migrant is also promoted, accordingly, as a figure of late-Enlightenment human liberation. To Said:

> it is no exaggeration to say that liberation as an intellectual mission ... has now shifted from the settled, established and

> domesticated dynamics of culture to its unhoused, decentred and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the migrant, and whose consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile, the political figure between domains, between forms, between homes, and between languages. (Said, 1994, 403)

Movement and migration, and all the ideas that come with it of the human condition of restlessness and new mobile identity formations, has had a noticeable impact on literary production too. It has even engendered a new type of writing, it is sometimes argued, in the form of a contemporary literature of migration. Said, for instance, sees 'a splendid cohort of writers that includes such different figures as Salman Rushdie and V. S. Naipaul' as 'chroniclers' of '[e]xiles, émigrés, refugees, and expatriates uprooted from their lands'. They '[open] further the door first tried by Conrad' (Said, 2000, xiv). Rushdie too points out how 'a new novel is emerging, a post-colonial novel, a de-centred, transnational, inter-lingual, cross-cultural novel' (Rushdie, 2000, 57).

Migration literature as a literary genre

What, then, are the proposed characteristics of this new type of writing? In a recent publication, *Migration and Literature*, Søren Frank summarises a list of general themes and formal features that may put together a rough image of what contemporary migration literature is imagined to be within this emerging field of study.

Thematically, the migration novel engages with human identity, cultural identity, national identity and globalisation processes, says Frank, in all of which '[h]istory and geography become fundamental components' (see Frank, 2008, 17–19). The characters of migration literature invariably 'cope with migration' in different ways, from the experience of migration and the uncertainty of displaced identities as 'destructive, agonizing, and painful' to the experience of migration and displacement as 'productive, fascinating, and appealing', but in general, the migration novel works from a perspective of 'rewriting … identities in order to evoke their impure and heterogeneous character' (Frank, 2008, 18, 19). Stylistically, migration literature 'not only reflects but also helps create an intratextual migratory world' in the sense that the 'enunciatory strategies' of migration novels 'reveal a complex play with multiperspectivism, wandering consciousnesses … as well as intratextual border crossings between story and discourse' (Frank, 2008, 19). The novels are characterised by a 'plurality of discursive tracks' insofar as

'a variety of discourses and styles are combined into highly complex compositions.' In this way 'discursive borders are constantly relativized and transgressed ... intensifying the work's migratory character' (Frank, 2008, 20). Moreover, 'the migrant's experience of several languages' is supposed to constitute 'a Bakhtinian heteroglossia ... and an awareness of the world's high degree of constructedness'. On the whole, language is employed in the migration novel to 'destabilise doxa as it is constantly set in motion, varied, and impurified through the double awareness of two or more languages' (Frank, 2008, 20).[1]

Another distinguishing feature of the contemporary migration novel, which is less explicit in Frank's typology, and which will be the focal point of this book, is the discursive accentuation of cultural *hybridity*, which typically manifests itself in tropes and thematisations of the experience of cultural in-betweenness, processes of intermixture, fusions or doublings of two or more cultures or two or more systems of signification. In particular, this book will be concerned with certain assumptions of hybridity as a *special mode or language of representation*. When seen as a mode or language of representation, hybridity discourse is often purported to generate the kind of complex, multiplicitous, nomadic proliferation of identity and movement of meaning that Frank points to. It is supposed to illuminate reality, individual and collective identity, language and its own act of representation as in a migratory state of uncertainty and constant mutation and metamorphosis.

Although many migration novels appear to invite readings that focus on hybridity – as Mita Banerjee rightly argues, this kind of fiction 'both caters to and is read in terms of theoretical conceptions of hybridity' – this may not be relevant for all migration novels (Banerjee, 2002, 302). In *Fictions of Migration*, Roy Sommer has set himself the brave task of identifying several types of novel within the general notion of migration literature. He proposes the two overall categories of the 'multicultural' and the 'transcultural novel'. Both varieties counter essentialist ideas of homogeneous national cultures, but whereas the former views cultural flux and unbelonging as a problem that deprives the individual of the stability of homeland and rootedness, the transcultural novel is thoroughly anti-essentialist and celebrates uprootedness and cultural fragmentation as liberatory processes which thrust identity into perpetual becoming (see Sommer, 2001, 75–6). Sommer further divides the two overall categories into several subcategories. The 'multicultural novel' is subdivided into the 'migration novel' (which deals with diasporic experiences as in Caryl Phillips' *The Final Passage*), and

the 'multicultural Bildungsroman' (which deals with second generation immigrants and their searches for identity within their host cultures as in Hanif Kureishi's *The Buddha of Suburbia*) (Sommer, 2001, 75). He subdivides the 'transcultural' novel into two types, both of which 'engage collective identities with an increasing amount of scepticism': the 'historical revisionist novel' (which deconstructs colonial history from a multiperspectival angle as in David Dabydeen's *A Harlot's Progress*) (see Sommer, 2001, 76–7, 157, 136, my translation) and the 'transcultural-hybrid novel' (exemplified by Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* and Zadie Smith's *White Teeth*) (Sommer, 2001, 76–7, my translation). Among these four categories, it is only the last one, the 'transcultural-hybrid novel', which explicitly deals with issues of hybridity, while hybridity, according to Sommer, may in fact be playing no significant role in any of the other variations of the migration novel (see Sommer, 2001, 14, 162). In view of that, the 'transcultural-hybrid' migration novel is the primary concern of this book.

Among other characteristics, Sommer sees the transcultural-hybrid novel as entailing 'visions of the dissolution of fixed cultural identities' and the assertion of 'cosmopolitan hybridisation' and 'ethnic fragmentation' as counter-models to 'exclusive national or ethnic identities' (Sommer, 2001, 49, 48, my translation). Moreover, Sommer sees novels of transcultural hybridity as closely affiliated with Bhabha's theories of hybridity insofar as they aim for a constant 'in-betweenness', a 'borderless cosmopolitanism' and assert 'transnational' and 'transitory' identities (Sommer, 2001, 51, 58, 54, 52, 54, my translation). In a way the transcultural-hybrid novel may be said to intensify the features Frank identifies as characteristic of migration literature: the rewriting of identity as impure, intensified by formal multiperspectivism and transformation, semantic instability and restlessness.

Sommer is right to suggest *The Satanic Verses* and *White Teeth* as prototypes of the transcultural-hybrid novel. To give a few other examples, novels that may be added to the list (at least for the reason that these novels are often celebrated for asserting the characteristics of the transcultural-hybrid novel) include Gloria Anzaldúa's *Borderlands / La Frontera*, most of Rushdie's other novels, especially *Shame* (1983) and *The Moor's Last Sigh* (1995), M. G. Vassanji's *The In-Between World of Vikram Lall* (2003), Michael Ondaatje's *The English Patient* (1992), Amitav Ghosh's *The Shadow Lines* (1988), Fred Wah's *Diamond Grill* (1996), in addition to the novels I am going to look at later: Bharati Mukherjee's *Jasmine* (1989), Jamal Mahjoub's *The Carrier* (1998), and, although in a quite different way, V. S. Naipaul's *The Enigma of Arrival* (1987).

As much as my book is concerned with suppositions of how transcultural-hybrid novels may intentionally produce hybrid discourses that radically destabilise meaning and identity, I am also concerned with how these features are in many cases conjured up in *readings* and *theorisations* of this kind of literature and what values and ideas such readings commonly ascribe to hybridity. Once again, this pertains particularly to the representational capacities that are associated with hybridity, but also to the radical changes of worldviews migration novels are commonly assumed to be capable of generating. In this respect, the book will be particularly critical of *celebratory readings* of migration literature and transcultural hybridity discourses. Typically such readings propose the contemporary transnational and transcultural migrant as a global hero-figure of almost messianic qualities, as a new kind of fluid, complex, multiple, open, inclusive identity, replacing old identities and cosmologies of stability and belonging with the uncertainty of a liminal position in-between two or several cultures. By virtue of these qualities the transcultural migrant hero is assumed to be endowed with a special, inclusive vision and sensibility, a double-vision that is particularly conducive for the heterogeneous complexity and perspectival uncertainty of novelistic modes of representation. As Andrew Smith puts it, 'it is the "double perspective" of the migrant that is taken to expose [the] "relativity" ' of all 'cultural facts and values' in seeing them as 'mutable, contested, and shaped in and through storytelling' (Smith, 2004, 248) – as for instance when André Aciman triumphantly declares that exiles 'are in permanent transience' because they 'see double, feel double, are double' (Aciman, 1999, 13).

Bakhtin and Deleuze as philosophical underpinnings

When entering the field of migration literature, it is immediately evident that Mikhail Bakhtin and Gilles Deleuze are sources of inspiration for a lot of the notions and ideas in circulation in theorisations and celebratory readings of this kind of fiction. This is not surprising since in Bakhtin's and Deleuze's theories there is a strong association of literature with movement, migration and cultural diversity – in fact the very terminology we find in Bakhtin and Deleuze may in itself explain their popularity in present-day studies of the migration novel. Bakhtin speaks of 'linguistic homelessness' and of the novel as a cacophony of voices and languages, as a decentred heteroglossia, and Deleuze's poetics accumulate an entire vocabulary of geographical and migratory terms, such as root-networks, nomads, movement, speed and lines of

flight, territories and borders, in-betweennesses and multiplicities; he speaks of the world as in a state of flux, 'from the drifting of continents to the migration of peoples' (Deleuze, 1993, 64).

To Bakhtin, the novel grew out of an increased international mobility of trade, travel, immigration and capitalist unrest, which triggered a collusion and interchange of multiple languages and cultures, a 'thoroughgoing polyglossia' that would diffuse or disintegrate the dominance of national myth with all its implications of purity, unity and centrality. Consequently, a multitudinous mingling of voices entered literature as a reflection of the modern world and, with this new *heteroglot* novel, the limited, isolated, *monoglot* consciousness of national cultures was replaced by a new cross-cultural and multilingual sense of reality (see Bakhtin, 1929, 19; 1941, 11, 12; 1935, 358; 1940, 60–1).

To Deleuze the highest aim of literature is to leave, escape, cross the horizon and enter another life. True literature, the kind of literature that does not conform to or confirm the codes of the established state of things, is 'rhizomatic' literature. The rhizomatic novel sets things in motion, puts things, systems and thoughts to flight (see Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 36, 74–5). Like Bakhtin's notion of the heteroglot novel, the rhizome operates with multiplicity and indeterminacy, violating any logic of unified meaning or being. Deleuze contrasts the rhizome with what he calls the root-book. Rather than a central root, the rhizome is a subterranean stem with an irreducible, decentred, intangible, mazelike net of roots – significantly differing from tree trunks with their bifurcating branches and common roots. The root-book is an authoritarian or 'major literature' exercising a 'major usage of language', which means that it speaks in the standard, normative tongue: a pure language, policing the established codes of signification and, with that, preserving the dominant social order and its stratifications (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 23, see 26–7). In short, like the Bakhtinian ideas of national myth, the root-book involves a strong territorialisation of the dominant worldview, confirming doxa.[2]

Like Bakhtin, Deleuze also associates subversive multiplicity with the crossing and disintegration of cultural and linguistic borders. With Guattari he famously speaks of a 'minor literature' written by migrants, immigrants and minorities, living in a language which is not their own (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 19). Minor literature practices a non-standard language usage that deterritorialises the constant, fixed and fixating norms and rules of the major tongue. Minor literature is rhizomatic. It involves a linguistic deviance, an impoverished vocabulary, an improper use of grammar, an unadorned, minimalistic style, which

turns it into a sign machine that avoids closure, that keeps pushing language to its limits, breaking down signification and multiplying meaning potentials. Minor literature is thus supposed to radically disrupt the purity and homogenising unity of major cultures.

What Paul de Man says about Bakhtin is true of Deleuze as well. It goes for both of them that they are 'bound to exercise a powerful attraction on a type of literary criticism that stems from a rebellion against the constraints of transcendental and monological systems' (de Man, 1983, 102). This is certainly the case when they are employed in celebratory readings and theorisations of migration literature. When it comes to the assumptions of hybridity as the specific mode of representation that I have referred to as a central concern in this book, they are often expressed in a Bakhtinian or Deleuzian language. Roger Bromley, for instance, sees Bakhtin's ideas of 'double-voiced discourse', his 'merging of voices', as analogous with 'Said's "double vision"' and as a 'means of challenging the oppositional presumptions of border, division, exclusionary thought and absolute difference', and he sees Bhabha's notions of 'a "space in-between"', 'indeterminacy' and 'the interstitial' as examples of Deleuze's 'nomad thought', 'against boundary, limit and demarcation' (Bromley, 2000, 122, 2, 100). Likewise, Nikos Papastergiadis says that:

> Bakhtin's attention to the mixture of languages within a text ... demonstrates a new level of *linking the concept of hybridity to the politics of representation*. The language of hybridity ... always undoes the priorities and disrupts the singular order by which the dominant code categorises the other. (Papastergiadis, 1997, 267, emphasis added)

And Said speaks in Deleuzian terms when he calls for:

> an investment neither in new authorities, doctrines, and encoded orthodoxies, nor in established institutions and causes, but in a particular sort of nomadic, migratory, and anti-narrative energy. (Said, 1994, 337)

The 'migrant turn' in post-colonial studies

As it happens, hybridity theory and the characteristics of the transcultural-hybrid novel, as identified by Sommer and expressed in the common use in the field of Bakhtin's and Deleuze's poetics, have had an enormous impact on post-colonial theory and the ways in which transcultural migration literature is commonly read. In fact,

a certain euphoria has been developing since, roughly, the late 1980s when we could almost speak of a 'migrant turn' occurring shortly after the establishment of post-colonialism as an academic area of study. At that time the thematic and theoretical momentum in post-colonial studies shifted from the insurgent politics of decidedly anti-colonial writings and readings to the discourses of hybridity and global migration. That is, the study of the literature of the anti-colonial struggle and the emerging national literatures of former colonies gave way to the celebration of migration, bordercrossing and hybridity as central to the explanation of the post-colonial experience. Roger Bromley adeptly summarises this central academic conflict by contrasting Homi Bhabha and Aijaz Ahmad:

> What is at stake in the argument between Ahmad and Bhabha is ... a dispute between the anti-colonial intellectuals who remain in the colonised space to engage in an ongoing internal struggle based on class, caste, gender and 'mentality', and the globalising, diasporic, post-colonial intellectuals who choose to move to the metropolis and, arguably, engage in a post hoc celebration of their situation as somehow symptomatic of the wider migrant experience. (Bromley, 2000, 102)

Over the years, the 'migrant turn' has in fact become so successful that the very term 'post-colonial' is often used as a synonym for transcultural migration literature and analysis, altogether pushing the anti-colonial aspect back into the periphery. As Ella Shohat observed in 1992, we have been witnessing a 'foregrounding of "hybridity" and "syncretism" in post-colonial studies' that centre on 'the multiplicity of identities and subject positionings which result from displacements, immigrations and exiles' (Shohat, 1992, 108). This is a literature and a theory, she says, that supposes a 'going beyond anti-colonial nationalist theory', positing 'no clear domination' and 'no clear opposition' (Shohat, 1992, 99–101).

Seen from the point of view of transcultural migration literature, anti-colonial literature had a legitimate purpose in liberating colonised subjects from their immediate oppressors, but its discourse is regarded as counterproductive in the long run. Anti-colonial discourse is seen not as an assertive discourse, but as a *reactive* discourse animated by the political anger of the slave against the master. It is seen as a discourse of *ressentiment*, in Nietzschean terms, not a creative and self-transformative *will to power*, but a will to power *over* another: anti-colonial discourse is

seen as the mere reversal of fixed hierarchies and relations of power and, as such, incapable of ever yielding a discourse that can liberate us from a simple politics of retaliation and binary structures – the replacement of one authoritarian or major culture by another.

This is where the post-colonial theory of hybridity and readings of the migrant hero are assumed to offer something else. In contrast to being steeped in the politics of reactive forces, the alleged wonders of transcultural migration literature and its transgressive discourse as a special mode of representation are supposed to set the post-colonial apart, entirely, from *partisan* agendas, offering a new pro-creative vision of the world that defies the polarised positions of both master and slave, West and East, of imperialism and anti-colonial nationalism. It enunciates the will to a productive third space of hybridity where the binarisms of cultural politics are suspended altogether. As Laura Chrisman put it in her critical review of post-colonialism in 1995, 'the term "post-colonial" ... occludes or erases the overtly political dynamics contained in the term "anti-colonial"' with the supposed result of delivering post-colonialism 'from the messy business of political alignment and definition' (Chrisman, 1995, 210). A year before that, Benita Parry had pointed to how '"difference" has been diverted by a postmodernist criticism as a theoretical ruse to establish a neutral, ideology-free zone' (Parry, 1994/2002, 134).

In line with critics like Shohat, Chrisman and Parry, this book is particularly critical of readings of migration literature that make such sweeping claims for the representational capacities of post-colonial migration and hybridity. It is critical of the suppositions that a hybrid and migratory mode of representation transcends all centralisations of meaning and binary structures or circumvents any kind of alignment or ideological affiliation. It is critical of what Shohat summarises as the '"in-between" framework' of hybrid and migratory discourse: its 'fleeting quality', its 'dizzying multiplicity of positionalities', its 'globalizing gesture', its 'slippery political significations' and 'depoliticizing implications' (see Shohat, 1992, 107, 104, 99–101). Secondly, the book is sceptical of how celebratory readings tend to valorise difference, mixture, multiplicity and transgressive movement while more or less uncritically renouncing notions of cultural sameness, coherence, continuity and rootedness. Readings and theorisations that build on such celebratory presumptions typically trumpet a 'rhetoric of wandering', as Tim Brennan put it already in 1989, which is 'rife with allusions to the all-seeing eye of the nomadic sensibility' (Brennan, 1989, 2).

As an alternative to a celebratory or triumphalist approach to migration literature and transcultural hybridity as a language of representation, the book will offer a critical reading practice pivoting around the following objectives (which will all be explained in more detail in the remainder of this introduction):

1. Hybridity will be read not as an exceptional language of discursive transgression and liberation, but as a language that has in many cases become dominant and normative.
2. Accordingly, the book will identify how the supposed uncertainty and multiplicity of hybridity is contaminated by forces of discursive centralisation, significantly reducing its proposed radicality and destabilising capacity.
3. It will note how hybridity as a language of representation is often infected by hyperbolic tendencies which causes the creation of new centralisations of meaning as well as politicised and hierarchising dualisms, for instance between the rootless and the rooted, the migratory and the sedentary, stillness and movement, hybridity and purity, heteroglossia and monoglossia.
4. It will also engage critically with a central binary opposition implied in migration and hybridity discourse between being and becoming, which casts the hybrid, nomadic and heteroglot as the only force of change as opposed to a supposed unchanging sameness of the settled and the rooted.
5. Finally, the book will aim to explore the dynamic and complex readings that may arise if we dialecticise the binaries in transcultural hybridity discourse between the nomadic and the settled, the hybrid and the pure, the heteroglot and the monoglot and between the supposedly discontinuous *difference* of *becoming* and the continuous *sameness* of *being*.

Because of the way in which their ideas of literature seem directly or indirectly to sponsor many of the suppositions of celebratory readings of migration literature, Bakhtin and Deleuze provide a lot of the theoretical scaffolding of the book. Yet, the book will not simply refute Bakhtin and Deleuze and their ideas of literature and literary modes of representation. While I will engage critically with the often poorly digested, run-of-the-mill jargon that characterises the deployment of Bakhtin and Deleuze in the field, I will also try to bring forth other sides to their theories that may pave the way for richer and more nuanced readings of transcultural-hybrid migration literature (in accordance with point five).

Re-engaging hybridity discourse and theory

In 1994 Bhabha thought that what was most urgently needed was 'a translational "migrant" knowledge of the world' (Bhabha, 1994, 306). It is safe to say that since then, 'a translational "migrant" knowledge of the world' has, in fact, become the norm. Ideas of cultural heterogeneity, flux, relativity, etcetera, now appear to reign supreme over ideas of cultural homogeneity, not only in the field of post-colonialism but in academia writ large. Apparently, this was already happening at the time when Bhabha was writing *The Location of Culture*. A year before Bhabha's book, in 1993, Stuart Hall observed a paradoxical centring of marginality: 'migranthood', he said, has taken centre stage, has become '*the* representative modern experience!' and as a consequence 'more and more people now recognize themselves in the narratives of displacement' (Hall, 1993, 115, 114, 117).[3] However, regardless of when exactly a 'migrant knowledge of the world' was taking centre stage, the fact that it did is a mixed blessing: it means, on the one hand, as Eva Hoffman points out, that 'we have come to value ... uncertainty, displacement, the fragmented identity' (Hoffman, 1999, 44). On the other hand, '[n]omadism and diasporism have become fashionable terms in intellectual discourse' and '[w]ithin this conceptual framework, exile becomes, well, sexy, glamorous ...' (Hoffman, 1999, 44). In other words, the downside of their success is that concepts like hybridity, nomadism, diaspora, heteroglossia and so on, have become buzzwords in cultural and literary studies, along with their rise to dominance, and in this way they have come to be taken for granted as common sense, as terms of truth obfuscating the need of further reflection. Sometimes it seems we are facing an almost automatic valorisation of hybridity. As Jan Nederveen Pieterse observes, since it 'has become an *ordinary* experience' and 'crossovers are now common in all spheres of life', '[h]ybridity is fast becoming a routine, almost trite point of reference in studies of global culture that speak of the "mongrel world" and the "hybridity factor" ' (Pieterse, 2001, 237, 236). Spivak goes even further. Having become a privileged and routinised mode of conceptualisation, 'triumphalist hybridism' oils the wheels of 'the ideological state apparatus' (Spivak, 1999, 319n.).

Hybridity has been subject to a lot of criticism, with good reason. It is accused of elitism, proposed by 'a new cultural class of cosmopolitans' (Pieterse, 2001, 225), just as it is accused of being an extension of the free market discourse of late global capitalism. As Hutnyk expresses it, 'the cultural effervescence of hybridity ... facilitates corporate multiculture' and it 'lulls us to sleep' as a 'panacea for putting up

with socio-economic disparities' (Hutnyk, 2005, 97). Yet, I agree with Pieterse, and a critic like Marwan Kraidy, that a lot of this criticism takes the form of an unconstructive 'antihybridity backlash' which, as Kraidy puts it, 'rests on a priori dismissal at the expense of serious engagement' (Kraidy, 2005, 70). To Pieterse, the backlash involves 'wholesale repudiations of hybridity thinking' where hybridity is seen 'at best as academic nonsense, at worst as a pernicious affirmation of hegemonic power' (Pieterse, 2001, 224, 221). Secondly, in addition to the downright refutation of hybridity theory, Pieterse identifies an unfortunate tendency in the backlash to revive outdated national romantic ideas of identity: the 'baffling' revival of '19th-century parochialism' re-imagining 'an ethnically and culturally compartmentalized world' (Pieterse, 2001, 221).

The critical re-engagement with hybridity discourses in this book is not just another hybridity backlash. Rather, like Pieterse, I propose a 'critical hybridity' (Pieterse, 2001, 239). I intend to critically engage with what Kaplan has referred to as the '[u]nexamined ideologies of travel and displacement [that] pervade the burgeoning literature of postmodern geographies' (Kaplan, 1996, 146), not by rejecting hybridity altogether but by finding new ways in which we may read hybridity in transcultural migration novels that avoid both the triumphant hybridity hype and the of parochial nineteenth-century notions of ethnic and cultural purity that Pieterse is concerned about. Like Kraidy, to whom hybridity is 'the cultural logic of our globalisation', I aim for a 'productive corrective to some of the excesses of hybridity theory' without turning essentialist (Kraidy, 2005, xii, x). The short version of my purpose in this regard is that I want to show that value-laden conceptualisations of hybridity, movement, migration, difference, pluralism and rootlessness are as problematic as emotive conceptualisations of purity, stillness, origin, sameness, oneness, roots and homeness. We must work against any tendency to a singular grammar in all of such terms.

What Kraidy refers to as the 'excesses of hybridity theory', I would refer to as a certain hyperbole within the field of migratory hybridity or a rhetorical exaggeration of its central concepts, tropes and metaphors: nomadic movement and metamorphosis, heterogeneity and multiplicity as conceptual perspectives from which rooted and settled identities are seen as fixed and backward-looking. Hyperbole serves purposes of persuasion. It is efficient in counter-political contexts, but it simplifies the world, it does not grasp the world's complexity. Hence, and in spite of its campaign against binary structures of thinking, the hyperbolic tendencies of hybridity discourse cause it to create its own dichotomies. Rushdie does so, for instance, when he suggests two ways

of perceiving cultures (of which he thinks the latter is the right one): we can choose to see cultures as *either* 'separate, pure, defensible entities' *or* as 'mélange, adulteration, impurity, pick'n'mix' (Rushdie, 1999, 297). In the field of migration literature dichotomies not only tend to be established between the hybrid and the pure, but also between movement and stillness, the migratory and the settled, rootlessness and rootedness, heterogeneity and homogeneity, difference and sameness, becoming and being.

For that reason, the first move in my critical reengagement with the discourse of transcultural hybridity is to highlight and counter its dichotomicating tendencies as they come across in theory as well as in readings of migration literature and in the discursive engineering of transcultural-hybridity novels themselves. I do not suggest that we transcend such binarism or search for other conceptualisations of a third space as I do not believe that we will ever be able to, or should, completely rinse our thinking from contrasts and binarisms. Rather, the second move in my critical reengagement with discourses of hybridity is to bring together the dichotomous poles they operate with, not to fuse these poles in a transcendentally balanced third space but to make them enter into an asymmetric dialectic in which each side of the binary is contaminated by the other but in an uneven fashion. Within this asymmetric dialectics, dichotomous poles cease from serving as *states* or *conditions*, being reactivated, instead, as dynamic *forces*. For instance, the implication of a finite *condition* or a state of self-sufficiency in nouns like 'monoglossia' or 'heteroglossia' or 'homogeneity' or 'heterogeneity' is replaced by the dynamic inifinity of the present participle (or adjectival) when we start speaking of heterogenis*ing* and homogenis*ing* forces. Or as noted by Tabish Khair, who is inspirational for this line of thinking:

> hybridization is not the same as hybrid. Hybridization is an active term that connotes an on-going process, while the hybrid ... is a static description. The hybrid *is*; it is not the endless process of *becoming*. (Khair, 2001, 90)

Notably, in my optics, each force, of heterogenisation or homogenisation, is contaminated by the other within a culture or discourse or novel. A grammatical-semantic manoeuvre like that may altogether result in other, more complex readings of migration literature than a one-sided celebration of hybridity, heteroglossia, rhizome and the nomadic as *conditions*, which leaves us but with the option of stating whether a work or

a discourse is hybrid or not, or heteroglot or not, whether it is a rhizome or a root-book.

What is most urgently needed today, as I see it, is therefore not an exclusive '"*migrant*" knowledge of the world', countering an exclusive sedentary knowledge of the world. Rather, it is a dynamic 'knowledge' that dialogises or dialecticises migration and dwelling, movement and stillness, the nomadic and the sedentary, heterogeneity and homogeneity, heteroglossia and monoglossia, the minor and the major, for example. In this regard, I will show how Bakhtin and Deleuze themselves offer more complex approaches to the concepts we commonly encounter in the widespread short-hand deployment of their most popular terms. For instance, I will show how Bakhtin's notions of discursive centripetality and centrifugality offer exactly the kind of epistemological conversion of heteroglossia and monoglossia from pure conditions to dynamic forces by rearticulating heterogeneity as a *force of centrifugality* and homogeneity as a *force of centripetality*.

Hybridity itself is a highly problematic term in this connection. It is used haphazardly in the field of migration literature to denote or connote states of both cultural *fusion* and *multiplication*, or *amalgamation* and *doubleness*. Robert Young puts it this way: 'hybridity is itself an example of hybridity, of a doubleness that both brings together, fuses, but also maintains separation' (Young, 1995, 22). Thus, there is a central contradiction (which largely goes unnoticed in readings of transcultural-hybrid migration literature) between, on the one hand, the *fusion* of cultures that is signalled by hybridity and, on the other, the cultural expansion and doubling, or the cultural *heterogeneity*, that is also often associated with it.

Lisa Lowe has tried to explain the simultaneity of fusion and doubleness in hybridity. She points out that hybridity and heterogeneity 'appear to be synonymous in their relationship to that of "identity"', that is, they are both opposed to homogeneity, sameness and oneness. Yet, Lowe goes on to say that hybridity and heterogeneity can also be precisely distinguished (Lowe, 1991, 138). She contrasts hybridity with all kinds of notions of cultural *purity*, with 'cultural "essence"', while she sees heterogeneity as a contrast to the erasure of cultural *difference* by the sameness of cultural assimilation and absorption (see Lowe, 1991, 146). In this book hybridity and heterogeneity form a pair insofar as they both signal a crisis of identity and homogeneity. When consciously championed in migration literature, they involve assertions of *difference* in opposition to the idea of a homogeneous sameness, or single-voiced discourse, whether this be difference understood as

hybrid uncertainty or difference understood as heterogeneous multiplicity. Notably, I see hybridity and heterogeneity as interconnected in the sense that hybridity *plays host to* heterogeneity; that is, hybridity contains a multiplicity of voices and languages that clash and fuse – like a 'dialogized heteroglossia', to borrow a term from Bruhn and Lundquist (Bruhn and Lundquist, 2001, 30). Without an appreciation of a certain degree of heterogeneity within hybridity, we would actually lose sight of the fact that there are more than one language or voice or cultural element at play in the hybrid discourse or culture, and, consequently, hybridity would appear as an integrated oneness or sameness. In this regard, a crucial concern in the book's theoretical position is the relative strength or weakness of the *visibility* of heterogeneity within the hybrid discourse or cultural text – the visibility of *difference* as opposed to the visibility of *sameness*.

Within the analytical framework of this book, hybridity itself may therefore be seen as a force of homogenisation as well as a force of heterogenisation, all according to the relative strengths of the forces of difference and sameness within the hybridising constellation or discourse or gaze. In my optics, Khair's notion of hybridisation (as opposed to the 'hybrid') may either be governed by a centripetal movement towards cultural sameness and homogeneity or a centrifugal movement towards cultural difference and heterogeneity, (directly, by deliberate design, or indirectly, by forces superior to any conscious intent).

Centrifugal and centripetal forces in hybridity discourse

As already pointed out, a particular concern in this book is the presumption of migratory hybridity as a particular *language of representation*. Monika Fludernik says about Bhabha in this regard that he shares Bakhtin's interest in 'the destabilization of authority ... with the politics of narration' and, like Bakhtin, he envisions this through 'the splitting of the authorial voice' (Fludernik, 1998, 21). However, whereas Bhabha routinely splits the 'authorial voice' of 'imperial-colonial discourse' (Fludernik, 1998, 21), he never splits the voices of authors or narrators of migration texts, which he takes for granted as naturally hybrid, fragmented, heteroglot and therefore overtly and successfully split and decentralised already. Sceptical of this alleged achievement, my concern is the splitting of the representing or 'authorial' voice in transcultural migration literature – the splitting of the voice of the supposedly heterogeneous, transcultural migrant author, narrator or character, who is consciously and deliberately laying claim to a highly ambiguous and

prolific discourse or mode of representation, or, at least, commonly celebrated in that way by many readers.

Bhabha suggests that hybridity 'causes the dominant discourse to split along the axis of its power to be representative, authoritative' (Bhabha, 1994, 162). What happens if the 'representative, authoritative' voice or discourse of hybridity is split? When Bhabha splits the 'dominant discourses' of colonialism or imperialism, texts that *intend to be* pure or to signal purity turn out to be actually heteroglot, subverted by their immanent *différance*, by all the significations they wish to exclude. The other way round, I propose to show that if we split the 'dominant discourses' in post-colonial literatures of the 'transcultural-hybrid' kind, discourses or texts that *intend to be* hybrid and heteroglot, or signal these qualities, actually turn out to be affected by forces of discursive centralisation, by forces of homogeneity and centripetality. The hybrid and heteroglot text does not return to a pure monoglossia as a pure monoglossia is impossible. Rather, asymmetric forces of centrifugality and centripetality cause meaning in its general discursive economy to be either gravitating towards a monoglossia or levitating towards a heteroglossia, depending on which forces come across as the strongest in the text, or in the context. In this respect, a substantial part of the analyses of the three novels that follow the book's theoretical part will consist in identifying homogenising and heterogenising forces within the discursive economies of their languages of hybridity.

From another angle, and this is the second major concern in the book, the splitting of the migrant's voice or vision, or the splitting of the hybrid discourse in a migration novel, does not lead to a singular becoming (which would presuppose a static being of the rooted, the homogeneous and the monoglot); rather, it leads to several speeds of becoming – once again depending on the relative strengths of the forces of homogenisation and heterogenisation in the discourse or text.

The question of becoming

To sum up, migration literature, as seen from the point of view of a celebratory reading, has two overlapping capacities in its mode of representation. Firstly, transcultural hybridity literature is seen as disestablishing *all kinds* of discursive monopolisations of power, whether Western imperialism or anti-colonial nationalism; secondly, the doing away with ressentiment and partisan discourses in the novel, the doing away with binaries and locked systems of representation and the act of putting meaning to flight, is envisioned as triggering *new lines of*

becoming, or new lines of change, that are devoid of all power games of cultural sameness hitherto – hence all the references in the field to *transition*, *transformation*, *metamorphosis*, *mutation*, *flux* and the defeat of stability and certainty.

Deleuze's lines of flight means that you put something to flight, that you put a system to flight in order *to see something new or make something new happen*: 'To fly is to trace a line, lines, a whole cartography. One only *discovers worlds* through a long, broken flight' (Deleuze, 1987, 36, emphasis added). Correspondingly, migration literature is often read as offering the discovery of something new; as Andrew Smith says, post-colonial studies treat migration 'generally in terms of its *epiphanies*: *new insight*, *new knowledge*, a *new understanding* of the relativity of things' (Smith, 2004, 257, emphases added). Bhabha, for instance, in the essay entitled 'How Newness Enters the World' (which is a title he takes from a recurrent catchphrase in *The Satanic Verses*), sees hybridity as 'an *empowering* condition ... *insurgent* and ironic' and its third space of the in-between as full of '*innovative* energy' (Bhabha, 1994, 324, 315, emphases added).

To Bhabha, 'the massive historical displacement' of 'postcolonial migration' is primarily 'a "translational" phenomenon' (Bhabha, 1994, 320). Hence, he sees the ' "newness" of migrant or minority discourse' as a newness that is brought about by 'cultural translation'. It is the 'indeterminate temporality of the in-between' of translation, its 'unstable element of linkage', which 'has to be engaged in creating the conditions through which "newness comes into the world" ' – 'the constant state of contestation and flux caused by differential systems of social and cultural signification' (Bhabha, 1994, 326, 325). This newness is first and foremost to be understood as a movement and transmutation of *meaning* and ways of understanding the world, very similar to Deleuze's ideas of putting a system to flight. Bhabha states that translation creates:

> that *movement* of meaning ... that, in the words of de Man 'puts the original in motion to decanonise it, giving it the movement of fragmentation, a wandering of errance, a kind of permanent exile'. (Bhabha, 1994, 326)

Secondly, by 'violat[ing] the system of naming', the 'migrant discourse' sets the material world afloat, causes it to change, to become something else (see Bhabha, 1994, 322).

This something else is most often envisioned as a new dawn of cultural fragmentation and multiplicity and permanent exilic uprooting

as a new mode of living – replacing any rootedness in national or ethnic collectivities. Hence, the newness offered by 'migrant discourse' is often expressed as the opening up of our minds and self-perceptions towards a 'new transnational world' which is a 'new society ... characterised by mass migrations' where 'new hybrid and transitional identities are emerging' (Gomez-Peña quoted in Bhabha, 1994, 313). It is no less than the becoming of 'a new international culture', 'a new international space', 'the movement of a migrant history' into 'an interstitial future', into 'the languages and landscapes of migration and diaspora', into 'a metropolitan world "becoming minority" ', 'a postcolonial, migrant community in-difference' (Bhabha, 1994, 327, 335, 337, see also 306–11). And it is third space narratives, like Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses*, that 'extend[ ] our senses' beyond 'the *Heim* of the national culture and its unisonant discourse' (Bhabha, 1994, 236, 312, see also 328). Appositely, a migrant character in *The Satanic Verses*, who is speaking on behalf of those who have 'crossed the oceans' and 'crossed the skies', announces that:

> we are here to change things ... We have been made again: but I say that we shall also be the ones to remake this society, to shape it from the bottom to the top. (Rushdie, 1988, 414)

This book looks at how the triggering of this new becoming is often ascribed to the special migrant vision mentioned above, the way a hybrid double-vision, or 'stereoscopia', is frequently proposed at the centre of the transcultural-hybrid novel enunciated by the migrant author, the narrator or a central character. But I will also ask the question of *how fast* this new becoming is; at what speed does this transcultural change or this newness happen? In Bhabha and in celebratory readings of migration novels one certainly gets the impression of an assumed *immediacy* of change and of an accelerated speed of becoming across the planet – an unquestioned supposition of migrant and hybrid becomings as accelerated change and a spectacular rhizomatic sprouting. As Banerjee puts it, migration and uncertainty are spoken of in the post-colonial field as 'the epitome of a *profound sense of rupture*' (Banerjee, 2002, 70, emphasis added), not a slow transition or a slow becoming, but a *rupture*, a becoming with the sudden speed of discontinuous disruption. My book will question the assumptions of such heady transnational or transcultural becomings. It will offer ways in which we can speak of several speeds of becoming instead, of slow becomings as well as fast. But before I explain a bit more about *how* I

will do this, I would like to further clarify what I mean by 'different speeds of becoming', which is an expression that will crop up many times along the way.

When I speak of different speeds of becoming, it refers primarily to the speed with which old systems of thinking are replaced by new ones (as in the above where a thinking of cultural sameness is replaced by a thinking of cultural hybridity, difference and heterogeneity). To put it in another way, it refers to how fast our recognition of something (our ability to confirm our instructed cognition of a thing or reconfirm a supposed unchanging sameness of something) is replaced by a *re*-cognition of that thing (a readjustment of our ways of viewing it).[4] The further implication of this is that new perceptions or new cognitions of the world cause us to refurbish the world and our places in it. Or, to put it differently, our re-cognition of the world is assumed to cause a material reshaping of the world: a reshaping of self-perception results in self-alteration and a reshaping of the collective imaginary results in wider material or socio-cultural alterations. This is what Stuart Hall means when he says that 'representation is conceived as entering the construction of things; and thus culture is ... as important as the economical or material "base" in shaping social subjects and historical events' (Hall, 1997, 5–6).

So, 'speeds of becoming' refers principally to the speed with which old recognitions of a culture through old, habitual systems of thinking are replaced by *re*-cognitions of that culture through new frames of mind, discourses or modes of representation. How fast is this offered re-cognition, then, how radical is it, how radically does it deviate from the discourses and modes of representation it purports to disrupt in order to facilitate a new cultural or material becoming? As regards the novel, it is a question of what the transcultural hybrid novel *can do* to our habitual recognition of the world. To Deleuze the novel is a sign machine that produces certain effects on the reader, and, in a wider scope, on the cultures in which it is read. As Bruce Baugh explains it, to Deleuze, 'the primary function of language is to affect others' and the novel's language use is supposed to generate forces that have profound 'effects on the ideas and feelings of the reader' and 'in their best instances, readers are able to put these forces to work to overcome the inhibiting and restrictive effects of the dominant social forces' (Baugh, 2000, 49, 34). Rushdie sees the novel in this way, as essentially a mode of inquiry, which 'by asking extraordinary questions, opens new doors in our minds' (Rushdie, 1990b, 423). The question remains of how widely flung these doors are and how swiftly.

Fast and slow speeds of becoming: organic and intentional hybridity

The argument of this book is in concert with Bhabha as concerns the idea that it is cultural translation that performs the midwifery of bringing cultural newness into the world. However, as opposed to Bhabha, I will not only be speaking of the possibility of accelerated becomings; I will also be speaking of very *slow becomings*. Unlike Bhabha, who sees 'the performativity of translation as the staging of cultural *difference*' (Bhabha, 1994, 325, emphasis added), I see translation first and foremost as an operation of incorporating difference into a structure of sameness, as a *domestication* of difference that turns a foreign text into a text of one's own, whereby difference is constantly effaced within the continuity of a culture's sameness – just as a language like English continues to be English although it has always been hybridised by incessantly incorporating foreign words into its vocabulary. The speed with which a transcultural discourse is capable of transforming, say, a national host culture then depends on how radically sameness is discontinued, or how much difference or foreignness survives the cultural translation that takes place, how visible foreignness remains despite the process of domestication, how much foreignness is ultimately allowed to redefine what the culture in question is. The greater the centrifugal or heterogenising force of the transformative discourse, the greater the potential speed of change, and, the other way round, the greater the centripetal or homogenising force of the transformative discourse, the slower the speed of change.

In this regard my book operates with two kinds of hybridity. Following in the footsteps of scholars like Robert Young and Pnina Werbner, I will propose that we employ at least two forms of hybridity in our reading of transcultural migration literature: organic hybridity and intentional hybridity (both terms are taken from Bakhtin). Organic hybridity constitutes the unconscious processes by which difference is incorporated into a culture which causes it to change slowly over long stretches of time, as in the incorporation of foreign words into a language. Intentional hybridity, on the other hand, is a highly conscious form of hybridity, a conscious highlighting of or affirmation of hybridity, as in Bhabha's theorisation of hybridity and as in the explicit foregrounding of hybridity as a force of difference in the transcultural-hybrid migration novel. Whereas organic hybridity is slow speed, it follows that intentional hybridity is, at least, intended as proposing a high-speed epistemological and ontological transformation. It deliberately aims to disrupt

sameness and forces of centripetality or homogenisation by asserting the centrifugal forces of difference, foreignness, heterogeneity, always resisting their disappearance through assimilation. As Bhabha expresses it, 'I *want to foreground* the "*foreignness*" of cultural translation' (Bhabha, 1994, 325, emphasis added).

However, as much as intentional hybridity intends to assert difference and foreignness, I find that when we split its voice, dissect its mode of representation, it is still contaminated by forces of sameness or caught up in the processes of organic hybridity, the processes of domesticating difference, which causes a far slower speed of becoming than initially advertised, signalled or envisioned. In this way we may note how a complex continuum between intentional and organic hybridity emerges, the asymmetry of forces of centrifugal heterogeneity and centripetal homogeneity effecting *various speeds of becoming*, from the gravitational slowness of organic hybridity to the levitating acceleration of becoming in the forms of intentional hybridity that most successfully accomplish a release of difference.[5]

It is my conviction that with the differentiation between organic and intentional hybridity, we can make a decisive step away from the simple dichotomies of hybridity versus purity, heterogeneity versus homogeneity and becoming versus being. Once again we avoid any implications of *states* and *conditions* by turning time, speed and processuality into primary parameters in our thinking of hybridity. Within this scenario the assertion of post-colonial hybridity is no longer to be read as a *separate* opposite to cultural purity, but as a hybrid becoming within a dynamic space of a slower, organic hybridity.

Since the concepts of intentional and organic hybridity remain rather poorly developed, explained in depth neither by Bakhtin, Young nor Werbner, a great deal of the theoretical part of the book is dedicated to a proposition of how we may understand these terms and their dynamics. Deleuze will be employed in this respect, along with a few other scholars, to flesh out the ways in which we can speak of hybridity in terms of different speeds of becoming in deliberate releases of difference and organic domestications of difference.

Choice of literary works

The book has two major parts. After Part I, which theorises organic and intentional hybridity, difference, sameness and speeds of becoming, I will move on to analyse three migration novels, engaging the theoretical perspectives I introduce and develop in Part I. The three novels are,

as mentioned, Bharati Mukherjee's *Jasmine* (1989), Jamal Mahjoub's *The Carrier* (1998) and V. S. Naipaul's *The Enigma of Arrival* (1987). These novels have been chosen for their combined inclusion of migratory experiences from across the world to reflect the global nature of migration literature: together they traverse India and the United States, the Middle East and Denmark, and, finally, the Caribbean and England. All three novels deal with the movement of 'the Other' to the West, in fact to the rural heartlands of the Western nations that play host to the migrant protagonists of the novels.

In each of the novels I will look at the relations between migrants and the cultures to which they migrate and, in this respect, the speeds of becoming that are ascribed to the central heroes' hybridising and heterogenising gazes, the speeds with which they are assumed to metamorphose, transform and recaulk the sameness and the traditional recognition of their host cultures. In this respect the primary settings of the works are important. The rural heartlands in all three novels seem to represent the last stronghold of a homogeneous national identity that, apparently, has disappeared from the metropolitan metropolitan centres in the three novels (New York, Copenhagen and London).

However, one of the most important criteria of selection is that the three novels represent various degrees and uses of, and indeed perspectives on, transcultural-hybridity discourse. Thus intentional hybridity comes across in very different forms in the three novels as do the speeds of becoming. Whereas the hybridising and heterogenising discourses in *Jasmine* and *The Carrier* are employed to confront or deterritorialise the sameness of the host culture in celebration of transcultural lines of becoming, the migratory language in *The Enigma of Arrival* is far less triumphant. Both Mukherjee and Mahjoub employ an explicit discourse of in-betweenness and discontinuity, of a stereoscopic, third-eye-view of the world, that is supposed to release the centrifugal forces of difference against all forces of sameness, while the discourse in Naipaul's novel acknowledges the continuity of the homogenising forces of identity formation in rural England. Hence, in *The Enigma of Arrival* all the centrifugal forces of difference released by the arrival of the migrant are close to being swallowed up entirely by a local economy of cultural sameness. In a way Naipaul attempts a non-intense hybridising gaze or discourse or mode of representation which shows that intentional hybridity need not only be a highly centrifugal form of hybridity. In fact Naipaul's novel may be read as a celebration *not* of a highly conscious hybridity, but of the centripetal forces of organic hybridity that may generate a unifying centre of

identity despite a reality ruled by forces of discontinuity and heterogeneity. In *The Enigma of Arrival* the processes of organic hybridity are therefore far more visibly part of the novel's overall enunciation than in the two other works where it can only be read in the margins of their central discourses or languages of representation. The three novels cross-compare in numerous other ways. Mukherjee's and Naipaul's novels, for instance, engage with discourses or representational modes that signal two very different speeds of becoming. Whereas *Jasmine* is a novel of extreme speeds of migration and metamorphosis, movement and change in Naipaul are extremely slow, almost, at times, getting close to a virtual standstill. What makes Mahjoub's novel special in relation to Mukherjee's is that *The Carrier* frames its transcultural, migratory discourse or hybridising mode of representation, thus problematising the assumptions of doubleness and in-betweenness in the migrant's vision. In *The Carrier* the migrant hero's stereoscopic vision is evidently reduced to a one-eyed telescopic vision. In Naipaul's novel, there is also a self-conscious discourse that highlights its own conjecture, but whereas a discourse of *difference* is framed in *The Carrier*, the discourse framed in *The Enigma of Arrival* is predominantly a discourse of *sameness*. Finally, both *The Carrier* and *The Enigma of Arrival* differ from *Jasmine* insofar as their migrant gazes incorporate a temporal dimension that considers the vertical distribution of difference, a distribution of heterogeneity and hybridity across time and historical eras. In comparison *Jasmine* deals almost exclusively with contemporary migration and difference as distributed horizontally across present spatial or geographical borders.[6]

In all three novels I split the migrant voices of narration, or at least I highlight this splitting as Mahjoub and Naipaul may be said largely to split their migrant voices themselves. This manoeuvre causes heterogenising and homogenising forces to show. In *The Carrier* forces of centrifugality and centripetality are explicated primarily in the reduction of the stereoscopic vision to a telescopic vision. In *Jasmine* the high speed transformation and discontinuity on the surface of the novel turns out to be contaminated by so many continuities and homogenisations at a silent formal and semantic level of the text, slowing down the novel's capacity for generating high speeds of becoming and actually causing its intentional hybridity to be subliminally governed by the centripetality of organic hybridity or the domestication of difference into a cultural sameness. In *The Enigma of Arrival* the continuity on the surface of the text is contaminated by so many discontinuities at a deeper formal and semantic level.

Although I would have liked to examine more than three works, I found that the tracing of discursive dynamics and speeds of becoming in the novels demanded a closereading that would not have been possible if each analysis had been granted less space. The three analyses are in effect six analyses as each analysis breaks on the middle, so to speak, where they shift from a migratory reading, following the novels' intentional releases of difference, to a sceptical reading that traces the forces of sameness in each novel.

* * *

Derrida says in *Monolingualism of the Other* that whenever we attempt to point things out 'more *directly*', we run 'the risk of misnaming them' (Derrida, 1996, 37). In this book I will be naming, *identifying*, certain problems of migratory discourses of hybridity and heterogeneity as well as I will be pointing out what other scholars have been saying about these discourses, and in the mere act of naming different ideas, positions and assertions, I will be running the risk of misnaming them. In this event, let it be known from the outset that I have no intention with my criticism to fix or reduce any voices in the field or any theorisations or readings of migration literature. All I intend is to zoom in on some *tendencies* in our general understandings of and approaches to transcultural hybridity and migration literature that need to be redressed. In spite of my critical readings, let it also be known that I think all three novels are fine literary works, and, as for people who may appear to be in the firing line more often than others, like Rushdie and Bhabha, let it be known that this is no summary of all they have to say. Any criticism is, once again, a criticism of general tenors and tendencies. It is my hope that the book, in spite of its insufficiencies and shortcomings, in spite of any misnomers and the incompleteness of its grasp, may succeed at least in inspiring others to continue similar studies of migration literature and hybridity theory – with or against what I have had to say.

Before I move on to a closer analysis of organic and intentional hybridity, I will set out by briefly airing some examples of celebratory notions of hybridity, which leads me on to a summation of the critical responses to post-colonial hybridity as well as recent constructive suggestions of how to develop hybridity theory from here.

Part I

A Critical Re-Engagement with the Theorisation of Hybridity and Becoming

1
From Celebration to Problemisation

Triumphalist hybridity

Along with the ever growing spectacle of international movement and migration, the post-colonial assault against notions of national or ethnic rootedness, homogeneity, essentialism and cultural unity has resulted in what Banerjee, among others, sees as an 'inflationary' use of migrancy and hybridity metaphors, which, through its massive reiteration, assumes presumptuous and hyperbolic proportions (see Banerjee, 2002, 41). We can speak of a virtual scramble for nomadism, in-betweenness, creolisation, and transcultural border-crossings, culminating in a 'hype', Sabine Broeck points out, that revels in uncritical celebrations of the hybrid and the migratory (see Broeck, 2007, 48–50). As a consequence the paradigm of hybridity is not only diluted as an analytical concept, it is also made to serve universalist claims. Andrew Smith observes that the valorisation of hybridity and the migrant condition is often used as an explanatory trope for human life itself, as a new revolutionary mode of human existence (see Smith, 2004, 246–7, 249). In support of such criticism, Marwan Kraidy has accumulated a host of examples of more or less embarrassing glorifications of hybridity. Here is a passage from Pascal Zachary's *The Global Me: New Cosmopolitans and the Competitive Edge*, published in 2000:

> Diversity defines the health and wealth of nations in a new century. Mighty is the mongrel. The mixing of races, ethnic groups and nationalities ... is at a record level. The hybrid is hip ... The impure, the mélange, the adulterated, the blemished, the rough, the black-and-blue, the mix-and-match – these people are inheriting the earth.

Zachary concludes that 'hybrid societies trump monocultures' and tops it off with a chapter heading that commands the reader to 'Mongrelize or Die!' (Zachary quoted in Kraidy, 2005, 87, 88). In a similar manner Rosi Braidotti celebrates the nomad without any fixed abode as 'the antithesis of the farmer'. '[T]he nomad gathers', she says, 'reaps, and exchanges but does not exploit' (Braidotti, 1994, 25). She encourages us to consider how:

> very settled, anchored, sedentary people are amongst the least empathic, the least easily moved, the most self-consciously 'apolitical' ... How many of today's homeless people have personally experienced this utter lack of interest, let alone emphatic understanding? (Braidotti, 1994, 35)

James Clifford has certainly made a pertinent point in observing that a 'taste for hybridity ... can be as unreflective as attachments to absolutist tradition' (Clifford, 1997, 178). And what is worse, as Kraidy points out, '[t]he sheer repetition of the word "hybridity" in hundreds of media outlets and dozens of academic disciplines gives hybridity an aura of legitimacy and hides its inherent contradictions' (Kraidy, 2005, 148).

In the field of post-colonial migration literature, Ahmad rightly refers to a kind of 'philosophical hybridity' that promotes the international post-colonial migrant as 'the "Subject of a Truth" that individuals living within their national cultures do not possess' (Ahmad, 1997, 372, 371). Gloria Anzaldúa gives voice to this, for instance, when she speaks in her novel *Borderlands / La Frontera* of the new mestiza as a future global race of synthesis and mixture, '*una mezcla de razas afines, una raza de color – la primera raza síntesis del globo ... la raza cósmica*' (Anzaldúa, 1987, 99). The members of Anzaldúa's race of '*los intersticios*' form 'a synthesis of the old world and the new ... of the two races in our psyche, the conquerors and the conquered' (Anzaldúa, 1987, 102, 52). Likewise Iain Chambers sees '[t]he migrant's sense of being rootless, of living between worlds, between a lost past and a non-integrated present' as 'perhaps the most fitting metaphor of [our] (post)modern condition' since '[t]he national, unilateral colonial model has been interrupted by the emergence of a transversal world that occupies a "third space", a "third culture", beyond the confines of the nation state' (Chambers, 1994, 27, 6). Bhabha speaks of 'exiles and émigrés and refugees, gathering on the edge of "foreign" cultures ... gathering in the half-life, half-light of foreign tongues' (Bhabha, 1994, 199). He supposes that their experience of 'liminal space' and 'indeterminacy' produces a 'borderline culture of

hybridity' which is particularly conducive for a mode of representation that disrupts sameness. It:

> opens up the possibility of a cultural hybridity that *entertains difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy.* (Bhabha, 1994, 5, 252, 322, 5 emphasis added)

A lot of readings of migration literature swallow such ideas raw. In regard to Anzaldúa's literature, Salah el Moncef sees *Borderlands / La Frontera*, with all its philosophical doctrines of hybridity, homelessness, nomadism, fluidity and becoming, as developing 'an inclusive theory of radical difference and multiplicity' which 'manages to supersede the logic of exclusion' (Moncef, 2003, 42, 43, 41). In fact Moncef sees Anzaldúa as succeeding where Nietzsche failed in envisioning the 'value-free individual' by expanding Nietzsche's philosophy beyond his own 'elitist phallo- and Eurocentric' limitations (Moncef, 2003, 41).

As pointed out in the Introduction, celebratory readings and theorisations of transcultural migration literature frequently draw inspiration from Bakhtin and Deleuze. Notwithstanding the more complex sides to Bakhtin's and Deleuze's poetics that I intend to call attention to, the two theorists undoubtedly express themselves in ways that seem directly to fuel the presumptions of a triumphalist 'hybrid philosophy'. This is particularly the case in the ways in which they tend to exaggerate the revolutionary triumphs of heteroglot and nomadic literatures by rhetorically contrasting them with their alleged opposites.

Bakhtin begins his mapping of the novel by contrasting it with the epic, which in many ways summarises the celebratory discourse surrounding transcultural migration literature as a discourse against all forms of purity and cultural homogeneity. To Bakhtin, the epic is essentially a national form and, as such, it serves as the prime example of monoglossia: it is fundamentally preoccupied with essences and the authenticity of origins; it is governed by an idealised past, by habit and tradition, which causes it to endlessly confirm and reproduce the discourses of socio-political and cultural centralisation. Hence, its language allows no open-endedness, no indecision, no indeterminacy (see Bakhtin, 1941, 3–40).

In contrast, Bakhtin celebrates the novel as a showground of discourses. Brimming with echoes of the 'primordial struggle between tribes, peoples, cultures and languages', it is assumed to be capable of no less than hosting 'a plurality of *equally-valid* consciousnesses'; and through such de-hierarchised multiplicity, it is supposed to violate any

significatory certainty, any unified language or one-sided worldview (Bakhtin, 1940, 50; 1941, 7; 1940, 55; 1941, 24, emphasis added). Wayne Booth appositely describes 'the quality pursued by Bakhtin' with his notion of heteroglossia as a kind of "sublimity of freed perspectives" ' or 'a view of the world superior to all other views' (Booth, 1984, xx).

Rushdie speaks of the novel in such exaggerated Bakhtinian terms. In his essay 'Is Nothing Sacred', he says about the novel that it 'does not seek to establish a privileged language, but ... insists upon the freedom to portray and analyse the struggle between the different contestants for such privileges' (Rushdie, 1990b, 420). Thus the only privilege literature takes is 'the privilege of being the arena of discourse, the place where the struggle of languages can be acted out' (Rushdie, 1990b, 427). The implication of Rushdie's position is that literature merely exhibits the struggles of discourses for power without partaking in that struggle itself, and, in that light, literature, in comparison with other forms of expression, is 'best suited to challenging absolutes of all kinds' (Rushdie, 1990b, 424). This is a discursive mode that Rushdie claims to realise in *The Satanic Verses*, which is a novel, he says, that disputes 'imposed orthodoxies of all types', it does not fix meaning and truth, but dissents 'from the view that the world is quite clearly This and not That' (Rushdie, 1990a, 396).[1]

As mentioned, Deleuze also contrasts ideal with less-than-ideal forms of literature, and his notion of the root-book in many ways corresponds with Bakhtin's idea of the epic as well as it sums up a lot of the root-sceptical rhetoric in transcultural hybridity writings and readings. Like the epic, the root-book is concerned with origins, authenticity and the rooting of identity and reality. It operates from the centre of 'a strong principal unity', like the trunk of a tree, from which the world is judged, measured and compared, choking indeterminacy and multiplicity with binarisms, stability and closure of meaning (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 4–6). However, the overstated contrast with the root-book brings Deleuze to speak of the rhizome in hyberbolic terms as having no fixed order or unifying axis: it is an open system in constant movement *without any stable centre*, it is 'heterogeneity' and 'can be connected to anything other' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 7).

Finally, both Bakhtin and Deleuze propose a new special consciousness or epistemology that draws on the formal and discursive qualities of the heteroglot or rhizomatic novel, respectively, and appears to share many of the presuppositions of the migrating hero's special vision or consciousness of hybrid and heteroglot inclusiveness. To Bakhtin the heteroglot novel produces what he refers to as a dialogised 'multi-languaged' or 'polyglot

consciousness' that is particularly attuned to the impure heterogeneity of reality and the 'incomplete process of a world-in-the-making', forever disbanding the predominant mode of 'European verbal-ideological life', that is, the idea of unity, coherence and similarity (Bakhtin, 1941, 11; 1940, 60–5; 1941, 30; 1935, 274).

The Deleuzian counterpart to Bakhtin's heteroglot consciousness is the idea of a nomadic consciousness, or a 'nomadic science' (*la science nomad*) or 'minor science' (*la science mineure*) which contrasts with what he calls 'State science' (*la science d'Etat*). State science is typified in 'the domination by trees or the search for roots', 'in the quest for national identity' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 19). It orders and organises the world into fixed hierarchies, categories and programmes, confirming sameness and excluding all that is different, tying our minds to ideas of 'the stable, the eternal, the identical, the constant' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 25, 361–2). Nomad science is all that State science is not. It is not a *static* science, fixing identity with the finite and essentialising verb 'to be', it affirms difference and movement, it actualises 'becoming and heterogeneity' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 361–2). Unlike 'a theory of solids treating fluids as a special case', it uses a 'hydraulic model' that attunes knowledge to the fact that 'flux is reality itself' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 362). It is ambulant, not sedentary; it *follows* the flow of things. Its mantra is not the dichotomous and exclusivist 'either or' of the State, it is the multiple, inclusive and limitless conjunction of 'and ... and ... and ...' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 25; Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 57–8). Nomad science is realised in rhizomatic literature: 'To write is to become', it 'has no other function: to be a flow that conjoins with other flows', it 'liberates a pure matter, it undoes codes, it carries away expressions and contents, states of things and statements, on a zigzag, broken line of flight' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 43, 62, 88, 72–3). Transferred to post-colonial studies, Édouard Glissant, one of the hybridity theorists who is directly inspired by Deleuze, speaks of a hybrid consciousness in terms of a 'poetics of relation' (as opposed to a poetics of self-sufficiency), which 'presupposes *no ideological stability*' but remains 'open, multilingual in intention', forever unfixed, mutating and in 'continual flux' and 'directly *in contact with everything possible*' (see Glissant, 1990, 34, 32, 161, 89, 133, emphases added).

Critical responses to hybridity theory

Down the years the concept of hybridity has been subject to re-evaluations which have shed light on its weakness in post-colonial

studies as a buzzword and a very uniform and universalising term, and by now a general consensus seems to be that it often invokes the kind of binarisms that are emerging from the picture I have drawn so far of hybridity discourse and of Bakhtin and Deleuze: a dichotomy is clearly in operation between the monoglot and the heteroglot, the settled and the migratory, the rooted and the uprooted, the static and the nomadic, which are dichotomies that are often reinforced in the uses of Bakhtin and Deleuze in triumphant readings of migration literature. Bhabha, particularly, has been criticised for constructing simple oppositions between hybridity and purity. Parry says about Bhabha that, '[f]or all his castigation of binaries', he 'posits essentialism or difference, nativism or cosmopolitanism, the claim to a purity of origins or the immersion in transnational cultural flows, as the only possible postcolonial perspective' (Parry, 1994/2002, 120,121, see also Werbner, 1997, 1–4). The opposition of purity and hybridity contradicts Bhabha's own basic thesis that no culture exists in and for itself insofar as all cultures are products of hybridity. In 'The Commitment to Theory' he rightly points out that '[c]ultures are never unitary in themselves, nor simply dualistic in the relation of Self to Other', thus following the line of Lévi-Strauss who argues that the term 'monocultural' is actually meaningless since all cultures are products of imports and mixtures (Bhabha, 1994, 52; Lévi-Strauss reference in Friedman, 1997, 77, 79). Yet Bhabha often disregards the historical inevitability of cultural mixture and heterogeneity when he challenges national or ethnic cultures. In order to make his hybrid space and hybrid subjects stand out as radically new and ground-breaking, Bhabha simply *imposes* a homogeneity on national cultures that was not there in the first place. Without hesitation, Bhabha speaks of 'homogeneous national cultures' and ' "organic" ethnic communities' and of identities as 'settling into primordial polarities' (Bhabha, 1994, 7, 5). In addition, he often associates national or unifying discourses with a decidedly harmful production of identity and speaks of doing away with 'our sense of the historical identity of culture as a homogenizing, unifying force, authenticated by the Originary Past, kept alive in the national tradition of the People' (Bhabha, 1994, 54). To Banerjee, Bhabha thus 'assumes a highly fortified, homogenized nation space which he only then sets out to deconstruct' (Banerjee, 2002, 92). On the basis of a supposed order of oppressive cultural fixity, the only possible liberation of signifiers and cultural identity is through those migrant subjects who have opted out of their complete membership of any polarised homogenised bloc of national or ethnic sameness, and embraced what Bhabha also refers to as the new '*inter*national culture' (Bhabha, 1994, 8–9).

To his defence, it might be contended that Bhabha's third space and resistance to purity is not about cultures as they may or may not exist, but is strictly about the *discursive* perception and dissemination of cultures. He often manages to restrict formulations about his project to the level of discourse criticism alone. Thus he aims to offer 'a possible critique of the positive aesthetic and political *values* we *ascribe* to the unity or totality of cultures'; that is to say, the ideological discourses that persuade us that our culture is one, homogenous, pure and unitary. He speaks about the displacement of a 'binary *logic* through which identities are often constructed'. He urges us to think 'beyond *narratives* of originary and initial subjectivities', and he speaks of the 'interstitial passage' not as a passage between fixed *identities* but between 'fixed *identifications*', that is, processes through which we construct identities (Bhabha, 1994, 5, 2, 2, 5, emphases added). The problem is, however, that Bhabha even at a strictly discursive level of argumentation still tends to assume that cultural signs within collective imaginations and traditions are entirely fixed or bent on fixation, ignoring the vast heterogeneity and dialectical processes already at work within any long-established site of cultural discourse. As a result, ethnic or national culture as a *discursive text* is also often reduced by Bhabha to a solid, oppressive oneness. Bhabha's approach to translation (referred to in the Introduction) clearly illustrates this: with reference to Paul de Man, he speaks of how translation banishes 'the original', 'decanonise[s]' it and sets it in motion by animating it with 'the movement of fragmentation' and 'a wandering of errance' (see Introduction). The assumptions of this radical subversion is based on the supposition that the original was a solid, stable, unified and totalised text before the translational interruption from the outside. Suitably, Robert Young asks the question of 'whether the old essentializing categories of cultural identity, or of race, were really so essentialized' or whether they have been 'retrospectively constructed as more fixed than they were' (Young, 1995, 27).

Yet, assumptions of purity and homogeneity are actually far less directly vocalised by Bhabha as much as they are implicit consequences of his rhetoric of *third space in-betweenness* and his proposition of a particular *hybrid identity* embodied by the international migrant figure, both of which tend to enunciate hybridity as an exceptional *condition* or *category* in itself. He defines his idea of the third space as a space in-between pure oppositional dualities: the stairwell is a 'liminal space ... the connective tissue that constructs the difference between upper and lower, black and white' (Bhabha, 1994, 5). The entire metaphor of a space in-between two directly opposed cultures, or races,

implies or causes us to think that the identity formations on either side of the hybrid migrant are homogenous and hermetically walled in. As Tabish Khair puts it, 'the hybrid contradicts itself by implying the existence of pure and separate parents' (Khair, 2001, 86). Or, as summarised by Jonathan Friedman, hybridity discourse in this variety is founded on a self-contradictive 'metaphor of purity' (Friedman, 1997, 82–3).[2]

Glissant is aware of the traps of speaking of hybridity as a certain condition (despite the fact that he also often falls back on the binary rhetoric of hybridity versus purity). He cautions us against the kind of discourse that represents some people as creolised and others as not. It creates a '*category* of "creolized", a "creol*ness*", that is considered as halfway between two "pure" extremes' (Glissant, 1973, 140; Glissant, 1990, 89, emphases added). In fact, one of Bhabha's primary inspirations, Derrida, makes it very clear how such a 'hyphenated' third space identity easily turns into a category of its own once it becomes a *desired identity* and we start competing about *who* is hyphenated and what it is to be hyphenated. The hyphenated identity turns into a *model* upon which we model ourselves: with reference to his own North African background, Derrida asks provocatively, 'who is the *most* Franco-Maghrebian', because it is:

> the one who is *most*, most purely, or most rigorously, most essentially, Franco-Maghrebian [who] would allow us to decipher *what it is to be* Franco-Maghrebian *in general* ... the Franco-Maghrebian par excellence. (Derrida, 1996, 11)

So, who is most truly, most essentially, most purely hybrid or hyphenated or most purely, most essentially ungrounded? Who has that status? Who belongs to that exceptional category and who does not? Certainly, says Derrida, we can *exclude* those who may be classified as subjects of the presupposed 'historical *unity* of *a* France and *a* Maghreb' (Derrida, 1996, 11).

All things considered, there seems to be good reason for talking about at least a general discrepancy in Bhabha's work which weakens the integrity of the Bhabhaian reading of hybridity. On the one hand, Bhabha wants to show that everything is already hybrid and, on the other, he wants to make everything hybrid. Finally, and as mentioned, the weakness of Bhabha's and many other post-colonial theories is that they tend to operate with a much too vague, poorly defined and generalised conceptualisation of hybridity. What critics are therefore calling for today, and what much of the current re-evaluation of hybridity theory

is starting to offer, is a more problematic and diverse understanding of hybridity, which does not simply stop at the celebration of a terminology everyone takes for granted as already understood and agreed upon.

The differentiation of hybridity as intentional and organic

Kraidy is right when he argues that 'placing [the hybrid] in a bipolar relationship with monoculture' really 'saps the analytical power of hybridity' (Kraidy, 2005, 106). Hence, one of the ways in which I think we should critically re-engage the concept of hybridity is to consider how hybridity works in a context that is already culturally hybrid and heterogeneous, a context in which we cannot simply make hybridity stand out by manipulating its surroundings as culturally pure, but are forced to consider hybridity as immersed in spaces that are already mixed, heteroglot and changing. Werbner poses the useful question in this regard of how hybridity can be theorised as commonplace on the one hand (given the fact that *all* cultures are already hybrid and heterogeneous), while at the same time it may still figure as a powerfully interruptive force. She proposes that we develop a broader theoretical framework which 'aims to resolve the puzzle of how cultural hybridity manages to stay both transgressive and normal' and how it can possibly be experienced 'as dangerous, difficult or revitalising despite its quotidian normalcy' (Werbner, 1997, 4).

Differentiation seems to be the only way of solving the puzzle. Rather than speaking of hybridity as a more or less unequivocal term, we must speak of multiple forms of cultural hybridity and heterogeneity. Together with Robert Stam, Shohat invites us to speak of 'diverse modalities of hybridity', such as 'colonial imposition, obligatory assimilation, political cooption, cultural mimicry and so forth' (quoted in Broeck, 2007, 50). However, as pointed out in the Introduction, Werbner's own suggestion for a differentiation of the concept of hybridity is to follow Young in summoning Bakhtin's distinction between an 'organic'/ 'unconscious' form of hybridity and an 'intentional'/ 'conscious' form of hybridity (Werbner, 1997, 4–5).[3]

Bakhtin exemplifies the organic form of hybridity by the historical evolution of any language, which is characterised by ceaseless and unreflecting borrowings of words from other languages, whereby no language can be said to have ever been a pure language. As foreignness and newness are unconsciously or semiconsciously integrated into a language or culture over a long period of time, organic hybridity does

not disrupt our sense of order and continuity. Yet, Bakhtin emphasises, organic hybridity is still 'pregnant with potential for new world views', creating the foundation for future change (Werbner, 1997, 5; Bakhtin, 1935, 360). Below, I intend to explore the processes of organic hybridity in more detail in order to flesh out the concept. I will show how organic hybridity is the result of a domestication of the foreign through processes of appropriation that cause cultural difference to fit more or less harmoniously with the dominant cultural economy. We can speak of a process of adapting difference in which new words, for example, are domesticated by the adoptive language and locally transfigured through grammatical structures, phonology and, sometimes, spelling – in other words, a domestication of difference within existing structures of sameness. In this respect, I will argue that Bakhtin's ideas of centripetal and centrifugal forces (that is, homogenising and heterogenising forces) become highly useful. We may understand organic hybridity as a variety of hybridity in which a strong *centrifugal* force of sameness is engaged in an asymmetrical dialectical process with a much weaker *centripetal* force of difference. The result is a slow change of cultural languages and epistemologies, which is experienced largely as a continuity of the same.

Intentional hybridity works in a different way. With reference to Bakhtin, Werbner says that intentional hybridity is a form of ironic double-consciousness, a deliberate 'collision between different points of view', an artistic intervention which fuses the unfusable. Moreover, Werbner explains, intentional hybridity works as a calculated, provocative, aesthetic challenge to an implicit social order or idea of identity, countering instances of monological ideologies and discursive constructions of cultures and languages as pure (see Werbner, 1997, 5). The latter points to the fact that intentional hybridity is intentionally *oppositional*, which is why Young is right when he refers to it as a '*politicised*' or '*contestatory*' form of hybridity (Young, 1995, 21, italics added).

According to Young, Bhabha's notion of hybridity is an example of politicised hybridity. As he puts it, 'Bakhtin's intentional hybridity has been transformed by Bhabha into an active moment of challenge and resistance against a dominant cultural power' (Young, 1995, 23). This stands in marked contrast to Bhabha's own supposition that hybridity, as a new consciousness or mode of representation, is a matter, to repeat, of entertaining 'difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy' (see p. 31). Notably, with this criticism, we are moving away from the idea of hybridity as an exemplary *condition* to hybridity as a *function*, and, in literary terms, we are moving away from the

perception of post-colonial migration literature as something entirely different from anti-colonial literature, as outside any partiality, as politically neutral or disinterested. When understood as a counter-political discourse, *ressentiment* is re-entering the discussion of hybridity and the discursive implications of migration literature; hybridity as a 'dialogized heteroglossia', to reiterate Bruhn and Lundquist's term from the Introduction, turns into what they refer to as a 'hierarchised heteroglossia' (Bruhn and Lundquist, 2001, 30).

As I see it, it is imperative to retain a distinction between intentional hybridity as an intentionally oppositional discourse and intentional hybridity as the proposition of a new way of being (as in Derrida's example of the hyphenated identity). The former views intentional hybridity in terms of *functionality* within a limited context, which, as James Clifford has noted, is 'good for displacing purisms of all sorts' (Clifford, 1997, 183). But as soon as intentional hybridity exceeds its immediate function as a counter-discourse, it becomes universalistic, idealistic and teleological, it separates itself from the limitation of context, it assumes to dispense with all hierarchies and its rhetoric starts obscuring its own implication in acts of representation and power relations. The problem in many celebratory enunciations and theorisations of hybridity is that the distinction between functionality and idealised condition is not retained.

In Chapter 3 'Forces of Sameness and Difference in Intentional Hybridity' I will expand on my analysis of intentional hybridity as an assertion of difference by proposing ways of discerning the internal dynamics of sameness and difference, or homogeneity and heterogeneity, within intentional hybridity. As with the idea of organic hybridity I intend to explore intentional hybridity in greater depth by, once again, engaging Bakhtin's terms of centripetal and centrifugal forces. It follows that the discourse of intentional hybridity engages in a deliberate augmentation of the centrifugal forces of difference in relation to the centripetal forces of sameness. In fact it is crucial in intentional hybridity that difference in the hybrid constellation remains visible, never escaping our awareness – as opposed to the disappearance or silencing of difference in organic hybridity.[4] There will therefore always be a concern in intentional hybridity with avoiding a total absorption of difference within sameness, as when Bhabha wants to '*foreground* the "*foreignness*" of cultural translation' (Bhabha quoted in the Introduction). Yet, just as the dominant sameness of organic hybridity is contaminated by difference, the assertion of difference in intentional hybridity is contaminated by sameness. This becomes particularly evident in acts

of representation. Intentional hybridity as an oppositional discourse establishes new hierarchies, and forces of sameness and homogeneity increase the moment others are represented within the language of intentional hybridity (as is the case, for example, with the construction and stigmatisation of the supposedly 'non-hybrid' as pure, homogeneous, fixed and oppressive).

However, another way, and, to me, more important way, in which intentional hybridity is contaminated by forces of sameness is through the centripetal forces of cultural sameness that are inescapably at work in language itself. For instance, there is a translation and domestication at work whenever an Indian culture or voice is represented within a major language like English. In this case, intentional and organic hybridity cease to be two very distinct forms of hybridity, intentional hybridity proving in so many instances to be caught up at a deeper level in the processes of bringing difference under control that we see at work in organic hybridity.

Because of the overlaps of organic and intentional hybridity, the latter being caught up by the former, we might speak of a continuum of hybridity ranging from the dominance of sameness in organic hybridity to the dominance of difference in the most radical forms of intentional hybridity, with various forms of less disruptive intentional hybridities in-between the two extremes. In this respect I would like to think that I am proposing a possible answer to Shohat's question of how we can:

> negotiate sameness and difference within the framework of a 'post-colonial' whose 'post' emphasizes rupture and deemphasizes sameness. (Shohat, 1992, 106)

But even more so, I would like to think that I am contributing with an analytical framework that heeds a call set forth by Pieterse.

Pieterse is also concerned about how we can differentiate the concept of hybridity, how we can 'deepen and fine-tune our perspective on hybridity' (Pieterse, 2001, 220). He proposes that we construct a '*continuum of hybridities*' in which we pay attention to '[t]he relative power and status of elements in the mixture' (Pieterse, 1994, 173, 2001, 219):

> on one end, an assimilationist hybridity that leans over towards the centre, adopts the canon and mimics the hegemony, and, at the other end, a destabilising hybridity that blurs the canon, reverses the current, subverts the centre. Hybridities, then, may be differentiated according to the components and centre of gravity of the mélange.

> On the one hand, an assimilationist hybridity in which the centre predominates [in my terms, a centripetal form of hybridity] ... and, on the other hand, a hybridity that blurs ... or destabilises ... the canon and its categories [a centrifugal form of hybridity]. (Pieterse, 1994, 172–3)

Finally, Pieterse appeals to a deepening of 'our understanding of the *temporalities* of hybridisation'; he suggests that we start noticing '*slow-downs*' and '*speed-ups*' of hybridisation (Pieterse, 1994, 180, emphases added). In this respect, a central part of my approach is to connect hybridity to processes of becoming which, in this context and as explained in the introduction, is understood primarily as an epistemological becoming or change: the transition that takes place when we move from a recognition of the world, the self, the other to a *re*-cognition of the world, the self, the other (as when Rushdie speaks of the making of 'new languages with which we can understand the world' or as when Bhabha proposes that a change in 'frame of reference' effects a change in 'frame of mind' (Rushdie, 1984, 100, Bhabha, 1994, 163)).

As mentioned, I propose that we, with the idea of sameness and difference as centripetal and centrifugal forces within a hybridity discourse or a cultural economy, enable ourselves to register different speeds of hybridity within the discourse or economy, or different speeds of change in its implied politics. As opposed to the dichotomisation of hybridity and purity which offers but a poor temporal contrast of an undifferentiated notion of *becoming* versus a fixed, unchanging *being*, the shift of perspective to the immanent forces of sameness and difference in organic and intentional hybridity opens a vista to *various speeds of becoming*, ranging from the gravitational slowness of organic hybridity to the levitating celerity and fast acceleration in those forms of intentional hybridity that most successfully manage to release difference. In all cases centripetality (a force of sameness that decreases heterogeneity and slows down becoming) is strongest in organic hybridity, but not absent in intentional hybridity. The other way round, the force of centrifugality (a force of difference that increases heterogeneity and the speed of becoming) is usually strongest in intentional hybridity but not totally eradicated in organic hybridity. Whereas the hybridity-versus-purity approach enables readings that can only note if a discourse or space or character in a migration novel is hybrid or not (or whether a work is heteroglot or not), this perspective enables more dynamic readings that note cultural hybridity in a work as a process tied up with different speeds of becoming, or different degrees of heterogenisation and homogenisation.

In what remains of the theoretical part of this book I will look at the asymmetric distribution of forces of sameness and difference in organic and intentional hybridity, respectively. But before that, I wish to show how difference is tied up with becoming. In this regard Deleuze comes to our assistance.

Forces of Difference and Sameness in Deleuze's philosophy

The forces of difference and becoming are inseparably connected in Deleuze. In fact it would be erroneous to speak of these as separate phenomena; they are both of the same order. Difference is that which causes becoming or change, indeed difference *is* change. Without difference everything would remain the same, everything would remain an unchanging being rather than a becoming, which is an inconceivable scenario in a Deleuzian perspective. However, to Deleuze, difference is not just difference, it comes in at least two forms. He draws on Bergson's idea of reality as divided into two modalities, the virtual and the actual, and difference exists in these two states, accordingly: a form of *controlled* difference in the realm of the actual and a *pure* chaotic form of difference in the realm of the virtual (see Deleuze, 1968, 258–65).

Difference in the actual may be explained as difference in our everyday world, the world of our 'verbal-ideological' codifications of reality, to borrow a term from Bakhtin. Difference in the actual is an entirely regulated and domesticated form of difference; it is a difference that is thoroughly within our control. Difference in the actual, which is usually the only difference we notice, is a difference of 'degree'; it is 'extensive' and 'quantitative', says Deleuze (see Deleuze, 1968b, 40–3). This means that it is a difference that is perceived entirely in terms of *space*. It is a spatial difference, a difference of 'juxtaposition', like the differences we have ordered and put side by side in categorical boxes. Moreover, spatialised difference is a 'numerical' difference which means it can be counted and measured; it is divisible and therefore discontinuous (see Deleuze, 1968b, 40–3). In the actual, difference is subordinated by codes of space: categorisations and classifications are acts of homogenisation, acts of subduing all the unruly difference of the word and the constantly changing nature of everything.

In contrast to the spatiality of difference in the actual, difference in the virtual is a purely temporal difference. It is not a quantitative but a purely 'qualitative' difference. Hence, difference in virtuality cannot be measured; it is uncountable, indivisible, it is a 'pure indeterminate'

(Deleuze, 1968, 37); it is pure immeasurable time, pure speed, pure becoming. Deleuze sometimes spells this difference with a capital 'D' to denote its absolute purity, uncontaminated, as it is, by any codifications. Difference, with a capital 'D', is an extreme state of utter formlessness in which everything is ceaselessly becoming different at a high speed.

To Deleuze, difference in the actual, in our everyday world, is not true difference. As a difference that is entirely perceived in terms of spatialising categories, we may further say that it is a difference that has been subordinated and controlled by the idea, or the epistemological perspective, that things have an *identity* (the notion of *identity* is spatial and limited – a fixed homogeneity that points to itself). In contrast, true difference is becoming, constant change – an unlimited heterogeneity. In virtuality there is no identity, no homogeneity, there is no *ground*, nothing with which difference may be compared, nothing on which the unruliness of Difference may be laid to rest; it ceaselessly differs from itself, it is impossible to hold it or grasp it. According to Deleuze, this is also the basic condition of reality as it exists outside our well-ordered everyday perception of the world. Without any organisation, reality is in a state of virtual Difference. In its raw form, no substance can have such a thing as a stable, fixed essence or identity; no constants are possible. Nothing can ever remain the same. All substance is fluid, all substance is a matter of time.

At one point, Deleuze explains the two modes of difference with reference to his terminology of trees and roots. Actual difference is 'arborescent multiplicities' and virtual difference is 'rhizomatic multiplicities', the first is countable whereas the latter is not (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 33). But Deleuze also illustrates the two states of difference through a comparison of two different kinds of temporality in music. On the one hand there is *Chronos*. This is a measured time based on structural and functional values; it '*situates* things and persons, develops a form, and determines a subject'. In music we experience this as a 'pulsed time' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 262, emphasis added). To expand on this, if we recognise Chronos as *metric*, time as chronometric, it becomes clear how time is appropriated by a *spatial* mode of orientation. We see how difference and speeds are controlled by a fixed rhythm, cut and shaped to fit into a formalised structure, a manageable regularity – it is *situated*, divided into equal chunks. The speed of difference, the formlessness of unmeasured time, has been punctured by regular points; difference is divided into an equal pace, modified to a seeming continuation of the same, no longer an erratic and unpredictable becoming. In contradistinction to Chronos, there is the temporality of *Aeon*. Aeon is an

'infinite time' that knows only 'speeds or differences', it is pure, unspatialised time. In music this comes across as a 'nonpulsed', 'floating' time (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 262). In other words, it involves a sound that is unstructured, undivided by the spatialising, regularising rhythm of beats, a pure fluctuation of difference and speed – a sound without organisation; you cannot *count* a sound.

True Difference and becoming as cancelled in human thought

The only difference our habitual everyday modes of thinking can conceive of is the difference that has been subjugated by spatiality, by identity and homogeneity, and, as said, this is not true Difference. Deleuze has one word for that which deprives difference of its speed of becoming, or deprives difference of its Difference: *representation*. In Deleuze, representation is associated with a process of identification and equalisation. It is driven by the desire for identity, for giving things an identity (see Deleuze, 1968, 286), and for that reason it subordinates Difference to a governing idea of Sameness. To represent something, or name something, is to '*ground*' it, says Deleuze (Deleuze, 1968, 341, emphasis added). That is, to represent something is to determine and fix the identity of something within a space of pre-established and stable coordinates and categories: 'the ground is the Same or the Identical' and it 'establishes moments of stasis within qualitative becoming' (Deleuze, 1968, 341, 343). 'Grounding is the operation of the logos' (Deleuze, 1968, 341), the Platonic belief in an essential first principle, a transcendent ideal, where everything else has to resemble an original in order to come as close to the true, the good or the beautiful as possible. Through the notion of logos or the ideal image or Essence of a thing, we subjugate Differece to Identity; we *ground* all that comes after the Ideal, judging it in terms of the extent to which it *resembles* the Same or the Ideal Identity – all that does not carry any resemblance does not count as part of the True (see Deleuze, 1968, 341–2). In short, the 'dearest task' of representation, according to Deleuze, is 'to relate difference to the identical' (Deleuze, 1968, 295).

The epistemology of sameness and homogeneity that deprives difference of its force and speed translate to Bakhtin's idea of a centripetal force, which, in discursive terms, adds up to the activation of a whole machinery of representation such as acts of naming, defining, categorising, stereotyping, reifying, integrating, appropriating, adapting, selecting and excluding difference – which are all summarised

by Deleuze as the 'four iron collars' of representation: identity, resemblance, analogy and opposition (Deleuze, 1968, 330, 335). All of these operations subordinate difference to the familiar, domesticate it, or cast it in the iron chains of ruling principles and pre-established norms and codes. Difference is co-opted into a sphere of control, a sphere of a certain established sameness and similarity, a certain established notion of what things should be or be made to look like before they are included as right or true – as for example in the way the difference of the East is perceived, or, rather, constructed in Western Orientalism, fixing an image of the East which ultimately serves to define and confirm the positive Identity of the West.

As a counter to this, Deleuze wants us to 'restore difference in thought' (Deleuze, 1968, 334). This can only happen if we rid ourselves of identification and representation as 'a principle of thought' – 'Difference is not and cannot be thought in itself, so long as it is subject to the requirements of representation' (Deleuze, 1968, 330). Instead, we must 'sense and ... think difference' by turning the hierarchy of identity and difference upside down through a 'philosophy of difference' that 'begins by subordinating the identical to the different' and releases 'a swarm of differences, a pluralism of free, wild or untamed differences' (Deleuze, 1968, 286, 41, 51, 61). Rhizomatic or minor literature is envisioned as an example of such a philosophy of difference or 'nomad science', and so are works of post-colonial hybridity.

I am going to discuss the forces of sameness and difference in intentional hybridity at a later point, but it might be appropriate beforehand briefly to sketch the ways in which difference is envisioned as the primary force in post-colonial hybridity discourse. The idea of hybridity as a revolutionary mode of enunciation implies a mode of writing and thinking that manages to turn the hierarchy of Sameness and Difference upside down. Bhabha's desire for a space in-between categories is a desire for the release of the forces of Difference against the categorising forces of sameness. To Bhabha, hybrid in-betweenness initiates 'a crisis of identification', a 'significatory or representational undecidability' (Bhabha, 1994, 34, 51). As such, the transgressiveness of the hybrid in-between is supposed to lie in its alleged defiance of acts of exclusion or ordering or hierarchisation. It opens the sluices to the formless modality of virtual Difference through its supposed release of pluralism, indeterminacy and uncertainty, or through its initiation of what Bhabha refers to as a 'free play of the signifier' and 'discursive *différance*' (Bhabha, 1994, 36, 38). Translated to Bakhtinian terms, hybridity as an assertion of radical difference is a highly centrifugal kind of

hybridity in which heterogeneity is released with the aim of suspending the centripetal forces of sameness, regulation and homogenisation.

However, as noted before, there is a dichotomising tendency in such ideas that pits Sameness and Identity against Difference, or Homogeneity against Heterogeneity, Being against Becoming, and this dichotomisation lingers in Deleuze's own choice of words as he tends to speak of the subjugation of Difference by Representation in rather exaggerated or hyberbolic language. It is not uncommon to hear him say that in representational thought difference *disappears* (*disparaît*), is *cancelled* (*annulée*), '*obliterated*' (*s'effacer*), that 'representation ... mediates everything, but *mobilises* and *moves nothing*', that it causes 'a *uniformisation* of diversity, and an *equalisation* of inequality' (Deleuze, 1968, 334–5; 1968b, 73; 1968, 67, 282, emphases added). Terms like 'cancel', 'disappear', 'obliterate', 'uniformisation' and 'to move nothing' connote a fixation, arrest or complete annulment of difference and becoming. In this perspective represented or spatialised difference simply does not seem to involve any becoming at all in Deleuze.

To avoid such dichotomies, we should not speak of a *cancellation* or *disappearance* of difference in representation, or an *obliteration* of becoming in representation. Rather, we should speak of a difference in representation whose capacity of becoming is *slowed down*. If we do not allow several speeds of becoming, epistemologically and ontologically, our science becomes one of dividing up difference, forcibly cutting it up into, on the one hand, a *false*, spatialised difference, which is really in the service of identity and a static being, and, on the other hand, a *true*, temporal Difference which is the only possible becoming (as in the dichotomy in hybridity theory between a pure, sedentary and homogeneous *being* and a hybrid and heterogeneous, migratory *becoming*).

Fortunately, this is not what happens in Deleuze, although his rhetoric of nomadism, especially, may often lead us to think so. What Deleuze actually means, I think, is revealed in his choice of the verb *tame* when at one point he says that difference 'can become thinkable only when *tamed* [*domptée*] – in other words, when subject to the four iron collars of representation' (Deleuze, 1968, 330, emphasis added). A *taming* does not involve a total *obliteration* of difference, but a *domestication* of its force, not a total arrest or fixation of becoming but a slowing down of its speed (Deleuze, 1968, 330, emphasis added). At another point Deleuze says that representation modifies difference 'from a *productive* to a *reduced* difference, and ultimately to a *cancelled* difference' (Deleuze, 1968, 282, emphases added). When representation *tames* difference, it *reduces* its

force of becoming, its 'productivity', I agree, but it can never completely *cancel* difference and becoming.

To think of becoming in terms of a variation of speeds involves not a division or a cut but a continuum that circumvents notions of a fixed being or a homogeneous purity altogether. In the following we shall look at organic hybridity as a *taming* of the speed of difference, as a reduction of its heterogenising force, which may altogether substitute all former denotations or connotations of a *pure being* in hybridity theory with the notion of a *slow becoming*.

2
Forces of Sameness and Difference in Organic Hybridity

Bakhtin refers to organic hybridity as an 'unintentional, unconscious hybridization' and as 'the most important mode in the historical life and evolution of all languages' insofar as 'languages change historically primarily by means of hybridization, by means of a mixing of various "languages"' (Bakhtin, 1935, 358–9). Yet he never actually describes the mechanisms or the process by which this occurs. Only one thing seems certain: in order for organic hybridity to remain an unconscious process, it must by necessity be such a slow and inconspicuous process that it is mostly experienced as a continuity of the same. The term 'organic' suggests a non-conscious processuality, with reference to the organ and organism as an un-selfconscious body that functions and develops mechanically. But it also points to the coordination of parts within a whole, as in an organisation, and the continuation of that organisation – the continuity of a whole, of a certain coherent sameness. All this requires a governing mechanism that channels and distributes forces of difference and movement according to a certain regularity. Hence, for an organism to work or something to develop organically, the centripetal forces of sameness, of appropriating and controlling difference to serve the interest of coherence and unity, must be far stronger than any scattering, centrifugal forces of difference. Culture, as an organism, involves a signifying system in which difference is *represented* within, *tamed* by a certain language, a certain worldview, a certain script or set of codes that all work more or less automatically, causing us to remain largely blind to the domesticating forces at work in our way of looking at or speaking of anything foreign. We may speak of this as a process of *organ*ising difference, which denotes an unconscious organic process (as in an *organ*) that orders and distributes (*organises*) difference to incorporate it into a domestic structure of sameness. It is for these reasons

that Deleuze is not fond of organisms, to say the least. Organisms and organisations of difference deprive difference of its delirious speed, they keep true difference at bay. An organism is nothing but the solution to a problem of difference, he says; it consists of an 'internal milieu endowed with a general effectivity or integrating power of regulation' (Deleuze, 1968, 262–3). In line with this, Bakhtin thinks that through language we unconsciously cut and shape not only the world but our own individual selves to fit into structures of sameness. We 'speak only in definite speech genres' and speech genres 'have a *normative* significance for the speaking individuum, and they are not created by him but are *given to him*' (Bakhtin, 1952, 78, 80–1, emphases added).

Whereas Bakhtin does not provide us with a clarification of the processes through which difference is 'tamed' before ending up as an organic form of hybridity, we may gather some idea of the actual *organ*ising process in Yuri Lotman's proposition of culture as a *semiosphere*. But more than that, Lotman's semiosphere also seems apt as a model for explaining how organic hybridity, in spite of its opaqueness, mutedness and slowness, may still be radically pregnant with change – as Bakhtin has it, 'with potential for new world views' (Bakhtin, 1935, 360). Or, in Deleuzian terms, how organic hybridity may still be charged with the speed of undomesticated or unrepresented difference. In fact we shall come across not one but two such forms of latent difference in organic hybridity within the semiosphere.

The domestication of difference in organic hybridity

Lotman sees culture as something that is never fixed or homogeneous, but a heterogeneous system in a state of perpetual transformation and becoming. In order to elucidate the enormous dynamism within a particular culture he has developed the idea of the semiosphere. A semiosphere is a highly diverse and constantly changing heteroglot field, invigorated by foreign and internal waves of impact (see Lotman, 1990, 124–6). In addition to the constant influx of and interaction with a heterogeneity of worldviews from the outside, the semiosphere itself is differentiated and intensified by races, classes, genders, generations, occupational groups, regional groups, each with their own local, peripheral and central group formations, and all contending for influence and power in shifting relations of influence. Any culture is thus an extremely complex, paradoxical and conflictual semiotic space. It is crisscrossed by a heterogeneous multiplicity and currents of difference and sameness at various strengths and speeds, of forces of identity and

alterity and of contradictory and constantly changing positions and oppositions (see Lotman, 1990, 126, 150).

Clearly, the idea of the semiosphere has a lot in common with Bakhtin's idea of language as a heteroglossia. Yet, for all the heteroglossia in language and its intermixing with other languages, Bakhtin still speaks as if of the possibility of a unified linguistic community; he can still speak of *a* language. The same goes for Lotman's semiosphere. Although the semiosphere is a complex space with complex semiotic mechanisms in constant motion and everything in this way is in a ceaseless process of becoming, the semiosphere remains observable as a relatively discrete and continuous system, such as for instance a particular ethnic or national culture (see Lotman, 1990, 203). Paul Gilroy coins a useful phrase in this regard, speaking of a culture as 'a changing same' (Gilroy, 1993, 122), or, as rephrased by Clifford, as 'something endlessly hybridized and in process but persistently there' (Clifford, 1994, 320). The reason why such relative sameness and continuity is possible, according to Lotman, is that the semiosphere is tied together by two phenomena: an 'organizing core' and an encircling but porous border. Without these two instances of centripetality, the semiosphere would be blown apart by the centrifugal energy of external and internal forces of difference (see Lotman, 1990, 128).

The idea of the 'organizing core' is particularly interesting in the present context. In correspondence with Deleuze's analysis of representation, Lotman speaks of the organising core as a 'law-forming' or 'normalising mechanism'. It is 'constructed on the principle of an integrated structural whole' and issues a governing 'model of the world'. In other words, it 'reconstructs the world as something totally ordered, with a single plot and supreme meaning' (Lotman, 1990, 144). In Deleuzian terms, the organising core may be said to host a concentration of all the forces that tame Difference; it constitutes an established, normative and collective language of *representation*. Hence, Deleuze and Lotman would probably agree with Todorov when he argues that '[s]ocial life is regulated not on the basis of material or even psychic realities, but on the basis of the *representations* we make of them' (Todorov, 1997, 5, emphasis added). Todorov goes on:

> Culture means *commonly-held representations* ... These *representations*, as signalled by the word itself, constitute an image and therefore an interpretation of the world; to possess a culture means having at one's disposal a prearrangement of the world, a miniature model, a map of sorts, which permits us to orient ourselves within it. (Todorov, 1997, 3, emphases added)

This does not mean that culture is homogeneous and unchanging, 'an immutable code' (Todorov, 1997, 15). Rather, 'each individual is a participant within multiple cultures and every culture is subject to change' (Todorov, 1997, 3). To Todorov culture is characterised by 'plurality and variability' like Lotman's semiosphere; it takes place 'between the forces of unification and differentiation' (Todorov, 1997, 4, 9). Todorov concludes with an observation that captures the central idea of Lotman's semiosphere: '"[p]ure" cultures do not exist, and neither do "mixed" ones' (Todorov, 1997, 5).[1]

With Lotman's semiosphere it becomes possible for us to speak of a given culture in terms of centripetal and centrifugal, or homogenising and heterogenising forces. It is a heterogeneous system in constant movement and becoming, yet held together by an internal mechanism for dealing with and processing signs; a heterogeneous system held together by a *homogenising* internal force of representation. In fact there is not just one core and one boundary in the semiosphere. The semiosphere is interlaced by numerous boundaries, languages and texts, each with their own small 'semiospheric' centres and peripheries through which information is continually filtered (Lotman, 1990, 138, 150). Likewise, any one type of differentiation or category in the semiosphere, such as *gender*, is shot through with an endless multiplicity of other differences. The category of *woman*, for instance, is endlessly destabilised by an infinite number of other differences, such as race, class, occupation, religion, age, health, sexual preferences, not to mention individuality, which, in turn, are all terms that may be cracked open to reveal yet another level of indefinite heterogeneity.

Differences at various points and times within the semiosphere thus pick up and lose speeds of becoming. To Lotman, the semiosphere is a space of shifting asymmetries between an overall centre and periphery as well as between countless local centres and peripheries, crisscrossed by a random, asynchronic diversity of currents of change (see Lotman, 1990, 126). For the same reason, the semiosphere's unifying language is far from a solid grammar of oneness, uniformly and evenly striated across the surface of the culture. On the contrary, the semiosphere is crowded with shifting 'partial languages' and 'half-formed systems', each responding to external and internal currents of difference in different ways. It is only as we get closer to the actual organising core that we encounter a more rigidly structured, yet never finalised or fixed system (see Lotman, 1990, 127–8). As we shall see, the overall becoming of the semiosphere is generated by the fact that difference continues to have a transformative effect at the very core of the regulating system

of sameness and similarity. However slow this process may be, it will always work to transform the very *grammar of our worldview*, to borrow an expression from Maria Corti (quoted in Bassnett, 1980, 83).

Lotman does not speak, like Deleuze, of representation as that which tames difference; he chooses the word 'translation'. In fact he sees translation as the primary mechanism of consciousness in the semiosphere and it works like a grid or, in Lotman's words, a 'filtering membrane' which mitigates or alleviates Difference, lessening the violence of its centrifugal forces. As such, translation works as an apt metaphor of the act of representation that we looked at above. It involves an act of representing, of *re*-presenting, that is, presenting something once more, in a new code, in a new language. Moreover, it points to the difficulty of asserting difference in acts of translation – to Deleuze, the impossibility of *representing* Difference, the impossibility of releasing Difference in a mode that subjugates it to the forces of sameness.

As such, Lotman's idea of translation diverges markedly from Bhabha's notion of translation as a force of heterogenisation, as an instance of rapid transitional in-betweenness and a ground-breaking release of difference (see Bhabha, 1994, 326, 38). As Lawrence Venuti reminds us, and this is the crux of Lotman's approach to translation, 'the very function of translating is assimilation, the inscription of a foreign text with domestic intelligibilities and interests', translation 'works in an asymmetrical relationship, always cooperating more with the domestic than the foreign culture' (Venuti, 1998, 11, 22). In Susan Bassnett's terms, translation involves a processing of foreignness through local conceptual and signifying grids (see Bassnett, 1980, 8). This amounts to an enforcement of a power hierarchy determined by the importing culture, a submission of the foreign text to the dominant images of the importing culture, an 'appropriation', a taking 'possession' of something foreign by a local code (Bassnett, 1980, 4, 6). The roots of making something your property in the word 'appropriation' come to the fore. The core of Lotman's semiosphere comes to function as a linguistic-geographical 'domain of semiotic modelling', along the lines of Martin Luther's thinking, who spoke of *Übersetzung* as an activity of *verdeutschen* the foreign (both quoted in Bassnett, 1980, 22, 54). In the semiosphere, translation appropriates difference, the foreign text, to a local code – a decoding followed by a recoding – so as to fit it in with its centralised image of sameness, in order for the foreign to be incorporated into its internal semiotics (see Lotman, 1990, 127, 137). However, in the process of domestication the local code grows. Through translation, 'the original becomes larger; it grows rather than reproduces itself', as

Derrida maintains (Derrida, 1985, 191). For the same reason we often come across metaphors like cannibalism and vampirism in translation studies to suggest how translation may be seen as a devouring or a consumption of a foreign source in order to nourish and strengthen local life (see Bassnett, 1993, 153–5).

The reason why the local code or the local culture grows through translation is that translation does not amount to a total eradication of difference or the total triumph of an unchanging and utterly unaffected Sameness. Bassnett reminds us of the fact that translation, although entailing a betrayal of the idea of a pure original, always involves at least two voices: it is inevitably '*dialogic* in its very nature', involving all the implications of *transaction*, *negotiation* and *mutual influence* between two or more texts (Bassnett, 1998, 6 138, emphasis added). In line with this Lotman envisions the process of translation, or what we might call the process of organic hybridisation, in the following way. On its entry into the semiosphere, difference, or the imported text or worldview, remains for some time in a state of unmodified difference, or 'non-mediated difference' to use a Deleuzian term (Deleuze, 1968, 28), before it is tamed by translations or adaptations. However, even after having been processed by the host culture's governing semiotic codes in the machinery of domestication and identification, the difference of the foreign text is never entirely annulled. As much as it is transformed by the internal semiotics of the semiosphere, it still retains some of its 'own characteristics' or its 'discreteness' (Lotman, 1990, 137, 152). In other words, there is an element of difference that 'survives' translation – or re-presentation – which in turn effects a change of the governing semiotic codes of the semiosphere, the language of translation, that is, or the sameness of the representing discourse. Thus, although the codes of the home culture are stronger and dominate the relation, foreign and local codes engage in a process of restructuring each other.[2]

The 'survival' of difference in translation is of crucial importance for the overall becoming of the semiosphere. Several theorists have noted this. Lotman ascribes it to the *inadequacy* of translation (see Lotman, 1990, 152). Bassnett speaks of linguistic and cultural untranslatability in cases where some meaning remains specifically language-bound or culture-bound (such as many semantic novelties, idioms and puns) (see Bassnett, 1980, 15, 17, 18, 30–1), or, I would like to add, place-bound signifiers of very localised signifieds, such as the animals we call 'skunk' or 'kangaroo' – both imported signifiers in English, from the language of the Algonquian Indians and the Aboriginal language of northern Queensland, respectively). Bhabha speaks of 'the *element of resistance* in

the process of translation' which consists in 'incommensurable elements' and 'stubborn chunks' that do not allow themselves to be *substituted* by a corresponding local word (Bhabha, 1994, 313). Similarly, Derrida speaks of 'that which remains of the text when one has extracted from it the communicable meaning ... when one has transmitted that which can be transmitted' (Derrida, 1985, 192). This is where translation fails, he says, when some core of the foreign text cannot be *translated* but only directly *transferred* to – carried over into – the new text, such as when a proper noun, such as 'Pierre', 'Jehovah' or 'Babel' cannot be *substituted* with a local 'equivalent'. Within the new text, the untranslatable lingers as a 'pure transferable' that can 'announce itself, give itself, present itself' (Derrida, 1985, 203). It is in this way that the growth of a culture depends on foreign influence.

Banerjee says of these untranslatable 'pure transferables' that they are not 'a preclusion of intercultural understanding' but that they stand up as 'a stronghold against appropriation', as Bhabha's 'stubborn chunks' and his references to the act of translation as 'the staging of cultural *difference*' (Banerjee, 2002, 249, Bhabha quoted p. 21). However, although these 'pure transferables' are not substituted with local terms, Banerjee and Bhabha, and Derrida, overlook other ways in which they are locally appropriated. Any pure transferable is still semantically understood (or misunderstood or re-understood) within the cultural framework of the translating language. Secondly, the 'pure transferable' is audibly appropriated, its intonation and pronunciation modified to suit the phonetic norms of the importing language. Thirdly, it may be visibly changed, its spelling altered as well as its written code, from Sanskrit to the Latin alphabet, for example. Thus, over time a 'pure transferable' appears less as a 'stronghold against appropriation', it loses its purity, its pure difference, and it can no longer independently 'announce', 'give' or 'present' its foreignness. It has been co-opted as part of the same in the semiosphere – or rather, the now slightly changed same (see also Lotman, 1990, 146).

Eventually the imported word or text or worldview may have filtered so deeply into the importing culture's self-understanding, its foreignness so thoroughly effaced, that it completely ceases to trigger any association with the culture of its origin. Who uses the word 'barbeque' because of the cultural difference it evokes as a word originally borrowed from the Arawaks (*Merriam-Webster*, 2010)? The foreign text may even be claimed as a founding element by the importing culture and exported again as an 'indigenous' cultural text (see Lotman, 1990, 147). In Denmark, to the extent that they are aware of the fact that it is not

a Danish word, Danes think of the word 'barbeque' only as an *English* loan word. Likewise, Bassnett calls attention to how translated texts, such as Greek classics and the Bible are treated as if originally written in our own languages (see Bassnett, 1980, 14). Other examples may be how 'mattress' (from Arabic) and 'pyjama' (from Hindi/Urdu) are sounds and objects originally imported from the Middle East and India that are now used spontaneously as local words and phenomena in several Western languages. Also witness how Christianity was exported throughout the empire as the white man's and not a decidedly Middle-Eastern religion (which again was building on imports from Buddhism and Hinduism). As Pieterse says, the homogenisation of Western culture in post-colonial discourse 'overlooks the fact that many of the standards exported by the West and its cultural industries themselves turn out to be of culturally mixed character if we examine their cultural lineages' (Pieterse, 2001, 169).

In a way Deleuze sums up the whole process of how difference is modified over time by the mechanisms of representation or translation in organic hybridity. As quoted above, Deleuze sees representation as curbing difference 'from a productive to a reduced difference, and ultimately to a *cancelled* difference' (see p. 46). The only exception in organic hybridity is that difference is never *cancelled*. Rather, it disappears from our view, or 'unappears'. In Bakhtin's terms, it is driven into a state of opacity, or muted, the way the English or the Danes no longer see or hear the Arawak difference in the word barbeque.

The endurance of difference in organic hybridity

The translational change of the machinery of identification at the very core of the semiosphere explains why Bakhtin insists that organic hybridity is still to be considered as a significant transformative power. Translation inevitably results in a hybridisation between a foreign and a local code, or, for that matter, of one local code with another local code. It is through the very operation of translation that the semiosphere remains a space of 'creolisation', as Lotman puts it, however muted or opaque this hybridity may be (Lotman, 1990, 124–6).

However, the appropriation of difference in the semiosphere or the domesticating dynamics of organic hybridity is clearly not a Deleuzian cup of tea. Evidently, it is still the centripetal forces of sameness and homogeneity that govern and incorporate difference. So, as much as we are talking of interaction and mutual influence and contamination in the act of translation, it is indeed still an asymmetrical exchange,

guaranteeing continuity with only a minor and gradual alteration of what constitutes the same within the translating culture. Difference is subjugated to identity, regulated and channelled within a relatively closed organism of sameness. Here is no freely roaming, unfeigned, intoxicating and giddying Dionysian Difference as in the formless state of the 'body *without* organs' where virtual Difference passes without restraint, unmodified and undirected by any *organ*isation or stratification (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 153).

Even so, organic hybridity may still be said to be latently charged with the full speed of virtual Difference in ways that far better suit a Deleuzian temper. To Deleuze the full speed of Difference will always endure in spite of our attempts to tame it and reduce its power of radical becoming. He does not speak of a slow becoming, but of how the untamed, unspatialised force of pure, or virtual Difference will always remain lurking underneath the plane of the actual, underneath any contemporary surface of ordering and regulating practices of identification. There is a Dionysian 'groundlessness' surrounding representation, bristling with the violence of infinite differences that defy our categorisations of the world (see Deleuze, 1968, 347).

As we have seen, there is at the horizontal level of the semiosphere a ceaseless arrival of new difference through its porous borders which keeps it in a largely liquid form, in constant interaction with new, untranslated, unappropriated forces of difference (see also Lotman, 1990, 138, 150). But what is just as important is that difference, even in its most unspatialised form, remains forever unmodified within the deeper layers of the semiosphere, in accordance with Deleuze's proposition. Thus, Lotman believes that any particular space is multilayered with difference: '[s]emiotic currents flow not only across the horizontal levels of the semiosphere, but also have their effect in a vertical direction, and promote complex dialogues between the levels' (Lotman, 1990, 130; 137). As such, difference can be seen as temporally layered in cultural phenomena, forming a force of resistance that radically deviates from a culture's self-definition at its present surface and centripetal machinery. According to Lotman, we may perceive this difference as a forgotten or repressed force of difference which inevitably resurfaces again at different points in time, especially whenever the governing structure in the semiosphere changes or shifts in its place (see Lotman, 1990, 137). Hence, when we look at the vertical distribution of difference, the diachronic distribution of difference as sedimented in the temporal layers of the semiosphere, Bakhtin's idea of the significant transformative power of organic hybridity takes on another dimension. Difference, in spite of its

surface domestication remains or endures as if in a dormant or embryonic condition. Literally, the semiosphere is '*pregnant* with potential for new world views' (Bakhtin, 1935, 360, emphasis added). Bakhtin also speaks in this regard of the 'primordial dialogism of discourse', the idea, that is, that any single language is already crossed by several internal voices (Bakhtin, 1935, 275). Hence, 'at any given moment of historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom', not only horizontally, 'between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth', but also vertically, across time, hosting 'the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions *between the present and the past, between different epochs of the past*' (Bakhtin, 1935, 291, emphasis added). Likewise:

> it must not be forgotten that monoglossia is always in essence relative. After all, one's own language is never a single language: in it there are always *survivals of the past* and a potential for other-languagedness. (Bakhtin, 1941, 66, emphasis added)

The idea of how difference endures in a dormant or embryonic state in the semiosphere may be further fleshed out by use of Deleuze's idea of the virtual state of Difference. Inspired by Bergson's ideas of the endurance of the past, Deleuze sees the virtual difference as a matter of pure time and depth, in contradistinction to the horizontal *spatialisation* of time we employ in acts of representation and other ways of regulating difference (see Deleuze, 1968, 290). Hence, 'every field of forces refers back to a potential energy, every opposition refers to a deeper "disparateness" ' (Deleuze, 1968, 296). Representation and ideas of sameness are incapable of doing more than imposing a temporary surface layer of seeming control and homogeneity as '[a]n entire multiplicity rumbles underneath the "sameness" of the Idea' (Deleuze, 1968, 344). By imposing equality on something, imposing a sameness or an identity on something, one makes it look indivisible as if without internal inequalities and differences (see Deleuze, 1968, 292) – as in the erasure of internal differences within a category like 'white men' (as Spivak puts it, 'the moment you say, "This is a white position", ... you are homogenizing' (Spivak, 1990, 60)). But underneath this equalisation, all the covered up differences, divisibilities and inequalities remain, rumbling with the sound of their impending return. As much as God may manage temporarily to cover the indivisibility of true difference, 'he dances upon a volcano' (Deleuze, 1968, 344; 293). Accordingly, we may see any present formation of a centre and a periphery in Lotman's semiosphere

as nothing but the *current*, *surface* representation of difference. All the past stages of less domesticated difference still exist in the present, curled up beneath the common image of things – the apparently homogeneous identity of the present is pregnant with enduring difference that threatens to return at any time.

Deleuze is particularly concerned with stressing the future dimension of the idea of enduring difference, which he does through a reading of Nietzsche's idea of the Eternal return. To Deleuze, 'Eternal return cannot mean the return of the Identical', it 'does not bring back "the same" ', 'it is not being that returns', 'the eternal return is not the permanence of the same, the equilibrium state or the resting place of the identical' (Deleuze, 1968, 50; 1962, 45, 43). On the contrary, what returns eternally is 'the being of becoming', that is, becoming itself or the virtual past, 'the absolute different', 'diversity or multiplicity' (Deleuze, 1968, 50; 1962, 43, 45). Duration in Deleuze is thus not only a matter of the unity of past and present, it is a matter of a unity of past, present and future, each dimension woven into the others. The future is the *return of Difference*, the return of the Difference of the past that has endured despite its subjugation in the present. In consequence, the present is pregnant with the past which is also its future. To transfer this to the idea of organic hybridity, the Difference that lies curled up beneath the surface of the present, the Difference that remains in the unmodified form it had when once entering the semiosphere, before it was tamed by the forces of sameness, can return to the surface at any time, thus effecting new becomings of the semiosphere, a future change – as in Bakhtin's metaphor of pregnancy: 'survivals of the past' are born to release 'new world views'. The cultural difference of the word 'barbeque', for instance, may resurface as a foreign element in the English language.

Conceptualisations of Sameness as slow becoming

At this point, before I move on to a discussion of sameness and difference in intentional hybridity, I would like to take a brief look at some possible theoretical conceptualisations of slow speeds of becoming, finishing off with a few possible indications of such conceptualisations in Deleuze's philosophy.

In the analysis of how difference endures in organic hybridity, it is now clear that a simple opposition between difference as becoming, on the one hand, and sameness as being, on the other, does not hold. Organic hybridity shows that there is difference and becoming in sameness. Within organic hybridity, all newness may be subjected to

a whole range of conscious, semiconscious and subconscious acts of translation or representation, but difference nevertheless continues to affect the economy of the same, transforming the same and the central codes with which this sameness is maintained. From this it follows that sameness and its regimes of codification do not remain unaffected, that the speed of difference is not completely annulled as much as it is modified. We are not talking of a *fixed* being as a binary opposition to becoming, but of a *slowed down* becoming. This is the crux of taking organic hybridity into account: we can no longer speak of an absolute Being or absolute Sameness or Purity that, by necessity, must be challenged by a discourse of Difference. All we can speak of are fast and slow becomings; all you can be upset with is not whether a culture changes through hybridity or not, but the speed of hybrid becoming, if it is too slow, or too fast, to your liking.

As said, despite Deleuze's vocabulary of two forms of difference, one often gets the impression that it is only pure, virtual Difference that effects becoming, whereas represented and spatialised difference is a difference that has been exhausted of its capacity to trigger any change. At his most radical Deleuze refers to State Science as a science of the static that fixes identity with the verb 'to be' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 25); '[t]he concern of the State is to conserve'. Hence, State Science 'reproduces' (*reproduit*) a model of 'the stable, the eternal, the identical, the constant' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 357, 12, 361), through the iron collars of representation, for example. It is 'the oldest form of thought' which does nothing except repeat already existing structures of thought, whereas 'modern thought [difference] is born of the failure of representation' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 12, Deleuze 1968, xvii). Likewise, he typically speaks of becoming only in radical terms, as celerity, delirium, flight, speed or 'the mad-becoming' (Deleuze, 1968, 178): 'becoming ... implies multiplicities, celerity, ubiquity, metamorphosis and treason', '[o]nly affirmation returns – in other words, the Different, the Dissimilar ... At the cost of resemblance and identity', it is 'a complete reversal of the world of representation', it is only 'absolute difference [that is] given in the repetition of eternal return' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 243, 372, 374, 11, see also 373). For this reason nothing can be repeated at all, says Deleuze: 'the very word repetition seems to be employed symbolically' (Deleuze, 1968, 27). It is not out of character either when he states that it 'spells ... the *death of becoming* [*la mort du devenir*]' when sorcerers, or some such nomad conjurers of Difference, 'pass over to the side of the family [that is, the territory of State science]' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 248, emphasis added).

However, Deleuze's own theory of difference and repetition exposes how State Science and representation cannot, in fact, reproduce models of 'the stable, the eternal, the identical, the constant', no matter how hard they try, because the world is fundamentally governed by 'metamorphoses and transmigrations' where 'nothing is equal', where 'everything bathes in its difference, its dissimilarity and its inequality' (Deleuze, 1968, 302). Deleuze says about Nietzsche's eternal return that:

> When we say that the eternal return is not the return of the Same, or of the Similar or of the Equal, we mean that it does not presuppose any identity. On the contrary, it is said of a world *without identity*, without resemblance or equality. It is said of a world the very ground of which is difference, in which everything rests upon disparities, upon differences of differences which reverberate to infinity. (Deleuze, 1968, 302)

In fact, this also means that the act of representation – as an act of causing something to *return* – is not necessarily so devastating to becoming as it sometimes appears to be in Deleuze's rhetoric. As shown, it is impossible to represent Difference in its pure form without taming it or slowing it down. However, it is equally impossible to represent the absolute Same, to repeat the absolute Same or *present* it once again without any alteration, without a slight difference at work. As any representation will inevitably thwart that which it wants to present again, there will always be a degree of change, newness, difference in acts of representation; it can never cause the '*death* of becoming' (*la mort du devenir*), or 'the *cancellation* of differences' (*l'annulation des différences*) (Deleuze, 1968, 283, emphases added). State science, or Todorov's idea of a concentration of 'commonly-held representations', cannot fix identity or endlessly reproduce 'an immutable code' (Todorov). Stuart Hall joins in, arguing that although 'there must be *some* fixing of meaning in language' for us simply to understand each other, 'meaning can never be *finally* fixed' and although '[*p*]*ower* intervenes in discourse' to 'fix meaning' it still depends on 'effective exchange' as representation is always '*dialogic*', never 'a one-way transmitter' (Hall, 1997, 23–4, 10–11). To repeat, all representation can do is cause a slowing down of becoming in comparison with the extreme speed involved in radical disruptions of representation and sameness by the release of pure difference. It is this slower becoming that is often missed out if we only follow Deleuze's melodramatic dichotomisations of Sameness

and Difference – as in the quote above where Deleuze opposes, on the one hand, 'the Same', 'the Similar', 'the Equal', 'identity' (*du Même*, *du Semblable*, *de l'Égal*, *identité*) with 'difference' and 'disparities' (*différence*, *disparités*) on the other.

What appears to be in demand, then, are analytical terms that can grasp this slowed down becoming. In dealing with hybridity theory we need something else than Glissant's refrain of how 'Sameness requires fixed Being [whereas] Diversity establishes Becoming' and how 'Sameness will be exhausted by the surprising dynamism of Diversity' (Glissant, 1974, 98, 101). Martin Heidegger may come to our assistance here. As opposed to Deleuze, Heidegger does not conjoin the terms 'the same', 'the identical' and 'the equal' as synonyms for all that excludes difference and becoming. In the short text 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking', Heidegger distinguishes between *sameness*, on the one hand, and *oneness, the equal* and *identity* on the other:

> The same never coincides with the equal, not even in the empty indifferent oneness of what is merely identical. The equal or identical always moves toward the absence of difference, so that everything may be reduced to a common denominator. The same, by contrast, is the belonging together of what differs, through a gathering by way of the difference. We can only say 'the same' if we think difference. It is in the carrying out and settling of differences that the gathering nature of sameness comes to light. The same banishes all zeal always to level what is different into the equal or identical. The same gathers what is distinct into an original being-at-one. The equal, on the contrary, disperses them into the dull unity of mere uniformity. (Heidegger, 1951, 216–17)

In short, Heidegger suggests a distinction between, on the one hand, identity and the equal as *being one* (identity as an absolute, solid oneness or uniformity, 'the identical as equal to itself' in Deleuze's terms (Deleuze, 1968, 374)) and, on the other, sameness as being *at one*, a collection or gathering of differences (or becomings) within a loose unity that does not, or cannot, 'level what is different'. In comparison with something as *identical*, the idea of sameness from this angle no longer seems to constitute such a solidly fixed and homogeneous totality. Accordingly, with *the Identical* and *Difference* as constituting two opposite extremes of fixed *Being* and dynamic *Becoming*, Heidegger's use of *sameness* may function as a term for a slowed down becoming. Heidegger's sameness is not a Deleuzian Sameness (at times Deleuze

spells the Same with a capital letter to indicate its absoluteness as a synonym of the Equal and the Identical). Whereas there is no becoming implied in Deleuze's rhetorical Sameness, there is always a slow becoming in a Heideggerian sameness. Likewise, there is a slow becoming in difference in the lower case and a fast becoming in Difference in capital letters; the latter, however, cannot be sustained in its purity for long.

Edward Casey illustrates the problem that arises when we do not distinguish between the identical, the equal and the same – or between different speeds of becoming – with an example from Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard laments that 'you cannot return home, for it is *never the same place* you left'. The reason for Kierkegaard's pessimism, Casey points out, is that he narrows *the same* down to the *identical* (the same as the Same) (Casey, 1993, 298). In fact, you *can* return to the same, says Casey, your house is the same insofar as it has only slightly changed, or undergone such a slow change that it is hardly perceptible – it has all the impresses of yesterday. The only thing you cannot do is return to the *identical* home.

Arguably, with Heidegger's distinctions, another understanding of Nietzsche's expression of 'the eternal return of the same' emerges. It can never mean the eternal return of the Identical, and in this sense Deleuze is right (this would imply the possibility of an unchanging *being*, the repetition of being and not the repetition of becoming). At most it can mean the eternal return of the same as a 'changing same', a slow becoming. Organic hybridity is such a kind of returning sameness, or 'changing same', and the poverty of many analyses of hybridity is ascribable exactly to the fact that they pit the consciously hybrid against an unchanging identity or mode of thinking rather than against a changing sameness or slow epistemological and ontological becoming.[3]

Deleuze does not like the Heidegger passage quoted above. He reads it as a failed attempt on Heidegger's behalf 'to think original difference' and to 'disconnect' it 'from all mediations' (Deleuze, 1968, 79). The problem is, according to Deleuze, that it is not 'enough to oppose the Same and the Identical', it does not cause difference to be 'truly disengaged from any subordination in relation to the identity of representation' (Deleuze, 1968, 79). As it is now, 'he [Heidegger] retains the primacy of the Same, even if this is supposed to include and comprehend difference as such', it is a 'Same which includes difference' (Deleuze, 1968, 208n., 374). But as I see it, Heidegger's is still in touch with Deleuze's 'philosophy of difference'. Heidegger's sameness is still conditioned by difference and not the other way round: '[w]e can only

say "the same" if we think difference', as he puts it, or, to walk off with one of Deleuze's own expressions, Heidegger's idea of sameness is still, like Lotman's semiosphere, 'conceiving of the same on the basis of the different' (Deleuze, 1968, 51). Likewise my proposal of a slow becoming, although not 'truly disengaged from ... the identity of representation' (Deleuze, 1968, 79), still presupposes a repetition of becoming and not the repetition of being or an unchanging Same.

Yet, in spite of Deleuze's disappointment with Heidegger, he does at times speak in ways that, I think, can support my reading of Heidegger's sameness as a slow becoming. On rare occasions, Deleuze speaks of different 'degrees' of becoming and the slowing down of acceleration; he speaks of 'relative speeds and slownesses', although never in great detail and without explaining how the variation of speed is produced: speed is speed is speed: 'a speed may be very slow, or even immobile, yet it is still speed' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 253–63, 381). I have already shown how his choice of the verb 'taming', in his claim that representation *tames* difference, implies that representation does not cancel or annul or obliterate difference as much as it de-intensifies the force of difference, causing a slowing down of the process of becoming, as in organic hybridity. But Deleuze is sometimes far more explicit than that. At one point he states that, in fact, he does not like his own distinction between spatial and temporal difference at all. He does not like it because it does not tally with the 'philosophy of difference' as a thinking that avoids dichotomies altogether, avoids distinctions along the lines of 'the One and the Multiple' (Deleuze, 1968b, 43). Consequently, the virtual and the actual, spatial and temporal difference cannot be kept wide apart after all, and Deleuze duly proceeds to allow spatiality, degree and quantity to contaminate pure, qualitative Difference: 'There are numbers enclosed in qualities.' And, the other way round, Difference is always at play in spatial difference: hence, '[d]ifferences in degree are the *lowest degree of Difference*' (Deleuze, 1968b, 92, 93, emphasis added) – that is to say, there is a slow becoming in spatialised difference, or 'arborescent multiplicities' (as opposed to the great speed of 'rhizomatic multiplicities'). We have seen how Deleuze tends to speak of how 'the eternal return' completely subverts 'the world of representation' and to say that '[o]nly the extreme, the excessive, returns': 'the eternal return ... is nothing other than chaos itself, or the power of affirming chaos', 'endowed with a violent centrifugal movement' (Deleuze, 1969, 300–1, 51, 300–1, 67). But now we also learn that repetition brings back something we may translate as a sameness in slow becoming: what returns is 'the *identical which belongs to the different*, or *turns around the different*' or 'the identical, the same or the

similar understood as *secondary powers ... turning around difference*', a sameness that is 'only on the periphery' (Deleuze, 1968, 51, 374, 67 emphases added). Here 'it is always the question of drawing a *small difference* ... from the repetition of elements' (Deleuze, 1968, 100, emphasis added). He also speaks of a 'repetition of the During' as a matter of 'becoming-similar or a becoming-equal' (Deleuze, 1968, 368). This is of course a repetition which is less ideal. Although it is not a repetition that assumes the repetition of a fixed being (a 'repetition of the Before'), it has obviously 'not yet banished the apparent positivity of the identical' (Deleuze, 1968, 371).

Deleuze refers to the ideal repetition of Difference as a 'centrifugal force' (Deleuze, 1968, 368). By comparison we may refer to the 'repetition of the During', the 'becoming-similar' or 'becoming-equal', as a centripetal force – never terminating in a *condition* of having become similar or equal or identical. Elsewhere Deleuze speaks of such forces as if they exist in a continuum. He says that the virtual and the actual 'coexist' as in a 'circuit' engaged in 'perpetual exchange' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 150–1, see also 148, 149). Thus, no longer pure binary oppositions, 'homogeneous quantity and heterogeneous quality ... pass from one to the other in a continuous movement' (Deleuze, 1968b, 74). In this way, says Deleuze, we are allowed to 'rediscover dualism and account for it on a new plane' (Deleuze, 1968b, 94). As I see it, this rediscovery of dualism may be seen as a dynamic and *asymmetric* dialectics between oppositional forces of centripetality and centrifugality (later I shall return to Deleuze in this respect as a dialectical thinker).

The Deleuze who fine-tunes our sensibility towards the great dynamics in-between the extremities of pure Identity and pure Difference is there to be found in all his writings, and it is this part of Deleuze that needs to come far more to the fore in the popular uses of his philosophy, as, for instance, in readings of difference, nomadism and becoming in connection with migration literature. Likewise, as with the Deleuzian dichotomy of Sameness and Difference, there is no such thing as a pure discursive homogeneity or a pure discursive heterogeneity – a dichotomy Bakhtin often brings out and which is very often repeated in readings of hybrid migration literature. Just as we can only have slower and faster speeds of becoming (unchanging stillness being an impossibility), homogeneity is always contaminated with heterogeneity and heterogeneity is always contaminated with homogeneity. As noted in the Introduction, adjectives like 'heterogeneous' and 'homogeneous', 'heteroglot' and 'monoglot', suddenly appear much too self-sufficient from this perspective; they emerge as absolute, static and lacking in distinction and subtlety. The only way we can get around such closure is, as

mentioned, to make a shift from the finite to the infinite reference and speak of a discourse, for instance, not as homogeneous or heterogeneous but as heterogenis*ing* or homogenis*ing*. The 'heteroglot' can only be said to be a *force* of heteroglossia (or centrifugality) and the monoglot a *force* of monoglossia (or centripetality). In Deleuzian terms we can speak of arborescent and the rhizomatic forces or 'arborescent multiplicities' and 'rhizomatic multiplicities' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 33).

To recap, a concern with forces means that we shift our focus away from seeing something as a *state* or *condition* (a state or condition of being homogeneous or heterogeneous, pure or hybrid) to seeing everything as in process (of slow and fast becomings). As concerns hybridity specifically, we shift away from seeing hybridity as a singular *condition* of being hybrid to an exploration of diverse forms of hybridising *processes*.

* * *

The exercise in this chapter on organic hybridity has been to show that there is no such thing as a pure, unchanging homogeneity; and to substitute the idea of a fixed being with an idea of slowed down becomings. The exercise in the next chapter will be to show how there is no pure release of Difference or Heterogeneity in intentional hybridity, as it is also contaminated by homogenising forces. Rather, we can speak of different speeds of difference and becoming in intentional hybridity; that is, different speeds at which the discourse attempts and sometimes manages to change the epistemological grammar of an established worldview.

3
Forces of Sameness and Difference in Intentional Hybridity

In contrast to the opaque and mute nature of difference in organic hybridity, with its centripetal forces of sameness and slow becomings, intentional hybridity is a conspicuous and consciously voiced form of hybridity that intends to release the centripetal forces of Difference. In Bhabha's words, '[t]he aim of cultural *difference* is to rearticulate the sum of knowledge from the perspective of the signifying position of the minority that *resists totalization*' (Bhabha, 1994, 232, emphases added). In fact, intentional hybridity depends on a considerable speed of difference. For the sake of remaining visible as a discourse of hybridity it needs to work against the cooptation of difference into sameness.

In migration literature the deliberate foregrounding of hybridity, or the thematisation of a centrifugal kind of hybridity, is often expressed through hyphenated identities, either explicitly as in the 'Vietnamese-American' character Du in Bharati Mukherjee's *Jasmine* (*Jasmine,* 222) or implicitly as with Zadie Smith's character Millat in *White Teeth*: 'Millat was neither one thing nor the other, this or that, Muslim or Christian, Englishman or Bengali; he lived for the in between' (Smith, 2000, 303). The hyphenated identity of, say, an 'Indian-English' protagonist may serve to illustrate what I see as the two principal ways in which intentional hybridity is proposed as an assertion of difference and a deterritorialisation of sameness – that is, two ways of escaping the supposed Sameness of both Indian and English identity. On the one hand, hybridity is understood as deterritorialising sameness through an *overabundance* or *excess* of ground and roots along the lines of Bakhtin's notion of how heteroglossia disintegrates oneness. On the other hand, difference is released through a groundlessness of the signifier along the lines of Deleuze's nomad science. In both cases the release of difference

is supposed to cause language to lose its referentiality, to cause a certain failure of representation.

With the pluralism of 'Indian' and 'English' in 'Indian-English' the hybrid subject is said to incorporate not one but several cultural identities simultaneously, forming a multi- and transcultural identity which is not *either* one *or* the other but *both and*. On the other hand, there is a more radically poststructuralist understanding of how hybridity deterritorialises sameness, which Radhakrishnan describes very well when he speaks in Deleuzian terms of 'the hybrid experience' as a 'moment of radical indeterminacy' or 'Deterritorialized immanence' that occurs in 'the exhilarating anomie between "having been deterritorialized" and "awaiting to be reterritorialized"' (Radhakrishnan, 2000, 3, 2, 1). In contrast to the excess of ground – the excess of naming in hybridity as a *both-and* – this is a hybridity of no ground, of a restless, nomadic groundlessness, a hybridity of *neither-nor*. Within this space, Radhakrishnan concludes, 'there is all manner of unprecedented "becoming"' (Radhakrishnan, 2000, 1). In the example of the hyphenated identity, this understanding of hybridity is expressed in the hyphen itself which constitutes the limitless third space before any signification gains new grounding. This is a third space of suspension in the non-categorisable intermezzo between deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, never touching ground with either side of the hyphen or establishing any new category.

The two understandings of hybridity may be expressed by an image evoked by Rushdie in his attempt to describe the migrant state of in-betweenness: 'Sometimes we feel that we straddle two cultures; at other times, that we fall between two stools' (Rushdie, 1992, 15). Hence, the migrant condition may involve an inclusive blending of two or more incompatible cultural identities, an equilibrating double-ground, on the one hand, and, on the other, a perilous experience of groundlessness, a great devilish, Dionysian fall between the safe stability of national or cultural categories.

Some migrant writers stress the simultaneity of an excess of belonging everywhere and the utter homelessness of belonging nowhere. In the essay 'A New World Order' Caryl Phillips responds to every place he visits across the globe with the refrain 'I feel at home here, but I don't belong. I am of, and not of, this place' (Phillips, 2001, 1, 2, 3, 4). In Bhabha we find an indiscriminate interspersion of both perceptions of hybridity: 'the postcolonial migrant' marks a space on the 'boundary of cultural difference that never quite adds up, always *less than one* nation and *double*' (Bhabha, 1994, 241, emphases added). Sometimes

he speaks of hybridity exclusively in terms of excess: a 'doubleness ... in the postcolonial play' (Bhabha, 1994, 84–5), a '*double* vision' (Bhabha, 1994, 126), a 'restless movement' of the 'here and there, on all sides, *fort / da*, hither and thither, back and forth' (Bhabha, 1994, 2). At other times, he understands hybridity as an empowering condition of insurgency when hybridity involves not a *both-and* but a state of being '*neither the one nor the other*' (Bhabha, 1994, 37). Expressions like the latter cause Young to read Bhabha's concept of hybridity as a 'raceless chaos', a 'restless, uneasy, interstitial hybridity' or a discontinuous 'radical heterogeneity' (Young, 1995, 25). Another critic, Benita Parry, seems to identify both the understanding of hybridity as excess and as groundlessness in Bhabha. She sees Bhabha as providing 'a form of writing cultural difference' that has 'affinities with Edward Said's "contrapuntal" readings' and Gilroy's 'doubleness of the black experiences in the West' but also 'a preference for terms that condense the play of difference' in 'adherence to Foucault's [and Deleuze's] recommendation that difference be freed from an oppositional and negative system as "thought without contradiction, without dialectics, without negation" ' (Parry, 1994/2002, 120, 121).

As regards the *intentionality* of intentional hybridity, the examples of how authors of migration literature are explicitly or implicitly envisioned as, or envision themselves as the *agents* of the release of difference through their literary endeavours are numerous. Rushdie's definition of what he calls the 'migrant condition', which of course includes himself as a migrant writer, overlaps with his idea of literature to a remarkable degree. Migrant identity is plural, at once incorporating a diversity of cultural taxonomies but all of them in a fragmented, non-unitary form. And because of its shiftiness and ambiguity, the uncertain ground beneath the migrant's feet is famously asserted as particularly *fertile* soil for literature (see Rushdie, 1982, 15). Like the novel, the migrant is an adaptable pragmatist who does not attempt 'to give permanence and authority to our knowledge and values by purporting to found them in some unchanging cosmic realm ... outside the flux of our human conversation' (Rushdie citing Don Cupitt, 1992, 418). Hence, migrant writers are particularly geared to offer a release of difference. They see the world through 'cracked lenses' and are 'capable only of fractured perceptions' and 'forced by cultural displacement to accept the provisional nature of all truths' (Rushdie, 1982, 12–13). It is due to the 'very experience of uprooting, disjuncture and metamorphosis' that migrant writers are 'capable of writing from a kind of double perspective' or 'stereoscopic vision' (Rushdie, 1990a, 394, see also 1982, 19).

The idea of intentionally releasing difference through a transformative vision of clashing and dialogising multiplicities is expressed by other migrant writers and critics. Michael Ondaatje thinks that migratory movement is 'like living three or four lives' which may 'double' the writer's perspective' (Nasta, 2004, 262). Bharati Mukherjee sees all writers as 'expatriates to one degree or another' who may 'hail from a country without a passport' (Mukherjee, 1999, 74). Ben Okri sees the storyteller as a magician occupying a space of 'mid-imagination, mid-fantasy, a country without land, without boundaries' (Okri, 2002, 32, 41). Anzaldúa argues that '[l]iving in a state of psychic unrest, in a Borderland, is what makes poets write and artists create' and '[b]eing a writer feels very much like being a Chicana, or being queer ... nothing defined or definite, a boundless, floating state of limbo ...' (Anzaldúa, 1987, 94–5). She sees the writer as a 'shape-changer', as a '*nahual*, a shaman', and her own queer, mestiza writing self as a 'participant in the further evolution of humankind' (Anzaldúa, 1987, 88, 1).

Edward Said now and then cautions us not to romanticise the exile or migrant as a nomadic hero, and advises against exaggerating the differences between the settled and the exilic. He insists that exile is an experience of pain rather than pleasure. In fact, to think of exile in aesthetic terms is 'to banalize its mutilations' and obscure the fact that it is 'irremediably secular and unbearably historical' (Said, 1984, 174). Yet his seminal essay 'Reflections on Exile' does not retain such a materialistic and historical focus on exile. Said lumps together all kinds of exilic and migratory experiences, from fiction and diverse historical eras, from across a multitude of geographical, cultural and social locations, so that in the end one is left with an impression of exile as not only a sweeping aesthetic metaphor with which to capture the essence of literature, but an epistemic metaphor with which to capture our age in its totality. Added to that, Said's essay combines literature and a special 'exile subjectivity' to form a heteroglot epistemology: exiles have 'achieved independence and detachment' from what Adorno scorned as the 'administered world' of 'readymade forms' and 'prefabricated "homes" ' (Said, 1984, 184). They see 'the entire world as a foreign land' which 'makes possible originality of vision'. As opposed to 'most people' who 'are in principle aware of one culture, one setting, one home', exiles have a 'plurality of vision' which makes the 'life of exile ... less seasonal and settled than life at home. Exile is life led outside habitual order. It is nomadic, decentered, contrapuntal' (Said, 1984, 186).

The ideas of decentredness, the inclusion of diverse cultural codes and visions that are stereoscopic and pluralistic naturally lead to Homi

Bhabha's theory of hybridity as a special 'language of critique'. With reference to Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses*, Bhabha states that '[t]he truest eye' belongs not to people who are rooted in one national identity or another, but 'to the migrant's double vision' (Bhabha, 1994, 7–8). Bhabha sees the emergence of a 'new internationalism' launched by the history of post-colonial migration and recorded in 'the poetics of exile', or 'borderline' writings, which offer an 'unhomed' discourse that explicitly stages 'cultural difference' and dramatises 'the ambivalent process of splitting and hybridity', 'extend[ing] our senses towards the new transnational world and its hybrid names' (Bhabha, 1994, 6–7, 10, 13, 46, 10, 312).

The intentional release of difference in Bakhtin's poetics

Evidently, the two ways in which difference is imagined to be released in intentional hybridity discourse, as illustrated in the simplified example of the hyphenated identity marker, correspond with the overall ways in which Bakhtin and Deleuze imagine difference to be released in literature.

In this respect Werbner's reading of Bakhtin's idea of intentional hybridity as a deliberate collision and fusion of voices refers directly to his idea of the novel as heteroglossia (see Introduction) – a poetics that, in our current perspective, sees literature as disrupting sameness through an excess of naming. To Bakhtin, the heteroglot novel deals not with the relation between a word and its object but with the relation between two or more voices *about* an object. It deals with, indeed *intensifies* the exchange, clash and fusing of opinions about – or 'commonly-held representations' of – an object: the language of the novel is 'a *system* of languages that mutually and ideologically interanimate each other'; it unfolds 'the Tower-of-Babel mixing of languages that goes around any object' and, as a result, it is not possible to analyse it as a 'single unitary language' at all (Bakhtin, 1940, 47; 1935, 278; see also 1935, 328, 330).

At one point Bhabha speaks of 'Bakhtin's displacement of the author as agent', thus repeating the common idea that Bakhtin, with his concepts of heteroglossia and dialogism, has done away with the author (Bhabha, 1994, 270). Yet the idea of the author continues to play a substantial role in Bakhtin's poetics and time and again he speaks as if the author is the orchestrator or prime facilitator of heteroglossia in the novel – in accordance with his idea of hybridity in the novel as an *intentional* artistic device. In *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, for example, it

is the *author* Dostoevsky who is continually stressed as no less than 'the creator of the polyphonic novel', just as Bakhtin speaks of the novelistic author's will as an 'artistic *will* of polyphony' as 'a *will* to combine many wills' (Bakhtin, 1929, 7; Bakhtin, 1929, 21, emphasis added, see also 16, 23, 34).

Bakhtin sees ideal authors as doing all they can not to deprive the imported voice of its verbal-ideological *independence*, not to appropriate it to suit their own discourse but to allow it to *speak for itself* – to *present* it rather than *represent* it. They do so either by withdrawing their opinions entirely from the work or by reducing their own opinions to one opinion in the vast multiplicity of opinions in the novel. As in Rushdie's image of the novel as a stage of discourses, the author 'has *no evaluation of his own*', he 'retains for himself, that is, for his *exclusive field of vision*, not a single essential definition, not a single trait ... he enters it all into the field of vision of the hero himself, he casts it all into the crucible of the hero's own self-consciousness' (Bakhtin, 1929, 251; 1935, 299; 1929, 48, emphases added).

The author's technique may be that of an 'indirect discourse' which Bakhtin describes, in this context, as 'the representation of another's word, another's language in intentional quotation marks' whereby the author distances himself or herself from the voice of the other and thus avoids tampering with its difference (Bakhtin, 1935, 304, see also 299, 300). Paul de Man explains why Bakhtin's idea of heteroglossia appeals to the 'disciples of Gilles Deleuze' in this regard. It involves '[t]he radical experience of voiced otherness' or 'voices of radical alterity' (de Man, 1983, 103). When the novelistic author invites heteroglossia into the work, he or she embarks on nothing less than 'an *assertion* of the otherness of the other' (de Man, 1983, 102) – a presencing of the foreign voice, a transfer, not a translation.

In correspondence with the pluralism of the hyphenated identity marker, Bakhtin refers to the discourse in the novel as a 'hybrid construction' or a 'double-accented', 'double-voiced' discourse (Bakhtin, 1935, 304). However, these terms also point to another slightly different understanding in Bakhtin of intentional hybridity than the one Werbner mentions. Whereas Bakhtin in the above speaks of heteroglossia and hybridity as being directly *presented* in the novel (through ways of avoiding the mediation of representation), he sometimes speaks of heteroglossia and hybridity as holding sway in the novel despite acts of *representation*. Here intentional hybridity is not a matter of the author doing all he or she can to make the other language speak for itself. It is a matter of making that other language speak through the author's

own, representing language. It is obligatory that the novel contains at least two 'linguistic consciousnesses', says Bakhtin: 'the one being represented and the other doing the representing, with each belonging to a different system of language' (Bakhtin, 1935, 359): on the one hand, there is 'the individual, *representing* authorial consciousness and will' and, on the other, there is 'the individualized linguistic consciousness and will of the character *represented*' (Bakhtin, 1935, 359, emphases added). But in representing the other voice, the representing voice of the author is necessarily contaminated or cross-pollinated by the voice it imitates. Hence any representing voice or language 'must by its very nature be a linguistic hybrid', it is 'always an 'internally dialogized hybrid' (Bakhtin, 1935, 359, 361). It always carries and fuses two voices or two 'semantic and axiological belief systems' (Bakhtin, 1935, 304). Despite the clear interference here of forces that lie outside any immediate intentionality, Bakhtin still speaks at times as if such internal dialogisation of the representing voice is a deliberate strategy on behalf of the author: it is still 'an intentional hybrid', and to the extent that the author carries his or her own accent into the interior of the novel, it is only in order deliberately to *dialogise* it (Bakhtin, 1935, 359; see 1935, 356, 358). For the most part, Bakhtin does not imply any asymmetry of the relative forces involved. Rather, he seems to purport a sufficient release or *presencing* of the difference of the represented voice in spite of the *representing* voice, suggesting that the entire dialogised utterance comes out as an ideologically suspended equilibrium of forces (yet, as we shall see below, there are more sides to Bakhtin than this).

The intentional release of difference in Deleuze's poetics

Deleuze does not care for what literature *is*, only for what it *does*, or *can do*, and, like Bakhtin, he sees literature as a mode of writing or thinking in which extraordinary things can happen to language. Literature can offer a space in which the logic of representation, the taming of difference by language, is radically suspended. Whereas we certainly see ideas of the disruption of sameness and monologism through overabundance in Deleuze in manners similar to Bakhtin, notably in his idea of the rhizome and the proliferation of 'and ... and ... and', the overall release of difference in his poetics is through the significatory groundlessness mentioned before, which can happen only when acts of representation are disrupted altogether.

Language originates in the social, according to Deleuze, as its purpose is to create communication, cooperation and coordination. As such, it

is incessantly monoglossified by the prevalent social order. Difference is tamed, obscured or blocked by language whereby *common* sense, the collectively *shared* sense, is made to appear as common sense, as the only sense, as *doxa*. At its best, literature does not *represent* in the sense of subjugating difference to the sameness of the social order. It manages the reverse, affirming difference, causing all that stands in the shadow of doxa, all *para*doxa, to break through the illusion of sameness, revealing how definitions and essences are but false impositions on a reality of multiplicity, flux and change (see Deleuze, 1968, 337, 365). The 'phantastical', for instance, such as the 'nonsense' in Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland*, is 'distinguished from the categories of representation' because 'the imagination ... crosses domains, orders and levels, knocking down the partitions coextensive with the world' (Deleuze, 1968, 345; 355; 356).

Deleuze expresses how art can release Difference in many ways. Most famously he brings out the distinction between the sedentary and the nomadic. Art and literature work through a *nomadic* distribution of difference, he says, as opposed to a *sedentary* distribution which 'is indistinguishable from the practice of representation' (Deleuze, 1968, 353). A sedentary distribution of difference works through the idea of rules and categories and effects 'a fixed sharing out', whereby difference is tamed by its subjugation to identity and sameness (see Deleuze, 1968, 355, 339, 342). In contrast, nomadic distributions of difference work according to no pre-existing rules. When describing the nomadic distribution of difference, Deleuze speaks like Bhabha of the 'borderline' and 'peripheral positions' as shifting and dynamic anomalies that are never 'assured by a *barrier*', as well as he imagines difference to be released in-between categories: '[t]he only way to get outside the dualisms is to be-between, to pass between, the intermezzo' and here '[t]he middle is not an average; it is fast motion, it has the absolute speed of movement' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 244–5, 277, 293). As in the example of the hyphen above, the nomadic distribution of difference in literature is 'imbued with the presentiment of groundlessness' (Deleuze, 1968, 346), or, to reiterate Radhakrishnan, it initiates the 'moment of radical indeterminacy' in-between deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation.

Deleuze also speaks of the escape from representation in literature as a drawing of lines of flight away from 'the world of dominant significations and established order' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 41). To flee is to trace an uncharted course and depart from the paths of conventional sense and pre-existing codes. Hence, a line of flight is also a kind of treason: 'We betray the fixed powers which try to hold us back, the

established powers of the earth' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 40). To flee is not a reactive, but an affirmative act. It is 'to make something flee', 'to make a system leak as one breaks a pipe' and 'the goal' of writing is to set one's thoughts aflight (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 47, 36, 75). In this way we come to:

> witness a transformation of substances and a dissolution of forms, a passage to the limit or flight from contours in favour of fluid forces, flows, air, light, and matter, such that a body or a word does not end at a precise point. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 109)

Deleuze prefers not to speak at all of the author as an agent of difference or as intentionally creating rhizomes. He simply does not recognise the idea of a creative subject or an author in the first place. In line with his idea of language as collective, there can be no author, no singular creative spirit with a singular voice: 'there are no individual statements, there never are. Every statement is the product of a machinic assemblage, in other words, of collective agents of enunciation' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 37). Deleuze prefers instead to speak of writing and the writer. Unlike the author, the writer is not a subject of enunciation but a product of many assemblages (see Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 51–2). Or, to put it differently, the writer is not an individual autonomous subject, but a machine in constant creation by a multiplicity of collective languages. Lecercle compares Deleuze with Foucault on this point, noting how they both bypass the subject by asserting that language is all there is – rather than a '*je parle*' all we have is an '*on parle*', rather than an individual subject speaking, all we have is a 'theatre of utterances' (Lecercle, 2002, 29, 84; Foucault cited in Lecercle, 2002, 14). Nevertheless, Deleuze does point out the excellence of individual writers with all the implications involved of intentionality and individual agency (such as Herman Melville, Franz Kafka, T. E. Lawrence and Lewis Caroll), and at times he does speak of writers in idealistic terms that are not unlike those of Ben Okri above: 'Writers are sorcerers' and '[s]orcerers have always held the anomalous position, at the edge of the fields or woods. They haunt the fringes. They are at the borderline of the village *between* villages' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 240, 246). Situated on the 'borderline between two groups', writers practice 'a politics of sorcery' or 'a politics of becoming-animal', which is nothing like the sedentary politics of the family, religion or the State. '[T]hey [writers] express minoritarian groups, or groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognized institutions' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 247). In particular Deleuze

and Guattari think that migrants, immigrants, minorities, exiles, outsiders who live in and challenge a major language which is not their own, are already practitioners of a minor literature (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 31–2, 17). In minor literature immigrant writers seem to be capable of facilitating a deterritorialising form of writing all by themselves. Minor writing is therefore something for other writers deliberately to aspire to; in fact we should all aim to 'become a nomad and an immigrant and a gypsy' in our own language (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 19). Similarly, Deleuze sees Anglo-American writers as particularly successful as opposed to French writers who are always searching for 'primary certainty'. As far as Anglo-American writers are concerned, '[*t*]*hey* create a New Earth' and the Anglo-American novel is a rhizomatic literature which 'has its line of flight and does not take root'. Everything in Anglo-American literature is departure, passage, leap, making connections with the outside, tearing down walls, uprooting, becoming, wandering – all at breakneck speed. As in minor writing, the writers in Anglo-American literature are nomadic and they write with a sense of 'frontiers as something to cross, to push back, to go beyond', linking becoming to something 'geographical' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 39, 36, 39, 36–7, 37).

Limits of difference in Bakhtin's and Deleuze's poetics

This brief delineation of Bakhtin's and Deleuze's ideas of the capacity of writing and literature to release Difference rests on a considerable idealisation of literature (or particular kind of literature), corresponding to the idealisation of migration literature that runs through the above quotations from Rushdie, Bhabha, Anzaldúa, Okri, etc. In Bakhtin we get the sense that he presupposes successful novelistic heteroglossia as an accomplishment of a certain superior objectivity in the novel. As Brian Poole puts it, a kind of 'impersonal narration' that involves 'a distanced observer, a perspective for all other perspectives, without its own content or subjectivity, but able to see everyone else's' (Poole, 2001, 137, 136) – very much as in Rushdie's image of the novel as an arena of discourses. In fact the idea of the stereoscopic vision in this respect overthrows the stipulation made by Rushdie that the 'cracked lenses' and 'fractured perceptions' of the migrant perspective prevents migrant writers from 'lay[ing] claim to Olympus' or the 'whole sight' (Rushdie, 1982, 12–13, 19). The 'stereoscopic vision' is not something migrant writers offer in place of the 'whole sight'. Quite the contrary, it *is* the whole sight. It implies an Olympic vision that sees all sides at once. To borrow an expression from Deleuze and Guattari, a book like

The Satanic Verses, with all its lenticular splits and cracks, is '[a] strange mystification': it is 'all the more total for being fragmented' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 4–6). Likewise, Bakhtin's idea of how one representational language can make other voices speak independently must jar on the ears of critics like Spivak or people who are in any way concerned with the politics of representation and discourse, just as the assumption of how *representing* languages are amply dialogised by difference must jar on the ears of people like Deleuze.

As regards Deleuze's idealisation of literature, we get a sense that acts of deterritorialisation exist in a pure form in the rhizomatic novel without any contamination of acts of reterritorialisation, that the sameness that comes with acts of representation can be completely suspended in pure nomadic distributions of difference. As I have already illustrated, the assumptions of a pure release of difference in heteroglot and rhizomatic literature stand out most spectacularly when Bakhtin and Deleuze oppose their ideal forms of the novel with the direct opposites of the monoglot novel and the root-book (see Introduction). Deleuze concludes in this respect that:

> [w]riting is very simple. Either it is a way of reterritorializing oneself, conforming to a code of dominant utterances, to a territory of established states of things ... Or else ... it is becoming. (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 74)

This leaves but two choices for writing and for reading literature: the work can be either heteroglot or monoglot, a work of deterritorialisation or a work of territorialisation and reterritorialisation.

Fortunately both Bakhtin and Deleuze at times look at literature from a more sceptical point of view. Sometimes Bakhtin explicitly moderates his own enthusiasm about the novel author's capacity of creating a true heteroglossia. At one point he raises the concern of representation himself and warns against the possibility of distortion when creating images of another language:

> One must not forget ... that the languages introduced into the novel are shaped into artistic images of languages (they are not raw linguistic data), and this shaping may ... more or less respond to the spirit and power of the languages that are being represented. (Bakhtin, 1935, 417)

The relative success of this 'more-or-lessness' is not all, however. In the very *selection* of words and languages, he says, the author inescapably

performs an act of 'value judgement' and, in the worst case, imported languages 'lose their second voice' entirely and come 'to reverberate with [the author's] own "truth" ' (Bakhtin, 1926, 482 and 1935, 418, 419, 302). Bakhtin also identifies such value-judgements and the centralisation of a certain voice at the centre of the work's structural organisation where all the levels of language intersect. He speaks of how 'a complex system of languages' may be stylistically 'appropriated into one unitary dialogical movement' with 'separate "languages" ' located at various distances from this 'unifying artistic and ideological center of the novel', and concludes elsewhere that, for this reason, '[t]he structure of form is indeed hierarchical, and ... comes close to political and juridical gradations' (Bakhtin, 1940, 48–9; 1926, 482).

So in spite of the characteristic aspiration to non-ideological discourse in the novel, the author's employment of many different languages, 'in order that he himself might remain ... neutral ... , a third part in a quarrel between two people', the author's play with languages and ventriloquist imitation of other voices can never entirely dispel 'the overarching ideological conceptualization of the work as a whole' (Bakhtin, 1935, 314, 311). To put it differently, literature never works in the *presentational* mode alone, it works just as much in the *representational* mode, and in the representational mode we are talking less of a free dialogisation between difference and the representing voice and more of a *domesticating translation* of difference by the representing voice. Accordingly, to borrow a term from Bruhn and Lundquist, even the most centrifugal texts are 'impregnated with monoglossia' (Bruhn and Lundquist, 2001, 33).

In a similar manner Deleuze comes round to a more complex view on the rhizome. At his most radical he is annoyed with the idea of order, structure and territorialisations in the work of art:

> [t]here is a whole politics which demands that the lines should be blocked, that an order should be established ... preventing indeterminism from going too far, in calming the madness of particles: a restoration of order. (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 67)

Yet, at other times he withdraws from this, acceding that there is bifurcation in rhizomes, that all literature, including minor literature, inevitably makes a major use of language, or a representational use of language (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 19). There are fluxes in literature 'which sometimes dry up, freeze or overflow, which sometimes combine or diverge' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 47). Hence,

deterritorialising lines of flight inevitably contain 'lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories' and the rhizome may stiffen into codes of striation, '[t]rees have rhizome lines, and the rhizome points of arborescence' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 3, 34):

> Does not a multiplicity have strata upon which unifications and totalizations, massifications, mimetic mechanism, signifying power takeovers, and subjective attributions take root? Do not even lines of flight, due to their eventual divergence, reproduce the very formations their function it was to dismantle? (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 13)

A nomadic distribution of difference may be what is intentionally aimed at, but its contamination by sedentary distributions of difference is inescapable. Hence, a rhizome is not necessarily just a decentred network of entangled connections. In some contexts and at some points in time, some lines of connection will swell and become thicker than others – as in the botanical definition of 'rhizome' which also notes how its stems are 'often thickened by deposits of reserve food material' (*Merriam-Webster*, 2010).

Different speeds of difference in intentional hybridity

Like Bhabha, and directly inspired by Deleuze, Lawrence Venuti proposes the possibility of shifting our translation of the foreign from an 'ethics of sameness' to an 'ethics of difference', the latter constituting a translational practice that is 'minoritizing', that deviates from 'domestic norms' and 'evoke[s] the foreignness of the foreign text' by releasing the 'remainder or difference' (Venuti, 1998, 10, 23, 87, 188). Intentional hybridity corresponds to such an 'ethics of difference', and I believe intentional hybridity, as in the example of hyphenated discourse, *can* release difference in a text. This is not all it does, however; it always reterritorialises as well, resting on or re-confirming grounds of sameness. As in Bakhtin's heteroglossia and the bifurcation of Deleuze's rhizome, an 'ethics of difference' will never entirely escape its contamination by a language of sameness.

If we then return to the simple example of intentional hybridity in the transcultural migration novel as a hyphenated discourse, we may therefore start to note several ways in which its heteroglossia and groundlessness are impregnated with monoglossia and centripetal forces of reterritorialisation. We may, for example, discern an

asymmetry of power relations between 'Indian' and 'English' in the very grammar of 'Indian-English': 'Indian' constitutes a much weaker, dispensable and replaceable adjectival modifier attached to the governing signifier 'English'. For this reason the doubleness of 'Indian-English' is not a heterogeneity without any hierarchy. On the contrary, we may speak of a significant reduction of heterogeneity caused by the semantic dominance of 'English'.

This hierarchy or asymmetry also affects the hyphen itself. Radhakrishnan asks if the hyphen in a hyphenated identity can really signify a non-hierarchical conjecture, suspending any inequalities in the former relation of its components (Radhakrishnan, 1996, 204, 211). The answer is no. Once our glance drifts from the groundless, non-representational space of the hyphen in the middle to the signifiers on either side, it is immediately contaminated by their unequal power relations. Its moment of groundlessness is unsustainable exactly because it is contaminated by its context. My point is that when a critic like Azade Seyhan tells us that '[a] hyphen both separates and connects ... it both contests and agrees', it will, in some contexts and from some perspectives, involve more separation or more contestation than in others, and the other way round in other contexts and perspectives (Seyhan, 1996, 28). To assert, or imply, that there is no hierarchy between the oppositions that enter into a mixture and that their hybridisation issues a free release of difference only obscures the power politics involved in hyphenations. The hierarchies of sameness and difference may very well shift several times within a text or discourse, but intentional hybridity will never succeed in a pure release of difference, whether in a freely proliferating heteroglossia or in a radical nomadic groundlessness.

Thirdly, to regard 'Indian-English' as a pure doubled discourse or heteroglossia or its hyphen as a pure a-signifying groundlessness depends on our willingness to disregard the fact that the phrase is written in *English* (and in the Latin alphabet), not in Hindi or in a mixture of Hindi and English. Arguably, there is therefore little otherness or Difference in the 'Indian' in the expression 'Indian-English'. Rather, it is an English *translation* of something Indian and not a direct presencing of its otherness; it is an *image* of Indian difference constructed by use of the representative vehicle of English. All we have is an already mediated or digested and appropriated reference to something Indian. In fact, it is as if we know what this Indian is already, we *recognise* it. It is named, encoded, grounded and appropriated through the English language, plotted within an English map of the world, Todorov would say. The radical and unmediated difference and otherness of India is absent.

It is true that the representing language, or translating language, in this respect, and in all other respects, is a hybrid one, as Bakhtin maintains. The voice of the author or the language of representation will always be contaminated by the represented voice or language (as in translation), but here the product is nevertheless an *asymmetric* hybridity or a dialogisation which gravitates heavily to the verbal-ideological economy of the representing language. At one point Bakhtin actually seems to point to such asymmetric dialogisation, stating that 'an intentional hybrid is precisely the perception of one language by another language. An *image of language* may be structured only from the point of view of another language, *which is taken as the norm*' (Bakhtin, 1935, 359, emphases added). The point is that the novelistic author's good intentions are up against the fact that words are always inhabited by the meanings and intentions of others and that, for this reason, no language, including English, can ever work as a neutral vehicle for the presencing of otherness. 'Language', says Bakhtin, 'is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker's intentions; it is populated – overpopulated – with the intentions of others' and as a consequence of:

> all these stratifying forces in language, there are no 'neutral' words and forms – words and forms that can belong to 'no one'; language has been completely taken over, shot through with intentions and accents. (Bakhtin, 1935, 294; 293)

Similarly, we have seen how a statement is always collective to Deleuze, even if uttered by a singular artist. In this context, Deleuze and Guattari speak of the signifier as imperialistic and of language as 'made not to be believed but to be obeyed, and to compel obedience' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 110, 76). Language is full of 'order-words' that command the preservation of established orders. Order-words give orders and demarcate the proliferation of meaning. 'It is not only that words lie' says Deleuze:

> they are also burdened with calculations and significations, with intentions ... with old habits that cement them together, that one can scarcely bore into the surface before it closes up again. (Deleuze, 1993, 173)

Hence, any cultural otherness in English, even if introduced through a translational 'ethics of difference', cannot remain unaffected by all

the 'stratifying forces' of 'order-words'; all the centripetal forces of the translating language will keep closing any holes of difference that may have been punched into sameness.

Although Pieterse uses different terms than I do, he also points to how the imperative assertion of difference in intentional hybridity is inescapably contaminated by centripetal forces of sameness:

> [H]ybridity serves a purpose on the basis of the assumption of *difference* between the categories, forms, beliefs that go into the mixture. Yet the very process of hybridisation shows the difference to be relative and, with a slight shift of perspective, the relationship can also be described in terms of an affirmation of *similarity.* (Pieterse, 1994, 176)

Elsewhere he concludes that within the hybrid continuum it is difficult to find hybridities 'without a centre', 'it is difficult to think of an example of completely free-floating mixture, for even at a carnival the components are always charged with different values, polarities' (Pieterse, 2001, 237). The intentional affirmation of a hyphenated 'Indian-English' subjectivity may thus in many perspectives amount to an affirmation of an asymmetric 'Indian'-English subjectivity, so to speak, with a heavy, homogenising pull towards the right-hand side of the hyphen – the major language of 'English' may even co-opt the properties of 'Indian' entirely over time (as in organic hybridity) despite the author's intentions of asserting Difference. This is in marked contrast to a contention like Arjun Appadurai's that 'the right-hand side of the hyphen', in the 'formula of hyphenation' that he sees as a feature of an emerging 'postnational world', 'can barely contain the unruliness of the left-hand side' (Appadurai, 1996, 171–2).

Finally, the highlighting of an Indian-English hybridity and heterogeneity in hyphenated discourse itself covers up so many differences and heterogeneities and hybridities and becomings by implying the categories of *an* Indian identity and *an* English identity (concealing semiopheric differences *of* and *within* races, classes, genders, ages, occupations, religions, individualities, etc.). To put it differently, the moment a hybridity discourse sets it itself up as the only true difference, it cuts off all other differences in the world, it becomes a matter of framing one kind of difference as the only true kind of difference, cutting it out of the multiplicity of the world. Hybridity discourse in this fashion becomes an oppositional or spatialising discourse, a fixation, a word that *orders* in the sense of sorting and organising us and in the sense of commanding us to obey its language. This is also exactly the point

where hybridity discourse tends to establish the hybrid as a new category in itself – hybridity as a third space – in line with Glissant and Derrida's critique of the idealisation of a hyphenated identity. Here there is a danger of a reterritorialisation in minor literature whereby the minor becomes in fact the major use. Behind the outward display of a desire to become-minor, the other dream may be lurking, Deleuze warns, the desire to become-major, to become the only true language (Deleuze, 1975, 27). In this regard, the desire to install the migrant figure or the consciously hybrid subject at the centre, as the archetype of our age, endowed with a special vision, 'the truest eye' (Bhabha, 1994, 7–8), certainly involves more than a desire to become-minor.

With all these examples of how difference is reduced within a hyphenated discourse, we are no longer dealing with the absolute speed of difference or the absolute release of the remainder in intentional hybridity. Rather, we are facing a slowing down of difference and becoming in intentional hybridity caused by its contamination with centripetal forces of sameness, a slowing down of its capacity to alter the collective recognition of reality, to cause a collective re-cognition of reality – considerably slower than assumed by celebrations of transcultural writings. The language-intention within the discourse of intentional hybridity may very well be one of genuinely exercising an assertion of Difference, governed by a profound will to cause different languages to clash and fuse in opposition to discourses of purity, and strategies of representational excess and erosion may also enable writers to release difference and disrupt an 'ethics of sameness'. However, intentional hybridity never escapes a simultaneous translation or *taming* of difference through its modes of representation.

In the examination of organic hybridity, the conclusion was that there is no such thing as a pure monoglossia since the most monoglot of discourses are impregnated with difference. Now, in the examination of intentional hybridity, we see that there is no such thing as a pure heteroglossia either; centrifugal texts or discourses are inescapably 'impregnated with monoglossia', contaminated by the inevitability of representation and all the subjugation of difference to a grammar of sameness it involves. For this reason we should avoid speaking of intentional hybridity, or hybridity as a radical 'language of critique', in oppositional terms that endlessly evoke the dichotomies of hybridity versus purity, heteroglossia versus monoglossia, Difference versus Sameness, becoming versus being. In our engagement with intentional hybridity, we must direct our attention to the ubiquitous commotion of centripetal forces of sameness and centrifugal forces of difference

and the complex asymmetry of these forces causing different speeds of becoming. Once again, it is a matter of disrupting the singular grammar of frequently used terms like hybridity, heterogeneity, homogeneity, heteroglossia and monoglossia. It is a matter of shifting our analytical gaze from a questioning of whether a discourse is heterogeneous or not to a questioning of the heterogenis*ing* and homogenis*ing* forces at work in the discourse, or, to look at the ways in which the discourse speeds up and slows down the forces of difference.

At one point Bakhtin makes this analytical shift himself. Rather than speaking of heteroglossia and monoglossia, with all the implications of self-sufficient states and conditions, he starts speaking of centripetal and centrifugal *dynamics* in heteroglossia and monoglossia:

> the *centripetal forces* of the life of language, embodied in a 'unitary language,' operate in the midst of heteroglossia ... [and] [a]longside the centripetal forces, the *centrifugal forces* of language carry on their uninterrupted work. (Bakhtin, 1935, 271–2, emphases added)

Hence:

> Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. The processes of centralization and decentralization, of unification and disunification, intersect in the utterance ... Every utterance participates in the 'unitary language' (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces). (Bakhtin, 1935, 272)

Within the perspective of centripetal and centrifugal forces, as well as the bifurcation of the rhizome and the becoming-major in the minor, it is after all not a simple question of whether literature or discourses are either 'a way of conforming to a code of dominant utterances' or pure becoming, as Deleuze stated in the quote above. Rather, 'deterritorializations remain relative, compensated for by the most abject reterritorialization' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 285).

Ultimately, intentional hybridity may still be different from, but is no longer radically different from, organic hybridity. Together they make up a continuum of modes of hybridity. Both are shot through with centripetal and centrifugal forces of sameness and difference, triggering different speeds of becoming in their capacity to alter the collective recognition of reality. Hence, any explicit hybridity discourse is always already

permeated by so many muted and opaque layers of non-subjective, *organ*ising processes below the surface of its immediate intention. In addition, any intentional assertion of one kind of difference at the surface may be outshined by other forces of difference resurfacing from the *organ*icised depths and substructures of the language in the work.

Intentional hybridity in the novel as a semiosphere

What emerges in the more complex, less dualistic sides to Bakhtin's and Deleuze's poetics is an image of the novel as a semiosphere in constant becoming but at different speeds at different levels, and depending on different contexts and perspectives. The novel as a semiosphere is a heteroglot field, but with shifting peripheral and central discursive formations. It is criss-crossed by a multitude of heterogenising and homogenising forces, by currents of difference and sameness at various strengths and intensities, by so many concomitant forces of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. Within this idea of the novel, any intentionally heterogenising or hybridising voice *can* work on the surface as a voice of difference, a centrifugal force animated by a principal drive of heterogenisation. It *can* dissolve authoritarian uses of language or partisan intentions that have colonised a word with fixed sociocultural power relations. However, intentional hybridity forms but one of the multiple currents and speeds within the novel as a semiotic sphere. It is immersed in a semiotic space of language that is already hybrid and heterogeneous and shot through with *organ*ising processes. It blends with an endless number of conscious, semiconscious, subconscious and, indeed, non-subjective activities of appropriation and resistance to appropriation, which may all accelerate or decelerate the speed of difference and becoming in the work. Incidentally, Booth sums up the novel this way, arguing that the novel is 'a "centrifugal" force dispersing us outward into an ever greater variety of "voices," outward into a seeming chaos' and 'various "centripetal" forces preserving us from overwhelming fluidity and variety', a 'drive to … some kind of coherence' (Booth, 1984, xxi–xxii).

In cases when the intentionally hybridising voice easily turns into a centripetal force of sameness itself, when intentional hybridity sits itself too heavily on the novel as a centralised *representing* voice, appropriating other voices in the semiosphere to its norms and rhetorical ends and depriving represented languages of speaking their difference, the novel will still be shot through with heterogenising forces. In line with Bakhtin's ideas of the primordial heteroglossia or dialogisation of

all languages and discourses and the preconditionedness of all words, any discursive intention will never entitrely conquer the represented language. A '[d]iversity of voices and heteroglossia enter the novel and organize themselves within it' says Bakhtin and adds that it is as if 'they put themselves in quotation marks against the will of the speaker' (Bakhtin, 1935, 300, 293–4).

However, if a heteroglossia of voices enter the novel and 'put themselves in quotation marks against the will of the speaker', heteroglossia in the novel is no longer necessarily the product of a particular language of representation or the (migrant) author's conscious creation. In fact, heterogenising forces may be said to be at work very much in spite of any centralised language of representation or authorial intentionality – the way difference endures in organic hybridity. Thus it is not to the author's credit, or even to the novel's credit, that words may always retain a degree of resistance despite their appropriation. It owes instead to an inherently heteroglot quality of language itself. If this is the case, it seems in fact that true heteroglossia is not brought forth in writing so much as it is in *readings*, when the text meets interlocutors who understand the meaning of words in endlessly different ways and from uncountably different perspectives than the intended. Bakhtin suggests a methodology of reading that may, in this respect, lead us in the direction of reading intentional hybridity as but one among other centrifugal or centripetal currents running within the novel as a semiosphere:

> the real task of stylistic analysis consists in uncovering all the available orchestrating languages in the composition of the novel, grasping the precise degree of distancing that separates each language from its most immediate semantic instantiation in the work as whole, and the varying angles of refraction of intentions within it, understanding their dialogic interrelationships and – finally – if there *is* direct authorial discourse, determining the heteroglot background outside the work that dialogizes it. (Bakhtin, 1935, 416)

In this regard, if the represented or imitated language is to retain a higher degree of non-appropriated independence, a higher degree of difference and resistance to sameness, the crucial thing that needs to happen may lie less in the search of a representing language that manages purer and more direct ways of presenting other voices, the author performing all sorts of acrobatics to avoid subjugating other voices to his or her own discourse. Rather, it may lie primarily in readings of the representing language itself as a representing or 'orchestrating' language. In short,

what is at stake here is a reading practice that turns the representing language, such as intentional hybridity, into an *image of language*.

This actually seems to be a crucial condition for the real release of difference in Bakhtin's idea of how a representing language may avoid domesticating the languages it represents:

> where hybridization occurs, the language being used to illuminate another language ... is reified to the point where it itself becomes an *image of a language*. The more broadly and deeply the device of hybridization is employed in a novel – since it occurs not with one but with several languages – the more reified becomes the representing and illuminating language itself, until it finally is transformed into one more of the *images of languages* the novel contains. (Bakhtin, 1935, 361, emphases added)

Hence, the representing language of hybridity itself must up and onto the stage, rather than hide in the wings under the pretence of being a transparent and unquestionable vehicle of difference and heteroglossia. In that event the function of *representation* in the novel is disrupted to a certain extent, in accord with Deleuze's prescription. The representing language is itself exhibited as a limitation, or even as an 'order-word', which encourages or activates the reader's imagination to see the *represented* languages differently from the way they are represented.

The idea of turning the representing language into an image of language seems to be a crucial point in Bakhtin that is often skipped over in the celebration of hybridity as a radical 'language of critique', precisely because the migrant author's voice, or the migrant narrator's voice, is usually perceived as a language of representation, an 'orchestrating' or 'illuminating' language, that has managed the feat of representing the world heteroglotically all by itself. However, by turning the discourse of intentional hybridity into an image of language, we can activate a reading practice that is concerned with the simultaneous forces of centripetality and centrifugality within and around the discourse. In that way we may be able to appreciate more sides to migration novels, to read them in terms of a greater discursive complexity than is often the case now. A critical reading of hybridity discourses, or languages of representation that are intentionally hybrid and heterogeneous, highlights all the unintended implications of power and asymmetry that are inevitably at work as well as how other discursive currents in the novel may re-heterogenise the work despite the centripetal forces of its centralised language of representation.

The role of reading

So far I have not really touched on the role of the reader in Bakhtin's and Deleuze's poetics, but it may be argued that it is implied by both that the way the work works, as heteroglossia or as rhizome, ultimately depends on how the reader reads. On the whole it takes a reader, for instance, to reduce any centralised representing language to a represented language. When Bakhtin speaks of the intentions of others in all words, it often takes a reader to activate those other intentions; just as it may take a reader to take off with a line of flight in order to subvert or escape an order-word. After all, what is Deleuze but a reader who looks for lines of flight and rhizomatic networks in a work, regardless of whether these were intended by the author or not. And what else is Bakhtin but a reader who looks for dialogic voices and heteroglossia, regardless of whether these were consciously planned by the author or not. As Michael Holquist says, 'in order for ... two-sidedness [in novelistic discourse] to be perceived, a third observer is required' (Holquist, 2001, 55). In a way the usual Deleuzian or Bakhtinian reading in the field of migration literature may in this way be said to be a 'migrant reading practice' that co-writes the novel, as it were, in ways that bear out the intentions of migrant authors. However, at times Bakhtin seems to stress a *sceptical* reading as a crucial factor in the realisation of heteroglossia in the novel, the reader assuming a stance that is independent from that of the author, rather than blindly following any authorial intentions; and so, it seems, does Deleuze.

Bakhtin mostly speaks of the reader in connection with his idea of the novel as a speech act, where the reader features indirectly in the author's discourse – like an implied reader in narratological terms (see Bakhtin, 1926, 488 and 1952, 94; 1935, 280–1). Yet in a few places he speaks of the reader in more direct terms as having an 'autonomous role' which keeps the reader from ending as 'a simple reduction of the author's position' (Bakhtin, 1926, 484, 481). In receiving an author's selection of words, readers engage in a 'co-selection', and as much as an author creates the text, readers recreate and renew it – the reader becomes 'a participant' in the production of its meaning (Bakhtin, 1926, 484; 1937–8, 253; 1929, 18). At one point, Bakhtin circuitously suggests that the independence of represented voices in the work hinges almost entirely on the autonomy of its readers, on their capacity to escape the author's interpellation, so to speak. He recounts how our everyday communication is in fact mostly about what *other people* have said and, because of that, the listener's prime role is to stay alert to any distortion of the

words of the represented party – or any silencing of another party. The listener needs to stay alert to the question of '*who* precisely is speaking', *how* and *when* and 'under *what* concrete circumstances' (Bakhtin, 1935, 340–1). Consequently, as much as readers, or 'migrant readers' of migration literature, may appreciate any achievement of heteroglossia and hybridity in a transcultural novel's representing language, it is the task of reading also to turn this representing language into an image of language in order to elucidate its inevitable contamination by centripetal forces of monoglossia. Here the inherent heteroglossia of all language also comes to the sceptical readers' assistance. Readers may re-activate the independence of the represented language by increasing the play of meaning, or voicing all the 'other intentions' in language that may convey different experiences of the represented party.

Notwithstanding the occasions on which Deleuze comes close to suggesting a certain kind of minor writer as the prime facilitator of lines of flight and the minor novel as a pure rhizome, it is the reader who gives writing a becoming in Deleuze's poetics. Without readers, writing would not exist, he says. Without readers, writing would be 'pure redundancy in the service of the powers that be' – the encounter of works and readers deterritorialises both (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 44). Yet, as much as the work depends on readers, its becoming also depends on *how* readers read. Deleuze cares less for the meaning of the work and more for its function. To Deleuze the work has no object, only 'machinic states' and the way we read its signs determines how the machine works (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 71). In this regard, readers may cause the work to function in territorialising ways as much as we may cause the work to function in deterritorialising ways. The best way to read is to see the work as a sign machine that 'never stops developing assemblages' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 39). Readers must not be concerned with deciphering or decoding *what* the text tries to signify, which would reduce the text's sign production to a single and definite meaning. Readers must only be concerned with *describing* all the different ways in which the literary sign machine creates connections and lines of communication in an endless production of signification (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 37, 38, 82). Hence reading should not be an act of *interpretation*, uncovering the deep hidden meaning of a sign – 'interpretosis', says Deleuze, is the tedious task of wanting something to remind us of something else, proposing a finality of the work, a 'sanitized scientific observation' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 46, 49, 53). Rather, readings should be *experimentations*, concerned with the unfolding of signs, registering all their possible and constantly shifting significations. Deleuze also refers to

this as a reading strategy of 'sympathy'. 'There is no judgement in sympathy', he says, 'but agreements of convenience between bodies of all kinds'. Accordingly, in a sympathetic reading the reader will 'speak with' or 'write with' the work (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 52). In the present case, this amounts to a matter of speaking with, writing with, *following* the nomadic science of intentional hybridity. As noted, we could speak of a migrant reading 'in sympathy' of migrant writing. Like the intentions of the migrant writer, such migrant readings set the work in motion as delirium rather than an organised order, as a rhizome rather than arborescence, as a becoming rather than a being (see Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 48).

When Deleuze speaks directly of the reading of rhizomatic literature, he often appears preoccupied with how we must sympathetically go along with all the deterritorialising functions of the rhizomatic text without considering how there may also be a point in observing the ways in which the work works in territorialising or reterritorialising ways – any sceptical readings seem relevant to Deleuze only as far as his categories of root-books and fascicular root-books are concerned. Yet, if we are to follow through Deleuze's contention that the rhizomatic text also bifurcates, this ought to be reflected in our readings of rhizomatic literature too. To look for the bifurcations of rhizomatic literature is an acknowledgment that representational acts are also part of how the rhizome *functions* and what it *does* and what it *effects*. Rhizomatic literature is not only 'disturbing the reality, morality and economy of the world' as Deleuze has it; it also plays a role in the creation of all of those (Deleuze, 1969, 71).

What I miss in Deleuze's suggestions for a practice of reading is therefore a tracing of sameness in literature that adds to our tracing of difference. Or, rather, a reading that traces the *dialectics* between forces of sameness and forces of difference; a science of the dialectics of sameness and difference which we could plug into the sign machine of migration literature. Yet, it may after all not be impossible to discern such a dialectic reading practice in Deleuze. At the end of the day, the preconditions of a dialectics are always there in Deleuze – as we have seen he does operate with dual spheres like the virtual and the actual, the nomadic and the static. On the face of it, this may seem like a preposterous idea as Deleuze is known to be a great critic of dialecticism. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy* he writes:

> The speculative motor of the dialectic is contradiction and its resolution. But its practical motor is alienation and the suppression of

> alienation, alienation and reappropriation. Here the dialectic reveals its true nature; an art of quibbling beyond all others, an art of disrupting properties and changing proprietors, an art of *ressentiment*. (Deleuze, 1962, 151)

At times Deleuze also resolutely denies the possibility of a dialectics between sameness and difference: 'What is real is the becoming itself' and '[b]ecoming produces nothing other than itself [that is, more becoming]' – '[b]ecoming is certainly not imitating, or identifying with something' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 238, 239; see also 1968, 277, 295, 336). The radical becoming within Deleuze's space in-between is not compromised by other forces. There are no gravitational grounding principles as in Platonic dialectics, no subordination of difference to identity, there is nothing of the amalgamation or third level synthesis 'dear to Hegelians' (or 'Fichteans' to be precise[1]). Becoming means that nothing is ever 'in equilibrium' (Deleuze, 1962, 154–5; 1968, 76, 334–5; Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 305).

Yet the kind of dialectics that may after all be discerned in Deleuze's philosophy and transported into a reading of literature crucially differs from Fichtean dialectics insofar as Deleuze's philosophy, like Bakhtin's, never aspires to any form of 'resolution'.[2] In Deleuze we will never find any sense of overcoming oppositions through mediation and their reconciliation in some form of synthesis, or higher *identity*. To Deleuze, the idea of such reconciliation comprises the subjugation of difference by similarity, the illusion of an achieved sameness and unity, of a reached level of calm, ultimately pacifying difference and providing a supposed elevated position from which the world is alleged to be more completely represented.

In this regard, I share Deleuze's objections against 'Hegelians', but there is plenty of opportunity to read Hegel in a different way which I think actually explains the kind of dialectics at work in Deleuze. We may read Hegel, for instance, as seeing contradiction not as something that comes from the outside of a unity, but as a negation inherent in a thing itself, whereby identities and categories, for example, come to be seen as ridden by contrary forces from within. Says Hegel: [o]nly ... reflection in otherness within itself – not an *original* or *immediate* unity as such – is the True' and 'disparity ... is itself still directly present in the True as such' (Hegel, 1807, 10, 23). In view of that, Hegel's dialectics is not a matter of dis/solving opposites in a third synthesised identity, but a matter of immanent relations of

sameness and difference, and any individual identity is the result of asymmetric relations:

> The single individual is incomplete Spirit, a concrete shape in whose existence *one* determination predominates, the others being present only in a blurred outline. (Hegel, 1807, 16)

In this light, dialectic thought is certainly not a 'quibbling art' of contradiction and resolution, of suppressing alienation for the sake of a new unified proprietary identity. On the contrary, dialectic thought is an acknowledgement of reality as conditioned, indeed produced by heterogeneity, asymmetry and constant transformation.

It is on the basis of such an understanding of dialectics that we may pave the way for a Deleuzian reading practice that registers an indefinite and irresolvable dialectics between difference and sameness in the work, or between centrifugal forces of difference and centripetal forces of sameness. Within a literary discourse, for example, no force, difference or sameness, will ever manage to triumph in a final conquest of the other. Instead these forces constantly interact with one another, and indeed *within* each other, in ceaselessly shifting internal and external relations.

Due to the widespread preoccupation with deterritorialisation, nomadism and lines of flight, there is a section in Deleuze and Guattari's writings on nomadology that is never mentioned in Deleuzian readings of migration literature. Throughout their writings, the two philosophers are engaged in showing how the nomadic mode of thinking (pure Difference) may be activated against the sedentary mode of thinking (Sameness, representation, binary logic and logocentrism). They envision how 'the striated space' of the State, the space of rigid and straight grids of regulation and codification, may be deterritorialised and returned to what they refer to as 'the smooth space' of the nomad, the borderless, unregulated space of limitless possibility, like the wide-open steppe, ocean or sky (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 18, 381, 371). However, towards the end of Deleuze and Guattari's 'Treatise on Nomadology', the two philosophers suddenly introduce the notion of a 'holey space'. The holey space is neither striated nor smooth but engages in communication with both – a dialectic communication, one might venture. The inhabitants of the holey space are the smiths or metallurgists who are ambulant or itinerant, and:

> [t]heir space is neither the striated space of the sedentary nor the smooth space of the nomad ... [They] are not nomadic among the

> nomads and sedentary among the sedentaries, nor half-nomadic among the nomads, half-sedentary among sedentaries... [They] are vague essence

and:

> it is by virtue of their itinerancy, by virtue of their inventing a holey space, that they necessarily communicate with the sedentaries *and* with the nomads. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 413–15)

Despite their obvious fascination with the smooth and the nomadic and how they are obviously bored by the striated and the sedentary, Deleuze and Guattari now claim that their real interest is actually rather in the combinations of the striated and the smooth and how spaces may change from one to the other (see also Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 500).

It is from neglected passages like this one that I propose we collect a vocabulary for dialectic readings of migration literature; not a migrant reading and not a reading in-between two State sciences or homogeneous cultures, but a reading between Sameness and Difference, Homogeneity and Heterogeneity, the Sedentary and the Nomadic, that registers the ongoing interaction of these forces without the possibility of one ever totally conquering the other. The holey space, by necessity, cannot entertain an equal dialectical balance between forces of sameness and difference; they will always be in an asymmetric relation, one force always relatively stronger than the other, engendering faster or slower speeds of becoming.

The intentions of my readings

By now, I have already anticipated most of the perspectives that will motivate my readings of the three novels in the following chapters of this book. Basic to my approach is a redirection from establishing the transcultural migration novel as heteroglot or rhizomatic to looking at the centrifugal and centripetal forces that are at work within it and, in particular, within its enunciation of intentional hybridity or propositions of a hybrid consciousness. In each of the three novels I am going to look at how the world is seen through the perspective of migrant narrators who define themselves as hybrids between several cultures and express a desire to hybridise the Western host cultures they arrive in. My central aim in this connection is, in short, to establish what kinds of

hybridity discourse we find in each work and what speeds of becoming these discourses activate as a consequence of asymmetrical dialectics between difference and sameness.

Above all, I will attempt in my readings of the three novels to turn the representing language of intentional hybridity into an image of language; to concentrate my reading on 'uncovering all the available orchestrating languages in the composition of the novel', as Bakhtin puts it in the quote above, and to understand 'their dialogic interrelationships' in terms other than those of a purely migrant reading and hybrid third-spaceness. In this way I am countering the assumption in theory and in celebratory readings of migration literature of the migrant author as having found a *representing* language – an intentionally hybrid discourse or 'language of critique' – which in and by itself can create all the wonders of releasing Difference as a pure heteroglossia or significatory groundlessness. My analyses will look at the extent to which the three migration novels can be said to invite readings that are sympathetic to these presumptions, ways in which they ask to be read in this particular way, *cater for* it, as well as the possible 'angles of refraction of [such] intentions', as Bakhtin puts it.

Having said so, I will not base my reading on the opposite assumptions either. That is, the assumption that the discourses in migration novels are simply *not* hybrid but binary, or simply *not* deterritorialising but territorialising. Rather I will seek to trace the various forces of discursive centrifugality and centripetality at work in the language of intentional hybridity in the novels. I will look at how intentional hybridity is resplendent with centrifugal forces of difference and heterogeneity that challenge the domesticating forces of representation, but also beset with centripetal forces of appropriation, sameness and homogeneity (for example, in its language use, its cultural grammar and in its representation of others). In brief, rather than reading the discourse of intentional hybridity in terms of a Bhabhian third space, I will read it in terms of asymmetric relations between forces of difference and sameness, heterogeneity and homogeneity, centrifugality and centripetality. A reading like this may cast light on different degrees of acceleration and deceleration of cultural becoming, all depending on the degree to which the forces of difference in the hybrid discourse are tamed or not.

These shifts of perspective on hybridity, I think, will also make it possible to analyse post-colonial hybridity within a space of hybridity and heterogeneity rather than pitting the discourse against a supposed space or discourse of purity. The concept of organic hybridity is a crucial

instrument in this regard. Insofar as my approach to hybridity seeks to redirect attention from a privileged hybrid space or condition *between* cultures, we will come to look at what goes on *within* it when it enters and blends with a complex cultural context, such as the semiosphere. For example, how it augments or resists forces of heterogeneity and homogeneity that are already at work in the cultural space it targets (intentionally or unintentionally). What emerges then is a picture of how intentional and organic hybridity are not two separate forms of hybridity. Intentional hybridity is at work within a site of organic hybridity where it may, in fact, be seen as constituting but a current instantiation of existing processes of *organ*ising difference, a cog in the wheel of organic hybridity, so to speak, inasmuch as intentional hybridity, too, is shot through with forces of sameness. Hence, we come to see how intentional hybridity has only relational value, not an absolute value. This means that in some contexts and perspectives the discourse of intentional hybridity will work in heterogenising ways, in others it will appear as a rather homogenising discourse; in some contexts and perspectives it will manage to release difference in ways that engender a high speed of becoming, in others, its release of difference will be considerably restrained as will the cultural becoming it may be said to produce.

In his suggestion for a reading practice, the last thing Bakhtin encourages the reader to do, 'if there *is* direct authorial discourse', is to determine 'the heteroglot background outside the work that dialogizes it'. As I understand it, this encourages us to look at what lies in the shadowed peripheries of any centralised discourse. As far as reading is concerned, it involves a 'co-selection' of languages in the novel, a strengthening of any languages in the text that may have been homogenised or fixed, their difference tamed by the representing language of the 'direct authorial discourse'. In many cases, as far as an 'authorial discourse' of intentional hybridity and a migrant epistemology is concerned, such a 'co-selection' of represented languages involves a sympathetic reading of languages that are not consciously hybrid or nomadic – languages, for example, of cultural rootedness, continuity and unity. Banerjee, among other critics, is right in suggesting that post-colonial literatures of a certain postmodern inclination often express a profound distrust of collectivities, over-emphasising how communal scripting threatens to dictate the identity of the independent, lonely, wandering outcast, 'at the expense of aspects to be gained from a stance less dismissive of collectivity' (Banerjee, 2002, 250).

In relation to the 'co-selection' of represented languages, Hegel speaks of the necessity of a deliberate act of revivifying the represented parts

within a whole, re-investing them with 'an existence of [their] own and a separate freedom', to aid these represented parts to become 'self-moving' and in 'tarrying with the negative' to convert it into being (Hegel, 1807, 18–19). My reading practice attempts in this respect to reinvigorate the represented, or othered parties in the discourse of intentional hybridity. Or at least, as J. N. Findlay puts it in his introduction to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 'to endow the non-independent with a certain *quasi*-independence' – bearing in mind that no represented language will ever achieve an unmediated presence as 'incomplete Spirit', which goes for the novel's representation of these languages as well as for my *re*-presentation of them (Findlay, 1977, x, emphasis added). For all its shortcomings and idiosyncratic pitfalls, this is a task I find particularly important in a situation in which the central authorial intention of the work, whether implied or stated directly, is celebrated as that of autonomously *orchestrating* a pure heteroglossia without depriving any voice of the independence to speak for itself.

The languages of homeness, rootedness, cultural and local unity have all had a revival in recent years as a reaction against the privileging in intellectual thought of heterogeneity, hybridity, nomadism, the global, the borderless, the marginal. The rethinking of nationality, ethnicity, or any forces of cultural continuity, cohesion and homogeneity, may in this respect constitute 'the heteroglot background outside the work' that does not refute but dialogises the mandate of intentional hybridity. My attempt to re-invigorate such discourses will draw especially on Edward Casey's idea of place which is, in fact, inspired by Heidegger's idea of sameness. Place to Casey combines time and space. It engages in a dialectics, so to speak, of the sedentary and the nomadic, of Chronos and Aeon, resulting in a spatialisation of time as well as a temporalisation of space, a becoming-sameness in difference and a becoming-different in sameness.

I believe that the 'co-selection' of the represented languages in much transcultural migration literature may cause signification in the individual work to keep reverberating, insofar as it uncovers the differences of languages that have paradoxically been tamed by the representing language of intentional hybridity. Deleuze speaks of blocks that interrupt the continuous flight of meaning in minor literature and how we must search for backdoors in such blocks (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 72–3). Whenever the discourses of migratory nomadism and intentional hybridity turn into a block of unified, authorial discourse in a migration novel, the co-selection of the represented languages of, for example, homeness and national rootedness may be one way of looking

for backdoors and escape routes in the text. A central question that will crop up in my analyses in this regard is the question of whether the works themselves, in their discourse or in their formal construction, aid the reader to escape from the language of intentional hybridity through such backdoors.

So far, and along with other critics, I have generally assumed intentional hybridity to be revolving around assertions of difference against sameness. A final question for me, however, is whether we can speak of other kinds of intentional hybridity, once we abandon the hybridity versus purity approach. Can there, for instance, be forms of hybridity discourse that deliberately position themselves as currents within a semiosphere *without* any intention of releasing Difference? The attempts to rethink the languages of homeness, rootedness, cultural unity has enticed me, in this regard, to search for languages of intentional hybridity that actively evade the idea of hybridity as an excess of belonging or a state of radically deterritorialised inbetweenness. These may be discourses of hybridity that come close to resembling the dynamics at work in organic hybridity in the sense that they involve a deliberate *slowing down* of difference and the speed of becoming. What is intentional in intentional hybridity is to forefront hybridity as the language through which we choose to uproot our identities through difference, but are there any examples of hybridity discourses in transcultural migration literature that intentionally celebrate the homogenising processes and dynamics of *organic hybridity*, contesting the *consciously* and *conspicuously* hybrid as an ideal? Readers of Naipaul may already have begun to sense that this is a question that will be raised in my analysis of *The Enigma of Arrival*.

Whereas Deleuze and Guattari delineate the *sciences* of States and nomads, they never suggest that there can be a 'science of the holey space'. In consideration of the overall motivations of my proposed readings, it might be that I am actually developing Deleuze and Guattari's sparse words about the holey space into a *science of the holey space*, or offering a 'holey space reading practice' as an alternative to a 'migrant reading' of the migration novel. I will be looking for ways in which sameness and difference, the sedentary and the nomadic are intertwined within the migration novel – without ever assuming any equilibrious dialectical dialogue, of course. In this regard Judith Halberstam proposes an argument in queer studies that is similar to what I have in mind with this study. There is a tendency in current academic discussions of globalisation, she says, to celebrate the global as an open space of movement, travel and migration while the local (or the national or

ethnic) is debased as closed, narrow and hard (see Halberstam, 2005, 5). Halberstam proceeds to quote Steve Pile who says that in such an academic climate 'the subjects of resistance are neither fixed nor fluid, but both and more. And this "more" invokes a sense that resistance is resistance to both fixity and to fluidity' (Halberstam, 2005, 21). It is this 'more' that I want to pursue, the view of resistance, in contemporary ideas of identity, as 'resistance to both fixity and fluidity' or resistance to Sameness as well as to Difference, to still being as well as to delirious becoming, to the nomadic as well as to the sedentary. I will address the need to resist, and sometimes embrace, both forces of fixity and forces of fluidity, which in my case, as in Halberstam's, involves the search for 'a developed understanding of the local, the nonmetropolitan, and the situated' (Halberstam, 2005, 12). This, I hope, may lead towards Lukács' Hegelian call in *The Theory of the Novel* for an 'intellectual comprehension *of permanence within change* and of *inner change within the enduring validity of the essence*' (Lukács, 1916, 16, italics added).

Part II

The Speeds of the Migrant Hero and Hybridity Discourses in Bharati Mukherjee's *Jasmine*, Jamal Mahjoub's *The Carrier* and V. S. Naipaul's *The Enigma of Arrival*

4

The Migrant Hero's Incredible Speed in Bharati Mukherjee's *Jasmine*

Bharati Mukherjee's novel *Jasmine* opens with an epigraph by James Gleick which sets the tone of the novel's general theme and projection of the world:

> The new geometry mirrors a universe that is rough, not rounded, scabrous, not smooth. It is a geometry of the pitted, pocked, and broken up, the twisted, tangled, and intertwined. (*Jasmine,* 1)

This is the geometry of our contemporary migratory world in which 'nothing [is] rooted anymore. Everything [is] in motion', as Jasmine, the narrator and main character, expresses it (*Jasmine*, 152). And it is the philosophical underpinning of Mukherjee's novel, which appears to be very much in tune with Deleuze's nomadology. The novel evokes international immigration as a nomadic war machine against the rigid, hierarchised, classificatory organisation of space and movement in State science which has overcoded the entire surface of the Earth with 'a whole counterhydraulic of channels and conduits' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 387). However, through their massive movements immigrants deterritorialise the grid-squared space of the Static, returning the surface of the globe to the turbulent diversity, multiplicity and metamorphosing irregularity of a nomadic space. National identity is 'out of season', says Jasmine, 'shredded' and replaced by 'the wilted plumage of international vagabondage' (*Jasmine*, 101–2). On the whole, Mukherjee's novel seems to diagnose the ills of civilisation as those of sameness, conformism, rootedness and proceeds to prescribe a substantial dose of Deleuzian Difference and nomadism: hidden in her purse

Jasmine keeps a 'sandalwood Ganpati', 'a god with an elephant trunk to *uproot anything in* [*her*] *path*' (*Jasmine*, 101–2, emphasis added).

Symptomatically, the mood of contemporary mass migration and disjunction, as captured throughout the novel and in the introductory quote has already imprinted itself on Jasmine's body at the beginning of the novel. Only seven years old, she is 'fast and venturesome' and 'scabrous-armed' in contrast to her soft-skinned sisters (*Jasmine*, 3, 4). We first meet Jasmine as she is given the forecast of her future by an uncanny village astrologer who destines her to a life of widowhood and exile. From this point Jasmine's life becomes one of continual movement and transmutation. At the age of fourteen, she elopes with a free-thinking young man, Prakash, a 'city man', who plans to make a career in electric engineering in America (*Jasmine,* 76). With Prakash Jasmine escapes the confines of tradition and gender roles in her native village, Hasnapur. Prakash changes Jasmine's original name Jyoti to Jasmine, they move to the city of Jullundhar where they marry. But the forces of intolerance and traditionalism soon catch up with them, this time in the form of Sikh nationalists who terrorise people with their visions of cultural and religious purity. Before Jasmine and Prakash manage to emigrate to America, Prakash is killed by the Sikhs. Subsequently, Jasmine decides to make the journey on her own to perform the ritual of *sati* (the Indian widow's self-immolation) at their planned destination.

She is smuggled into America onboard a trawler. The captain of the trawler, Half-Face, exploits her exposed position and rapes her in a motel. Desperate about her situation, Jasmine metamorphoses into Kali, the black Hindu goddess of destruction, stabs Half-Face to death and starts roaming around the American countryside until she is found by Lillian, a charitable woman who teaches Jasmine how to blend in in America and renames her Jazzy.

Jasmine makes her way to New York where she abandons the idea of self-sacrifice and decides instead to kill her old self by shedding what she has now discovered to be the self-effacing codes of her Indian background. She seeks out the professor who was meant to help her late husband getting started on his American career, but the Professorji has created a copy of home within a small Indian community in Flushing, an 'artificially maintained Indianness', as Jasmine puts it, which jeopardises her ambition to escape 'everything Indian, everything Jyoti-like' (*Jasmine,* 145).

After half a year in Flushing, she manages to get out, finds a job as the nanny of the adopted child of a successful academic couple at Columbia University, Taylor and Wylie Hayes. She falls in love with Taylor and

when the Hayes' marriage breaks up, they develop a relationship. Jasmine changes again, 'from a diffident alien with forged documents into adventurous Jase' (*Jasmine,* 186). However, a new feeling of finally getting rooted is abruptly interrupted when she is recognised in a park by one of Prakash' killers. She flees to Iowa and ends up in the small farming community of Baden where she marries an agricultural banker, Bud Ripplemeyer, who renames her Jane. Jasmine tries to integrate into the conservative white community in Baden. She and Bud adopt Du, a fourteen-year-old Vietnamese refugee and later Jasmine gets pregnant with Bud's child.

After some time, Jasmine feels increasingly trapped by the conformity and immobility of the local community, especially after Bud is shot by a disillusioned client and confined to a wheelchair. Du, who never puts down roots in the small town, leaves for Los Angeles and, shortly after, Taylor turns up again, offering Jasmine a way out of Bud's life and Baden. They head off together, further into the west of America.

Like this Jasmine projects an entire line of flight across the novel, from one end of the book to the other, uprooting herself whenever things begin to build up to a territorialisation of her identity and threaten her continued becoming.

The following analysis will start out with a reading that loyally trails the celebration of the hybrid migrant and the centrifugality of Difference, as already sketched in the above. However, about halfway through the analysis, I will start questioning this celebratory track noting more and more centripetal forces at work in the novel's discursive economy that slow down its speed of difference. My analysis ends up suggesting that Mukherjee's novel is in fact part of the processes of organic hybridity, incorporating difference into a major sameness rather than managing the radical release of Difference that is envisioned in the novel's voice of intentional hybridity.

The taming of Difference in the overcoded society

Baden, Jasmine's home in Iowa, corresponds to Deleuze and Guattari's ideas of the overcoded society. Life in this farming town is carefully ordered, structured by habits and ritual practices which clearly serve to confirm the unity of the family and the community. Fixed codes of race, family and gender roles form lines of stratification and coordinates that assign individuals with a specific place and function and draw the outer boundary line of the community's logic of inclusion and exclusion. Thus the Baden community is sceptical of anything foreign.

It is a 'basic German community', Jasmine observes, where even Danes, Swedes and the Dutch can be thought of as 'genetically unpredictable', 'inscrutable' or 'sneaky' (*Jasmine,* 11).

The Badeners define their identities in codes of rootedness, lineage and origin that rigorously restrict individual development and cultural change. Individual belonging appears to depend on a willingness to submit to the pressure of social and cultural conformity. The individual is pre-programmed with the principles of duty and guilt that are passed down through family and religion. Karin, Bud's former wife puts it like this: ' "Farm boys grow up guilty if they desert the family ground ... It's that simple." This is puritan country; we're born with guilt or quickly learn it' (*Jasmine,* 228). So, in marked contrast to the great upheavals of the world around them and in marked contrast to Jasmine's story, the people of Baden *do not move*. The small community and its inhabitants are sedentary, solidly resting in one place, tied down by forces of gravity – to use to a common metaphor in migration literature. They stay in the place they grew up in and confirm their rootedness through daily habits and ritual practices.

As Baden is a community whose coherence rests on homogenous self-reflectivity and the endless repetition of the same, instances of difference constitute a continual threat to its self-image and the existing order of things. Any sign of difference, whenever it shows on the horizon, will have to be subordinated to a logic of identity. When Jasmine turns up, she personifies exactly such difference. Yet the Baden community does not *exclude* Jasmine. In fact her difference is a mark of attraction. 'Bud courts me because I am alien', says Jasmine,

> I am darkness, mystery, inscrutability. The East plugs me into instant vitality and wisdom. I rejuvenate him simply by being who I am. (*Jasmine,* 200)

But right from her point of entry into the Baden community, an entire machinery of sameness has been set in motion to domesticate and control the difference and flux that Jasmine portends. Bud is attracted to Jasmine for her difference, but at the same time, in typical orientalist fashion, her difference is entirely defined by him along the lines of a homely, pre-established notion of what her foreignness is. From the Western culture he was born into, Bud has already inherited an entire archive of knowledge of the East which reduces the intensity of her difference to a manageable state where he can label it and, ultimately, make it serve his own interests. In the bedroom Bud asks Jasmine to

change roles for him 'from caregiver to temptress', thus doubly imposing the stereotypes of a common male fantasy on Jasmine as a woman and an oriental (*Jasmine,* 36).

Such domestications of Jasmine's difference is repeated in the public sphere. People see her cooking as an exotic experience without taking any particular interest apart from the immediate entertainment of its strangeness (see *Jasmine,* 9). In this way they fix her as a strange element within their circles of routine, but it is still an entirely known – an entirely stereotyped – strangeness, or difference, serving to contain her power to actually influence and change their ways of viewing things and doing things. In fact a contained difference like this can only confirm the idea of their own sameness. As Iain Chambers puts it, we are usually only willing to recognise differences so long as they remain within the domain of our language, our knowledge, our control (Chambers, 1994, 30).

Jasmine's identity is domesticated from the opposite angle as well. In contradistinction to the attempts of mapping her difference, the people in Baden simultaneously aim to *tone down* her difference. Jasmine is aware that the farmers in Baden are afraid of facing her 'genuine difference': '[t]o them, alien knowledge means intelligence. They want to make me familiar' (*Jasmine,* 33). Accordingly, to stay in control, they continually modify her obvious signs of difference. They change her name from Jyoti to Jane and in order to smooth out the obvious breach of their codes of racial homogeny, they continually stress the light colour of her skin; she is not black, she has 'a darkish complexion' (*Jasmine,* 33). Often the danger of truly facing Jasmine's otherness is evaded by resorting to a form of complacent indifference. Unlike Taylor, who never wanted 'to scour and sanitize [her] foreignness', Bud never asks Jasmine about her Indian past, he 'wouldn't be interested in the forecast of an old fakir under a banyan tree' (*Jasmine,* 105, 12). Bud is 'always uneasy with tales of Hasnapur ... as though Hasnapur is an old husband or lover. Even memories are a sign of disloyalty' (*Jasmine,* 231). To consider her alienness at any deeper level than he does would be to take a deep look into something that might profoundly disturb the safety of his habitualised way of seeing things, the truth of her foreignness threatens the entire foundation of his existence, which is why its mediation and subjugation is imperative.

Speeds of becoming in Baden

However, in spite of the heavy machinery of sameness that is constantly at work in the Baden community, domesticating Jasmine, taming her difference, the homogeneity of the local culture is not unaffected.

Difference still appears to make its entry into the cultural organism of the village, changing its apparent oneness. In spite of Bud's resistance to truly take in her difference, Jasmine suggests that he has nevertheless been transformed by India too. Before he met Jasmine, Asia would be classified as 'a soy-bean market', a possible tourist destination and a war zone that deprived him of his brother, who died in Korea (*Jasmine,* 17). With Jasmine, however, 'Asia had transformed him, made him reckless and emotional', he has become '[t]he banker who steps out of marriage to live with an Indian' (*Jasmine,* 14, 229). 'There are different mysteries at work', as Jasmine puts it, performing their subtle sorcery on the Baden community (*Jasmine,* 229).

Within the wider community of Baden, it starts with the food. Jasmine introduces the Indian cuisine into Baden. She serves spicy Indian food in the Lutheran Relief Fund, mixes *alu gobi* with pork, and in that way makes herself guilty of 'subverting the taste buds of Elsa County' (*Jasmine,* 19). In response to this, Banerjee argues that Jasmine's claim to cultural subversion are highly questionable, considering how translation in Baden is 'a oneway process' (Banerjee, 2002, 238). However, what Banerjee may read as a failure of intentional hybridity may still be read in terms of the processes of organic hybridity. The 'oneway process' is not a solid closure of Sameness and does not preclude hybridity. Difference is translated by the dominant culture, appropriated, tamed and consumed whereby change is not eradicated but slowed down. A degree of difference endures, like a 'magic snake' that 'will penetrate solid walls when necessary', as the seer prophesises at the beginning of the novel, causing a degree of change within the same (*Jasmine,* 4). Allegorically, Jasmine helps Darrel Lutz, a solitary, slow-witted young man running a family farm against his will, in growing a small oriental garden on his land whereby a miniscule patch of difference emerges in the vast, prototypical mid-western American landscape.

In fact there are different speeds of becoming in Baden. Bud's transformation is kept at a relatively slow pace by his grids and codes of translation. In comparison, Darrel, who has been 'touched by the same virus' as Bud (*Jasmine,* 229), charts a becoming of a far greater speed. Darrel does not fear and compromise Jasmine's 'genuine foreignness' the way Bud does. The fact that Darrel is himself an inferior in the local social relations and does not master its codes causes him to let in Jasmine's difference without any attempt to channel or stem it. To Darrel, Jasmine's difference is not so much a threat against the same as a possible way out of it. Inspired by Jasmine's escape from her Indian village, Darrel has come to realise that there is no destiny or natural law that ties him to

the family farm. He can uproot himself and follow his desire of moving to New Mexico as he pleases. Whereas Bud is obviously capable of containing his new 'restlessness' within the established frames of the Baden community, Darrel's restlessness is far more intense. It is a matter of leaving the community to allow a complete deterritorialisation of the codes and obligations that restrain his present self, 'he wants to fly away to Tahiti, to Mars, to the moon' (*Jasmine,* 217). In this way Darrel makes up a local high speed parallel to Jasmine – emblematically, Darrel's German family name 'Lutz' means light like the Hindi 'Jyoti'.

Darrel's story ends tragically, though. Bud, who has the power to let him go, as his creditor and self-appointed guardian, will not 'release Darrel from the land', as Jasmine puts it (*Jasmine,* 229). Whereas Bud's loyalty to the land, family and tradition preserves him, Darrel's inability to escape causes his already frail constitution to deterioriate to desperation and madness. After a last unsuccesful attempt to escape Baden and the farm, proposing that he and Jasmine elope together, Darrel hangs himself.

Intentional hybridity and Jasmine's nomad speed of becoming

Jasmine is of an altogether different speed of becoming than Bud and the community in Baden, and unlike Darrel she is not a potential but a realised nomad. As a typical migrant protagonist, Jasmine is caught in-between the State science of traditional American culture, Baden as the 'heartland' of America (*Jasmine,* 155, 224), and the State science of traditional Indian culture, the latter catching up with her again in America in the form of the overcoded society of little India in Flushing. The Indians in Flushing exemplify the nostalgic-patriotic-homesick immigrant community, their neighbourhood having been transformed into an almost perfect image of India, complete with social and cultural customs, codes, roles, habits and rituals, which all threaten to reterritorialise Jasmine, returning her to the restricting sameness she left when escaping to America in the first place (see *Jasmine,* 146–7).

Significantly, Jasmine differs from other kinds of migrants in this respect. The problem with the immigrants in the Indian ghetto, in a Deleuzian perspective, is that the deterritorialisation that occurred when leaving their customary lives in India is disallowed the continued metamorphosis of further blending with the culture in the new context. Rather, their construction of a copy of home, their strong imaginary attachment to home once again solidifies their identities, reducing

the transformative energy of migratory *becoming* to the rigid state of constantly reaffirming a ghettoised identity. To Deleuze and Guattari '[t]he nomad is not at all the same as the migrant' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 380):

> If the nomad can be called the Deterritorialized par excellence, it is precisely because there is no reterritorialization *afterward* as with the migrant ... With the nomad ... it is deterritorialization that constitutes the relation to the earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself ... The land ceases to be land, tending to become simply ground (*sol*) or support. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 381)

Although Jasmine is 'always pinned against the wall of dominant significations', her migration is one of successfully escaping the striation of oppressive discourses, or the 'objective determinations' that keep closing in on her (see Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 45). And because she always manages to escape, always manages to make 'a clean break', in Deleuze's terminology, 'makes the past cease to exist', she can be called 'Deterritorialized par excellence' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 38, Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 381). As a true nomadic character, she refuses 'to bunker [herself] inside nostalgia', choosing instead a condition of 'travelling light' (she has long since left behind her suitcase and the weight of the attachments to her former self – her sari, a photo of Prakash, all the memoralia of her Indian past and identity) (*Jasmine,* 185, 121). In Jasmine's case, there is no 'reterritorialisation afterward', no yearning for 'Paradise, Home, Mother at the other end of the voyage' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 38), or, as Roger Bromley puts it in his reading of the novel,

> Jasmine overcome[s] what Deleuze and Guattari call the paranoiac impulse to reterritorialise ... [with] no territory, or belonging as such ... decentred and deracinated. (Bromley, 2000, 27)

Jasmine's entire line of flight from one nation to another, one community to another, one lover to another and from one self to another is, in fact, a long trajectory of betrayal. Deleuze would say that she draws a long 'witch's line that escapes the dominant system' (Deleuze, 1993, 5). She never ceases to be an unfixed, wandering, drifting subject, incessantly betraying 'the established powers of the earth' which 'try to hold us back' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 40–1).

Jasmine is conscious of her hybrid in-betweenness as a contrast to the mentality of purity she meets in Baden and in little India. She feels 'suspended between worlds', 'between identities' (*Jasmine,* 76, 77). In terms of gender, she offers an image of herself as fluctuating between the traditional role of female submissiveness and a liberated, educated woman with a mind of her own. Culturally, she finds herself in-between the Indian belief in tradition, submission and fate and the Western belief in individualism, 'caught between the promise of America and old-world dutifulness' (*Jasmine,* 240). Socially, she finds herself between tradition and modernity, between city and village, between modernism and feudalism. For good reason, critics commonly characterise Jasmine in Bhabhaian terms as 'plural and transitional', as 'persisting in her liminal, in-between state', as 'an interstitial subjectivity which cannot be wholly one presence nor wholly another' (see Bahri, 1998, 154, 150 and Hoppe, 1999, 144, 145).

One of the most manifest examples of the novel's intentional hybridity discourse is the central image of Jasmine's special vision, which seems like a direct precursor to Bhabha's idea of a third space 'language of critique' ingrained in the migrant's eye-view on the world: Jasmine refers to a star-shaped wound that is punched into her forehead at the beginning of the novel, at the incident of the prophecy, as her 'third eye' (*Jasmine,* 5). She interprets the mark in terms of Indian mythology in which the holiest sages 'developed an extra eye in the middle of their foreheads' through which 'they peered out into invisible worlds' (*Jasmine,* 5). And she connects it with the demystifying enterprise of the Enlightenment which 'meant seeing through the *third eye*' (*Jasmine,* 21, 60, emphasis added). In the language of hybridity theory, the third eye makes visible the invisible discursive constructions of identity and the subjugation of difference by master narratives, and it does this with an eye to a new future to-come of a heteroglot consciousness, or with an eye to the kind of 'levelling of discourses' or 'neutralization of politics' that Banerjee identifies as a principal aim of 'philosophical hybridity' – the refusal 'to establish a hierarchy among [different] stances by valorizing one over the other' (Banerjee, 2002, 237, n. 203, 202). Thus Jasmine also refers to the mark on her forehead as her 'cold pale star', her 'third eye', glowing, with messianic connotations, like 'a spotlight trained on *lives to come*' (*Jasmine,* 21, 60, my italics).

Jasmine's adopted son, Du, makes up another explicit configuration of a hybrid in-between in the novel; he is 'a hybrid', as Jasmine puts it, 'like the fantasy appliances he wants to build' (*Jasmine,* 222), and, articulated through the lexical fields of electric engineering, biology and

surgery, his skill is that of 'crossbreeding appliances' where everything is intimately connected and singular elements do not 'confine themselves to one, boring function' (*Jasmine,* 224, 154). Du is 'reshuffling circuits, combining new functions' (*Jasmine,* 154). With a 'surgeon's touch' '[h]e transforms the crude appliances', altering 'the gene pool of the common American appliance', splicing 'a Black & Decker paint sprayer into the gear drive of a repaired Mixmaster' (*Jasmine,* 154, 156). Du as a hybrid character at once incarnates and actively combines new lines of connection in America, changing what is usually perceived as quintessentially American from the white, English-speaking Protestant to a hybrid hotchpotch of cultural and racial difference.

However, Jasmine still draws a distinction between Du's transformation and her own. She sees his transformation as 'hyphenated' whereas her own is 'genetic'; that is, a complete, discontinuous metamorphosis or reincarnation (*Jasmine,* 222). If Du represents a hyphenated form of identity that doubles and fuses, Jasmine's identity is swallowed up within the hyphen itself, she is not a 'both and' but a 'neither nor'. Jasmine does not so much straddle opposites as much as she is between the two stools in Rushdie's image, falling through binary categories in a fast drop of flight, an exhilarating luciferous nose-dive. Cutting herself loose from any certainties and attachments, she feels 'like a stone hurtling through diaphanous mist, unable to grab hold, unable to slow [herself], yet unwilling to abandon the ride [she's] on' (*Jasmine,* 138–9).

Whether as a 'both and' or a 'neither nor', the hybrid space of in-betweenness is supposed to release Difference and set everything afloat in a process of constant shape-shifting and becoming. In a Deleuzian optics, this is where we may rid ourselves of the grave fixity of the verb 'to be' and the exclusionist dichotomy of 'either or' which 'all of grammar is a way of maintaining' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 57). We must '[s]ubstitute the AND for IS' as it is only when we are '[t]hinking *with* AND, instead of thinking IS' that we find multiplicity and becoming, as expressed by the fugitive line of 'and ... and ... and' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 57). Jasmine and Du are not *either* one thing *or* the other, but whereas Du's 'is-ness' diffuses as a this *and* that *and* that *and* that, the 'and' does not appear to be the appropriate word for Jasmine. The heterogenising 'and' *conjoins* multiple identities in the process of becoming and seems to imply at least a degree of continuity. Jasmine, on the other hand, in stressing her transformation as genetic, as a series of complete reincarnations, offers a far more radical break with former codes and selves: we have to 'murder who we were so we can rebirth ourselves in the image of dreams' (*Jasmine,* 29). Accordingly, Jasmine's

line of becoming seems to involve a far more radical and discontinuous line of 'then ... then ... then ...'. She is Jyoti *then* Jasmine *then* Khali *then* Jazzy *then* Jase *then* Jane *then* ...: 'I rip myself from the past', 'Jyoti, Jasmine: I shuttled between identities', '[h]ow many more shapes are in me ...?' (*Jasmine,* 208, 77, 215). This infinite and discontinuous transformation evades any kind of overcoding of the subject, it evades any kind of finite inflexions of 'to be'. The fixity of '*I am*' or 'Jasmine *is*' dissolves and the character accelerates to an incredibly fast speed of becoming. She becomes a body without organs, absolutely uncoordinated, subject to no regulation, no *organ*isation, no *organ*ising corpus. She reaches a state of intensity in which she can no longer say 'I am', other than I am Becoming – becoming as the pure assertive force of 'greed', 'recklessness', 'want' and 'hope' (paraphrase of *Jasmine,* 241).

Formal forces of centrifugality in *Jasmine*

Mukherjee's novel is often read as a transcultural-hybrid migration novel with reference to its remarkable centrifugal thrust. It is read as developing a heterogeneous and hybrid 'language of critique' through which it discloses all the codes that fix us culturally and socially, and, disrupting all of these, the novel supposedly sets the world afloat in a great deterritorialising movement of becoming. Anupama Jain reads *Jasmine* as a 'portrayal of global subjectivities', depicting 'a world in which cultural hybridity has replaced immutable differences between people and countries/regions of the world'. It works through 'a de-centered, fluid and uncontainable politics of non-identification' (Jain, 1998, 120, 125). To Bromley, Mukherjee is a writer of 'transformation' and 'liquidity' rather than 'preservation' and the novel's form reflects Jasmine's character as 'unfinished nature ... and random proliferation, an amorphousness that refuses the shapings of others' (Bromley, 2000, 23, 25). The characters in the novel are 'of continuing metamorphosis ... The episodic and the interstitial *is* their condition', they 'script their own otherness in flight and fluidity, temporariness and the transitional' (Bromley, 2000, 27). To Andrea Dlaska, Mukherjee's novel is a work of 'constant change' that accommodates an '"oceanic" view of unhousement on a global scale' and Jasmine is one of the 'representatives of a future that will shatter all order and boundaries of nation, gender and culture' (Dlaska, 1999, 128, 127). To a critic like Bahri, Jasmine is an 'agent of change' who has 'dislodged from fixity' and the novel as such aspires to the goal 'implicit in the postcolonial enterprise' which is 'to constantly become anew, to shift ... borders and ... identity at the very moment that they are in danger

of crystallizing' (Bahri, 1998, 145–6). Mukherjee depicts 'forces turning the globe with their collective gypsy wanderings' and she manages to keep Jasmine 'in a state of endless *das zwischen* – a condition of "always becoming" to escape "having become"' (Bahri, 1998, 145, 141). Dayal sees Jasmine as a 'perpetual nomad and hybrid in the most radical sense' (Dayal, 1993, 77). These, and numerous other readings of the novel, are all what Deleuze would call 'sympathetic readings', readings that 'speak with' or 'write with' the novel (see Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 52), or, they are migrant readings that move in sync with the migrant writer's discourse of intentional hybridity as the novel's central language of representation. Below I intend to go along with this for a little while longer, to follow the *form* of the book as a piece of nomadic and heteroglot science that, supposedly, avoids any kind of discursive fixity.

Lecercle says in summary of Deleuze's view on literature that 'the highest task of literature is not to represent the event' or to 'reproduce' it, 'but to *be* the event itself' (Lecercle, 2002, 130). One of the ways in which Deleuze expresses this is to say that metaphors should be replaced by *metamorphosis* (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 22). Whereas metaphor constitutes an established sense of a word, suggesting stasis and being, metamorphosis involves flight and deterritorialisation, it opens up towards 'a becoming that includes the maximum of difference' (Deleuze, and Guattari, 1975, 22). In concord with this, the nomadic is not just a metaphor in Mukherjee's novel. Mukherjee fuses the nomadic discourse at the content level with the novel's formal design, or, to put it differently, the nomadic discourse at the content level is enacted by the novel's form which in itself may be experienced as nomadic, in perpetual flight, releasing Difference at 'breakneck speed' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 37). The narrative of Jasmine's many reincarnations, for instance, emerge through a fractured chronology where lines of story snap and jump, mirror and intertwine, and the position of the narrative voice shifts from past to present, from one geographical location to another and from one incarnation of Jasmine to another. In this way the novel appears to have a fluid, centreless quality to it, like a proper rhizomatic novel, transgressing borders, tearing down nominal walls. It renounces the confining myths of arborescence in its very form, the fixating order of trees and roots, the linear plot and the coherence of a unified narrative subject.

The character of Jasmine in particular functions as a node where content melts into form, where form and content merge in pure migratory becoming, or a permanently unhoused migrant consciousness. With all her discontinuous selves, her constant becoming-other and

becoming-difference, the character of Jasmine does not make up a metaphor of becoming, she does not *stand for* or *represent* becoming: her character metamorphoses into becoming itself. In Deleuzian terms, she manages to become imperceptible, escaping the capture of an identifiable identity, to become 'known by nobody' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 45). Jasmine becomes imperceptible in the sense that she turns into pure movement, a pure becoming, pure line of flight, made of nothing but displacement, migration, thresholds and transgression – the madness of a delirious speed. But the speed of the novel accelerates even further.

One of the most crucial ways Deleuze imagines literature as escaping the act of representation is when it pushes language to the limit, when it ceases to make sense and instead opens up to *sensual* experiences of the world; where language ceases to *stand for* or *describe* an experience and becomes the very *sensation* of that experience itself. Hence characters in rhizomatic literature are not people or subjects, but 'collections of intensive sensations' (see Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 39–40). Jasmine takes language to the limit by turning into pure speed, but she also stimulates our bodily senses, our noses, our ears, our eyes; she transforms into a strong fragrance, a breathless sound, a flickering bright light. She is 'small and sweet and heady', says her first husband, she will '*quicken* the whole world with [her] perfume' (*Jasmine,* 77, emphasis added). Next, with Jasmine we begin to stutter: Jyoti, Jasmine, Jase, Jazzy, Jane, a relentless J..J..J..J..J..J. *Jasmine* through Jasmine sends 'language ... racing along a witch's line' (Deleuze, 1993, 109). Language is pushed 'to its point of suspension' (Deleuze, 1993, 53), strained so much by Mukherjee that it reaches a limit where it ceases to be speech and grammar and becomes pure sound: an inarticulate, stuttering sound, breath, a staccato breath, emitting a fast and jerky reverberation of air. Altogether, Jasmine ceases to be a sign and becomes pure affect, touching the bodies of readers; a burst of energy, a smell, a sound, a light, a speed – a flash, a fugitive flash of light across the pages, *jyoti*, pure 'travelling light' (see Deleuze on pure affect, 1993, 134). In fact, *Jasmine* is in this way, and in so many senses, a *light book*, a dazzling and dizzying experience – to borrow one of Lecercle paraphrases of Deleuze, the book 'does not *make* sense', it '*is* sense' (see Lecercle, 2002, 56, 118, emphases added) – a triggering of 'arbitrary forms of possible intuitions' (Deleuze quoting Kant, 1993, 34).

The speed of the novel's becoming is coupled with an intentional heteroglossia which also throws representation into a state of groundlessness to facilitate a release of Difference. With Jasmine's radical metamorphoses

Mukherjee gives herself a tool with which to display and give voice to several worlds at once in the sense that Jasmine's multiple reincarnations make up a kaleidoscope of different perspectives on the world – thus formally enacting the discourse of Jasmine's 'third eye'. Moving through and metamorphosing into the mindsets of disparate communities and cultures, the novel, through Jasmine, encompasses a heteroglossia of views of the world from an American metropolitan vantage point to that of a small, isolated Midwestern farming community, from the perspectives of rural and urban Indias to the experience of destitute illegal immigrants and non-integrated immigrant communities. In paraphrase of Bakhtin, a chaos of voices is invited into the work by the novelist, not to weaken it but to intensify it (see Bakhtin, 1935, 298). Here is in fact another kind of 'becoming imperceptible' in *Jasmine*. Jasmine loses her 'identity', her 'face', 'disappears' and 'becomes unknown', 'goes unnoticed' by becoming 'like everybody else', 'become[ing] "tout le monde"... becom[ing] everybody and everything' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 45; Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 279).[1]

Formally, Mukherjee's novel thus attacks any monocentric discourse from the two points of cultural and discursive groundlessness and overdetermation, which matches the 'philosophy of Difference' and intentional hybridity at the novel's level of content. The book offers itself as a nomadic whirlwind, releasing Difference by setting language adrift in a plurality of signification that speeds past the meaning of signs.

* * *

In the above I deliberately chose to follow the nomadic form and discourse of Mukherjee's novel in a sympathetic reading of the book's central language of enunciation. I chose to follow the novel's heady speed of becoming, its release of the centrifugal forces of Difference, its lines of escape from representation. I chose to cleanse my reading of '[s]ignificance and interpretosis', 'the two diseases of the earth' which instruct the reader always to read literature purely as signification and representation, as if it always stands for 'something else', looking for the supposedly hidden 'little secret' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 47, 46). I chose to cleanse my reading of the:

> politics which demands that the lines should be blocked, that an order should be established ... preventing indeterminism from going too far, in calming the madness of particles. (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 67)

However, it is high time to betray Deleuze, or, rather, to betray Deleuze's nomadic rhetoric, and to betray the good intentions of heteroglossia and rhizomatic becoming in *Jasmine* (which is a strange thing making me more Deleuzian than Deleuze insofar as his philosophy emphasises betrayal as that which makes something new possible). My treachery consists in moving away from the sympathetic migratory reading of the novel to note where the rhizome bifurcates, to note how the centrifugal forces of heteroglossia are counterworked by centripetal forces of monoglossia, where the novel engages in acts of representation, blocking lines and 'calming the madness of particles'. Representation is an inescapable part of the literary sign machine, in my view, and bifurcation part of the way in which it functions. Besides, who says literature needs our sympathy anyway? Sometimes people speak as if literature is a weak and enfeebled patient in need of special treatment.

Mukherjee's novel wants to be read as a 'third eye' perspective of hybridity, multiplicity and becoming. In Bakhtinian terms this means that the novel's representing language is one that intentionally strives to allow a multiplicity of different, hybridising perspectives to the fore, one that allows a free release of Difference. Not only are we invited to this reading by the novel's nomadic form and its explicit discourse of intentional hybridity, it is also signalled through the quote of James Gleick that opens the novel before the story begins. The quote sets the themes of the novel, anticipates its form and reflects the nature of the narrator and her outlook – all marked by a rough, unrounded geometry of the 'broken up, the twisted, tangled, and intertwined'. An opening quote like that may be seen in terms of Derrida's notion of the *parergon*. A parergon is like the frame of a painting, or the drape on a sculpture, or the title of a book. It is placed outside the work (*ergon*), or, rather, on the border of the work, like an edge to the work, or like an end to the work: it 'comes as an extra, *exterior* to the proper field' (Derrida, 1978, 56). But the parergon, or the frame is not simply outside the text or picture; it inevitably interacts with that which it frames. Derrida refers to the parergon as an 'hors d'oevre' (Derrida, 1978, 24), indicating how it 'inscribes something' in the text itself; how it comes to play a function in the text, how its 'transcendent exteriority comes to ... abut onto, brush against, rub, press against the limit itself and intervene in the inside' (Derrida, 1978, 56).

However, and this is the crucial point, the parergon only intervenes in the inside, says Derrida, 'to the extent that the inside is ... *lacking in something*' (Derrida, 1978, 55, 56, emphasis added). Without this internal lack, the unity would have no need of a parergon. So what causes frames and titles and opening quotes to work as parerga is not simply

their exteriority as a surplus, a '*supplement* outside the work', 'it is the internal structural link which rivets them to the lack in the interior of the *ergon*' (Derrida, 1978, 57). In other words, the parergon helps something on the way that would not be self-evident; that would not necessarily move without the assistance of the parergon. Derrida suitably compares the parergon with a wheelchair:

> [t]hus one pushes forward something which cannot stand up, does not erect itself by itself in its process. Framing always supports and contains that which, by itself, collapses forthwith. (Derrida, 1978, 78)

With the James Gleick epigraph Mukherjee has offered the reader an appetizer for the text, whetting our appetites, preparing us for a certain taste – like that, the parergon is an end with an end, one might say, or, as Derrida implies, a trace of the intention of the author, just as the hole where the handle used to be on an artful Grecian urn leaves a trace of its past functionality (Derrida, 1978, 89). In a manner of speaking, Mukherjee with her epigraph affixes an operating handle onto her novel which, when we pull it, activates a reading in the direction she intended.

If parergons compensate for internal lacks in the work, their removal would cause the lack of the inside of the work to appear (see Derrida, 1978, 57). So, in the remainder of this analysis, I will stop pulling that convenient handle on Mukherjee's book. Rather, I will follow Derrida's suggestion of stealing not the picture but its frame, the framing of the novel, the framing of the novel's central discourse as a discourse of Difference, pluralism and absolute becoming. As far as I can see, at least two things are unable to stand once Mukherjee's novel is robbed of its supportive frames: the heteroglossia of its representing voice gives way to forces of monoglossia and the speed of becoming in its intentional hybridity is significantly reduced.

The reduction of heteroglossia in *Jasmine*

In the sympathetic reading I noted how Mukherjee's novel creates a heteroglossia of perspectives through Jasmine's many reincarnations. However, we may also identify a marked centripetal force of monoglossia in this, a force that reduces the multiple, discontinuous perspectives to a singular view of the world that runs through the whole novel as if in an unbroken narrative line. I agree with Carter-Sanborn that Jasmine appears to have a remarkable capacity to comply with the shifting identities others impose on her and thus to see the world from radically

diverse points of view (see Carter-Sanborn, 1994, 576–7). Yet my contention is that she escapes those perspectival reincarnations remarkably untouched too, which results in a paradoxical continuity and coherence of the narrative voice. This is evident at the level of enunciation which is mastered by a coherent, self-aware narrative subject that speaks: just the simple fact that there is a narrating self that is aware of its many transformations shows that we are dealing with one self rather than a series of discontinuous selves. Likewise, at the level of naming, the title of the novel creates a sense of a coherent, continuous character; Jasmine remains the central name uniting all other selves.

From this angle, Jasmine's shape-shiftings appear to be, at best, only skin-deep, or staged – reduced to a mere semblance of transformation (at least after her having become 'American'). To the extent that Jasmine is changed by the environments she crosses, this is only a temporary and superficial change. Hence, from beginning to end Jasmine is an autonomous, self-determined mind more or less set apart from the mindsets around her. She remains detatched, unconditioned and unaffected by the environments she passes through, capturing what Braidotti says in celebration of transcultural difference, '[t]he nomad is only passing through' (Braidotti, 1994, 35). So, in spite of the novel's intention, there is actually no real reincarnation of Jasmine's identity: she seems to be rushing through identities rather than voicing these identities from any level of deeper experience. It has a sarcastic and dead ring to it, for instance, when Jasmine declares from her home in Baden that '[w]e're puritans' (*Jasmine,* 237). The utterance is hollow, delivered without any conviction or emphatic insight into what it actually means to be 'puritan'.

As a consequence, and in spite of Mukherjee's contention that her primary material 'is the reality of transplantation and psychological metamorphosis' (Mukherjee, 1999, 70), there is no real change of perspective in the novel's representing language; none of the discourses of the places Jasmine transverses appear to affect the central narrative voice or tone of the novel in any noticeable way, it stays the same whether Jasmine is this or that or the third self. The novel has but one surviving I, one, stable and central eye through which the world as well as all other languages are seen, told and judged, and that is the nomadic perspective, the nomadic discourse, which, ultimately, remains unaffected by the sedentary spaces and points it only passes through. This is a largely undialogic voice, essentialising flux, movement, travel and flight as the only liberating force, which paradoxically causes its claim to heteroglossia to peter out. A reshuffling of letters is at work here, illustrating how easily the *nomadic* gravitates towards the *monadic* – which is also what

Khair points to when he proposes that 'openness can turn into fixity' with reference to Rushdie as espousing a '*hegemonic* conception of the hybrid' (Khair, 2001, 296, 297, emphasis added).

There are other, related ways in which the novel's 'third eye' claim to heteroglossia shrinks. First of all, Jasmine's detachment means that sedentary and rooted experiences are objectified by an outside voice – they become objects of representation. Secondly, there is a significant reduction of difference in the novel's representation of these other voices and experiences. Mukherjee's representation of the Indian villagers in Hasnapur, the migrants in the Indian ghetto in New York and the white community in rural America turn out to have a lot in common with the strategies of representing difference that is unwittingly employed by the Badeners. Just as the people in Baden domesticate Jasmine's differences, Mukherjee, through Jasmine, speaks of these communities as something entirely knowable and in that way thoroughly fixed within the domain of her language, knowledge and control, to reiterate Chambers.

A prime example of this is Jasmine's portrayal of the Indian community in Flushing, which amounts to a rather typical parody in transcultural hybridity literature of the patriotic, nostalgic and homesick immigrant community. Mr Vadhera is an unattractive, complacent, middle-aged man who has imported his parents and a 19-year-old wife, fresh from India. There is no imagination or cultural mixture here, all is business and concern with proper Indian appearances. The immigrant couple are following 'an ancient prescription for marital accord': he is 'silence, order, authority' and she features 'submission, beauty, innocence' (*Jasmine,* 151). The oldest generation complains that their offspring are corrupted by America, which is rendered in the novel in typical Western caricature of Indian English:

> All the time, this rush-rush. What to do? There are no grandchildren for us to play with ... If we are doomed to die here, at least let us enjoy the good things of America: friends from our village, plentiful food, VCRs, air conditioning. (*Jasmine,* 147–8)

Mukherjee states in an interview that '[t]he aim of fiction is to break down stereotypes' (Chen and Goudie, 1997, question 54), but in the representation of Flushing she clearly stumbles into some pitfalls identified by Bakhtin. All parody and travesty are examples of intentional hybridity to Bakhtin. Yet, whereas parody has a vast subversive potential, illuminating one language 'by means of another', 'parody is always biased in some direction, and this bias is dictated by the discursive

features of the parodying language' (Bakhtin, 1940, 75; 1935, 361). Bakhtin further explains this as a certain centripetal force or unidirectional discursive movement and goes on to say that irony, ridicule, mockery, exaggeration may at worst entirely objectify and freeze the parodied language to the extent that it no longer has any room to resist the parodying language (see Bakhtin, 1935, 364; 1929, 194). In this respect the Indians in Flushing are far from Bakhtin's idea of characters as 'autonomous participants' or 'individualized language-intentions' (Bakhtin, 1929, 21; 1935, 361). In fact they never get to represent themselves at all against the language of the nomadic migrant. Always mediated through the monoglot force of Jasmine's voice, they remain mutely represented, never speaking directly and never given the chance to offer any 'resistance ... to the parodying language' (Bakhtin, 1935, 364).

Mukherjee is commonly criticised for her reductive representation of the non-Western world whereas few critics speak of her representation of white communities as equally reductive. The centripetal tendencies towards a monoglossia in the novel make themselves felt in Jasmine's portrayal of Baden too. The novel gives a picture of Baden as a largely fixed, static and hierarchical society where traditions constitute a highly restrictive overcoding of individual identity, putting an abrupt halt to any becomings other than those preordained by custom and convention. In this way, the community in Baden functions as an American parallel to the Indian village of Jasmine's childhood, and as with the Indians in flushing, and the Indians in India, the Badeners never get to represent a different picture of themselves. Baden is 'all power and no mobility'; it represents 'old-world dutifulness' as opposed to Taylor's 'promise of America' (*Jasmine,* 11, 9, 240). Darrel's tragic end serves to show the ultimate triumph of the life-negating forces in Baden of purity, sameness, homogenisation and regulation: twisting from the rafter, his hanged body is that of 'an astronaut shamed by the failure of his lift-off', keeping 'his bitter face turned away from the galaxies that he'd longed to explore' (*Jasmine,* 234). In Baden the nomad's flight is arrested even before it gets to set out on the promise of movement and becoming.

Another major reason for the reduction of heteroglossia in *Jasmine* is to be found in Mukherjee's construction of the narrative voice which functions largely as an internal monologue. Jasmine observes others, records their various views and while outwardly complying with them, she never voices her private judgements in the presence of other characters. Bakhtin says that a crucial feature of heteroglossia is that characters' 'voices are not self-enclosed or deaf to one anothers, that '[t]hey hear each other constantly, call back and forth to each other' (Bakhtin,

1929, 91). As characters furiously battle with the 'definitions of their personality in the mouths of other people', they acutely sense 'their own inner unfinalizability' and therefore strongly protest against 'any externalizing and finalizing definition of them' (Bakhtin, 1929, 59). But since the Badeners and the Flushing Indians never get to know how Jasmine really sees them, they never even get as far as to discover any need to confront or protest against her definition of them and her divestment of their 'inner unfinalizability'. Jasmine's representing voice remains self-enclosed and in Baden and Flushing they remain deaf to this voice.

Ultimately, as Jasmine's language is never countered or challenged by other voices, the novel's central representing language is never illuminated as an image of language, is never turned into an object of scrutiny. As it never has to *defend* itself, it is never disallowed the pretence of being a transparent window to the world.[2] In Bakhtinian optics, Mukherjee allows a singular language to 'constitute the novelistic world in its entirety' which consequently becomes a language of 'automatic value-judgement'; a language that takes itself and its perception of other languages for granted, not subjecting its views to discussion or questioning; a language that believes its own verbal-ideological expression of reality to correspond to reality itself (Bakhtin, 1929, 25; 1926, 476, see also 480–1).

* * *

To sum up, what remains *lacking* in *Jasmine* is the heteroglossia that is advertised by the novel's representing language. The novel lacks the heterogenisation and dialogisation of languages that would have occurred if the nomadic and the sedentary worldviews, or heterogenising and homogenising voices were brought to quarrel with each other. Instead, the sedentary and supposedly homogeneous voices are always and unsuspectingly being held out at an arm's length by the nomadic and consciously hybrid voice. The lack of actual heteroglossia in the novel is obscured by the spectacular and dizzying language of discontinuity, transcultural shapeshifting, hybridity, third eye visions and multiple becomings, which pushes a heteroglossia forward that would have difficulty standing up on its own. Like the parergon – an elegant and colourful drape on a statue or a beautifully gilded frame presenting a picture – this hyperbolic language '*bedazzles*' the reader, to recycle an expression Gurleen Grewal rightfully uses about *Jasmine* (Grewal, 1993, 183, emphasis added), and since the narrative voice is never objectified or challenged, readers are easily blinded by its dazzling language, losing sight of it as a *representing* language that re-produces all other languages

in the text, defines them and controls them. Dlaska, for instance, uncritically goes along with the novel's representing language and sees the Iowa farming community as exhibiting 'an arrogance and certainty of self', without noticing the arrogance Jasmine displays in casting a community in that light (Dlaska, 1999, 148). Dlaska is bedazzled by Jasmine and fails to see how, in Bakhtin's words, 'the other person's discourse is a completely passive tool in the hands of the author [or narrator] wielding it', how Jasmine, takes someone else's 'defenceless discourse and installs [her] own interpretation in it, forcing it to serve [her] own new purposes' (Bakhtin, 1929, 197, 49–50). In fact Mukherjee herself seems to be bedazzled by her own nomadic discourse, believing that *Jasmine* 'is not just Jasmine's story', that 'the minor characters' are 'pivotal in the book' as they form 'many different kinds of immigrants, having many different reactions to the fact that they are suddenly in this culture' (Cawelti, 1994, 102; Desai and Barnstone, 1998, 132). It is very difficult to see that any other character in the novel enjoys any autonomy or '*rights equal to those of the hero*' (Bakhtin, 1929, 49–50).

Movement versus the inhibitive stillness of place

Jasmine is definitely a 'story of immigrant wanderlust', as Roy puts it (Roy, 1993, 137). Accordingly, one of the most persistent binarisms in the novel's representing language is the simple opposition between movement and leaving and the alleged inhibitive stillness of staying in one place. As summarised by Jasmine, '[t]he world is divided between those who stay and those who leave' (*Jasmine,* 228). Leaving is proposed as liberation and staying as crippling. Likewise, Bud's house comes to embody the entrapment of dwelling. It is an 'ugly, comfortable house' in which gratitude and submission are expected in return for the comfortable 'safety' it provides against the world's uncertainties – '[h]ow *dare* we want more', Jasmine exclaims (*Jasmine,* 223, 209, emphasis added). In this connection, Eva Hoffman is right in observing how:

> [i]n the 'nomadic' configuration ... home is conceived of mostly as a conservative site of enclosure, of narrow-mindedness, patriarchal attitudes, and dissemination of nationalism. (Hoffman, 1999, 58)

The staying–leaving dichotomy works as another parergon. In order for its nomadic and cross-cultural discourse to gain the appearance of radicality, the novel has to heighten the drama of movement versus stillness, rather than fusing these – just as Deleuze and Guattari heighten

the drama of '[c]elerity against gravity' when speaking of '[t]he celerity of a war machine against the gravity of a State apparatus' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 289). Like Darrel, the nomadic hero has to be *released* from *the land*.[3] If the hero always has to leave in order to avoid any inhibition of becoming, or if a liberated becoming is only achieved through an excess or proliferation of belonging, the implication is that place in itself is poor, lacking in diversity, difference and becoming – place is indeed simply reduced to 'ground (*sol*) or support', as Deleuze and Guattari say in praise of the nomad (see above).

Edward Casey is but one philosopher who is more sensitive than that to the nature of place.[4] Casey rightly observes that place is invariably taken for granted as 'the very paradigm of the lasting and the *un*moving in human experience', wherewith we fail to see that places are *inherently nonstatic*, that motion is '*intrinsic to place*' (Casey, 1993, 280, 289). What he means is that place is inseparably connected with time; that place is always in a process of becoming, always changing, never at a stand-still. Places may offer a certain degree of stability, but stability is not the same as fixity (see Casey, 1993, 285). Casey thus operates with a simultaneity of time and space in his concept of place, which he expresses by referring to place, not in exclusively spatial terms as a room or container, but as an *event*. To see place as an event unites the temporal and the spatial insofar as place in this optics is not just something that merely *is*; it *happens* or *takes place*, it is not a *being* but a *becoming* (see Casey, 2003, 24–5, 27).

Secondly, Casey transfers this simultaneity of time and space to explain how we dwell in a place. Since place always happens, always becomes and is never still, we cannot really *inhabit* a place. Rather, says Casey, since we always need to adjust ourselves to the ceaseless changes of a place, we can only be in a constant process of *re-inhabiting* a place (the 're' constituting a temporal marker and the 'in' a spatial one). Accordingly, getting connected with a place, or to feel rooted, is an endless process of 'getting back into place' or striving to keep on becoming *of* a place (Casey, 1993, 297). The central term Casey uses for such constant re-inhabitation is emplacement or re-emplacement, which involves an ongoing re-connection with a place, a continuous re-familiarisation with or re-knowing of a place that continually renews itself (see Casey, 1993, 291–3).

Emplacement is clearly not characterised by any radical disruption or discontinuity, but it is not a fixed, immobile staying either. On the contrary, says Casey, it involves a:

> *slowed-down speed*: the need for the gradual re-acquisition of the right habits, the sedimentation of the appropriate habitudes, the

> growth of effective habituations. (Casey, 1993, 298, 297, emphasis added)

Emplacement is never-ending and the dialectics at work within its processes are always infinite and asymmetrical, we always get 'back into place in a nonbalanced way' (Casey, 1993, 298). Hence the continuous process of re-emplacement, and its *slowed-down speed*, may also be understood in terms of organic hybridity in which slowly changing codes of representation, or habitudes, are at work to tame the centrifugal forces of Difference and flux.

Deleuze and Guattari are far from innocent in establishing a dichotomisation of place and movement. However, there is a largely overlooked side to their philosophy that interrupts the endless reiteration of nomadic movement against the sedentary and the static. Previously I have spoken of how the smooth space and the striated space, the sedentary and the nomadic are dialecticised in the idea of the holey space. Those who find themselves in the holey space 'are not nomadic among the nomads and sedentary among the sedentaries, nor half-nomadic among the nomads, half-sedentary among sedentaries' but '*vague essence*': 'they necessarily communicate with the sedentaries *and* with the nomads' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 413–15, emphasis added). In a few places Deleuze and Guattari follow up on this by inviting a complex reading of the still and the moving. They agree with Toynbee that the nomad is in fact '*he who does not move*', poised as he is on the saddle on the camel and clinging as he does to an age-old itinerary. Accordingly, 'it is ... false to define the nomad by movement.' What we need to do instead is:

> to make a distinction between *speed* and *movement*: a movement may be very fast, but that does not give it speed; a speed may be very slow, or even immobile, yet it is still speed. Movement is extensive [that is, spatial]; speed is intensive [that is, temporal]. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 381)

This calls on us to look for the speed and change in supposedly still places: the possible simultaneity of '[i]mmobility and speed, catatonia and rush', which Deleuze and Guattari, inspired by Kleist, express as '*stationary process*' or '*station as process*' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 381, emphases added). The equation of the words 'station' and 'process' is important here, indicating another kind of becoming than the astonishing speed of absolute discontinuity. There seems to be a gravitational pull, a 'stationarity' that slows down becoming, yet never arrests becoming in a fixed state of being, or a spatiality that slows down the speed

of pure temporality. Such fusion of concepts of movement and stillness, space and time, the sedentary and the nomadic, and, even, the striated and the smooth provides us with a far richer vantage point to the 'settled' and the 'rooted' from which place is never seen as an immobile or a solid sameness, a mere supporting *sol* to be crossed by the nomad.

At this point I would like to admit a partial revision of my reading of *Jasmine*'s heterogenising and homogenising forces. In opposition to my reading so far, there actually are a few images in the novel that may work as a kind of hermeneutical hinge, swinging a reading in the direction of place as an event of re-emplacement and changing sameness – as vague essence and stationary process – rather than something you have to leave in order to change.

Taylor is writing a paper on 'weak gravity' in the field of sub-nuclear particle physics and he tries to explain it in a humorous way:

> Weak gravity is ... what keeps Jase and Duff together ... so they don't fly off the bed at night. When you look around, weak gravity is everywhere. (*Jasmine,* 178)

'Weak gravity' seems to articulate a different sense of belonging based on a continued negotiation between movement and settlement, rootedness and rootlessness, the pull of gravity and the lift of celerity – as in the centripetal and homogenising forces of organic hybridity. A related set of metaphors are suggested in the images of a revolving door and an escalator. The first time she sees a revolving door Jasmine wonders: 'How could something be always open and at the same time always closed?' (*Jasmine,* 133). She is equally puzzled the first time she experiences an escalator: 'How could something be always moving and always still?' (*Jasmine,* 133). Hosting the forces of openness, closedness, mobility and immobility simultaneously, these metaphors seem to articulate an epistemology in which there is a becoming of movement in the still place and a becoming still in movement; in other words, a 'stationary process', a perpetual interchange within a particular locality between difference and sameness, conservation and change, heterogeneity and homogeneity.

In line with this, some readers may argue that there is a significant play of ambiguity in Jasmine's voice which calls for a moderation of the criticism I have offered so far. A language of attachment and belonging occasionally slips in to mingle with or upset the celebratory voice of unrestrained becoming and cultural uprooting. With Taylor in New York, for instance, she is relieved to have become 'a dense object', to have 'landed' and begun the process of 'getting rooted' (*Jasmine,* 215,

179). However, it may be argued that this discourse does not significantly disturb the dominance of hybridity and nomadism in the novel's representing language and all its dichotomising tendencies after all.

To start with, there seems to be a reduction of the ambiguity offered by these instances of double-voicedness when measured against the strength of the nomadic voice in the novel's overall discursive economy. The dichotomisation of the restrictive fixity of place and the liberation of flight from place is extremely persistent throughout the novel, ubiquitously embedded in the novel's word choice: in Flushing, Jasmine feels she has 'gained so much *weight*' that she is 'spiralling into depression behind the *fortress* of Punjabiness'; she feels like 'a *prisoner*' behind an 'imaginary *brick wall* topped with *barbed wire*', keeping her from 'breaking into the future' (*Jasmine,* 148, emphases added). The fixity of Baden is spelled out in Bud's body and organs: within him 'the *fluids gather*' and '*circulation* has *slowed down*', '[*i*]*mmobility* has made him more *excitable*' (*Jasmine,* 157, 227, 11, emphases added). Hence, as I see it, all the possible metaphors of stationary flux and ambiguities in the representing voice lose their significatory strength in the overall discursive economy of the novel insofar as they remain rather isolated, never really penetrating the novel's nomadic rhetoric. The metaphors never really match or disturb the strength of the novel's dichotomisations. In a manner of speaking, the novel's central migration discourse – the spectacular drama, or hyperbole of the nomad hero's discontinuous reincarnations – is extremely loud and draws so much of the reader's attention to itself that any other instantiations of hybridity and speeds are brought out of earshot. In this way, the dominance in the representing language in *Jasmine* of nomadic movement constantly pushes any emerging perception of slow becoming or Heideggerian changing sameness back into a presumption of fixity and solid oneness. As Jasmine escapes Baden at the end of the story and takes off with Taylor into the mythical west of the American frontier, weak gravity gives way to weightlessness, celerity cancels any force of gravity or desire for getting rooted. The finishing pages of the novel offer a direct opposite to Darrel's tragic end and the 'gathering fluids' and 'slowed down circulation' of the mid-western community, ultimately stressing movement, transformation and the agency of the detached individual as exclusively life-affirming forces:

> Adventure, risk, transformation: the frontier is pushing indoors through uncaulked windows. Watch me reposition the stars ... I am out the door ... scrambling ahead of Taylor, greedy with wants and reckless from hope. (*Jasmine,* 240–1)

Finally, the ambiguous instances in the narrative do not really unsettle the novel's representing language for the simple reason that ambiguity is contained within the dominant voice of the nomadic migrant. The seer's 'curse' of excommunication at the beginning of the novel, for instance, is only a curse in the perspective of village tradition which the nomadic perspective has already disqualified as an inhibiting monological and static perspective.

Ambiguity is an indispensable trait in Bakhtin's heteroglossia as it destabilises or splits the static representation of reality with several contradictive utterances. In concert with this, Michael Taussig has said that writing practices the art of 'leaving ambiguities intact' (quoted in Chambers, 1994, 11). There are ambiguities in *Jasmine* but they are not left intact, and for this reason, I find it difficult to speak like Bromley of a '*fundamental* ambivalence that operates throughout the narrative' (Bromley, 2000, 24, emphasis added). On the contrary, ambiguity appears as a surface phenomenon, almost a token-like pointer towards uncertainty of voice. The novel's migration discourse of radical border-crossing and discontinuous transcultural becomings is simply too loud, Jasmine's f/light too dazzling for this ambiguity ever to play any significant role in the novel's overall enunciation.

Yet these instances of ambiguity admittedly do offer an exit door for the reader to escape through in order to discontinue the nomadic voice as a singular language that colonises 'the novelistic world in its entirety', to reiterate Bakhtin, an exit door from the novel's dichotomous economy. Readers who disregard the exit door entirely and keep going along with the central discourse in Mukherjee's novel start to speak like Bromley who explains the tragedy of Bud and Darrel as a tragedy of being tied to a place: they 'have become immobilised: their belonging has been too long' (Bromley, 2000, 25). Bromley is not to blame at all, though; the exit door is a narrow one, hard to see and hard to slip through.

Casey's philosophy of place shows that there are all kinds of limits to both staying and leaving. In fact, at times, staying may turn out to be the most radical form of leaving and leaving the most radical form of staying. There is a final twist in my analysis of *Jasmine* in this respect. As shown above, Jasmine has to leave in order to stay the same, in order to stay a pure nomadic migrant. However, at a deeper, unexhibited level the novel's representing language of cultural disruption and discontinuity turns out to be a language of cultural sameness and continuity, supporting the major language of white, middle-class, Anglo-Saxon America. As such, and as I will go on to show, the cultural ripples produced by

Mukherjee's discourse of intentional hybridity are ultimately mired in the slow, mute and opague processes of organic hybridity.

Jasmine as organic hybridity

I have argued that the novel's centralised voice, the continuity of Jasmine's voice across all her reincarnations is a nomadic voice of uprooteedness and ceaseless becoming which speaks against all languages of sedentary being and belonging. To say so may at a first sight seem to run counter with Mukherjee's notorious project of assimilation. She is often criticised for speaking of the need of immigrants to enter a process of complete 'naturalization' in America (Mukherjee, 1996, 34). Novels like *Jasmine* and *The Holder of the World*, she says, are 'sort of a way station in my personal Americanization' (Desai and Barnstone, 1998, 132).

However, when Mukherjee sees herself as transforming into an American, it is because she sees America as an exemplary realisation of a deterritorialised multiplicity in constant becoming – as opposed to Europe's obsession with homogeneity and India's fixation of identity by gender, religion and caste (see Mukherjee, 1996, 29, 30, 32). To Mukherjee, America is a nation of immigrants and 'many, many different ethnicities together', which invites 'nomadic living' (Mukherjee, 1985, 2–3; Byers-Pevitts, 1997, 198; 1995, 303). For the same reason, she sees herself as an American writer not *in spite of* but *because of* her immigrant experience (Mukherjee, 1985, 3).[5]

Yet, Mukherjee does identify a hierarchy of immigrants within this migrant nation: a certain normative core of American identity, a dominant '[c]entral-casting' which is 'European, white, Christian and Jewish' (Mukherjee, 1999, 80, 83). To Mukherjee, the newer immigration narratives of third world immigration function in this respect as the ultimate mongrelisation and deterritorialisation of the American imaginary, its 'steady de-Europeanization' in the creation of a new national creed that constantly 'synthesizes – fuses – the disparate cultures of our country's residents', producing 'a constantly re-forming, transmogrifying *we*' (Mukherjee, 1996, 34, 33). Mukherjee sees herself as speaking for these new 'non-traditional' immigrants and she sees Jasmine as a 'mongrelizer' in 'the vanguard of the new transformation of America' (Vignisson, 1993, Desai and Barnstone, 1998, 143).

However, at closer scrutiny Jasmine's hybrid and nomadic voice turns out to be heavily invested by exactly the 'central-casting' of American identity that Mukherjee intends to heterogenise. This is something she has been criticised for by a number of readers who see her novels

as taming and pacifying otherness through a normative Eurocentric homology. In particular they point to Jasmine as a character whose difference completely surrenders to a decidedly white Anglo-American cultural identity, forming 'a classical American dream of assimilation' (Carter-Sanborn, 1994, 583; see also Knippling, 1993, 146 and Banerjee, 2002, 243). An example of this comes across in the novel in the role of clothing as a cultural signifier. Jasmine dresses up in informal American clothes to disguise herself from the immigration police: 'blouses with Peter Pan collars, maxi skirts, T-shirts with whitewashed pictures, sweaters, cords, and loafers' (*Jasmine,* 134, 132–3). Whereas all other dressing seems to involve a cultural encoding and deprivation of the freedom of becoming, mass-produced American clothing is presented as de-hierarchised and liberated from cultural particularism. To Mukherjee, it is a choice of substituting 'the food, the clothes, the accent of expatriation' with a 'T-shirted, blue-jeaned' identity (Mukherjee, 1999, 77). Arguably, Mukherjee in this way confuses mainstream or popular American mass-culture with the migratory cultural heterogeneity she associates with a 'mongrelised' America, failing to see how the predominance of its codifications actually involves a reduction and muting of cultural difference and heterogeneity – the way she fails to see the hidden discourses in nomadic hybridity as a representing language. Thus, what appears to be a novel of cultural deterritorialisation turns out to be a novel that territorialises difference from the point of a major cultural language which Mukherjee paradoxically states it as her mission to displace. What remains is an altogether contained difference safely defined from within the domain of the common code – transparent, identifiable, manageable and already well under way within the processes of co-optation of organic hybridity.

Another example of how a voice of sameness prevails in the novel is Mukherjee's handling of the English language. Language is never culturally neutral, as Bakhtin says, it is full of the intentions of others. It produces culture, carries culture, carries identity. Hence, the language we use is already inhabited by a larger socio-cultural machinery of discourses and discursive hierarchies with which we speak. To Bakhtin,

> every conscious act is already a social act, an act of communication. Even the most intimate self-awareness is an attempt to translate oneself into the common code. (Bakhtin, 1926, 486)[6]

Accordingly, *Jasmine*, through Mukherjee's choice of English as her language of representation, forms part of a huge machinery that

constantly appropriates difference, a huge grammar of representation and imperialistic signifiers through which the novel becomes part of the processes of organic hybridity, taming difference and gradually absorbing it as part of the changing same of an Anglofied representation of the world.

But still, as Deleuze reminds us, there is always a choice in *how* we use a language. Whereas a major usage of language accepts, confirms and reproduces the existing codes and assigned functions of words and signifiers, and thus confirms the existing social order, a minor usage pushes language to the limit, allowing difference and foreignness to disrupt the sameness of the common code. Minor usage 'opens up a kind of foreign language within language', as he puts it (Deleuze, 1993, 5). A minor usage may be achieved through all kinds of standard deviations, such as ungrammatical writing, for example, or a multiplication of dialects and accents and all kinds of unlikely mixtures of different socio-cultural speech genres.

To Deleuze, Mukherjee's medium is particularly well suited for minor usages due to its imperialistic history and global migration. As the English language has spread out across the surface of the world, it has made itself all the more vulnerable to Difference (see Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 58–9). Deleuze speaks of a whole internal nomadic war machine at work in the English language as it is constantly reworked from within by new non-standard speakers (see Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 58). In comparison with German, which he sees as 'dogged by the primacy of being, the nostalgia for being', English is a magnificent rhizomatic becoming (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 59). And, as for American English, it:

> does not even have British English as its mother, but becomes an exotic mixture or a 'potpourri of various idioms' (in keeping with the American dream of bringing together immigrants from around the world). (Deleuze, 1993, 10)

There is definitely a minor intention in *Jasmine* in line with her aim of de-Europeanising America. There are so many dialects and accents in the novel and replications of all kinds of world englishes. There is the non-standard syntax and grammar of Indian English: 'She is all the time blushing', 'their wives also are liking to work', and the energetic idiosyncrasy of its word-doublings: 'All the time, this rush-rush. What to do?', 'the water is *hot-hot*, and plentiful' (*Jasmine,* 74, 84, 147, 175). And there is Belize English: 'We got ourssels a clumsy mon! you waitn see, we end up domped in dat goddom ocean!' (*Jasmine,* 105); and

Jamaican English: 'What she t'ink? Slavery makin a big comeback?... we gotta unionize' (*Jasmine,* 179); and American Southern dialect: 'This'n here's my own special lookout. Me'n her's been traveling a long ways together' (*Jasmine,* 111); and Australian English: 'you'd love Owstrylia. Perth's just the plyce for you' (*Jasmine,* 102). In addition, the novel's English is punctured by untranslatable chunks of Indian names: Mazbi, Yama, Khali, Dida, Prakash, Jyoti, Aurangzeb, Hasnapur, and Hindi ways of incorporating relations into titles and names: Mataji, Professorji, Masterji, Arvind-prar, Hari-Prar. These chunks of Hindi perforate the flow of English, and one can actually *see*, let alone hear, how the English text, these sheets of English that are the pages of *Jasmine*, get to stutter with so many holes of foreignness in them.

And yet, in spite of all this linguistic difference and heterogeneity, there is a strong economy of homogenising sameness in the novel's English. Jasmine's English, the novel's representing language, never reveals the slightest trace of being affected by an Indian-English or Hinglish accent and it never slips from the major language in any other way, except for a few faint indications of a local Iowan accent ('us new ones' (*Jasmine,* 13)). Hence, the novel's discursive economy remains dominated by the major language of standard English, the common code. All dialects and varieties of English are merely reported by, or imitated by Jasmine, framed by the dominant standard. Several times the novel's other englishes are even mocked for their deviance from the norm, as in the parody of the Indians in Flushing quoted earlier. Accordingly, in spite of any intentions of releasing Difference, the representing language in *Jasmine* is not a language of Difference, but a language of sameness, containing and absorbing difference – it is not a minor or nomadic language but an asymmetric holey language, a sedentary English of sameness with holes in it. This book's language cooks and prepares cultural difference for Anglo-American consumption, sufficiently de-spicing it for Western readers to swallow rather than radically 'subverting' any 'taste buds', or palates or tongues. Over time, even these holes will close up, making it harder to see or hear their foreign origin – as with 'pyjama', 'shampoo', 'bungalow', 'shawl', 'thug', 'jungle', 'cash', 'avatar' or any other co-opted element within the 'central casting' of American identity that is always slowly changing to stay the same.

With Deleuze and Guattari we may ask: 'What good does it do to perceive as fast as a quick-flying bird if speed and movement continue to escape somewhere else?' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 284). Jasmine may be fast, but difference has escaped in the other direction, to the the cultural and linguistic varieties of the ethnicities in Baden and Little India,

which now constitute a greater difference to the common code than Jasmine. Jasmine may be a master of movement, but she is 'no longer *master of speeds*' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 285). In fact, the novel's intentional hybridity appears to be but a surface intention spinning fast around itself without any real speed of difference. Rather, the real becoming of the novel as a whole is the slow, undramatised changing sameness that takes place at an unexhibited level of the text, within its deep *organ*isation where difference is ceaselessly disappearing into sameness.

Conclusion

If my criticism of Mukherjee's language and appropriation of difference sounds harsh, that is actually not what I intend. Any harshness I think arises from countering the presumptions of a migration novel like *Jasmine* as a novel that offers a language and form of radical Difference and Heterogeneity (which is a reading Mukherjee often helps along herself in articles and interviews). *Jasmine* is a novel of movement and hybridity, but it is a hybridity that is governed mainly by the inclusion of difference into the existing same rather than a disruption of the same by an intense heterogenising release of Difference.

Or perhaps we should rather speak of two speeds of hybridity in the novel, to do some justice to Mukherjee's intentional hybridity. The highest speed of change is in the story of Jasmine as an object of change: Jasmine's transformation from an Indian village girl to a member of an Anglo-Americanised discourse and material economy. Hence, the difference of Anglo-America is working as a highly disruptive force on the sameness of Jasmine's Indian cultural codes. The slowest speed of the novel is in the story of Jasmine, and the book as such, as an orchestrator of change, as 'the vector[ ] of deterritorialization' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 382), supposedly triggering a new becoming of the major language and the dominant codes of the Anglo-American imaginary. After Jasmine's transmutation by the codes of urban, American mainstream, change simply slows down significantly in the novel. The novel's hero and its representing language remain highly continuous and gravitate heavily towards the homogeneous, although, on the surface, the reader is induced to believe that difference continues to shoot through the book at a high speed. Hence, the trope that is attached to Jasmine throughout the novel as an orchestrator of change loses its aptness: Jasmine, the character, or Jasmine, the book, is not a 'tornado' of change uprooting everything as far as the major code and its representation, ordering and naming of the world are concerned (see *Jasmine,* 205, 215, 241). In the

end, Mukherjee's novel offers less of a radical 'de-Europeanization', less of a 'mongrelisation' of the American collective imaginary than she appears to have intended.

* * *

Jasmine is a strange book. It signals an extreme asymmetry in its explicit favouring of Flux over Fixity, Difference over Sameness, Heterogeneity over Homogeneity, Movement over Stillness, Discontinuity over Continuity and yet it brings with it an extreme asymmetry of sameness prevailing over difference, homogeneity over heterogeneity, stillness over movement, continuity over discontinuity. In this light, the book itself is a product that joins in the processes of incorporating and taming Difference within the central machinery of the American cultural semiosphere. Yet a critic like Banerjee seems to go a bit too far when she indicates that Mukherjee's 'assimilationist model' does not even allow 'the possibility of ... difference affecting the sameness of the whole' (Banerjee, 2002, 241). Although the book's hybridity is governed by sameness rather than difference, this does not mean that difference has been entirely smothered, and although the book involves a marked slowing down of the forces of Difference and the process of cultural change and becoming, it is still very far from being a product that reflects a cultural standstill or fixity. Venuti says that even in the most domesticating forms of translation, words remain unreplaced and hence their difference and foreignness lurk under the sameness of the single signifier (see Venuti, 1998, 188). However tamed, the difference of an Indian cultural economy inevitably seeps from *Jasmine* into American culture. Yet, some readers may still be put off by the migratory rhetoric of Mukherjee's fiction, which is generally too much of a binary matter of light versus darkness, the bright dazzling light of Jasmine versus the extinguished light of Darrel Lutz.

* * *

Moving on to my analysis of Jamal Mahjoub's *The Carrier* we will come across assumptions about movement, migration, hybridity and difference similar to the ones that dominate *Jasmine* as well as a similar tendency to represent sedentary or national cultures as culturally fixed and homogeneous. However, in Mahjoub's novel the central discourse of migrant hybridity is turned into an image of language through a narrative self-reflectivity that we do not see in *Jasmine*. In my analysis of *The Carrier* I will start out by following the novel's nomadic and transcultural lan-

guage of representation as I did in the analysis of *Jasmine*. Then, about halfway, my analysis breaks off and takes another direction. A short theoretical intermezzo returns to the criticism of dichotomisations within hybridity theory, this time taking up the anti-essentialist momentum in hybridity theory that easily turns into a too easy rejection of all kinds of ethnic or national group formations. I will recount critical responses to anti-essentialism and the recent notions of anti-anti-essentialim and strategic essentialism. This leads me on to consider the possibility of a strategic hybridity discourse which I proceed to take along with me back into the analysis of *The Carrier*. Resuming the analysis, I look for self-reflective instances in Mahjoub's narrative strategies and, in particular, I expound on the novel's trope of the telescope as an example of how the novel explicitly turns its transcultural and nomadic discourse into an image of language, thus reducing its assertion of hybrid identity from a universalising discourse to a strategic discourse with a limited reach. As opposed to the stereoscopic doublevisions of the Bhabhaian and Rushdian variety, Mahjoub's telescope offers but a one-eyed vision on the world. Finally, I round off the analysis by looking at what goes on outside the limited vision of the novel's telescopic hybridity, in the margins of the novel's representing language. Here I discover that the anti-essentialist discourse that occupies most of the novel's discursive space appears to soften into a more complex image of collective identity in Denmark supplanting an unyielding oneness with an anti-anti-essentialist opening towards a changing sameness.

However, with Mahjoub, and later with Naipaul, another dimension or orientation in the discourse of intentional hybridity is also brought into play. As opposed to a predominantly horizontal and spatial orientation in *Jasmine*, both Mahjoub and Naipaul include a far more vertical and temporal orientation. Therefore, before I move on to analysing *The Carrier*, I would like to briefly explain these two orientations in hybridity discourses or hybridising gazes.

Different orientations and dimensions of intentional hybridity

There must be countless ways in which hybridising discourses may accelerate or decelerate the force of difference within the semiosphere, but in general we can speak of two types of operation that follow the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the semiosphere. That is to say, we can speak of horizontal and vertical, or spatial and a temporal, orientations within intentional hybridity.

As I have shown earlier, difference is distributed horizontally in Lotman's semiosphere which is crisscrossed by multiple differences and new difference arrives incessantly through its vaporous borders, like foreign words constantly making their way into a language. Vertically difference is distributed through the layers of the semiosphere by the mechanisms of organic hybridisation. Given the duration of the past, all the untamed Difference of anything foreign, as for instance other meanings of words that were once foreign, remains curled up beneath the actualised surface.

A typical expression in migration literature of the horizontally orientated hybridity is the celebration of a contemporary multitude of intermixing cultures, all perceived as the result of recent flows of global migration across all kinds of borders. The horizontal orientation is thus preoccupied with the present, its temporal dimension being far less developed in comparison with its spatial dimensions. Such horizontal hybridity may be described as a movement of *transgression*, a crossing and disruption of *spatial*, indeed geographical, territories, borders and categories. By contrast, the vertical or temporal orientation in a hybridity discourse may be described as an *ingressive* movement, which is a term I have borrowed from John Neubauer.[7] *Ingression* involves a crossing of temporal borders. Transferred to my theory of hybridity, it involves a hybridising operation that is far more concerned with time than space, registering or re-cognising how spatial distributions of sameness and difference shift, change or continue over time – often within a single location. Pieterse points to the two orientations in 'hybridity thinking' when he says that:

> *New* hybrid forms are significant indicators of profound changes that are taking place as a consequence of mobility, migration and multiculturalism. However, hybridity thinking also concerns existing or, so to speak, *old* hybridity, and thus involves different ways of looking at *historical and existing* cultural and institutional arrangements. This is a more radical and penetrating angle that suggests not only that things are no longer the way they used to be, but were never really the way they used to be, or used to be viewed. (Pieterse, 2001, 221, emphases added)

The ingressive performance may be said to turn a passive organic or unconscious hybridity into a conscious and speedier form of hybridity, thus disrupting ideas of the host culture as homogeneous from within the national or ethnic historiography of the host culture itself. In other

words, this strategy activates the intensity of the difference that lies curled up beneath the surface of homogeneity, the latent Difference that has been stored up over time. In a manner of speaking, it undoes or rewinds the process of organic hybridisation which had successfully incorporated difference into a sameness by exhuming and thus revitalising layers of difference from their muted and opaque condition, reactivating the force of heterogeneity within hybridity – not unlike the bringing into play of difference in a word by an etymological activation of its earlier meanings. In fact, the study of etymology involves a movement from the mere surface recognition of a word to the *re*-cognition of the word that arises when the word's historical migration and different significations are exposed. Etymology thus involves a kind of reactivation of the inherent Difference of the word which may trigger another becoming in our language – and another outlook on the world.

In *Jasmine* the reader follows a predominantly spatial and rather flat hybridity discourse in terms of time. The novel is concerned with the spectacle of contemporary mass-migrations and the crossings of contemporary national and cultural borders without any real attention paid to historical processes. In the next two novels, Jamal Mahjoub's *The Carrier* and V. S. Naipaul's *The Enigma of Arrival* contemporary migrations and mass movements are piled onto a deeper historical perspective of movement and change. Thus the reader is faced with a direct combination of the horizontal gaze with a vertical gaze – a crossing of borders not just in space but also in time.

5
Mongrel Speeds, Slow Danes and Telescopic Gazes in Jamal Mahjoub's *The Carrier*

Jamal Mahjoub's *The Carrier* from 1998 is a migration novel that has received very little attention, as has Mahjoub's writing in general. In fact the novel has been the subject of only two sustained critical analyses, by Theo D'haen and Jopi Nyman whose readings will also figure in what follows.

In *The Carrier* an archaeologist from Copenhagen, Hassan, is called to Jutland, a provincial part of Denmark, where a mysterious instrument of oriental origin has been found. Hassan finds out that the instrument is a Muslim navigational tool used to identify the direction of Mecca, and intrigued by this, he starts piecing together the story of how the instrument came to Denmark from scraps of information from the local archive and other excavations. In another timeline in the novel – which may or may not be Hassan's imaginative reconstruction of the story of the instrument – the reader is taken back to the seventeenth century. The astronomer, and slave, Rashid al-Kenzy is sent on a mission to Europe by the Quadi in Algeria to obtain the latest scientific wonder, the telescope. However, his ship is wrecked in a storm in the North Sea and instead of arriving at his destination in Holland, Rashid is washed up on the shore in Jutland. He is found by a crowd of locals and subjected to the most barbaric and humiliating treatment because of his strangeness. What follows is a long painful process of coming to terms with his status as a foreigner in a small Danish provincial society. By chance, Rashid becomes the slave of a local scientist, Heinesen, a former apprentice of the celebrated Danish renaissance astronomer, Tycho Brahe. Heinesen puts Rashid to work on the construction of a gigantic observatory, much against the will of the local villagers and the clergy who believe Rashid to be in league with the devil. At one point

Heinesen discovers that Rashid is in fact a highly distinguished colleague, a carrier of a wealth of astronomical and mathematical knowledge from the Arab world. Rashid is duly reassigned as a researcher in the library. Here he meets Heinesen's sister, Sigrid, and falls in love with her. However, before anything may evolve along the course of a love plot, the outrage of the villagers and the aggression of the local religious authorities catch up with Rashid and Heinesen. A boy has died in an accident, the village church has burned down, and the locals blame the monstrous foreigner for both incidents. After a painful trial in town in which Heinesen only just manages to protect Rashid, Heinesen retreats from public life, gives up his astronomical projects and never recovers. The Heinesen household falls into disrepair, the staff flees. When a package from a Dutch scientist arrives to Heinesen containing the telescope, it is, as if fated, Rashid who opens it and commences the studies of the instrument. Heinesen dies and shortly after the villagers burn down his estate, killing Sigrid. Rashid flees with the telescope and, at the end of the novel, it is uncertain whether he manages to escape Denmark or dies from exhaustion in the attempt. As the story of Rashid unfolds we follow the progress of Hassan's research in separate chapters and how he struggles with the treatment of difference in the contemporary village in ways that seem to echo, or be echoed in, Rashid's story.

A cosmopolitan geography and two migrant heroes

The Carrier is a migration novel with a vast geographical scope. Through its characters and stories, the novel draws lines that connect the imaginary of local spaces (the Danish village excepted) with a planetary network of routes between cosmopolitan hubs of trade. The world has been set in motion by caravans and merchant ships and the novel teems with the names of an emerging seventeenth-century global geography: the Marmara Sea, the Aegean Sea, the Atlantic, the North Sea; the continents of Europe, Asia and the Americas; the West Indies and the dark blotch of Africa. The novel celebrates the birth of such a global imaginary as a heterogeneous flowing together of worldviews and cultures in remarkable cosmopolitan landscapes. The Bay of Cadiz is a carnivalesque spectacle of international plurality, 'a disparate collection of outsiders, strange types scrabbling through the plazas and thoroughfares' (*Carrier,* 74) and the harbour of Algiers is:

> packed with vessels arriving from every conceivable point of the globe, [and] rings to the tune of unfamiliar tongues in the breathless, incessant chatter of humanity. (*Carrier,* 17)

This is the kind of environment that produces a new restless type of humans, like the novel's two migrant heroes, Rashid and Hassan. As the novel's primary hero, Rashid is endowed with all the quintessential features of a nomadic figure. He is fundamentally homeless, treated as a foreigner everywhere and with 'no town or village mourning his absence' (*Carrier,* 215). His elaborate geographical movement draws a long line of flight, from Aleppo on to Tripoli, Alexandria, Cairo, Cyprus, Algeria, Spain and then finally Denmark. He is a man of the in-between: the product of racial intermixture and the illegitimate offspring of the oppressor and the oppressed (his Nubian mother served as a slave and was raped by her Arab master). Speaking more than seven languages and romantically epitomised as a citizen of the world who sleeps with the 'canopy of stars for his blanket' and 'could live anywhere', Rashid enjoys what Rosi Braidotti venerates as a 'polyglot' or 'nomadic consciousness' (*Carrier,* 215; Braidotti, 1993, 40, 31–4).

It is primarily through science that Rashid seeks the freedom of detachment. In fact, the novel projects philosophy and science as great liberators of man from the constricting mystifications of metaphysical worldviews as well as from the limited imagination of cultural homologies. Hence, ideas travel the surface of the globe, making a mockery of cultural, national, racial, social and gender-based borders. Through science, '[t]he world grew bigger, more colourful, more filled with noise and light' (*Carrier,* 70). In the library Heinesen's sister, Sigrid, leads Rashid to discover the absence of objective certainties and truths in the world and that all meaning and all truth, indeed reality itself, are *created* by ourselves by the way we choose to look at the world. Sigrid refers to this as 'perspectivism' (*Carrier,* 238). With the realisation of this epistemology, Rashid embraces an understanding of the world in terms of constant becoming and change:

> there was movement and change; the stars were not fixed in a crystal latticework as Aristotle had claimed ... what had previously been believed to be fixed and unchanging was not actually so. What had been supposed to be silent and still was no longer so. (*Carrier,* 237)

At the end of the novel, '[h]e had learned that the sun was the source of the world's life and that the earth was a simple singing orb' (*Carrier,* 274). Through Agnes Heller we may see this as Rashid's loss of the last notions of home – Earth, Man, God. To Heller the experience of 'cosmic contingency' results in 'the loss of the metaphysical home'. When a question mark replaces God and the belief in a predetermined goal of

our earthly life, we lose 'the imaginary space where our life was supposed to become fulfilled'. This space may indicate the 'level of the social order of rank where the person finds his self-appointed task or destiny' just as it may 'indicate the geographic space, that is, the city, the country, the territory of one's final destiny' (Heller, 1995, 4). However, as Heller points out, in a modern frame of thought, where 'one embraces contingency' such 'opening up of infinite possibilities' is perceived as the ultimate achievement of freedom (Heller, 1995, 4).

Evidently, Rashid is developing a 'nomad science' or epistemology that appreciates how 'flux is reality itself', a 'hydraulic model', as opposed to a conservative and conformist State science that uses a 'theory of solids treating fluids as a special case' and destabilises older scientific certainties 'within science itself' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 362). Rashid proceeds to appoint himself as the carrier of this dynamic science, turning his life into 'a tool of change' with the mission of disrupting the stasis of political, cultural and religious truths. In Bhabha's terms, Rashid becomes one of 'the libratory people' who 'are themselves the bearers of a hybrid identity' and 'initiate the productive instability of revolutionary cultural change' (Bhabha, 1994, 55). Yet, as opposed to Jasmine's plunge into the a-signifying turmoil between two cultures, Rashid fuses opposing grounds of signification. He is not a hybrid 'neither nor' but a hybrid 'both and' and his hybrid deterritorialisation of opposites works through an overabundance of cultural identity. He wants to marry the two 'apparently separate spheres of East and West' (*Carrier,* 244, 246).

As said, Hassan may be read as the narrator of Rashid's story and the overlaps between the narrator and the hero he has brought forth keep drawing attention to themselves. Hassan is an Arab immigrant in Denmark. He is a man of science and an outsider, and, analogously with Rashid's story, he is moving from a cosmopolitan metropolis (Copenhagen) to the dark provincial periphery where the village is still virtually disconnected from the flow of the world as in Rashid's time. Symptomatically, the phone line in Hassan's room is dead (*Carrier,* 6, 10). Like Rashid, Hassan is driven by a polyglot, nomadic consciousness, which makes him uncomfortable in such small spaces of cultural closure. He characterises himself as an 'urban creature' who feels more at ease in the metropolitan centres of the world:

> he would always feel more at home in the preoccupied tangle of race, tongues and creeds, than in places like this. It was too quiet; he felt his presence magnified. He stood out like the proverbial sore

> thumb ... To him villages signified inbreeding, mental and social isolation, backwardness. (*Carrier,* 108)

However, Hassan as a transcultural migrant hero is impaired by a tragic flaw. Unlike Rashid, he is not blessed with the kind of transcendent perspective that tolerantly sees through the predisposed properties of all antagonistic truths and perspectives. He is, as he puts it himself, 'as prejudiced as the next man' (*Carrier,* 108). This is an important point we shall return to later.

The nomad under the gaze of State science

Like Jasmine, Rashid and Hassan, as migrant heroes, are targets of the logic of purity, regulatory constants and hierarchical categorisation that characterises State science. Nowhere is this made more explicit than in Rashid's encounter with the Danes. Rashid is subjected to a wide range of discursive representations, from popular superstition to institutionalised medieval theology, natural science and geo-strategic politics, all with the common aim of territorialising his otherness in typical Orientalist fashion, and all animated by the kind of fear, territorial aggression, ignorance, racism and fundamentalism that is often assumed to be the result of cultural and ethnic isolation. When a mob of people find Rashid on the shore, they:

> chanted and cursed the misfortune which the sea had brought upon them ... They knew that he was a creature from the strange forest far across the sea ... where all men turned black and the devil lived in luxury in his palace of sin. (*Carrier,* 150)

They proceed to lock him up in a shed for animals. When the religious authorities arrive to inspect him, they immediately categorise Rashid as a heathen, a worshipper of the devil with a tainted skin to match the darkness and moral depravity of his soul (see *Carrier,* 204). Even local science is not elevated above such discourse and partakes in the dehumanisation of Rashid. A surgeon subjects Rashid to a pitiless anatomical examination that reduces him to a dehumanised 'it'. With his 'bony hand' and an entire inventory of early Renaissance medicaments, the surgeon prods and pokes 'every corner of the creature's anatomy', rubs its skin, sticks wooden rods up its rectum, cobber pipes down its throat, needles into its belly, searches for gills, valves, ventricles, webbing and other non-human features. Heinesen, as a widely travelled scientist,

blames the provost for the inhuman treatment of Rashid (*Carrier,* 140). However, Heinesen is also deeply enmeshed in Eurocentric and racial superiority. To Heinesen, Rashid is a 'harmless creature' of 'inherent deformity' whose eyes convey a 'simpleness of mind', he is a native of Africa, a slave of the Ottomans and capable of hard work like a 'well-trained work horse' (*Carrier,* 201–3). The only Dane who unreservedly acknowledges Rashid's humanity, before he meets Sigrid, is a small boy who unexpectedly sings for him at Christmas (*Carrier,* 178).

Hassan explains his motivation for writing Rashid's story as one of archaeological and historical interest, but one clearly senses another, discursive motivation too. Among other tings, Hassan undertakes an orientalist analysis of the many references to Rashid as a Turk, which he ascribes to the historical circumstance that the Ottoman threat to Christian Europe was at its height in the seventeenth century (see *Carrier,* 113–14). As Hassan seems constantly to be drawing parallels between then and now, deploying Rashid's story as a *projection* of his own experience as an immigrant in Denmark, Rashid's story thus seems to function as an archaeology of the deep structures of thought that inform the discourses, the power and truth games in the Danish, or Occidental, reception and treatment of Orientals – the hostile mentality or State science – which Hassan is facing in contemporary Denmark. Hassan is mapping the archival structures of the local responses to the foreign that remain either latently present in the collective unconscious or surface in very explicit utterances of bigotry (as when a gang of youth in the village nail a toy monkey to his door) or in more sophisticated and inconspicuous expressions of prejudice and discrimination.

The migrant returning the colonial gaze

D'haen rightly observes that Jamal Mahjoub and *The Carrier* join:

> the growing body of authors and works forcefully writing the West's 'Others' back into the West's cultural memory, not as objects of the Western gaze and discourse, but as subjects in their own right. (D'haen, 2005, 134)

The Carrier in this respect forms a counter-narrative to the dominance of the West in naming the world. It reverses the usual Western representations of East and West as sites of irrationality versus rationality, aggression versus tolerance, savagery versus civilisation, and

so on. Accordingly, Denmark and the Danes are represented as the binary opposite of the pluralistic cosmopolitanism of the Oriental world in the early seventeenth century, othered by the narrator as the barbarian contrast to the civilised and enlightened world Rashid hails from.

One of the ways in which the novel achieves this is through a reversal of the European voyage of discovery. Rashid's journey (and Hassan's) forms a reversal of Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, in which the civilised white colonialist travels into the horrors of the dark African interior. In *The Carrier* it is the civilised, worldly Southerner who moves into the dark, vile, uncultivated and unexplored regions of the North, 'the ends of the earth', the realm of 'the infidels' (*Carrier,* 21, 98). The first images readers receive of the Danes revoke the descriptions of savages on strange shores that have been passed down to us from the earliest European explorers. In animal fashion the Danes scavenge about the wreckage of Rashid's ship, searching and sniffing, suspiciously prodding at the flotsam on the beach (see *Carrier,* 172, 173). Their animal nature is emphasised by Rashid's observation of their language as 'a long, unbroken and very garbled grunting sound' (*Carrier,* 181). As they discover Rashid, the novel's observation of the Danes starts mimicking the Crusoe-discourse of the civilised shipwreck. These natives shriek and shrink at Rashid's civil gestures, before they embark on an apparently instinctual ill-treatment of the stranger (*Carrier,* 173–4).

Throughout the novel the reader is presented with the anthropological gaze of the civilised Southerner who has come to the North, to the land of barbaric savages. Rashid observes how the Danes suffer a squalid existence in longish, low and frail buildings made of timber and mud with bare walls and tiny windows. Everything has a barren look, everything is dark and heavy, the doors are rattling in the wind (*Carrier,* 164–5, 191, 213–14). But more than that, the problem with the Danes seems to be the weather, to paraphrase Gibreel's diagnosis of the English in *The Satanic Verses* (see Rushdie, 1988, 354). The Danes live in an 'inhospitable climate', 'a land which does not know warmth'. It is always raining, the air is brittle like glass, cold wind is slicing through the body and dampness makes the bones weep (see *Carrier,* 163, 169, 213–14). As for the landscape, the only thing it has to offer are stooping trees and sparsely wooded windswept, muddy ridges. It is a 'flat country, of no significant elevation whatsoever' (*Carrier,* 163, 168). Besides, the Danish soil is an 'unwilling flesh', a 'cold immobile fundament' (*Carrier,* 178). By implication, this is the natural habitat of a national

character marked by inhospitality, reservation, coldness and dull backwardedness, offering no stimulation of the senses or the intellect, whatsoever. Nothing foreign is allowed to grow here.

The representations of Denmark in Rashid's story also seem to fold over into Hassan's time, serving as a kind of underlying resonance of Hassan's experience of the nature of the Danes. For instance, there is a brief glimpse of a newspaper article of a Gambian man being deported which Hassan reads as a reflection of the general turn to an anti-immigrant mood in Denmark (see *Carrier,* 107). When Hassan is unexpectedly invited to dinner by his Danish colleague, Okking, the explicit hostility to foreigners in Rashid's story is echoed as a general social awkwardness and discomfort with cultural and racial difference (*Carrier,* 251). Although markedly different from the Danish homes in Rashid's time, Okking's home is equally uninviting seen from a stranger's point of view. It is neat and orderly, 'like a doll's house' where 'everything appeared to fit into place' (*Carrier,* 252–3). Although informal, its informality is so thoroughly encoded that any unusual presence will indeed stand out as misplaced, as not fitting in. Hence, Nyman seems to be following the immediate intention of the novel's representation of Denmark, then and now, as an exposure of the discursive mechanisms of 'nationalist narratives emphasising the purity of Nordic lands' (Nyman, 2002, 257).

Hegemonic hybridity

Mahjoub explains in an interview that he is very concerned with how 'people in the host country know nothing about [immigrants]', believing:

> that they'll never need to know about these people, and that their own history and culture have always been pure and unadulterated by outside forces. (Sévry, 2001, 91)

In line with the latter, another motivation for Hassan's archaeological and narrative endeavour appears to be the unearthing of a suppressed reality of hybridity wherever purity prevails. This is at least how Nyman reads the novel. To Nyman the novel tests the limits of constructing a European identity based on a 'pure *Volkish Heimat*' by showing that all places, no matter how peripheral, are never without foreign influence, without their silenced histories of migration, without their 'hybrid heritage' (Nyman, 2002, 256). The implication of intentional hybridity as an ingressive gaze in *The Carrier* in this way conveys the same revisionist

history of Europe as expressed by the narrator in one of Mahjoub's other novels, *Travelling with Djinns*:

> The face of this continent is scarred by the passage of people. From east to west, north to south. From the earliest Neolithic wanderers to the Mongol hordes, from the Huguenots to the Calvinists, pilgrims, refugees, gypsies. It is a history of railway tracks and roads. A history of transgression, of frontiers and border lines being crossed and recrossed ... our collective history is written in the course of those migrations. (Mahjoub, 2003, 58)

Nyman suggests that *The Carrier* is connected in this way with Paul Gilroy's project of hybridising and heterogenising the history of the Atlantic, Mahjoub adding a black North Sea to Gilroy's tracing of the black diaspora (Nyman, 2002, 257). Like Hassan's archaeology, Gilroy intends to show how 'movement, relocation, displacement, and restlessness are the norms rather than the exception' on the European continent (Gilroy, 1993, 133), and how we may start to see Europe in its true state, as 'transcultural' and 'fractured' and 'rhizomorphic' through the 'unusual perspective' of 'creolised double consciousness' (Gilroy, 1993, 4, 111, 221).

Gilroy describes his own project as a revisionist 'archaeology of black critical knowledges' which reveals how the unacknowledged, and unexplored, 'history of blacks ... has a great bearing on ideas of what the West was and is today' (Gilroy, 1993, 33, 45). In this regard, if we follow Nyman's reading, the affiliation of Mahjoub's novel with Gilroy's project is most evident in its assertion of the unacknowledged but decisive Oriental influences that lie at the base of Western scientific discoveries, calling attention to how the flow of scientific knowledge was moving from East to West up until the Renaissance. In this respect, the novel also uses science as a trope to articulate an epistemology that has no geographical, political or cultural borders. It is through the love of science that Rashid is able to pursue his professed mission of marrying East and West. Significantly this happens in Heinesen's library where Rashid and Sigrid meet, and Rashid's desire for Sigrid is duly cast in the language of migration, fluidity and hybridity: '[h]e was *adrift*, *floating* in a sea of *liquid*, *molten* life', 'looking for a *translation*, a *transformation*, a *change of form*. A *metamorphosis* that would enable him to reach her' (*Carrier,* 247, 249, emphases added). Thus, the novel definitely invites a reading like Nyman's, using a unique position of 'travel, migration and dislocation' to search for new ways of representing home, nation

and identity that replace rigid binaries with a 'hybrid form of identity' (Nyman, 2002, 253).

However, as much as the novel enunciates alternative visions of hybridising movements in the world of science, as well as in its depiction of the cosmopolitan South and its migrant characters, it is questionable how much it actually includes Danish identity in its hybrid vision. It is questionable whether the novel's intentional hybridity, through its re-voicing of these silenced mongrel histories, really reconstructs or *re*-cognises Danish collective identity – 're-members' it in Bhabha's terms – as a hybrid and heterogeneous identity (Bhabha, 2002, 65). In relation to Denmark, the novel assumes the power of definition from the viewpoint of the margin, and, in the spirit of ressentiment, it reverses the images of the master and the slave, the Orient and the Occident. Its discourse of intentional hybridity then suggests that it only does this in order to eventually transcend such binaries. Nevertheless, ressentiment appears to linger throughout the story insofar as the opposition between Rashid, the cosmopolitan, hybrid, polyglot, nomadic migrant and the intolerant, monoglot, nationalist, sedentary mass of Danes is never really destabilised by the hybrid vision itself. On the contrary, Danish identity seems to remain fixed as a background of solid homogeneity – naturally induced through the unwelcoming climate – that causes the intentionally hybrid to stand out as radical newness. This means that the kind of dichotomy between hybridity and purity, mobility and immobility, becoming and being that is so conspicuous in the third-eye vision in *Jasmine* tends to be in operation in *The Carrier* as well, contaminating the inclusiveness of its hybrid vision (it is true that the novel also punctures its own tendency to stigmatise Danish cultural identity by invoking images of a few Danes who are different, like Sigrid. However, this does little to change the general picture of intolerance and bigotry as the norm of Danish national culture – instances of tolerance by necessity being exceptional, individual or incidental). The novel's language of representation thus leaves us with the incommensurable choice between an anti-essentialist hybridity and an essentialist cultural purity, while paradoxically essentialising Danish national identity as homogeneous. In Khair's terms, the novel's 'conception of the hybrid' becomes '*hegemonic*', its 'openness ... turn[s] into fixity'. Yet, this is fortunately not where the development of intentional hybridity ends in Mahjoub's novel.

In recent reengagements with the dichotomy between purity and hybridity in hybridity theory, a discussion of essentialism and anti-essentialism has yielded ideas of how to explore identity formations in

ways that involve more parameters than the question of whether this or that identity is pure or impure. Ways are offered in which we may soften the dichotomy of national essentialism and hybrid anti-essentialism by speaking of *strategic* essentiaslism and *strategic* anti-essentialism. In-between these two positions human identity formation appears to take place in the space between the pure and the hybrid. As these ideas may take us round to another reading of *The Carrier's* intentional hybridity and representation of Danish culture, I will make a short theoretical pit stop here before shifting the analysis into a second gear.

Moving out of the binary of essentialism vs. anti-essentialism

In parallel with Werbner's appeal to dialecticism as replacing the extreme opposition of hybridity versus purity, she calls attention to the inherent danger of an anti-essentialist hybridity discourse: it causes us to 'essentialise all essentialisms as the same', which criminalises any basis of religious, ethnic and national identities (Werbner, 1997, 19). Werbner's argument in this regard tallies with the old but justified concern, spearheaded by critics like Spivak and Ahmad, that endless plays of uncertainty and ambiguity offer no ground for collective commitments or political action.

Consequently, Werbner suggests that the general oppositionality between hybridity and essentialism be punctured by an epistemological shift from an anti-essentialist position to an anti-anti-essentialist position. This means that we may acknowledge some varieties of essentialism as necessary in a *strategic* sense. Instead of rejecting or condemning essentialism altogether, we may contextualise essentialism by asking 'who essentialises whom, when and for what purpose'? What is at issue, Werbner points out, is the politics and power games involved in representation and self-representation (Werbner, 1997b, 226, see 228). Along with the differentiation of the concept of hybridity itself, I agree that such reconsideration of essentialism is highly urgent in an academic climate where anti-essentialism and plays of ambiguity and uncertainty have taken centre stage as the only right mode of thought. In fact, as Samir Dayal points out, a true pluralism is not a pluralism that categorically excludes essentialism, it is a perspective that appreciates identity formations in their specific contexts – including even occurences of racism, by asking what kind of racism, against which group and for what reasons (see Dayal, 2007, 279–81). This kind of pluralism also seems sufficiently pliant to accommodate Paul Sharrad's call for a strategy that

allows 'the continuation of ethnic identity as a partly racial/ised phenomenon while also validating ... cultural mixing', wherewith we avoid getting carried away with 'the superficial bricolage of postmodernity' (Sharrad, 2007, 106, 117).

The idea of 'strategic essentialism' was actually coined by Spivak already in 1988 in 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' and has since been advocated by many critics in the post-colonial field, such as Robbins, Banerjee, Clifford and Hall. In an argument against 'prescriptive anti-essentialism', Clifford states that 'struggles for integrity and power within and against globalizing systems need to deploy *both* tradition and modernity, authenticity and hybridity – in complex counterpoints' (Clifford, 1997, 178). In all this mixing 'we need to be able to recognize strategic claims for localism or authenticity as possible sites of resistance and empowerment rather than of simple nativism' (Clifford, 1997, 183). Banerjee says about essentialism as a strategic matter that 'while it is aware of its constructedness, it is nevertheless willing to take a stand' (Banerjee, 2002, 20). She indicates that this is still a perception of identity that rests on a fundamental perception of reality as ruled by difference, contingency and flux:

> While its *strategic* nature would testify to the fact that it has theorized and recognized the heterogeneity of the categories it retains, its stopping short of an endless deconstruction also accounts for its political viability. (Banerjee, 2002, 29, see also 42)[1]

Although Stuart Hall now and then falls into the rhetoric of simplistic third-space scenarios and exceptional migratory perspectives (see Hall, 1990), his idea of hybridity in particular seems to make room for a discourse of strategic essentialism. In 1993 in 'Minimal Selves' he spoke of what may be coined as a kind of 'provisional essentialism'. First, he emphasised that all traditional forms of group politics, 'nation, ethnic group, families, sexualities, etc.' are based on 'arbitrary closures', yet such closure is necessary for any action to become possible in the first place, since '[t]he politics of infinite dispersal is the politics of no action at all'. He then proceeded to point to the necessity of temporary closures to the 'meaning of the end of the sentence' (Hall, 1993, 118):

> Potentially, discourse is endless: the infinite semiosis of meaning. But to say anything at all in particular, you do have to stop talking. Of course, every full stop is provisional. The next sentence will take nearly all of it back. So what is this 'ending'? It's a kind of stake, a

> kind of wager. It says, 'I need to say something, something ... just now.' It is not forever, not totally universally true ... But just now, this is what I mean; this is who I am. At a certain point, in a certain discourse we call these unfinished closures, 'the self,' 'society,' 'politics,' etc. (Hall, 1993, 117)

Hall understands such discursive positioning as 'strategic' insofar as 'there is no permanent equivalence between the sentence we close, and its true meaning as such', which means that 'meaning continues to unfold ... beyond the arbitrary closure that makes it, at any moment, possible' (Hall, 1990, 397). By the same token, 'practices of representation', to Hall, 'always implicate the positions from which we speak ... the positions of *enunciation* ... What we say is always "in context", *positioned*' (Hall, 1990, 392). Identity is 'never complete, always in process' but within representation, identities form 'points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us' (Hall, 1990, 392; Hall, 1993, 6). Summing up, the idea of strategic essentialism in this light offers temporary positions of homogeneity within the general condition of heterogeneity, or temporary pauses to or decelerations of the world's heterogenising forces.

Within recent years an increasing number of hybridity theorists have begun to speak of *strategic hybridity* or *strategic anti-essentialism* as a parallel to strategic essentialism. Kraidy, for example, chooses to see hybridity as 'strategic rhetoric' exercising a certain power of persuasion and Sharrad thinks that a '*strategic hybridity*' may answer to 'the needs of its different users according to their socio-political contexts' (Kraidy, 2005, viii; Sharrad, 2007, 106). Just as we may in certain contexts endorse certain forms of anti-hybrid essentialism as *strategic essentialism* we may in other contexts acknowledge certain forms of anti-essentialist hybridity as strategic hybridity, or 'strategic deconstruction' to use one of Werbner's terms – for instance, as Banerjee suggests, in a context in which nationality and cultural specificity are exploited to 'exclude migrant subjectivity' (Werbner, 1997, 10; Banerjee, 2002, 63, 101).[2]

Strategic hybridity may thus be seen as offering temporary positions of rhetorical ambiguity and heterogeneity as a resistance to extremist *discourses* of certainty and essentialism. Here the term 'strategic' comes to signal both the contextual deliberation and intentionality of a hybrid discourse and its limited applicability as a discourse centred on a particular target. If we retain a view on intentional hybridity as a delimited, bounded and focalised act of resistance, we may temporarily endorse the crudeness of its anti-essentialist rhetoric and the hyperbolic

binaries it constructs between the pure and the hybrid as *contextually imperative*, while still barring the discourse from ever turning into a panacea for all cultural, social and political problems and their historical and material underpinnings. Or, to put it differently, if we retain a focus on intentional hybridity as a counter-discursive *function*, we avoid celebrating it as an end in itself or an ideal *condition* to aspire to.

Both strategic essentialism and strategic hybridity are examples of an anti-anti-essentialist perspective, but anti-anti-essentialism may also be understood as more than just a matter of signalling a deliberate political strategy or position of resistance or acknowledging 'temporary discursive positions' in certain countertexts. Another idea of the anti-anti-essentialist perspective seems to be emerging within the discursive space that is left behind in-between the extremes of strategic essentialism and strategic hybridity. Anti-anti-essentialism seems to involve an acknowledgement or a reconceptualisation of cultural identity formations as taking place in the space in-between hybridity and purity – as if capturing Lukács' dialectic notion of an 'intellectual comprehension *of permanence within change* and of *inner change within the enduring validity of the essence*' (Lukács, 1916, 16, italics added) or, for that matter, the impermanence of a Heideggerian sameness that is not innate or ordained by some cosmic or natural order, and yet not an arbitrary construction either. Robbins, in this respect, has suggested a phrase like 'imperfect certainty' as a new way of understanding human identity formation, which implies a kind of cultural 'essence', or 'vague essence', that is not absolute or totalising (Robbins, 1999, 119).

Notwithstanding the uneasiness about deconstruction expressed above (such as the concern about 'endless deconstruction' and 'the superficial bricolage of postmodernity'), it may be argued that deconstruction the way Derrida understood it belongs to this version of anti-anti-essentialism, rather than to the postmodern anti-essentialist project it is often associated with. The problem with hyperbolic hybridity is that it is closely affiliated with an idea of deconstruction as implying a throwing away or rejection of that which is deconstructed. Hence, the deconstruction of the logocentricity of a concept – the logocentricity of ethnicity or nationality, for example – is often followed by a refutation of ethnicity and nationality altogether. We expose something as a construction and conclude that it is therefore deceptive and useless. In this manner we easily end up with a 'prescriptive' form of anti-essentialism. Hall has noted how Derrida's theoretical insights have been re-appropriated in this connection into 'a celebration of formal "playfulness" which evacuates ... political meaning' (Hall, 1990, 397). This is not the

point of deconstruction at all, and it fails to capture the crucial implication in Derrida that concepts, as they are *dethroned*, may simultaneously be re-employed, *recycled*, in their deconstructed forms, since we have no 'truer' concepts to replace them.

As opposed to a mere throwing away of a concept, reusing deconstructed concepts involves a use that *re*-cognises the internal instability and heterogeneity of concepts, their internal forces of Difference and their shifting validity and effect in different contexts and relations. Derrida is very explicit about this in his essay 'Some Statements and Truisms about Neologisms, Newism, Postism, Parasitisms, and Other Small Seisms' where we may discern an appeal to an anti-anti-essentialist mode of thinking. Derrida speaks of putting old concepts in quotation marks in order to re-use language again 'by submitting it to the effects of deconstruction ... without reconstituting what is being deconstituted' (Derrida, 1987, 75). This, he says, is the *effect* of the entire project of deconstruction: a kind of 'propriety', a 'mode of self-consciousness' which conveys 'a distrust towards a concept which is pure from any contamination and from an absolutely reappropriable proper sense' (Derrida, 1987, 77, 83). This kind of recycled or 'second-hand' use of concepts is very far from any kind of 'formalist sophistication' and 'neutralization of reference' that 'keeps history at a distance', says Derrida. Quite the opposite, it 'conveys the sharpest sense of history, of the history of concepts', it is not mere 'play', it is driven by 'political and ethical responsibility' (Derrida, 1987, 75).

Accordingly I tend to agree with Hayden White that Derrida is a relativist 'only in an instrumentalist way' (White, 1983, 71). White explains Derrida's project of deconstruction as a defetishisation of certain fetishes of Western thought, like 'the origin, the subject, referentiality, closure'. Yet, although Derrida 'seems to leave nothing un-deconstructed', he does not throw away concepts as worthless; all he does is to show:

> the instability of the product, the discourse, or the representation ... how a product worthy of interpretation bears the marks of the process of its own production on its very surface. (White, 1983, 71–2)

It might also be argued that the process of deconstructing a concept only to re-cycle it in a 'deconstituted' form is actually what is at work in the recent reconsiderations of the concept of hybridity. 'Critical hybridists' like Werbner, Pieterse, Kraidy, for example, are deconstructing hybridity by exposing the teleological and universalising implications in hybridity discourse and its reification and dismissive homogenisation

and polarisation of other discourses, but instead of rejecting the concept altogether, they suggest that we start looking for ways of reusing it after its deconstruction, or, in Hayden White's words, after its defetishisation (White, 1983, 72). The unreflexive orthodoxy of Hybridity with a capital 'H', which we may find in cases when hybridity is turned into a prescriptive 'hybrid*ism*', is then to be replaced with many kinds of hybridities in the lower case.

In contrast to Bhabha, Hall is much more vocal and explicit about the reuse or recycling of deconstructed concepts in their non-totalised forms. '[D]etotalized or deconstructed' concepts are still 'good to think with', he argues in paraphrase of Lévi-Strauss' famous remark on myth. 'The line which cancels them [concepts], paradoxically permits them to go on being read', and concepts, such as the concepts of ethnic or national identity in this way come to operate:

> 'under erasure' in the interval between reversal and emergence; an idea which cannot be thought in the old way, but without which certain key questions cannot be thought at all. (Hall, 1993, 1, 2)

Hall's point about how we establish meaning by strategically putting temporary stops to the 'infinite semiosis of language' must be seen in the same light. Such stops – the 'unfinished closures' of 'the self,' 'society,' 'politics' – form momentary cuts or positionings in the heterogeneous flux of signification, which do not detract from Derrida's insight as long as we do not mistake them as permanent or absolute (see Hall, 1990, 397–8).

To Hall, once we mobilise not only the language of difference but also the language of 'contingent closures of articulation', it becomes possible:

> to think about the nature of new political identities which isn't founded on the notion of some absolute, integral self and which clearly can't arise from some fully closed narrative of the self. (Hall, 1993, 118)

This may bring us to see, for instance, ethnicity in a new light. Whereas '[e]thnicity *can* be a constitutive element in the most viciously regressive kind of nationalism or national identity', it is also:

> beginning to carry some other meanings, and to define a new space for identity. It insists ... on the fact that every identity is placed,

> positioned, in a culture, a language, a history ... It insists on specificity, on conjuncture. But it is not necessarily armor-plated against other identities. It is not tied to fixed, permanent, unalterable oppositions. It is not wholly defined by exclusion. (Hall, 1993, 118–19)

Likewise Hall begins to see tradition and rooted identity in terms of process rather than fixity. Traditionally rooted identity is not necessarily backward-looking and conservative, keeping us in places. On the contrary, it can be progressive, looking to the future, helping us to move on, to go places:

> Though they seem to invoke an origin in a historical past with which they continue to correspond, identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not 'who we are' or 'where we come from', so much as what we might become. (Hall, 1996, 4)

Gilroy makes a similar point in *The Black Atlantic* about the 'reproduction of traditions' which he sees:

> not in the unproblematic transmission of a fixed essence through time but in the breaks and interruptions which suggest that the invocation of tradition may itself be a distinct, though covert, response to the destabilizing flux of the post-contemporary world. (Gilroy, 1993, 101)

This is a line of anti-anti-essentialist thinking that brings Gilroy to offer alternative conceptualisations, or recycled conceptions of essentialism and homogeneity. In addition to his idea of 'a changing rather than an unchanging same', he suggests such notions as 'flexible essentialism' and a 'tradition in ceaseless motion' (Gilroy, 1993, 101, 99, 101) – all to facilitate a dialectics between the equally rigid perspectives of essentialism and anti-essentialism (Gilroy, 1993, 120, see also 101–2). Or as Hall has it: 'Difference ... persists – in and alongside continuity'; as cultural identity is always 'a matter of "becoming" as well as of "being" ', there will always be a 'play of "difference" within identity' (Hall, 1990, 396, 394, 396). Such conceptualisations of anti-anti-essentialism is clearly affiliated with Lotman's ideas of collective cultural identity as a semiosphere, with Bakhtin's ideas of centripetal and centrifugal forces, with Heidegger's sameness, with Casey's idea of emplacement and with the concern of this book with processes of organic hybridity and slowed down becomings.

As opposed to Mukherjee's novel there are a number of hermeneutical keys in *The Carrier* that call attention to its discourse of intentional hybridity as an intentionally strategic discourse. This will be illustrated below, and, as I will show towards the end of the analysis, it is exactly Mahjoub's explicit framing of the novel's hybridity discourse as a strategic discourse that makes room for a re-reading of the novel's representation of Danish identity in an anti-anti-essentialist perspective.

The strategic framing of hybridity discourse in *The Carrier*

As I have shown, Mahjoub's novel repeats the common dichotomy in hybridity discourse of hybridity versus purity in its establishment of simple oppositions between the cosmopolitan and the national, the nomadic and sedentary, between a transcendental homelessness and a transcendental homeness, between heterogeneity and homogeneity, and so on. These oppositions do not initiate any dialogue or dialectic between forces of homogeneity and heterogeneity and, as in *Jasmine*, the novel's hybridity discourse in this way paradoxically reduces heteroglossia in the novel, excluding, silencing or deprecating voices that are not consciously hybrid.

One passage in particular seems to indicate a complete colonisation of the novel's discursive economy by the voice of migrant hybridity. At the Okkings' Hassan feels interrogated by Mrs Okking. He senses a silence that 'close[s] in on him' which he recognises from earlier encounters with Danes (*Carrier,* 254). Hassan proceeds to interpret Mrs Okking's references to his foreignness and her compliments on his fine Danish as a form of subtly disguised discrimination. When she expresses a concern for her daughter in the capital, which is 'another world', Hassan significantly quotationmarks her use of the word 'cosmopolitan' to denote a place 'inhabited by people like him' (*Carrier,* 254). While Hassan plays along on the surface of the conversation, he judges it as a discourse with a covert or silent agenda, expecting the turns it takes, interpreting its pauses, hesitations, excuses and apologies (*Carrier,* 256). Clearly this is one of the episodes D'haen has in mind when he suggests that the discrimination in Rashid's time is repeated in Hassan's in a 'moderate' or 'swaddled' form (D'haen, 2005, 130). Nyman also reads along with the novel's representing language here and elaborates on Hassan's judgemental interpretation of the Okkings. To Nyman the values of the Okkings are 'based on their acceptance of nationalist ideologies, as is shown in their way of contrasting the purity of their rural space with the hybrid metropolis populated by Hassans, Rashids and migrants with

different lifestyles' (Nyman, 2002, 256). However, the exchange between Mrs Okking and Hassan also illustrates the machinery at work when the discourse of hybridity imposes the kind of purity and essentialism it is against upon its chosen adversary, the sedentary national citizen.

In Bakhtin's vocabulary, Mrs Okking's voice constitutes an imported verbal-ideological language in the novel. In this case it is a combatant language imported into a space of enunciation that is ruled by a transcultural migrant hybridity discourse. But rather than doing all it can *not* to deprive the imported voice of its independence and allow it to 'speak for itself' (Bakhtin, 1935, 358), the novel allows its migrant protagonist to go between Mrs Okking and the reader, silencing her voice by interpreting it and thus completely speaking *for* her. In addition, as in *Jasmine*, Hassan keeps his thoughts to himself which means that no real dialogue ensues between the different voices. Rather, Hassan's interpretation of Mrs Okking's voice leaves us with an absolute, essentialist counter-position to the discourse of cultural hybridity while the latter remains safely unchallenged.

However, although the opposition between hybridity and purity in Rashid's story is repeated in this way in Hassan's story, something else is at work too. There is another dialogue in Hassan's part of the novel that may point to an alternative economy of discourses in *The Carrier*; this is a dialogue between Hassan and Martin (a young Dane Hassan befriends). Hassan irritably complains to Martin about the village youth and their racist harassment, bitterly blaming them for their desire not to know anything about him and the way they feed their aggression, like their ancestors, with ignorance and fear. Surprisingly, Martin comes to their defence. They are bored, he says, and stuck in a situation with few prospects of a more interesting life. In fact they mean no real harm (see *Carrier,* 222–3). In this way Martin represents a voice in *The Carrier* that prevents Hassan's universalising anti-racism and anti-essentialism from completely colonising the discursive territory of the novel. Without being appropriated by Hassan, or colonised by his interpretation, Martin's voice independently challenges the predominant language-intention in the novel. Notably, Martin contextualises racist discourse, isolates it and explains it through local socio-cultural factors that, in fact, posit Hassan as the privileged party, favoured with maturity, education and a greater degree of free choice. Martin's accentuation of the immediate power relations that are at work in the particular situation in this way becomes a kind of strategic essentialism.[3]

The episode with Martin exposes an element of *not-seeing* in the hybrid perspective and it relates directly to Hassan's earlier confession

that he is as prejudiced as the next person. Both instances cast doubt on the reliability of all of Hassan's representations of the world, himself, Rashid, Denmark and the Danes. Admitting his own prejudice, Hassan may be said to constitute a practice of 'self-italicization' of the novel's own discourse, to borrow a term from Banerjee (Banerjee, 2002, 245), and in this manner the novel accomplishes a framing of its hybridity discourse in a way that reduces its central language of representation to a discourse among discourses, illuminating its limited reach, its situational deployment and its intentionality. Yet it is the figurative role of the telescope that really causes the representing language of intentional hybridity to be exhibited as an *image of language* in Mahjoub's novel.

The telescope as a central trope in *The Carrier*

Neither Nyman nor D'haen comment on what seems to me to be a key trope in Mahjoub's novel: the telescope. *The Carrier* is above all a novel about the act of *seeing* as a discursive activity, but contrary to many other migration novels like *Jasmine* and a work like *The Satanic Verses*, *The Carrier* does not evoke the image of a stereoscopic vision as its primary metaphor of the migrant's eye-view on the world; Mahjoub ultimately chooses the telescope.

As the novel's overall trope of seeing, the telescope dramatises the idea of 'perspectivism' that Sigrid introduces to Rashid; that is to say, the telescope epitomises the novel's representation and blending of a variety of different discursive epistemologies – or lenses – through which we observe and thus represent and construct the world. Most often subjects and objects are not cast through one lens only in the novel's telescopic dramas, but through a layering of lenses. We have seen how the representation of Danes is effected through both the lens of the anti-colonial return of colonial discourse and the lens of cosmopolitan hybridity and mobility. As another example, the novel poetically articulates a complex image of 'stargazing' through a superimposition of the lenses of astronomy, astrology, soothsaying, travel, navigation and map-making, each lens piled on top of the other to blend the gazes of otherwise discrete 'sciences'. This of course carries a specific historical reference to the blending of the sciences in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance which were only later separated into distinct disciplines, but D'haen, following the lines of a 'migrant reading', suggests that the novel in this respect desires a compounded gaze to realise a productive synergy between faith, poetry and reason (see D'haen, 2005, 130).

Yet, the novel definitely also warns against the potential epistemological totalisation that may result from such overlaying of lenses, or perspectives. A telescopic drama is acted out, for example, in the close-up 'scientific' study of Rashid's body, which is then repeated in Hassan's sensation of being 'magnified' in rural and provincial Denmark. In Rashid's case, his identity is fixed by the 'Static' lenses of medical science, superstition, religion, racism and orientalism, which are being piled on top of each other to produce a totalised gaze. But the telescope may also be swung back to the novel's migrant hybridity discourse as an apparently inclusive vision that easily changes into a totalising perspective. In the following I will illustrate how the telescope makes itself available to such an 'anti-anti-essentialist' reading in three ways: Firstly, it highlights the *instrumentality* involved in observing and representing others, which also pertains to the gaze of the migrant hero. Secondly, it turns a meta-reflexive gaze on novelistic discourse, illuminating it as an appropriation of reality. And finally, the telescopic framing of the novel's intentional hybridity discourse may lead us to explore the margins of the novel outside the reach of its central language of representation.[4]

The discursive mechanism of the telescope

The word 'telescope' derives from the Greek *teleskopos* which means 'farseeing' (constituted by *tele* which means 'far' and *skopein* which is 'to look or see'), but *skopos* also means 'target', which is the core of the Latin appropriation, *scopo*, as 'purpose' or 'goal' (see *Merriam-Webster*, 2010). Accordingly, the telescope may involve a far reaching sight as well as a seeing from afar, which are two dimensions that are typically implied in the usual analysis of the migrant's stereoscopic vision (in *The Carrier*, primarily activated in Rashid and Hassan's gaze upon Denmark from a point of cultural distance as well as in Hassan's observation of Rashid and Denmark from a temporal distance). However, the trope of the telescope determinedly complicates the notions of 'farseeing' and 'seeing from afar' by drawing attention to the inescapability of optical manipulation involved in observing something from a distance: the telescope constitutes a mechanical apparatus that artificially aids the eye. This is where the element of 'skopos' gains weight with its chain of signification from 'target' to 'goal' and 'purpose'. First, the telescope involves a *deliberate targeting*, a *framing* with a specific *purpose* or *goal*, and, secondly, this targeting, purpose, or intention, involves a manipulation of distance through the telescope's mechanism of *zooming-in* on its object,

enlarging or magnifying the thing that is observed. Accordingly, just as Rashid and Hassan are magnified by the essentialist, xenophobic and racist discourses of Danish national identity, Danish identity is also magnified within a migrant or nomadic perspective. Danish identity is constructed in the novel by a manipulative zooming-in that enlarges certain features of Danish identity within a limited frame, the observer's intentions, distorting it or blowing it out of proportion. The magnified image threatens to fill the observer's, and indeed the reader's, entire field of vision. Such manipulation may produce critical insights, as argued in the discussion of intentional hybridity, but, as with any other vision, it will never escape its dependency on instrumental design as well as its inherent potential of deception, universalisation and likely eclipse of other fields of vision. This is where Hassan's admitted prejudice merges with the trope of the telescope as an articulation of the limited reach of the migrant's eye-view of the world. In fact, it is Hassan's self-examination that may justify this reading of the telescope in the first place.

Hence, Mahjoub's offer of what we might call the 'telescopic vision' differs markedly from the common idea of the migrant's 'stereoscopic vision' or 'double vision' or 'third-eye vision'. The stereoscopic vision is a privileged vision, although it pretends not to be. When enunciated as a 'double vision' or 'the truest eye', it assumes a meta-discursive position outside the games of the discourses it observes, disclosing and hybridising their codes of binary oppositions from a supposedly transparent or disinterested perspective, or 'outside gaze', that cannot be univocally fixed or placed (see Bhabha, 1994, 7–8). By comparison, the idea of a telescopic gaze in *The Carrier* stops short of assuming such privilege. It highlights *all* 'seeing' as discursively positioned along Hall's line of thinking, including the migrant's supposedly heterogeneous and hybrid vision. Accordingly, Mahjoub's is a hybridity discourse that explicitly draws attention to its own discursive frames as well as to its discursive framing, a self-reflexivity that calls into question the adequacy of representation itself. Rather than a 'double-vision', it is a 'one eye gaze out upon the world' (*Carrier*, 276).[5] Or to put it differently, the metaphor calls attention to the contamination of the nomadic with the monadic in the migrant's vision as a telescopic gaze – an awareness of the bifurcation within the rhizome. And yet, as in Hall's theory, the temporary closure and the limitation of a perspective, for all its dubiousness, does not necessarily mean that we have to take it all back: a temporary closure to the endless uncertainty of signification is all we have and is therefore indispensable for any kind of navigation in the world; without

some privileging of one's own position, it becomes impossible to say anything at all.

As said, Mahjoub's novel offers an ingressive gaze, as opposed to the merely transgressive gaze we have seen in *Jasmine*. In this respect, Mahjoub makes elaborate moves to make the reader connect the figure of the telescope with a temporal perspective to add to the instrument's otherwise exclusively spatial orientation: 'The hollow tubular instrument' is a 'gleaming conduit that can reach out, forwards into the distance and the future, and backwards into the past' (*Carrier*, 276) – a kind of time-travel occurs when looking at stars because of the time lag of light (an obvious link being drawn between Rashid's astronomy and Hassan's archaeological digging for historical otherness and hybridity), and as a navigational instrument the telescope anticipates the future: keeping an eye on imminent encounters, obstacles and passage ways on the road ahead. However, these temporal dimensions of the telescopic gaze do not offer any kind of penetrating super-vision either. Mahjoub evokes the image of the *penumbra*. A penumbra is an area of partial shadow, such as occurs, for instance, at the eclipse of the moon or the sun – the moment just before, or after, complete darkness. Hassan explains that with a penumbra one is 'peering into the past and yet … seeing only a portion of what had once existed' (*Carrier*, 44). The word 'penumbra' derives from Latin, combining paene: 'almost' and *umbra*: 'shadow' or 'shade' (as in 'umbrage'). The *Merriam-Webster* definition reads: 'a space of partial illumination (as in an eclipse) between the perfect shadow on all sides and the full light' or 'something that covers, surrounds, or obscures: *shroud*' (*Merriam-Webster*, 2010). The telescope may offer 'a peering into the past' – a past of heterogeneity and hybridity – and this vision may cast a futuristic dream back onto the present, but it is only 'for a brief, fleeting moment' that 'the present is faintly illuminated' (*Carrier*, 276). The telescopic vision is thus, at best, a penumbral vision, a *partial* vision, not an *impartial* vision, a vision impeded by shadow and shade, that may cover and obscure as well as reveal and expose – all ascribable to the insufficiency of the beholder's instrument in taking in the entire spatial and temporal context. Hassan's factitious and fictitious revisits with the past, and his representations of the Danes, can only offer a glimpse of truth, or offer one possible mode of truth, and may just as well obscure a lot of other truths.

The novel as a telescopic gaze

I have touched on telescopic lenses of ideological and temporal dimensions, but Mahjoub's trope may also raise the question of how literature,

the novel itself, constitutes a telescopic gaze, and what consequences this has for the novel's overall acts of representation? In 'The Limits of Relativism in the Arts', Hayden White says about works of art that they 'demand interpretation, claim it, while continually resisting *definitive* interpretation, precisely because they symbolically represent the process of representation itself'. That is to say, at one and the same time 'they both *enact* and *draw attention to*' representation, they 'are representations of representation – symbols of the process of representation' (White, 1983, 61). In this way literature supposedly works as a machine of demystification that avoids what White refers to as a human capacity to *bewitch* itself with language.

White reminds us of the way in which structuralists and post-structuralists distinguish between the *sign* and the *symbol*. In this equation the *symbol* involves a system of signification that has become conventionalised in a given culture or social group. *Signs*, on the other hand, are found in nature, like the footprints of an animal. Whereas signs are merely indexical and do not necessarily indicate any conscious intentionality, 'symbolising signs require that we impute intention or purpose to them' (White, 1983, 55). As it happens, humans often turn indexical *signs* into *symbols* by encoding them culturally and socially – the merely indexical sign is *fetishised*, says White. This may be what is happening more or less automatically when the world is processed through a culture's system of commonly-held representations (Todorov). To White, any automatic or unconscious generation and transmission of represented signs is 'to be at the mercy of the symbolic code' which is 'usually some kind of common sense, that [one] unthinkingly uses as the only possible way of truthfully representing reality' (White, 1983, 61). For this reason,

> [t]he human capacity to create symbol systems is ... envisaged as little more than a basis for understanding how human intelligence can *bewitch itself* by its own powers of signification. (White, 1983, 69, emphasis added)

It is in this regard that literature, by being about the processes of symbolisation, by exposing them, may disenchant us from the self-bewitchment caused by our commonly-held representations. Likewise, 'by virtue of its apparent self-referentiality', by 'calling attention to or featuring as part of its "content" its own symbolizing processes', literature supposedly avoids a new conversion of signs into symbols (White, 1983, 56). The caution we need to make here, I think, is not to believe

that for this reason literature is merely *about* the bewitching powers of signs-turned-symbols or that literature only works as a sobering antidote to bewitchment, defetishising symbols and returning them to their deterritorialised status as signs. Literature certainly has great revelatory power and can make visible power structures that lie hidden in discursive symbolism, such as oppressive codifications of identity in, say, colonial discourse, but it also partakes in the production of symbols itself, inescapably producing and transmitting value-laden or highly encoded signs. For instance, Mukherjee's novel does draw attention to the processes of representation through its demonstration of how the symbolising processes of major discourses define and limit individual becoming. But as far as the novel's own representing language is concerned, its third eye language of transcultural mobility, there is a strong tendency in the novel only to represent rather than *drawing attention* to its own act of representation, causing us to lose sight of this language as anything but a transparent reflection of the world. It is precisely in this manner that transcultural migration literature and its celebratory reception seem unreflectively to reproduce a highly bewitching discourse of migration and hybridity as a transparent language of the heterogeneity and flux of reality; a language charmed as descriptive while so many prescriptive elements are at work within it.

The Carrier is close to repeating this through its enchanting nomad heroes, its alluring cosmopolitan hybrid geography and its global migrant's eye-view on the world. If we are not wary at this point of the bewitching powers of sign-production, we risk being left 'at the mercy of the symbolic code', automatically and unthinkingly transmitting the codes of migratory discourse, its self-assumed heterogeneity and hybridity, as a new kind of 'common sense', as 'the only possible way of truthfully representing reality'. But here the trope of the telescope functions particularly well in drawing attention to the novel's sign-production. The kind of self-referentiality that is effectuated by the telescope is a self-referentiality that points to the novel's own intentional participation in the symbolic codification of signs. In White's terms, 'its own symbolizing processes' feature 'as part of its "content" ' (see White, 1983, 61–2). One passage that explicitly shows this uses the telescopic trope to point to the mechanisms at work in the construction of a story:

> The instrument in question is deceptively simple: a brass casing open at either end into which hard droplets of glass are squeezed. The light enters through the glass, bending as it does so – air and glass being

> so related – and passes, thus transformed, into the long brass tube of time. The rays are collected like so many threads and sewn together again, much like in the telling of a tale. (*Carrier,* 276)

So 'the telling of a tale', the novel as a telescopic instrument, is described as a processing of that which 'passes through' it, 'light'. Light translates as reality or ideas or discourses which enter the novel and are immediately *transformed* by its particular internal machinery of representation, *bended* and dissected into many rays or threads. The rays or threads are then 'collected' and 'sewn together again' before they are emitted. What is at stake in this rendition of literature is markedly different from the idea of literature as an arena of discourses transparently exhibiting various contestations for truth. The novel does not merely exhibit language, or the heteroglossia of the world, as Rashid's meta-analytical gaze might at first indicate; it thoroughly works on the discourses it imports into its body, appropriates them, transforms them and emits them again in a new symbolising construction – or a new translation of signs. An entire discursive machinery is thus at work in the novel as a sign machine, comparable with the instrumentality of the telescope with all its implications of exaggeration, positioning, framing and intentional focusing – all operated by the 'two droplets of glass' at either end of the instrument: the acts of writing and reading.[6]

In form and content *The Carrier* thus abstains from exploiting the powerful mechanisms in language of making loaded discourse disappear in tricks of transparency. But, as indicated, and this is probably the most important point, the novel ultimately continues to renounce any implications of omniscience that may paradoxically emerge as a result of exposing its own discourse. It renounces the possibility of any meta-language altogether. Towards the end of the novel, Rashid asserts that man has a 'foolish vanity and desire for omnipotence' (*Carrier,* 242). Obviously, this statement refers to the totalising epistemologies we have encountered throughout the novel – that is, religious, scientific and ethnocentric claims to omniscience – but it also refers to the migrant judgement of national and sedentary cultures from the perspective of anti-essentialism: Rashid lifts the telescope to his eye and looks up into the sky. Simultaneously, in a hallucinatory moment, he soars out of his body and, suspended in mid-air, looks down at himself while his mind travels back to where his story began (see *Carrier,* 278). Rashid may have discovered perspective as the producer of truth and meaning, but he also discovers that 'perspectivism' remains inescapable despite this epistemological breakthrough: discovering the construction of reality and truth through perspective does not

result in any final, superior pluralistic meta-perspective. From above he sees himself lying flatly against the ground and concludes that 'science', even a nomadic and heteroglot science such as Rashid's, 'cannot lead us anywhere, but back to ourselves' (*Carrier,* 278). In a sense Rashid's observation of himself through the telescope may be read as a dramatisation of Derrida's idea of what deconstruction really is:

> the construction of a radical metalinguistics, which, however, integrates within itself ... the *impossibility* of metalanguage. (Derrida, 1987, 76, emphasis added)

Even from this suspended or elevated point of view, Rashid's hybrid and heteroglot gaze turns back on itself and its own perspectival positionality, relativising its own relativism.

Outside the telescopic frame

In *The Carrier* Mahjoub may be said to succeed in calling attention to the representing language of the migrant hero as an image of a distinctive language, 'as a *particular point of view on the world and on oneself*', as Bakhtin puts it (Bakhtin, 1929, 47). Outside the frame of the novel's intentional hybridity discourse, or in the fringes of the novel's central representing language, other things may then start to come into view. As it happens, there is a pertinent second definition of 'penumbra' in *Merriam-Webster* in this connection. 'Penumbra' can mean 'a fringe' or 'a surrounding or adjoining region in which something exists in a lesser degree' (*Merriam-Webster,* 2010). The penumbra is thus a space of less than the essential thing, a region off the centre, yet ad*joining* the centre. As a final turn in this analysis, I shall move into this quiet, penumbral part of *The Carrier* to make a few suggestions of possible readings outside the frames of the novel's central discourse, in the fringe where the nomadic and transcultural-hybrid language may persist 'in a lesser degree' than intended. As I will move on to show, the reader may experience another sense of Danish identity and landscape outside the telescopic frame, in the undefined spaces left behind outside the novel's high drama of hybridity versus purity, or anti-essentialism against essentialism, just as we may experience a more complex sense of Hassan's place in the Danish setting. It is in the fringe of the novel that we may also start to discern slow speeds of cultural becoming.

One of the most striking things to appear in the novel once its central representing language loses its authority of representation is a

remarkable contrast between the attitudes Hassan anticipates he will be met with in the village ('standing out' like Rashid, 'his presence magnified') and how he is *actually* received by the villagers in many instances. In great contrast to Rashid's experience, the first villagers Hassan comes across seem to pay no attention to his difference at all. There is no reference to his difference in the local shop, a man on a tractor respectfully gestures a soundless greeting and his landlady treats him like any other guest without the slightest suggestion of anything out of the ordinary (see *Carrier,* 6–8). What is striking about these passages, which are so brief that they are easily missed, is the complete absence of the kind of aggressive eruption of xenophobia or the awkward hesitation Hassan expects – and leads the reader to expect with his representations of the Danes. This is but further accentuated by the fact that Mahjoub's protagonist does not even notice or comment on this absence at all. It is as if Hassan, once again, fails to see things, as if his self-assumed omniscience in the representation of the Danes falters without him noticing it. Such passages seem to make up an unmarked, unsaturated or non-verbalised level of the text where the world is no longer explicitly or implicitly defined, interpreted or explained by Hassan, or by the cosmopolitan hybrid perspective. It is as if a certain silence occurs at this level of the text, as if the verbal denseness of the novel's language of representation thins out, and, as if superimposed on this silence, the passages of Hassan's accusations against the Danes suddenly come across as extremely loud and overstated – it is not really Hassan who 'stands out' in these brief peripheral landscapes, it is his *idea of standing out* that protrudes from the text as an unreasonable, unfounded exaggeration or hollow roaring.

Lecercle says about Deleuze's idea of language that when it is pushed to the limit, we are 'moving towards silence as the climax', silence as the highest value of language (Lecercle, 2002, 2–3). Deleuze thinks there is too much of a racket in language; he thinks that 'far from not communicating enough, we already communicate too much' – there is too much discussion, too much talk, too many words, too much noise (see Lecercle, 2002, 248). We have seen how the nomadic hybridity discourse tends to be very loud in *Jasmine*, occupying the discursive space of the novel to such an extent that it gives alternative visions of the world a scant chance. It is hard to escape Jasmine's explanations of how things are and are supposed to be; Mukherjee's novel is 'crammed full, with no empty space remaining' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 165). This is why the silences that arise in *The Carrier* when the novel's representing language does not say all, when it stops talking, stops describing the

Danes directly, are so precious. Instances of silence or representational undersaturatedness leave spaces open to other reading experiences of the text, or a co-writing of the text by the reader. It is in the novel's *silences*, outside the telescopic hybridity discourse, where the novel's thematisation of race, ethnicity, nation and cultural separation as the prime shapers of identity appears to recede, that an aperture is opening up to a different, or less definite or more complex impression of the local villagers. Rather than being *told* what to think of the Danish landscape, culture and identity, rather than being *ordered* to think of those things in a certain way, from a certain perspective of migrant mongrelisation, denotation shifts to connotation, opening a possibility for readers to get to a different sense of the local landscape, culture and identity – as the product of a slowed down becoming or a slow process of emplacement, for instance.

As a migrant hero, Hassan typically challenges evocations of space as offering a reliable, unchanging and naturally national ground. By observing great discontinuity in the local landscape across time, he replaces the nation's self-authorising 'guise of pastness', to use a term from Bhabha (Bhabha, 1994, 52), with a radical speed of becoming: he observes how the manmade features that presently stand out of the landscape are very recent, and how, before that, it would all 'have been open, unkempt moorland shaped by the last ice age' (*Carrier,* 37). This is a vision of place as subject to such a vast and great speed of becoming that it cannot support the continuity of a specific cultural identity across time: the greater history of the landscape does not belong to a momentary Danish history, but to the history of planetary geology. However, in spite of such nomadic disruptions of any sustained connection between a specific place and a specific culture and identity, there are brief, less dazzling observations of this landscape in which radical discontinuity and unbelonging give way to a slowing down of becoming. For instance, there is a longstanding continuity of certain features of Danish cultural identity as shaped in the interaction with this landscape across generations. In its most careful attempts in capturing something particular about Danish identity, the novel emphasises the proximity of the country and its people to the sea. Rashid notes how 'silver mineral flakes ... cling like fish scales to ... hands and faces' and how Andersson, the draughtsman, 'had a tightly chiselled face, with small eyes set close together that were like hard blue mussel shells' and later Hassan notes how the village church is built by rocks spattered with molluscs (*Carrier,* 178, 152, 40, 159). However brief, these are instances in the novel that indicate how cultural identity is not reducible to an arbitrary discursive

construction that has imposed itself on a landscape that may just as well host a different culture. In both the church architecture and in the translation of mussel shells (a distinguishing feature in those parts of Denmark) into facial landscapes, a deep continuity is created between the development of cultural identity and the natural features of the local landscape. The local culture is *of* the local landscape, Casey would say, to whom emplacement is 'the radical experience of merging with the place we are in' of 'becoming one with the landscape' by 'internalising' or 'interiorising' the surrounding environment into self-perception (Casey, 1993, 297, 198). Rather than an arbitrary construction, cultural identity grows out of a complex intertwinement of humans and land, of the natural and the manmade (see Casey, 1993, 291–3).

Yet, the close intertwinement of landscape and cultural features does not appear as a continuous line of homogeneous and fixed Sameness. For all the continuity across time, there is constant change within the slowness of the same. The church is still at the centre of the village after four centuries, but the population has increased and shrunk throughout the years, the central trades of the town have changed and thatched roofs have been replaced by tiles (see *Carrier,* 108–9, 8). Most importantly, Hassan is part of and contributes to the enunciation of how present features of Danish identity and landscape reaches back into the past: the mussels and facial features, the church and the mollusc. He is also the one who inscribes an Arab presence in the midst of it all, then and now, the spectacle of the latter slowly waning as the foreign is silently absorbed as part of the same – the way Hassan's otherness is becoming-imperceptible, ceasing to stand out in the landscape, despite his failure to see this himself, like a difference that has entered the opacity and muteness of organic hybridity. In addition, by describing the land and the village, he is already participating in the local processes of emplacement. He is no longer just *in* Denmark like Rashid, he is slowly becoming *of* Denmark. Arab difference is slowly becoming *part of* the sameness of Danish identity *without* substituting the local processes of emplacement with cosmopolitan, postnational global and nomadic Difference. Reading the novel in this way, rural Denmark is no longer excluded from the event of a hybrid becoming.

Casey says that '[w]hen we engage in the near and the far, we find ourselves dealing in *depth*. To move near to something is to move into its depth; to move far from it is to leave its depth' (Casey, 1993, 66). In the resentful rendition of the horrible climate and miserable habitat of Danish identity, there is a telescopic distance to Denmark, a rendition of Danish culture from the distance of a highly politicised migratory

cosmopolitanism. In the silences in the fringe of the novel's discourse, however, Hassan – the novel – seems to move far deeper into the depth of local identity, into its 'incomplete Spirit', Hegel would say, where we lose any clear outlines of its borders. Here is *close vision*, or, rather, vision itself is actually replaced by a more complex *sensation* of place and emplacement. 'Where there is close vision', says Deleuze, 'space is not visual, or rather the eye itself has a *haptic*, *nonoptical* function' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 494, emphasis added). Categorial generalities give way to the boundlessness of detail – as in the sensations that may emanate from the horizonless vision of 'the valley which was thick with heather and lavender' or as when 'a long-legged spider edges its way across the pinewood' or a single rain drop 'fell into a boot-sized pool', the hill turning silent 'when the ripples ceased' (*Carrier,* 188, 187, 186). In the close vision, 'no line separates earth from sky ... there is neither horizon nor background nor perspective nor limit not outline or form or center; there is no intermediary distance ...' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 494). In other words, there is only immanence, you cannot clearly see the outline or the border of what you are in – it 'does not end at a precise point'. Another way of putting it is to say that the narrative is no longer *in front* of Danish identity, culture or landscape in such passages; it moves into it, no longer transcendent but blending with its possible sensual experience and knowledge. As opposed to the 'close vision', Deleuze and Guattari say that the global vision is a striated, 'long-distance vision' which needs to impose an encompassing 'horizon or background ... without which nothing would be global or englobed' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 494).

And yet, the novel's mode of representation, *English*, inevitably keeps pushing the novel's enunciation of Danish identity back out into the long-distance of the global view. As it is, Danish identity and culture are translated into English in *The Carrier* and Danish identity is consequently disentangled from the language it is inseparably embedded in or immanent with. Other Danish readers may in this context share my sensation that because of the novel's language, there is a significant reduction of Danish culture in the novel – a certain deficiency of cultural intimacy or closeness, which results in the impression of a rather sketchy image. For instance, a local sensual or haptic quality or immediacy is lost in replacing the Danish word '*blåmuslinger*' with the English 'blue mussel shells' or '*lyng*' with 'heather', '*edderkop*' with 'spider', '*fyrtræ*' with 'pinewood', '*Jylland*' with 'Jutland', '*København*' with 'Copenhagen', and so on. As opposed to the Danish words, the English words, from a Danish perspective, function mostly as denotative signification while

lacking that extra dimension of associative sensation; they are signifiers of *meaning*, not affects or percepts, in Deleuze's terms; that is, they are not 'compounds of sensation' (Deleuze, 1991, 175, 189). Or, to put it differently, they are making sense, making *meaning*, rather than triggering any *sense-experience*. It seems Danish identity cannot really live in the English language, cannot presence itself in English. As Spivak says about globalised perspectives, '[t]he everyday cultural detail, condition and effect of sedimented cultural idiom, does not come up into satellite country' (Spivak, 2003, 16). The consequence is that Danes and Danish cultural identity remain patently objectified in the novel, the reader has to be *told* what Danish identity is, whereby Danish identity is clearly demarcated and categorised, its difference spatialised by representation. This corresponds with the old anti-colonial focus on imperialistic (mis)representations of the Other, the anti-colonial concern with finding 'a way of allowing the other to speak in its absolute alterity, or the self to speak in its unutterable sameness', as Young puts it (Young, 1993, 12). The only difference is that this time, the Other, or 'Othered', is European. We are offered but an outside, global, perspective on Denmark, through the medium of global English, which is never really dialogised with an inside perspective or view up close.

However, the spells of silence in the novel are particularly important in this connection too. They are not only an interruption of direct description and *representation*, they are also the only interruptions of English as a language representing Danish identity. The silences actually puncture the English language and, as a Danish reader, one may re-heterogenise the novel, accordingly, by filling in these holes with the cultural intimacy we carry along in our perceptual baggage. It is as if it is in the silences, the voids left in the wake of the representing language of the text that I, as a Danish reader, can make a particular Danish experience speak, or, rather, sense the 'unutterable sameness' of a small, local community in Denmark. Thus, when the English language of the book tells me that a small boy 'opens his mouth and sings' I can hear the sound of Danish (just as when the English language of the book tells me that 'Rashid al-Kenzy begins to recite', the sound of English is broken by a silence that may be filled by the 'verbal music' of Arabic, to borrow a term from David Damrosh (*Carrier,* 180–1, Damrosh, 2003, 288).

All of this may sound essentialist, but it is not intended as such. At one point Bannerjee notes the irony of how anti-colonial charges against misrepresentations of the other were later condemned as essentialist by post-colonial scholars. However, she says, charges against

misrepresentations of cultures need not be based on essentialist assumptions, at least not if we allow a:

> strategic reading of the cultural sign where the meaning of the sign is intraculturally negotiated while – interculturally – a privileged reading by the cultural insider is still allowed for. (Banerjee, 2002, 230)

In a related argument Gunew says that:

> [t]he whole notion of ... migrant experience, is one that comes to us constructed by hegemonic voices; and so, what one has to tease out is *what is not there*. One way of doing this (if one has knowledge from a particular culture), is to say: but look this is what is left out, this is what is covered over ... (Spivak and Gunew, 1990, 61, emphasis added)

In this respect, the only strategic charge I am making is against the tendency in intentional hybridity discourse to banalise or dismiss the profundity and complexity of sensual experiences connected with the emplacement of a particular culture for the sake of trumpeting spectacular cultural mixing and radical uprooting. All I hope to have shown in the case of *The Carrier* is how the close and intimate experience of Danish culture is not conveyed in the verbalised representation of Danes, but the text may make up for this by releasing more complex apertures to Danish identity in the silences that emerge outside the frames of its representing language. In the periphery of the novel, another vague contour, or 'vague essence' if you will, of Danish culture starts emerging, which is not discursively represented but emotively sensed.

In summary, the anti-essentialist stance in *The Carrier* seems to relax a little outside the discourse of strategic hybridity, leaving room for the kind of changing sameness that has been linked with the ideas of organic hybridity and anti-anti-essentialism in the above. Silences may be said to release a non-verbalised sense of the villagers as neither consciously essentialist nor consciously hybrid or cosmopolitan, as neither pure nor hybrid, and the newcomer silently coming to be accepted as part of the landscape (in Hassan's time). In the discursive fringes of the novel, there is a slow becoming-different of Danish cultural identity. Or, to put it in another way, a virtual space seems to open up through which difference begins to play more freely, as Danish identity is no longer reduced to a uniform backdrop of cultural purity that serves to highlight the great Difference of the cosmopolitan hybrid.

Conclusion: centripetality and centrifugality in *The Carrier*

The analysis of Mukherjee's *Jasmine* demonstrated how discursive heteroglossia is not realised through the discourse of migrant hybridity and heterogeneity. On the contrary, 'un-deconstructed' hybridity discourse results in a strong discursive centralisation of a language of anti-essentialism that deprives other voices of their verbal-ideological independence. The possibility of increasing the heteroglot potential in the hybrid migration novel therefore depends on the amount of restraint the novel exercises against the universalising impetus inherent in migrant hybridity discourse (as in any other discourse). Paradoxically, heteroglossia depends on the lines of flight the novel makes available away from what is often erroneously perceived and advertised as a decentralised heterogeneous discourse.

As illustrated, *The Carrier* also articulates a migrant's eye-view of the world and, as such, it charts a consciously cosmopolitan hybrid and hybridising discourse. Yet, in determining the forces of the discursive economy of the novel, two readings seem to make themselves available. One reading charges the signifiers of migrant discourse with a normativity that universalises a dichotomy between a desirable cultural heterogeneity and a detrimental cultural homogeneity, thus severely reducing centrifugality and heteroglossia in the novel. The other reading seems to burden the migrant discourse with limits to its validity, reducing the hyphenated discourse of intentional hybridity to a strategic *function*, which altogether opens the novel's discursive field to a greater dialectic in-between heterogeneity and homogeneity.

The respective strength of the centrifugal and centripetal forces in the novel's discursive economy depends on how the reader understands the relation between the two storylines in *The Carrier*, that is, whether one reads the representation of Danish identity in Hassan's story and in Rashid's story in terms of continuity or difference. Or, to put it differently, the strength of the novel's heterogenising forces depends on how little intimacy the reader allows between the two stories. A reading that intimately connects Hassan with Rashid results in a centripetal movement, unifying the language of migration and hybridity across the two levels of story. It causes the voices of both characters to come together as backing up the same point. To borrow a term from Bakhtin, intentional hybridity is turning into a monological discourse, as in *Jasmine*, in the sense that it 'gravitates toward itself' (Bakhtin, 1929, 32). Reading Rashid's story, like D'haen, as the product of Hassan's interrogation of

his own situation, as 'a direct projection of Hassan's perception of his own situation', actually delimits the novel's heteroglossia by interlocking its discursive economy in a simple dichotomy between hybridity and purity – a one-dimensional representation of the sedentary by the nomadic (Rashid's story of the cosmopolitan foreigner *in intolerable Denmark back then* comes to function as a kind of analogy of Hassan's story of the cosmopolitan foreigner *in intolerable Denmark now*). Nyman arrives at a similar conclusion, reading the novel as positively countering a 'politics of location and rootedness' with a 'narrative of movement' (Nyman, 2002, 257). Mahjoub's novel certainly invites such readings; it intimately connects Hassan and Rashid as nomad heroes against the Sciences of State and Nation. Hassan thinks of Rashid, for instance, as 'a kind of catalyst', '[a]n outside element that, once introduced, tended to accentuate the light in some way' (*Carrier,* 252).

The alternative reading, a reading that stresses an uneasy relationship between the two heroes and storylines, results in a centrifugal movement that causes the solidity of the migrant hybridity discourse to crack and fissure; to stand out, as it were, as a self-conscious, telescoped discourse. Stressing the discontinuities between the two heroes and storylines makes it impossible to use Rashid's story to fill in holes in Hassan's story; it becomes impossible to make a direct overlap between Hassan's self-perception and Rashid's incarnation as the impeccable cosmopolitan hero. Hassan's flaws and Martin's defence of the village youth may inspire such readings, calling on readers to doubt the migrant hero's voice and the reliability of the novel's general representation of the Danes. They invite readers to puncture the hegemonic position in the novel of cosmopolitan hybridity, or even to reduce it to a discourse among other discourses (without taking back the importance of strategic representations of Danish identity in the struggle for greater tolerance). However, with the exception of Hassan's flaws and Martin's protests, all of the novel's moderations of the migrant discourse are non-verbalised, *silent* and easily overlooked. They only gain in potency through the novel's central trope of the telescope. Through the trope of the telescope the novel manages to *dramatise* the voice of hybridity, to make it visible and thus reducing intentional hybridity discourse to a level of strategic performativity, with the possibility that other experiences of identity, in-between the pure and the hybrid, start emerging in the periphery of the central representing voice.

Thus, the connection made between the novel's different layers of story functions as a kind of hermeneutical hinge that may shift the momentum of the discursive economy in *The Carrier* from that of a

celebratory, universalising hybridity to that of a more critical engagement with ideas of the migrant mongrel, directing attention to one-voiced perspectives in the language of intentional hybridity. For this reason, Mahjoub's work may be said, at one and the same time, to encompass, oppose and exceed the discourse of intentional hybridity.

* * *

I have said that the most complex hybridising gazes may be said to be the ones that manage to blend a cultural semiosphere's contemporary or horizontally distributed differences with its historical or vertically distributed differences. As regards the exhumation of historical hybridity and heterogeneity, the most radical 'language of critique' typically disqualifies the successful integration of difference in the semiosphere (its processes of organic hybridisation). A hybridising gaze like that wants difference brought back to its full speed, brought back as a disruptive force against the mechanisms of '*organ*isation', as fuel for a new, radically Different becoming – a true actualisation of Deleuze's idea of the eternal return as an affirmation of Difference, an intentional act of uncovering the past to disrupt and disqualify the present order of things and its machinery of 'commonly-held representations'. Such gazes, or discourses cause, or seek to cause the disintegration of tradition, habits, established codes and cultural scripts, resulting in the possibility of only little or no continuity within a far stronger current of discontinuity. Intense forms of intentional hybridity have very little patience with the slowness and obscurity of organic processes of hybridisation.

However, as we shall see in the next analysis, the most complex hybridity discourse is not necessarily the fastest kind of hybridity discourse. A less intense discourse may actualise the difference of the past *not* in order to disqualify the incorporation of difference into sameness but to merely elucidate the very processes of organic hybridisation in appreciation of the semiosphere's centripetal forces. A less intensive intentional hybridity thus involves a hybridising gaze or discourse that, as much as it re-cognises the hybridity and heterogeneity that is already present in any culture, also re-cognises the importance of all the centripetal and homogenising forces that hold a given community together. Appropriation and assimilation become central issues in the hybridising process, yet without ever reaching the annulment and exclusion of difference as in a discourse of essentialism and purity. The consequence is a slower process of becoming in the novel, generated by minor changes within a dominant force of continuity. Whereas the

intense form of intentional hybridisation seeks to maintain the intensity of Difference in its horizontal and vertical distribution for as long as possible, to prevent or suspend its domestication, the non-intense forms of difference celebrate the forces of sameness within the hybridising process or the hybrid constellation, indeed celebrates the wonders of organic hybridity. This is what is at work in Naipaul's *The Enigma of Arrival*.

6

Fast and Slow Becomings in the Migrant's Vision in V. S. Naipaul's *The Enigma of Arrival*

Sir Vidiadhar Surajprasad Naipaul notoriously stands out as politically deviant from his fellow post-colonial writers and accusations against him often run high, labelling him as an essentialist, a reactionary, a lackey of neo-colonialism and a mimic of white supremacy. George Lamming, Edward Said, Derek Walcott, to mention but a few, have accused him of seeing the world from a Eurocentric and orientalist perspective, repeating the dichotomy of European order and rationality versus the disorder and irrationality of the non-European other. Lamming has accused him of 'striving like mad to prove himself through promotion to the peaks of a "superior" culture' (Lamming, 1960, 225). Said has referred to him as 'a kind of belated Kipling [who] carries with him a kind of half-stated but finally unexamined reverence for the colonial order', and, according to Pallavi Rastogi, Naipaul is more 'stiff upper lip' than the English. To Tabish Khair, he looks at 'postcolonial hybridity and confusion' with regret and does not recognise it as a 'creative, constructive effort' (Said, 1981, 115; Rastogi, 2002, 270–1, 278; Khair, 2001, 255).

This kind of criticism is often echoed in readings of *The Enigma of Arrival*. According to Van der Veer, for instance, *The Enigma of Arrival* is 'not about hybridity' at all. Naipaul is 'not in favour of Bhabha's multiculturalism', he says, but of 'white culture', and, with this novel, Naipaul, as an 'arch-conservative' celebrating Englishness with 'a nostalgia for the Empire', becomes a 'protagonist of assimilation' (Van der Veer, 1997, 99–100). According to Bhabha, Naipaul 'turns his back on the hybrid half-made colonial world' and *The Enigma of Arrival* is animated by a 'melancholic conservatism' and 'patrician disdain' (Bhabha, 1994, 153; Bhabha, 2001). To Rastogi, the novel's 'structure' lends itself to 'multicultural

migrations', but its author nullifies 'any subversive potential inherent in such writings' (Rastogi, 2002, 270). Instead, the novel is irretrievably 'fixed' in traditional notions of cultural 'authenticity and belonging', in 'the English imagination' and 'the discursive paradigms of the Imperial West' (Rastogi, 2002, 270–1). In sum, *The Enigma of Arrival* is commonly read as a monocultural assault against hybridity and heterogeneity, subordinating difference to a superior English culture.

Naipaul raises hackles wherever he goes and there is no doubt that he has brought a lot of this kind of criticism upon himself. He often does express a lack of understanding for post-colonial struggles such as in an infamous 1981 conversation with Bharati Mukherjee and Robert Boyers where he speaks with unmodified contempt for 'the illiterate black man shouting for racial redemption' and 'extraordinarily stupid' Indians, while praising the 'tremendously successful' English civilisation (Mukherjee and Boyers, 1981, 83–4). Visiting Trinidad in 1956, he exclaimed in a letter to his wife, Patricia, that he would 'prefer a hundred times to be ruled from London, as in the old days, than to be ruled by the present people', 'the present government of noble niggers' (Naipaul quoted in French, 2008, 173, 172).[1] Likewise *The Enigma of Arrival* articulates an unabashed admiration for English history, tradition, culture and landscape. Naipaul feels he has come too late to England, its perfect grandeur now brought down and replaced by the invasion of 'all the barbarian peoples of the globe' (*Enigma,* 154). But this does not mean that the novel's discourse is necessarily racist, essentialist and anti-hybriditist. On the contrary, it may be dealing with issues of post-coloniality, migration and hybridity in a different, and, perhaps, more intricate manner.

In the following analysis I will look at the forms of hybridity the novel contains, or, rather, the composite nature of Naipaul's hybridising or heterogenising mode of representation. In the first half of the analysis I will look at how Naipaul's gaze heterogenises the landscape and the small community in Wiltshire by intentionally exposing their compound and metamorphic textures in a spatial and temporal perspective. In the second half I will show how this heterogenising dynamic in the novel is then all but swallowed up by another, homogenising dynamic, which appears to be driven by a desire to restore the heterogeneity and diversity Naipaul has uncovered to its muted and opaque state, as if in defence of the forces of sameness that tie English culture together and make its continuity possible.

It is important to stress from the outset that while my analyses of the two dynamics in Naipaul's discourse or gaze are of roughly the same

length, it is in fact the homogenising forces that govern the novel's discursive economy on the whole, whereas the heterogenising dynamic emerges in the form of interruptions or punctures of the novel's surface of cultural sameness and slowness. Nevertheless, I find it necessary to spend a fair share of the analysis on the heterogenising energy in the novel in order to unpack it properly, exactly because it plays a far more significant role than the moderate density of its actual distribution in the novel indicates at a first glance (obviously, it is typically overlooked or ignored by Naipaul's most abrasive critics).

But before I start the actual analysis, I will make a brief summary of how *The Enigma of Arrival* shares a number of features with other migration novels and how it significantly deviates from them.

Migratory features in *The Enigma of Arrival*

The Enigma of Arrival is really a plotless, quasi-autobiographical novel in which action has been replaced by close observation of landscape and its changes, and story-line has been replaced by an almost meditative dwelling on various experiences and perceptions. However, within this mesmeric stream of thought we come across the usual themes in migration literature, as in Naipaul's other novels, of unbelonging, exile, restlessness, global movement and migration, journeys and crossings of various kinds of borders, meetings and collisions of cultural differences, arrivals and departures. Likewise, the narrator, Naipaul, is a migrant figure, uprooted, wandering, traversing the globe physically and imaginatively. Like the author Naipaul, he left Trinidad and moved to England in his youth and now, as an old man residing in a rented cottage at a rural estate in Wiltshire, he is struggling with the experience of a fractured life and the alienation of being 'in the other man's country' (*Enigma,* 6). The narrator describes himself as 'always a stranger, a foreigner' and speaks of a certain rawness of nerves caused by his personal state of displacement as well as by the historical experience of colonialism in Trinidad (*Enigma,* 266, 17, 56, 99, 110, 55). The novel also contemplates the disintegration of the imperial order of the world and how the former colonial subjects now return to settle and take root in the centre, imagining it afresh. In line with this, Rushdie rightly lists *The Enigma of Arrival* among the novels that portray how '[t]he immigrant must invent the earth beneath his feet' and 'learn, once more, to see' (Rushdie, 1987, 149).

Indeed, and as is the case with *Jasmine* and *The Carrier*, *The Enigma of Arrival* is a novel about *seeing*, offering a migrant's view on the worlds the

narrator leaves or arrives in. There are brief references to popular ideas of the migrant's special gaze in the novel, as when Naipaul alludes to split lenses of perception in connection with the stranger's raw nerves. However, that is as far as the privileging of the migrant's sight goes. The narrator continually questions his own vision, discovering its flaws and need of constant revision. As several critics point out, the *The Enigma of Arrival* is in this way a highly self-reflexive novel, like *The Carrier*, mirroring the insufficiency of its own discourse.[2]

For all its migratory features, *The Enigma of Arrival* is a very atypical migration novel, however. It is not neo-colonialist, as some critics suggest, yet anti-colonial perspectives are toned down. Whereas a novel like *Jasmine* pulls out all the stops to illucidate the complicity of all corners of the West in imperial and neo-imperialistic enterprises, Naipaul seeks to relax the totality and solidity of connections between life in small, local places and the overseas exploitation of the non-Western other. On the one hand, he stresses the colonial connection in his representation of the local estate in Wiltshire, built, as it is, on the wealth of the British empire, which gives him reason to counter his landlord's orientalist discourse and the uses to which the myth of a superior and pure English identity have been put in the colonisation of other peoples' minds. On the other hand, however, he severs this local, rural culture from the Englishness of the imperial enterprise by highlighting the enormous cultural and social heterogeneity in this small place which has to deal with its own local problems of coherence and disintegration, internal difference and negotiations with discourses of collective identity. Similarly, the valorisation of post-colonial migration and hybridity has been toned down. Judith Levy speaks of *The Enigma of Arrival* as 'a muted celebration of exchange and fluidity', but it is questionable whether Naipaul even goes as far as that (Levy, 2005, 211). Certainly, the common rhetoric of third-spaceness and the transcultural migrant as the archetype of the twentieth century or as a messianic figure of a brave new world is highly moderated, as is the common fascination with the speed of movement. Two chapters of the novel deal with Trinidad, the acceleration of global mobility and the crossing of great distances, but throughout most of the book, the narrator is *walking* through this small rural setting where news is still fresh even when a year old (*Enigma,* 50). Similarly Naipaul does not see the contemporary spectacle of air travel as a great force of metamorphosis. On the contrary, it was before the fast speed of air travel and the 'matter-of-fact departures and arrivals' in airports that going abroad could 'fracture one's life'. Back then, when you crossed the Atlantic by ship

on a long, slow journey, you found yourself months away from home (*Enigma,* 168, 378). Today, as Eva Hoffman puts it, '[t]he ease of travel and communication, combined with the loosening of borders' means that 'leaving one's native country is simply not as dramatic or traumatic as it used to be' (Hoffman, 1999, 42).

In the thrall of the myth of Englishness

What Naipaul saw when first arriving in Wiltshire was the very image of a quintessential English landscape in all its calm splendour of rural idyll and romance. Here was an 'unchanging world', a 'historical part of England', in fact, 'the ancient heart of England' (*Enigma,* 32, 18, 111). He is later to learn, however, that *seeing* was the least of what he was doing when he first came, just as one could not speak of an arrival at all (*Enigma,* 54). Instead of seeing, he was merely appreciating the beauty of the landscape – the gardens, the green pastures, the water meadow – *through* the instructed images and the discursive frameworks from his colonial schooling in Trinidad and through the conservative study of writers like Hardy, Wordsworth, Gray, Goldsmith and landscape painters like E. H. Shepard and John Constable (*Enigma,* 203). Accordingly, his initial gaze amounted to nothing more than the authentication of an idealised imagination: a reiteration of the very shaping of an image of a national, healthy English race out of rural landscapes. As he puts it, a received set of lenses had accustomed him to be 'interested in English people purely as English people, looking for confirmation of what [he] had read in books' (*Enigma,* 165).

In 'The Discovery of Rural England' Alun Howkins delineates how the ideology of England and Englishness was more or less consciously constructed and cultivated from the 1880s on through romanticised images of the rural south, mainly by poets and writers like W. H. Hudson, Edward Thomas and Stanley Baldwin. At different points in time this culminated in a virtual propagandist industry of country writing (see Howkins, 1986, 78).[3] The image that was created and consolidated was that of a mythic, organic and coherent English culture and civilisation, growing naturally out of an indigenous, bucolic landscape. It was an image of timeless wholeness, harmony and stability enjoyed by a healthy, productive, moral and pure race. Images like these were disseminated throughout the empire, teaching the colonial subjects of the inimitable virtues of their benevolent English master – as on the condensed-milk tins in Trinidad that Naipaul recalls from his childhood which were decorated with romantic drawings of grazing cows on an English hillside.

Domestically the myth served as a confirmation of national identity to withstand ideological hesitation and racial degeneration (Howkins, 1986, 69, 72, 74–5; see also *Enigma,* 90). As Bhabha observes,

> [t]he recurrent metaphor of landscape as the inscape of national identity emphasizes ... the power of the eye to naturalize the rhetoric of national affiliation and its forms of collective expression. (Bhabha, 1994, 205)

In Éduard Glissant's vocabulary, such a construction of Englishness would be an example of a 'myth of genesis', a myth of a sublime origin, casting the English landscape as a perfect prelapsarian garden (Glissant, 1978, 72, 73, 77). To Glissant such myths amount to a discourse, or epistemology, of 'Ordering' and 'Sameness' corresponding to Deleuze and Guattari's concept of 'State science' as a mode of thought that idealises notions of unity, stability, essence, permanence, coherence while blocking the dynamic forces of Difference, ambiguity, heterogeneity, flux and discontinuity (Glissant, 1978, 73). They constitute a 'ritualized narrative' that fixes everything according to its 'fundamental explanation of the world' (Glissant, 1978, 72, 77; 1974, 98–9). Like State science, Glissant's discourse of Ordering and Sameness seeks to preserve the world in a static form of *Being*, allowing no disturbance by all the forces that would set the world in motion (see Glissant, 1978, 72, 77; 1974, 99). And as we have seen in *Jasmine* and *The Carrier*, State science permits only the difference that it defines and controls itself. Naipaul cuttingly exemplifies this last point with reference to how his landlord's Orientalist images of India and Indian cosmology comprise a self-indulgent Indian romance, 'a warm blur', that suits his Wiltshire setting (see *Enigma,* 231–2). Controlled in this way the difference of India is no threatening difference. It is a difference that is entirely defined and represented – tamed, domesticated – by the landlord who may now use it to accentuate the stability, coherence and authenticity of the English landscape. Any perceptual or sensual access to the real, undomesticated Difference of India that would most likely threaten and destabilise the landlord's view of the world is blocked.

As long as Naipaul remains in the thrall of, or enthralled by, the State science of English nationalist and colonial constructions, his vision is reduced to an automatic apparatus of confirmation, mechanically repeating the existing order of things by registering the presence or the absence of pre-programmed forms. All he can do is to *compare* everything he sees with its fixed, elevated ideals and then sort the world

according to how well one thing or another resembles these ideals (as indicated, this is where most criticism of *The Enigma of Arrival* ends). As Deleuze and Guattari point out, State science, as an utterly fixed mode of thought, involves an eternal 'reproduction, iteration and reiteration' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 372).

However, Naipaul gradually discovers the constructed nature of this Ordered Sameness. He begins to realise how the idealised and nationalist visions of purity and permanence have been imposed on the landscape, imposed on his ability to imagine the landscape in other ways, and he begins to register how this still image, this still life, visibly cracks as he begins to discover Difference and change in the landscape.

The still life cracks

Little by little the reality of change, the recent alterations of the landscape by industrialisation and modernisation (a military base, jets, a highway, even *redbrick*!), encroaches on Naipaul's romanticised and idealised impression of the place and becomes increasingly impossible to block out from the picture of pastoral beauty. But even worse than the grimness of modernisation, he discovers that the original idyllic English landscape, the foundational image of an essential Englishness, never existed in a naturalised form at all; it was entirely engineered from the beginning. He discovers 'an element of play ... in the ordering of the manor grounds', as for instance in how his cottage turns out to have been *designed* to give off an atmosphere of rural warmth and welcome – qualities that he believed before to be innate and naturally given (see *Enigma,* 210–12). He discovers how things are built to *look* old to (re)create a specific idea of the past and feign the appearance of an unbroken continuity between that (re)created past and the ordered image of the present. Artificiality and pretence gives itself away in the slight exaggeration of the rustic style of local architecture, or, in the opposite way, in insufficient mimicry of the ideal. Likewise, the people Naipaul initially saw as *exemplifying* English types – the servant, the gardener and the dairyman – turn out to be *performing* such parts. There 'was an element of acting' about the dairyman – 'like a man living up to a role that had been given him' (*Enigma,* 41). As with the architecture of the buildings, the locals either exaggerate or fill out their parts poorly, which all causes their masks to fissure (see *Enigma,* 243).

Yet, these cracks and fissures in the constructed image of the landscape and rural life enable Naipaul to see something else in Wiltshire.

He begins to see a reality of diversity, difference, movement and change underneath the illusion of stability.

The heterogeneity and flux of Wiltshire

In Glissant's terms, Naipaul's gaze at this point shifts from a gaze being informed by a consciousness of Sameness to a gaze informed by the consciousness of Diversity – a liberating mode of thought infused by a great dynamism that shatters Sameness through its elucidation of Difference and Diversification (see Glissant, 1978, 71, 77; 1974, 99, 101). Like Deleuze's nomadic science, the consciousness of diversity gives priority to flows rather than fixity, realising how identity and sameness exist only as secondary principles imposed on the principal condition of Difference, change and heterogeneity. It is a mobile science of speed which is capable of making visible or liberating the continuous state of becoming of life and things. In line with this, Naipaul begins to tune in to registering 'flux and the constancy of change' as the prevalent and primary forces in the world: 'I lived not with the idea of decay ... so much as with the idea of change. I lived with the idea of change, of flux, and learned, profoundly, not to grieve for it' (*Enigma,* 54). The idea of decay 'implied an ideal, a perfection in the past' which never was (*Enigma,* 228). This prompts Helen Hayward to characterise *The Enigma of Arrival* as a 'lesson in impermanence' (Hayward, 2002, 50).

Accordingly, after the discovery of the fixed image of Englishness as a constructed illusion, Naipaul starts recasting his representation of the locals in the kind of nomadological discourse that is usually reserved for *migrant* protagonists in this kind of literature, the way we have seen it in *Jasmine* and *The Carrier.* Naipaul records how people move in and out of the area, how the mobility of cars has become more important than the sedentary condition of homes. Here is 'no fixed community', the people here are all 'people on the move', 'unanchored, floating', they are 'itinerants' and 'wanderers' (*Enigma,* 33, 59, 241, 261–2). In addition, a diversity of high and low culture and social heterogeneity become visible. The place and its people are kept in a state of constant change by internal differences, contradictions and paradoxes, shifting power relations and negotiations with imposed discourses of identity. In other words, Naipaul depicts the rural setting of Wiltshire not as a fixed and homogeneous community, but as a semiosphere in Lotman's sense of the word. It is a heterogeneous and volatile space of great socio-cultural complexity, a place with a heteroglossia of ambiguous, inconsistent and incompatible worldviews in constant translation, metamorphosis and becoming. So, as

opposed to the tendency in many other migration novels, Naipaul does not use a local, sedentary site to homogenise and fix a national identity in order to make the migrant hero stand out as a great and revolutionary new identity of multiplicity and flux. Instead, Naipaul shows an irreducible presence of change and diversity in even the smallest of places. Or, to put it differently, in contradistinction to many other transcultural migration novels, Naipaul avoids the simple plot of the cosmopolitan hybrid migrant entering a space of cultural homogeneity and monoglossia; he manages to immerse his migratory gaze or discourse in a space that is already percolated with difference and diversity.

When Naipaul arrived in the valley the first time, he automatically mobilised the usual hybridity–purity or stillness–movement duality. He saw an 'unchanging world' and he saw the local gardener, Jack, as his opposite, as rooted to the place, as quintessentially English. It is only after a while that he discovers that this opposition is a false simplification of the world; that Jack was once a newcomer too and may ultimately be thought of in the same terms Naipaul thinks of himself, as a transitory presence in a transitory landscape (*Enigma,* 18, 111, 32, 99). In the words of Eva Hoffman, Naipaul realises that in this world, which is already 'too fragmented to have an easily discernible inside or permanent centers of power', it is 'insufficient to define ourselves as Other in opposition to some archetypal oppressor or hypothetical insider' (Hoffman, 1999, 62).

Having shed the instructed image of a certain unchanging identity in the English landscape and now equipped with a sensibility towards constant change and flux, Naipaul further deepens the transgressive movement of his gaze with an ingressive one. He begins to see a greater drama of *time* played out in the valley, noting temporal layers of Difference in the landscape in the form of concrete traces of the past. Like Lotman, and Mahjoub with *The Carrier,* he adds a vertical or temporal dimension to the horizontal heterogeneity on the spatial surface of the semiosphere by registering the flux and heterogeneity of the landscape across time (see Lotman, 1990, 130, 137). Judith Levy notices this manoeuvre and refers to Naipaul's novel as a 'tearing down of temporal barriers' that elucidates 'a kind of everlasting, chaotic, primordial flux' (Levy, 1995, 107).

The temporal gaze in *The Enigma of Arrival*

Once the still life of the English landscape has cracked, Naipaul begins to see how a far more diverse past is sticking out of the top layers of

time in the present landscape – there are traces of a prehistoric riverbed, scattered rusty machinery, an old barn, an abandoned gypsy caravan, a war time bunker, a dilapidated farm building, traces of ancient fortifications and sacred sites, medieval relics, signs of a heterogeneity of peoples, hunter-gatherers, Celts, Romans, Saxons, the imperial manor in various stages of ruin, a Victorian Sunday school only thinly superimposed by a modern cake shop – there are layers of age even in red brick! All of this comes across 'like things in a house that had broken down or been superseded, but remained unthrown away' (*Enigma,* 143). In a parallel movement, Naipaul sees how past differences and historical diversity begin to stick out of the English language, like the Celtic 'avon' and the Germanic 'Waldenshaw', both words speaking of 'invaders from across the sea and of ancient wars and dispossessions' (*Enigma,* 98). 'Waldenshaw', he observes, is in fact a fusion of 'two tribal languages', *shaw* from the Old Norse *skogg* fused with the German *Wald*, both words meaning 'wood' or 'forest' (*Enigma,* 98).

We may also speak of what goes on here in terms of organic hybridity. As I have shown, any past differences in the state of organic hybridity have been muted or repressed by or made to serve the narrative of current discourses of sameness and homogenisation in the top layer of the semiosphere. Bhabha, for example, speaks of how a collective forgetting is essential for the construction of a unified national will of the present. 'Being obliged to forget', he says, 'becomes the basis for remembering the nation' (Bhabha, 1994, 230–1). Hence, all that constitutes an actual difference to the historical homogeneity of Englishness in the area of Wiltshire – the Celts, the Romans, the Vikings, even Saxon otherness – is deprived of its force of Difference; pacified, muted, subdued. If not entirely unremembered, historical heterogeneity is pacified as an abortive past that is decidedly over and done with, vanquished and supplanted by the successful history of a pure, coherent and harmonious national identity that arose out of the tumult – 'like an extension of religion, as an idea of one's own redemption and glory' (*Enigma,* 53). However, no matter how heavily we have managed to subdue Difference with our impositions on the world of illusory constants, essences and fixed forms, Difference in its pure form never completely disappears. It *endures* under the surface of sameness, always curled up within an *organ*ised homogeneity 'pregnant with potential for new world views' (Bakhtin). Lurking beneath, Difference is ready at any time to release its full force of change in a complete disruption of the surface layers of sameness – '[a]n entire multiplicity rumbles underneath the "sameness" of the Idea'. God may cover this intensity, but 'he dances upon a

volcano' (Deleuze, 1968, 344, 293). In its state of duration, Difference has not disappeared so much as it has *unappeared* and, in Glissant's words, any place or landscape thus always 'retains the memory of time past' (Glissant, 1973, 150). However, as Michael Dash eloquently explains in his introduction to Glissant, 'it is not the rational mind that restores the past': 'the past resides in material objects that only release their hidden meanings when encountered *imaginatively* or *sensuously*' (quoted by Dash, 1981, xxxv, emphases added). This is in line with Deleuze's idea of how sensory experiences work as important apertures for releasing the forces of Difference and intensity, and how it is in literature that words may 'open up', metamorphose into pure sensory effects, to 'actually produce the visions and sounds that remained imperceptible behind the old language ("the old style")' (Deleuze, 1993, 173).

According to Lotman, the forgotten or repressed Difference in the semiosphere inevitably crops up again at different points in time, and, he adds, it is often the arrival of differences in the top layers of the semiosphere that cause forgotten or repressed layers of difference to be reactivated (see Lotman, 1990, 137). In *The Enigma of Arrival* Naipaul represents the arrival of such difference. Coming to Wiltshire, he feels out of place, 'unanchored and strange', an oddity, 'a man from another hemisphere' whose 'presence in that old valley was part of something like an upheaval, a change in the course of the history of the country' and he brings with him a different *sensual* apparatus, a certain rawness of nerves that attunes the stranger or colonial subject to incoherence (see *Enigma,* 13–14, 18, 70, 110). Therefore, once Naipaul penetrates the monoglot grid of English purity and authenticity, he opens the floodgates of Difference. He begins to expose the muddled and jumbled heterogeneity of the rural landscape of Wiltshire. In a manner of speaking, he undoes or rewinds the process of organic hybridisation which had successfully incorporated difference into an ostensible sameness. He releases Difference from its appropriation, in Todorov's terminology, by the 'commonly-held representations' of the discourse of a national English identity. Laying bare, or re-actualising, all differences in an untamed (or, at least, less tamed) form, Naipaul's sensibility draws the repressed layers of the semiosphere back to the surface of the semiosphere, changes difference from a pacified to an active force, restores its capacity to trigger new epistemological and ontological becomings. It also upturns the land in such a way that any ordering principle or cushioning discourse of coherence or unity is entirely suspended. All the bared Difference is just there, made *present*, laid out on a horizontal plane before the reader's eyes like the Deleuzian paratax of 'and,

and, and': traces of a Celtic civilisation and Stonehenge and the Roman empire and a gypsy caravan and a defunct tractor and a prehistoric riverbed and an old coach road and ancient tribes, all of it scattered on a plane of simultaneity. There is no syntax, no ordering, no spatialising hierarchy, no lines of connection, no organisation to harness or obstruct the beholder's imagination or creativity, and, consequently, the becoming of identity may pick up maximum speed and develop in any direction. Naipaul's manoeuvre is not unlike the bringing into play of semantic and cultural difference in a common word through an etymological unearthing of its geographic and cultural origin, its peregrinations and earlier meanings. It is a matter of reviving a dead language in a living language, of restoring the Difference buried in the current use of language, or '"boring holes" in the surface of language so that "what lurks behind it" might appear' (Deleuze, 1993, 172). Or, to explain it with another image, Naipaul re-polishes the foreignness of domesticated words, like 'avon' and 'Waldenshaw', so that they may shine again, as Derrida expresses it, in the local language 'like the medallion of a proper [foreign] name' (Derrida, 1985, 177). Naipaul bores out or re-polishes the foreign within the familiar in Wiltshire, exposing how 'the ancient heart of England' is not an organ of homogeneity, order, purity, sameness, but an organ of great diversity, if a coherent organ at all.

It is as if all the past heterogeneity of Wiltshire and the contemporary global heterogenisation of England, represented by Naipaul as a newcomer at the top layer of the semiosphere, are deliberately interlocked in Naipaul's gaze, as if caused to mutually reflect and reinforce each other. Looking back on his arrival in London a few decades before (in 1950), he observes that he:

> [w]as at the beginning of that great movement of peoples that was to take place in the second half of the twentieth century – a movement and a cultural mixing greater than the peopling of the United States ... a movement between all the continents ... [where] [c]ities like London ... were to become cities of the world, modern-day Romes. (*Enigma,* 154)

Accordingly, we may speak of an *intention* in *The Enigma of Arrival* of connecting the exposed historical heterogeneity in Wiltshire with the entire migratory discourse of contemporary movement, mixture, unsettlement and transnationality, which altogether triggers a radical disruption of the 'commonly-held representations' of English identity, setting it afloat at a fast speed of becoming. In line with that, Naipaul explicitly

blends the landscape of Wiltshire with landscapes and geologies from other parts of the world in what we might refer to as a planetary dimension to his gaze. Having revitalised the intensity of *past* difference and heterogeneity, Naipaul floods the landscape with *contemporary* arrivals of difference and demonstrates just how receptive the landscape can be to new cultural configurations, to new becomings of identity.

A planetary gaze

As much as Naipaul exposes temporal Difference in Wiltshire, the hybridity and heterogeneity that was already there before his own arrival, he further hybridises the place with different landscapes from across the globe. He compares the English landscape with, and often sees or *senses* the English landscape *through* other, radically different topographies – alpine and tropical. The reader finds Naipaul walking between flint slopes and in chalk valleys which look 'sometimes like a Himalayan valley strewn in midsummer with old, gritted snow' (*Enigma,* 18). The sound of fire from a burning-pit blends with Naipaul's memory of the overpowering noise of a big waterfall in South America (*Enigma,* 85–6). At another time, the shape and texture of drifting snow transports Naipaul to a beach in Trinidad with its shallow streams, a rotting boat-house suggests a tropical river ruin in Orinoco and, working on the novel *A Bend in the River,* he projects Africa on to Wiltshire, and 'Wiltshire – the Wiltshire I walked in – began to radiate or return Africa to me' (*Enigma,* 46, 225, 187). Similarly Naipaul makes close observations of how tiny *sand*scapes, asphalt crusts and rivulets make miniature topographies of cliffs and rivers, creating a minute 'geography of great countries' (*Enigma,* 46–7). Thus different landscapes are superimposed and even sometimes fused in Naipaul's gaze, triggering hybrid dimensions in which to experience, or sense, the brook or the marsh in ways that are not accessible in, say, traditional romantic or national readings of English landscapes.[4] Insofar as a 'landscape has its language', as Glissant's argues, Naipaul changes the language of rural Wiltshire from a limited monoglot English landscape to a heteroglot planetary and transnational landscape (Glissant, 1973, 145). And worth mentioning in this context, in contrast to Glissant who polarises the dynamic, heterogeneous and rhizomatic language of the tropical forest and the inhibiting, reactionary and degenerative 'economy of the meadow', Naipaul avoids the trap of pitting hybridity against purity by actually heterogenising 'the landscape of down and barrow' (Glissant, 1973, 146; *Enigma,* 189).

Naipaul explains that his idea with all of this is to connect places of relative isolation with 'a vaster geography', as when for the first time he caught a view of Trinidad from an aeroplane and found himself able to imagine the place anew, as he puts it, 'restor[ing]' the island 'to the globe' (which he was prevented from by the formal, 'monkish, medieval' colonial schooling that instructed him to see the island as an out-of-the-way and wrong world, far off from the real world of England) (*Enigma,* 47, 126, 173). As with Trinidad, Naipaul restores rural Wiltshire to the globe. Obviously, the landlord's manor already testifies to historically powerful global connections, but as these connections are rapidly closing down, and the manor is no longer symbolic of the centre of the world, but of a place of increasing decay and seclusion, Naipaul is enabled to replace the old imperial connections with new connections of a different order, within different relations and asymmetries of power.

This dimension in Naipaul's gaze is not unlike the kind of radical change of consciousness or epistemic shift Spivak has recently called for. In *The Death of a Discipline* (2003) she asks us to overwrite our fixation on *the global* with what she refers to as a *planetary* perspective, or episteme, which puts the *planet*, *Earth*, at the centre of our conceptual framework. To Spivak, one of the problems with globalisation or the global episteme, is that it is a discourse of sameness, it involves 'the imposition of the same system of exchange everywhere'. In this respect, the episteme of globality is a decidedly urban episteme, preoccupied with cities, metropolitan hubs of trade and communication and the international routes and channels between these major centres (see Spivak, 2003, 72, 93). In contrast, the planetary episteme does not fail to register how it is in fact not the city but the vast spaces of *land* that really mark the surface of the globe. Like Naipaul, Spivak looks down on the planet from an aeroplane 'in search of a springboard for planetarity' and what jumps to her vision is the figure of Earth, the vast rural and uninhabited expanses below her, 'the figure of land' (Spivak, 2003, 93). Accordingly, planetarity may challenge the uniform and urbanised imaginary of globalisation, like *The Enigma of Arrival*, by directing our attention to the rural and vast stretches of unpopulated terrains.

However, planetarity also challenges globality at a more philosophical level. In contrast to globality which 'allows us to think that we can aim to control [the world]', planetarity is a 'less foundational mode of thought' and hence it offers an undomesticated alterity that radically destabilises and displaces such illusions of control (see Spivak, 2003, 80). What globality does not capture, is the planet 'in the species of

alterity, belonging to another system' beyond our influence (Spivak, 2003, 72), like weather and geological contingency. Spivak goes on, '[i]f we imagine ourselves as planetary subjects rather than global agents, planetary creatures rather than global entities', we cease to be the ones who preside over difference; in Spivak's own words, 'alterity remains *underived from us*' (Spivak, 2003, 73, emphasis added). Casey speaks in similar terms of respecting nature 'in its own terms, to take our lead from *it* rather than from our own inwrought personal selves and ingrown social structures'. The former amounts to a sobering 'geocentrism' as 'the most effacious antidote to centuries of un-self-questioning anthropocentrism and subjectivism' (Casey, 1993, 187). The planet is, in this view, a smooth space, a huge body without organs, where Difference reigns in its full intensity, outside the reach of our domesticating machineries of identification and sameness. It involves a 'defamiliarization of home', says Spivak, offering a world which we can only inhabit 'on loan' – in correspondence with Casey's idea of emplacement (Spivak, 2003, 77, 72). Spivak mentions 'the defamiliarization of familiar space' as one of the entryways into a planetary consciousness (Spivak, 2003, 77), which is clearly at work in the blending of landscapes in Naipaul's vision and the connections drawn between small places and the planet's geography. But apart from the horizontal and spatial transgression of blending local sceneries with the unsettling vastness of planetary space, it is, once again, the dimension of time in the planetary gaze that really re-intensifies difference and unsettles human control.

A planetary time in *The Enigma of Arrival*

When we enter the planet's time, the time of weather, climate and geology, we enter a time of radical alterity outside the history made by humans, in truth, a Difference 'underived from us' (Spivak, 2003, 88). In the planet's time human history is placed within the forces of nature, away from, say, 'the specificity of nations' (Spivak, 2003, 94). In Deleuzian terms we are dealing with the Aeon – an 'infinite time', which, as we have seen, is a purely non-pulsed, unstructured, floating time that knows only Difference and speed, in contrast to the spatialised, divisible time of Chronos (see 'Forces of Difference and Sameness in Deleuze's Philosophy'). Spivak gives the example of how the pterodactyl is 'prior to our thinking of continents' and 'can claim the entire planet as its other' (Spivak, 2003, 80). The temporal dimension of Naipaul's gaze expands in an equally radical way. Streams on the beach

in Trinidad transfer his gaze back to 'the beginning of the world, before men' just as the valley in England:

> spoke of vast rivers hundreds of yards across, flowing here in some age now unimaginably remote: a geography whose scale denied the presence of men. (*Enigma,* 46–7)

This time is not only *unimaginably* remote, outside our capacity of representation and hence outside our capacity of domesticating it and making it serve our present constructions of identity, it is a time that also dwarfs human history which has no significance or consequence whatsoever in the vaster geological time of the planet. Time and space are stripped of all 'cultural or linguistic accretions', as Casey would say (Casey, 2003, 28). In particular Naipaul notes how the history of the empire shrinks when time is sped up. He is astonished to realise that all that looks like *ancient* decay in the 'ruin' of the manor is but an 'illusory depth', giving the impression of the empire reaching back, massively, into a remote, almost timeless past, while concealing the fact of its surprising historical recentness and brevity (see *Enigma,* 238, 93). By allegory, Naipaul discovers how the weight of imperial and national discourse dissipates as its claim to an ancestral past is invalidated by the timeless history of planetarity.

But the temporal vision in planetarity does not only reach far back into the past; it reaches far into the future as well. From the aeroplane view of the Earth below, Naipaul's mind can 'travel back – *and forward* – aeons' (*Enigma,* 114, emphasis added). Human history is dwarfed by the immensity of the planet's future when Naipaul offers us an image of how nature eventually conquerors and outlasts human presence. He speeds up time in the growth of plants when depicting how the ruin of a farmhouse is rapidly crumbling, vanishing in the chill dampness of vegetation around it, the trees 'grown tall, dwarfing the house', like the shrinking of imperial history (*Enigma,* 11). Here is a vision of a time when the remotest non-human past fuses with the remotest non-human future. As is the case with organic hybridity, the untamed Difference of the planetary past also lies curled up underneath the apparent stability of the present, ready to be released in a magmatic eruption of Difference in a planetary future. This is a Deleuzian vision of how the past is the future of the present, how the virtual past becomes the future: in returning the heterogeneity of the past, Naipaul releases the Difference of a future-to-come. Hence, at its most intense moments, Naipaul's gaze fuses time and space at the greatest of scales, offering a

geomorphology in which space turns into a temporal becoming beyond any human control or reach, revealing a time of monstrous geological rotation, turning hugely with a slowness that is incomprehensibly fast. At such moments, when a pre-human planetarity past illuminates a post-human planetary future, human history ceases to matter and all our petty arguments about how to shape, structure and order reality stand out as hopelessly big-headed and futile. As Gopal puts it, 'Naipaul confronts the future through a backward glance... [and] the future is given to us as a ruin' (Gopal, 2005, 350).

* * *

To sum up my analysis so far, Naipaul's heterogenising and hybridising language is driven by an intentional and highly intensive energy that shatters the present order of things – in this case, the discourse of an English identity and its categorisations of the world. Tuned to flux and constant change as the primary condition of reality, his gaze proceeds to dissolve any formation of sameness and sets everything afloat in a multiplicity of fast becomings. Most significantly, he interrupts the illusory link between present day England and a homogeneous, national past. As in an eternal return of Difference, the past heterogeneity he has identified in the landscape connects with a future heterogeneity, and it all comes to full fruition with the kind of international migration that his own presence in Wiltshire represents. Or, to put it differently, the overturning of the heterogeneously layered pasts in his vision of the landscape rolls on into the becoming of an intensely heterogeneous future. In Naipaul we may thus have an example of what Glissant means when he speaks enigmatically of a *'a prophetic vision of the past'* or a 'future remembering' (Glissant, 1976, 63; 1973, 144).

From this angle, it is hard to see how Naipaul's text as a migration novel does not exploit the subversive potential of its genre, and it certainly is a truth with modifications when Khair suggests that Naipaul has a 'tendency to identify with a strongly structured, very "stable" past' when it comes to the 'idealized imperial England of his imagination' (Khair, 2001, 256). Naipaul's hybridising gaze is infused by an energy that may be said to bring about the kind of 'uncertainty [that] afflicts the discourse of power', which Bhabha speaks of as one of the most significant effects of post-colonial hybridity. Naipaul's gaze does exploit the power of intentional hybridity to disrupt the illusion of cultural homogeneity and de-automatise normalising discourses by making heterogeneity and cultural mixture highly visible, causing contrasting

perspectives to collide and fuse. At its most extreme Naipaul's temporal vision takes on a geological, planetary dimension that completely negates any human structure.

However, as I have mentioned, this is only one instantiation of the heterogenising and hybridising discourse in *The Enigma of Arrival*, and the speed of Difference and becoming that I have illustrated above really only crops up occasionally in the text to interrupt the principal force of sameness in the economy of the novel's vision.

Slowing down the speed of Difference

Maria Tymoczko says in an article on post-colonial writing and translation that:

> [a]n author can choose a fairly aggressive presentation of unfamiliar cultural elements in which differences ... are highlighted, or an author can choose an assimilative presentation in which likeness or 'universality' is stressed and cultural differences are muted and made peripheral to the central interests of the literary work. Similarly, linguistic features related to the source culture (such as dialect or unfamiliar lexical items) can be highlighted as defamiliarized elements in the text, or be domesticated in some way, or be circumvented altogether. (Tymoczko, 1998, 21)

If the intention of Naipaul's gaze is to expose the presence of heterogeneity and hybridity in all places, I have shown this exposure, so far, to be in the service of a radically deconstructive and highly dynamic heterogenising discourse, a discourse of immense centrifugality and dispersion. In Tymoczko's terms Naipaul's temporal gaze offers an 'aggressive presentation' of the unfamiliar or defamiliarising elements, highlighting the differences of the past and the fluidity of the present so as to disrupt any discourse of sameness and prevent it from ever blocking our views again from the reality of flux. *The Enigma of Arrival* in its transgressive and ingressive movements offers a discourse of diversity or a nomad science that *affirms* Difference, mixture, heterogeneity and becoming; indeed, it 'makes one multiplicity pass into another' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 52).

Yet, *The Enigma of Arrival* is not a 'lesson in impermanence' alone, and it is not the whole picture when Timothy Weiss says that Naipaul, as an exile, 'chooses flux over fixity and authority, insecurity over security, constructed identity over inherited identity' (Weiss, 1992, 218). Despite

Naipaul's commitment to the idea of flux and his exposure of the omnipresence of heterogeneous collisions and fusions – indeed his venture to 'think difference in itself independently of the forms of representation' (Deleuze, 1968, xvii) – the novel exhibits a remarkable desire to slow down the decentring forces of Difference, to take the speed out of change. So, in contrast to one of the possible readings of Mahjoub's novel, the intention of making organic hybridity and flux visible in *The Enigma of Arrival* does not only serve the purpose of setting everything off in a fast flow of rapid metamorphosis and becoming, celebrating a radically decentring and destabilising pluralism. Naipaul's heterogenising gaze is surrounded by another dynamic that revolves around an appreciation of the homogenising forces at work in the process of incorporating difference into a cultural organism: Organic hybridity appears to be appreciated for its capacity to produce a sense of continuity and coherence in response to the fundamental forces of Difference and diversity. This comes across in the novel's *reaffirmation of homogenising forces*, such as cultural adaptation, appropriation and a continued use of established cultural codes, or, to put it differently, the novel appears to repair 'the failure of representation' (Deleuze) by recycling the *organ*ising capacities of local 'commonly-held representations' (Todorov).

However, as much as we may discern a dialectics in this between difference and sameness, heterogeneity and homogeneity, a dialectics between the nomadic and static sciences, this is not at all a balanced kind of dialectics. The respective dynamics of sameness and difference in *The Enigma of Arrival* do not enter into dialogue at an equal strength, and below I will show how the forces of taming and domestication have ultimately been allowed such prevalence in the narrator's discourse that the Difference that is triggered by the intensive moments in the novel are to a large extent *muted* within a greater language of sameness. The 'becoming-minor' in the novel remains a minor dynamic, enfolded by a major dynamic of homogenisation. At times the novel's taming of the Difference it has intentionally unearthed is in fact so all-encompassing that it looks like a desire to restore it to its silent, unconscious, or *organ*icised, state for the sake of recreating a sense of coherence and homogeneity, regardless of how illusory this sense may be in an abstract theoretical perspective. In this way, Naipaul's novel offers a hybridising discourse that is very unusual in migration literature, a hybridising discourse that is at times intentionally unintense, in marked contrast to the common visions within the genre of conspicuously creolised futures. It is probably this dynamic which causes many critics to see *The Enigma of Arrival*, erroneously, as an anti-hybridity novel.

Revising the heterogenising gaze

Hayward says that *The Enigma of Arrival*:

> is preoccupied with the mechanics of perspective and failures of vision: it recapitulates in minute detail every enormous assumption Naipaul first made about his surroundings. (Hayward, 1997, 54)

I have shown how Naipaul realises the failure of his initial vision of the landscape, which turned out not to be an independent and free vision, but an instructed mechanical vision of sameness that wordlessly commanded him to fix the landscape in relation to the fabricated ideal of a major discourse. The revision of his initial assumptions then opened a perceptual passage to seeing everything as flux, inconstancy and heterogeneity, in space and time. However, as Hayward also notices, the revision of visions in *The Enigma of Arrival* does not stop there. Naipaul's newfound gaze of flux and heterogeneity is subjected to further revision.

Hayward is correct in observing that the novel, despite its pervasive erosion of sameness, 'lacks the triumphalism of myth-destruction' (Hayward, 1997, 53). Subverting the myth of Englishness is not something Naipaul enjoys. In fact he does not feel he has ever been oppressed by the myth of Englishness so much as he has actually been made by its tradition, enabled by it and derived tremendous aesthetic pleasure from it – as in his initial experience of joy at recognising how the English idyll in the valley matched the images he had been taught to revere. In line with this, his discovery of the flux of everything is not rendered in any tone of celebration. In contrast to Glissant's and Deleuze's enthusiasm for diversity and becoming, Naipaul does not necessarily see this as a liberating epistemology. The nomadic perspective of the world is something that has to be painstakingly learned and it takes time for him to accept it as, to him, it brings more loss than gain, always thwarting and changing 'what [he] had just begun to enter' (*Enigma,* 45). For these reasons Naipaul often makes tentative returns to his first impressions and the models and forms that governed them, despite their apparently constructed nature. As Hayward says, Naipaul questions and retracts from his initial impressions, but he is also reluctant to completely throw away the models on which he based these initial impressions – to use Naipaul's own words, they remain 'unthrown away'(see Hayward, 1997, 55).

We have seen how Lotman does not see the 'organizing core' of the semiosphere as an inhibiting factor to the same degree that Deleuze

despises organisation, sameness and the domestication of Difference. Lotman explains that if it had not been for the plotting of a law-forming or normalising 'structural model of the world', a 'myth-forming mechanism' in the semiosphere, the forces of heterogeneity and fluidity would simply tear the semiosphere apart (see Lotman, 1990, 152–3, 162). It is these homogenising forces, these 'commonly-held representations' of English culture that Naipaul is wary of finally abandoning – the kind of culturally generated systems of classification and ordering that reduce the world of anomalies and surprises, reduce diversity, in favour of regularity, repetition and a sense of sameness, the codes through which a community may understand itself, as Lotman puts it, as 'an integrated structural whole' (Lotman, 1990, 144).

Thus, despite Naipaul's recognition that the idyllic English landscape is a construction, a myth, covering up a vast heterogeneous and constantly changing reality, he never really lets go of this initial vision and the discourse of projecting a particular 'English' identity onto the landscape. After realising that the ideal of a timeless English idyll never existed, he paradoxically continues to express a regret that this idyll is vanishing. He cannot help classifying the landscape's heterogeneity into, on the one hand, desirable elements of reverence and mystique (like the curves of a country road which are 'overhung with green, mysterious and full of depth'), and, on the other, undesirable elements that are out of place, cold and disenchanting (like a new asphalt road, modern agricultural machinery, trucks and the aggressive, roaring blares from the military grounds) (see *Enigma,* 12, 326). Naipaul has settled in sufficiently in this place, arrived sufficiently, gone through a sufficient process of emplacement and built up a sufficiently stable vision of the landscape to feel threatened by new change (see *Enigma,* 55). And although he insists more than once that his gaze is not a sentimental and nostalgic one, 'not tormented in any romantic way ... not wishing to recreate or "restore" ', he expresses a contradictory desire 'to *stay with*' and '*re-create*' what he had found when he first came; in other words, to turn back change and return things to a former state (*Enigma,* 256, 96, emphasis added). As a result, Naipaul's claim that he had replaced the idea of decay, and all its implications of original, pure forms, with the idea of change does not hold. He never lets go entirely of the idea of 'antiquity' or a 'perfection in the past' (*Enigma,* 228) and the novel teems with enduring ideas, at least half-formed, of a former state of the world as a standard of measurement and comparison.

As much as Naipaul abandons the instructed images of the landscape and begins to *re*-cognise the heterogeneity of the place, he keeps

performing the opposite epistemological manoeuvre of blocking out signs of Difference to recreate or conjure forth an unsullied idyllic image of the English landscape – although acknowledging that he always has to 'look selectively' to do so (*Enigma,* 174, 17). Judith Levy has made the important observation in this regard of how the modern industrial world that is encroaching on the local scenery is semantically and grammatically bracketed in Naipaul's text (Levy, 1995, 100), as in the following passage:

> So the idea of antiquity ... as well as the ideas of literature enveloped this world which – surrounded by highways and army barracks though it was, and the very clouds in the sky sometimes seeded by the vapour trails of busy military aeroplanes – came to me as a lucky find of the solitude in which on many afternoons I found myself. (*Enigma,* 19–20)

Undesired modernisation is bracketed here or grammatically enclosed by the dashes and verbally by the 'though it was'. Significantly, *The Enigma of Arrival* is characterised by such bracketing of change and heterogeneity at all levels of the text, silent and spoken, making it possible for us to identify at least a partial reduction of Difference to a less visible, muted state. As I will move on to argue in the following, *The Enigma of Arrival* decelerates the speed of Difference by enveloping it in a general discursive economy of sameness and slowness.

A discursive economy of Sameness in *The Enigma of Arrival*

As mentioned, critics often blame Naipaul for being more English than the English. In accord with that accusation, the most powerful affirmation of homogeneity in the discursive economy of Naipaul's gaze is the fact that he does not entirely cease to view new difference in the landscape from the perspective of the myth of English identity as outlined by Howkins. Not only do we see this in Naipaul's anxiety about how the landscape that has traditionally served to symbolise a certain national sentiment is vanishing. There is an even more astonishing trace of the myth of a homogeneous English identity in the anxiety he displays about his own presence in Wiltshire. We have seen how Naipaul is aware that his presence signals an upheaval in English history and identity, how it constitutes a sign of Difference and radical disruption arriving 'from another hemisphere'. However, when Naipaul in this way embarks on the

typical plot in migration literature of the post-colonial subject returning to refurnish the former imperial centre, he does so with the hope of causing as little disturbance as possible. He has not arrived to tropicalise England, like Gibreel in *The Satanic Verses*, or to colonise the place like the 'prospecting rooks' which arrive in large numbers and radically change the landscape of Wiltshire by killing the trees (see *Enigma,* 326). He feels like an intruder and, almost self-effacingly, he harbours a wish 'not to interfere', to be 'unaffirmative'. He decides to paint his room with a deep mauve, which is 'the least assertive colour' he can think of (*Enigma,* 235).[5] Like this, Naipaul paradoxically regrets his own part in ruining the construction of an idealised picture of the landscape, and, accordingly, his hybridising gaze visibly shifts to an intentionally decelerating gaze, muting the difference his own presence represents in the perspective of English myth. To put it differently, Naipaul takes pains not to further undermine the picture of sameness that is generated by the traditional image of English identity, 'nervous' as he is 'of undoing the *magic* of the place' (*Enigma,* 209, emphasis added). But Naipaul affirms the forces of homogeneity and sameness and reduces the speed of difference at a more implicit and fundamental, or silent, level as well: through his medium of representation.

The language of *The Enigma of Arrival* is standardised English through and through. It is the major tongue, 'the language of masters' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 163). Whereas Deleuze is thrilled about how English is reworked from within by new speakers, how an entire war machine against English is setting the language afloat in an endless stream of englishes, Naipaul hardly engages in any 'minor usage' or attempts of being 'a foreigner in [his] own language' at all (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 58–9). In *The Enigma of Arrival*, there is little deterritorialisation of the major tongue, no asignifying howls, no experimentation with non-standards like dialect, creole or new englishes, no pursuit of the 'points of nonculture or underdevelopment' or 'linguistic Third World zones' of English (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 26–7) – or 'unfamiliar lexical items', as Tymoczko puts it. Naipaul circumvents any radical display of linguistic difference altogether. The novel's few explicit eruptions of linguistic and cultural heterogeneity, as when Naipaul re-asserts the difference of 'avon' and 'Waldenshaw', are never referred to again and sink back below the homogeneous surface of the novel's language. As with the grammatical bracketing of modern grimness, Standard English seems to territorialise the entire linguistic field of the novel and in this way overlay or muffle up cultural difference. Naipaul seems to cause difference to recede back into a state of concealment or muteness under the surface of what Bhabha

refers to as the 'normative grammar' of a 'unitary national linguistic conformism' (see Bhabha, 2002, 61–2). In paraphrase of Bhabha, Naipaul has moved from a foreignisation of English, in which he turned English into Norse, German, Celtic, etc., back to an English domestication of other languages, in which he turns Norse, German, Celtic, etc., into English (see Bhabha, 1994, 326). He turns the language of the Wiltshire landscape back into an English sameness. Concurrently, the expansion of the language of the English landscape with topographies from other parts of the world recedes into the background. The Difference of the landscapes of Himalaya, Africa and the Caribbean is significantly reduced by the fact that they have undergone a contextual, cultural and linguistic translation. As they are processed through, or rendered to us through the cultural grammar inherent in Naipaul's major use of the English language, they remain embedded, or enclosed, in the prevalent economy of the 'down and barrow'.

In Bakhtinian terms, *The Enigma of Arrival*, in its predominant mode of expression, thus ceases to be *consciously* 'double-languaged', or, as Glissant would say, the novel ceases to be 'multilingual *in intention*' – there is no intentional attempt to counter or mix the preponderance of standardised English with other social or cultural languages or linguistic consciousnesses so much as there is a dynamic of English absorbing these differences (see Bakhtin, 1935, 361, 358, 360; Glissant, 1990, 32, emphasis added). Consequently, it will now take a reader's intentionally heterogenising and hybridising gaze to unearth and restore the speed of Difference at work under the novel's linguistic surface – for instance, to exhume the Persian, Aramaic, Latin, French and German layers of the word 'rose' (the national emblem of England and a central flower in Naipaul's text), or, for that matter, the foreign roots and travels of the words 'meadow', 'barrow' and 'garden' (see *Merriam-Webster*, 2010).

Naipaul seems to share Derrida's 'taste for the purity of language', as Derrida puts it about his feelings for the French language (Derrida, 1996, 46). Deconstruction essentially challenges any assertion of purity, but in *Monolingualism of the Other* Derrida admits that for some reason he cannot help defending a proper or 'good' use of French. Derrida characterises himself in this regard as 'more French than the French'. He was brought up with this 'taste for the purity of language' and has never been able to abandon it. Derrida's only consolation is that this 'purity of language' is 'a purity which is not very pure', because 'monolingualism' can never be 'at one with itself' and a language is therefore never singular (Derrida, 1996, 47, 65, see also 58). In line with Bakhtin's idea of all languages as inherently heteroglot, Derrida states that '[*w*]*e only ever speak one language*'

yet '[*w*]*e never speak only one language*' (Derrida, 1996, 7).[6] Accordingly, because Naipaul's standard English is at once monoglot and heteroglot, a sameness with an immanent instability, the bottom of which we will never reach, because of this, there is no need for him to *intentionally* show the heterogeneity of English. Heterogeneity will always be there for readers to register at all times. Naipaul has shown the way with the archaeology of avon and Waldenshaw, as well as he shows it by constantly destabilising any act of representation, but he does not need the parergon of a massive post-colonial rhetoric to hold up the heteroglossia of English. Such a thing is only necessary if, like Glissant, one thinks of a root as a 'monolingual' *contrast to*, rather than *part of*, the rhizome (see Glissant, 1990, 15–19, 98). With Naipaul it is not a matter of being 'multilingual *in intention*'; it is the other way round. Since heteroglossia and significatory instability are already primary conditions, he *intentionally* clings to whatever scraps of ground he can, to secure a minimum place of dwelling. So when Naipaul chooses to follow only one set of 'commonly-held representations' (Todorov) or one 'orchestrating language' (Bakhtin), he does so knowing that this is not the only option and it represents no natural or logocentric truth, knowing that there is no such thing as a pure oneness or monolingualism and that even a standard does not necessarily amount to a language of totalitarian and intransigent intent.[7]

In the end, Naipaul's strategy of representation does not assume a final grounding of the meaning of words or an arrival at a final definition; there are no finite optic claims in *The Enigma of Arrival*, neither monoglot nor heteroglot. Nor does Naipaul assume the eternal return of the Same. In Deleuze's words, Naipaul's representation involves only the return of 'the identical which belongs to the different, or turns around the different' (Deleuze, 1968b, 51). In accord with a Deleuzian philosophy of difference, *The Enigma of Arrival* still operates within the 'legitimate use of the words "identical" and "similar"' as it does not belong to the 'platitude of the identical as equal to itself', it does not 'produce[ ] an image of identity as though this were the *end* of the different' (Deleuze, 1968, 374–5).

A discursive economy of slowness in *The Enigma of Arrival*

The slowness of *The Enigma of Arrival* is one of the novel's most striking features and it significantly accentuates the dynamics in Naipaul's gaze of muting difference and reducing the speed of change and becoming. Slowness is not only created by the setting itself, rural Wiltshire,

and the fact that our migrant hero is *walking* through this landscape. Formally the novel is turned into a slow and heavy read through its virtual absence of action and dialogue, which are replaced by reported speech, long pondering passages and extremely detailed descriptions. Naipaul's narrative moves slowly with the slow changes of country life, and objects move into his range of vision at the slowest of paces. On the linguistic level speed is taken out of sentences by their length and the heaviness of their grammar as in:

> [t]he order that Pitton had imposed not only on the grounds but also on my idea of the seasons, that order had gone. (*Enigma,* 25)

Note the weight and slowness caused by the inserted 'not only', the repetition of 'order' and the long pause created by the comma and the heavy, demonstrative pronoun 'that'. In fact, as several critics observe, the repetition of words within singular sentences is one of the prime instruments Naipaul uses to slow down the pace of narration. In this way, the routine and repetitiveness of the slow life in Wiltshire as well as Naipaul's repetitive return to earlier modes of seeing are underwritten by a formal and grammatical heaviness.

The slowness and the many repetitions in the novel's grammar and syntax comprise a formal semantics that reflects the reluctance in Naipaul's gaze to let go of the centripetal forces of sameness. Levy maintains that the many repetitions may be seen as the search for an original experience, a relentless attempt to return to beginnings, a 'wish for the complete recapturing of origin without difference' (Levy, 1995, 110). In repetition, as Levy points out, there is 'little account for variety or otherness' (Levy, 1995, 110). Translated to our terms, repetition, as the repetition of 'the lowest degree of Difference' (Deleuze, 1968b, 93), works as a homogenising force, limiting the room in space and time for heterogeneity and diversity. In a similar vein Gopal argues that the novel's textual commitment to repetition follows the temporality of rituals that 'release their power through iteration' (Gopal, 2005, 351). I would like to add to Gopal's observation that the reduction of difference and variety involved in the reiteration of ritual, and in its incarnation in *The Enigma of Arrival* as repetition, both produce the kind of almost meditative, rhythmic, soothing, tranquil quality that many critics identify as the novel's monotonous tone or mood – a steady tone largely undisturbed by the diversity of sudden, disruptive changes in pitch or speed.

Slowness, as a decisive feature of *The Enigma of Arrival*, significantly affects the discursive economy of Naipaul's novel. There is in this

slowness and repetition, in its grammatical, mimetic, verbal and even tonal manifestations, a discernible attempt to retain some stability, some stillness of the word and its objects despite their fundamental evanescence. I agree strongly with Hayward's suggestion, in this regard, that the many repetitions appear like a search for fixed points (see Hayward, 2002, 51). Hayward refers to Christopher Ricks as having captured the effect of the novel's style with a line from Eliot's 'Burnt Norton III': as a 'slow rotation suggesting permanence' (Ricks quoted in Hayward, 2002, 50). The pervasive slowness in Naipaul's gaze does not cancel difference, but mutes it, reduces its force and envelops the fast speed of the ingressive gaze, just as Standard English in the novel envelops etymological differences, and signs of modern grimness in the landscape are bracketed in the text through punctuation and grammatical strategies. All things considered, slowness may facilitate a sense of continuity and consistency within change and a degree of change within continuity and consistency, a sense of permanence within transience and a degree of transience within permanence, like 'the identical which belongs to the different, or turns around the different'.

In fact there is a very concrete example of this in the way the novel *performs* the gradual disappearance of Naipaul's own difference in the landscape, as if in a novelistic manoeuvre that imitates the slow 'organic' processing of difference in a culture from its visible and intense state at the point of arrival to its gradual domestication and muting by local codes of homogenisation. Naipaul consciously registers the increasing disappearance of his difference in the landscape: fifty years ago his presence in this landscape would have been impossible, he says, whereas now it is only 'a little unlikely' (*Enigma,* 55). But, at another, wordless level in the novel, this gradual disappearance of his difference in the landscape is formally played out, like a fading voice or a weak signal faltering on the air, especially in the large sections of the book where we find no references to his foreignness, neither self-reflexive nor in the voices of other characters or in his interaction with them. As in Hassan's story in *The Carrier* there is an absence in the local response to Naipaul of any taking notice of his difference (with the only exception of the landlord's orientalist poetry and gifts). This points to a complete adoption of Naipaul by the community, which is also suggested in how the locals confide in him as a trustworthy member of the community. Consequently, the reader may completely lose sight of his difference, as when Naipaul observes how newcomers 'stand out' or describes the recent industrialisation of farming and dairy production as 'the new, exaggerated thing that had come upon *us*' (*Enigma,* 342–3, 36, 58,

emphasis added). Once again, it is at moments like these, when difference is obscured in a homogenised 'us', restored to a mute, opaque or unconscious level, that it takes a reader's intentionally hybridising gaze to expose the actual Difference in the landscape beneath the homogeneity of the collective pronoun. Naipaul in this way allows his difference to be swallowed up, slowly and steadily, by the prevalent economy of sameness in the place.

Pushing the *West* back into the *west*

However, the novel's discursive economy of sameness and slowness, the absorption of difference within a predominant cultural grammar of 'Englishness' does not amount to a surrender to the master's voice – or an internalisation of white racist assumptions, as Dimple Godiwala argues, or a servile mentality as Walcott has suggested in his review of the novel (see Godiwala, 2007, 67; Walcott, 1987). On the contrary, it is motivated by a far more foresighted displacement of Western power than may often be the case in post-colonial literature that asserts difference more aggressively.

Obviously, there is a radical dislodgement of Western power in the planetary perspective in which all geographical positions are disinterestedly distributed on the face of the earth and the inscription of human history on the surface of the planet are blotted out. However, there is another dynamic in Naipaul's planetary gaze through which the power of the West is more subtly displaced. Most of Naipaul's narrative stays on ground level and zooms in on the immensity of detail in a tiny location, like a slowly changing close-up view of a small corner of the world. Here the immense rotation of the planet and geological time we saw in the acceleratory gaze recedes into the background and becomes enveloped, or rather covered up, muted, by Naipaul's preoccupation with the small rotations of time that give meaning and structure in everyday human life, such as the repetitive and cyclical time of practical routines, the slow turn of hours, days, months, seasons, years within which 'it took time for change ... to be noticed' at all (*Enigma,* 33). This runs in line with a second dynamic that Spivak envisions in her proposal of an episteme of planetarity. She stresses the importance of dialogising the ethereal view from above with a view from below which draws attention to the actual and physical life and needs within specific locations, not only in opposition to the vast, unsettling geography of the planet, but also to the vast, unsettling history of globalisation. Unlike the episteme of globalisation, which is 'on our computers' where

'[n]o one lives', planetarity involves a 'learning to learn from below', by which she means a reconnection with forms of inhabitation and a certain density and complexity of lived experience (Spivak, 2003, 72, see 100). In *The Enigma of Arrival*, it is not only from the air, but also from down here, on the ground, that we catch a view of the planet:

> the vapour trails ... of commercial airliners ... like disappearing chalk-marks ... in exceptional atmospheric conditions coming together to make a thick white arc of cloud from end to end of the horizon, clearly showing the curvature of the earth. (*Enigma,* 345)

Arguably, the effect of Naipaul's stress on the smallness of this place, of its relative isolation from centres of power – the former signs of imperial control now reduced to innocuous ruins – along with the limited view from below of but the curvatures of a vast planetary body outside its mastery, add up to a re-imagining of the geo-political position of the west away from its place at the centre of the world. The West with a capital letter is pushed to the off-centre position its name warrants: *west* of centre, not the centre but the west – *just* the west, in the lower case – on equal ranking with all other decentred geographical markers: the east, the north, the north-east, the south, the eastern south. In accordance with Glissant's poetics of relation, Naipaul may be said to move away from the opposition of centre and periphery, turning all peripheries into a centre, or, rather, letting his word lead 'from periphery to periphery' (Glissant, 1990, 29).

From this descended perspective, through this practice of learning to learn the west from below, Naipaul's geographical reorganisation is far from an aggressive one; it involves an attempt to restore the West to the west in another manner, a gentle manner that is not at all without effect. One incident in particular illustrates this. Naipaul has moved to another cottage which he has refurbished counter to his usual principles of not causing any change. One day a man shows up with his old mother. The cottage turns out to have been a significant place in her childhood, but now she no longer recognises it, which profoundly unsettles and disorientates her, making her question where she is (see *Enigma,* 346–7). Naipaul reacts with embarrassment:

> embarrassed to be what I was, an intruder, not from another village or another country, but from another hemisphere; embarrassed to have destroyed or spoilt the past for the old lady, as the past had been destroyed for me in other places, in my old island, and even

> here, in the valley of my second life ... where bit by bit the place that had thrilled and welcomed and reawakened me had changed and changed. (*Enigma,* 347)

It is in passages like this one with its remarkable absence of the post-colonial rhetoric of the periphery challenging the centre, as well as it is in the connection Naipaul draws between Wiltshire and Trinidad, as sharing an experience of change as loss, that the West is drawn away from the centre back into the west. Wiltshire is represented here as having become as vulnerable to dynamics beyond local control as Trinidad, both places now at the mercy of planetary and global-historical dynamics of flux and change that fundamentally disturb their chances of autonomously ordering their immediate environment and dwelling places. In the last chapter of *The Enigma of Arrival* Naipaul records the changes in Trinidad and how he feels the same way as the old lady when on a visit he discovers that the past, the sacred places of his childhood, the sense of a rural idyll, through which he had been able to construct 'a fantasy of home', had vanished. As with the landscape in Wiltshire, the landscape of his childhood is turned into a purely functional space by a modernisation of the economy, its twists and curves straightened, its mysteries gone, 'its secrets opened up', which in turn has forever altered the mood and palled the self-image of the population (see *Enigma,* 384–7). Naipaul is aware that the past in Trinidad is scarred by cruelty and is very far from idyllic, but he nevertheless asserts that it is through our capacity to create welcoming ideas of landscapes, despite their disfigurements and testimonies of violence, that we can re-create a sensation of home and, with that, an architecture for a collective future. Notably in this context, Casey defines homelessness not as a liberated vagabonding state in which any becoming is possible, but as 'being without any effective means of orientation in a complex and confusing world' (Casey, 1993, xv).

In conclusion, *The Enigma of Arrival* is not to be read as a nostalgic text longing for the heyday of the empire. By observing – simply, laconically, compassionately, patronisingly – that the West is turning into the west, Naipaul eludes the counterproductive repetition of an anti-Western discourse that, ironically, keeps re-consolidating an undesired geo-political imaginary by constantly pointing to the west as occupying a central position. In *The Enigma of Arrival* the west, or Europe, has lost its central position and that is the discursive order or geo-political imaginary that is incessantly reiterated. The force at work in *The Enigma of Arrival* in this regard is an *active* force, not a *reactive* force of ressentiment. In 1987 Naipaul may of course have been anticipating the course of history from

an immature point in time, but this is where the foresightedness of his showdown with the West lies. Many critics would point to the reality of neo-imperialism and the continuation of Western world hegemony. Now, however, twenty years after the publication of Naipaul's novel, we may be witnessing the signs of its final stages of dissolution. The slackening of the Western iron grip on the world with the demise of the empire is picking up speed with the current growth of economic, military and cultural power in other parts of the world. Significantly the development in China and India heralds a continued reduction of any legacy of Western imperialism and elucidates the growing role of the west as a receiver rather than an issuer of worldviews and dynamics of change.

'Land is not land alone'

Once the West is reduced to the west, once it no longer represents a master discourse, or, rather, once the core of the imperialistic discourse of Englishness has retreated from the centre, shrunk back to a small and far corner of the world – disempowered, emasculated and ruined – it becomes possible for Naipaul, as a post-colonial writer, to write an apology for English culture and the narratives of stability it needs, like the old lady, as a 'means of orientation in a complex and confusing world'.[8]

The story of the old lady touches on a central point which explains Naipaul's reluctance about the epistemology of flux and heterogeneity. One of Naipaul's greatest regrets about the modern changes of the landscapes in Wiltshire and Trinidad is that they are 'stripped finally of [their] sanctity', reduced to a space of transit rather than inhabitation, like the homes of the restless locals in the valley that are demoted to temporary shelters (see *Enigma,* 62, 59). At one point he finally admits that he cannot surrender himself to the epistemology of flux:

> I had lived with the idea of change, had seen it as a constant, had seen a world in flux, [b]ut philosophy failed me now. Land is not land alone, something that simply is itself. Land partakes of what we breathe into it, is touched by our moods and memories. (*Enigma,* 365)

In this perspective, the structuring and regulation of time and space, the taming of the unsettling forces of Difference are seen as an investment of identity and emotion in a place. You 'transfer (or risk transferring) emotion or hopes' to a place, as Naipaul puts it, without which a place becomes unengaging and unsuitable for dwelling (*Enigma,* 59).

Throughout this analysis, I have referred to images of English identity as arbitrary cultural constructions. However, as mentioned before, a central ambition in Casey's philosophy of place, and in *The Enigma of Arrival*, is actually to soften the distinction between nature and culture, noting their reciprocity and entwinedness, in order to show how places are both *physical* and *psychical* and how belonging in a place is at once concrete, imagined and relational (Casey, 2003, 30–1). Hence, the wisdom Naipaul arrives at is that pre-established forms, or relatively continuous cultural grids through which to filter the world, are not only to be seen as a deprivation of reality, preventing us from seeing alternative realities. Grids of the imagination may just as well function as gateways to a sensual and cultural enrichment of the experience of our surroundings – like reading a landscape through a mythologising code or a literary work of the nineteenth century – and in that way facilitate a realisation of the world, a meaningful connection with the world, or even, for that matter, the unthinking merging with the world engendered by the bewitching power of language, which may very well be the very basis of the feeling of belonging. As Casey points out, when an 'imaginatively place-specific architecture' enhances our perceptions of a place rather than reducing them, 'the space and time that result become the very basis of expansively expressive experiences' (Casey, 2003, 51 n. 36). For these reasons Naipaul's gaze never tips over into a simple third-space rejection of categories and sameness. As opposed to Deleuze's aversion against the idea of pre-established forms of representation, or Glissant's aversion against 'order-knowledge', Naipaul does not see these as necessarily reactionary and limiting of vision. True, pre-established poetics and codes which structure and order the world *can* be oppressive and restrictive of becoming, but pre-established codes and categorisations may just as well be enriching of one's experience of the world and reality, the forms through which we read a landscape effecting a sensual intensification which a purely deterritorialising nomadic vision may overlook. In fact, without forms or structures or lenses or grids to translate and represent the world, the world may just remain 'out there', shapeless, unengaging and unengaged by us. 'I saw what I saw very clearly', says Naipaul at one point, 'But I didn't know what I was looking at. *I had nothing to fit it into*' (*Enigma,* 5, emphasis added). To Naipaul that which has no category and some kind of order easily becomes disenchanted and unmoving:

> Now, with the growth of weeds and the advance of marsh plants, the disappearance of the rose-bed, to be in the garden was like being in the midst of *undifferentiated* bush. (*Enigma,* 365, emphasis added)

This only changes once Naipaul begins to learn the local encodings of the place, which is 'like learning a second language' (*Enigma*, 30):

> I had slowly learned the names of shrubs and trees. That knowledge, helping me visually to disentangle one plant from another in a mass of vegetation, quickly becoming *more than a knowledge of names*, had added to my *appreciation*. It was like learning a language, after living among its sounds. (*Enigma,* 365, emphases added)

The etymology of the word 'culture', as Heidegger reminds us, denotes the tilling, cultivation of a place, we may even say a *writing* of place (see Heidegger, 2001). Accordingly, the local language Naipaul wishes to learn, this local writing, with all its offers of codifications and categorisations of the landscape, may be beyond his immediate experience of the landscape, yet it is also necessary for an engaging interaction with the landscape, equipping him with a model of reading or a grid of translation, so to speak, which may quicken his perceptual experience, or jerk it into movement from the passivity of non-engagement. And, enabling a particular localised experience of the landscape, it deepens the global migrant's range of experience. Naipaul constantly speaks of a desire to overcome the crudeness of his reading of a foreign landscape like the English, to overcome the embarrassing 'rawness of response' to a particular place one inevitably suffers from when 'in the other man's country' (*Enigma*, 6). To acquire an intimate sense of the local experience of Wiltshire, like the native language of his knowledge of Trinidadian landscape which he experiences as almost instinctive. And it is in the process of Naipaul's acquisition of this second language that we get to see how cultural identity is the product of an intimate and intricate, tendril or fibrous and dynamic – in fact, rhizomatic – connection between place, individual and socio-cultural identity.[9]

Casey speaks eloquently of how we are 'placelings' more than 'earthlings' – and 'planetlings' I suppose (Casey, 2003, 19). We make places inhabitable, he says, by attaching our stories to them, a kind of cultural configuration or 'culturalisation' of space, which causes land to reflect an identity back onto us. All this happens through a complex and largely unconscious dialectics between our socio-cultural registers and our sensual apparatus. Cultural and social structures 'sediment themselves into the deepest level of perception', says Casey, and 'become infusions into the infrastructures of perception itself' (Casey, 2003, 18, 19). In truth, 'even the most primordial level of perceiving is inlaid with cultural categories in the form of differential patterns of recognition, ways of organizing the perceptual field and acting in it' (Casey, 2003, 34).

The crucial thing in this respect is that we realise that places are not 'passive recipient[s] or mere vehicle[s] of cultural enactments'; specific localities are themselves 'enactive of cultural practices', taking part in *shaping* our cultures (Casey, 2003. 34). The power of places is then that they 'gather experiences and histories, even languages and thoughts', and in our sensual and perceptual interaction with a place, we enter a process of being anchored by and anchoring socio-cultural identities and perceptual experiences within the place: we are 'at once encultured and emplaced *and* enculturating and emplacing' (Casey, 2003, 24–5, 34). Like this, we are not only *in* a place but in a constant process of becoming *of* that place, as well as that place, we may add, is in a process of becoming *of* us (Casey, 2003, 19).

When we cease to invest our landscapes with the language of our desires, emotions, dreams and hopes as well as our rhythms and routines, 'breathing into it' our *myths* of identity, landscape loses its enchantment. Not only do we lose a shared language of experience (real and ideal); space becomes *ordinary* (Naipaul's word), if not meaninglessly drab, indifferent, bleak and austere (see *Enigma,* 326). Secondly, we lose agency. Our emotional investments in a landscape and our shaping, ordering and structuring of time and space work as stabilising designs, as form-giving intentions, that to some degree resist and direct the otherwise overwhelming and disruptive forces of flux and Difference. Naipaul as a post-colonial subject is painfully aware of this. As an inheritor of the history of displacement, of Indian indentured labour in the Caribbean, and as an international migrant, he has 'been given an especially tender or raw sense of an unaccommodating world' (*Enigma,* 99) – a world of violent global disruption and the disintegration of home, place, tradition, codes of representation and grids of translation. Glissant registers this sense of an 'unaccommodating world' in the representation of landscape in Caribbean literature. It strikes him how landscape, especially in Creole folktales, is often 'not meant to be inhabited' (Glissant, 1975, 130). It never becomes a place, but remains a space you just 'pass through', as he puts it, inhospitable and resilient to any emotional investment (Glissant, 1975, 130). Glissant thinks this explains '[t]he extreme "breathlessness"' we find in Creole fiction. When a landscape refuses to harbour identity, it offers no room for rest, no lasting relations between people and place, vegetation, creatures, ground.[10] Hence, in Caribbean literature, says Glissant, there is '[n]o time to gaze on things', no time for 'appreciating the world' (Glissant, 1975, 131) – '[t]he landscape has never been recorded' in the production of a West-Indian culture, Naipaul lamented in 1960 (Naipaul, 1962, 58).

In other words, dwelling cannot begin lest a poetics or a language of the landscape starts developing. Writing a place enculturates a place; it allows you to rest in a place long enough to catch your breath so that you may actually speak again.

'Breathlessness' is not a word that suggests itself when reading *The Enigma of Arrival*, to say the least. Naipaul's gaze does indeed *dwell* on, and dwell *in* the things and the landscape he observes. However, once Naipaul loses the magic language and poetics of an idyllic English setting – once he loses the 'bewitchment' of the symbolising power of language to recycle White's phrase – and once the landscape starts changing too fast, it becomes unresponsive, reduced to a space you just 'pass through': '[h]ow exposed a house looks when it becomes a site for builders, how stripped of sanctity, when a room, once intimate, becomes mere space!' (*Enigma,* 97). Significantly, Naipaul suffers a breakdown during his stay in Wiltshire; the cracking up of the promise of the still life in the rural landscape is paralleled by a psychological cracking up, each functioning as the mirror of the other, the dissolution of the emotional tangibility of land reflecting the dissolution of the solidity of mind.

In this light, Naipaul's received images of England are, after all, not necessarily to be seen as an oppressive or arbitrary or reductive imposition on the landscape that enslaves its inhabitants and visitors to a certain fixed and *monadic* vision of the world. It is an emplaced language that has been locally generated through a continuous intertwined and intertwining process between humans and land, the natural world and the cultural world, contemporaries and ancestors (see Casey, 1993, 291–3). Once acquired, it opens up to a certain process of sharing social, cultural and, not least, *sensual* experience of the place, giving shape to the environment and connecting people to this environment as well as to each other. If Naipaul can be said to 'mimic' an English cultural identity, in learning this 'second language', his mimicry may reveal that its model has no fixed *essence* or *supreme* representational *authority*, but it does not refute this model as having no *substance* or representational *mandate* whatsoever. In contrast to the predominant mode of thinking in migration theory and writing, preoccupied as it is with margins, peripheries, vagabondage, fragmentation, decentring, Naipaul never tires of looking for or trying to enter a centre – a semiospheric centre – and in *The Enigma of Arrival* it is a very localised one of the kind or a localised structure of order (see Naipaul, 1984, 10, 40, 159–60). Symptomatically, we find respite in Naipaul's novel from the dominant mode of *leaving* in much migration discourse – the preoccupation with lines of flight, as in *Jasmine*, leaving roots, leaving traditions, leaving selves, leaving places,

or in Chambers' idea that criticism involves not 'a point of *arrival*' but 'a perpetual *departure*' (Chambers, 1994, 7, 42, emphases added). Arrival in Naipaul is not an end point or a destination, however; it is a *beginning*, a point in time when criticism begins, when we start *dwelling* on things, when the exploration of a place and its people and the interminable development of one's identity in that place commences or intensifies; it does not imply any finitude or finality (see Naipaul, 1984, 12).[11] Correspondingly, and in great contrast to the celebratory nomadic discourse of migrancy and border-crossing, Naipaul does not see the ordering and taming of Difference, nor does he see the ideas of *one* home and belonging to *one* place, as limitations to the experience of life. To Naipaul home is the place where one lives most profoundly and to be, like Jack, 'a man of his own setting', at peace with his routines and habits, appears to him as 'an especially happy condition' (*Enigma,* 31). Nor does this mean that belonging and rootedness in one place is seen as a particularly fixed position, as a final defeat of Difference and becoming. Time and again, *The Enigma of Arrival* illustrates how the smallest of places host a complexity and heterogeneity matching the greatest of topographies – like the irreducible infinity of a life. Jack, for all the smallness of his environment, is a man who 'had created his own life, his own world, almost his own continent' (*Enigma,* 99). Whereas Glissant is excited about the 'inexhaustible tangle' of relations we find within cultural variance (Glissant, 1990, 58), and rightly so, Naipaul is equally excited about the 'inexhaustible tangle' of relations within 'one' place, within the 'commonly-held representations' of 'one' culture – to live in any one place or any one language, French, English or Creole, is to live the whole world. Apparently, this explains why Hoffman reads *The Enigma of Arrival* as '[o]ne of the most interesting and subtle meditations on home' (Hoffman, 1999, 59).

Conclusion: a celebration of organic hybridity

In *The Enigma of Arrival* we find a recognition of the twentieth century migratory movement as a significant historical era of change, as 'a great shaking up of the world, a great shaking up of old cultures and old ideas' (*Enigma,* 173). However, the novel also brackets the importance of cultural heterogeneity and hybridity caused by the contemporary era of global mass migration. Through the vast temporal dimension of his ingressive gaze, Naipaul posits contemporary forces of hybridity in a larger perspective as but a continuation of processes that have always been going on, rather than falling prey to the unreflective notion of a great disruptive force that breaks with a past of cultural homogeneity,

immobility and fixity. Whereas an increasing number of writers and critics since the 1980s have tended to celebrate our age as a new age of global migration and uprooting and the 'demythification' of identity, Naipaul is less enthusiastic about the present and allows the past to exist as a moment of resistance against it. In *The Enigma of Arrival* the past resists its reduction to a homogeneous mass of static and unproductive sameness by a discourse that recommends itself as a dynamic force of unparalleled speeds of Difference and new becomings.

For the same reason *The Enigma of Arrival* does not fall prey to any flaunting of the by now clichéd discourse of migrant hybrid in-betweenness. In fact, the common transcultural migration discourse, to the extent that it crops up in the novel, is held at arm's length. At one point Naipaul had hoped 'to arrive, in a book, at a *synthesis* of the worlds and cultures that had made [him]', but later this kind of synthesis begins to '*tire*' him, as he puts it (*Enigma,* 172, my emphases). The naïve implication of a harmonious balanced fusion of opposites in such 'synthesis' is simply too trivial, as well as it may smack too much of a solution, a final arrival. Nor do we find any dazzling discourse of fast speed post-colonial hybridity in the novel. Here is no cross-cultural spectacle, no creole carnival, no festival of translated men and half-breeds, no mongrel 'in-betweens', 'both-ands' or 'neither-nors'. On the contrary, Naipaul's hybrid discourse, or semi-hybrid discourse, is slow, undramatic, non-sensational in great contrast to *The Satanic Verses* Rushdie was to publish one year later (not surprisingly, *The Enigma of Arrival* bores a writer like Rushdie who sees it as a monotonous, lacklustre, 'exhausting' book with no 'spark of life' (Rushdie, 1987, 151)).

Nor does Naipaul celebrate the migrant's vision as a special stereoscopic or double vision (although he is not exempt from doing so in novels published both before and after *The Enigma of Arrival*, as pointed out in note 2 of this chapter). The migrant's gaze in *The Enigma of Arrival* is not a penetrating and revelatory vision of truth, but a vision subject to conjecture and in constant need of revision – throughout the novel the migrant narrator stresses that it takes time for him to learn to see. In order for him to see the complex heterogeneity and the flux of identity in rural Wiltshire, he needs to shed both the myth of a timeless English purity as well as the temptation for a mobile gaze to represent localised cultures as immobile and homogeneous. And even when he discovers the ubiquity of flux and heterogeneity, this discovery needs revision in appreciation of the human need of a language of the landscape that may cause place to be inhabitable and slow down the speed of Difference.

Without the discourse of hybrid in-betweenness and special migrant visions, Naipaul's novel constitutes an example of contemporary migration literature that avoids contrasting hybridity with purity, avoids turning hybridity into a category in itself in-between other supposedly homogeneous categories. Instead Naipaul deconstructs the silly difference that theory tends to establish between an alleged cultural homogeneity in the 'traditional' western societies and the post-traditional heterogeneity of a post-colonial hybrid identity. This leaves him no option but to immerse the composite nature of his own identity and migrant's eye-view on the world within a local space that is already crisscrossed by the complexities of movement, change, difference, blending, contradiction and ambiguity. Without the binary simplicity of hybridity versus purity, Naipaul challenges us to note the heterogenising and homogenising forces at work in any cultural space and in any observer's gaze. If there is any in-betweenness at all in *The Enigma of Arrival*, it is thus not a betweenness between two or more cultures, but a shifting and asymmetric dialectic between sameness and difference, forces of homogenisation and forces of heterogenisation within discourses and cultures.

Radhakrishnan speaks of how hybridity may be present everywhere but in ways not available to the dominant consciousness of a culture and, in this respect, hybridity 'awaits perspectival instrumentalization' (Radhakrishnan, 2000, 5). In other words, it awaits its actualisation at the conscious level of a community's self-perception. As shown, this is exactly what Naipaul is after at the most accelerated instantiations of his heterogenising gaze. Rewinding the processes of organic hybridity, he turns the unconscious, muted and opaque difference of English identity into a conscious and highly visible heterogeneity and hybridity, exposing the complex multiplicity of the past in the local space of Wiltshire, which in fact uproots the very heartland of Englishness.

Now, if we turn to the *purpose* of such exposures of hybridity and heterogeneity – Radhakrishnan's emphasis on '*perspectival instrumentalization*' – we may talk of at least two general instrumentalisations or intentions in ingressive gazes in migration novels. In its most radical form the unearthing of local hybridity opposes the process of domestication by local forces of sameness that have successfully caused the muting of difference in the first place. The purpose of this radical gaze is to restore difference to its full speed as in a Deleuzian nomadic science, allowing no subordination of Difference to any identity or similarity. Or, to put it differently, it is a disruptive gaze that exploits foreignness and Difference to intensify the heterogenising forces of the cultural

semiosphere, causing new and old cultural differences and hybrid forms to govern the conscious, self-reflective image of a community. The speed of cultural change accelerates in this vision, constantly changing the semiosphere beyond recognition, if not causing it to disintegrate completely. In contrast, a far less radical gaze appreciates the continuity of existing structures of sameness and allows them to interact and fuse with difference. Here the ingressive exposure of a culture's inherent heterogeneity serves the purpose of bringing the historical inevitability of hybridity to a conscious level, so as to open up the host culture to new difference yet without rejecting the cultural machinery of domesticating this difference. To put it differently, this is a vision that allows foreignness and difference to be swallowed up by the semiosphere's homogenising forces, thus slowing down cultural change and effecting a sense of coherence and continuity, a changing sameness, despite the culture's fundamental fluidity and heterogeneity.

Whereas theory has been busy illuminating the former, the intention of the hybridising gaze in *The Enigma of Arrival* definitely belongs to the latter. When we look at the asymmetric distribution of homogenising and heterogenising forces within the novel, it definitely augments the forces of sameness in the semiosphere of England against forces of difference. This is not with an intension of fixing English culture, or to cut it off from the world, or seal it against external influence and the constant arrival of new difference, but to allow a high degree of local control of the forces of difference in order to give direction to change and forestall discontinuity, fragmentation and the complete loss of belonging and identity. Clearly Naipaul does not sympathise with Bhabha's appreciation of how '[t]he foreign element *destroys* the original's structures of reference and sense of communication' (Bhabha, 1994, 326, emphasis added). Amidst his foreignisation, Naipaul never rejects the process of domestication: the centralising 'structures of reference' or commonly-held representations remain 'unthrown away'.[12]

Glissant correctly observes that 'one cannot break each particular culture down into prime elements, since its limit is not defined' (Glissant, 1990, 169). Naipaul is not staking out limits of English culture, enforcing its borders, but, as a foreigner, he is enhancing the centripetal grammar that holds the cultural semiosphere together from within in order that the foreign may be incorporated within this structure rather than contributing to its further erosion and collapse. This is all in the spirit of Derrida when he says that 'openness should not contradict unity': 'openness opens the unity, renders it possible, and forbids its totality. Its openness allows receiving and giving' (Derrida, 1985, 190).

In Deleuzian terms we might say that Naipaul establishes a dialectics between the nomadic and the static gaze, but this is a lopsided dialectics, constantly gravitating to the forces of stability and sameness. As much as Difference, flux and change are acknowledged as primary forces, Naipaul never gives up the attempt to curb them. He recognises in himself 'a cultivation of old, possibly ancestral ways of feeling, the ways of glory dead' while at the same time holding on to 'the idea of a world in flux' (*Enigma,* 57). He exposes the myth of Englishness as something that has been somehow composed. Yet he also discovers how symbolic constructions of identity as locally anchored in landscape are not necessarily and entirely arbitrary, artificial and oppressive. Rather they develop in intricate and processual relations between humans and their environments, between culture and nature. Relations such as these may lay a malleable, changing yet unifying foundation of individual and collective identity formation – like the 'imperfect certainty' or 'temporary closure' Bruce Robbins and Stuart Hall speak of, or Gilroy's notion of 'a changing same' or a Heideggerian sameness: not the uniformity of a oneness or a solid identity, not a *being-one*, but a gathering of differences into a slowly changing *being-at-one*.

I have spoken of how there is a dynamic in *The Enigma of Arrival* of restoring old and new difference to the muted, opaque and unconscious state of organic hybridity. Allow me to add here that, in addition to the novel's discursive economy of sameness and slowness, the very absence of the usual rhetoric of third space hybridity (which was to gather momentum in the wake of books like *The Satanic Verses* and *The Location of Culture*) in itself draws attention away from cultural difference and strengthens the processes of organic hybridity. But for obvious reasons such muting of difference can only be half-done. Naipaul does not cause difference to disappear as much as he causes it to *unappear.* For one, it is an impossibility to *consciously* return something to the unconscious. Secondly, the intensive heterogenising gaze he has scattered throughout the text will always be puncturing the novel's discourse of sameness. What Naipaul may arrive at, at best, is perhaps a form of semiconscious hybridity, an acknowledgement that our cultures are full of imports from other cultures and will continue importing cultural difference, but that we also make these imports our own by shaping them sufficiently in order that they may blend in and eventually become part of the homogenised heterogeneity that constitutes our own cultural discreteness. That is, at least until the intensity of foreign imports is restored to its full speed by another intentionally hybridising vision. As Hayward puts it, '*The Enigma of Arrival* ... involves an endeavour to

eradicate disorder while, by its structural discontinuities, bearing witness to the persistence of that disorder' (Hayward, 2002, 71).

* * *

There is a final twist to *The Enigma of Arrival* in terms of its discursive economies of sameness, difference, speed and slowness. If the predominant state of the world is one of flux and constant metamorphosis, the most intensive force of difference is not necessarily to be found in high speed changes and transmutations of identity. On the contrary, the most radical difference would be constituted by that which appears infinitely slow and relatively permanent, that which seems to be adamantly rotating in its habitual tracks. Only the slow and continuous would pose a radically different challenge to the commonplace of fast change. Naipaul exemplifies this with the image of Jack's old father-in-law. Regardless of the many changes over the years that keep rearranging the landscape, Jack's father-in-law has stuck to his habitual path for decades, which keeps zigzagging across the land like an old geography resisting the infrastructure of ever newer layers. The path forms an old, steady circuit that now cuts through, under and over shifting divisions of the territory (see *Enigma,* 15, 24). This is not an example of the 'sad repetitions of habit' (Deleuze, 1968, 366). It is an example of how the supposed immobility of routine and habit may actually belong to fast speed, just as 'slowness belongs to the same world as ... extreme speed' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 499). The old man's habitual trail becomes a motionless travel, if you will, just as nomads may be seen as those who do not move, who follow itineraries, who 'cling to the steppe' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 37). Jack's father-in-law may function as an image of the relative homogeneity of the particular script of English culture Naipaul wishes to sustain in the novel. Within a world in which the heterogenising forces of intense and speedy cultural hybridisation has become the norm – the major discourse – it is the forces of cultural homogenisation and continuity that assume an intense, and, possibly, liberating transgression of the global 'imposition of the same system of exchange everywhere' (Spivak).

Writing in Naipaul is not a Deleuzian 'woman-becoming', 'negro-becoming' or 'Indian-becoming' or 'animal-becoming' (see Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 43). It is an outrageous English-becoming (in a traditional pastoral sense), yet with the caveat that this English-becoming has changed from the major code it once was towards a becoming-minor (the dominant codes now distributed from elsewhere, through

contemporary channels of globalisation and the becoming-major of a post-colonial hybridity discourse). From that perspective Naipaul may still be seen as resisting master narratives, as it were. As for Naipaul's choice of writing in a standardised English, this comes close to Deleuze's appreciation of the becoming-minor in Kafka's ultra-correct German, which he appreciates as 'a new sobriety', a '[s]chizo politeness, a drunkenness caused by water', which makes the major 'swell ... up' and 'cry with an extremely sober and rigorous cry' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 19, 25–6). At any rate, the story of Jack's father-in-law shows that it is a matter of perspective when we judge a word as a nomadic word or a sedentary order-word. Very often a nomadic distribution will turn out to be sedentary if seen from a different angle, a force of difference changes into a force of sameness, and vice versa. Likewise, the determination of whether a language or language use is major or minor ultimately depends on the eyes that are looking. Standard English may be a major language in one context (the domination of other languages and englishes), but a minor language in other perspectives (standard English increasingly turning into a deviation from the norm of non-standard uses).

7
Conclusion

The development of an emphatic and assertive discourse of Difference, Hybridity and Heterogeneity has had its urgency as a reaction and a challenge to all kinds of totalising, fundamentalist and extremist discourses of purity in the past, and in that capacity its urgency continues in many present contexts. The discourse of transcultural hybridity, as well as Deleuze's philosophy of Difference and Bakhtin's ideas of a discourse of 'a plurality of consciousnesses', has taught us to look at reality and human identity from new and complex angles, establishing non-essentialist principles as primary paradigms, such as change and becoming, difference and multiplicity, fluidity, instability, movement and in-betweenness. As Bassnett puts it,

> [o]nce upon a time, it was deemed to be unsafe and undesirable to occupy a space that was neither one thing nor the other, a no-man's land with no precise identity. (Bassnett, 1980, 10)

Fortunately, this is no longer the case. To Mary Louise Pratt:

> new mobilities are disrupting the monopoly of one of the most taken-for-granted norms of human social life, namely the normativity of staying ... Until then, the state of staying did not need to be named ... the normative backdrop of immobility ('home and here') against mobility ('elsewhere and away') is no longer the basis for the geo-social ordering of the world ... (Pratt, 1992, 243)

This is undoubtedly one of the greatest merits of transcultural migration literature too. But presently the discourse of Difference, heterogeneity and hybridity often comes across as a new major language, a new

normative language that is taken for granted as the undisputed truth, even in its overstated manifestations.

To Hegel:

> [t]he commonest way in which we deceive either ourselves or others about understanding is by assuming something as familiar, and accepting it on that account. (Hegel, 1807, 54)

When concepts are 'uncritically taken for granted as familiar, established as valid', they are 'made into fixed points for starting and stopping' (Hegel, 1807, 54). As pointed out, several critics have addressed this as a problem in the field of hybridity theory. At times, Said joins the chorus of sceptics in spite of his frequent reference to the language of exile and nomadism as a liberating discourse. To Said, 'a methodological breakthrough' can turn into 'a theoretical trap' when 'it is used uncritically, repetitively, limitlessly' (Said, 1983, 244, 239). If a 'language becomes general', it 'risks becoming a theoretical overstatement', 'a theoretical parody of the situation it was formulated originally to remedy or overcome' (Said, 1983, 244, 239). Under these circumstances, insurgent, liberatory or radical discourses become counterproductive, 'dull[ing] the critical consciousness', as Said puts it, trying to convince us 'that a once insurgent theory is still insurgent, lively, responsive to history' (Said, 1983, 247). As for the language of postcolonial liminality, Said admits that:

> there is no real escape, even for the exile who tries to remain suspended, since that state of inbetweenness can itself become a rigid ideological position, a sort of dwelling whose falseness is covered over. (Said, 1993, 120)

If transcultural or intentional hybridity discourse in the area of migration literature has become a counterproductive standard language which is in many instances pushed forward or aided to stand up by habitual clichés and overstatements, we must make an attempt to save its theoretical value from such tendencies.

One way of doing this is through a differentiation and fine-tuning of its theoretical apparatus. 'Let there just be fluxes', says Deleuze, and I agree. Any notion of unchanging, fixed being is counterproductive in thought, let alone impossible in reality. But this is not all, however. We must qualify the perspectives of Difference, Becoming and Flux. Accordingly, the overall purpose with this book has been to show how

there are more kinds of hybridity than just Hybridity, more kinds of heterogeneity than just Heterogeneity, more kinds of difference than just Difference, more kinds of sameness than just Sameness, more kinds of becoming than just Becoming. I have proposed that we can escape a monological, one-dimensional and rather static use of all of those concepts as conditions by registering the centripetal and centrifugal forces at work in all of them, which are generated by an asymmetric dialectics between forces of centripetality and forces of centrifugality.

Deleuze's and Bakhtin's philosophies and poetics are useful in sketching how these forces work. In Deleuze we find ideas of how the deterritorialising forces of Difference may be released as well as tamed, producing different speeds of becoming, and in Bakhtin we find ideas of intentional and organic hybridity in addition to how the finite terms of heteroglossia and monoglossia may be re-understood as heterogenis*ing* and homogenis*ing* forces within a discourse or culture. In terms of transcultural hybridity theory, once we begin to register the centripetal forces of homogenisation and centrifugal forces of heterogenisation within a culture or within an intentionally hybrid discourse or gaze, we may begin to register different speeds of becoming, different speeds with which hybridity is capable of challenging and changing the machinery of a culture's commonly-held representations. In this perspective migratory concepts like uprootedness, movement, difference and heterogeneity become relative and processual and a matter of many different degrees of speed, and so do the traditionally sedentary concepts of identity, sameness, homogeneity, essence, rootedness, origin. The latter is most clearly conceptualised in terms of organic hybridity as a changing Heideggerian sameness, 'something endlessly hybridized and in process but persistently there'; a slow becoming.

Finally, by approaching questions of post-colonial or transcultural hybridity as a discourse within a continuum of fast and slow becomings, contaminated by both heterogenising and homogenising forces, we avoid the theoretical and methodological poverty of dichotomisations like hybridity versus purity, anti-essentialism versus essentialism, difference versus sameness and becoming versus being. The hybrid and heterogeneous discourse in a novel may be read as immersed in an already hybrid and heterogeneous context making time and speed primary parameters of analysis. Yet, another dimension is important here: the release of difference and the speeds of becoming will vary according to context and perspective. Staying may be the slowest speed of becoming from one perspective yet a great force of difference from another perspective, as in the case of Jack's father-in-law in *The Enigma*

of Arrival. Likewise, leaving may involve a slowed down becoming, as in *Jasmine* where the migrant hero has to leave Baden and Flushing in order to stay the same.

* * *

As opposed to the celebration of Difference, movement, uprooting and heterogeneity, there is a great vigorous and largely unexplored field in dialecticising heterogeneity and homogeneity, difference and sameness, etc., in readings that are neither wholly migratory nor wholly sedentary, sometimes loyally following, sometimes digressing from the immediate intentionality of the migrant discourse, or ways in which intentionally hybrid novels may seek to guide our reading. Without such blending, the emphases in migrant readings of migration literature on 'double vision', the migrant as 'neither one nor the other', etc., appear rather 'one-sided', as Banerjee observes (Banerjee, 2002, 302).

The three readings in this book have shown that the assumptions of hybridity and heterogeneity as languages of representation do not hold, that there can never be any sustained, pure centrifugal release of multiplicity and Difference within a single special vision or special mode of representation. The transcultural-hybrid migration novel is shot through with an asymmetry of centripetal and centrifugal forces of heterogenisation and homogensisation, like a bifurcating rhizome. Likewise, Deleuze's provocative maxim does not hold that writing is:

> [e]ither ... a way of ... conforming to a code of dominant utterances, to a territory of established states of things ... Or else ... it is becoming. (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 74)

There is no alternative to becoming. Instead there are several speeds of becoming at work in all three novels, and the fast speed of intentional hybridity, its deterritorialisation of 'dominant utterances' is inescapably intertwined with and contaminated by the decelerated becomings of tamed difference and organic hybridity.

In *Jasmine* the nomadic hero is represented as a bringer of a new world vision, a new world order of transgressive hybridity and mobile global identities, and the novel in this respect conspicuously draws attention to its own discourse as a heterogeneous, hybrid and deterritorialising mode of representation that is supposed to release Difference and facilitate an acceleration of transcultural metamorphoses and becomings. As a hyphenated discourse, the novel operates with both overdetermination

and groundlessness, its in-betweenness both doubling, multiplying cultural identities and dropping into the significatory groundlessness of the hyphen itself, the latter being the most predominant feature of the novel. On the surface, the novel manages to signal a great release of Difference generating a high speed of becoming, a disruptive tornado of change whizzing across the commonly-held representations of national and sedentary cultures. However, along with the speeds and pluralities it proposes to generate, the novel paradoxically gains in a gravitational centripetality. In the language of Bakhtin and Deleuze, the novel's transcultural nomadic voice turns into a 'unified authorial consciousness' (Bakhtin, 1929, 9) which reduces discursive heterogeneity and tames Difference by making the identity of others 'gravitate around the verb to be' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 57). As a result it is only the spectacular speed of the migrant hero's becoming that is allowed to stand out as a true becoming, and, to paraphrase Wayne Booth, the novel's narrator, or author, marshals all the possible voices and languages of the work 'to harmonize everything into [this] single unified picture', doing all she can – parergons and all – 'to aid the reader to see that picture' (Booth, 1984, xxiii). What presents itself as intentional hybridity and heteroglossia thus turns out to homogenise, dichotomise and mute worldviews that are different from that of the central character, and author. Rather than being 'drowned out' by all the other voices in the novel (Bakhtin, 1929, 5), it is the authorial voice that, to a large extent, drowns out heteroglossia. Finally, with its coincidence with the values and codes and perspectives of American mainstream culture, which is erroneously purported as an American nomadic pluralism, this unified authorial consciousness causes the novel as a whole to function as a cog in the wheel of organic hybridity, supporting the continuity of the major language and cultural codes of white, middle-class, Anglo-Saxon America. It is as if a great force of homogeneity lurks under the novel's surface release of Difference and fast speed metamorphoses, its fundamental values and viewpoints really moving in the opposite direction of what is signalled in its outward discourse or language of representation. There are escape ways away from the central discourse, a certain degree of ambiguity in the narrative voice and tentative suggestions of a dialectics of 'vague essence' and 'stationary process', but these exits are narrow and tend to be deafened by the spectacle of its dominant voice. This may explain why the novel has generated so many celebratory readings by well-meaning hybridity cheer leaders.

Whereas Mukherjee's novel stands out as a novel that is governed by a largely undialogised nomadological discourse in celebration of a

new sensibility of uprootedness and transcultural becoming, exemplifying intentional hybridity as a normative discourse, Mahjoub's novel exemplifies intentional hybridity as a strategic discourse, reducing it to a counter-discursive instrument. It appears that the greatest release of difference is not necessarily achieved by languages that offer themselves as hybrid and heteroglot all by themselves. Heteroglossia and the release of Difference seem, at least potentially, to have better conditions in novels that split their own voices of representation, making their own languages of representation stand out as images of languages. Rather than pretending to see things from multiple angles, these novels see their own discourse first, and it is the disclosure of one's own discourse that really opens up to the flourishing of multiple views, inviting readers to experience the represented parties in different ways than the novel's central language of representation.

Like *Jasmine*, Mahjoub's novel is dominated by a mobile, transcultural hybrid language of representation. Everything is seen and judged from a globalised, migrant perspective, by a hyphenated discourse that releases Difference as both-and, as significatory overdetermination, as a cosmopolitan doubling or multiplication of cultural belongings. However, the intentionality of Mahjoub's intentional hybridity is turned into a strategic hybridity by its narrative strategies, or at least the novel's discourse of intentional hybridity contains signposts that may channel a reading that way: Hassan's admitted prejudice and, above all, the novel's trope of the telescope draw attention to the novel's representing language as an image of language. Hence, although the language of hybridity and migration in *The Carrier*, as in *Jasmine*, celebrates heterogeneity and heady transcultural becoming, Mahjoub's framing of the novel's central language of representation ultimately prevents the novel from creating a dichotomy of the hybrid and the pure, the nomadic and the sedentary, the heterogeneous and the homogeneous.

On the whole, Mahjoub's one-eyed telescopic vision offers itself as an interesting alternative to Bhabha's and Rushdie's stereoscopia and double visions as epitomising the migrant's eye-view on the world. Framing the representational language, *The Carrier* both highlights its primary function as a highly politicised, oppositional discourse, contaminated by ressentiment, and draws attention to its limits of representation as well as to the limited licence of its assertions of hybridity. Chambers says about the idea of third-spaceness that it is not:

> a counter-discourse that sets argument against argument, position against position, but rather with a continuous disbanding and

> dispersal of the terms that claim to represent us, them, and reality. (Chambers, 1994, 86)

Whereas *Jasmine* runs straight ahead, assuming its own discourse to realise such an independent, nonaligned third-spaceness, Mahjoub's novel highlights the ways in which third-space discourse never escapes representing 'us, them, and reality' with all its implications of naming, categorising and fixing identities, values and ways of being. Secondly, the narrative framing of the migrant discourse opens up to other readings of difference, heterogeneity and speeds of becoming in the fringes of the novel where its metaphors of cosmopolitan uprootedness and conspicuous nomadic transculturalism cease to be normative metaphors of a basic human condition. These other differences and heterogeneities may be glimpsed, or, rather, sensed as alternative, 'un-authorised', experiences of the host culture, mainly thriving on the silences left behind by the withdrawn voice of representation.

Whereas the representational language in *Jasmine* defines heterogeneity and describes it as a positive presence, almost *counts it* by counting its own multiple perspectives and voices and languages, summing them up for the readers to see and nod at in approval, heterogeneity outside the telescope is only *indicated* as a possible presence within the undefined, undetermined space that the representing language has left behind. Seeing is closely connected with science, as in Mahjoub's telescope, and science, from the Latin *scindere* is to 'separate one thing from another', 'to distinguish from', like the Greek *skhizein:* 'to split, rend, cleave' or the Old English: *sceadan*: 'to divide, separate' (see *Merriam-Webster*, 2010). Science is an act of cutting up reality, an act of di*vision*. It secedes or cuts out something from everything else, extracts it from the whole in order to look at it in isolation. However, as soon as you cut your own science, your own point of (di)vision (or bi-vision), all the rest, out there, all the things your vision does not grasp or is unable to categorise in chunks and oppositions may start emerging in their state of undivided Difference, their state of unspatialised infinity, as the 'incomplete Spirit' of everything, of every 'identity'. It is in this way that all that which is not migratory or nomadic or consciously hybrid and heterogeneous escapes fixation in Mahjoub's novel to a far greater extent than in *Jasmine*. If any, there are only vague contours of what this heterogeneity is which causes the role of the reader's co-writing to be enhanced. My reading, which is one reading among a multiplicity of possible readings, registers a pontential experience in the novel of the local emplacement of Danish culture and the complex processes of its changing sameness, its slow becoming.

Naipaul's novel also differs from *Jasmine* by questioning its own voice, yet it exemplifies intentional hybridity in different ways than *The Carrier*. In a manner of speaking, *The Enigma of Arrival* moves directly into the field in-between essentialism and anti-essentialism and its intentional hybridity takes form as an appreciation of the forces of organic hybridity. Pieterse is right in observing that '[i]f practices of mixing are as old as the hills, the *thematization* of mixing as a discourse and perspective is fairly new' (Pieterse, 2001, 222). Thematisation is a *science* that cuts out a piece of the world. When you thematise something you draw all attention to it, you emphasise it, and when you stress something too forcefully, too insistently, the complexity of the rest of the world is put on hold as a more or less uniform background your theme may stand out from. Hence my frequent references to the hyperbole of migration discourse, with its central motifs of rootlessness, metamorphosis, speed, transgression, flux and overt hybridity, as a loudness that drowns out the voices of other experiences of identity. One of the great differences between Naipaul's novel and the other two novels is that the heavy thematisation of transnational migration and transcultural heterogeneity and hybridity with all its suggestions of spectacular cosmopolitan newnesses and global becomings, has been toned down and obscured by the novel's unhurried pace and attention to the detail, complexity and slow changes within a small, apparently homogeneous local landscape.

Overt 'thematicity' becomes a kind of parergon, the text starting to offer its own frames of reading. But themes will always be burdened by what they leave out. Hence, Bhabha's preoccupation with the forces of *difference* in translation is burdened by his comparative neglect of the forces of *sameness* in translation, as well as his preoccupation with movement across geographical borders and spatial territories is burdened by his comparative neglect of the temporal change within places. To put it differently, Bhabha's thematisation of the '*inter*' and '*inter-est*' in cultural in-betweenness, hybridity and heterogeneity – that is to say, cultural hybridity and heterogeneity as a matter of *inter*national or *inter*cultural or *inter*linguistic translation – is burdened by its comparative neglect of hybridity and heterogeneity as a matter of *intra*national and *intra*cultural and *intra*linguistic translation (Bhabha, 1994, 56, xx; see also 272, 273, emphases added). In Naipaul the *inter* does not shade the light of the *intra*, forces of difference do not shade the light of forces of sameness and geographical, or spatial, transgression does not shade the light of temporal ingression. By toning down the themacity of transnational and transcultural migrant hybridity, or, the other way round, by intensifying the *intra*cultural mixing and multiplicity in cultural translation and move-

ment, all the layered differences within a local place and all the fluidity and mobility within the heartland of a 'sedentary', 'pure', 'national' culture, Naipaul is already well on the way to immersing his migrant vision within the heterogeneity of reality, avoiding a separation of the migrant vision from the rest of the world and the consequent dichotomisation of the Hybrid and the Pure, the Nomadic and the Sedentary, Sameness and Difference, Being and Becoming. Instead his novel opens to an exploration of different forces of centrifugality and centripetality and a differentiation of speeds of becoming within his migrant perspective and within culture as a semiosphere of several currents of difference and sameness. *The Enigma of Arrival* functions as a highly complex exploration of the formation of identity in interaction with place, rather than reducing place to an immobile site and commonly-held representations to oppressive, arbitrary constructions.

One of the greatest differences between the migrant eye-view in *The Enigma of Arrival* and the migrant heroes in *Jasmine*, and to some extent in *The Carrier*, is its visualisation of the slow becoming of cultural change and its apologia for cultural resistance to the kind of Difference, change and discontinuity that comes with the disruptive forces of globalisation and mass migration of peoples and cultures. Hence, although a discourse of mixing and multiplication of cultures and belongings runs through Naipaul's novel, it definitely gravitates heavily to the right-hand side, to the changing sameness of the English side of the hyphen, in appreciation of the centripetal forces that slow down change and generate a higher degree of continuity and stability of cultural identity across time. In this way Naipaul's novel can be read as a celebration of the success of organic hybridity in domesticating and taming difference by the traditional codes of sameness in his host culture.

Yet, despite its desire for continuity and sameness, Naipaul's text remains in touch with Deleuze's philosophy of Difference. Naipaul disrupts *representation* by constantly disrupting his own vision and presentation of reality as well as the constructions imposed on reality by others. Naipaul's dissection of the novel's central language of representation does not take the form of a strategic telescoping; it consists instead in a profound fracture of the eye, a 'profound fracture of the I', as Deleuze has it, which also involves a profound fracture of the nomadic, migratory eye/ I – the migratory subject, the migratory theme (Deleuze, 1968, 334). In addition, Naipaul's philosophy is not a Static science that treats Difference as an abnormal case. It is a science that treats the return of sameness as an inferior, yet highly desirable dynamic. Any sense of sameness or relatively stable identity Naipaul assembles

is, accordingly, only assembled in resistance to the far greater forces of Difference and flux. Hence the tendency of Difference to disappear from our sight in *The Enigma of Arrival* does not mean that Difference has been conquered. It constantly lurks beneath and within the surface of Naipaul's language and representations, constantly destabilising the stabilities he keeps re-establishing.

In this way the discursive economy in *The Enigma of Arrival* to a large extent works as the opposite of the discursive economy in *Jasmine*. In the latter, all the overt affirmations of Difference and attempts to topsy-turvy the hierarchy of identity and difference turn out only to obscure a more fundamental and subliminal thinking of identity, sameness and conformity. In contrast, Naipaul's conscious descriptions of forces of sameness makes for a hierarchy of sameness and difference in which Difference prevails in the end, showing what Heidegger means when he says that '[w]e can only say "the same" if we think difference' or what Deleuze means when he speaks of identity as 'not a first ... but ... a second principle, as a principle *become*; that ... revolve[s] around the Different'.

From a related angle, Jasmine's offer of a discourse of uprooting, departure and accelerated becoming is a discourse that globally seems to level out cultural difference. All places and identities are reduced to sites that the migrant hero rushes through. In comparison, Naipaul's discourse of emplacement, slowness of arrival and decelerated becoming is a discourse that globally seems to intensify cultural difference. Cultural identities are explored as invested differently in different places in close interaction with local social and natural landscapes. The same is the case if we compare Naipaul's novel with Mahjoub's. Migration literature typically speaks with a pluralism of toponyms and multiple local place names are scattered across migration novels like Mahjoub's – Cadiz, Takriri, Frankfurt, Istanbul, Antwerp, Baghdad, Prague – to invoke a heterogeneous global imaginary. However, in this listing, or delirious rambling of names, there is a strong homogenisation of local places which are all flattened by the global gaze, the complex identities and unique heterogeneities within each place name levelled by the distance of the elevated perspective. In contrast, Naipaul's close vision exposes the depth and unique interaction of sameness and difference within a very small geographical place. On the other hand, this means that the complexity of other, distant places and cultures viewed from Wiltshire is reduced: Trinidad, Africa – Himalaya flattened! – through their domestication by the local language and outlook on the world.

Yet, Naipaul's novel in this regard testifies to Bruce Robbins' observation that the centrality of local cultural life and world perspectives continue

within a 'globalised' world. To Robbins, each locality experiences globalisation differently. This is a 'worldliness', he says, which forces us to see all internationalisms and globalisms as local, as locally produced rather than produced by 'one universal rationality'. Accordingly, it is no contradiction to speak of 'culturally particular forms' of internationalism, as for instance an 'American internationalism', or an English internationalism as in *The Enigma of Arrival* (Robbins, 1999, 7). Robbins refers to Clifford who sees such internationalisms or cosmopolitanisms as 'discrepant cosmopolitanisms' (Clifford quoted in Robbins, 1999, 100). Likewise we can speak of 'discrepant hybridities' and 'discrepant heterogeneities', as in Naipaul's novel, generated in the process of translating difference into slowly changing local economies of representation.

* * *

This book has been dealing with our age as an age of mass migration, but this in itself may be a false premise at the end of the day, or at least a premise we need to modify outside narrow fields of study like 'migration literature'. If every age requires its special literature, it appears, in fact, to be somewhat of an overstatement to refer to our age as the age of migration and the central literary paragons of our age as migration, movement, uprootedness and deterritorialisation. Without a doubt global migration has intensified over the last half-century in volume, scale and speed, and doubtlessly the great metropolitan hubs of the globe have become assemblages of complex inter- and transnational commingling. However, locality and cultural domestications of becoming continue to play a major role around the world to this day, reterritorialising the forces of cultural difference which is why a '"migrant" knowledge of the world' will not give us the full picture; it needs at least to enter into a dialectics with a knowledge of the sedentary, of local emplacement.

But there may be far more important points why migration literature and a '"migrant" knowledge of the world' are not a true reflection of our age in its entirety, or 'responsive to history' as Said puts it. Migrants still constitute only about two per cent of the world's population (Achcar et al. quoted in Kraidy, 2005, 12), which means that at least 98 per cent of the world's population are not likely to see themselves as part of a global mass migration. From this perspective ours is a world that does not move much. Or, at least, from this perspective, it moves less and at a far slower speed than the dream of our age as an age of global mobility suggests. And as for those who do move globally, who find themselves among the two per cent of the world's population who

form the international flux of mass migration, it is highly questionable whether metaphors of flux and flow and newness and accelerated becoming really pertain to more than a minority.

First, as I have touched on in the Naipaul chapter, and this goes for the privileged part of the two per cent, international travel and movement and crosscultural contact today is so swift and easy and standardised that Difference does not radically disrupt or challenge the continuity of our cultural identities. You are never far from home anymore in terms of time and communication and extensions of national networks in transnational space, should you find yourself too challenged by Difference. Just as 'staying' remains the norm for most people in the world, it is in effect also the case for a lot of those who are physically on the move. Secondly, and this goes for the underprivileged part of the world's migrants, the celebration of metaphors of flow and flux and change seem to be misconceived, at best, and an insult, at worst. Pratt has said about global migration that:

> We are often invited to imagine this kind of movement as 'flow', a metaphor that suggests a natural process which ... will automatically reach a horizontal equilibrium. Flow is the preferred metaphor of globalization. The horizontal image of flow makes the market appear as the consummate leveller. (Pratt, 1992, 241)

But most stories of migration, she argues, 'reveal the flow metaphor to be perverse' (Pratt, 1992, 241):

> asphyxiated Chinese workers were not flowing in the back of trucks; the Rio Grande may have been flowing but not the young men who drowned there. Money does not flow. It is sent, and the need to send it often confines transplanted workers in veritable bondage abroad. (Pratt, 1992, 241–2)

She continues: '"Flow" disguises the fact that the world of neoliberal capitalism is run by decisions people make that have ethical dimensions'. The 'forces' of these decisions 'are not horizontal but vertical. They pump wealth upward into fewer and fewer hands' (Pratt, 1992, 242). From this perspective, it is not only the widespread metaphors of flux and flow, but also their accompanying metaphors of double-visions, inclusiveness and liberating transcultural becomings that appear rather perverse, or at least insufficient as a discourse that reflects the material economy of migration in our time.

Notes

Introduction

1 A brief note on the terms 'migrant' and 'migration' is due here. Most scholars in the field use 'migrant' and 'migration' as generic terms that include a host of related terms in circulation, such as exile, refugee, immigrant, nomad, traveller, wanderer, etc. These all involve radically different experiences, which is why the term 'migration literature' may be accused of being wrought with universalising and romanticising implications. Nevertheless, 'migrant' and 'migration' unite these different experiences for their shared suggestions of movement and acts of crossing geographical and cultural borders. As for universalising and romanticising implications, the problems of the term 'migration literature' are unmistakable but no different from the problems of terms like 'national literature' and 'world literature'.

2 Another book that fails is the fascicular root-book. This book achieves more than the root-book. It aborts the principal root and shatters linear unity. Yet it impedes any real multiplicity and becoming by implying a new superior order to replace the unity it tore apart, and so it 'does not really break with dualism'. Deleuze sees William Burroughs and James Joyce as fascicular writers (see Deleuze, 2003, 5, 6).

3 It seems that we cannot speak of any neat chronology of a tendency that grows to become the norm and only then starts to attract opposition and criticism. Tendency, norm and criticism appear to happen more or less simultaneously in the formative years of post-colonial hybridity theory, yet critical voices may be said to have increased in volume over the years, especially since the late 1990s, while the celebration of hybridity has been running unabated all along. Emblematically, Benita Parry justifies the 2002 re-publication of her critical assessment in 1994 of Bhabha's theories in her essay 'Signs of Our Times' with the observation that 'books and essays reiterating Bhabha's notions without examination of their premises continue to appear ... [and] students routinely reproduce his pronouncements in manifest ignorance of their theoretical context and ideological implications' (Parry, 1994/2002, 119). I absolutely agree.

4 Deleuze speaks of recognition as 'a common sense', as 'the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object', an 'image of thought' that obstructs 'the creation of new values' and 'the mad-becoming' (Deleuze, 1968, 169, 172, 178).

5 A brief note on that highly contentious term 'intentionality' is due here. The 'intentionality' in 'intentional hybridity' need not always be as explicitly proclaimed as Bhabha has just done or as explicitly foregrounded as Rushdie does when he says about *The Satanic Verses* that 'the process of hybridization ... is the novel's most crucial dynamic' (Rushdie, 1990a, 403). In the transcultural-hybrid novel hybridity is mostly highlighted as a certain language of representation or critique, but 'intentional hybridity' may also be expanded a

bit to include a more general, less explicit *directionality* in works that take up issues of migratory flux and cultural changes *without* necessarily being bent on a radical assertion of difference and disruption of sameness. The latter, for example, will be shown to be the case with Naipaul's *The Enigma of Arrival*. In addition we can speak of intentional hybridity as intentional *readings* of hybridity in a work.

6 It is important to note here that I am not speaking of a progressive development of the discourse of hybridity along some chronological time line that supposedly comes to fruition in Naipaul's novel – Naipaul's novel is obviously the oldest of the three. Although literature and theory often seem to reflect each other in this field (like so many other migration novels, the three works appear to be greatly inspired by various post-colonial theorisations and, the other way round, the way Bhabha's ideas are directly inspired by Salman Rushdie's writings, for example), it appears that literature is often far ahead of theory, experimenting with various forms of hybridity discourse or heterogenising gazes long before they are dissected by theory. This explains why the somewhat different approaches to hybridity in a migration novel like *The Enigma of Arrival* have not been illuminated before within theoretical writings. Theory always has to catch up with literature, and it has to keep returning to works from the past in order to do so.

1 From Celebration to Problemisation

1 Although such idealisation of literary discourse is a quite strong *tendency* in Rushdie's poetics, he sometimes cautions us against it, as when he concedes that the individual work offers but *one* version of the world and that we are all 'radioactive with history and politics' (Rushdie, 1984, 101, see also Rushdie, 1982, 13, 14; 1990a, 412). My objective is therefore not to reduce the range of Rushdie's poetics; it is only to exhibit the unsustainability of his most celebratory notions of the novel. For a discursive analysis of *The Satanic Verses* see Moslund 2006.

2 Yet Monika Fludernik insists that although Bhabha often speaks of hybridity as a *condition*, as in his spatial and static enunciation of hybridity as a 'hybrid site' and a 'hybrid identity', his idea of hybridity is always intended to be understood as functional and dynamic (Fludernik, 1998, 30, 22–3).

3 For the record, Robert Young was the first scholar to dig out these notions from Bakhtin and introduce them to post-colonial theory (see Young, 1995, 21–2).

4 As said in the introduction, a continuing problem in hybridity theory is whether we are speaking of a collision or a fusion of languages, whether we are speaking of a heterogeneity of *distinct* languages or an *amalgamation* of these languages. Bakhtin is not clear on this either. He speaks alternately of intentional hybridity as a *fusion* and as a *collision* of voices. Sometimes he speaks of mixing and collision in a single sentence: 'In an intentional novelistic hybrid ... the important activity is not only (in fact not so much) the *mixing* of linguistic forms ... as it is the *collision* between differing points of view on the world'; 'two potential utterances are *fused*, two responses are, as it were, *harnessed* in a potential *dialogue*' (Bakhtin, 1935, 361, emphases added, see also 364). One explanation for this indecision, which I think is also often implied

by Bakhtin, may be that in a dialogic collision there is inevitably a degree of fusion going on, each language being contaminated or cross-pollinated by the other. Hence, within the novel, within hybrid discourse, heterogeneity, collision and fusion go together. All three terms mark a distinction from oneness and homogeneity and they all interact in various degrees of discrete co-presence and amalgamation.

2 Forces of Sameness and Difference in Organic Hybridity

1 In a way similar to Todorov, Ulf Hannerz speaks of culture as a 'management of meaning' (Hannerz, 1987, 550). And Stuart Hall speaks of culture as language and representation: 'Culture is about "shared meanings"' and '[m]eanings can only be shared through common access to language', language here operating as 'a *representational system*', and '[t]o say that two people belong to the same culture is to say that they interpret the world in roughly the same ways' (Hall, 1997, 1, 2). Likewise, Bhabha has more recently spoken of the collective as a '*representational* medium' (Bhabha, 2000, 181). Via Nietzsche Deleuze says about cultures understood in this fashion that they are 'inseparable from iron collars, from torture [and] ... atrocious means', they implement 'a training for the mind'' (Deleuze 1962, 124; 1968, 205).

2 Although Bhabha is sometimes cast as decidedly anti-nationalist, he does not necessarily refute national and ethnic collectivities *per se*. Rather, he sees the narrative of the nation as constructed in a dialectics between two discursive economies, the pedagogical and the performative, which bears resemblances to Lotman's semiosphere (Bhabha, 1994, 220). The pedagogical economy is a 'powerful master-discourse', an ideological, homogenising national discourse that instructs the population in unity, stability, continuity based on the idea of a common origin in a national past (Bhabha, 1994, 223, 209–11). The performative economy, on the other hand, is processual and fragmented. It consists in the 'scraps, patches and rags of daily life' where the insufficiency of homogenising ideology is experienced, certainty giving in to 'the heterogeneity of the population' (Bhabha, 1994, 208–9, 220, 212). Each of the two economies intervenes in the other, which results in a constant redefinition and re-imagining of the shared codes of identity, keeping the collective codes in a constant process of becoming (see Bhabha, 1994, 220). Bhabha's only concern here is that the pedagogical economy does not succeed in totalising the performative economy and its vital heterogeneity.

3 All this may also cause us to reconsider the terms Bhabha uses in his conceptualisation of 'mimicry', which he frequently refers to as a matter of being 'almost the same but not quite' (Bhabha, 1994, 122, 123, 127). In Heidegger's terms, difference is already incorporated into the same, whereby 'mimicry', the case of being slightly different, does not give cause to that much of a stir. In this respect, if Bhabha wants to retain some provocative or radical edge to his concept of mimicry, he would need to rephrase his definition as a matter of being '*identical* but not quite'. In turn, the phrase 'identical but not quite' exposes how Bhabha's theory of hybridity depends on the proposition of extreme scenarios (Identity versus Difference); and, in this light, Bhabha's

hybridity, as a 'language of critique', is only useful as a critique of extremes – for example, as a counter-political critique of discourses of intolerance and extremist assertions of racial and cultural purity – but is far less useful as a language that examines the actual complexities and heterogeneity of the sameness of collective identities.

3 Forces of Sameness and Difference in Intentional Hybridity

1 Actually, Deleuze's idea of Hegelian dialectics as a dialectics that aims to resolve the problem of difference at a third level of synthesis is not entirely right. It is true that Hegel is often read this way, but the triadic model of dialectics (thesis – antithesis – synthesis) is Fichte's, not Hegel's.
2 Bakhtin emphatically dissociates his idea of the dialogic from dialectics. In the dialogic, there is no dialectic reduction of the world to 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis', no unified 'Hegelian spirit', but a 'profound ambiguity', a 'pluralistic' conjunction of forces, a 'mutual contradictoriness ... and interconnectedness ... resolving nothing' (Bakhtin, 1929, 26, 27, 30, 19). Even so, Bakhtin's theory does tend towards a synthesised equilibrium of voices to the extent that it involves a desire to suspend the hierarchy of the discourses that enter into the novel. He even speaks at one point of the dialogic as 'a higher unity, a unity ... of the second order, the unity of a polyphonic novel' (Bakhtin, 1929, 16) – this definitely smacks of a dialectical *Aufhebung*. Bhabha is not fond of dialectical syntheses either. He emphasises that his dialectics of 'negotiation' is 'a dialectic without the emergence of a teleological or transcendent History' (Bhabha, 1994, 37).

4 The Migrant Hero's Incredible Speed in Bharati Mukherjee's *Jasmine*

1 Mukherjee often stresses such polyvocality as a deliberate trait of her aesthetics. She sees herself as 'a pioneer', 'a woman with a series of countries' (India, England, Canada and the USA) and a life 'made up of fluid identities' and, thus, '[c]hameleon-skinned', she is capable of discovering material 'over and across the country, and up and down the social ladder' (Vignisson, 1993; Mukherjee, 1988, 29; see also Mukherjee, 1977, 298). She claims to follow no 'isms' and declares herself against any idea of purity, choosing instead to 'celebrate racial and cultural "mongrelisation" ' (Vignisson, 1993; Mukherjee, 1996, 33–4). '[S]alvation', she believes, is 'the fusion of opposites' (Rodriguez, 1995, 304).
2 Bakhtin says our awareness of our own discourse already occurs the moment we have to defend a point, which is the moment the point is not taken for granted anymore, when 'it has already become dubious, has separated from its referent' (Bakhtin, 1926, 476). In other words, the moment we are face with the need to defend something, it has lost its authority as natural, self-evident – *self-supportive* – truth.
3 Mukherjee sees herself as 'a new world citizen' and declares that it is not a sad thing 'to lose one's original culture' (Vignisson, 1993) since 'soil, family, caste,

religion, gender' are nothing but fixing conditions, '"typing" your identity' (Desai and Barnstone, 1998, 131). Andrew Smith is certainly not off the mark when he observes that 'it does seem as if the celebration of a radical hybridity in culture also means a celebration of *disconnection*' (Smith, 2004, 253).

4 For other thinkers of place as complex and unfixed see Michel Foucault (1967), Mary Douglas (1991), Pile and Keith (1993), Doreen Massey (1995) and Agnes Heller (1995).

5 This is a manifestly Deleuzian idea of America. To Deleuze, America is 'a collection of heterogeneous parts', a playful sample 'from all ages, all lands, and all nations' that comprises 'a universal people composed of immigrants' (Deleuze, 1993, 56–7). Unlike Europe's drive towards 'organic totality', the law of America is 'the law ... of fragmentation' (Deleuze, 1993, 57, 56). For that reason, American literature is a 'minor literature par excellence': American writing invents 'a minor people ... a bastard people ... always in becoming, always incomplete' (Deleuze, 1993, 57, 4).

6 In a similar way Deleuze sees language as social and collective, as 'a collective assemblage of enunciation', or as Lecercle explains it, a 'mixture of bodies, instruments, institutions and utterances, which *speaks the speaker*' (Lecercle, 2002, 88, emphasis added).

7 John Neubauer proposed his ideas of ingression in a lecture entitled 'Transgressive vs. Ingressive Histories' at the ESF-LiU Conference on Literature for Europe, Vadstena, Sweden, 12–16 May 2007.

5 Mongrel Speeds, Slow Danes and Telescopic Gazes in Jamal Mahjoub's *The Carrier*

1 As it happens, we find ideas of strategic essentialism in Bhabha too, which are mostly overlooked by his most stalwart critics. At times, peeping through his anti-essentialist rhetoric of 'undecidability' and 'ambivalence', he takes to the defence of cultural minorities against 'the grand globalizing narrative of capital' (Bhabha, 1994, 330).

2 Just as we find indications in Bhabha of strategic essentialism, he also alludes to hybridity as a strategically or specifically targeted counter-discourse, as when he refers to 'rhetorical strategies of hybridity' as 'an extended analogy of guerrilla warfare', rather than an aiming for some kind of future 'beyond' (Bhabha, 1994, 207).

3 Todorov sees racism and xenophobia as a 'hardening of identity' which characterises 'those who feel most vulnerable in their social existence' who 'do not have a good command of the codes in operation in the englobing society' (Todorov, 1997, 7–8). From this perspective, intolerance may be viewed, as David Morley does, as an indirect expression of the desire for a 'fuller integration into and more equitable participation in the social and economic life of the nation' by those who feel excluded from the society they have always been part of (Morley, 2000, 248–9). Arguably, such analysis of racism is more productive than a blank denunciation of racism as a universal ignominy.

4 To keep the record straight, it must be mentioned that the Norwegian writer Jan Kjærstad also suggests the telescope 'as a metaphor' to explicate the discursive mechanisms of the novel (Kjærstad, 1999, 8, my translation). However,

as opposed to the diverse functions of the telescope in *The Carrier*, Kjærstad is preoccupied with how combinations of telescopic lenses are put together for us to see something *new*, or discover *new* ways of seeing. He points to Patrick Chamoiseau, Salman Rushdie and Ben Okri as achieving a 'radical perspectivation' and 'a completely new way of seeing things' by juxtaposing 'completely different spheres of comprehension' within the 'frame' of the novel (Kjærstad, 1999, 220–1, 221, my translation).

5 Obviously, the 'stereoscopic' is also contaminated with 'scope'. Hence, the task at hand is to tease out all the scopality that is present in stereoscopes, especially when this scopality is muted by assertions of hybridity as a representing language that is all-inclusive, heterogeneous and rhizomatic in itself.

6 Discursive self-reflexivity is also expressed formally, the novel's design openly signalling that we are dealing with the narration of a narration: Hassan is observing himself, telescopically, through his narration of Rashid and, through a variety of meta-reflexive references, Mahjoub may be said to be observing his own multinational migrant identity through his enunciation of Hassan and Rashid.

6 Fast and Slow Becomings in the Migrant's Vision in V. S. Naipaul's *The Enigma of Arrival*

1 In his recent autobiography of Naipaul, Patrick French explains Naipaul's divisive style as a particular 'Trinidadian trait' where people are often 'masquerading or making trouble for [their] own entertainment', a style that is locally referred to as 'playing ole mas' or 'picong'. Yet French concedes that '[b]alance was never to be his strong point' (French, 2008, xiii, 55).

2 Naipaul is not exempt from privileging the migrant's point of view in other contexts. In letters and conversations he refers to a 'sense of being lost, of being between two worlds and respected in neither', and speaks of the possibility of writing from 'no point of view' (French, 2008, 167, 289). His biographer loyally sanctions this discourse, suggesting Naipaul's vision as 'detached' and 'global', 'of everywhere and nowhere' (French, 2008, 279). The migrant's privileged vision and subjectivity is also suggested in a number of his other novels. See for example, *Half a Life* (2001), pp. 60, 62, *A Bend in the River* (1979), pp. 175, 178, 223–4 and *The Mimic Men* (1967), p. 207.

3 I owe the reference to Howkins to W. John Walker who uses him in his article 'Unsettling the Sign: V. S. Naipaul's *The Enigma of Arrival*' (see Walker, 1997, 79).

4 In this respect, Naipaul does not seem to agree with anti-colonial readings of English classics, such as Thomas Hardy for instance, as romantic nationalist confirmations of a pure English identity. On the contrary, his temporal explorations of the heterogeneity of English landscape follows in Hardy's footsteps. In Hardy's *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, for instance, a heterogeneous past – 'Druidical mistletoe', 'sylvan antiquity', a 'forest of monoliths' – is sticking out of the novel's present landscape, just as the Norman D'Urberville is sticking out of the Saxon Durbeyfield. In Hardy, we even find Africa in Wessex, Tess moving across a 'zebra-striped field' (Hardy, 1891, 42, 43, 501, 403).

5 By contrast Bhabha appears to entertain decidedly anti-nationalist sentiments when celebrating how Gibreel's tropicalisation of London in *The Satanic Verses* articulates a 'narrative of cultural difference' that strikes back at the centre with a post-colonial climate of 'heat', 'dust' and 'darkness' forever evacuating memories of 'the "deep" nation crafted in chalk and limestone', 'quilted downs' and 'moors menaced by the wind' (Bhabha, 1994, 241–3).

6 For the same reason, Derrida does not see the use of a linguistic standard as incompatible with the act of deconstruction: 'speak in good French, in pure French, even at the moment of challenging in a million ways everything that is allied to it, and sometimes everything that inhabits it' (Derrida, 1996, 46–9).

7 At times Naipaul's discursive sameness and intentional mobilisation of the homogenising forces of discursive centripetality comes across in the novel in the form of very reductive representations of others, as for instance Trinidadian villagers who keep themselves 'deliberately dirty and ragged', or the suggestion of immigrants as destructive 'rooks', or the way he perpetuates a Eurocentric history of the world that casts European civilisation as the only agent of change, as when 'men' in caravels 'crossed the Atlantic and intruded into the *evenness of history* on the other side' (*Enigma,* 124, 45, emphasis added). Yet, because Naipaul deliberately turns his representing language into an image of language, any Eurocentric observation of the other will always remain contaminated by that other discourse in the novel of heterogeneity and flux and fundamental self-questioning that destabilises all the narrator's acts of representation. Deleuze says, as if in a critique of Bakhtinian heteroglossia, that 'multiplying representations and points of view' do not necessarily result in any great release of Difference (see Deleuze, 1968, 68). Correspondingly, Naipaul does not include an infinity of representations and multiple points of view; he undermines the positivity of representation itself, which Deleuze defines as a distinguishing feature of the philosophy of Difference. As Hayward puts it, Naipaul 'encourages a consciousness of the limitations of the author's vision' (Hayward, 2002, 59).

8 Ironically, in an increasing number of post-colonial novels, it is the post-colonial subject who preserves the traditional construction sites of English identity. In David Dabydeen's *Disappearance* (in which *The Enigma of Arrival* figures as a central intertext), a Guyanese engineer arrives in England to repair the collapsing sea-defence on the Hastings coast and save the village of Dunsmere from being flooded by the sea. The Empire over and England having 'long ceased to matter', the engineer makes it his mission to protect this piece of land 'from the world outside its boundaries' which 'at the slightest movement could cause it to flake and disappear' (Dabydeen, 1993, 86, 157).

9 However, Naipaul's reference to the opposite of a cultivated landscape as 'undifferentiated bush' also clearly shows the tendency of codes and grids of representation to limit our field of vision and experience of the world. Naipaul establishes a hierarchy of vegetation – roses and garden ranging above weeds and bush – which may prevent him from learning the language and thus the richness of supposedly less desirable landscapes, including the uncultivated land of tropical landscapes. Yet, on his journey in the Caribbean in 1960 Naipaul made a less limited observation when in Trinidad he felt he 'was seeing the landscape for the first time', discovering that he had been wrong to believe that 'the foliage had no variety' (see Naipaul, 1962, 57).

10 A particularly good example in Caribbean literature of breathless characters chased by the landscape's hostility is Harold Sonny Ladoo's fabulous *No Pain Like This Body* (1972).
11 Unarguably, Naipaul's oeuvre is full of nomadic departures and impatience with singular places. In *Finding the Centre* (1984), he speaks of the expatriate as 'a man out of his country', moving between continents, to whom 'one place [is] always made bearable by the prospect of departure for the other' (Naipaul, 1984, 125). This is why *The Enigma of Arrival* is unique in the sense that it opens up to a complex understanding of the inexhaustible multiplicity and change within a singular place. In *The Enigma of Arrival* Naipaul only speaks of leaving Wiltshire once it has changed too much; once it has, in fact, left him.
12 Once again, this goes to show that literature is often ahead of theory and, in order for theory to cast light on new ways of understanding the world, or, as in the present case, of adding new perspectives to the idea of post-colonial hybridity, it has to keep returning to works from the past. Naipaul's novel is still within the recent past that belongs to the contemporary, but the dynamics of organic hybridity may of course be studied in any work that goes much further back in time – long before theory was openly concerned with such ideas as cultural hybrity and multiplicity.

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