

Migration,  
Minorities and  
Citizenship

SOCIAL CAPITAL, POLITICAL  
PARTICIPATION AND MIGRATION  
IN EUROPE

*Making Multicultural Democracy Work*

Edited by Laura Morales and  
Marco Giugni



*Migration, Minorities and Citizenship*

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# **Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe**

**Making Multicultural Democracy Work?**

Edited by

**Laura Morales**

*University of Manchester, UK*

and

**Marco Giugni**

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# Contents

<i>Tables</i>	vii
<i>Figures</i>	xi
<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	xiii
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xvii
1 Political Opportunities, Social Capital and the Political Inclusion of Immigrants in European Cities <i>Laura Morales and Marco Giugni</i>	1
2 Conceptualizing and Measuring Migrants' Political Inclusion <i>Laura Morales</i>	19
3 Institutional Opportunities, Discursive Opportunities and the Political Participation of Migrants in European Cities <i>Manlio Cinalli and Marco Giugni</i>	43
4 The Electoral Participation of Naturalized Immigrants in Ten European Cities <i>Amparo González-Ferrer</i>	63
5 The Role of Social Capital in Migrants' Engagement in Local Politics in European Cities <i>Laura Morales and Katia Pilati</i>	87
6 Optimal Opportunities for Ethnic Organization and Political Integration? Comparing Stockholm with Other European Cities <i>Per Strömblad, Gunnar Myrberg and Bo Bengtsson</i>	115
7 Is 'Home' a Distraction? The Role of Migrants' Transnational Practices in Their Political Integration into Receiving-Country Politics <i>Laura Morales and Miruna Morariu</i>	140
8 Patterns of Participation: Engagement among Ethnic Minorities and the Native Population in Oslo and Stockholm <i>Gunnar Myrberg and Jon Rogstad</i>	172
9 Political Efficacy and Confidence among Migrants <i>Eva Anduiza and Josep San Martín</i>	198

10	The Impact of Religion on the Political Participation of Migrants <i>Nina Eggert and Marco Giugni</i>	219
11	Place Attachment, Community Cohesion and the Politics of Belonging in European Cities <i>Ranji Devadason</i>	238
12	Conclusion: Towards an Integrated Approach to the Political Inclusion of Migrants <i>Marco Giugni and Laura Morales</i>	262
	<i>Appendix</i>	275
	<i>References</i>	280
	<i>Index</i>	299

# Tables

1.1	Socio-economic indicators of the metropolitan areas	12
1.2	Groups selected in each city	14
2.1	The political attitudes of autochthonous and migrants by city and group	34
2.2	The political participation of autochthonous and migrants by city and group, percentages	36
3.1	Summary scores for the political opportunity structures in the nine cities	49
3.2	Overall political participation and participation in protest activities in the nine cities (percentages)	55
3.3	Effects of political opportunity structures on the overall political participation of migrants (odds ratios)	56
3.4	Effects of political opportunity structures on protest activities of migrants (odds ratios)	59
4.1	Sample size by city of residence (row percentages)	70
4.2	Turnout of naturalized and autochthonous population in last national elections, by city of residence (percentages)	71
4.3	Logit estimates of the probability of voting in national elections of the country of residence	74
4.4	Predicted probabilities of voting for naturalized citizens of Turkish origin and autochthonous population in Oslo, Stockholm and Zurich	76
4.5	Logit coefficients of participating in national elections versus not (coefficients and standard errors)	77
5.1	Interest in the politics of homeland vs. residence-countries (percentages)	93
5.2	Ethnic vs. mainstream contacting (percentages)	94
5.3	Ethnic vs. mainstream protest (percentages)	95
5.4	Ethnic bonding and interest in politics	101
5.5	Ethnic bonding and political contacting	103
5.6	Ethnic bonding and protest action	105
6.1	Primary activities of the associations, column percentages	119



6.2	Associational-level political participation in Stockholm, per cent active	120
6.3	Description of associational membership (Stockholm)	122
6.4	Description of political interest and political participation (Stockholm)	125
6.5	Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation (Stockholm)	127
6.A1	Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Oslo)	131
6.A2	Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Barcelona)	132
6.A3	Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Madrid)	133
6.A4	Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Lyon)	134
6.A5	Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Milan)	135
6.A6	Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Zurich)	136
6.A7	Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Geneva)	136
6.A8	Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (London)	137

7.1	Openness towards naturalization	145
7.2	Visits to home/parents' country	149
7.3	Very or fairly interested in homeland country politics	151
7.4	Read newspapers regularly about homeland country	151
7.5	Talk regularly about homeland politics	153
7.6	Participation in any of 13 political action forms, related to homeland concerns	155
7.7	Involvement (member of or participates in) any ethnic advocacy organization	155
7.8	The effect of transnational practices on interest in the politics of the country of residence. Logistic regression (single level for model 1, multilevel for model 2)	157
7.9	The effect of transnational practices on the propensity to vote in local elections in the residence country. Logistic regression (single level for model 1, multilevel for model 2)	161
7.10	The effect of transnational practices on country-related political action. Logistic regression (single level for model 1, multilevel for model 2)	163
7.11	Summary of findings on the effect of transnational engagement	167
8.1	Direction of political activities, per cent	181
8.2	Average levels of political participation	185
8.3	Logistic regression analysis of voting in local elections	187
8.4	Ordinal regression analysis of contacts	189
8.5	Ordinal regression analysis of loud-voiced protest acts	190
8.6	Ordinal regression analysis of low-voiced protest acts	192
8.7	Explanatory variables in the full models for the four modes of political participation	193
8.A1	Modes of political participation (principal component analysis)	196
9.1	Socio-demographic profile of Moroccans and Ecuadorians	206
9.2	Political efficacy and confidence by group and city	209
9.3	Explanatory factors of political efficacy among the migrant and autochthonous population	210
9.4	Explanatory factors of political confidence among the migrant and autochthonous population	211

10.1	Migrant groups and religion in the four cities (percentages)	225
10.2	Political participation of Christian and Muslim migrants in the four cities (percentages of yes)	229
10.3	Religious indicators in the four cities (percentages)	230
10.4	Logistic regression for the overall political participation of Christian migrants in the four cities (odds ratios)	232
10.5	Logistic regression of the overall political participation of Muslim migrants in the four cities (odds ratios)	233
10.6	Logistic regression for protest activities of Christian migrants in the four cities (odds ratios)	234
10.7	Logistic regression for protest activities of Muslim migrants in the four cities (odds ratios)	235
11.1	Attachment to neighbourhood, city, ethnic group and compatriots mean scores (0–10 scale)	244
11.2	Individual, institutional and social aspects of locale (percentage of respondents)	248
11.3	Bivariate analyses of attachment to the city by individual, institutional and social aspects of locale (Pearson's $r$ )	250
11.4	Stepwise regression model of attachment to London neighbourhoods and city (OLS regression)	252
11.5	Stepwise regression model of attachment to Oslo neighbourhoods and city (OLS regression)	253
11.6	Stepwise regression model of attachment to Lyon city (OLS regression)	255
11.7	Stepwise regression model of attachment to Stockholm neighbourhoods and the city (OLS regression)	256

# Figures

1.1	The theoretical approach	6
2.1	Comparing the interest in residence country politics of migrant-background and autochthonous population (very or fairly interested in local or national politics)	27
2.2	Main effect of migrant background on interest in residence country politics (value of the logit coefficient)	28
2.3	Political participation in any of 13 types of activity	30
3.1	Individual and collective rights by city and ethnic group	51
3.2	Specific opportunities and discursive opportunities by city	51
3.3	Local configurations of citizenship in the nine cities	52
4.1	Turnout level by city of residence and ethnic group	72
4.2	Relationship between the openness of the naturalization rules and the participation gap between the naturalized immigrants and the autochthonous population	81
4.3	Relationship between regulating residence permits and the participation gap between the naturalized immigrants and the autochthonous population	82
4.4	Change in the probability of voting of a naturalized citizen of Turkish origin as the rules regulating residence rights become more open	83
5.1	Involvement in ethnic 'advocacy' organizations by city and group	97
5.2	Co-ethnic 'bonding' in associational involvement by city and group (only for respondents who are members or participate in at least one association)	98
5.3	Ethnic homogeneity of immediate social circle	99
5.4	The index of group-level organizational ethnic bonding	100
5.5	The interactive effect of ethnic-bonding associational social capital and POS on mainstream political contacting (as per Table 5.5, model 2)	108
5.6	The interactive effect of ethnic-bonding associational social capital and POS on mainstream protesting (as per Table 5.6, model 2)	109

6.1	Four roads to political integration via associations	116
6.2	Political activity of ethnic or migrant associations in nine cities	121
6.3	Associational involvement in 10 cities (per cent members in each category)	123
7.1	Openness of nationality acquisition	145
7.2	Interest in residence-country politics by ethnic group and city, with autochthonous group as reference	146
7.3	Voting behaviour in local elections by ethnic group and city, with autochthonous group as reference	146
7.4	Political action related to country of residence concerns by ethnic group and city, with autochthonous group as reference	147
7.5	Visit homeland country at least once a year	149
7.6	Voting activity in the last homeland elections	154

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*Laura Morales*  
*Marco Giugni*

# 1

## Political Opportunities, Social Capital and the Political Inclusion of Immigrants in European Cities\*

*Laura Morales and Marco Giugni*

Discussions about how public policies can promote more effectively the active engagement and participation of immigrants and their children<sup>1</sup> in the political and civic life of the countries where they live are at the core of current scholarly and public debates. In advanced democracies, there are recurrent disputes about the appropriateness and potential benefits or shortcomings of introducing legal reforms that would guarantee that large immigrant populations – and especially their native-born children – are not excluded from the political process and from political representation. As Jones-Correa (1998: 35 and 46ff.) notes, migrants' political marginalization has several potential negative implications for democratic politics: it undermines the process of democratic representation and accountability, it undervalues the role of active participation in the polity for the construction of the political community, and it perpetuates the view of immigrants and their descendants as outsiders to that community. Furthermore, the negative consequences related to migrants' political exclusion are likely to spill over to their social and economic integration, as the policy process will fail to address adequately their needs in these domains. Yet there are widely divergent views on what are the most effective ways to promote migrants' political inclusion, and on when and under what conditions should first-generation immigrants be granted full political rights.

In its basic outlines, these different views correspond to different 'models' or conceptions of citizenship and of how the polity absorbs newcomers to the community. While some conceptions of citizenship privilege territorial belonging to the community, others give much more importance to ethnic and cultural lineages in the attribution of membership status (Brubaker, 1992). Furthermore, when confronted with new entrants to the community, different conceptions of citizenship come to terms with ethnic and cultural diversity in contrasting ways. Some promote it and celebrate it, while others view ethnic and cultural practices as something that belongs in the private realm at the same time that the state should aspire to neutral action based on equal treatment and blindness towards diversity (see, for example, Taylor, 1992;

Soysal, 1994; Favell, 1998; Joppke, 1998; Entzinger, 2000; Rex, 2000). Clearly, there are very few examples of cases that follow purely each of these polar models, and conceptions of citizenship and their implementation into legal codes and practices are constantly subject to social and political change (Joppke, 2000), sometimes even leading to a certain degree of convergence that originates in divergent political strategies (Feldblum, 1998). Yet there is a growing consensus that different citizenship regimes do have a substantial impact on the degree of and paths to migrants' political incorporation or integration (Ireland, 1994 and 2000; Koopmans and Statham, 2000b; Koopmans et al., 2005; Bloemraad, 2006b).

In this regard, American and European scholarship has typically approached the study of the political engagement of migrants from sharply different perspectives. In the US, issues related to the political dimension of immigrant incorporation have been – until very recently – largely neglected by political scientists and sociologists, as the privileged focus of attention has been economic and social incorporation. Notable exceptions to this general sidelining of political incorporation is the work by Jones-Correa (1998), Gerstle and Mollenkopf (2001), Bloemraad (2006b), Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008), and Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009a). Moreover, often the emphasis of the American literature has been either on tracing the historical and political processes that lead to migrants' political incorporation (for example, Savidge Sterne, 2001; Ueda, 2001; McKeever, 2001) or on identifying the individual predictors of migrants' political engagement (for example, DeSipio, 1996; Tam Cho, 1999; Leal et al., 2008).

In contrast, in general terms, the European scholarship has developed a larger body of work that is specifically concerned with the political dimension of migrants' integration. Partly due to a lack of adequate survey data, and partly due to the prevailing academic traditions, European academia has privileged the study of the contextual and institutional factors when accounting for the different levels and pathways of migrant integration into the political process (for example, Ireland, 1994; Rex, 2000; Togeby, 2004; Garbaye, 2005; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008). And in so doing, it has borrowed a solid pre-existing theoretical framework that is able to account for the variations in migrants' political incorporation across settings: political opportunity theory (Koopmans and Statham, 2000b; Koopmans et al., 2005).

A more recent development in European scholarship has also stressed the importance of the group-level resources – notably the social capital generated by the patterns of interaction and linkage of migrants' organizations – in understanding why certain groups are more successfully incorporated into the political process (cf. Fennema and Tillie, 1999 and 2001; Jacobs and Tillie, 2004). This has led, on both sides of the Atlantic, to an increasing interest in the ways in which migrants' associations can contribute to speed or slow the political incorporation of the newcomers (cf. the essays in Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008).

In this book, we move a step forward in this research agenda by explicitly bridging these different but complementary research agendas and traditions. We believe that a proper understanding of the processes that drive the political inclusion (or exclusion) of immigrants and their descendants requires paying attention to the various individual, organizational and contextual factors that are likely to be relevant. As we discuss in the next pages, the study in which this book is based has carefully collected information on these three levels of analysis and, hence, takes on board the insights from both the American and the European traditions.

As we will argue – and as many of the chapters in this volume show – several aspects of the context of migrants' integration importantly shape their chances to become incorporated into the polity. But which context is the relevant one? Often in this field, scholars have privileged the national context in their studies (Brubaker, 1992; Soysal, 1994; Joppke and Morawska, 2003; Koopmans et al., 2005). This is an understandable development, as the thrust of citizenship and immigration policies is commonly defined at the nation-state level. However, it is at the local level where policies with a more direct impact on the daily life of migrants are designed and implemented (Body-Gendrot and Martiniello, 2000; Penninx et al., 2004; Borkert and Caponio, 2010). Local governments are the first to experience the policy challenges brought about by the ethnic, cultural and social diversity that immigration processes entail (Ireland, 1994; Rogers and Tillie, 2001; Jones-Correa, 2001), and their responses can complement, contradict or supplant national policies – especially in what is referred to as immigrant integration (cf. Alexander, 2003; Penninx, 2006). Consequently, local policies, local institutional settings and the prevailing public discourses at the local level can importantly shape the pace, intensity and level of migrants' incorporation into the public arena. Moreover, these aspects can substantially vary across local contexts even within the limits imposed by national policies – mostly, citizenship and flow control policies.

It is also at the local level that migrants usually have greater opportunities to become involved in political life. In several European countries, both EU and non-EU citizens are granted voting rights at the local level, and in all countries migrants are more likely to be able to mobilize successfully around co-ethnic candidates at the local level. It is also, primarily, the local context that determines the opportunities that migrants have to form civil society organizations, forge links with pre-existing local associations and parties, and rally together for collective action. Additionally, in various cities consultative structures have been established between the municipal government and the immigrant population, whereas in others the opportunities for migrants to participate in local decision-making are scarce. The larger concentration of immigrant-origin minorities in urban spaces also favours the development of common identities and of feelings of shared fate, thus fostering the emergence of group consciousness and group mobilization.

Furthermore, the local context provides the conditions that will shape the attitudes of the native population towards migrants, and the reaction of policy-makers and political elites to the newcomers and their descendants. Sometimes the political engagement of minorities is the result of specific political issues that emerge in mainstream city politics. Thus, focusing on the local level adds several layers of richness to the materials that one can analyse when studying migrants' political incorporation.

This book focuses on the local level – on large European metropolitan cities, in particular – and, therefore, it contributes to examine a level of government and of social interaction that is still understudied in a broad comparative perspective. As we will explain in greater detail in the coming pages, we have collected a vast amount of information that – without neglecting the importance of the nation-state in determining some of the conditions for migrants' political incorporation – inspects how the institutional, associational and societal dimensions of the local context alter the opportunities that migrants have to become included in the political process. As such, the book will illuminate the areas of policy intervention that local governments can identify in their quest to improve the conditions of integration of immigrants and their offspring.

This leads us to the need to highlight that one major problem in the study of migrants' political integration is the lack of conceptual clarity about what 'integration' means. What are the exact outcomes that policies and policy-makers should aim at achieving when promoting migrants' political incorporation? Whereas sociological and economic approaches to immigrant integration have extensively dealt with this conceptual issue – albeit not necessarily reaching a consensus – there is much less elaboration on the political component of integration or incorporation. Both the scholarly literature and the policy-makers have been using in an interchangeable fashion notions such as political incorporation, political integration, political assimilation and political inclusion. Often, it is not very clear whether all these notions are indeed equivalent and whether the desired outcome that is pursued is the same in all cases. Because the notion of political integration is central to our whole endeavour, in Chapter 2 Morales discusses the various conceptual and empirical angles that can be applied to the study of migrants' engagement in the civic and political communities of their countries of residence, and outlines the notion of political integration that we privilege in our approach to this topic at the same time that she discusses the main tensions inherent in the study of migrants' political integration. As is explained in that chapter, we believe that the most fruitful option is to conceive political integration as a relative notion that entails comparing the situation of migrants to that of the autochthonous population. Hence, we view political integration as equivalent to political inclusion and, consequently, as the absence of political exclusion.

From that conceptual starting point, this volume analyses in detail the various factors that lead to (or prevent) a successful integration of migrants into the political process. As we will detail later in this chapter, the volume relies on a unique international study that has collected data for 10 European cities on the individual behaviours, attitudes and characteristics of selected groups of migrants; on the associational fields of these same groups; on the socio-demographic composition of the migrant groups; and on the institutional and discursive political opportunities for migrants' integration. The uniqueness of the data lies not just on how extensive it is from the point of view of the number of cases and levels of analysis covered, but also on the fact that the data were collected following the same methods and using the same instruments in all the cities included.

In the remainder of this chapter, we introduce the study to the reader in more detail. The next section sketches out the main objectives and framework of the volume, at the same time that it describes what is our main contribution to the current scholarship on this topic. The third section provides some important details about the research design and the data that we use throughout the book, which we believe constitutes an important step forward in the empirical study of this subject. The final section anticipates some of the main findings and conclusions of each of the chapters in the volume.

### **Understanding migrants' political integration: micro, meso and macro factors**

The main purpose of this book is to assess the degree of political integration (or exclusion) of migrants in various European cities following a multidimensional analytical perspective that takes into account three main sets of explanatory factors: the individual characteristics of migrants, their embeddedness in social (organizational) networks, and the political opportunity structures of their place of residence (country and city). Figure 1.1 summarizes the theoretical approach that underlies the focus of this volume.

All three kinds of explanations have their roots in different strands of the literature on political behaviour and participation. The role of individual characteristics and resources has long been stressed by students of political participation (see, for example, Verba et al., 1995; van Deth et al., 2007). Indeed, the resource model (Verba and Nie, 1972) has long represented the dominant paradigm in studies of political participation. In this perspective, aspects such as education and socio-economic status are strong predictors of participation. According to Verba et al. (1978), for example, political participation at the individual level is largely determined by civic resources (time, money and civic skills), which are usually the product of an elevated socio-economic status.






Figure 1.1 The theoretical approach

The comparative analysis of the political participation and, more generally speaking, the political integration of citizens of migrant origin in European cities must pay careful attention to individual characteristics that might explain why some participate while others do not, why some trust the political institutions of the receiving society while others do not, why some are interested in the politics of the settlement society while others are not, why some adhere to the habits and values of the receiving society while others do not, and so forth. All these aspects are influenced by the personal resources and skills migrants carry with them and are able to deploy. In this regard, one specific individual skill is likely to play a crucial role: the command of the language of the place of residence (Jacobs et al., 2004). The impact of this characteristic, of course, depends on which aspect of integration we are dealing with. For example, to be interested in the political affairs of the receiving society one clearly has to have at least some knowledge of the language. Similarly, one has to take into account the duration of stay in the country of residence and, partly related to that, the strength of the homeland ties of individual migrants. We should expect migrants who have arrived at an early stage of their lives or who have been born in the country of residence and who, hence, have only a weak relation with their country of ancestry to be politically more integrated. Yet, these as well as other predictions relating to the impact of individual characteristics on political integration need to be explored empirically, including through comparisons both across ethnic groups and across different settings. This is a major task

of this volume, and one to which it contributes substantially with novel and unique data.

A second strand of research on political participation has stressed the role of social integration (Almond and Verba, 1963). This body of literature emphasizes in particular the importance of being engaged in political, but also social and cultural, associations (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995; Pattie et al., 2003) as well as the mobilizing potential of community ties and integration into local networks. Some have also stressed the importance of integration within the community through the feeling of attachment to the community and the feeling of trust towards others (Putnam, 1993 and 2000; Hall, 1999). In this regard, the concept of social capital has become quite fashionable to capture those (positive) externalities that individuals can draw from their involvement in organizational networks and that they can bring into their political experience. Starting from the seminal works of Bourdieu (1984, 1986), Coleman (1988, 1990) and, more recently, Putnam (1993, 2000), the literature on social capital has witnessed an important growth in recent years (see Lin, 2001, and Portes, 1998 for overviews).

In the field of immigration and ethnic relations, this perspective has recently been brought to the fore by Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie (1999, 2001). Fennema and Tillie have argued that differences in political participation of ethnic minorities are linked to differences in what they call 'civic community', which they conceive of above all as 'ethnic' social capital of migrants stemming from participation in ethnic associational life. Drawing from a research tradition that goes back to Alexis de Tocqueville, Fennema and Tillie maintain that voluntary associations create social trust, which spills over into political trust and higher political participation. In their approach, however, the degree of ethnic civic community is measured through the density of networks between ethnic organizations (see van Heelsum, 2005, and Vermeulen, 2006, for a similar perspective). Thus, networks are seen as reflecting the amount of social capital at the group level. In this perspective, '[s]ocial capital at the group level is a function of (1) the number of organizations, (2) the variety in the activities of the organizations and (3) the density of the organizational network' (Tillie, 2004: 531).

While fundamental both in their findings and for having stimulated further research, the work by Fennema and Tillie has two main limitations for the study of individual participation and integration. Firstly, it focuses on organizational density and the social capital at the group level. Yet, social capital does not only derive from organizational networks as such, but is translated into individual resources through involvement in organizations and other social networks. The number, variety and density of organizations constitute the social capital at the group level, but if we want to explain the political integration of migrants we must take into account their involvement in voluntary associations and other structures of social interaction

at the individual level as well. Secondly, Fennema and Tillie have focused on ethnic social capital, neglecting the role of cross-ethnic and non-ethnic networks. In other words, associational involvement may spur 'bonding' social capital, but also 'bridging' social capital (Putnam, 2000), and research should be able to analyse the impact of both aspects on the political participation and integration of migrants. In fact, the quality of a multicultural democracy might well stem more from the bridging than from the bonding social capital, as the latter lies within a specific community, whereas the former overcomes the ethnic cleavage.

Recent work by a number of scholars, including Fennema and Tillie themselves, has tried to respond to both of these limitations. On one hand, they focus on the individual-level dimension of social capital by looking at how individual involvement in different types of associations might favour political participation and integration. The results of these studies were published in a special issue of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (Berger et al., 2004; Jacobs et al., 2004; Tillie, 2004; Togeby, 2004). These studies show, on the other hand, that non-ethnic or cross-ethnic organizations play an important role and have a distinct impact on the political participation of migrants.

This volume follows this line of reasoning by looking at the impact of organizational membership in different types of voluntary associations and networks on the political participation and integration of migrants at the individual level. We improve the existing research by taking into account the effect of the social capital that develops from organizational formation and involvement both at the individual and the group level (see, especially, Chapter 5 by Morales and Pilati, and Chapter 6 by Strömblad et al. in this book).

Together with political attitudes and motivations, individual characteristics and social integration form what has been called the 'civic voluntarism model' of political participation (Verba et al., 1995). In this perspective, 'three main factors influence the decision to participate: the personal resources used to participate, political attitudes that encourage participation, and connections to groups or people who ask one to participate' (Dalton, 2008b: 58). While it has dominated the existing literature, this focus on individual-level factors overlooks the crucial role played by the political and institutional context. Indeed, recent work on political participation has started to stress contextual factors, either on their own (Franklin et al., 1996) or in conjunction with individual factors (Anduiza, 2002; Bühlmann and Freitag, 2006; Morales, 2009).

This is all the more important in the case of migrants, as they often face a political and institutional setting that is completely different from the one they were used to in their country of origin. Hence, one should seriously take into account the impact of the context of settlement for migrants' political integration (Portes and Böröcz, 1989), and specifically the local

variations that we often find within countries. Local contexts are, in this regard, especially relevant because it is at the local level that many of the policies and political interactions that have a vital impact on migrants' lives develop. For example, the local setting largely determines how political parties and other political actors react to the arrival of new residents who can become – eventually – full citizens and voters (Jones-Correa, 1998). Additionally, in many countries local authorities have sufficient powers on a number of policy domains that determine migrants' capacity to become part of the local society, and very importantly, that determine their ability to engage in the policy process.

The concept of political opportunity structures has become fashionable in this respect (Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 1978; Kriesi et al., 1995). This is the third strand of research that we consider as important to arrive at a deeper understanding of the patterns of political participation and integration of migrants in European cities. This concept has its origin in the literature on social movements and contentious politics (see Kriesi, 2004 and Meyer, 2004 for reviews). Political opportunities can be defined broadly as 'consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements' (Tarrow, 1996: 54). More specifically, they refer to all those aspects of the political system that affect the possibilities that challenging groups have to mobilize effectively. Among such aspects, one can mention the following main dimensions (McAdam, 1996): the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; the presence or absence of elite allies; and the state's capacity and propensity for repression. All these aspects define 'options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them, which depend on factors outside the mobilizing group' (Koopmans, 2004b: 65).

We maintain that the concept of political opportunity structures, originally crafted to account for social movement and protest activity, can fruitfully be applied to the study of the political participation and integration of migrants. In order to do so, however, we need to elaborate it further in at least three directions, as compared to its traditional usage in the social movement and contentious politics literature. First, in addition to the more traditional aspects relating to the general political opportunity structures, such as the access to the institutionalized political system or the configuration of power, one should also consider more specific features of the political context that influences in particular the attitudes and behaviours of migrants, most notably citizenship rights that open or close their access to the national community (Koopmans et al., 2005). The policies enacted and implemented by the political authorities of the country of residence obviously constitute an important aspect of institutional opportunities in this sense (Bloemraad, 2005; Ireland, 1994; Vermeulen, 2005 and 2006).

Second, we need to acknowledge that behaviours are not only constrained by political institutions, but that discourse matters as well. In other words, opportunities have both an institutional and a discursive side. The former aspects refer to the openness or closure of the institutional setting or the policies enacted by political authorities; while the latter determine which collective identities and substantive demands have a high likelihood of gaining visibility in the mass media, resonating with the claims of other collective actors, and achieving legitimacy in the public discourse (Koopmans et al., 2005).

Finally, while political opportunity theory has looked almost exclusively to when and how opportunities influence collective mobilization and social movements, we propose to apply institutional and discursive opportunities to explain the political participation and integration of individual migrants. The main idea behind this extension of the original reach of the theory is that political opportunities structure not just the incentives and disincentives for political mobilization at the group level, but that they also structure individual action. This is a logical extension of the applicability of these theories, as it is difficult to see how political opportunities would impinge on movement mobilization and protest if they do not affect individual participation decisions as well, and other research has successfully blended already the political opportunity structures approach with the traditional predictors of political participation in models of individual behaviour (cf. Leighley, 1995 and 2001; Morales, 2009).

In sum, this book aims to explain the political participation and integration of individual migrants of different national and ethnic groups by examining the role of their individual characteristics and resources, the impact of social capital accumulation at the individual and group level, and the general and specific political opportunities – both institutional and discursive – that characterize the country and especially the city in which they live. We now describe in some detail how we conducted the study and the data on which the volume is based.

## **The study**

All the chapters that are included in this volume employ a large dataset that is the result of an ambitious effort to study migrants' political integration and social capital in several European cities. It is the result of a collective endeavour that was initiated originally by Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie in 2003 with the setting up of a network of European scholars that agreed to employ the same research design and methods of data collection in each and all of several European cities. Over the years, some teams were able to get funding for their projects and others did not, some started earlier – the Norwegian and Swedish teams, for example – and others had to wait a bit more to get sufficient funding. In the end, eight teams were able to run

the projects at some point between 2004 and 2008, and the data they have produced for 10 different European metropolitan cities is what we use in this volume.

### **The cities**

As we have discussed in previous pages, studying migrant integration in the urban context is particularly fruitful for several reasons. First, migrants and their descendants in Europe are overwhelmingly concentrated in cities. Migrants are often over-represented in cities and urban regions, as these are places that provide not only better economic perspectives but more diverse and dynamic social networks and integration possibilities. As a result, an increasing number of European metropolitan cities contain large foreign-origin communities of between a tenth and a third of their total population. Yet, not only demographic factors make cities an important focus of research on the political integration of migrants. In addition, most European cities are relatively autonomous in formulating and implementing policies that have a substantial impact on migrants' daily lives, and the local context is increasingly the one where the integration of migrants is at stake (Rex, 2000; Penninx et al., 2004; Alexander, 2004).

From this viewpoint, the city is the setting that provides (or denies) migrants with the general and specific political opportunities, both institutional and discursive, for their political participation and integration. This is the reason why we selected a number of European metropolitan cities that reflect a wide variation in terms of the magnitude of immigrant flows, their timing and their composition. We have chosen to study cities in countries of long-standing immigration – London, Lyon, Oslo, Stockholm, Zurich and Geneva – as well as cities where immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon – Barcelona, Budapest, Madrid and Milan.

All the cities studied are centres of large metropolitan regions with strong economies. The annual per capita GDP generated in these places is usually significantly higher than the national figure (Table 1.1). This attracts migrants to these regions in larger numbers than the respective national average. The difference is most striking in the case of London where the proportion of migrants is more than six times that for Britain as a whole, although the North London boroughs covered by our analysis (Islington, Camden, Hackney and Haringey) are especially over-represented by ethnic minority groups even in comparison with other parts of the city. The proportion of Londoners who belong to ethnic minority groups is 29 per cent for the whole city.

In absolute terms, the British and Swiss cities stand out as the ones with the largest shares of immigrant population, with Budapest at the other end with barely 3 per cent of migrants. Most cities, however, are in intermediate situations of between 10 and 20 per cent of immigrant population. Another major difference across the cities studied is related to the dynamic element of migrants' presence in the city. In Barcelona, London, Madrid and Milan there

Table 1.1 Socio-economic indicators of the metropolitan areas

Metropolitan Region	Population (million)	Per capita GDP (in USD, thousand)	Per capita GDP of the country (in USD, thousand)	Percentage of migrants
London <sup>+</sup>	7.5	56.8	34.1	50.6 <sup>†</sup>
Milan	3.9	44.3	29.5	12.5
Madrid	6.1	38.7	29.6	17.9
Barcelona	5.3	34.9	29.6	17.8
Budapest	1.7	39.7	17.9	3.2
Zurich	1.3	n.a.*	38.6	30.2
Stockholm	1.9	46.6	34.3	20.5
Lyon	1.7	39.3	31.7	9.4
Geneva	0.4	n.a.*	38.6	42.8
Oslo	0.5	94.6	52.0	25.0

Source: Population and GDP, *OECD Regional Statistics, 2006–2007* (TL3 level); percentage migrants, respective local government statistics.

<sup>+</sup> Includes Inner London (East and West), Outer London (East, North East, South, West and North West).

<sup>†</sup> Only for the North Inner London boroughs of Islington, Camden, Hackney and Haringey where the study was conducted.

\* Figures not available.

have been sharp increases in the inflow of immigrants in the last decade, which reach up to a fivefold increase in the two Spanish cities. In contrast, inflows have been less dramatic or have even stagnated in the other cities.

Our selection of cities has also sought to maximize the range of different political contexts for migrants in their different dimensions: institutional and discursive (see Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume, for more details). Thus, we have chosen cities in countries that are usually described as leaning towards pluralist or multicultural models of citizenship (London in Britain, and Stockholm in Sweden), cities in countries characterized as following universalist-republican models (Lyon in France), cities in countries thought to approach migrants' integration from an assimilationist-differentialist model (Geneva and Zurich in Switzerland, Oslo in Norway), and a number of cases in countries with less clear-cut models or ones very much in the making due to their position as new receivers of immigration (Barcelona and Madrid in Spain, Budapest in Hungary, and Milan in Italy).

## Data and methods

The analyses presented in all chapters employ as their core source data from surveys to representative samples of residents in the respective cities, stratified by national/ethnic origin. In each city, the surveys include at least two – and in most cases three – groups of migrant origin, and a control group of autochthonous population. The migrant-background groups were selected on the basis of their country of birth, nationality or ethnicity depending on

the city and the available sampling frames. Thus, in Barcelona, Budapest, Madrid, Lyon, Milan, Oslo and Stockholm migrants are defined as those respondents who were either born in one of the foreign countries selected to define the migrant origin, or with at least one parent foreign-born in the respective country.<sup>2</sup> In Geneva and Zurich, migrants were selected based on their nationality at the time of sampling, but respondents who were randomly selected to the autochthonous group that were either born or had parents of any of the respective foreign backgrounds were reallocated to their respective migrant groups. In London, respondents were selected on the basis of the ethnic group to which they ascribe. In all cities we aimed at obtaining subsamples for each of the groups of between 200 and 300 individuals, so as to be able to compare them adequately. Additionally, in all cities, a contrast group of autochthonous population of the same sample size was also interviewed.

In our selection of migrant groups, we had to balance a number of aspects that were important for the study. First, their population size needed to be big enough to be able to extract a sample of around 300 individuals. Second, we wanted to include groups of more distant and more recent migration waves. Third, in all cities we wanted to include at least one group of predominant Muslim faith. Fourth, migrant groups needed to be 'relevant' in each of our cities, as it made little sense to study groups that were relatively small within our cities, even if they were the most suited for comparative purposes. Finally, we aimed at maximizing the comparability of national origins across cities whenever possible. The resulting selection is shown in Table 1.2.

The surveys were carried in Oslo and Stockholm in 2003–2004 with national funding and in the other eight cities in 2007–2008 with funding from the 6th Framework Programme of the European Commission for Budapest, London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan and Zurich; and national funding for Barcelona and Geneva. Hence, the latter eight studies used a questionnaire that overlaps much more than that administered in the two Scandinavian cities, which share approximately three fourths of the questionnaire with the other eight cities. In Barcelona, Budapest, London, Madrid, Milan and Stockholm the interviews were conducted face to face, whereas – due to cost issues or sampling frame availability – in Geneva, Lyon, Oslo and Zurich they were undertaken by telephone.<sup>3</sup> The sampling strategies had to adapt to the different availability of registers or lists that covered the population of interest. Hence, in Barcelona, Budapest, Geneva, Madrid, Oslo, Stockholm and Zurich nominal individual samples were randomly drawn from the local population registers.<sup>4</sup> In London, focused enumeration within postal districts was employed. In Milan, a method of random selection within centres of aggregation was employed for the migrant groups,<sup>5</sup> while the autochthonous group was selected from telephone registers. Finally, in Lyon, the lack of any available register that includes information about the country of birth or nationality of the individual or on that of the parents



Table 1.2 Groups selected in each city

Nationality country and city	Groups of recent arrival	Groups of longer settlement	Muslim groups
<b>France</b> Lyon	Tunisian	Algerian, <i>Moroccan</i>	Algerian, Tunisian, <i>Moroccan</i>
<b>Hungary</b> Budapest	Chinese, Ethnic Hungarian	Arab/Turkish mixed group	Arab/Turkish mixed group
<b>Italy</b> Milan	<i>Ecuadorian</i>	Filipino	Egyptian
<b>Spain</b> Madrid Barcelona	<i>Ecuadorian</i> <i>Ecuadorian</i>	<i>Moroccan</i> and some of the other Andean <i>Moroccan</i> and some of the other Andean	<i>Moroccan</i> <i>Moroccan</i>
<b>Switzerland</b> Zurich Geneva	<i>Kosovar</i> <i>Kosovar</i>	<i>Italian, Turkish</i> <i>Italian</i>	<i>Turkish, Kosovar</i> <i>Kosovar</i>
<b>UK</b> London	Bangladeshi	Caribbean, Indian	Bangladeshi (some Indian)
<b>Norway</b> Oslo	<i>Former</i> <i>Yugoslavia</i>	<i>Turkish</i>	<i>Turkish (some former</i> <i>Yugoslavia)</i>
<b>Sweden</b> Stockholm	–	Chilean, <i>Turkish</i>	<i>Turkish</i>

Note: groups that are studied in more than one city are shown in italics.

led to a sample design that proceeded by randomly generating telephone numbers – within the area code – and screening respondents through a short list of questions about their country of birth and their ancestry.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to the survey of individuals, as indicated in Figure 1.1, the design of the study was structured around a data collection process that gathered information on the multiple levels of analysis required for testing the proposed theoretical and analytical model. In all cities, except for Oslo,<sup>7</sup> we have additionally collected data through:

- A survey of migrants' associations that collects information on their internal organization, goals, membership structure and – very importantly – their links and collaborations with other migrant and autochthonous local organizations (such as political parties, trade unions and NGOs).

- The analysis of various policy documents, regulations and interviews with policy-makers that allow characterizing the institutional political opportunity structures that migrants face.
- The coding of claims-making covered by newspapers and which reflect the dominant public discursive practices with regard to immigration and immigrant groups in each city, thus allowing us to adequately measure the discursive opportunity structures for migrants' political integration in the local polity.
- The collection of various statistics and official data on the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the immigrant population and groups within each city.

In this book, we make more extensive use of the data collected through the survey of individual respondents as well as of the information gathered about the institutional and discursive political opportunity structures. In two chapters in this volume (5, by Morales and Pilati, and 6, by Strömblad et al.), we also employ some of the data collected through the survey of migrant organizations, but we leave the detailed analysis of this latter dataset for other publications.

In summary, the data that we employ is unique and extremely rich. It is the first large-scale international study of migrant minorities conducted in this many cities in Europe. It not only covers individual information, but also information on migrants' organizational social capital, and about the institutional and discursive setting for migrants' integration into public life. And, very importantly, it applies the same design and data collection instruments in an unparalleled effort to obtain good quality data that will allow us to test our theoretical propositions.

## **Outline of the book**

The volume looks at different elements of the theoretical model illustrated in Figure 1.1 in its various chapters. Chapter 2 by Laura Morales discusses in some detail the concept of political integration as applied to immigrants and their descendants, and takes issue with the multiple empirical approaches that one can employ when trying to measure this concept with survey data. This chapter critically reviews the multiple understandings of the concept of political integration and related notions, discusses the multiple underlying tensions in the study of migrants' political integration, and illustrates with the survey data of this project the implications of choosing different conceptual and measurement solutions to those tensions. From that starting point, all other chapters look at the various aspects that foster or hinder migrants' political integration.

In Chapter 3, Manlio Cinalli and Marco Giugni focus on the effect of the political context. They present the information collected on the institutional

and discursive political opportunities that migrants face and study how they shape migrants' individual political participation. In Chapter 4, Amparo González-Ferrer builds on the findings by Cinalli and Giugni and examines whether naturalized immigrants are less inclined to vote than autochthonous individuals, and how this gap is moderated (or multiplied) by the opportunities they are afforded to become integrated – in particular, those related to the legal configuration of residence status.

The following chapters focus on the effect of migrants' individual and group-level social capital on their political integration. Laura Morales and Katia Pilati analyse, in Chapter 5, the role of 'bridging' and 'bonding' social capital in defining the focus of concern of migrants' political action and interest, and how this effect interacts with the political context. In Chapter 6, Per Strömblad, Gunnar Myrberg and Bo Bengtsson look at the integrative functions of migrants' voluntary associations and compare the, *a priori*, favourable institutional opportunity structure for ethnic organization and political inclusion of Stockholm with the situation in the other European cities covered by the study.

In Chapter 7, Laura Morales and Miruna Morariu shift the focus of attention to the impact of migrants' transnational engagement and examine whether the continued link with the country of origin or ancestry is, as some have suggested, detrimental to their integration in the societies where they live. Their chapter looks at different forms of transnational exchanges and pays special attention to the spillover effects of these engagements.

In Chapter 8, Gunnar Myrberg and Jon Rogstad compare in some detail two cases that are often considered as relatively similar in many aspects relevant to migrants' political integration but not to their integration 'philosophy': Oslo and Stockholm. In so doing, they seek to identify the similarities and differences in the patterns of political engagement of immigrants and their descendants across the two contexts, as well as the factors that can account for the gaps in engagement with respect to the respective autochthonous populations.

The last three empirical chapters focus on various aspects of migrants' attitudes, orientations and belief systems. Chapter 9 by, Eva Anduiza and Josep San Martín, analyses the gap in political efficacy and confidence of migrant populations for a selection of cities and groups. Their chapter shows that in not all cases and all contexts are migrants less trusting of political institutions than the autochthonous population, and that the common predictors of efficacy and confidence operate differently for the autochthonous and the migrant populations.

In Chapter 10, Nina Eggert and Marco Giugni study how religiosity is an important driving force in migrants' political participation. But they also examine the ways in which the political context mediates the relation between migrants' religiosity and political engagement. In particular, their

chapter looks at the effect that the ways in which local authorities deal with cultural and religious differences mediate the connection between religion and politics.

Chapter 11 by Ranji Devadason analyses the patterns of identification with the political community of immigrants and their descendants by focusing on place attachment. Using the case of London as the comparative standpoint of a multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan city, she looks at how different contexts shape the feelings of belonging to ethnic and religious categories, as well as to the neighbourhood and the cities where they live.

Finally, in the concluding chapter we summarize and discuss the main findings generated by the study and presented throughout the volume, and we extract the main conclusion with regard to how European societies and policy-makers can more effectively promote the integration of immigrants and their offspring into the political life of the places where they live.

## Notes

\*We thank Bo Bengtsson, Abigail Fisher Williamson and Dirk Jacobs for their detailed comments on previous versions of this chapter.

1. For brevity, throughout the book we will refer to immigrants and their children as 'migrants', thus including first and second generations of people of foreign origin.
2. In the case of Lyon, a small number of cases of individuals whose grandparents were of Maghrebi origin were also included in the sample.
3. In Milan, the autochthonous group was interviewed by telephone.
4. In Barcelona and Madrid, due to problems of updating of the local register and of response rates, part of the sample of the autochthonous group was selected through random routes, and a small proportion of the samples for the migrant groups were selected through the spatial sampling procedures employed also in Milan. Multiple analyses of the Spanish data have shown that the sampling method does not have a significant effect on the main outcome variables of interest to this study. In Geneva and Zurich, the sampling frame for the autochthonous subsample was the telephone register, which is the common sampling frame used in Switzerland for surveys to the general population. In Budapest, due to problems of coverage of the official population registers, for the Chinese and the mixed Arab/Turkish groups the initial samples of 100 individuals were complemented with individuals selected through the snowball method with more than 25 starting points (31 for 249 Chinese subjects, and 27 for 286 additional respondents).
5. The sample is designed to achieve representativeness by proceeding to randomly select within two different levels of sampling. The first level requires the identification of a certain number of local immigrant meeting places distributed across the municipality. This level of the sampling refers to the local centres or places of aggregation (institutions, places of worship, entertainment, care centres, meeting points, and so on). The second level of sampling refers to the individuals sampled in the various local centres. The universe of immigrants present at the time of the survey, thus, is made up of a list of  $H$  statistical units, each of which represents a set of contacts with a local centre (Blangiardo, 1999).

6. The effort and cost of this method should not be underestimated. Even if the precision of the area codes allows targeting specific neighbourhoods within Lyon, 67,938 phone numbers had to be called to obtain a sample of 1,100 individuals. This means that nearly everyone was called across the selected areas. Targeting in the areas of Vénissieux and Vaulx-en-Vélin was particularly difficult since all the existing telephone numbers were exhausted at a relatively early stage. Numbers were not randomly 'generated', instead lists of all existing phone numbers were obtained from private companies that can provide all available phone numbers for any given area. The selection included only landlines.
7. In Oslo, only the individual survey was conducted.

# 2

## Conceptualizing and Measuring Migrants' Political Inclusion

*Laura Morales*

### **Conceptualizing migrants' inclusion in the political arena: assimilation, acculturation, incorporation or integration?**

Traditionally, the study of the processes and issues involved in the absorption of large immigration inflows has sidelined somewhat the political dimension of these processes. Short of neglecting this aspect, the truth is that – even in recent times – there is much less theoretical elaboration on the political component of immigrants' integration or incorporation, and especially around the concepts that we use when studying political integration or incorporation. Many general recent overviews on the subject of immigrant integration fail to address the political dimension at all (Alba and Nee, 2003, Bean and Stevens, 2003) or do not address the important conceptual issues involved (Messina and Lahav, 2006). This is not to say that political scientists and sociologists have ignored the politics of immigration – far from it, there is a booming academic industry on the topic – but conceptual development has not been at centre stage.

Several American scholars have recently started to reflect around the meanings, measurements and theories of the incorporation of migrants to democratic politics (cf. Gerstle and Mollenkopf, 2001; Jones-Correa, 2005; Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2009b; Minnite, 2009). All of these studies highlight the complexities and current 'muddiness' of our definitions, conceptions and theorizing around immigrant political incorporation.

In parallel, European researchers initiated a wave of scholarship that privileged cross-national comparisons and combined several of the concepts, theories and methods of social movement studies with the scholarship of political theorists on citizenship and the nation-state to gain a better understanding of the political processes involved in the mobilization and integration of immigrants and their descendants (Ireland, 1994; Koopmans and Statham, 2000b; Koopmans et al., 2005). On that side of the Atlantic, much of the discussion focused on the ways in which different models or philosophies of citizenship and integration condition the extent to and pathways

through, which migrants mobilize and become politically incorporated. A substantial part of this scholarship has been devoted to examining whether multicultural models or philosophies – and their mechanisms to foster migrants’ ethnic organization – were better placed than assimilationist ones to achieve the political integration of migrants (Fennema and Tillie, 1999, 2001; Berger et al., 2004; Jacobs et al., 2004).

More recently, several works have bridged the different approaches and scholarship on both sides of the Atlantic in an effort to illuminate our knowledge about the multiple macro- and micro-mechanisms that lie behind different outcomes in the political incorporation of migrants across advanced western democracies (Bloemraad, 2006b; Bloemraad et al., 2008; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008; Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2009a; Ireland, 2010).

Nevertheless, frequently these works have skipped the clear definition of what exactly is political integration or incorporation, how we go about measuring it and, especially, how we identify it when we see it. The aim of this chapter is to contribute, modestly, to advance in the development of a theoretically meaningful and empirically grounded definition of political integration. In line with Bleich’s (2008b: 533) suggestions, the purpose of this chapter is to try to clarify what constitutes successful integration, at the same time that it tries to identify the appropriate metrics to assess it.

In the remainder of this section, I briefly discuss the issues involved in the conceptual blurring of terms such as assimilation, incorporation, integration and acculturation. Then I introduce the main tensions that emerge in the scholarly literature when studying political incorporation or integration. The following sections in this chapter address each of these core tensions at the same time that they illustrate the empirical implications for comparative analysis with data from the surveys we have conducted in 10 European cities (see Chapter 1 in this volume). The goal is not to provide a final solution to the conceptual and measurement issues underlying said tensions, but to propose possible ways forward in gaining some clarity in this area.

### **On the need to clarify our concepts and definitions**

The idea that we need to gain greater clarity in the definition of the core concepts in this field is very well illustrated by Schuck’s (2009: 170) argument that assimilation and integration are, in essence, the same thing and that both carry the same ideological baggage of conformity to the cultural and social norms of the majority population. In fact, contemporary scholars contend that assimilation is but one type of immigrant incorporation or integration (Bean and Stevens, 2003: 95), but the truth is that it is often difficult to draw clear lines between the two terms.

Historically, the notion of assimilation implied that the behaviours and attitudes of the immigrants and their descendants approximate those of the native population. Assimilation was viewed initially as a linear process that

moves in stages and results in convergence over time (Park, 1926, 1930; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1927; Handlin, 1951; Gordon, 1964). Thus, for Gordon (1964), political assimilation would require structural assimilation into the main institutions of society – including civic associations – and civic assimilation, which entails the absence of conflicts around values and power. Similarly, Dahl's (1961) notion of immigrant political incorporation is also linear and proceeds through stages: disengagement, ethnic mobilization through brokerage and patronage, and assimilation.

The linear process of incorporation that is implied, and its normative connotations in relation to the expectation of conformity from migrants, have been subject to much criticism, and alternative models have been proposed: the ethnic disadvantage model (for example, Glazer and Moynihan, 1963), and the ethnic pluralism and segmented assimilation models (Gans, 1992; Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006).<sup>1</sup> However, many contemporary scholars stress that the normative issues are much more problematic for the socio-cultural and political elements of the assimilation canon than for the socio-economic ones (for discussions, see Brubaker, 2001; Alba and Nee, 1997, 2003; Gans, 1999; Bean and Stevens, 2003; Bauböck, 2006). This is so because, while the convergence of immigrants and their offspring towards the socio-economic positions and status of the majority population is viewed as intrinsically positive for the former, convergence towards mainstream cultural and political values, customs and behaviour implicitly assumes that migrants will have to discard (at least some of) those previously held. Considering this loss of cultural diversity as something positive is normatively problematic and often viewed as ethnocentric.

Still, some sociologists defend a less value-laden conception of assimilation that is taken to mean only the process by which migrants become part of the mainstream, and converge towards the positions of the native-born (Alba and Nee, 2003; Bean and Stevens, 2003). Implicit is an assumption that both receiving society and migrants move towards convergence, in such a manner that there is mutual movement and adaptation. The core argument, then, is that assimilation is one of the several valid paths towards the incorporation of migrants into the societal mainstream. Assimilation may occur either through the convergence of the newcomers to the pre-existing mainstream (the conformity route) or by mutual convergence of newcomers and the mainstream (the 'melting pot' route).

Two conclusions from this brief overview of current understandings of the concept of assimilation are important for our purposes. First, assimilation is but one of several pathways or routes toward immigrant incorporation. Second, different dimensions or aspects of assimilation may occur at different paces or with different routes altogether. These two conclusions have important implications for our understanding of the political component of immigrant incorporation. One is that, from an empirical point of view, we do not need to find exactly the same patterns of political attitudes and



behaviours among migrants and the mainstream population in order to conclude that migrants are being incorporated successfully into political life. The other is that we should expect multiple scenarios in the link between the socio-economic situation of migrants and their political incorporation, given that socio-economic incorporation might precede, follow or be coincident with political incorporation.

When focusing on political incorporation, there is no clear agreement on what are the best indicators of successful incorporation. Shefter (1986: 90) defines it as the process of gaining a secure position in the political process, whereas several scholars explicitly refer to system responsiveness to the interests of the groups and their representation in policy-making (Browning et al., 1984; Ramírez and Fraga, 2008; Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2009b). Often, in addition to participation in the electoral process, naturalization is taken as a major, or the main, indicator of political incorporation (Jones-Correa, 1998; Howard, 2009: 7–8). For example, Mollenkopf and Hochschild (2009: 9) view naturalization as one of the main drivers of political incorporation and reflect upon the reduced rates of naturalization of immigrants in Europe as a major barrier to their political incorporation. Other scholars widen substantially the scope and include in their studies a broad array of forms of political engagement, interest in politics, or feelings of belonging and attachment to the political community (cf. Ramakrishnan, 2005; Messina and Lahav, 2006; Lee et al., 2007b; Bleich, 2008a; Martiniello, 2009; Gidengil and Stolle, 2009).

In this volume, we favour an encompassing view of migrants' political inclusion that takes into account the multiple ways in which they relate to the political process. In this regard, using naturalization as a core indicator of incorporation or integration is highly problematic and potentially misleading, insofar as it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to become engaged in most non-electoral forms of political participation or to feel part of the political community and develop political attachments. It is, hence, probably more appropriate to consider the acquisition of citizenship (or holding it by birth) as a likely facilitating condition of political integration, but one that we should not expect to foster equally all forms of engagement and attachments.

In any case, a thorough review of the literature suggests that there are no substantial differences between the concept of political incorporation and that of political integration. In most cases, what is meant by incorporation and integration is the same, and it is often a matter of personal taste which of the two is chosen – with a more common preference for the usage of the concept of incorporation in the North American literature, and a more common predilection for the concept of integration in Europe. An important exception is Bloemraad (2006b, 2008), who considers that political assimilation – which she equates to indistinguishable individual-level patterns of civic and political behaviour between migrants and autochthonous

populations – and political incorporation – that she relates to naturalization and group-level political mobilization – are two different paths to political integration. Hence, for Bloemraad, political incorporation is but one form of political integration – the latter being the final desirable outcome to be assessed. Her distinction is very suggestive, and highlights one of the main tensions in the conceptual development around the political inclusion of immigrants and their descendants – whether we should focus primarily on individuals or on groups.

In order to clarify the terms of the analyses that will follow in this and subsequent chapters, I propose to distinguish between the notions of political integration and political incorporation. While both refer to the same substantial phenomenon, we think it might be useful to reserve the latter for the ‘dynamic’ component of inclusion into the political process, while using the former to refer to the ‘static’ element at any given time-point. Thus, when we discuss and evaluate the levels and types of the political integration of immigrants and their descendants throughout this book, we evaluate snapshots of the situation throughout the European cities that we study. Admittedly, this may look as little more than a semantic distinction; however, it is probably as far as one can go, given that the concepts of incorporation and integration carry no substantial differential meaning in most situations and for most scholars.

### **Main tensions in the study of migrants’ political integration**

A review of the conceptual elaboration around the political incorporation or integration of immigrants and their children also serves to highlight a number of analytical tensions that underlie much of the scholarship to date. These tensions refer to the fact that the focus or object of analysis is not always clear. A first such tension is related to whether integration is predicated of individual migrants or of migrant communities or groups (see Jones-Correa, 2005). An example of this tension is found in the work of Bloemraad (2006b, 2008), who argues that political integration can be achieved either when individual migrants show the same patterns of political behaviour as the majority population, or when migrants become mobilized in the political arena as a group. Consequently, a lack of political integration is evident when migrants are neither politically assimilated as individuals nor politically mobilized as a group around a collective identity.

Bloemraad’s distinction between individual and collective ‘paths’ to political inclusion highlights the inherent tension in the study of migrants’ political integration, as both individual-level and group-level processes are in place. Though we find her distinction between individual and collective routes to political integration very appealing, we also think that it is still somewhat problematic. For one, it fails to acknowledge that situations where migrants are politically mobilized – for example in the way of collective protest – but are not able to engage individually in the major forms of

civic and political action that determine policy-making in contemporary democracies can hardly be described as indicative of political integration. This is most obviously problematic when the lack of individual engagement is mostly due to exclusion that stems from the incapacity to become a full citizen in contexts where access to citizenship is very stringent. But we are also likely to judge situations where migrants are formally not excluded from the political process but fail – voluntarily or out of multiple processes of practical exclusion – to engage individually in political life as indicative of a lack of political integration, especially if the native population is much more active than the migrants.

A second recurrent tension in the literature is that between conceiving of political integration as an outcome or as a process (see also Ireland, 2010). As discussed earlier, often the concept of political incorporation is viewed as one that focuses primarily on the dynamic element of inclusion to political life (cf. Lee et al., 2007a). For example, Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009b: 15ff) opt for an understanding of political incorporation that privileges the processual and dynamic aspect. They identify several definitions of political incorporation that share an underlying notion of process and gradualism, and argue that ‘incorporation is a process in which individuals or groups move from less to more (or vice versa) or from early stages to later ones rather than a particular moment or threshold’. They hence advocate a definition that emphasizes the process rather than the evaluation of outcomes on simple dichotomous terms. Equally, Minnite’s (2009) account of political incorporation theories emphasizes process, whether resulting in inclusion or in absorption.

However, the tension between defining political incorporation as a process or an outcome is clearly illustrated by Hochschild and Mollenkopf’s choice to favour a flexible but relatively ambiguous notion of political incorporation: ‘addressing individuals as well as groups, attitudes and beliefs as well as interests, processes as well as outcomes, exclusion as well as inclusion, and change caused by immigrants’ actions as well as changes in those actions’ (2009b: 16). A vague definition is somewhat less problematic when comparisons are based on disparate cases, data and methods (as is the case with the contributions to that volume), but they are highly problematic when we need to evaluate outcomes cross-nationally and using the same methods and data collection processes. Furthermore, vague definitions of political incorporation are at odds with the starker depiction of the comparison of political representation outcomes between the US and European countries that Mollenkopf and Hochschild offer a few pages before (2009: 11).

This leads to the realization that – even if processes are important – in most cases we are primarily interested in outcomes that can be evaluated at any given time-point. When focusing on outcomes, we can choose to look at outcomes of the ‘process’ of incorporation – such as system responsiveness – or outcomes related to the group members’ orientations and behaviours. In this

regard, Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009b: 23ff.) take the responsiveness of the political system as indicative (or otherwise) of successful incorporation (see also Browning et al., 1984; Jones-Correa, 2005). This choice is, however, not without problems, as policy change and changes in institutions and practices in favour of (immigrant-origin) minorities are often the result of complex political coalitions that involve not just the said minorities but also large blocks of the mainstream population. Moreover, these changes can (and do) frequently coexist with the political exclusion of large portions of those minorities. Hence, it is problematic to take system responsiveness (or its absence) as a clear indicator of political integration or otherwise.

Other scholars have chosen to analyse outcomes that are not dependent on the outcomes of the policy process, but on migrants' capacity to mobilize politically (Ong and Meyer, 2008). This entails judging whether the levels and forms of political action in which migrants engage are indicative or not of successful political incorporation. This is indeed a tricky issue, as different mixes of political action can be indicative of different degrees of political integration depending on the context. This connects with the issue of the multidimensionality of political participation and the different drivers and consequences related to the multiple forms of political action. Given that political participation is multidimensional and that individuals and groups can choose to express their concerns, grievances and preferences in multiple ways, it is not always straightforward to point to the political mobilization patterns that are unequivocally indicative of integration and those that indicate marginalization or exclusion.

In the following sections, I address these various tensions inherent in the scholarship on migrants' political incorporation and integration in more detail, and at the same time propose ways forward in the analytical and empirical approximation to each of these topics. The possible solutions to these conceptual conundrums will be illustrated with the data obtained through the surveys of immigrant-background and autochthonous individuals presented in Chapter 1 of this volume.

## **The political integration of whom? Individuals versus groups**

A recurrent theme in the study of the political integration of immigrants and their offspring is the fuzziness about whether the focus should be primarily on individuals or on groups. Admittedly, the question is not a simple one, as it is linked to the question of whether it is individual or collective processes that drive the inclusion of migrants in political life.

DeSipio (2001), for example, argues that unlike earlier models or waves of political incorporation, the current model of incorporation to electoral politics in the US is one primarily driven by individual-level factors. Rather than being incorporated into the political process by ethnic-community-based institutions, migrants are increasingly incorporated (or not) by their individual

decisions to naturalize and, in parallel, by the socio-economic biases that drive the political engagement of the majority population.

This debate can be approached from different angles. One option is to take groups as the starting point and examine how cohesive they are in the strategies and pathways they pursue when engaging in public life. This allows an assessment of the extent to which collective processes of political integration are prevalent. Another option is to take individuals as the starting point – consistent with methodological individualism – and assess the relative weight of individual-level and group-level attributes and processes in migrants' political integration. These two options lead to distinct methodological approaches in data gathering and analysis, and in this volume we have chosen the latter one.

In order to illustrate how we can discern the relative relevance of individual and group factors we use the interest in the public affairs of the country of residence as an example of a 'minimalist' indicator of political integration. Figure 2.1 compares the levels of interest in politics of the autochthonous population with, on the one hand, all individuals of immigrant origin interviewed (section A) and, on the other hand, individuals of each of the specific groups studied (section B).<sup>2</sup> We can evaluate how important group-level processes might be by comparing the results when we take all immigrant backgrounds as a single category (section A) and when we disaggregate between each of the migrant/ethnic groups (section B). The results point to the existence of a wide array of situations. While in most cities there is a substantial gap in the levels of political interest of migrants when compared to the autochthonous population, in several cities, group-level processes do not seem to be of much relevance. In places like Madrid, Geneva, Zurich, London and Stockholm, all migrant groups show similar levels of interest in politics. In the opposite case, in Barcelona, Milan, Budapest, Lyon and Oslo we find substantial variation across the migrant groups studied.

Further to this, the type of data collected in this project allows us to assess DeSipio's (2001) claims – summarized above – that political integration is primarily reflecting the same socio-economic biases that prevail for the majority population. As an illustration, continuing with the example of interest in politics described in Figure 2.1, we can simply examine whether having a migrant background plays a part in driving levels of political integration – and also whether different migrant backgrounds operate in different ways. Figure 2.2 shows the results of estimating two slightly different models of interest in the politics of the country of residence. Model 1 focuses on the estimation of the likelihood of being interested in politics for the immigrant-origin population (as compared to the majority population), while model 2 focuses on comparing the likelihood of being interested in politics of each of the studied migrant groups to the reference group of the majority population. In both cases the figures show the estimated value of the logit coefficient for the relevant contrasts and the models control




Figure 2.1 Comparing the interest in residence country politics of migrant-background and autochthonous population (very or fairly interested in local or national politics)

Legend: White squares are for immigrant-origin individuals and black dots for autochthonous individuals. The dot/square indicates the value of the mean and the bars mark the 95 per cent confidence interval of the mean. ALG = Algerian; AUT = autochthonous, AND = Other Andean; BAN = Bangladeshi; BCAR = Black Caribbean; BOS = Bosnian; CHI = Chinese; CHIL = Chilean; ECU = Ecuadorian; EGY = Egyptian; ETH\_HU = Ethnic Hungarian; FIL = Filipino; IND = Indian; ITA = Italian; KOS = Kosovar; MOR = Moroccan; MMUS = Mixed Arab/Muslim; PAK = Pakistani; TUN = Tunisian; TUR = Turkish.

for gender, age, educational attainment, employment situation and having citizenship of the country. Hence, when the 95 per cent confidence interval of the coefficients overlaps with the value of zero we have no evidence that individuals of migrant background differ from the autochthonous population in their levels of interest in politics.

As we see, only in four cities (Budapest, Zurich, Stockholm and Oslo) do the gaps in interest in politics persist once we control for naturalization and for the main socio-economic aspects that drive engagement in politics.




Figure 2.2 Main effect of migrant background on interest in residence country politics (value of the logit coefficient)

Legend: The dot/figure indicates the value of the coefficient and the bars mark the 95 per cent confidence interval of the coefficient. Group acronyms as in Figure 2.1.

We cannot delve much into it in this chapter, but it is interesting to point to a different pattern in the sign of the coefficients for the countries of recent immigration (Hungary, Italy and Spain) and those of longstanding immigration (France, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK).

In the case of interest in politics, group-level specificities do not seem to abound, as the results of Model 2 indicate that – once individual-level attributes are controlled for – all migrant groups within a given city tend to show similar gaps with respect to the majority population. Hence, all three migrant groups in Oslo (Bosnians, Pakistanis and Turks) show equivalent gaps with the autochthonous Norwegians, and all three migrant groups in Zurich (Italians, Kosovars and Turks) show similarly lower levels of interest

in politics than the autochthonous Swiss. There are some exceptions, though, as Arab ethnics in Budapest show patterns that are dissimilar to the Chinese and ethnic Hungarian migrants in that city; and the Indians in London and the Chileans in Stockholm do not follow the same patterns of interest as the respective remaining migrant groups studied in each city.

As mentioned earlier, this is just an illustration of how the results presented throughout this volume might help us move forward in the examination of individual- and group-level processes of political integration. By focusing on individual migrants but also collecting sufficient information about the migrant groups to which they ascribe, we can gain some clarity in this area.

### **Absolute versus relative notions of political integration**

The discussion and, especially, the analyses presented in the previous section link well with another of the key dilemmas when discussing political incorporation and integration: should we opt for a relative or an absolute notion? In other words, do we need to take the autochthonous patterns of civic and political engagement as a standpoint from which to judge migrants' participation, or can we conceive of political integration in some absolute sense that is detached from what the autochthonous population does?


Clearly, the scholarship on immigrant assimilation opts for a view of integration that by default compares patterns of social, economic and political attitudes or behaviour with those of the majority or mainstream population. However, other scholars have argued for conceiving of integration in absolute rather than relative terms. For example, Bengtsson (2010) approaches the notion of political integration from the view of 'proper' access to political rights and resources and uses as a standpoint the normative standards of what full political membership entails. Hence, Bengtsson applies the notion of political integration to society as a whole, rather than to a segment of it. If migrants do not have access to the political rights and resources of full membership in the political community then the society is not politically integrated and neither are migrants themselves. As individuals, migrants are not politically integrated when either they or others believe that they do not have the right to participate on equal terms. Bengtsson thus conceives of political integration as a normative and socially constructed concept that does not necessarily require an explicit comparison to the mainstream population.

Nevertheless, following this logic (and that of any absolute notion of political integration), if the autochthonous population is passive and displays high levels of political apathy – as is often the case in many advanced and consolidated democracies – then the society as a whole is not politically integrated either. But how should we describe migrants' political integration in a situation where they are as active as the autochthonous population but all are equally inactive? This is probably one of the scenarios that becomes difficult to categorize when the prism to evaluate



political integration is that of society as a whole, and for this reason we do not think it is the most helpful option.

We can well illustrate the substantive implications of choosing an absolute or a relative notion of political integration with some of our data. Figure 2.3 shows the results of analysing in absolute (panel A) and in relative (panel B) terms the levels of political participation of migrants in the 10 cities for which we have data. In this case, the indicator of political participation is a dichotomous variable that adopts the value of 1 whenever



**Figure 2.3** Political participation in any of 13 types of activity  
*Legend:* White squares are for immigrant-origin individuals and black dots for autochthonous individuals. The dot/square indicates the value of the mean and the bars mark the 95 per cent confidence interval of the mean. ALG = Algerian; AUT = autochthonous, AND = Other Andean; BAN = Bangladeshi; BCAR = Black Caribbean; BOS = Bosnian; CHI = Chinese; CHIL = Chilean; ECU = Ecuadorian; EGY = Egyptian; ETH\_HU = Ethnic Hungarian; FIL = Filipino; IND = Indian; ITA = Italian; KOS = Kosovar; MOR = Moroccan; MMUS = Mixed Arab/Muslim; PAK = Pakistani; TUN = Tunisian; TUR = Turkish.

the individual has participated in any of 13 forms of political activity in the 12 months prior to the survey.<sup>3</sup>

If we evaluate migrants' political integration from the viewpoint of absolute levels of engagement, then we should conclude that the political integration of migrants has been quite successful in Stockholm and in Lyon for all groups studied, and in Geneva for Italians; in these three cities these migrant groups achieve levels of political participation close or over 50 per cent of the relevant subpopulations. Following this same logic, migrants – and in some cases also the majority population – are not politically integrated at all in several cities, most notably in Milan, Budapest, Zurich and London. In all of them, the rate of political participation of migrants is around or below 20 per cent.

However, if we focus on the gap between the majority population and each of the respective migrant groups, the conclusion changes somewhat: only in Barcelona are all migrant groups indistinguishable from the autochthonous population, and the political integration of immigrants and their descendants has also been relatively successful for most groups in London and Lyon, whereas Stockholm and Geneva show more mixed results with small participatory gaps for one of the groups (Chileans and Italians, respectively) but not for the other (Turks and Kosovars, respectively). In turn, the gloomy picture for Milan and Zurich remains the same when we analyse participatory gaps but it changes somewhat for Budapest, as ethnic Hungarian migrants exhibit a large positive participatory gap in comparison to the autochthonous Hungarians.

Hence, our conclusions change substantially with regard to Barcelona and London when we look at political integration from the point of view of a relative notion that compares migrants with the mainstream population. They are also somewhat qualified in the evaluation of the cases of Stockholm and Budapest, as they allow us to focus on the specificities of different migrant groups and their distinctive patterns of political integration within the city. Finally, analysing migrants' political integration from a relative viewpoint focuses the attention on the important issues of political inclusion and exclusion, and equality of voice, as they position migrants' participation in the context of the habits and ways of doing of the majority population.

In summary, our proposal in this volume is to move forward in this research agenda by focusing on relative notions of political integration that take levels of political orientations and behaviours from the majority population as the comparative standpoint from which to judge the degree to which a given society has been successful in integrating immigrants and their offspring into life. Precisely for this reason, in many of the analyses presented throughout this volume, a key issue of empirical focus is whether migrants differ in their attitudes or behaviours from the autochthonous population, once other aspects that drive attitude formation and behavioural patterns are taken into account. In this regard, this volume privileges a notion of political integration built around the notion of political inclusion. Yet, as

I explain in the next section, this understanding of political integration is not necessarily 'assimilationist'. We are not seeking to find identical attitudinal and behavioural patterns between migrant groups and the autochthonous population, as our notion of political integration as inclusion allows for migrants engaging differently in politics as long as this divergence does not entail their political exclusion.

### **The multidimensionality of political integration and its consequences for judging political integration**

As we have discussed in previous sections, the notion of political integration is complex and multifaceted. Previous work by scholars on this topic has stressed the importance of considering not just participatory behaviours, but also attitudinal aspects such as trust or confidence in political institutions and showing an interest in politics (see Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Jacobs et al., 2004). In contrast, most of the American scholarship focuses on voting (Tam Cho, 1999; Mollenkopf et al., 2001; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Messina, 2007; Leal et al., 2008; Jang, 2009), although an increasing number of studies in the US are also taking into consideration other forms of political participation (see chapters in Lee et al., 2007b; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Rim, 2009), as well as political orientations, especially partisanship (Cain et al., 1991; Álvarez and García-Bedolla, 2003; Geron and Michelson, 2008).

The special attention devoted to voting in studies of immigrant political integration and incorporation is, though understandable, highly problematic because it assumes that electoral participation and abstention patterns fully and adequately reflect the degree of integration or incorporation achieved by the respective migrant groups. As Minnite (2009: 52) argues, the extension of traditional approaches and theories of ethnic and racial politics to the study of immigrant political incorporation is inadequate, as electoral politics need not be the pathway to the political inclusion or absorption of migrants in the same way that it was for African-Americans in the US. This critique is likely to be valid not just for the US case, but also for the European context. The risk is that, as she points out, we may be falling into conceptual and theoretical stretching that results from applying inadequate theoretical models to immigrant political incorporation by focusing wrongly on the electoral dimension. In fact, the data analysed by Ramakrishnan (2005: ch. 7) for California shows precisely that voting is for some immigrant groups not the most common form of political engagement – attending local meetings is, for both first- and second-generation Latinos, as well as for second-generation Asian-Americans – and that the patterns of political engagement (and the mix of forms of action they prefer) can substantially vary across ethnic and migrant groups.

Clearly, this calls for opening up the range of forms of political participation and attitudes that we consider when studying immigrant political

integration. This raises, however, two important substantive and methodological issues. The first is that the meaning of some types of political engagement and political attitudes are not unequivocal. In this vein, Bleich (2008a) argues that while some indicators of political incorporation are undisputedly so – voting and engagement in various forms of mainstream political organizations and activities – there are other forms of political engagement whose integrative character is contested – such as engagement in migrant/ethnic-based politics and organizations. Furthermore, and crucially for our purposes in this volume, he argues that different political contexts and citizenship regimes will facilitate certain forms of engagement by migrants, probably at the expense of others. Hence, multicultural models of integration might more often promote the latter forms of ‘disputed’ political incorporation, thus avoiding outright political exclusion but sometimes leading to ‘withdrawal’ from mainstream politics. In turn, assimilationist models of integration are – if successful – likely to foster ‘undisputed’ political incorporation but can often lead to reactions of ‘resistance’ when the equality that the normative vision of citizenship it portrays is not fulfilled in daily life. As a consequence, the interpretation of given levels of political participation will not always be straightforward, as the meanings of the same forms of political action may vary depending on the context and can have diverging implications for political integration as a whole.

A second important difficulty that we face when acknowledging empirically the multidimensionality of the concept of political integration is deciding – from an empirical point of view – how much weight we should give to each of these different forms of engagement and orientations towards political objects when trying to assess the degree of political integration that various immigrant groups have achieved in any given society. Of course, different attitudinal and behavioural components of political integration can highly correlate as to form a single underlying dimension of political integration, but this is not often the case empirically (see the relevant chapters in van Deth et al., 2007). Indeed, political participation can sometimes be motivated by mistrust or discontent with political elites, as sometimes happens with ‘critical citizens’ (Norris, 1999). But more often than not scholarship in the field of political behaviour has shown that citizens who have positive political attitudes and orientations towards political institutions and elites are generally more likely to be politically active as well.

Our surveys of autochthonous and migrant populations allow us to examine this multidimensionality in quite some detail. We have measured several of these components of political integration, and thus we can distinguish between attitudinal and behavioural indicators of our respondents’ engagement with the political affairs of the countries and cities where they reside. Table 2.1 presents the cross-city and cross-group patterns for each of the main attitudinal indicators of political integration that we can analyse in the ten cities studied, while Table 2.2 includes the behavioural indicators.

Table 2.1 The political attitudes of autochthonous and migrants by city and group

City	Group	Interest local politics (%)	Interest country politics (%)	Trust city gov't (0–10 average)	Trust national parl't (0–10 average)	Non response to both trust items (%)	Attachment to settlement country people (0–10 average)	Non response to left-right self-placement (%)
BAR	AUTO	43	45	5.2	4.7	2	7.2	11
	MOR	50	56	6.4	5.8	6	7.1	44
	ECU	37	42	5.6	5.6	7	6.6	23
	AND	41	49	5.6	5.5	6	6.8	17
MAD	AUTO	45	50	4.8	5.1	0	8.3	7
	MOR	31	40	5.5	4.9	12	7.1	31
	ECU	31	41	6.0	6.0	3	6.6	12
	AND	38	46	5.7	5.5	5	6.5	7
MIL	AUTO	68	65	4.9	4.4	2	7.8	10
	EGY	25	43	5.3	5.1	18	6.0	34
	FIL	33	38	6.2	6.1	6	6.2	34
	ECU	19	26	3.7	3.9	7	4.9	31
BUD	AUTO	61	62	4.2	3.8	4	8.3	29
	ET_HU	60	71	2.5	3.7	6	5.6	19
	CHI	65	63	5.1	4.9	42	5.1	61
	MMUS	41	38	5.7	5.3	21	6.1	26
ZUR	AUTO	71	79	6.5	6.1	1	8.0	7
	ITA	48	49	6.9	6.6	10	7.5	11
	KOS	51	55	7.1	6.8	2	7.4	27
	TUR	47	48	6.3	5.8	9	6.7	14
GEN	AUTO	58	79	5.4	5.7	4	7.0	10
	ITA	50	51	6.2	5.8	10	7.7	18
	KOS	47	50	7.3	7.0	12	8.1	36

LYO	AUTOC	54	75	6.0	4.9	0	7.5	4
	MOR	52	75	6.1	5.0	3	7.7	8
	ALG	49	66	6.0	4.8	1	7.8	6
	TUN	42	72	5.2	4.7	2	7.4	5
LON	AUTOC	42	50	6.3	5.9	2	7.0	32
	BAN	36	44	5.9	5.1	8	4.9	43
	IND	36	37	6.3	5.8	6	5.2	34
	BCAR	38	36	4.3	3.8	1	6.0	36
STO	AUTOC	65	75	4.5	6.0	0	7.1	2
	TUR	39	55	5.2	6.0	5	6.5	17
	CHIL	42	60	4.5	6.0	2	6.6	9
OSL	AUTOC	70	86	5.5	6.0	0	6.9	n.a.
	TUR	25	38	5.4	5.7	13	6.1	n.a.
	PAK	25	23	4.9	4.9	4	6.1	n.a.
	BOS	34	47	5.9	6.2	15	6.0	n.a.

*Legend:* For the group acronyms, see Figure 2.1; n.a. = item not available in the survey.

*Table 2.2* The political participation of autochthonous and migrants by city and group, percentages

City	Group	Voting				Contacting			
		Voted national elections	Eligible national elections	Voted local elections	Eligible local elections	Contacted a politician	Contacted a govt official	Contacted media	Contacted a solicitor
BAR	AUTO	81	95	80	93	7	6	4	2
	MOR	45	14	29	14	4	9	4	6
	ECU	32	8	33	8	2	11	3	5
	AND	73	20	63	19	3	12	4	7
MAD	AUTO	87	95	84	94	5	11	3	3
	MOR	53	6	47	6	1	2	0	1
	ECU	47	5	36	5	2	3	3	2
	AND	70	11	62	10	2	7	3	4
MIL	AUTO	93	96	90	97	9	15	12	4
	EGY	61	10	45	10	0	2	2	2
	FIL	75	3	63	3	2	2	2	3
	ECU	43	2	29	2	2	3	2	3
BUD	AUTO	78	98	76	97	2	5	1	1
	ET_HU	75	22	77	25	5	6	3	3
	CHI	29	3	14	3	1	1	0	1
	MMUS	56	19	54	21	1	1	2	1
ZUR	AUTO	63	99	63	99	7	12	7	5
	ITA	14	2	14	2	1	2	4	2
	KOS	21	11	15	11	7	2	3	2
	TUR	23	22	38	22	3	1	3	3
GEN	AUTO	72	97	69	97	10	10	7	6
	ITA	66	15	58	15	4	4	4	7
	KOS	34	14	20	14	7	4	4	5
LYO	AUTO	60	100	n.a.	n.a.	18	21	10	8
	MOR	69	78	n.a.	n.a.	10	12	9	5
	ALG	64	80	n.a.	n.a.	11	12	6	6
	TUN	61	79	n.a.	n.a.	8	12	6	5
LON	AUTO	45	97	40	95	3	3	1	0
	BAN	45	81	32	83	1	1	0	1
	IND	54	49	53	49	4	4	1	1
	BCAR	33	89	23	93	2	1	0	1
STO	AUTO	94	99	86	99	18	37	9	9
	TUR	83	78	76	82	11	22	7	7
	CHIL	85	70	84	72	11	21	6	8
OSL	AUTO	96	98	87	99	19	29	16	15
	TUR	67	63	65	67	5	5	4	14
	PAK	65	65	60	66	5	3	4	4
	BOS	55	40	56	56	4	6	6	7

Worked for action group	Party activity		Protest				Consumer participation		
	Worked for political party	Member or participates activities political party	Wear/ display badge/ sticker/ poster	Attended public demonstration	Joined a strike	Signed a petition	Donated money	Boycotted products	Boycotted products
3	4	3	6	15	2	17	5	7	7
3	1	1	8	9	2	12	7	4	5
1	1	0	5	5	1	16	5	3	5
3	0	3	9	9	2	17	10	5	9
4	3	3	7	22	6	22	3	11	13
0	0	0	0	2	0	1	4	0	0
1	0	0	5	9	2	12	2	2	5
3	2	2	5	8	2	11	3	5	6
5	3	4	9	17	17	29	8	27	9
0	1	0	2	4	3	2	1	2	1
1	1	1	4	4	1	4	1	3	1
1	0	0	1	3	2	3	1	1	0
1	1	1	3	3	0	9	2	3	1
2	4	2	8	20	4	19	3	9	4
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
3	3	9	2	8	1	45	12	30	17
1	1	3	1	3	2	7	3	8	2
2	1	2	1	5	1	6	8	2	1
2	1	1	1	6	0	4	3	5	4
3	2	7	13	12	3	64	20	39	23
1	0	1	6	4	3	34	13	16	7
1	1	1	4	3	1	10	5	5	1
4	4	6	11	28	22	53	16	39	18
6	5	4	13	26	25	40	6	18	9
2	3	4	9	25	22	43	13	23	9
2	2	4	5	25	12	34	12	23	10
0	1	1	3	2	0	7	1	4	4
0	0	0	7	3	1	5	1	2	1
1	0	1	2	2	0	3	1	0	0
0	0	0	4	1	0	4	1	5	1
9	2	4	8	9	1	51	66	32	21
6	4	8	9	18	3	34	37	18	10
8	6	5	11	32	8	46	51	34	15
5	6	0	19	27	8	38	14	31	25
2	1	0	5	14	4	16	6	14	5
1	3	0	4	8	7	2	8	9	2
1	0	0	4	18	7	17	3	14	7



Starting with the attitudinal indicators of political integration (Table 2.1) we see that, in most cases, migrant-origin individuals across cities and groups are substantially less interested in the politics of the countries and cities where they live than are the autochthonous population. There are some exceptions, though, with Moroccans in Barcelona showing higher levels of interest in both local and national politics than the autochthonous Spaniards, ethnic Hungarians displaying a greater interest in Hungarian national politics and similar ones for local politics, and most migrant groups in Lyon showing very similar levels of interest to the autochthonous French.

The picture changes substantially when we focus on trust or confidence in the main local and national political institutions: the city government and the national parliament.<sup>4</sup> In most cases, migrants declare higher levels of confidence than the autochthonous population. Again, some exceptions exist: ethnic Hungarians are extremely critical of the local government of Budapest, Black Caribbeans are very mistrusting of both the local executive and the British parliament, Tunisians place less confidence in the government of Lyon than all the other groups, and Ecuadorians in Milan tend to show less trust in both the local Milanese government and the Italian parliament. However, it is also noteworthy that the non-response levels for some of the migrant groups with respect to political confidence are extremely high, thus indicating an incapacity to relate to these institutions and provide an answer. This is particularly the case with the Chinese and the Arab/Muslim mixed group in Budapest, and to a lesser extent with Moroccans in Madrid, Egyptians in Milan, and Turks and Pakistanis in Oslo.

A further potential attitudinal indicator of the extent of political integration of migrants relates to their feelings of attachment to the citizens of the countries where they live and, hence, how much they feel they belong to the 'people' (see also Devadason, Chapter 11 in this volume). In this case, we see quite mixed patterns depending on the locality and the group we consider. All migrant groups in Budapest (including the ethnic Hungarians) feel substantially less attached to the Hungarian people than do the autochthonous population, and the same is true for the Bangladeshis and Indians in London in relation to the British, for all the Andean Latin Americans in Madrid in relation to Spaniards, and for all migrant groups in Milan in relation to Italians. However, in other places – Lyon, Oslo, Stockholm and Zurich – most migrants feel as attached to the country nationals as do the respective autochthonous groups. And the patterns of responses across groups do not seem to be consistent with either those relating to interest in politics or with confidence in political institutions, thus pointing to what seems an entirely different dimension of attitudinal political integration.

Finally, the last column in Table 2.1 shows the patterns of non-response for the item that asks individuals to place themselves on the left–right scale. As we know, the left–right ideological divide is still a crucial organizing element of the political landscape of European societies, and hence being

able to position oneself on this continuum indicates a capacity to relate to the core political objects and issues at stake. In this regard, we see that several migrant groups in several of the studied cities have considerable trouble in relating to the left–right ideological dimension. This is particularly clear for the Chinese group in Budapest, all migrant groups in Milan, Moroccans in both Barcelona and Madrid, and Kosovars in both Geneva and Zurich. At the opposite end, we find that most of the migrants studied in both London and Lyon have incorporated the main ideological divide into their way of relating to politics.

Turning our attention to political action (Table 2.2) again we find a mix of consistent and contrasting patterns.<sup>5</sup> Three cities show consistent and large gaps between the autochthonous population and all migrant groups for virtually all forms of political participation: Milan, Oslo and Zurich. And three cities show a higher degree of participatory assimilation of most migrant groups to the autochthonous patterns for many of the forms of participation: London, Lyon and Stockholm. In the remaining cities (Barcelona, Madrid, Budapest and Geneva), the patterns substantially change across groups and forms of political participation. For example, in Barcelona, migrants show relatively high levels of contacting that are similar to or surpass those of the autochthonous Spaniards but have very low election turnout levels and much less of an inclination to join demonstrations. And in Budapest, the ethnic Hungarians are much more active than the autochthonous Hungarians across most forms of engagement, while the Chinese and the mixed Arab/Muslim groups are generally as disengaged as the autochthonous population, except for their much lower voting rates.

If we look carefully at the different types of political participation, we can compare how the patterns of political integration vary across forms of action. With regard to voting, we find that – with few exceptions (ethnic Hungarians in Budapest, Bangladeshis in London for national elections, all groups in Lyon for national elections, and Chileans in Stockholm for local elections) – in most cities and for most groups, migrants have substantially lower rates of turnout than the autochthonous populations for both national and local elections. Moreover, in the cities in which immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon (Barcelona, Budapest, Madrid and Milan) and in the two Swiss cities, the percentage of migrants who are eligible to vote is really a minority; whereas in the other four cities (London, Lyon, Oslo and Stockholm) a majority are entitled to vote.

When we focus on contacting, we find much more inclusive patterns of engagement, as in many cities the levels of contacting of migrant individuals are very similar to those of the autochthonous population – or even higher. Only in Milan and Oslo do we find large gaps between migrants and the natives. Instead, there are no clear patterns with regard to party activity, partly because levels of engagement are very low as well for the autochthonous populations in most contexts. It is interesting to note that the ethnic

Hungarians, and Chileans and Turks in Stockholm, show a mildly greater inclination to join the activities of political parties.

Turning to protest activities, a close inspection of the results suggests that – contrary to what many believe – migrants are not particularly contentious. In fact, in most cases they are either less inclined to protest or indistinguishable from the autochthonous population in their protest behaviour. Only the ethnic Hungarians in Budapest and the Chileans in Stockholm are consistently more prone to protesting than their respective autochthonous populations. Finally, political consumerism is generally not very widespread across migrants in Europe. In Madrid, Milan and Zurich migrants rarely engage in this sort of practice, whereas they show patterns that are closer to the autochthonous ones in Barcelona, Budapest and Stockholm.

Overall, substantially different patterns of political integration emerge depending on the indicators we examine. However, there are a few general patterns that provide interesting insights. Taken as a whole, we see a relatively consistent picture of political assimilation in London, Lyon and Stockholm; whereas a situation of acute political exclusion of all or most migrant groups emerges in Milan, Oslo and – somewhat less – in Zurich. The situation in Barcelona, Budapest, Geneva and Madrid is much more mixed and crucially depends on what aspect of political integration we focus on.

In essence, what these results are suggesting is that in empirical terms there is no single underlying set of attitudes and behaviours that consistently identifies who is politically integrated and who is not. In fact, the results of a number of factor analyses performed on the data – not shown here due to space limitations<sup>6</sup> – suggest the non-existence of a single underlying dimension of political integration, regardless of the origin group. For both types of respondents, the indicators for confidence in political institutions come up as distinct from the underlying dimensions of participation and, often, of interest in politics and/or voting. In practical terms, what this means is that migrants – like the autochthonous population – might be quite well integrated in terms of their confidence in political institutions but not in terms of their active engagement in politics, or the other way around. Hence, in the future we need to pay attention separately to these different elements of migrants' political integration.

## Conclusions

In this volume, we share the concerns of other scholars who have pointed out that the notion of 'integrating' immigrants and their descendants is highly problematic, to the extent that it assumes the existence of a pre-existing organically integrated and bounded society (Joppke and Morawska, 2003). Our proposal is to define political integration as equivalent to political inclusion. We will therefore say that migrants are politically integrated whenever their political attitudes and behaviours are not indicative of their outright exclusion

from the policy process, and this can be empirically evaluated by taking into consideration the multiple forms through which migrants can become included in political life.

This does not necessarily mean that in all instances migrant groups will have to replicate identically the attitudinal and behavioural patterns of the autochthonous – that is, they need not be fully assimilated to the autochthonous. Our notion of political integration leaves room for migrants to define patterns of engagement with politics that diverge in important ways from that of the natives or the mainstream, as long as this divergence does not entail their political exclusion.<sup>7</sup>

For example, migrants might display different levels of political contacting and protesting than autochthonous populations without this necessarily indicating that they are excluded from the political process. As long as migrants are able to use other repertoires of political action that grant them access to decision-making processes we would judge them as politically integrated into their countries of residence. Hence, in our view, the notion of political integration needs to be understood in terms relative to the prevailing patterns of engagement with politics in the countries where migrants reside, but this does not mean that political integration is indistinguishable from political assimilation in all instances.

This approach is, on the other hand, consistent with a view of participation in the political community that does not make simplistic assumptions about a supposed homogeneity in the patterns of political engagement of the autochthonous population. All societies encompass multiple political subcultures that relate to the political realm in varying ways (see Almond and Verba, 1989), and assuming the existence of a unique 'autochthonous' political culture overly simplifies the political realities of contemporary democracies and artificially imposes a homogeneity that does not really exist.

Consequently, an empirical approach to migrants' political inclusion will thus have to consider in a balanced way both levels and patterns of political participation and attitudes of migrants. This means, in practical terms, that we need to assess the degree to which migrants and their children become involved and share the basic values of the settlement polity. But it also means that we will have to carefully assess whether the patterns of engagement we find reflect exclusion (or *excorporation*) or are simply reflecting the emergence of new political subcultures through which migrants adapt the political repertoire to their needs and preferences.

## Appendix

List of variables used in this chapter that required any substantial recoding, and that are described in the general Appendix to this volume: immigrant-origin; overall political participation, non transnational (allpolaction3); confidence in political institutions; attachment to 'host-country' people; gender; age;

educational attainment (edu); employment situation (employed); and having the citizenship of the country (resnatio).

## Notes

1. A final interesting contribution to this conceptual debate is that of Berry (1997), who considers integration and assimilation as two distinct strategies of acculturation. Berry describes four typical strategies of acculturation depending on the degree to which the newcomers interact with the dominant or mainstream groups, and the degree to which they try to maintain their own original identity and values: integration, assimilation, separation/segregation and marginalization.
2. We refer the reader to Chapter 1 for a detailed description of the samples and the groups included in this study.
3. However, individuals who only engaged in such activities in relation to their country of ancestry were given a value of zero. Hence, this variable is well suited to capture the notion of political integration in its behavioural component.
4. These were two of the three indicators that the two Scandinavian questionnaires included that were common to the other questionnaires, the other one being related to the police. Furthermore, the response categories differed between the Scandinavian wording and that used elsewhere: the former employed a four-category ordinal response set, whereas in the rest of the cities a 0 to 10 scale was used. See the general Appendix to this volume for a description of how the responses were recoded for the two Scandinavian surveys to make them comparable to the rest.
5. The grouping of political participation forms follows that suggested in Teorell et al. (2007: 344–348) who distinguish five forms of political participation that are more or less consistent in their dimensionality across Continental Europe: voting, contacting, party activity, protest activity and consumer participation.
6. Different specifications of the factor analysis were used: city-by-city analyses; pooled analyses, distinguishing between the autochthonous group and the three migrant groups; and distinguishing only the autochthonous group and all migrant individuals jointly. Nine indicators were included that measured: trust in the city government, trust in the national parliament, interest in local or national politics, attachment to the people of the country of residence, local voting (intention), party activity, contacting, protesting and consumer activity.
7. For a similar view see Ireland (2004: 17ff.).

# 3

## Institutional Opportunities, Discursive Opportunities and the Political Participation of Migrants in European Cities

*Manlio Cinalli and Marco Giugni*

### **Introduction**

The idea that the political context sets the parameters within which political participation and mobilization occur is quite common among students of social movements and contentious politics (see Eisinger, 1973; Kriesi et al., 1995; McAdam, 1999; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978). This holds as well for the political activities carried out by migrants' organizations (Bloemraad, 2006; Vermeulen, 2006). However, previous work has stressed the impact of the institutionalized political system, largely overlooking more cultural and symbolic contextual aspects. In addition, previous work has looked at the role of political opportunities for explaining collective action, focusing much less on how they influence individual participation and behaviour (but see Leighley, 2001; Morales, 2009). This chapter engages with the systematic analysis of a set of 'opportunity structures', ranging from institutional opportunities to discursive opportunities, for the political participation of migrants at the individual level. To what extent does the political context influence individual participation? If there is an impact, how can we disentangle the institutional from the discursive aspects of that context? What are the implications in terms of policy-making?

Following on previous work on variations in claims-making in the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics (Giugni and Passy, 2004 and 2006; Koopmans et al., 2005; Koopmans and Statham, 1999a), we look at the ways in which institutional approaches to migration and public debates in this field provide opportunities for the political participation of migrants. In particular, we use data from the analysis of a large number of political indicators and from systematic coding of local newspapers so as to examine the impact of two main strands of opportunities, namely, institutions and discourse, on the political participation of migrants.

Our study focuses on nine European cities: Barcelona, Budapest, Geneva, London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan, Stockholm and Zurich. We start with the

analysis of the impact of institutional opportunities, focusing in particular on the main political arrangements in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. This initial analysis deals especially with the intervention of the nation-state, for example in terms of its laws referring to citizenship, working permits and antidiscrimination rights. Subsequently, we include the analysis of more specific opportunities that may be available for migrants in their own cities, primarily related to specific policies of migrant integration. This first strand of more classic opportunities is then combined with the analysis of the second strand, that is, 'discursive opportunities'. We thus consider whether the political participation of migrants varies according to the prevailing public discourse, which fosters public visibility and political legitimacy for certain actors, identities and issues. Overall, we aim to identify variations across cities in terms of institutions and discourse that may explain differences in the political participation of migrants.

### **Political opportunities for political participation**

Political opportunities have been shown to play a major role in explaining the levels, forms and outcomes of the mobilization of social movements (see Kriesi, 2004 and Meyer, 2004 for reviews). McAdam (1996: 27) has identified four main dimensions of the political opportunity structures found in the literature: the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; the presence or absence of elite allies; and the state's capacity and propensity for repression. Different combinations of these four dimensions have in particular been applied both to single case studies of the emergence of certain movements (for example, McAdam, 1999; Meyer, 1990) and to the analysis of systematic cross-national variations in social movement mobilization (Kriesi et al., 1995). Furthermore, recent work has proposed to include within the notion of political opportunities those elements that influence only certain collective actors in certain fields (Cinalli, 2004; Berclaz and Giugni, 2005; Chabanet and Giugni, 2008). For example, migrants often lack basic citizenship rights allowing them to exert some leverage on receiving society institutions in order to mobilize. In this case, the aspects of the political context that affect their mobilization are to be found not primarily in the overall institutionalized political system or in elites' alignments, but rather in the citizenship rights that open or close their access to the national community (Koopmans et al., 2005).

This definition of the concept of political opportunities and its concrete applications to account for political participation face in our view a number of challenges and a major shortcoming. A key challenge is to apply institutional and discursive opportunities to explain not only the political participation of migrants at the collective level, but also the

political participation of *individual* migrants and their descendants. A related challenge is that previous studies of the impact of political opportunities on collective mobilization have not paid enough attention to empirical measures of political opportunities themselves. Scholars have found ways to measure the activities carried out by movements (for example, through methods such as protest event analysis), but have mostly relied on abstract or anecdotic operationalizations of political opportunities. Koopmans et al. (2005) are the most noticeable exception in the literature, providing a comparative set of citizenship indicators, ranging from the legal-institutional framework for obtaining citizenship rights to national immigration and integration policies. Indeed, we pick up from where these authors have left off, so as to extend the number, scope, and level of political indicators to be measured.

Having assessed precise measures of our two main strands of political opportunities across the nine selected cities, this chapter faces another main challenge. These measures are taken as an additional explanatory factor to be put side by side with other factors that are more usually taken into account for predicting political participation at the individual level. In so doing, we contribute to further bridge the gap between scholars working on individual variables at the micro-level, on the one hand, and those who deal with the context of political institutions and public policies at the macro-level on the other hand. In particular, we evaluate the relative impact of a wide range of top-down political interventions vis-à-vis the individual characteristics of migrants themselves. In other words, we can assess the predicting power of individual variables at the micro-level while controlling for cross-national differences on key indicators of political opportunities.

Among these individual attributes, command of the main language in the country of settlement is considered to be a key factor in much of the literature on the political participation of migrants. Language proficiency, it is argued, works often as a precondition for incorporation, allowing for full communication and understanding of codes of receiving societies (Jacobs et al., 2004). The generational effect is also considered to be decisive (Grunberg et al., 2002), with expected differences between different age cohorts of migrants. This is also linked to the analysis of the 'timing of immigration'. Gender and employment are additional variables which this chapter will take into consideration, as they have been used extensively to explain different forms of political engagement, including variations in political knowledge (Hatchuel and Loisiel, 1999). We also take into consideration the potential effect of other characteristics of individual migrants so as to check whether citizenship, religion, or a certain type of migration, do have an important impact on their political participation.

As regards the major shortcoming, this lies in the fact that the study of political opportunity structures is often approached as having only an



institutional dimension. Yet, as the body of works on framing processes in the field of social movement studies has shown (see Snow, 2004 and Benford and Snow, 2000 for reviews), discourse matters as well. In other words, opportunities for political mobilization and participation stem not only from the openness or closeness of the institutional setting or the policies enacted by political authorities, defining the conditions that impinge upon the costs of different forms of mobilizations and their chances of success (Koopmans, 1995; Tilly, 1978), but also from the discourses which prevail in the public domain. These discourses, in turn, determine which collective identities and substantive demands have a high likelihood to gain visibility in the mass media, to resonate with the claims of other collective actors, and to achieve legitimacy in the public discourse (Koopmans et al., 2005).

In the next section we show how we have approached methodologically the measurement of the two strands of political opportunities. We discuss how institutions and discourse combine into a multi-level structure that can be assessed through the analysis of a series of indicators at the national and at the sub-national level. In the following sections we analyse empirically the impact of political opportunities structures on migrants' participation in the nine cities included in the study. We offer a general description of the situation of political opportunities in our cities. We then analyse the political engagement of migrants at the individual level, focusing on overall political participation and political protest.

### **Measuring institutional and discursive opportunities for comparative purposes**

The main objective of this chapter is to assess the impact of variations in institutional and discursive opportunities (at the macro-level) on the political participation of migrants themselves (at the micro-level). As regards institutional opportunities, we focus on three main dimensions of analysis, dealing respectively with the individual access of migrants to the community of nationals, with the promotion of their cultural group rights, and with the specific opportunity structure in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. Each dimension has been operationalized through a set of indicators to be measured along a three-point scale, but also more qualitatively through the production of extensive commentaries that discuss each score. As an example, it can be useful to provide further details about some main indicators that measure the third dimension of specific opportunities. Thus, we have assessed the extent to which public information and support services for migrants are provided in the city (ranging between non-existent and well-developed); we have identified all policies tackling migration; and we have looked for the percentages of the city budgets devoted to the development of migration policies and to the subsidy of migrants' organizations. More crucially, we have measured the involvement of a wide range

of organizations, including boards and assemblies that represent migrants themselves, in both the formulation and the implementation of city policy-making. In addition, we have examined the existence of arrangements to favour the presence of persons with ethnic minority background in both the leadership and the membership of local parties. Our indicators also enable us to distinguish between different ethnic groups.

All measures were computed by attributing a score to each indicator on the basis of a three-point scale: -1 corresponds to restrictive policies (and therefore to closed opportunities for migrants) and +1 to liberal policies (and therefore to more open opportunities), with 0 reflecting a more neutral situation. We then added the scores of the indicators in each subdimension and calculated the averages within each dimension. In particular, the average score for the first dimension, namely, individual rights of migrants vis-à-vis the community of nationals, is based on eight categories of indicators: access to short-term permits; access to long-term permits; access to family reunification; access to nationality; labour market access; welfare state access; anti-discrimination rights; and political rights. The average score for the second dimension, namely, cultural group rights, is based on six categories of indicators: cultural requirements to access the community; language programmes; schooling; religion; media; and labour market group rights (affirmative action). As regards the third dimension, namely, the specific opportunities structure, the average is based on five categories of indicators: degree of development of migrants' integration policy at the local level; political representation of migrants; attitude of sub-national powers towards minorities and migrants' organizations; attitude of local powers towards organizations whose activity is specialized in, or has an impact on, migration and integration issues; and electoral support of anti-immigrant and radical right parties. All scores refer to the situation in 2006.

Moving to the second strand of our political opportunities, the impact of discursive practices has been examined by building on our previous work on political claims analysis, in a way to conduct a systematic analysis of discursive interventions in reports of main newspapers in our cities (Koopmans and Statham, 1999b). Political claims analysis builds on protest event analysis as developed in the field of social movements and collective action (see Koopmans and Rucht, 2002) but extends the method to include speech acts and public discourse variables. We have thus decided to analyse all forms of public claims-making in the field, including purely discursive forms such as public statements, press releases and conferences, publications or interviews, alongside conventional forms of political action such as litigation or petitioning, as well as classical protest forms such as demonstrations or political violence. At the same time, we extend the range of actors to include any discursive intervention in our cities, regardless of the actor who makes it, including the usual suspects of protest event analysis (social movement groups, NGOs, and so on), as well as interest groups (such as employers'

associations or churches), but also political party, parliamentary, governmental and other state actors.

Each discursive intervention is characterized by a typical structure that can be broken down into some main parts. Given our focus on cities, we have collected data on discursive interventions which entered the local public domain through publication in a number of selected newspapers.<sup>1</sup> Data cover one full year corresponding to the same time as the collection of information on institutional indicators (2006).<sup>2</sup> Actor and issue are the main variables for data collection and analysis. We have also coded information on the addressee and object of the discursive intervention, as well as the position towards the object. This latter variable enables us to evaluate which actors intervene more explicitly in favour or against the interests of migrants. More precisely, measures of discursive opportunity structures have been computed on the basis of the analysis of one main newspaper in each city. Scores represent the average position of all actors for which claims were reported except migrants themselves.<sup>3</sup> As in the case of institutional opportunities, scores range from -1 to +1: the closer the score is to +1, the more favourable is the discursive position and therefore the discursive opportunities for the political participation of migrants.

### **Variations in political opportunities across cities**

We first present the values of political opportunities across our nine cities. As said, we have unpacked the institutional strand into three dimensions (individual rights, cultural group rights, and specific opportunities). As regards discursive opportunities, measures of average discursive positions refer to the whole migration and ethnic relations field.<sup>4</sup> Table 3.1 provides the summary scores for every type of political opportunity. While some relevant intra-national variations refer to different groups within a same city, cross-national variation is the most noticeable.

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show in full the extensive variation across groups and, especially, across cities along each dimension of the institutional strand. The analysis of individual rights shows that Kosovars in Geneva are far from accessing the community of Swiss citizens on the same basis as Algerians in Lyon. More generally, Budapest is the city with the strongest constraints in terms of individual rights, while Stockholm stands out for its remarkable openness. The analysis of cultural group rights again shows key distinctions between cities that acknowledge cultural pluralism on the one hand (Stockholm, London, Madrid and Barcelona), and cities that do not promote cultural group rights (Budapest, Milan and Geneva) on the other hand. The analysis of specific opportunities confirms previous findings: thus, London has gone the farthest in terms of provision of political opportunities for migrants' participation, while Budapest stands out for its highly constraining environment. Yet, it also adds up some key data that do not fit necessarily

Table 3.1 Summary scores for the political opportunity structures in the nine cities

	Individual rights	Cultural group rights	Specific opportunities	Discursive opportunities
Barcelona			.27 (intermediate)	.27 (intermediate)
Moroccans	.01 (intermediate)	.33 (open)		
Ecuadorians	.06 (intermediate)	.33 (open)		
Andeans	.06 (intermediate)	.33 (open)		
Budapest			-.54 (closed)	-.23 (closed)
Ethnic Hungarians	-.18 (intermediate)	-.25 (closed)		
Chinese	-.20 (closed)	-.43 (closed)		
Muslims	-.20 (closed)	-.22 (intermediate)		
Geneva			.02 (intermediate)	.32 (intermediate)
Kosovars	-.28 (closed)	-.19 (intermediate)		
Italians	-.01 (intermediate)	-.19 (intermediate)		
London			.64 (open)	.30 (intermediate)
Bangladeshis	.13 (open)	.04 (intermediate)		
Indians	.13 (open)	.42 (open)		
Afro-Caribbeans	.13 (open)	.42 (open)		
Lyon			-.43 (closed)	.36 (open)
Algerians	.29 (open)	.08 (intermediate)		
Tunisians	.22 (open)	.08 (intermediate)		
Moroccans	.03 (intermediate)	.08 (intermediate)		
Madrid			.18 (intermediate)	.35 (open)
Moroccans	.01 (intermediate)	.25 (intermediate)		
Ecuadorians	.06 (intermediate)	.33 (open)		
Andeans	.06 (intermediate)	.33 (open)		

(continued)

Table 3.1 Continued

	Individual rights	Cultural group rights	Specific opportunities	Discursive opportunities
Milan			-.27 (intermediate)	.15 (intermediate)
Filipinos	-.07 (intermediate)	-.28 (closed)		
Egyptians	-.07 (intermediate)	-.28 (closed)		
Ecuadorians	-.07 (intermediate)	-.28 (closed)		
Stockholm			.51 (open)	.49 (open)
Turks	.73 (open)	.56 (open)		
Chileans	.73 (open)	.77 (open)		
Zurich			.25 (intermediate)	.06 (closed)
Turks	-.28 (closed)	.00 (intermediate)		
Kosovars	-.28 (closed)	.00 (intermediate)		
Italians	-.18 (intermediate)	-.05 (intermediate)		

Note: Cut-off points calculated on the basis of quintiles.




Figure 3.1 Individual and collective rights by city and ethnic group




Figure 3.2 Specific opportunities and discursive opportunities by city

with previous findings. In particular, specific opportunities are very closed in Lyon. This is somewhat in contrast with the generous provision of individual rights and the relative openness in terms of cultural group rights in the French city.

As regards discursive opportunities, the lower segment of Figure 3.2 confirms the importance of high cross-national variation. Stockholm and Budapest are situated on the opposite poles of the discursive continuum. The consideration of other cities leaves no doubt about the idea that the discourse is not necessarily dependent upon the institutional context, and hence deserves a central place for treatment itself. Thus, Lyon now stands out for its high openness (second only to Stockholm) in spite of previous findings in terms of specific opportunities. In other words, the constraining force of institutional arrangements and local policy-making in the French city does not fit with the fact that a great share of interventions in the public

space go in favour of migrants' interests. Milan provides us with another interesting case owing to the openness of its discursive environment, which is in contrast with the overall negative nature of all dimensions of the institutional strand.

Furthermore, combinations of opportunities broaden the scope of analysis. The crucial point here is that individual rights and cultural group rights can be mixed together so as to identify a bi-dimensional space for placing cities in different positions (Koopmans and Statham 2000). Figure 3.3 shows that Budapest, Milan, Zurich and Geneva fit well with an assimilationist model, acknowledging limited space for both individual and cultural group rights. Take, for example, Zurich and Geneva, which follow the traditional Swiss treatment of migrants as 'guest-workers'. Here barriers to citizenship acquisition are still very high, long-term permits are defined by strict limits, while cultural rights for minorities are extremely rare, as the absence of public-funded minority schools, or again the ban on minarets during the 2010 referendum, seem to confirm. The city of Milan, itself a major symbol of Italian immigration, is also influenced by the assumption that immigrants are not there to settle. By contrast, Stockholm is the multiculturalist city *par excellence* owing to its extensive promotion of both individual and cultural group rights. In this case, the guest-worker model is rejected through generous access to both individual and cultural rights. The main assumption is that immigrants are there to stay and that policy-making has the duty to facilitate their integration.

Lastly, the other cities provide us with scenarios that are more ambiguous. On the one hand, Lyon fits only partially with French Republican rhetoric

Cities within citizenship regimes




Figure 3.3 Local configurations of citizenship in the nine cities

since any further restriction in terms of individual rights would be sufficient to push it close to the other assimilationist cities. Let us examine, for example, the common claim that 'everybody can be French'. In this case, it is important to emphasize that in Lyon (and more generally, France) full access to nationality for second-generation migrants is guaranteed (independently of conditions of residence). Yet, one should also pay attention to the criterion of the required time of residence, which is the same as in Budapest (5 years), and not very different in practice from the situation in the Swiss cities (as the years' residence between the ages of 10 and 20 years double count). Another illustration of this is the recent restrictive twists in France (in 2003 and 2006) in terms of rights of citizenship acquisition through marriage. On the other hand, Madrid, Barcelona and London are just on the edge of the 'differentialist' space, owing to the relative mismatch between a generous promotion of cultural pluralism and a somewhat parsimonious provision of individual rights. Once again, our data identify the potential risk that true institutional practices and policies may indeed depart from the official rhetoric of nation-states. Thus, when analysing regulations about short-term and long-term permits, or again about family reunion and welfare state benefits, one discovers that access to individual rights in 'multicultural' London is as difficult as it is in Budapest, Geneva and Zurich (that is, the most assimilationist cities of our study).

Variation of opportunities also allows for placing each city along the continuum comprising 'closed', 'intermediate', and 'open' opportunities (see Table 3.1) so as to assess the extent to which a curvilinear relationship may exist between opportunities and mobilization (see Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Tilly, 1978). The cut-off points for detecting closed, intermediate or open opportunities have been calculated on the basis of the quintiles for the distribution of cases on each type of opportunities.<sup>5</sup> The absolute scores that we used to classify opportunities between -1 and +1 make the interpretation of final averages difficult when identifying 'intermediate' situations close to 0, either on the positive or the negative end, along different dimensions of opportunities. Indeed, the multiple dimensions are measured with the same -/+ vector, but they may have a distribution according to a different progression of marginal increments. For example, under the leadership of an inclusive government, increments in terms of institutional openness could be much easier to achieve than the same increments in terms of discursive openness, owing for example to the presence of counter-movements and the extreme right in the public space. Thus, we have taken the two extreme quintiles as indicating a closed and an open opportunity structure, respectively, while at the same time considering the other quintiles under the label of 'intermediate' opportunities.

Looking at the specific situation in each of the nine cities included in our analysis, we can see the particularly unfavourable political context faced by migrants in Budapest, as compared to the other eight cities, where it is more



open. On the other end of the openness–closedness continuum, Stockholm presents the most favourable situation, in terms of the more open opportunity structures for the political participation of migrants. An almost similarly open situation exists in Madrid, Barcelona and London. Geneva is relatively open, except in the dimension of individual rights for Kosovars. Zurich has a not so different situation, but it is more open in terms of specific opportunities and more closed in the dimension of individual rights. Opportunities in Milan follow the shape of the two Swiss cities, but some major constraints in terms of collective group rights are noticeable in the Italian city. Finally, Lyon represents a particularly interesting case insofar as it combines a strong closure in the specific opportunity structures with an extreme openness at the discursive level. This shows that the institutional and discursive dimensions of the political opportunity structures do not necessarily go hand in hand.

### **Variations in political participation by migrants across cities**

Our analysis has hitherto shown that political opportunities vary across cities and, to some extent, groups. That is, migrants in our sample differ not only in terms of their own key individual characteristics such as gender, age, employment status, language proficiency, timing of migration, and so on, but also in terms of the political opportunities that they can seize at any time. The case of Moroccans in France offers the most extreme example of this high variability, as they are under the influence of closed specific opportunities, very open discursive opportunities and relatively open opportunities in terms of individual rights. This has encouraged us to integrate this type of data referring to the macro-level of the political context side by side with other information gathered at the individual level in our population survey in the nine cities.

Before we turn to the results of a series of regression analyses we have conducted and which integrate the two types of data, it is worth having a more descriptive look at the dependent variable, that is, political participation at the individual level. However, it is important to distinguish between various types of activities, as recent work has stressed the need to go beyond the simple ‘participate/does not participate’ dichotomy (Teorell et al., 2007). They distinguish in particular between four main types of participation: voting activities; contacting activities; party activities; and protest activities. In addition to looking at overall political participation, here we engage, in particular, with the specific analysis of protest, that is, the form that has traditionally been investigated by social movement scholars.

Table 3.2 shows the extent of overall participation and more specific participation in protest activities of migrants in the nine cities studied. The figures are the percentages of respondents who said they have engaged in at least one political activity in the past 12 months from a list of 13

*Table 3.2* Overall political participation and participation in protest activities in the nine cities (percentages)

	<b>Barcelona</b>	<b>Budapest</b>	<b>Geneva</b>	<b>London</b>	
Overall participation	38.8 (740)	15.3 (823)	41.6 (649)	11.6 (886)	
Protest activities	8.2 (740)	7.7 (823)	4.9 (649)	2.0 (886)	
	<b>Lyon</b>	<b>Madrid</b>	<b>Milan</b>	<b>Stockholm</b>	<b>Zurich</b>
Overall participation	65.1 (705)	21.5 (866)	10.9 (900)	71.7 (508)	21.2 (902)
Protest activities	32.8 (705)	6.7 (866)	4.4 (900)	27.9 (508)	5.5 (902)

*Note:* N between parentheses.

possible activities.<sup>6</sup> As we can see in the first row, the overall participation varies very much across cities, ranging from less than 12 per cent in London to over 70 per cent in Stockholm. The second row of the table shows the distribution of protest activities for migrants in the nine cities.<sup>7</sup> We also observe important variations across cities in their relative following. Let us compare, for example, Lyon with the two Swiss cities, Geneva and Zurich. This comparison suggests that protest activities play a more important role in the former, with respect to the other forms of political action. This is in line with previous cross-national analyses of the protest actions carried by social movements. Several studies have stressed the moderate action repertoires of movements in Switzerland due to particularly open political opportunity structures and have contrasted them to the radical repertoire of French movements as a result of closed opportunity structures (Kriesi et al., 1995).

### **The impact of political opportunity structures on the political participation of migrants**

In order to assess the impact of political opportunity structures on the political participation of migrants, however, we need to go beyond this simple descriptive way of presenting our findings. We therefore now move to a set of multivariate analyses that allow us to control the effect of political opportunity variables with more usual factors affecting political participation. Table 3.3 shows the results of four logistic regressions explaining the effect of the four types of opportunities discussed earlier (individual rights, cultural group rights, specific opportunities and discursive opportunities) on the political participation of migrants. We also control for a number of individual-level variables (gender, age, education, language proficiency, length of residence, having the citizenship of the country of residence, being a refugee or an asylum-seeker, being an undocumented migrant, and being a Muslim).<sup>8</sup> The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the individual has participated in at least one of the 13 activities

*Table 3.3* Effects of political opportunity structures on the overall political participation of migrants (odds ratios)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Man	1.217*** (.058)	1.143* (.060)	1.198** (.058)	1.301*** (.060)
Age	1.010*** (.002)	1.007** (.002)	1.010*** (.002)	1.012*** (.002)
Education	2.047*** (.100)	2.118*** (.103)	1.936*** (.101)	2.760*** (.105)
In paid employment	.949 (.062)	.974 (.064)	.978 (.062)	.902 (.063)
Language proficiency	3.036*** (.077)	2.522*** (.087)	3.244*** (.076)	2.512*** (.079)
Proportion of lifetime in country of residence	1.496*** (.103)	1.374** (.114)	1.675*** (.101)	2.061*** (.104)
Citizenship	1.350*** (.078)	1.635*** (.074)	1.684*** (.078)	1.173* (.075)
Refugee/asylum-seeker	.922 (.323)	.589 (.315)	.655 (.316)	.886 (.319)
Undocumented migrant	1.269 (.134)	1.778*** (.157)	1.402* (.135)	1.228 (.138)
Muslim	.904 (.067)	.719*** (.075)	.802*** (.062)	.772*** (.064)
Individual rights (ref.: closed)	***			
Open	2.162*** (.105)			
Intermediate	1.654*** (.096)			
Cultural rights (ref.: closed)		***		
Open		1.513*** (.126)		
Intermediate		1.715*** (.139)		
Specific POS (ref.: closed)			***	
Open			.611*** (.088)	
Intermediate			.773*** (.076)	
Discursive POS (ref.: closed)				***
Open				3.278*** (.090)

(continued)

Table 3.3 Continued

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intermediate				1.216** (.082)
Constant	.038*** (.170)	.060*** (.178)	.072*** (.158)	.032*** (.164)
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.168	.129	.164	.207
-2 log-likelihood	7270.066	6714.391	7294.152	7061.806
N	6533	5658	6533	6533

\* p≤.05, \*\* p≤.01, \*\*\* p≤.001

Note: Standard errors between parentheses.

mentioned earlier. The measures of political opportunities are entered in the models as categorical variables in which closed opportunities are the reference category. Since we are above all interested in the effect of political opportunities on the political participation of migrants and the individual-level variables are only included as controls, we discuss only the results concerning the contextual variables.<sup>9</sup>

Model 1 looks at the first dimension of political opportunities, that is, individual rights. The variable referring to this dimension of opportunities is highly significant and displays a strong effect on participation. An open political opportunity structure in terms of individual rights (that is, when they tend to provide migrants with easy access to the community of national citizens) considerably increases the likelihood of participation in one of the various political activities, compared to a situation in which individual rights are more restrictive. The effect is also significant for respondents living in a context characterized by an intermediate situation in this respect, but the odds of participating are lower. Thus, in line with political opportunity theory, and net of certain individual characteristics, the overall political participation by migrants is encouraged by relatively open opportunity structures, but especially by particularly open ones.

If we turn to cultural group rights, whose effects are shown in Model 2, we obtain quite similar results. In this case as well, open opportunities in terms of cultural group rights make political participation more likely. However, the results suggest a somewhat curvilinear relationship between openness of the political context and political participation. This can be seen in the fact that the odds of participating are slightly higher in the intermediate situation than when opportunities are more open. Thus, while the impact of individual rights is linear, that of cultural group rights gets closer to a curvilinear one. While puzzling in some respects, as we cannot interpret the fact that this occurs only for one aspect of citizenship regimes, this finding is in line with early arguments in the social movement literature stressing the

curvilinear relationship between opportunities and protest (Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Tilly, 1978).

Specific opportunities also display a significant effect, as we can see in Model 3. However, their impact on political participation differs from that of the two previous dimensions in one crucial respect. In this case, a closed opportunity structure seems to be more conducive to political participation than both an open and an intermediate one, as indicated by the odds ratio lower than 1. The 'worst' situation in this regard is one in which opportunities are hypothetically more favourable. Migrants who live in a context characterized by closed specific opportunities have more chances to participate than those who are in a city endowed with open or intermediary opportunities. A full engagement with these findings is not easy, especially within the limits of this chapter. We think that the crucial point here is that opportunities follow different logics according to the specific target of their impact, and the level at which they are effective. Thus, a too drastic expansion of group-based opportunities may well discourage migrants from engaging politically through more classic and individual-based forms of participation. As work on group polarization suggests (Sunstein, 2002), a strong prospect for migrants' integration needs to deal with potential threats of groupness radicalization. In addition, our data emphasize the articulated mixture of open and closed opportunities at the intersection of different levels. After all, individuals will engage politically when they see that their targets are within reach (Bagguley, 1991). Thus, a restrictive policy measure by the local government may well provoke a stronger political reaction than a similar measure taken by the national government.

Altogether, all dimensions of institutional opportunities contribute in important ways to the explanation of participation, regardless of the variable direction they take. Model 4 suggests that discursive opportunities matter as well. Specifically, open discursive opportunities strongly increase the chances that migrants have participated in at least one of the various political activities, as compared to closed opportunities. In this case, we observe a linear relationship between this contextual aspect and political participation, as the intermediate category also has a positive effect, but lower than open opportunities. Put simply, our analysis suggests that public discourses about migrants and migration matter as much as, if not more than, the institutional context of laws and various types of policy arrangements.

Do we observe similar patterns when we look at a more specific form of participation instead of the overall political participation? Table 3.4 shows the results for protest activities. The structure of these findings is similar to those concerning overall political participation. Focusing on what interests us most, we see that all types of political opportunities play an important role, except for collective rights in the intermediary stage, whose effect is not statistically significant. We observe, however, some differences if we

Table 3.4 Effects of political opportunity structures on protest activities of migrants (odds ratios)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Man	1.221* (.086)	1.137 (.088)	1.190* (.087)	1.279** (.088)
Age	.992* (.003)	.994 (.004)	.993* (.003)	.993 (.004)
Education	2.167*** (.150)	2.054*** (.155)	1.871*** (.152)	2.968*** (.157)
In paid employment	1.067 (.092)	1.141 (.095)	1.182 (.093)	1.057 (.094)
Language proficiency	2.534*** (.137)	2.535*** (.153)	2.755*** (.136)	2.094*** (.141)
Proportion of lifetime in country of residence	1.137 (.153)	1.152 (.165)	1.223 (.150)	1.600** (.153)
Citizenship	1.903*** (.117)	2.478*** (.110)	2.098*** (.115)	1.670*** (.113)
Refugee/asylum-seeker	1.765 (.490)	.980 (.474)	.953 (.477)	1.252 (.478)
Undocumented migrant	.934 (.229)	1.381 (.245)	1.077 (.230)	1.011 (.233)
Muslim	1.133 (.095)	.979 (.109)	.920 (.091)	.953 (.092)
Individual rights (ref.: closed)	***			
Open	3.016*** (.176)			
Intermediate	2.337*** (.173)			
Cultural rights (ref.: closed)				
Open		.668** (.172)		
Intermediate		.827 (.191)		
Specific POS (ref.: closed)			***	
Open			.418*** (.115)	
Intermediate			.418*** (.107)	
Discursive POS (ref.: closed)				***
Open				2.496*** (.129)
Intermediate				.578*** (.137)
Constant	.011*** (.277)	.031*** (.263)	.046*** (.239)	.018*** (.249)
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.128	.103	.141	.177
-2 log-likelihood	3933.272	3684.064	3889.077	3765.857
N	6533	5658	6533	6533

\* p≤.05, \*\* p≤.01, \*\*\* p≤.001

Note: Standard errors between parentheses

compare these results with those concerning overall participation. Firstly, unlike in the previous analysis, the use of protest activities seems to be discouraged rather than encouraged by open political opportunities in terms of cultural group rights, even in the intermediate situation. Secondly, the results pertaining to the specific opportunities largely reflect those previously observed. Both an open and an intermediate context diminish the likelihood that migrants have made use of protest activities, as compared to a situation of closed opportunities. Thirdly, discursive opportunities have a strong effect as well. However, while a more open discursive context favours involvement in protest activities, as compared to a closed one, an intermediate situation seems to deter involvement in this form of participation. Thus, here we find a curvilinear relationship between the degree of openness of the political opportunity structure and participation in protest activities.

In sum, our analysis suggests that, with one partial exception (the effect of cultural group rights on protest activities), all types of political opportunities have a significant effect on participation and involvement in protest activities by migrants. Individual rights and discursive opportunities seem to play a particularly important role in this regard, an open context favouring both overall political participation and involvement in protest activities, as compared to a closed context and, to a lesser extent, to an intermediate situation.

## **Conclusion**

The main argument of this chapter is that the political participation of migrants needs to be studied by putting more emphasis on the characteristics of the political context within which they settle. Conceptually, following previous work in the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics, but applied here to the individual level of analysis, we have argued that this political context comprises both an institutional and a discursive strand. Our findings show, firstly, that both strands vary in important ways across cities, some cities offering a more favourable context than others. Secondly, we have shown that the overall participation by migrants in the nine cities also varies considerably, and so does their involvement in protest activities. Thirdly, we have shown that all types of political opportunities play a key role in explaining the political participation of migrants at the individual level.

Political context matters. Too often the behaviour of migrants is explained with very little or no reference to the macro-level of their own political environment. The decision to settle within a precise city represents a moment of key importance for migrants and their descendants, since each city has its own peculiar political borders in terms of access to its own processes of policy-making, discourse and overall community. On the one hand, migrants

should be cautious about their final places of settlement: beyond the simple consideration of economic opportunities, the possibility should not be missed to live in a place where access to citizenship is not precluded, policy-making is inclusive, and discourse does not stigmatize. On the other hand, policy-makers and the citizenry in general should be more aware of the driving force of their own polities: cities are, at least to some important extent, true rulers of the game. They can have a major say in the implementation of national frameworks for the incorporation of migrants, they can provide specific mixtures of opportunities and constraints at the intersection with the national level, and they give a distinct shape to actors' interventions in the public space.

Indeed, our findings show that an exhaustive evaluation of the political context is possible only after a full engagement with discourse, as it is shaped through actors' interventions in the public space. The consideration of the political context needs to go beyond the study of institutions and traditional politics in terms of electoral systems and parties' strategy. Political provisions, laws and policy-making need to be considered side by side with the interventions that actors of different kinds make in the public space. Our findings show that at least one of the major characteristics of these interventions, namely, whether they are advanced to improve or constrain the position of migrants, can be taken as a major predictor of the political behaviour of individual migrants. Discourse plays an equally strong and clear role vis-à-vis the institutions.

Political context matters, but there is still much more to study about the way it does matter. In this chapter, we have just opened space for further investigation of different types of political opportunities. Each type stands out for its particular relationship with its object, since distinct forms of political engagement may respond differently to the same configuration of opportunities. What is more, opportunities combine into variable dynamics and directions at the intersections across different levels. Knowledge of these multi-level dynamics needs to be fostered for the benefit of scholars, policy-makers, the citizenry and migrants themselves.

## Notes

1. Newspapers have been selected for each local case, following considerations of quality, internal structure, presence of local sections (if only national papers were available), sales and distribution. In particular, the main news sections (with the exclusion, for example, of sport pages, culture and entertainment pages, and various specials) of every Monday, Wednesday and Friday issue have been sampled and coded for all political claims relating to immigration, migrant integration, and racism and xenophobia. For two collective actors – migrants and extreme right organizations and groups – we have also coded claims that are not related to immigration issues, for example, homeland political issues in the case of migrants,



or claims on the Nazi regime or the Holocaust in the case of the extreme right. These claims, however, are not used in the present analysis.

2. Data on Barcelona covers only six months (every other month of 2006 starting from January). Data on London refers to 2004.
3. We have excluded all claims by migrants from the sample when analysing the discursive interventions in each city so as to avoid problems of endogeneity that would blur distinctions between dependent and independent variables.
4. Including migration, asylum and aliens politics, minority and integration politics, as well as claims relating to racism, xenophobia and interethnic conflicts.
5. A quintile is one of the five classes in which a distribution can be divided, each class containing one-fifth of the total number of elements.
6. That is: contact a politician; contact a governmental official; work in a political party; work in an action group; display a badge, sticker or poster; sign a petition; participate in a public demonstration; boycott a product; buy something for political reasons; donate money; participate in a strike; contact the media; contact a solicitor.
7. Out of the 13 forms of political activity listed in note 6, we considered as protest activities only participation in public demonstrations and in strikes.
8. The length of residence is operationalized through the proportion of the lifetime spent in the country of residence.
9. Odds ratios are the exponential of the B coefficients, which represent the strength of a given effect, and can be interpreted as follows: when the odds ratio is greater than 1, the independent variable has a positive impact on the dependent variable; when the odds ratio is smaller than 1, the effect is negative; finally, when the odds ratio equals 1, there is no effect. The effect can be considered to be multiplicative. For example, a coefficient of 2 means that having the characteristics described by the independent variables doubles the likelihood of having the characteristics described by the dependent variable (in this case, participating in party activities, demonstrative protest or confrontational protest). The same reasoning applies to coefficients lower than 1, but in the opposite direction.

# 4

## The Electoral Participation of Naturalized Immigrants in Ten European Cities

*Amparo González-Ferrer\**

### Introduction

The debate about the possibility of entitling foreigners with local voting rights is periodically resurrected in European countries and cities. On the one hand, the exclusion of a growing share of their population from the right to participate in elections implies a contradiction for contemporary liberal democracies with potential effects on their own legitimacy. On the other hand, the partial betrayal of the principle 'one person, one vote' adds up to the debate about the responsibility of the receiving states in promoting the integration of their immigrants. In fact, the recognition of voting rights to foreigners can be conceived as a tool to facilitate integration rather than just as a reward to proved attachment and assimilation derived from the acquisition of the host nationality. The former has been the predominant view in countries like Sweden, Norway, Denmark or the Netherlands, which extended local voting rights to foreign residents in the 1970s and 1980s. However, in many other countries a very nationalistic view on this issue has prevailed, either widely opposing the signature of the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at the Local Level (1992), or undergoing very controversial debates before approving its application.<sup>1</sup>

As a result of this restrictive approach to granting local voting rights to non-EU foreigners in most European cities, the only empirical evidence we have on the electoral behaviour of persons of immigrant origin comes either from non-naturalized immigrants residing in the aforementioned North European countries, or from the subset of the population who have acquired the citizenship of their country of residence through naturalization. The extent to which the voting behaviour of naturalized immigrants can be taken as representative of the behaviour of the immigrant population at large is difficult to assess. However, from a public policy perspective it seems important to know at least what are the main factors that impinge upon the inclination of this particular group ('naturalized immigrants') to turn out in the elections of the countries where they live.

There are several reasons why we might expect high rates of participation among naturalized foreign-born citizens. First, naturalization is a voluntary act that will often imply some important advantages for the person who decides to apply for it, one of which is precisely the possibility of having a say in the host country's politics. Moreover, the naturalization process itself may serve as an opportunity to learn about the politics of the country and about democracy (Wong, 2000). Immigrants who go through the naturalization process learn the practical, and normative, rules of the game when it comes to democracy (DeSippio, 1996). In addition, most of the naturalized immigrants enter the political system at a moment in their lives when both their interest in politics and their stakes are high, compared to their descendants (Ramírez, 2002). For all these reasons, naturalized immigrants should be expected to show higher participation rates than the comparable autochthonous population and their own descendants. However, most of the available studies in this field, which have mainly focused on the US experience, have found a lower – instead of a higher – turnout level among naturalized citizens, in comparison to that of their native counterparts. Within the European context, most of the scarce empirical evidence available comes from Scandinavian countries, where the aggregate rates of participation of naturalized citizens are still reported to be lower than that of the native-born citizens (Öhrvall, 2006, cited in Bevelander and Pendakur, 2008), although they have effectively been found to participate significantly more in local elections than their non-naturalized counterparts (Bäck and Soininen, 1998; Togeby 1999; Bevelander and Pendakur, 2008).

This consistent finding might be due to differences in the socio-economic profile of the naturalized group, a lack of assimilation, the particular effects that (ethnic) social capital may exert on the political engagement of immigrant individuals, or differences in the political opportunity structures that both immigrants and non-immigrants face in their cities. However, our knowledge on this issue still remains quite limited, especially in the European context, due to the difficulty to trace back the immigrant origin of voters in most of the available sources for the study of electoral behaviour.

In this chapter we contribute to the debate on the voting behaviour of the population of immigrant origin by utilizing the data collected by the Localmultidem survey in 10 European Cities: Barcelona, Madrid, Geneva, Zurich, London, Lyon, Milan, Oslo, Stockholm and Budapest. We analyse the electoral participation of naturalized citizens in national elections, in comparison with that of the autochthonous population in their respective cities of residence. Our main goal is to isolate the effect of factors that have traditionally been found to explain the decision to vote in the general population from those other factors that are immigrant-specific, both at the individual and contextual level.

## **What makes naturalized voters different?**

Two main elements are thought to intervene in shaping an individual's voting decision: their interest in politics, and the cost-benefit structure of voting. But both elements vary with the individual's resources. Early models of political participation already found a significant relationship between socio-economic variables and the propensity to vote (Campbell et al., 1960; Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Although education, income and occupation are commonly utilized to test the resource model, also known as the socio-economic status (SES) approach, education is generally the best predictor of electoral participation among these three.

In addition to these resources, age and marital status have also been found to be strong predictors of an individual's likelihood of voting. Generally, the young are less prone to participate in elections, whereas married individuals are more likely to vote than singles. The argument behind the higher turnout of married people and, to some extent, of employed individuals is a network one: both employment and marriage are indirect indicators of the degree to which individuals are embedded in social networks, which are likely to foster participation to the extent that they reduce the costs of obtaining political information. In addition, in the case of spouses, the positive effect of marriage is hypothesized to come from potential 'selective sanctions for noncompliance' coming from peers (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).

Many of the immigrants currently living in European democracies came to their countries of residence for economic opportunities. This fact indirectly implies that they typically have low SES or, at least, a lower SES than natives. Accordingly, they also are expected to have lower electoral participation levels. However, individuals of similar SES also reveal different attitudes towards politics due to differences in psychological characteristics and previous socialization experiences. Not only does the level of political interest vary between individuals of the same socio-economic group, but so also does the extent to which they believe that their participation matters (external efficacy) and that they understand politics (internal efficacy). In most cases, studies concerned with the political incorporation of people of immigrant origin have not paid attention to these political orientations due to the lack of data, on the one hand, and to the overwhelming dominance of the resources approach in previous analyses of electoral behaviour, on the other. However, some recent investigations have demonstrated the importance of political orientations in shaping the immigrants' decision to naturalize (Pantoja and Gershon, 2006; Diehl and Blohm, 2003). If the immigrants most interested in politics tend to be over-represented among the group of naturalized citizens, it seems essential to neutralize the effect of potential differences in political orientations across groups in order to explain correctly differences in the turnout of naturalized and non-naturalized voters.

Moreover, migration is known to have an important disruptive effect in different fields of social and economic life, which is expected to vanish as the length of residence increases and the behavioural patterns of immigrants progressively converge (assimilate) with that of their comparable natives. In the case of political integration, the evidence available so far also indicates a positive effect of years since migration on electoral participation (Uhlener et al., 1989; Hill and Moreno, 1996; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001). Some authors have even concluded that differences in turnout behaviour among naturalized immigrants from different national origins merely reflect differences in length of stay across groups, or differences in their time of arrival (Bass and Casper, 2001; LaFountain and Johnson, 2009). However, we know that 'years since migration' is just a proxy for many other processes going on in the settlement process that we often cannot adequately measure. One of the main reasons why naturalized immigrants might vote less than autochthonous citizens is their language skills, which are a crucial resource for navigating the political system and obtaining the very basic information needed to participate. Apart from language skills, more subjective indicators of assimilation such as 'perceptions of discrimination' are also expected to affect immigrants' propensity to vote and, at the same time, vary with length of residence. Previous studies in the US have confirmed that both language fluency (Johnson et al., 2004), and the absence of feelings or experiences of discrimination (Schildkraut, 2004) are generally associated with increases in the electoral participation of naturalized immigrants.

In spite of the consistent evidence that suggests that assimilation affects turnout levels, important differences across ethnic and/or national groups who reside in the same country remains even after controlling for differences in their length of stay. These inter-group differences have sometimes been attributed to the long-lasting effect of different political cultures in their countries of origin. Other authors have emphasized the potential role that the aggregated characteristics of the migrant communities to which they belong may play in explaining different participation gaps across ethnic groups. Particularly lively has been the debate around the effects that aggregate levels of (ethnic) social capital may have in accounting for the differences in turnout between ethnic groups since the publication of Fennema and Tillie's (1999) original article on this matter. It appeared from their network analyses that the Turkish community in Amsterdam is the most civic, followed by the Moroccan community, the Surinamese and the Antillean. This rank order was the same as the rank order found for turnout at elections, which led the authors to conclude that 'the more an ethnic group is engaged in the own community's affairs, the more it participates in local politics' (1991: 721).

Despite the large empirical efforts conducted over the last years to test the different implications of the (ethnic) social capital hypothesis (Fennema and Tillie, 2001; Michon and Tillie, 2003; Berger et al., 2004;

Jacobs et al., 2005; Tillie, 2004), the evidence still remains inconsistent and particularly scarce with regard to the potential effects of associational engagement on the electoral behaviour of migrants at the individual level (Togeby, 1999). Formulated at the individual level, the theory is that participation in voluntary ethnic organizations builds social trust and tolerance, which in turn creates the basis for widespread political participation and trust in political institutions of the country of residence (see Anduiza and San Martín, Chapter 9 in this volume). If participation in ethnic organizations merely increases participation, but not trust, it is still possible that organizational participation enhances political mobilization, but this mobilization is not necessarily an asset for democracy. Therefore, it is important that participation in ethnic organizations leads not only to increased activity, but also to increased participation in the political institutions of the country of residence – for example, higher voter turnout (Togeby, 2004).

Finally, the role of the institutional context and the structure of political opportunities, configured either at the national level (Ireland, 1994; Soysal, 1994; Koopmans and Statham, 1999a; Giugni and Passy, 2004), or the local level (Bousetta, 2000; Garbaye, 2002; Morales et al., 2009), is also thought to be fundamental in explaining immigrants' political integration as a whole. Although one of the major weaknesses of the opportunity structure approach was, for a long time, the lack of specific measurements for such a multifaceted concept, some recent pieces of research have substantially improved the quality of their empirical test by gathering systematic information on a series of indicators for different dimensions of the opportunity structure (see Koopmans et al., 2005; Giugni and Passy, 2004; Koopmans, 2004a). They have all confirmed the importance of models of citizenship – both national and locally defined – in shaping patterns of collective mobilization and political claims-making by immigrants and ethnic minorities (see also Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume). However, none of them has examined whether and how these models of citizenship affect the electoral participation of individuals of immigrant origin who are entitled to voting rights.

In the particular case of naturalized immigrants, the rules regulating citizenship acquisition are expected to be one of the institutional factors that more strongly affect their electoral participation. However, in which direction that effect goes is not clear in advance since the main determinants of the naturalization decision have not been yet clearly established in the literature (Johnson et al., 1999). One of the arguments more commonly utilized by the advocates of restricting immigrants' access to citizenship is that the tougher the naturalization rules, the more selective the process, and thus the more similar new and old citizens will be. Applied to the field of political integration and electoral behaviour, one may expect that the participation gap between naturalized immigrants and the autochthonous population will be smaller in those cities where the process to

acquire citizenship assures that naturalized citizens know the language, the costumes, intend to stay permanently, and feel truly attached to their new country. And, the other way around, the gap is expected to be larger in those contexts where the access to citizenship is not demanding enough. We will refer to this reasoning as the ‘selection hypothesis’.

On the other hand, it also seems reasonable to expect that norms regulating the access of foreigners (and their relatives) to entry and residence permits will have an effect on the turnout of the naturalized (and foreigners, where they are granted local voting rights). Contexts that facilitate the acquisition and renewal of residence permits will promote ‘more integrated’ immigrants to the extent that a stronger legal status reduces the probability of exploitation, discrimination, social exclusion and so on. Moreover, as some authors have pointed out, harsher conditions for family reunification, difficult access to legal employment and, in general, insecurity of residence status may operate as strong incentives for naturalization (see Bauböck and Cinar, 2001 on the recent Austrian example). Such an ‘escape into naturalization’ is likely to weaken the potential link between naturalization and the exercise of voting rights if the main reason to naturalize is (merely) to avoid laws applied to foreigners.

Finally, the particular setting in which the election takes place is likely to affect the turnout of different groups. In the case of voters of immigrant origin, Pantoja et al. (2001) have demonstrated that the degree of politicization around immigration issues significantly affects the level of immigrants’ participation. There is also some evidence of this in Dutch cities (van Heelsum et al., 2007). Accordingly, we expect an increase in turnout among the naturalized citizens if relatively strong anti-immigrant parties are present, while we have no clear theoretical argument to expect either a positive or a negative effect on autochthonous voters.

## **Data, samples and main descriptives of the dependent variable**

### **Data and samples**

Persons to whom the citizenship of a state is not ascribed at birth may be able to acquire it later in life through naturalization. Accordingly, we classify an individual in the Localmultidem dataset as a naturalized respondent if she acquired the citizenship of the country of residence after birth. We must emphasize that our samples were not designed to be representative of the naturalized population residing in each city, but only of the population of specific groups of immigrant origin. However, the proportion of naturalized respondents in our city samples is quite close to the proportion estimated by other sources, which make us more confident about the reliability of our results.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, it is important to highlight that some of these individuals we call ‘naturalized’ can be ‘second-generation immigrants’

since they are children of immigrants who were born as foreigners in their parents' country of immigration but acquired the citizenship of their country of residence (and birth) later on. In our data, these individuals represented approximately 10 per cent of the total sub-sample of naturalized citizens.<sup>3</sup> We have run all the models with and without this group, and results hardly change.

The size of the naturalized group in a particular city or country depends on the rules governing the access to the host country's nationality, the length of stay of the immigrant population and their propensity to naturalize. Differences among cities reported in Table 4.1 largely reflect variation along these three dimensions. As shown, 25 per cent of the total naturalized population concentrates in Oslo and 17 per cent in Stockholm, while the rest of the naturalized group is more or less evenly distributed across cities, with the only exception being Milan, where the presence of naturalized citizens is negligible.

### **The dependent variable**

In this chapter we will analyse turnout in national elections, and we are primarily interested in the differences between naturalized individuals and the autochthonous population.<sup>4</sup> The question used to create our dependent variable ('voted in the last national elections in the country of residence') was the following: 'Sometimes people don't vote because they cannot or because they don't want to. Did you vote in the last [name of host country parliament] elections, or was there anything that made you unable or unwilling to vote?'

If the respondent answered negatively, the interviewers were instructed to ask them whether they were eligible to vote or not. Approximately 13 per cent of the 1990 naturalized individuals included in our analyses responded that they were not eligible to vote at the time of the latest national elections.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, 2.5 per cent said they did not remember whether they voted or not, and 0.5 per cent refused to answer this question. In the case of the autochthonous population, 2.4 per cent were not eligible, 2 per cent could not remember and 1.1 per cent refused to answer. Therefore, we calculated the turnout percentages with a final sample of 1674 naturalized individuals and 3109 autochthonous.

As shown in Table 4.2, on average, individuals who acquired the nationality of their host country by naturalization participated approximately 20 per cent less than the autochthonous population of their respective city in the last national elections (see the turnout ratio in last row). However, there are large cross-city variations in this regard. Zurich presents the largest gap in turnout levels, but no gap is observed in Lyon, and it is even reversed in the case of London. In between, we observe cities with relatively large participation gaps such as Barcelona, Madrid, Milan or Oslo, and cities with relatively small gaps such as Budapest, Geneva and Stockholm.



*Table 4.1* Sample size by city of residence (row percentages)

	<b>BAR</b>	<b>BUD</b>	<b>GEN</b>	<b>LON</b>	<b>LYO</b>	<b>MAD</b>	<b>MIL</b>	<b>OSL</b>	<b>STO</b>	<b>ZUR</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Naturalized</b>	7.2 (144)	6.3 (126)	9.4 (187)	10.2 (202)	8.5 (170)	6.8 (136)	2.1 (42)	25.4 (505)	17.2 (342)	6.8 (136)	100.0 (1990)
<b>Autochthonous</b>	9.2 (302)	18.3 (600)	7.3 (240)	9.0 (297)	11.3 (371)	9.3 (306)	9.2 (301)	9.1 (300)	9.9 (324)	7.5 (247)	100.0 (3288)
<b>Total</b>	8.5 (446)	13.8 (726)	8.1 (427)	9.5 (499)	10.3 (541)	8.4 (442)	6.5 (343)	15.3 (805)	12.6 (666)	7.3 (383)	100.0 (5278)

*Note:* Number of observations in brackets.

*Table 4.2* Turnout of naturalized and autochthonous population in last national elections, by city of residence (percentages)

	BAR	BUD	GEN	LON	LYO	MAD	MIL	OSL	STO	ZUR	Total
<b>Autochthonous</b>	82.5	80.6	73.4	50.0	65.8	87.2	93.1	96.3	94.1	69.9	79.9
<b>Naturalized</b>	55.6	69.9	65.3	52.9	62.9	59.3	69.4	66.2	86.8	32.8	64.9
<b>Turnout Differential</b>	-27.0	-10.7	-8.1	2.9	-2.9	-27.9	-23.7	-30.1	-7.3	-37.1	-15.0
<b>Nat/Aut Turnout Ratio</b>	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.5	0.8

Some of these differences across cities are due to differences in the turnout propensity of different ethnic groups, which are unevenly represented in the cities we study (see Figure 4.1). For instance, naturalized citizens of Kosovar and Ecuadorian origin have turnout levels below 50 per cent, and they are only present in Swiss cities and South European cities, respectively. However, ‘pure’ city-effects also seem to exist as individuals of the same ethnic origin living in different cities reveal substantial differences in turnout. In Figure 4.1, this fact is clearly illustrated by the case of the Turks, who participate much more in Scandinavian cities than do their counterparts in Zurich, or of the Moroccans who participate much more in Lyon than in the Spanish cities.

Finally, we cannot discard the possibility that migrant communities have different characteristics across cities with regard to their SES, migration background, religious practice, political attitudes and so on, which could account for – at least part of – the turnout gap between naturalized citizens and the autochthonous population. In fact, in our sample, naturalized individuals are, on average, younger and less educated than the majority population, and are also married and employed more frequently than their native counterparts. Furthermore, the presence of atheist/agnostic respondents is more common among the autochthonous population (23 per cent) than among the naturalized group (10 per cent), and the proportion of Muslims is virtually zero in the majority population while it represents almost half of the naturalized individuals. With regard to their political attitudes, naturalized immigrants lag behind the autochthonous population in their level




Figure 4.1 Turnout level by city of residence and ethnic group

Note: bars around the symbol represent the 95 per cent confidence interval for each average turnout.

of political interest and associational engagement, although differences are relatively small.<sup>6</sup>

All in all, it is clear that we should consider all these concurrent dimensions (group-effects, city-effects and individual-effects) simultaneously in order to provide a complete account of the turnout gap observed between naturalized citizens and the majority population in our ten cities. Unfortunately, limitations in the number of cases and the selection of immigrant groups across cities prevent us from such an ideal analysis because few groups are present in several locations. Alternatively, we have decided to run two different types of multivariate analysis. First, we focused on the largest ethnic or regional ethnic groups surveyed in several cities (Turks, Maghrebians and Andeans) and analysed the main determinants of their electoral behaviour by utilising logistic regressions to assess the size and characteristics of the potential differences across groups. Secondly, we ran a second set of analyses in which we pooled the information for all naturalized citizens (regardless of their ethnic/national origin) and examined the observed differences in their electoral behaviour in comparison to that of the autochthonous population in their cities of residence, utilising multi-level logistic regressions. This second analysis allows us to analyse the role of the political opportunity structures in shaping the voting behaviour of naturalized citizens across European cities.

## **Analyses and results**

### **The electoral participation of naturalized individuals with a focus on cross-ethnic group differences**

In order to exploit as much as possible the information in the Localmultidem dataset, in this section our aim is to compare the main factors explaining the gap in the turnout of naturalized citizens of different ethnic origins, regardless of the city where they live. To do this, we focus on the three largest groups that we are able to reconstruct from our samples: Turks, Maghrebians (including Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians), and Andeans (including Ecuadorians, Colombians, Bolivians and Peruvians).<sup>7</sup>

Results in Table 4.3 show both remarkable similarities across these three groups. First, after controlling for differences in SES, migration trajectory, religion, political attitudes and organizational involvement,<sup>8</sup> a significant gap in participation between the naturalized and autochthonous respondents only exists for Turks and Andeans but not for Maghrebians. In fact, a significant gap between the Maghrebians and autochthonous French remained until we added the control 'Muslim' to the model, which took away the large differences in voting behaviour between the two groups (not shown here). This is surely an interesting result that deserves further investigation, given that religion does not play such a crucial role in explaining the turnout differences among Turks and the autochthonous population in their respective

Table 4.3 Logit estimates of the probability of voting in national elections of the country of residence

	Maghrebians	Andeans	Turks	
			Model 1	Model 2
Naturalized (ref. autocht.)	-0.04 (0.54)	-3.46** (0.56)	-1.44** (0.67)	-2.37** (.85)
Years since migration	0.00 (0.01)	0.10** (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)	0.05** (.02)
Fluent (ref. no)	-0.09 (0.47)	-0.97 (2.22)	0.78** (0.37)	0.12 (.41)
Discriminated (ref. no)	0.39 (0.32)	-0.27 (0.53)	-0.24 (0.40)	-0.78 (.50)
Age	0.05** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (.01)
Female (ref. male)	-0.15 (0.16)	0.22 (0.21)	0.23 (0.18)	0.20 (.19)
(ref. primary and less)				
Lower secondary	0.43* (0.25)	0.40 (0.32)	-1.17** (0.35)	-0.71 (.37)
Upper secondary	0.96** (0.28)	0.78** (0.33)	-0.87** (0.32)	-0.49 (.34)
Tertiary	0.57** (0.27)	0.75** (0.36)	-0.11 (0.36)	-0.01 (.39)
Employed (ref. no)	0.21 (0.17)	-0.27 (0.24)	-0.35 (0.19)	0.27 (.25)
With partner (ref. no)	0.34** (0.16)	-0.08 (0.20)	0.90** (0.19)	0.67** (.21)
(ref. not at all)				
Very interested in host politics	1.39** (0.28)	2.12** (0.42)	1.75** (0.35)	1.73** (.31)
Fairly interested...	0.90** (0.24)	1.45** (0.28)	1.41** (0.28)	0.79** (.31)
Little interested...	0.54** (0.24)	0.65** (0.26)	0.71** (0.29)	0.51** (.23)
Involved in organization (ref. no)	0.18 (0.16)	0.46** (0.21)	0.92** (0.21)	0.51** (.23)
Involved in ethnic advocacy organization (ref. no)	N.E.	N.E.	0.10 (0.47)	0.05 (.51)
Muslim, or Protestant for Andean (ref. other)	-0.77* (0.41)	0.10 (0.66)	-0.52 (0.36)	-0.42 (.42)
Oslo				2.35** (.41)
Stockholm				2.04** (.31)
Naturalized Turk* Oslo				0.25** (.62)

(continued)

Table 4.3 Continued

	Maghrebians	Andeans	Turks	
			Model 1	Model 2
<b>Naturalized Turk* Stockholm</b>				1.10** (0.62)
<b>Constant</b>	-2.59** (0.63)	-0.15 (2.25)	-1.86** (0.62)	-2.95** (0.68)
<b>Pseudos-R2</b>	0.1514	0.1976	0.2139	0.3104
<b>N</b>	1100	980	1188	1188

Legend: \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05. Standard errors in brackets. N.E. = not estimated due to insufficient cases.

cities. In addition, the assimilation model is only partially supported by these results. Although longer stays generally reduce the turnout gap, the result is not significant for Maghrebians. Besides, language fluency only appears to be relevant in explaining the participation gap of the Turks but not the rest of our groups, although interpretation of this effect is again problematic, because it is only relevant for the Moroccans in the Spanish cities (but not in the French ones) and for the Ecuadorians in Milan; and finally, perceptions of discrimination played no role. With regard to the resource model, results are also mixed. Neither gender nor employment displayed significant effects for any group, and education revealed the expected positive and significant effect for both Andeans and Maghrebians. However, one of the most surprising results in these analyses is the effect of education within the Turkish community: apparently, the least educated Turks (if we run the model including just naturalized individuals and exclude the autochthonous voters) are the ones who participate more. Surely, this result requires additional research. Finally, both organizational involvement and interest in politics show consistent positive and significant effects across the three groups.

Bearing all this in mind, it is unavoidable to wonder if part of these results derive from true differences across these three ethnic groups or rather from differences between the respective autochthonous populations in each city, or even from their cities' characteristics. In order to explore this issue a bit further, for the sample of naturalized citizens of Turkish origin – which is the largest and most homogenous one in terms of ethnic composition in our dataset – we have estimated one additional model that includes city-effects (see the last column in Table 4.3). Differences across cities, even if we restrict the analyses to the same ethnic group, remain large and significant; in the case of the Turks, the differences between naturalized Turks across cities is even more important than differences from their respective autochthonous population. To illustrate the actual effect of all these differences, in Table 4.4 we summarize (as per the estimates in Model 2 of Table 4.3) the predicted

**Table 4.4** Predicted probabilities of voting for naturalized citizens of Turkish origin and autochthonous population in Oslo, Stockholm and Zurich

	Naturalized of Turkish origin	Authocht.	Ratio Naturalized-Authocht.
<b>Oslo</b>			
Pr(y = 1):	0.54 [0.31, 0.77]	0.82 [0.63, 1.00]	0.65
Pr(y = 0):	0.46 [0.23, 0.69]	0.18 [0.00, 0.37]	
<b>Stockholm</b>			
Pr(y = 1):	0.69 [0.45, 0.93]	0.77 [0.57, 0.98]	0.90
Pr(y = 0):	0.31 [0.07, 0.55]	0.23 [0.02, 0.43]	
<b>Zurich</b>			
Pr(y = 1):	0.09 [0.00, 0.18]	0.31 [0.07, 0.55]	0.29
Pr(y = 0):	0.91 [0.82, 1.00]	0.69 [0.45, 0.93]	
<b>Ratio Naturalized Oslo–Stockholm</b>	1.17		
<b>Ratio Naturalized Oslo–Zurich</b>	6.0		
<b>Ratio Naturalized Stockholm–Zurich</b>	7.6		

*Note:* 95 per cent confidence intervals in brackets.

probabilities of voting in host national elections of a male naturalized immigrant of Turkish origin, with lower secondary education, with partner, employed, who has resided for 15 years in the city, with little interest in the host country's politics, fluent in the host language, not involved in any kind of association and who has not felt discriminated against because of his origin.

On average, differences in turnout probabilities of naturalized Turks with the described characteristics in different cities remain larger than differences between them and their native counterparts in their respective cities (compare ratios in the last row and the last column in Table 4.4). These findings clearly encourage paying more attention to the potential role of different political opportunity structures in shaping immigrants' behaviours, as we do in the next section.

### **The electoral participation of naturalized individuals with a focus on cross-city differences**

The dataset will be analysed using multilevel logistic regression with cities at level 2. Multilevel analysis is used for one main reason: our sample is

drawn from 10 cities and it is quite likely that there is an unmeasured effect of the context (that is, cities) resulting in intra-class correlation, which has to be controlled for.<sup>9</sup> In this chapter, we will pay particular attention to the city characteristics related to specific aspects of the political opportunity structure at the city level that are likely to influence the voting behaviour of naturalized citizens.

Six logistic regression models with the dependent variable ‘voted in the last national elections in the country of residence’ are presented (Table 4.5). Model 0 gives the null model with a random intercept for cities, and serves as a reference point in the evolution of cross-city variance. In Model 1 the immigrant-specific characteristics (whether the person is a naturalized citizen, her length of residence, whether she is fluent in the host country language, and whether she had felt discriminated against because of her ethnicity in the last 12 months), along with the individual’s religion (Protestant, Muslim and others) are included. In Model 2, we test the strength of the resources model and the importance of political attitudes to account for participation differences between naturalized citizens and the autochthonous population, by adding individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, employment, partnership status and interest in host politics to the previous specification. In Model 3, indicators controlling for the organizational involvement of the individual in either ethnic or non-ethnic organizations are added. And finally, Model 4 includes three selected indicators measuring those dimensions of the political opportunity structure more likely to affect the turnout of naturalized citizens: the openness/closure of the citizenship acquisition regime, the openness/closure of the

Table 4.5 Logit coefficients of participating in national elections versus not (coefficients and standard errors)

	<i>Model 0</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
<b><i>Immigration-specific</i></b>						
Naturalized (ref. autocht.)	-1.92** (0.17)	-1.55** (0.18)	-1.59** (0.19)	-1.53** (0.19)	-1.53** (0.19)	-1.53** (0.19)
Years since migration	0.05** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Fluent (ref. no)	-0.15 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.17)	-0.22 (0.18)	-0.22 (0.18)	-0.29 (0.18)	-0.29 (0.18)
Perception of discrimination (ref. no)	-0.02 (0.14)	0.04 (0.15)	0.00 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.10 (0.16)	-0.10 (0.16)
Protestant (ref. other non-Muslim)	0.31** (0.11)	0.20 (0.12)	0.14 (0.13)	0.11 (0.13)	0.11 (0.13)	0.13 (0.13)
Muslim (ref. other non-Protestant)	-0.42** (0.12)	-0.21 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.18 (0.14)

(continued)



Table 4.5 Continued

	<i>Model 0</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
<b>Socio-economic</b>						
Female (ref. male)			-0.05 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)
Age (ref. less than lower secondary)			0.03** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)
Lower secondary			0.19 (0.14)	0.13 (0.14)	0.10 (0.14)	0.12 (0.14)
Upper secondary			0.63** (0.13)	0.49** (0.13)	0.45** (0.13)	0.46** (0.13)
Tertiary			0.91** (0.13)	0.62** (0.14)	0.54** (0.14)	0.56** (0.14)
Employed (ref. no)			0.22** (0.09)	0.26** (0.09)	0.25** (0.09)	0.24** (0.09)
In partnership (ref. no)			0.37** (0.08)	0.38** (0.08)	0.37** (0.08)	0.38** (0.08)
<b>Political attitudes</b>						
(ref. not at all)						
Very interested in host politics				1.60** (0.14)	1.52** (0.14)	1.52** (0.14)
Fairly interested				1.06** (0.12)	1.00** (0.12)	1.03** (0.12)
Little interested				0.44** (0.12)	0.40** (0.12)	0.43** (0.12)
<b>Social capital</b>						
Involved in association (ref. no)					0.41** (0.09)	0.41** (0.09)
Involved in ethnic advocacy association (ref. no)					0.15 (0.35)	0.18 (0.36)
<b>Political opportunity structure</b>						
Citizenship Regime*Naturalized						-0.06 (0.21)
Residence Rights*Naturalized						0.79** (0.27)
Anti-immigration Parties*Naturalized						0.27 (0.27)
Constant	1.15** (0.23)	1.57** (0.30)	-0.92** (0.35)	-1.36** (0.37)	-1.46** (0.37)	-1.48** (0.36)
St. Dev. Random Intercepts	0.70** (0.16)	0.76** (0.17)	0.76** (0.17)	0.81** (0.19)	0.79** (0.18)	0.70** (0.16)
Log-lik.	-2434	-2307	-2183	-2101	-2090	-2086
N	4614	4614	4614	4614	4614	4614

Legend: \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05. Standard errors in brackets.

residence permits regime, and the electoral support received by anti-immigrant parties in the last national elections in each particular city.

Model 1 confirms that naturalized citizens vote less than their autochthonous counterparts. However, we must admit that the participation gap suggested by the coefficient of the variable 'Naturalized' (-1.92) is a little unrealistic since it measures the effect of being a naturalized individual who has resided zero years in the host country (years since migration = 0), which is a virtually impossible situation. The positive sign of the coefficient of 'years since migration' indicates that there is some convergence with natives' turnout levels over time, although at a quite slow pace since a naturalized male Muslim who is fluent in the host language, has reported no discrimination and has lower secondary education would require more than 30 years of residence to reach the participation level of a comparable native in his city of residence. Note that 30 years of residence to achieve the autochthonous turnout level is a long time, especially if one takes into account that the naturalized are a self-selected group within the immigrant population for which participation is expected to be easier and, therefore, more likely.<sup>10</sup>

On the other hand, neither language fluency nor feelings of discrimination revealed a significant effect in explaining the participation gap among them and the autochthonous voters. These results are a little bit unexpected and contrary to previous evidence, especially the one referring to the non-significant effect (and negative sign) of language skills, which does not change even if we drop the cities in which most immigrants have the same language as natives (Madrid and Barcelona). Moreover, if we restrict the sample to the naturalized group (excluding natives), the sign of the coefficient reverses (as expected), but it remains non-significant.<sup>11</sup> On the contrary, the effect of 'having felt discriminated against' becomes negative and significant if we restrict our sample to only naturalized immigrants, in line with previous findings in the literature. In other words, discrimination feelings affect the participation probabilities of the naturalized citizens in our sample but they have no significant effect in explaining the participation gap between immigrants and the autochthonous population.

Finally, we include religion as an immigrant-specific variable because most Muslim individuals in our sample are immigrants. As can be seen, different faiths are associated with a different voting propensity: while Protestants are more likely to vote in national elections, Muslims are significantly less likely to participate than people from other faiths (including non-believers). However, we need to control for additional variables before interpreting this result.

Model 2 confirms the importance of individual resources and political attitudes in explaining part of the observed differences in the level of electoral participation between the autochthonous population and individuals of immigrant origin. However, as expected, the classical resource model is

insufficient to account for the large political gap between these groups since the effect of being a naturalized citizen remains negative and significant (see the coefficient for 'Naturalized' in Models 1 and 2) even after neutralizing the impact of differences in gender, age, education, employment and partnership status.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, controlling for socio-economic differences between the two groups eliminates the effect of religion on voting propensity, which is an important result to highlight.

In model 3 we added a set of dichotomous variables measuring differences in the individuals' interest in host country politics. As expected, individuals who reported to be very interested in politics are much more likely to vote than those who are fairly, little or not at all interested (differences between the four categories are significant); in addition, this is the case for both the naturalized and the autochthonous population if we run separate regressions for each group. Despite the large effect of interest in politics in predicting voting behaviour, the large negative effect of being naturalized remains, which confirms that differences in the political interest for these two groups are not the main reason underlying the participation gap.

In model 4, we test the social capital hypothesis at the individual level. According to our results, associational engagement in general (that is, in any kind of association) exerts a positive effect on electoral participation, in line with our expectations. However, participation in 'ethnic advocacy organizations' in particular does not make a significant difference with regard to the gap in voting behaviour between naturalized citizens and the autochthonous population in national elections. In addition, it is important to highlight that these effects remain unchanged if we restricted the sample to naturalized immigrants.

Once we have examined the explanatory value of the assimilation model, the resources approach and the social capital hypotheses in accounting for the voting gaps between naturalized immigrants and the autochthonous population, we turn our attention to the role that different political opportunity structures may play in shaping the voting behaviour of naturalized individuals. One of the main objectives of this chapter consists of examining the empirical support for the 'selection' and the 'escape into' naturalization hypotheses, as we formulated in section 2. If tough naturalization rules truly secure that naturalized immigrants will be the most integrated ones (that is, the most similar to their autochthonous counterparts), the voting gap between the autochthonous and naturalized migrants should be lower the tougher the naturalization regime is.

In Figure 4.2 we have represented this relationship according to the information in our sample.<sup>13</sup> The index for 'openness of the nationality acquisition rules' was calculated on the basis of seven different indicators measured for each national (ethnic) group in each city.<sup>14</sup> The participation gap is measured here as the turnout ratio between naturalized immigrants and their autochthonous counterparts. Thus, a turnout ratio equal to 1




Figure 4.2 Relationship between the openness of the naturalization rules and the participation gap between the naturalized immigrants and the autochthonous population

indicates no gap in electoral participation between the naturalized and the autochthonous population, a ratio larger than 1 indicates that the naturalized group participates in elections more than the autochthonous population, and a ratio smaller than 1 indicates that naturalized people vote less than autochthonous citizens. The results lead to concluding that the relationship is in the opposite direction to that expected by the ‘selection’ hypothesis, according to which the turnout ratio should be closer to 1 as the citizenship acquisition regime becomes tougher (more negative in our indicator), and in any case quite weak.<sup>15</sup>

In Figure 4.3 we have also examined the hypothesis of ‘escape into naturalization’. According to this hypothesis, the tougher the legal regime to grant foreigners (and their relatives) entry and residence permits, the greater their incentive to apply for naturalization regardless of political interest and, therefore, the weaker the expected relationship between naturalization and voting in host country elections. In this case, to calculate the openness of the residence regime we employed 15 different indicators for each group-city combination.<sup>16</sup>

On this occasion, the relationship goes in the expected direction and seems clearer and stronger than before: naturalized immigrants who face greater difficulties gaining legal status in their cities of residence (left side of




Figure 4.3 Relationship between regulating residence permits and the participation gap between the naturalized immigrants and the autochthonous population

the figure) show lower turnout ratios (larger gaps in participation with their autochthonous counterparts), than those who reside in contexts where the access to a stable legal status is easier to achieve (right side of the figure) for whom we observe turnout ratios closer to 1.

In order to confirm whether the preliminary evidence shown in these figures is confirmed in our multivariate analysis, we added the two aforementioned variables – openness of the rules for acquisition of the host country’s nationality, and openness of the residence permits’ regime – to the initial specification of the model. Note that the potential effect of these two variables only makes sense for naturalized immigrants, not for natives; accordingly, we have interacted them with the variable ‘naturalized’ in model 5. In addition, in the same model, we have also added an indicator for the electoral strength of anti-immigrant parties in the last national elections at the city level.

Our results in Model 5 confirm, first of all, that a sizable part of the variance in the size of the participation gap across cities is due to differences in these institutional characteristics (see the reduction in the size of the standard deviation of the random intercepts from model 4 to 5). In addition, results show that naturalized immigrants who live in contexts where the legislation allows foreigners a stable legal status, immigrants who decide to naturalize are more likely to participate in the host country elections than in those contexts where naturalization becomes almost the only way to secure

residence (and other) rights. In contrast, tougher naturalization regimes are not able to ensure that new citizens will be strongly engaged with the host country politics, as indicated by the non-significant effect of the variable 'citizenship regime'. Thus, the 'selection hypothesis' does not seem to be in operation with regard to the electoral participation of the naturalized citizens. In sum, from our results we can deduce that legal systems that offer foreigners easier ways of securing their legal status in the host country tend to promote more participatory behaviour among naturalized immigrants in elections.

Finally, the presence of relatively strong anti-immigrant/radical-right parties does not seem to trigger turnout for either naturalized immigrants or the autochthonous group. We also tried out an interaction effect, in order to allow for possible opposite effects of this variable between naturalized and autochthonous voters, but no significant effect emerged, so we decided to keep the model as simple as possible.

In Figure 4.4 we have represented the change in the probability of voting as the rules governing the granting and renewal of residence permits becomes softer for a naturalized immigrant who is a 40-year-old male Muslim, with upper secondary school, married, fairly interested in politics, a member of a voluntary association, fluent in the host language, who arrived to the country 16 years ago, who has not reported experiences of discrimination because of his origin in the last 12 months, and who lives in a city where anti-immigrant parties are not particularly strong and where




Figure 4.4 Change in the probability of voting of a naturalized citizen of Turkish origin as the rules regulating residence rights become more open

the norms regulating the access to citizenship are neither too tough nor too soft. As we see, the increasing openness of the immigration regime in terms of residence status substantially increases the probability of naturalized immigrants of participating and, therefore, of reducing their gap with the comparable autochthonous population.

## Conclusions

Our results have confirmed that naturalized immigrants participate systematically less than comparable autochthonous citizens in the national elections of their host country in virtually all the cities included in our study, even after neutralizing the effect of differences in the socio-demographic characteristics, political orientations, immigration experience, social capital, religiosity and the institutional context affecting these two groups. Although there is some evidence of assimilation in the electoral participation of naturalized citizens as their length of residence extends, it seems to proceed at a very slow pace. However, it seems important to highlight that independently of the characteristics of the naturalized population, there seems to be large amount of room for legislators and policy-makers to promote the electoral participation of naturalized citizens by offering them credible possibilities of having a secure residency status after their arrival in the country. This policy choice is likely to promote and enhance 'true integration' of immigrants into the host politics and society, not only after naturalization but from the very beginning of the foreigner's arrival. In addition, this same result casts some doubts on the efficacy of relaxing the requirements for citizenship acquisition as a palliative for the lack of political rights of the immigrant population. In fact, our results found no evidence of any significant connection between the turnout of the naturalized population and the openness of the citizenship acquisition regime.

Finally, it seems clear that further research on this issue should improve our insights. Future work should examine group-specific effects (including both characteristics of the countries of origin of the individuals, and characteristics of the immigrant communities at destination), as well as other institutional characteristics of the cities of residence, such as the type of electoral system or the mobilization context, which were not covered in our analyses.

## Notes

\*I am grateful to Ed Fieldhouse, Marc Swyngedouw, Katia Pilati, Laura Morales and José Fernández-Albertos for helpful suggestions to previous versions of this chapter. All mistakes are mine.

1. For an illustration of this see the description of the Belgian case where the modification of the electoral law in 2004 was preceded by 'a rather nasty political struggle, which brought the federal government very close to a crisis' (Jacobs, 2007).

2. According to the Spanish National Immigrant Survey 2007, in the provinces of Madrid and Barcelona the percentage of naturalized people born in Morocco, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru – the five groups sampled in the Spanish Localmultidem Survey – is 17 per cent. The corresponding proportion in the municipalities of Madrid and Barcelona is 17.4 per cent according to the Localmultidem dataset.
3. Of these individuals, 24 per cent resided in Geneva, 19 per cent in Lyon, 17 per cent in Stockholm and 16 per cent in Zurich.
4. Results for local elections were also analysed and showed the same pattern.
5. Most of these individuals were Latin Americans living in Madrid and Barcelona, or Bosnians living in Oslo, who had acquired their host country's nationality before we took the survey but after the last national elections in their countries of residence.
6. Sample descriptives for each of the explanatory variables not shown here.
7. We are aware that collapsing Ecuadorians, Colombians, Peruvians and Bolivians into a single regional ethnic group (Andeans) is problematic, especially because Ecuadorians and the rest of the Andeans have differing behaviours in some regards. This also happens, to a lesser extent, for Moroccans and Tunisians in Lyon. Obviously, the most homogenous of these three are the Turks, although some important differences might also emerge between Kurds and non-Kurds. For these reasons, we focus our comments and conclusions from these analyses on the Turks. However, we considered it necessary to provide the reader with some examples of differences across cities for relatively 'equivalent' groups.
8. Note that the effect of the variable 'involved in ethnic advocacy organization' could not be estimated for Maghrebians and Andeans; Stata software automatically expelled the small number of cases with positive values in this variable because of 'perfectly predicted outcomes'.
9. The multilevel analyses were run with Stata, which provides full maximum likelihood for random intercept logistic regression models. The estimated parameters indicate whether there is a difference between respondents in the probability to vote and whether there is any difference across cities in the extent to which people vote. If there is residual variance between contexts it can be further analysed whether this is the effect of specific characteristics of the cities.
10. It would be desirable to estimate the number of years needed to converge with the autochthonous turnout level after naturalization, instead of 'since arrival'. However, one important limitation in our data is the lack of information about the exact moment when each individual naturalized.
11. This might be related to the limited variability in fluency level in our sample, which is the combined result of the relatively large length of residence required to apply for citizenship in most of the cities in the survey, and the additional time that people often take to apply and being granted with host country citizenship.
12. If we run separate regressions for the naturalized and autochthonous groups the following differences emerge. First, more education is associated with higher voting probabilities for the autochthonous but not for immigrants. Secondly, employment is only positively associated with participation for naturalized migrants but not for the autochthonous. Third, to be married or cohabitating increases the probability of voting only for the autochthonous population. Both results are consistent with the different meaning that these variables entail for each group as potential indicators of their ability to get information through their participation in social networks either at the workplace or at home



(Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). As partners of the naturalized immigrants are mostly of immigrant origin as well, the 'selective sanctions for noncompliance' coming from peers (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) are not significant in this case. In contrast, the workplace might be a much more valuable environment to obtain information about local politics for people of foreign origin than for the autochthonous, as long as they are not segregated into ethnic niches.

13. The number of observations in the figure equals the number of city-ethnic group combinations in our sample, since different groups usually have different participation levels, and sometimes they are also subjected to different rules for citizenship acquisition even if they live in the same city or country.
14. The seven indicators were: 1) *ius solis* (birthright citizenship) for 2nd/3rd generations; 2) conditions for acquiring the nationality through marriage with a national; 3) length of residence required to acquire the nationality by naturalization; 4) existence of a requirement of minimum economic resources to obtain the nationality; 5) the percentage of approved applications for naturalization in 2005; 6) reasons for nationality withdrawal; and 7) existence of cultural requirements (language test and others) for the nationality acquisition. Each of these indicators was coded -1, 0 or 1 and the final index was calculated by adding up the score of these seven indicators and dividing it by seven. See Cinalli and Giugni (Chapter 3 in this volume) for more details on the indicators.
15. The result does not change if we eliminate city-group combinations with fewer than 30 observations in our sample (BUD-CHI for Chinese people in Budapest, MIL-FIL and MIL-ECU for Filipino and Ecuadorian people in Milan). Even if we eliminate the entire city of Zurich and Indians in London (LON-IND), the overall result remains unchanged.
16. For short-term permits, four indicators were considered: 1) automatic acquisition of the permit if the mother or father of a national minor child; 2) automatic acquisition of the permit through marriage with a national; 3) link between work regime and permit regime; 4) grounds for withdrawal. For long-term permits: 1) automatic acquisition of the permit if the mother or father of a national minor child; 2) automatic acquisition of the permit if marriage with a national; 3) required minimum time of habitual residence; 4) economic resources requirement; 5) percentage of given long-term permits over the total number of applications at national level; 6) grounds for withdrawal; 7) expulsion precluded. And, finally, for permits on the basis of family reunification: 1) eligibility for legal residents; 2) economic resources requirement; 3) duration of validity of permit; 4) grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status; and 5) the right to an autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority.

# 5

## The Role of Social Capital in Migrants' Engagement in Local Politics in European Cities

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### Introduction

European scholars studying migrants' political participation largely privilege explanations based on structural approaches that link political participation to structures of opportunities and constraints. On the one hand, the political opportunity structures (POS) approach, developed within the social movements field, focuses on how the citizenship regime defines different sets of individual and collective rights for migrants, as well as different opportunities for the emergence of migrants' collective action (Koopmans and Statham, 2000a; Koopmans et al., 2005). On the other hand, other work focuses more on the opportunities and constraints set by organizational structures, specifically ethnic organizational structures and how they increase levels of migrant political participation (Fennema and Tillie, 1999 and 2001; Fennema, 2004). With respect to the latter approach, however, a recent debate has emerged as to whether different types of organizational structures that lead to the formation of 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital may have a varying impact on migrants' political integration (Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2002; Jacobs and Tillie, 2004). The main claim is that different types of organizational structures and links shape opportunities, constraints and resources in non-uniform ways, and hence will have potentially divergent effects on migrants' political integration. While some scholars claim that bonding social capital can promote migrants' integration because it constitutes an additional resource for generally less resourceful groups (see, for example, Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Fennema and Tillie, 1999 and 2001; Tillie, 2004; Jacobs et al., 2004), others show that bonding social capital can also isolate migrants from the larger body politic and prevent them from becoming politically integrated (Portes and Landolt, 1996; Putnam, 2000; Marschall and Stolle, 2004).

The aim of this chapter is to examine how the different resources that derive from two types of social capital – bridging and bonding social capital – differently shape the political attitudes and behaviours of migrants

across cities in Europe. We want to transcend simplistic notions of 'good' and 'bad' social capital for the integration of migrants and our goal is, thus, to analyse in greater detail the different outcomes that might be associated with bridging and bonding social capital.<sup>1</sup> In this regard, we view these two forms of social capital as producing diverse types of resources that can have different uses. Particularly, we expect that whenever migrants' social interactions are primarily characterized by the generation of bonding – rather than bridging – social capital this will provide fertile ground for ethnic mobilization. Consequently, if migrants are embedded in social structures where they fundamentally interact with their co-ethnics they will be more likely to be exposed to mobilization cues that relate to issues and concerns framed around their own 'ethnic' group. Instead, migrants who are exposed to more ethnically diverse social interactions will more frequently get political cues that are related to issues and concerns that affect the larger society.

In this chapter, we analyse the data collected at the individual, organizational and contextual level for eight of the cities included in this volume: Barcelona, Budapest, Geneva, London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan and Zurich. We will use only the information on the migrant minorities for our analyses, as we are primarily interested in the political integration of these groups and in the effect of social capital and, in particular, of bonding and bridging social capital on their political engagement.

### **The impact of bonding and bridging social capital on migrants' political engagement**

The nature of the social relationships and structures of which individuals are part has long been considered central to social and political action. Simmel (1955 [1908]) emphasized the importance of the interconnection of individuals' multiple structural memberships, and differentiated between concentric forms of social membership and intersecting forms of membership. Depending on the structure of these memberships, opportunities and constraints for social action may either be consistent with one another or diverge. When memberships converge, they will shape boundaries along a single social category. In contrast, when they diverge, the intersecting opportunities and constraints are likely to blur the consistency of certain social categories and boundaries. In the first case, structures are said to overlap and form concentric webs, setting strong external boundaries between individuals and groups, and producing a highly segmented system in which actors' attributes and actions tend to be defined by the characteristics recognized within such structures. This was, for example, true in highly segmented societies in pre-modern eras where concentric social webs or circles embedded individuals in such a way that belonging to a group defined other forms of affiliation. Membership of a certain family entailed, for example, ascribing to a certain social class and a certain religious group, so that ascribed and

acquired characteristics of the family were sustained and reproduced in other groups. The tendency in modern societies seems instead to be the promotion of intersecting webs and circles, given that individuals belong simultaneously to multiple social groups and categories, which sometimes diverge in their orientations and practices (Simmel, 1989 [1908]). Intersecting structures have the effect of making boundaries among groups more blurred and, consequently, individuals' identities and social action will be defined along different social categories.<sup>2</sup>

This logic of overlapping or crosscutting memberships has also been pivotal to the debate around cleavage politics and political behaviour. Several seminal pieces in electoral studies have repeatedly stressed the importance of structures of membership and social relations to explain citizens' political behaviour (Berelson et al., 1954; Rokkan, 1970). When citizens are embedded in social relations that reinforce each other to sustain a certain cleavage, political behaviour becomes stable and reflects the social bases of politics in relatively predictable ways. When the social environment of individuals is politically and socially homogeneous in ways that reinforce their own social identities, political and mobilization cues will more frequently converge to sustain the political concerns and preferences that the social group shares.

In this regard, the structure of the multiple social memberships that migrants are embedded in has notable and important consequences for their political engagement, as well as for the structural opportunities and constraints that shape their patterns of political incorporation. As we discussed above, the literature on migrants' political participation has above all emphasized two structural levels: the institutional and the organizational. With regard to the institutional level, several scholars have argued that the effect of the context of reception of migrants is of primary importance (Portes and Böröcz, 1989). The receiving social and political context determines the integration policies, the patterns of segregation and ethnic concentration, and the patterns of political mobilization by established actors and parties. In this regard, several scholars highlight that the POS shape the patterns of political behaviour and mobilization of ethnic and migrant groups (Soysal, 1994; Ireland, 1994 and 2000; Koopmans and Statham, 1999a; Koopmans et al., 2005; Bloemraad, 2006b). The main thrust of these approaches is that the ways in which conceptions and regulations of citizenship – as well as the dominant discourses about the relevant identities that define migrant minorities – are socially and politically constructed, have a direct impact on the way migrants mobilize politically and, consequently, on the paths for their political integration in the receiving polity.

In parallel – and often complementary – ways, a related strand in the literature has emphasized that the organizational capacity and the patterns of inter-organizational connection – along ethnic or cross-ethnic lines – can have a crucial impact on the mobilizing capacity of given ethnic and migrant

groups. Such studies draw on a literature that stresses the role of organizations as crucial mobilizing structures. In this sense, organizational resources can help overcome the barriers to political participation imposed by a lack of socio-economic resources (Verba et al., 1978; Verba et al., 1995). Moreover, European scholars have emphasized how the internal cohesion of specific ethnic groups – as measured by the density of ethnic organizational links – can result in high levels of political participation that can even exceed that of the native population (Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Togeby, 1999).<sup>3</sup> There is, however, some debate as to whether the impact of the social capital accumulated by ethnic and migrant communities varies depending on its bridging or bonding nature (Putnam, 2000; Togeby, 2004; van Londen et al., 2007), or whether it is mediated by the institutional opportunities afforded by the local context (van Heelsum, 2005), or with the form of political action (Wong et al., 2005). In particular, bridging social capital, defined as social networks and links among socially heterogeneous groups (Putnam, 2000) is thought of as more desirable. Whereas bonding social capital is seen as a menace to social and political cohesion, bridging social capital is perceived as more conducive to democratic engagement (Dowley and Silver, 2002; Pickering, 2006). Equally, bridging social capital is thought to foster social trust towards a wider range of individuals and groups, whereas bonding social capital would reduce social cohesion to the restrictive boundaries of a given identity and social group.

The debate on the role of POS and on bridging and bonding social capital is thus closely related to the classical Simmelian and Rokkanian literature on overlapping and intersecting structures of membership, as both stress the existence of different types of structures or links which may affect attitudes and behaviours in different ways. Consequently, we expect that the nature of the structures or links that migrants are embedded in will have different effects on the orientation of their political concerns and actions. In this sense, when migrants tend to privilege links with people of their own ethnic group or country of origin, and thus form social relationships characterized by bonding ethnic social capital, this will result in political mobilization along ethnic lines being more likely. In the opposite situation, when the links and relationships that migrants forge are ethnically heterogeneous, they are able to accumulate 'bridging' social capital, thus reducing the likelihood of ethnic political mobilization and favouring political mobilization on mainstream issues.

Therefore, we expect that bonding and bridging social capital will have different – and maybe opposing – effects on the focus of concern and action of migrants' political attitudes and behaviours. More specifically, we expect that bonding social capital will tend to foster political attitudes and behaviours with an ethnic focus (and, possibly, hinder engagement in mainstream or cross-ethnic political issues). Political engagement that focuses on ethnic concerns is characterized by the sustainment and defence of the causes and interests of specific ethnic groups, leading, for example, to advocacy and

lobbying activities to defend the interests and needs of people from specific ethnic groups or related to their countries of origin. At the other end, mainstream or cross-ethnic political participation by migrants is characterized by the sustainment and defence of the interests of groups in the wider society – regardless of their ethnic origin – and, therefore, migrants will participate in actions that defend interests that go beyond narrowly defined ethnic boundaries.

In the following pages, we assess the effect of 'bonding' social capital on migrants' political interest and participation. The notion of social capital we privilege in this chapter is structural and relational, and our approach to its measurement reflects this notion.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, we analyse the effect of varying degrees of 'bonding' social capital that are produced at different levels of aggregation. On the one hand, we measure bridging/bonding social capital at the individual level with indicators related to the respondents' involvement in ethnically homogeneous associations and informal networks of close acquaintance. On the other hand, we measure bonding social capital at the ethnic-group level with indicators that reflect the degree of connectivity of the associations of the groups we study in each of the eight cities with other organizations of their same ethnic group. Therefore, our indicators of bonding social capital come from two different datasets: the survey of individual migrants, and the survey of migrant organizations in each of the cities. Finally, we also take into account the impact of POS in the process of shaping migrants' political engagement with the inclusion of two indicators that capture the main dimensions that shape citizenship regimes: individual rights, and collective and cultural group rights (see Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume).

## **Data and methods**

### **The cases studied**

In this chapter, we analyse data from eight cities in six countries: Barcelona, Budapest, Geneva, London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan and Zurich. Our selection of cases is strictly related to data availability: for Oslo data was not collected for the study of local ethnic organizations or for the POS indicators, and for Stockholm the survey of individuals did not include several of the core indicators on ethnic-bonding social capital. Nevertheless, our selection of cases includes a sufficient range of different models of citizenship regimes (see Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume). On the other hand, given the nature of our core questions, we employ only the information provided by migrant respondents, and we leave out autochthonous individuals in all our analyses.

### **Dependent variables**

The literature on migrants' political integration has primarily focused on measuring it with indicators of respondents' interest in the residence-country

politics and of their electoral participation – substituted with intention to vote in local elections should they be eligible. Occasionally, other forms of political action were examined (Berger et al., 2004; Jacobs et al., 2004) but in a less systematic way and usually with summary indicators that do not distinguish among different types of political action. Yet, the literature on political participation has repeatedly shown that political action is multidimensional and that different individual and contextual factors are relevant to understanding its various dimensions or forms.<sup>5</sup>

Hence, in this chapter we will consider several attitudinal and behavioural indicators of the political engagement of migrants. First, as regards political attitudes, we will analyse the interplay between the development of an interest in the politics of the country of residence and in the political issues of the country of origin of the respondents or of their parents.<sup>6</sup> Hence, we examine whether bonding social capital significantly affects the inclination to become interested in the local or national politics of the country of residence, and whether it promotes or sustains the interest in homeland politics.<sup>7</sup> Second, we analyse two different indicators of political action that relate to different dimensions of citizens' participation in politics. Following Teorell, Torcal and Montero's (2007: 344–48) identification of four distinct modes of participation that are broadly equivalent across western Europe – contacting, party activity, protest activity and consumer participation – we analyse the two dimensions that elicit a sufficient number of positive responses from migrants: contacting, and protesting.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to levels of participation in such actions, our questionnaire also allows us to measure the 'ethnic' or 'mainstream' focus of migrants' political action. For those respondents who answer that they have participated in a certain form of action, we asked them who was affected by the issue that motivated that action. Whenever a respondent indicated that the issue fundamentally concerned (a) the respondent, his/her family or a few other persons – and the issue was also related to the situation of migrants – or (b) persons in their homeland country, we considered this as indicative of 'ethnic' political action. Consequently, as regards the three dimensions of political action, we are able to test whether the bonding social capital developed through ethnic ties increases the likelihood of engaging in ethnic politics.

To measure interest in residence-country and 'homeland' politics, we have combined the responses to two separate questions on interest in the politics of the two countries relevant to each respondent. Individuals who were not very or not at all interested in the politics of the given country were coded as 'not interested' while those who were fairly or very interested were coded as 'interested'. The two-by-two combination of these responses produces four types of individuals with regard to their interest in politics. Table 5.1 shows the descriptives for these four types of respondents.

In Budapest, Milan and in the two Swiss cities – where ethnic conceptions of citizenship regimes prevail – interest in homeland issues is higher than interest

*Table 5.1* Interest in the politics of homeland vs. residence-countries (percentages)

		No interest in either	Only interest residence- country	Only interest homeland	Interest in both	Total N cases
Barcelona	Moroccans	35	25	5	35	224
	Ecuadorians	31	14	22	34	259
	Andeans	32	14	13	40	257
Madrid	Moroccans	48	8	12	31	298
	Ecuadorians	40	11	16	33	291
	Andeans	43	8	10	39	277
Budapest	Ethnic Hungarians	14	19	11	56	290
	Chinese	21	8	12	58	249
	Mixed Muslims	21	7	37	35	284
Geneva	Italians	43	21	6	30	339
	Kosovars	29	10	16	44	310
Zurich	Italians	31	15	14	40	299
	Kosovars	18	6	22	55	306
	Turks	35	15	11	39	297
London	Bangladeshi	43	17	11	29	300
	Indians	47	9	15	29	296
	Black Caribbean	54	17	5	24	290
Lyon	Moroccans	20	46	0	33	114
	Algerians	27	39	4	30	461
	Tunisians	22	50	3	25	130
Milan	Egyptians	40	15	16	29	300
	Filipinos	41	5	21	33	300
	Ecuadorians	42	6	31	21	300

in the politics of the countries of residence for several of the groups studied. In contrast to the patterns found in cities where the POS is more closed, in Lyon – where a civic-territorial conception of citizenship prevails – levels of interest in residence-country politics are much higher than levels of interest in homeland issues. London does not show any clear pattern across the three ethnic groups observed, which differ in their preferred focus of interest. In the two Spanish cities, interest in homeland politics tends to prevail, but different patterns emerge for the Moroccan group, which shows a greater interest in residence-country politics in Barcelona than in Madrid. Nevertheless, our results also indicate that developing an interest in residence-country politics is not at all incompatible with sustaining an attentiveness to homeland politics (see also Morales and Morariu, Chapter 7 in this volume). Indeed, in most cities and countries between one-third and one-half of the migrants interviewed expressed an interest in the politics of both countries. Further to this, it is also noteworthy that significant portions of



our respondents in several of our cities showed no interest in the political affairs of either country, especially in Madrid, London and Milan.

Focusing now on political participation, Table 5.2 shows the distribution of responses with regard to political contacting in the 12 months preceding the interviews.<sup>9</sup> We differentiate mainstream contacting (that is, contacts related to issues that affect the larger population of the city/region, the residence-country, or the world), from contacting activities with an ethnic focus (when issues concern a small group of migrants in the immediate circle of the respondent, or the homeland), and respondents who engage both in mainstream and ethnic-related contacting, or in none.

Table 5.2 shows that Lyon is the city with the highest percentage of migrants who engage in any form of contacting, and chiefly in mainstream contacting. Indeed, more than 15 per cent of migrants in Lyon, independently of the group of origin, participated in some form of political lobbying on mainstream concerns in the 12 months preceding the interviews. Migrants

*Table 5.2* Ethnic vs. mainstream contacting (percentages)

		No contact at all	Only mainstream contact	Only ethnic contact	Both ethnic and mainstream contact	Total N cases
Barcelona	Moroccans	83	10	5	2	224
	Ecuadorians	83	10	7	0	259
	Andeans	79	11	7	2	257
Madrid	Moroccans	97	0	2	0	298
	Ecuadorians	91	3	5	0	291
	Andeans	88	6	5	1	277
Budapest	Ethnic Hungarians	88	7	3	1	290
	Chinese	98	1	1	0	249
	Mixed Muslims	99	1	0	1	284
Geneva	Italians	86	12	2	1	339
	Kosovars	88	7	3	2	310
Zurich	Italians	93	4	2	0	299
	Kosovars	90	5	5	0	306
	Turks	91	8	1	0	297
London	Bangladeshi	97	2	1	0	300
	Indians	95	2	1	2	296
	Black Caribbeans	96	3	1	0	290
Lyon	Moroccans	79	16	4	2	114
	Algerians	78	16	4	2	461
	Tunisians	78	20	2	1	130
Milan	Egyptians	96	2	2	0	300
	Filipinos	95	2	2	1	300
	Ecuadorians	95	1	3	1	300

in Barcelona and Geneva show similar patterns to those in Lyon, albeit at lower levels of engagement. In all other cities, engagement in mainstream and ethnic contacting remains at similar levels. But, across the board, political contacting is clearly about mainstream politics, and less frequently about ethnic issues; and in several cases the percentage of migrants who engaged in both mainstream and homeland contacting is nil.

As for contacting activities, we provide the equivalent distribution of responses with regard to protest activities in the 12 months preceding the interviews (Table 5.3).<sup>10</sup>

Levels of mainstream protest action vary widely across cities and across groups, while protest action with an ethnic focus is quite rare and often nonexistent. As regards mainstream protesting, migrants in Lyon are again the most active, but Italians in Geneva also show relatively high levels of contention. In contrast, migrants in Milan, Zurich, Budapest (except for ethnic Hungarians), and Kosovars in Geneva all engage very little in protest action.

*Table 5.3* Ethnic vs. mainstream protest (percentages)

		No protest at all	Only mainstream protest	Only ethnic protest	Both ethnic and mainstream protest	Total N cases
Barcelona	Moroccans	83	17	0	0	224
	Ecuadorians	81	19	0	0	259
	Andeans	80	20	0	0	257
Madrid	Moroccans	97	3	0	0	298
	Ecuadorians	82	14	3	0	291
	Andeans	86	12	1	1	277
Budapest	Ethnic Hungarians	73	17	7	2	290
	Chinese	100	0	0	0	249
	Mixed Muslims	99	1	0	0	284
Geneva	Italians	67	31	2	0	339
	Kosovars	88	9	3	0	310
Zurich	Italians	91	7	2	0	299
	Kosovars	92	4	3	1	306
	Turks	92	7	1	0	297
London	Bangladeshi	93	7	0	0	300
	Indians	97	2	1	0	296
	Black Caribbeans	96	4	0	0	290
Lyon	Moroccans	48	46	2	4	114
	Algerians	49	47	2	3	461
	Tunisians	55	42	2	2	130
Milan	Egyptians	94	6	0	0	300
	Filipinos	94	5	1	0	300
	Ecuadorians	94	6	0	0	300


Ethnic Hungarians are the exception with the highest degree of contestation with an ethnic focus. For most other groups ethnic-oriented protest is almost nonexistent, with them more often engaging in mainstream protests.

In summary, we find relatively consistent cross-city variations in the degree to which migrants engage in mainstream or ethnic political activity. Migrants in Lyon are clearly those who have assimilated the most by engaging primarily only in mainstream political activities. At the same time, migrants in Milan, Budapest (with the exception of ethnic Hungarians), Moroccans in Madrid and often migrants in the two Swiss cities (with the exception of Italians in Geneva) all tend to show very low levels of political engagement, regardless of whether we focus on attitudes or behaviour. This suggests that the types of migration politics and the political context of immigration are likely to shape the levels and focus of migrants' political involvement, given that more closed POS seem to hinder migrants' engagement or to direct it to ethnic issues. Moreover, the political context seems to matter both at the country and at the local level, as the systematic differences between the same groups of migrants in Barcelona and Madrid, and often between Geneva and Zurich, show. London constitutes an exception to the connection between more open POS and engagement, as all three groups of migrants are rarely inclined to participate – possibly as an adaptation to the low levels of engagement of the white British – but they are clearly not resorting to ethnic engagement instead, as the previous figures on political interest clearly show. Finally, the results also show that ethnic concerns are much more prevalent for interest in politics and for contacting, while mainstream issues dominate engagement in protest activity.

### **The core explanatory variables: 'bridging' and 'bonding' social capital**

Our core interest lies in assessing the effect of the overlapping or intersecting nature of membership structures along ethnic lines – as measured by bridging and bonding forms of social capital – on patterns of involvement in political affairs. For this purpose, we asked respondents about the different public and private spheres where those membership structures are manifest. First, we look into associational engagement, and the degree to which migrants' interactions within associations provide 'bridging' opportunities or, alternatively, embed them in ethnic enclaves. Then we examine the ethnic composition of their most intimate social circle and relations: the people with whom they talk and interact most often, their spouses and partners, and their households. Finally, we assess the degree to which bonding social capital dominates at the ethnic group level with information about the inter-organizational links of the ethnic associations of each group in each city.

We first focus on the bridging or bonding nature of associational engagements. There are a number of ways in which we can approach the measurement of 'ethnic' social capital. The most obvious is to examine the levels



**Figure 5.1** Involvement in ethnic ‘advocacy’ organizations by city and group  
*Legend:* MOR = Moroccan, ECU = Ecuadorian, AND = Andean, EGY = Egyptian, FIL = Filipino, ET\_HU = Ethnic Hungarian, CHI = Chinese, MMUS = Mixed Muslim group, ITA = Italian, KOS = Kosovar, TUR = Turkish, ALG = Algerian, TUN = Tunisian, BAN = Bangladeshi, IND = Indian, BCAR = Black Caribbean.  
*Note:* the shapes mark the average value, the bars along each point indicate the 95 per cent confidence interval, and the white patterned shapes highlight groups that are present in more than one city.

of membership and participation in the activities of associations that are primarily oriented towards the advancement of the respondents’ own ethnic or national origin group.<sup>11</sup> In a sense, these are primarily ethnic advocacy organizations, to the extent that they are primarily concerned with defending the causes that are directly related to a specific ethnic or national community. In this sense, they are fairly political in their goals. As we see from Figure 5.1, restricting the consideration of ‘ethnic’ associational memberships only to this type of organization limits substantially both the levels of positive responses and the variation across groups.

Yet for the purposes of our core research questions, we are more interested in measuring the extent to which the social interactions in which migrants engage because of their involvement in any sort of associations – and not just advocacy ethnic associations – are primarily limited to interactions with other co-ethnics. Hence, if the aim is measuring the degree of bonding and bridging social capital that migrants accumulate overall, we will capture it better by asking respondents about the ethnic mix of the membership of each association in which they are involved. To this end, respondents were asked – for every association they either were members or participated in their activities – whether 50 per cent or more of the membership was of their own ethnic or national origin group. With this information, we compute a new variable that reflects – for any given respondent – the percentage of the associations in which they are involved that are also composed of a majority




Figure 5.2 Co-ethnic ‘bonding’ in associational involvement by city and group (only for respondents who are members or participate in at least one association)  
 Legend and Note: see Figure 5.1.

of co-ethnics.<sup>12</sup> In essence, the resulting variable is the best available proxy of ‘bonding’ – and, reversely, of ‘bridging’ – associational social capital that one can get with survey data. Figure 5.2 shows the results of this indicator of bonding associational social capital by city and group.

A first important conclusion that these results suggest is that, in several of the cities, there is a substantial amount of ethnic bonding in the associations that most migrant-background residents join.<sup>13</sup> Generally, between 30 and 60 per cent of the associations in which migrants are involved are formed by a majority of co-ethnics. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the degree of associational ethnic bonding across groups is generally relatively similar within cities and tends to vary more across cities, with the exception of the Italian case. The French city (Lyon) is the one where ethnic bridging is more common in the associational realm – and, hence, where residents of migrant background mostly join associations where members are not predominantly of their own ethnic or national-origin group – whereas London is at the top end of the ethnic bonding spectrum. This provides some support to the notion that republican and multicultural citizenship regimes produce sharply contrasting patterns of co-ethnic interaction also within associations, and highlights the importance of considering – together with meso- and micro-structures and relationships – institutional contextual factors (Bloemraad, 2005).

Additionally, for the few groups we have studied in more than one city, we also find interesting similarities. For example, Ecuadorians in Barcelona, Madrid and Milan show very similar degrees of co-ethnic associational engagement, and the same happens with Kosovars in Zurich and Geneva. However, this is not the case with Moroccans in Barcelona, Madrid and

Lyon – who show substantially less ethnically segregated associational patterns in the latter city – nor for Italians in Geneva and Zurich, who are marginally less segregated in their associational engagements in the former city.<sup>14</sup>

Nevertheless, associational engagement only taps into the more formal side of social capital and its bonding or bridging nature. Additionally, our questionnaire provides us with information on the ethnic composition of close acquaintances, family and household members of the respondents. First, we requested the interviewee to identify up to three people with whom they talked and interacted frequently.<sup>15</sup> Though a majority of respondents identified a relative – but not necessarily one who lives in their own household – as one of the three 'relevant others', around one-quarter of respondents mention at least one friend or acquaintance, and around one-fifth cite a co-worker. Subsequently, we asked respondents about the ethnic background of these relevant others. Second, to respondents who are married or living in a partnership, we asked them about their spouse/partner's country of birth.<sup>16</sup> Finally, all interviewees were asked about the ethnic composition of their own households.<sup>17</sup> With these five items,<sup>18</sup> we can create a reasonable proxy indicator of the degree of ethnic homogeneity of the most intimate social circle of respondents. Consequently, the index approximates the degree of bonding and bridging informal social capital. Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of this index across cities and groups.

The results on informal social capital indicate that ethnic homogeneity – as we would expect – is much more widespread than for associational social capital. For most cities and groups, between 60 and 90 per cent of respondents' most intimate social circle is ethnically homogeneous. In this




Figure 5.3 Ethnic homogeneity of immediate social circle

Legend and Note: see Figure 5.1.

case, cross-city variations are smaller, at the same time that within-city variations are also relatively reduced. The Swiss and French cities stand out as relatively distinctive in producing more ethnically heterogeneous social settings, partly due to higher levels of inter-ethnic marriages in Lyon and for the Italians in the Swiss cities.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, as this indicator is not related to the public realm, citizenship regimes seem to be of little relevance – in particular the contrast between republican and multicultural models.

Finally, we include a fourth variable on ethnic-bonding social capital measured at the organizational level. This index measures the amount of ethnic ties that organizations from the respondents' ethnic group have with other organizations of that same ethnic group.<sup>20</sup> This index intends to measure the extent to which the organizational networks of the migrant groups studied are ethnically bonded. The higher the index value, the more organizations are linked to other organizations of the same ethnic group.

The differences across cities and across groups that emerge in Figure 5.4 are substantial. In Barcelona and Geneva we find the highest degree of ethnic bonding among migrant organizations, which means that organizations of the same migrant group are highly connected to one another. This holds especially true for Ecuadorians and Moroccans in Barcelona, as well as for Kosovars in Geneva. The degree of ethnic connectivity among migrant organizations is, in contrast, very low in Lyon. Although patterns of ethnic ties among migrant organizations are not clear for all the cities observed, the results suggest that in Lyon the discouragement of ethnic mobilization results in Maghrebi organizations that are minimally connected with other organizations of the same migrant group. In any case, within-city variation is also considerable, as different ethnic groups display varying degrees of ethnic




Figure 5.4 The index of group-level organizational ethnic bonding  
 Legend and Note: see Figure 5.1.

inter-organizational bonding. Thus, Ecuadorian organizations in Barcelona and Milan are more inclined to engage in collaborations with other local organizations of Ecuadorians than with the other groups in those cities, and equally the Chinese in Budapest and the Kosovars in Geneva sustain intense bonding links with co-ethnic organizations.

In summary, our four indicators of ethnic-bonding social capital cover a wide array of elements that are important for assessing the multiple effects of different forms of social capital on migrants' political engagement. In the next pages we turn to the multivariate analysis of these effects.

### Assessing the effect of social capital on migrants' political engagement

In the following tables, we assess the impact of different types of bonding and bridging social capital on three dimensions of political engagement: political interest, political contacting and protesting. For each of these dependent variables, we estimate the likelihood of engaging in homeland or ethnic politics (model 1), the likelihood of engaging residence-country or mainstream politics (model 2), and the likelihood of engaging only in homeland or ethnic-focused politics as opposed to engaging only in mainstream politics (model 3). Hence, only the third model captures the correlates that drive individuals to engage exclusively in homeland or ethnic politics. The first two models are estimated with logistic regression, and the third reports on one of the several possible contrasts of a multinomial regression on the variables described in Tables 5.1 to 5.3. Given that some of the variables are

Table 5.4 Ethnic bonding and interest in politics

	Model 1: interested in homeland politics (1) vs. rest (0)		Model 2: interested in residence country politics (1) vs. rest (0)		Model 3: interested only in homeland politics (1) vs. interested only in residence country politics (0)	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
<i>Social capital variables</i>						
Involved in any organization	0.22*	(0.09)	0.72***	(0.10)	-0.75***	(0.18)
Involved in ethnic advocacy organization	0.39*	(0.16)	0.44*	(0.21)	-0.12	(0.40)
Ethnic bonding within associations	0.24**	(0.09)	-0.69***	(0.12)	1.52***	(0.19)
Ethnic homogeneity of informal relationships	0.32**	(0.10)	-0.36***	(0.10)	1.09***	(0.26)

(continued)



Table 5.4 Continued

	Model 1: interested in homeland politics (1) vs. rest (0)		Model 2: interested in residence country politics (1) vs. rest (0)		Model 3: interested only in homeland politics (1) vs. interested only in residence country politics (0)	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
Ethnic bonding of inter- organizational networks	0.63	(0.66)	0.10	(1.01)	1.04	(2.00)
<i>POS variables</i>						
POS individual rights (positive = open)	-2.08**	(0.70)	-0.41	(0.82)	-2.65*	(1.18)
POS group rights (positive = open)	-0.07	(0.31)	-0.74	(0.48)	0.92	(0.74)
<i>Control variables</i>						
Man	0.25***	(0.07)	0.31**	(0.09)	-0.11	(0.15)
Education	0.87***	(0.15)	0.92***	(0.15)	-0.07	(0.27)
In paid work	-0.13	(0.07)	0.07	(0.08)	-0.36*	(0.15)
Age	0.00	(0.00)	0.01**	(0.00)	-0.01*	(0.01)
Married	0.15	(0.08)	0.08	(0.08)	0.14	(0.13)
Trust	0.34**	(0.13)	0.42*	(0.19)	-0.17	(0.26)
Second generation	0.19	(0.15)	-0.24	(0.20)	0.56	(0.35)
Muslim	-0.00	(0.13)	0.23	(0.17)	-0.36	(0.31)
Proportion of life living in country residence	-0.73**	(0.23)	0.41	(0.27)	-1.86***	(0.43)
Has citizenship of country of residence	-0.16*	(0.07)	0.29*	(0.14)	-0.78***	(0.20)
Language	0.06	(0.10)	0.62***	(0.18)	-0.94***	(0.24)
Undocumented migrants	-0.02	(0.13)	-0.27	(0.20)	0.37	(0.31)
Refugees	0.32	(0.20)	0.07	(0.23)	0.33	(0.25)
<i>Interaction variables</i>						
Interaction POS individ- ual rights with bonding within associations	0.65	(0.38)	-0.88	(0.60)	2.40	(1.34)
Interaction POS group rights with bonding within associations	0.73*	(0.37)	1.05*	(0.52)	-0.57	(0.71)
Constant	-1.01***	(0.23)	-1.86***	(0.31)	1.44*	(0.57)
Log likelihood	-3800.08		-3762.45		-7135.67	
Pseudo R2	0.063		0.080		0.081	
N	5855		5916		5957	

Logit coefficients and standard errors (models 1 and 2). Multinomial logit coefficients and standard errors (model 3).

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

measured at the level of the ethnic/migrant group or the city/country, the models correct the standard errors for the clustering involved.<sup>21</sup>

We present three tables (Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6), one for each dimension of political engagement considered.<sup>22</sup> We control for variables that are known to be relevant correlates of political behaviour and attitudes, and for a number of variables related to the migration process that are very likely to have a direct impact on migrants' inclination and capacity to become engaged with political affairs.

Our findings are generally supportive of the expectation that, overall, bonding social capital – both formal (involvement in organizations with a majority of co-ethnic members) and informal (ethnic homogeneity of

Table 5.5 Ethnic bonding and political contacting

	Model 1: ethnic political contacting (1) vs. rest (0)		Model 2: mainstream political contacting (1) vs. rest (0)		Model 3: only ethnic political contacting (1) vs. only mainstream political contacting (0)	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
<i>Social capital variables</i>						
Involved in any organization	0.77***	(0.11)	1.26***	(0.16)	-0.47*	(0.20)
Involved in ethnic advocacy organization	0.61	(0.35)	0.38	(0.36)	0.26	(0.52)
Ethnic bonding within associations	-0.05	(0.25)	-0.73**	(0.25)	0.74*	(0.31)
Ethnic homogeneity of informal relationships	-0.11	(0.16)	-0.84***	(0.11)	0.92***	(0.20)
Ethnic bonding of inter-organizational networks	1.26	(0.95)	0.94	(1.18)	0.45	(1.43)
<i>POS variables</i>						
POS individual rights	0.50	(0.91)	1.71*	(0.78)	-1.35	(0.96)
POS group rights	0.98*	(0.46)	-0.47	(0.56)	1.70**	(0.55)

(continued)

Table 5.5 Continued

	Model 1: ethnic political contacting (1) vs. rest (0)		Model 2: mainstream political contacting (1) vs. rest (0)		Model 3: only ethnic political contacting (1) vs. only mainstream political contacting (0)	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
<i>Control variables</i>						
Man	0.35*	(0.14)	0.35***	(0.10)	-0.01	(0.11)
Education	1.05***	(0.27)	0.84***	(0.21)	0.06	(0.27)
In paid work	-0.31	(0.16)	-0.17	(0.10)	-0.13	(0.17)
Age	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)
Married	0.30*	(0.12)	0.21	(0.11)	0.12	(0.17)
Trust	-0.50	(0.31)	0.06	(0.19)	-0.64	(0.41)
Second generation	-0.11	(0.63)	-0.13	(0.30)	0.36	(0.74)
Muslim	-0.32	(0.20)	0.08	(0.20)	-0.38	(0.19)
Proportion of life living in country residence	-0.46	(0.64)	-0.02	(0.44)	-0.69	(0.82)
Has citizenship of country of residence	-0.03	(0.27)	0.17	(0.14)	-0.32	(0.29)
Language	0.26	(0.28)	1.01***	(0.22)	-0.83**	(0.31)
Undocumented migrants	0.60**	(0.21)	-0.02	(0.31)	0.67*	(0.31)
Refugees	-0.77	(0.82)	-0.12	(0.42)	-0.56	(0.73)
<i>Interaction variables</i>						
Interaction POS individual rights with bonding within associations	-2.56	(1.92)	-4.06**	(1.34)	1.58	(2.80)
Interaction POS group rights with bonding within associations	-0.28	(0.84)	1.33	(0.99)	-1.93	(1.48)
Constant	-4.14***	(0.39)	-4.59***	(0.42)	0.42	(0.52)
Log likelihood	-931.00		-1358.72		-2259.16	
Pseudo R2	0.068		0.1344		0.111	
N	5957		5957		5957	

Logit coefficients and standard errors (models 1 and 2). Multinomial logit coefficients and standard errors (model 3).

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table 5.6 Ethnic bonding and protest action

	Model 1: ethnic political protest (1) vs. rest (0)		Model 2: mainstream political protest (1) vs. rest (0)		Model 3: only ethnic political protest (1) vs. only mainstream political protest (0)	
	B	se	B	se	b	se
<i>Social capital variables</i>						
Involved in any organization	0.95***	(0.23)	1.12***	(0.16)	0.05	(0.30)
Involved in ethnic advocacy organization	-0.24	(0.43)	0.09	(0.30)	-0.66	(0.58)
Ethnic bonding within associations	0.05	(0.30)	-0.62**	(0.23)	0.63	(0.40)
Ethnic homogeneity of informal relationships	0.63	(0.34)	-0.75***	(0.13)	1.39***	(0.41)
Ethnic bonding of inter-organizational networks	-4.03	(2.33)	0.93	(1.70)	-4.43	(3.07)
<i>POS variables</i>						
POS individual rights	-0.88	(2.10)	4.32***	(1.04)	-6.25**	(2.08)
POS group rights	-1.66	(0.97)	-1.66**	(0.63)	-0.01	(1.12)
<i>Control variables</i>						
Man	0.27	(0.26)	0.12	(0.11)	0.29	(0.26)
Education	0.31	(0.45)	0.57**	(0.18)	-0.41	(0.51)
In paid work	-0.02	(0.22)	-0.06	(0.08)	-0.05	(0.28)
Age	-0.00	(0.01)	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.01)
Married	0.04	(0.16)	-0.09	(0.08)	0.16	(0.28)
Trust	-0.16	(0.49)	0.17	(0.23)	-0.37	(0.47)
Second generation	-0.56	(0.49)	-0.51*	(0.24)	-0.00	(0.51)
Muslim	-0.27	(0.29)	0.10	(0.24)	-0.66	(0.34)
Proportion of life living in country of residence	-0.25	(0.70)	0.64*	(0.27)	-0.98	(0.69)
Has citizenship of country of residence	0.45*	(0.20)	0.22	(0.15)	0.22	(0.23)
Language	1.25**	(0.45)	1.15***	(0.25)	0.08	(0.46)
Undocumented migrants	0.09	(0.54)	0.06	(0.23)	0.25	(0.56)
Refugees	0.45	(1.00)	0.10	(0.40)	-0.01	(1.02)
<i>Interaction variables</i>						
Interaction POS individual rights with bonding within associations	-1.99	(1.27)	-1.36	(1.87)	-0.85	(2.54)

(continued)

Table 5.6 Continued

	Model 1: ethnic political protest (1) vs. rest (0)		Model 2: mainstream political protest (1) vs. rest (0)		Model 3: only ethnic political protest (1) vs. only mainstream political protest (0)	
	B	se	B	se	b	se
Interaction POS group rights with bonding within associations	0.40	(0.88)	1.60*	(0.76)	-0.74	(1.20)
Constant	-5.35***	(0.70)	-3.22***	(0.29)	-2.18*	(0.97)
Log likelihood	-544.77		-2023.56		-2552.23	
Pseudo R2	0.072		0.185		0.167	
N	5957		5957		5957	

Logit coefficients and standard errors (models 1 and 2). Multinomial logit coefficients and standard errors (model 3).

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

informal relationships) – hinders migrants' interest and engagement in the political affairs of their country of residence. In turn, ethnic-bonding social capital fosters the interest in homeland politics but has no significant effect on active involvement in ethnic contacting or protesting. Moreover, the more migrants are involved in organizations with a majority of co-ethnic members and the more their closest acquaintances are ethnically homogeneous, the more likely they are to be interested or active only in homeland/ethnic politics as opposed to developing an interest only in residence-country politics.

The two other variables that measure ethnic bonding social capital have a minor effect on migrants' political engagement. On the one hand, involvement in associations that are specifically concerned with ethnic causes – or 'ethnic advocacy' organizations – significantly fosters migrants' interest in the politics of the country they live in, but it has no significant effect on contacting or protesting. Hence, rather than supporting the hypothesis that ethnic organizations foster political engagement with an ethnic focus, these results indicate that ethnic advocacy organizations expose migrants to politics in a diffuse way. On the other hand, ethnic bonding at the group level – as measured by the ethnic character of inter-organizational networks – has no effect on individual migrants' engagement with politics. These results are even more interesting when we take into consideration that greater stocks of social capital *per se* are conducive to a greater likelihood to become interested and active in both ethnic/homeland politics and mainstream/residence-country politics,

while it generally discourages migrants from paying exclusive attention to ethnic/homeland politics.

Overall, these findings provide mixed evidence as to whether ethnic bonding is detrimental to migrants' political integration. Ethnic bonding within formal associational engagements and within the closest circles of acquaintances seems to be clearly detrimental to the political incorporation of migrants, as it is negatively related to becoming engaged in the politics of the country of residence while it does not have any positive effect on ethnic political engagement either. Yet, involvement in ethnic advocacy organizations has no such negative effect, though its positive effects are relatively marginal and limited to fostering interest in political affairs in general. In essence, our results point to the fact that social relations that disconnect migrants from the general population and embed them in primarily ethnic bonds will limit their engagement in politics more generally, whereas social capital that bridges across ethnic groups has a strong positive effect on all forms of political engagement, especially in the politics of the country of residence.

In addition to the individual- and the organizational-level variables, we have introduced two indicators of the closure or openness of the POS. We employ the overall indices of individual and group rights specific to each pair of migrant group and city as presented in Table 3.1 in Cinalli and Giugni (Chapter 3 in this volume). Hence, positive values indicate more open contexts in the respective dimension, whereas negative values indicate closure. Our results show interesting patterns in this regard. On the one hand, the more individual rights migrants are granted, the more they tend to participate in residence-country activities and less in homeland or ethnic activities. On the other hand, although the patterns are significant only for some of the dependent variables, generally we find that in the contexts where migrants are granted more group rights, they are less likely to be engaged in mainstream politics, and in the case of contacting they favour instead political action that revolves around their own ethnic groups' issues. Consequently, our results confirm and extend the findings presented by Cinalli and Giugni (Chapter 3 in this volume) that highlight the importance of POS when accounting for migrants' political engagement.

The results of the interactive effects of POS and ethnic bonding within associations are also of some interest.<sup>23</sup> For interest in politics (Table 5.4) we find that contexts where migrants are afforded considerable group rights multiply the positive effect of bonding associational social capital on the interest in homeland politics (model 1); at the same time greater group rights moderate the negative effects of ethnic associational bonding on interest in the politics of the country of residence (model 2). Hence, in both cases, group rights foster the political interest of those who are more embedded in ethnically homogeneous social relations, whereas it has no

significant effect on migrants who pay exclusive attention to homeland politics (model 3). In the case of individual rights, we find no interactive effects with bonding social capital for interest in politics.

In the case of political contacting (Table 5.5), we find only a significant interactive effect between POS related to individual rights and ethnic associational social capital on mainstream political contacting (model 2). The results indicate that in contexts with closed POS – in what relates to individual rights – migrants with higher levels of bonding social capital are more likely to engage in political contacting on mainstream issues. However, increasing levels of associational ethnic bonding result in diminishing likelihoods of engagement in mainstream political contacting when the context is neutral, and in even sharper declines when the POS is most favourable to migrants (Figure 5.5).

When we turn our focus to protest action (Table 5.6), again we find an interactive effect only between POS and ethnic associational social capital in relation to mainstream protesting (model 2) and, in this case, for group rights only. The results indicate that in contexts where the POS is closed or neutral towards migrants' group rights, greater bonding within associations results in a decreasing likelihood of engaging in protest around mainstream issues (Figure 5.6). Hence, in closed or neutral contexts towards migrants' group rights, there is a sharp difference between the inclination to engage in mainstream protests of migrants who are involved only in associations where their co-ethnics are not a majority (values of zero in the ethnic bonding variable) and that of migrants who are involved in associations where their co-ethnics are a majority (values of one in the ethnic bonding variable). In




Figure 5.5 The interactive effect of ethnic-bonding associational social capital and POS on mainstream political contacting (as per Table 5.5, model 2)




Figure 5.6 The interactive effect of ethnic-bonding associational social capital and POS on mainstream protesting (as per Table 5.6, model 2)

contrast, in those contexts where migrants' group rights are recognized the levels of mainstream protesting of migrants engaged primarily in bridging associational involvements are very similar to those involved in primarily bonding associations, and slightly higher for the latter.

Overall, these results indicate that different aspects of the POS interact differently with ethnic social capital depending on the form of political engagement we consider. While in many cases ethnic-bonding social capital hinders engagement in mainstream political issues, in some cases the POS importantly mediates that effect. In certain contexts, ethnic social capital has substantial mobilizing potential – both for mainstream and ethnic issues – while in others it discourages political involvement. Simplistic views of the effect of migrants' bonding with co-ethnics are bound to lead us to erroneous conclusions about how immigrants and their children become involved in the political process.

## Conclusions

Our findings provide some support for our initial hypotheses that bonding and bridging social capital have differential effects on the focus of concern and action of migrants' political attitudes and behaviours. Invariably, ethnically segregated patterns of social interaction are related to a reduced inclination to become interested and active in the political affairs of the country of residence. This is particularly true for ethnic-bonding associational engagement and ethnically segmented intimate social relations, which show a significant and negative effect for all



the forms of interest and participation in the politics of the country of residence that we have analysed in this chapter. In contrast to this clear pattern of negative effects, ethnic mobilization through organizations that specifically pursue the promotion of the concerns and interests of ethnic minorities (ethnic advocacy organizations) are capable of enhancing migrants' political interest in the politics of both the 'homeland' and the country of residence. Bonding ties among ethnic organizations do not seem to be significant in their role of mobilizing structures for any type of political engagement.

In this regard, our findings are different to those reported by other scholars working on this topic (Berger et al., 2004; Jacobs et al., 2004; Tillie, 2004). While our measurements are more refined and not entirely comparable to those used in these previous pieces of research, our results are somewhat at odds with those reported by Jacobs et al. (2004) for Belgium and by Tillie (2004) for the Netherlands, as they generally find a positive effect for ethnic associational memberships. Instead, the results we have shown in this chapter are more in line with (but still different to) the more ambiguous conclusions derived from Berger et al.'s (2004) study, who find differential effects of ethnic associational memberships on interest in German politics (none or negative effect) and political action on German issues (positive effect). They attribute these seemingly contradictory findings to the fact that participation directed at German issues can still be ethnic-related. Our measurements of political participation have allowed us to differentiate between participation that is related to 'mainstream' issues and that concerned with either homeland issues or ethnic-group issues. With these more refined measurements, however, our results are not consistent with Berger et al.'s speculation that ethnic associations mobilize ethnic participation. What we find is that bonding social capital – either in formal associations or in informal social relations – reduces the interest and the engagement in mainstream political affairs and has no significant positive effect on active participation in ethnic issues or concerns.

This notwithstanding, our chapter has also shown that the political context is quite important in any account of migrants' political engagement. An open POS in terms of migrants' individual rights is generally conducive to higher levels of participation in relation to mainstream political concerns, and to a diminished interest in homeland politics. Equally, an open POS in terms of migrants' group rights results in higher levels of ethnic political contacting. But more importantly, the effect of ethnic associational social capital depends on the configuration of the POS. This interactive effect of bonding social capital and the political context is most likely responsible for the seemingly divergent results reported for Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands in past scholarship. Ethnic social capital has different meanings and mobilization value in different political and institutional contexts. In a context where individual rights are easily accessible to immigrants and

their children and group rights are underdeveloped, ethnic social capital is primarily a segregating force. In contexts where migrants' group rights are plentiful, ethnic social capital has a more (albeit still mild) integrative effect. The one unequivocal finding of this chapter is that ethnically bridging social capital derived from associational engagement invariably fosters the political engagement of migrants.

## **Appendix: list of variables employed**

### **Common variables (see General Appendix to this volume)**

Age, education (edu), in paid work (employed), married, Muslim, second generation migrant, citizenship (resnatio), undocumented, refugee, proportion of life in the country (propyrscntry), fluency (fluent), involved, invethni, social trust (but rescaled to 0–1 range and with all non responses given a value of 0.5), ethnic bonding within associations (bridethn2), ethnic homogeneity of informal relationships (proethinf), POS individual rights, and POS group rights.

### **Variables specific to this chapter**

*Interest in politics of homeland vs residence country:* we created three different variables, one reflecting interest in the politics of the country of residence, another reflecting interest in the politics of the country of origin/ancestry, and another reflecting the possible combinations of the answers to the former two. These three variables are the result of combining three variables on interest in the politics of the city of residence, the national politics of the country of residence, and the politics of the country of birth or ancestry. The three variables had four response categories (not at all interested, not very interested, fairly interested and very interested) that were collapsed into two categories of interest (very or fairly) and no interest (not at all, not very). Interest in the politics of the residence country reflects a positive response in either local politics or national politics.

*Ethnic vs. mainstream contacting:* the questionnaire included five items on political contacting (a politician, a government official, the media, a solicitor, worked in an action group), and for each that elicited a positive response, respondents were asked who was affected by the issue that motivated the action. The response categories were: 1 = respondent, family or few people, 2 = people in this city/region, 3 = people in the country, 4 = people in (origin) country, 5 = people in the whole world. The respondent was then asked whether the issue concerned people of his/her ethnic/national-origin background. We created three variables reflecting the types of contacting the respondent had engaged in. When a respondent answered that the issue was of concern to him/herself, their family or few people and to people of his/her same ethnic/national background, or when the individual answered

that it concerned people in the country of origin for any of the five forms of contacting, this was coded as an 'ethnic-focused' contact. When a respondent had engaged in any form of contacting that was not 'ethnic-focused' s/he had a positive value on the 'mainstream' contacting variable. The third variable reflected the possible combinations of the previous two: no contacting at all, only mainstream contacting, only ethnic-focused contacting, both forms of contacting.

*Ethnic vs. mainstream protesting:* we applied the same logic as for contacting but for the items of signing a petition, participating in a demonstration, and participating in a strike.

*Ethnic bonding of inter-organizational networks:* this variable comes from the analysis of the survey of migrant organizations conducted in each city. It is an index that ranges from 0 to 1 and is the result of dividing, for each ethnic/national group, the average number of links to other organizations of the same ethnic group by the total number of organizations of that same group that were named by any organization in the study.

## Notes

\*We want to thank Yaojun Li and Mario Diani for the detailed comments they made to previous versions of this chapter, as well as the participants in the several workshops where early drafts of this chapter were presented.

1. See Cheong et al. (2007) for a similar approach.
2. This notwithstanding, several authors have underlined that social groups tend to be characterized by the principle of homophily, according to which people's personal networks are homogeneous with regard to many socio-demographic, behavioural and intrapersonal characteristics (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001).
3. The underlying mechanism is related to the way in which the organic solidarity produced within minority communities can foster collective action (see Rex, 2000: 61ff).
4. See Lin (2001: 25–27) on the various conceptual and methodological controversies in the theorizing of social capital.
5. Among the most recent, see the chapters in van Deth et al. (2007) and, in particular, the chapter by Teorell, Torcal and Montero (2007).
6. We will refer to the latter as the 'homeland' for brevity, but we acknowledge that for many respondents the country of ancestry might not be regarded really as their homeland in terms of personal attachments.
7. We have decided not to analyse voting because in most of the countries we study non-citizens are not allowed to vote in any elections. See González-Ferrer (Chapter 4 in this volume) for a detailed analysis of migrants' electoral behaviour.
8. The indicators of party activity and political consumerism did not elicit a sufficient number of positive responses for statistical analyses to be meaningful in most cases.

9. We have attributed a positive response to all respondents who had done any of the following in relation to either 'ethnic' or 'mainstream' issues or concerns: contacted politicians; contacted government officials; worked in a political action group; contacted the media; or contacted a solicitor/judicial body for non-private matters.
10. Protesting includes signing petitions, participating in demonstrations or joining strikes.
11. This associational category was described to the respondent as any '[Ethnic group] organization (e.g. organization primarily for the advancement of [ethnic group] people)', and the interviewer would substitute the text within brackets for the name of the ethnic group the respondent was sampled from (Algerian, Ecuadorian, Caribbean, and so on).
12. Respondents who were not involved in any association were assigned a zero value for the variable that we include in the multivariate analyses later in this chapter. However, for the purposes of presentation in Figure 5.2, individuals who were not involved in any association whatsoever were excluded from the analysis. Hence, Figure 5.2 indicates the prevalence of ethnic bonding among those migrants who are engaged in at least one association.
13. The 95 per cent confidence interval error bars are very wide for a few ethnic groups because few respondents in these groups are involved – are members or participate in activities – in any association. This is less of a problem for our multivariate analyses because we pool all the city surveys and we do not differentiate by ethnic group.
14. Unfortunately, we cannot explore to what extent these ethnic-bonding associational patterns are related to differential degrees of urban ethnic concentration in the territory, but it is very likely to be related.
15. Unfortunately, due to time constraints, in Lyon respondents were asked only about the one person with whom they talked or interacted the most. Around 65 per cent cite a relative, around 20 per cent a friend or acquaintance, and around 15 per cent a co-worker.
16. This way of measuring co-ethnic partnerships underestimates ethnic homogeneity for countries with sizeable second generations that were born in the country of residence, as we only register as a homogeneous partnership those in which the ethnic group of the individual matches the country of birth of the partner. Thus, if a British respondent of Bangladeshi origin but born in Britain is married to another British Bangladeshi also born in the UK we will not capture this couple as homogenous but, wrongly, as inter-ethnic. This is particularly problematic for the British and French cases.
17. Again, this question was not asked in Lyon, as the pilot tests indicated that many respondents had trouble in understanding what they being were asked about.
18. It includes only two items for the French case. To avoid as much as possible the problem of the difference in the number of items between the French and the other cases – but also the difficulties linked to the different number of 'relevant others' that respondents did mention – we have computed the index as the proportion of ethnically homogenous social relationships out of the total number of valid responses obtained for the five indicators.
19. However, the heterogeneity of the closest social relationships of the French respondents is most likely overestimated, given the reduced number of items related to the ethnic composition of social acquaintances in the French questionnaire.

20. The index is the group-level average of the proportion of outgoing ties (*outdegree*) that interviewed organizations of a particular migrant group had with other co-ethnic organizations out of the total number of migrant organizations of that same migrant group that could be mentioned.
21. We have used Stata command `vce(cluster)`.
22. The analyses we present pool the data for the eight cities and six countries considered in this chapter; however, we also ran equivalent models (without the city- and group-level variables) on split files of single-city samples and they were broadly consistent with the results presented in Tables 5.4 to 5.6.
23. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 use the estimates reported in the respective tables and change the values of the variables of interest while holding the rest constant at their means (for scales) or modes (for binary variables). For the purposes of meaningful estimation, we have set the value of involvement in any organization to 1 (yes).

# 6

## Optimal Opportunities for Ethnic Organization and Political Integration? Comparing Stockholm with Other European Cities

*Per Strömblad, Gunnar Myrberg and Bo Bengtsson*

### Introduction

In most European cities, immigrants and their children comprise a rapidly growing share of the population. Although heterogeneous in most aspects, this category is characterized by at least one distinctive political feature, namely its underrepresentation in democratic decision structures (Bäck and Soininen, 1998: 29; Fennema and Tillie, 2001; Togeby, 2004; Myrberg, 2007). Obviously, this situation implies a potential 'participatory distortion' (Verba et al., 1995) in which ethnic minorities risk getting less attention paid to their problems and needs than the native majority population and, consequently, an unknown number of original and innovative views may never get through to the political agenda. If so, this political inequality constitutes a problem not only for individuals whose voices go unheard but also for the democratic society as a whole. In this respect, public policies aimed to facilitate the integration of immigrants seem to have failed.

In the academic discourse, engagement in voluntary associations has frequently been regarded as a road to political participation, and considerable empirical evidence has been presented in support of such a positive relationship (Almond and Verba, 1963; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1995; Kwak et al., 2004). Similar expectations have been directed towards ethnic associations as a possible path towards political integration and political equality for members of minority groups (Strömblad and Adman, 2009). In this case, however, there is also a strong competing theory saying that engagement in ethnic organizations may create bonding social capital and contribute to a stronger isolation from society at large (Putnam, 2000).<sup>1</sup>

The disparate academic views notwithstanding, Swedish integration policy has long been directed towards civil society and the organizational life of immigrants (Borevi, 2002: ch. 4). With obvious inspiration from

the ‘popular movement’ idea, ethnic associations are expected to function both as platforms for political action and beneficial environments for the development of their members’ democratic competence and political efficacy (Bengtsson, 2004: 13–14; Hadenius, 1999). Accordingly, ethnic associations have been granted political and economic state support since the mid-1970s (Borevi, 2002: ch. 4; Aytar, 2007: ch. 5). Although the regulative parameters have been somewhat modified from time to time, the policy theory as such has remained remarkably stable (Dahlström, 2004). In light of the overall aim of making access to Swedish society easier, ethnic associations are expected to counteract social exclusion and to enhance migrants’ political participation. Thus, in Swedish integration policy ethnic self-organizing is an important policy instrument for supporting the political integration of immigrated citizens, and considerable institutional support and economic incentives have been addressed to this part of the voluntary sector.

This strong backing has created a rather unique political opportunity structure for ethnic organizations (Bengtsson, 2010), and the aim of this chapter is to investigate empirically whether this can be seen as resulting in a different role of associations as political actors, and as arenas for political action, in Stockholm when compared to the situation in other European cities. Our point of departure is that Stockholm should be regarded as a ‘most likely case’ with regard to the role of ethnic associations as a road to political integration. In consequence we will focus our analysis on Stockholm and use results from the other European cities primarily as a comparative point of reference.

In previous research, one of us has pointed out that there are actually four possible links between migrants’ associational engagement and their political involvement and influence. Figure 6.1 illustrates this idea (Bengtsson, 2004 and 2010). Firstly, both *ethnic* and *non-ethnic* associations may offer *channels* for political participation, whereby members collectively make efforts to influence policy-makers and social conditions. Secondly, both

	Via ethnic associations	Via non-ethnic associations
<b>Channel mechanism</b>	(1) political power of ethnic associations	(3) power of immigrants in non-ethnic associations
<b>Arena mechanism</b>	(2) participation in ethnic associations	(4) participation of immigrants in non-ethnic associations

Figure 6.1 Four roads to political integration via associations

ethnic and non-ethnic associations may also (more or less intentionally) serve as *arenas* where migrant members develop political resources and motivation. Obviously, these four mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, but it is important to note that, in contrast to the channel mechanisms, the two arena mechanisms do not demand that the association itself is politically active. Indeed, individual political involvement encouraged by these mechanisms may strictly take place outside the organizational realm. Even so, the activities may, at least partly, result from a membership-based gain in knowledge and experience.

Together the conditions of these four mechanisms – ethnic associations as (1) channels and (2) arenas, and non-ethnic associations as (3) channels and (4) arenas – can be conceived of as defining a political opportunity structure (POS) for political integration (or political inclusion) of migrants via associational activity (Bengtsson, 2010).<sup>2</sup> In this chapter we primarily investigate the second of these four roads to political integration, that is, the function of ethnic associations as arenas where members' political resources and motivation can be developed. Hence, although we descriptively compare the activities of ethnic associations, our main research question is whether participation in such organizations does indeed serve as a road to political participation and integration in a context where formal political opportunities for organizational life in general, and for ethnic organization in particular, appear to be almost optimal.

### **A most likely case for political integration through ethnic organization**

Over the past 40 years Stockholm has become a progressively more multi-ethnic urban area (Andersson, 1998b: ch. 3; Lundén, 1999). Consequently, the number of inhabitants with a background in other parts of the world is by now large enough to include fairly substantial subgroups of several ethnic minorities. This is of course true of many of the cities studied in this volume, but what is more important in the case of Stockholm is the fact that the voluntary organization of ethnic minorities is constructed as a political instrument for integration and thus encouraged, by local as well as national authorities, both by means of financial support, and in terms of consultative status. As a rule then, the actual possibilities of joining (or perhaps even forming) an association directed towards people from one's own country of origin should be better there than elsewhere.<sup>3</sup> Hence, one may argue that strong political, economic and institutional support of ethnic organization makes Stockholm a 'most likely case' for political integration through ethnic associations in their role as political *channels*. We would expect that, all things being equal, economic resources, political access and institutional networks should give ethnic associations more collective power than in other cities.



Perhaps it is less obvious what to expect when it comes to the role of ethnic organizations as participatory *arenas*. In one perspective, ethnic associations can be seen as a 'weapon of the weak' (Michels, 1962 [1915]; cf. Leighley, 2001: 5–6) which may perform a compensatory function for people who otherwise would have limited opportunities to make themselves heard in political life. Thus, in a propitious setting for the development of ethnic associations, migrants should generally enjoy better opportunities than in other contexts to be politically encouraged as a side-effect of associational engagement (Strömblad and Adman, 2009).

However, this is not the only theoretically possible outcome. A possible counter-hypothesis would claim that state support rather 'domesticates' ethnic associations whereby their political strength is diluted (Ålund and Schierup, 1991). Still another objection would be that additional governmental support to ethnic civil society is counter-productive as it may stimulate segregation rather than integration. Following Putnam's (2000: 21–4) notion that social capital comes in two different flavours, the promotion of ethnic associations may encourage 'bonding' instead of 'bridging' relations in a multiethnic society (see also Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 in this volume). In such a scenario, members of prosperous ethnic associations may withdraw from the surrounding society rather than try to influence its policies and institutions (Warren, 2001).<sup>4</sup>

If either of these counter-hypotheses is valid we would not find a positive effect of ethnically based associational affiliation on political interest and participation in Stockholm. Specifically, a null result indicates either (1) that ethnic organizing in general does not have the expected positive effects, or (2) that state-supported ethnic associations in particular do not enhance individual members' political integration. In the first scenario we would not find a positive relation between affiliation with ethnic associations and political participation in any city, and in the second case we would find no such effects specifically in Stockholm.

We start out the empirical analysis of this chapter by mapping the organizational life of the ethnic groups studied in Stockholm. To put the Stockholm ethnic associations in a comparative light we study *organizational-level* political participation across the surveyed European cities. We then turn to the *individual level*, analogously comparing the organizational activities of members of ethnic minorities. Next, we go on to analyse the *effects* of involvement in ethnic organizations on individual-level political participation, again on a cross-city comparative basis. Our overall question is to what extent the political opportunity structure in Stockholm turns ethnic organizations into efficient political channels, and/or into efficient arenas for developing individual political resources and motivation. As our analyses primarily reveal only minor differences between Stockholm and the other European cities in this respect, we conclude the chapter by reflecting upon why the opportunities are not as optimal as could be expected.

## Ethnic associations as political channels

In this section, we present the 106 ethnic associations surveyed in Stockholm and take a closer look at their political involvement.<sup>5</sup> Table 6.1 offers a snapshot of how the associations studied present themselves when it comes to their manifest functions. The structure of this table is based on the total rank order of associational types chosen by the respondents, and we also compare the four ethnic categories in terms of the primary activities of their associations. Although we are, on the whole, not able to discern any striking relationship between ethnic group and associational type, the figures confirm that associations of this kind may have quite differing substantial objectives.

Turning to collective-level political involvement, associations may act in several ways to influence political processes and strive for changes in society. The survey tried to capture a number of such possibilities through

*Table 6.1* Primary activities of the associations, column percentages

Type of association	Chilean	Turkish	Kurdish	Syrian Christian	Total sample	Total sample (no. of assoc.)
Cultural society	22	14	31	44	25	27
Sports club	26	23	4	22	19	20
Immigrants' organization	22	6	15	6	12	13
Youth association	0	20	0	22	10	11
Charity organization	11	3	8	0	6	6
Women's organization	0	6	12	0	5	5
Religious organization	4	6	0	6	4	4
Pensioners' organization	7	0	4	0	3	3
Humanitarian aid	0	0	8	0	2	2
Ethnic association	0	3	4	0	2	2
Political party	0	3	0	0	1	1
Business organization	0	3	0	0	1	1
Hobby club	0	0	4	0	1	1
Residents' association	0	3	0	0	1	1

a battery of questions on organizational activism. Respondents were asked to report how frequently their respective associations have performed different activities ('during the last 12 months') by using the response options 'never', '1–3 times', '4–6 times', or '7 times or more'.

Table 6.2 displays a list of the specific activities thus recorded with relative frequencies of each mode of participation. Specifically, the figures display the percentages of associations reporting that they had been active at least 1–3 times during the last 12 months.


Following Strömblad and Bengtsson (2009) the political activities of associations may be classified into the two major categories of 'proclaiming' and 'protesting'. The former category embraces activities aiming at declaring an association's point of view, with some intention to influence opinions. This may certainly be the aim of activities in the second category too, but the common denominator of protest-oriented acts is that they are more expressive manifestations; involving participation 'taken to the streets', rather than 'behind the desk' (later on, analysing individual-level data, we also make a finer distinction between low-voiced and loud-voiced acts of protest).

In line with reasonable expectations (and analogously to what corresponding individual-level data would have shown) some political acts are more common than others. For instance, the figures in Table 6.2 reveal that a large majority of the associations studied (approximately three-quarters of them) have sent letters to public authorities. Protesting by means of organising a boycott is, on the other hand, far less widespread; barely one in 10 associations reports having been politically active in this way, and none of the surveyed associations in Stockholm had taken part in an occupation (but in some of the other cities such participation had taken place, which is why the measure is included).

The variation notwithstanding, considering also that the proclivity for protest-oriented political participation generally seems to be lower, our data suggest that the ethnic associations in Stockholm find decent possibilities to act politically as organizations.<sup>6</sup> Still, the level of activity is hard to

*Table 6.2* Associational-level political participation in Stockholm, per cent active

<b>Proclaiming activities</b>		<b>Protesting activities</b>	
Send letters or writings to the authorities	74	Collect signatures for a petition	32
Administer press conferences or press releases	39	Organize demonstrations and public meetings	42
Manage or implement public programs	71	Organize boycotts	9
Distribute newsletters to influence public opinion	39	Participate in occupation of buildings	0



*Figure 6.2* Political activity of ethnic or migrant associations in nine cities

*Note:* The darker bars in the graph represent an additive index (transformed to a scale 0–100) of 8 modes of associational-level political activities (see also Table 6.2 above). Grey bars represent the percentage of ethnic or migrant associations with members who have stood as candidates in elections.

assess without a point of reference. Utilizing data from the corresponding organizational surveys in other European cities, we may however put the Stockholm associations in a comparative light.

Figure 6.2 provides information on an additive measure of all previously mentioned political acts. The index has been rescaled to vary, theoretically, between 0 and 100.<sup>7</sup> Additionally, the graph includes a measure of political candidacy, based on a question of whether a member of the association ever had stood as a candidate in an election, with bars in this case simply indicating the percentage of positive answers.

The results reveal that although the Stockholm associations hardly appear to be politically passive, their output is rather unimpressive for a ‘most likely case’. In comparison with the ethnic associations of the other cities,<sup>8</sup> Stockholm, rather, seems to occupy an average position. True, just over four in 10 of the ethnic associations in Stockholm have ‘produced’ candidates for elections, whereby they occupy the top position in this particular respect (slightly ahead of the ethnic associations in London). Considering the index summarizing political activity, however, the ethnic associations of London, Madrid and Milan generally appear to be more active. Hence, when evaluated in this way, we can not conclude that Stockholm provides an extraordinarily advantageous context for the political involvement of ethnic associations. In a comparative light, the ethnic associations in Stockholm seem to perform reasonably well as political channels, but data suggest that other settings may provide at least as beneficial possibilities.

## Ethnic associations as arenas for promoting political action

We now proceed to analyse ethnic organizations as possible *arenas* for developing political resources and motivation. In this section we map first the organizational activities and then the political participation of the ethnic minorities studied in Stockholm in the comparative light of results from the other European cities.<sup>9</sup> In the following section we move from description to explanation, analysing the effects of ethnic organization on individual-level political interest and participation.

Table 6.3 summarizes the associational membership of the respondents with a background in Turkey and Chile and of the native Swedes. The first row presents the average number of associational memberships in the 16 types of associations that were presented during the interviews (see the Appendix). In the second row we give the percentage of members in *ethnic or migrant associations (EMA)* in the respective category.<sup>10</sup> As expected, native Swedes have a higher number of memberships than the other categories. But one should also note that respondents with a background in Turkey score much higher than the Chileans in terms of membership in ethnic associations, while the Chileans on the other hand have higher membership rates in general.

Expanding the analysis to include individual-level data from all 10 cities included in the research programme, Figure 6.3 depicts organizational involvement in each group in each city. Specifically, the graph shows the percentage of members in any association (black bars) and the percentage of members in EMAs (grey bars).

The graphic comparison clearly suggests that Stockholm provides an auspicious setting for civil society engagement. We may note that native Swedes occupy the top position with respect to membership rates (with over 90 per cent being members of one association or another). More interesting for this study, however, we observe that the ethnic minority categories surveyed in Stockholm, Chileans and Turks, are not too far behind. In fact,

Table 6.3 Description of associational membership (Stockholm)

	Turks	Chileans	Native Swedes
Number of associational memberships (average)	2.19**	2.38**	2.99
Membership in ethnic or migrant association (per cent members)	34**	22**	3
N	227	267	323

Note: Asterisks mark the difference in relation to native Swedes.

\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ , \* =  $p < 0.05$ .




Figure 6.3 Associational involvement in 10 cities (per cent members in each category)

comparing the percentages of members in any association, only one single population category, native Norwegians, stands out as stronger than the ethnic minorities in Stockholm (see Myrberg and Rogstad, Chapter 8 in this volume). Hence, Chileans and Turks in Stockholm seem more inclined to join voluntary associations in comparison to both ethnic minorities in and natives of the other cities studied in this book.

Moreover, a somewhat more controlled comparison is feasible because migrants from Turkey were surveyed both in Stockholm and in the cities of Oslo and Zurich. While the membership rate in this category is 82 per cent in Stockholm, the corresponding figures are approximately half as large (43 per cent) in Oslo, and lower still in Zurich (32 per cent). Thus, the overall conclusion regarding associational engagement is not altered after such a within-group comparison.

The same seems to be true if we study membership in EMAs. Comparing the situation of Turkish minorities, those who reside in Stockholm display the highest membership rates. In this particular category just about one-third of the respondents report that they are members of an ethnic or migrant association while the corresponding figures are lower for Turks in Oslo as well as in Zurich. However, the grey bars in the graph also demonstrate that, although the ethnic minorities in Stockholm are also comparatively highly engaged in their 'own' organizations, several other groups (in other cities) are at least as involved in ethnically oriented segments of civil society. Considering all surveyed ethnic minorities in all 10 cities, Italians in Geneva score highest in this respect. Further, focusing on the Chileans in Stockholm, they are outperformed, in terms of membership in EMAs, by all groups in Geneva, Lyon and Oslo. Hence, as with the 'channel function' of ethnic associations described earlier, the Stockholm setting hardly appears to be extraordinarily beneficial. Various ethnic minorities in other European cities seem to enjoy at least as good conditions as Turks and Chileans in Stockholm when it comes to the possibilities of participating in associations organizing migrants who share a similar background.

Yet, at the same time, we have noticed that ethnic minorities in Stockholm are highly active in non-ethnically based associational life. In the light of our conceptualization of political opportunity structures, such involvement may very well be supportive, at least to the extent that the arena mechanism is activated (cf. position 4 of Figure 6.1). One would in other words want to know whether migrants become more politically interested and active as a consequence of their participation in other kinds of associations than in those organizing people with the same background. Before studying relationships of this kind, however, we need to map the overall group differences in terms of political engagement.

Putting forward a set of dependent variables in order to study the political consequences of associational involvement, we first examine group

Table 6.4 Description of political interest and political participation (Stockholm)

	Turks	Chileans	Native Swedes
Interest in city politics (0–1)	0.43**	0.44**	0.56
Interest in national politics (0–1)	0.50**	0.55**	0.65
Interest in homeland politics (0–1)	0.36	0.34	–
Voting	0.74**	0.82	0.86
Political contacts (0–1)	0.12**	0.11**	0.18
Loud-voiced protest acts (0–1)	0.08*	0.14**	0.05
Low-voiced protest acts (0–1)	0.25**	0.37*	0.42
N	227	267	325

Note: Asterisks mark the difference in relation to native Swedes. \*\* =  $p < 0.01$ , \* =  $p < 0.05$ .

differences in the measures selected. Table 6.4 provides information on the political interest and participation of Turkish, Chilean and native Swedish respondents in Stockholm (see the Appendix at the end of this chapter for coding information).<sup>11</sup> Comparing the three columns of the table, we notice that native Swedes, as could be expected, score higher than the two other categories on most measures, and that the Chileans tend to score higher than the Turks. In general, native Swedes appear to be more interested and, accordingly, more inclined to utilize their democratic rights to take part in political activities.

However, one noteworthy exception is that both groups with an immigrant background participate more extensively in the more expressive ('loud-voiced') protest acts than native Swedes. When we consider political participation 'taken to the streets', the ethnic minorities in Stockholm are significantly more active. At the same time, these results demonstrate the importance of separating different kinds of 'protests'. When it comes to more low-key protest acts, such as signing petitions, ethnic minorities score lower than the native population. Hence, the ethnically structured imbalance in political participation is overturned only when we specifically focus on visible (perhaps usually more intensive) efforts to influence societal conditions.

### Comparing the participatory consequences of ethnic organization

To what extent may the observed differences in political interest and participation be reduced as a result of associational involvement? Although a quantitative answer to this question is probably out of reach, not least due to the overall uncertainty in data of this kind, we find good reasons to explore the potential extra benefit for migrants of being involved in EMAs. We observed that native Swedes (along with the native populations in all



other cities referred to in this study; recall the pattern in Figure 6.3) in general are more active also in associational life. This gap (though seemingly less profound in Sweden than elsewhere) might in some degree account for the detected differences in political interest and participation. Nevertheless, it might be the case that the participatory distortion would have been greater still, had it not been for migrants' involvement in EMAs. Moreover, apart from such a possible compensatory function, EMAs may perhaps provide arenas where resources and motivation, particularly for expressive protest actions, are developed, which in turn may explain the 'reversed' pattern observed for this kind of political participation.

To perform a fair analysis in this regard, we need to account for possible simultaneous affiliations with other kinds of voluntary associations. This is obvious considering that several outcomes are possible when it comes to the participatory consequences of engagement in civil society. For any particular ethnic minority, we may find that membership either in EMAs, or in other associations, or in both, are consequential for political participation. Most important from our particular point of view, we may find that membership in EMAs does not increase political engagement once a control is undertaken for other types of affiliations.

Importantly though, at least two differing interpretations are compatible with this scenario. On one hand, such a result may be due to a failure to generate the political side-effects of the arena mechanism within the ethnically based associational life. In that case, EMA membership does not increase the possibilities to expand upon one's political resources or motivation (including, then, resources and motivation for loud-voiced protest acts). That is, involvement in non-ethnic (or non-migrant) associations may generally (and, in the light of previous research, expectedly) stimulate people to take part in political life; however, being a member in an EMA does not produce any value added in this specific respect.

On the other hand, however, *indirect* positive effects of membership in EMAs are perfectly possible. EMA members may tend to join other types of associations as well, and thus become more likely to participate politically. In the case of substantial linkage between membership in ethnic and other kinds of associations, a direct (and positive) effect of involvement in EMAs should be observable when no control is made for involvement in other kinds of associations.

Table 6.5 contains summarized results from a series of regression analyses, performed to empirically uncover any effects of different kinds of associational involvement on political interest and participation (controlling for a number of possibly confounding background variables as well). In the left part of the table, we find the controlled effects of involvement in EMAs, whereas the right part provides the 'original' direct effects; that is, the relationships that do not take into account possible simultaneous involvement in other types of associations.

*Table 6.5* Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation (Stockholm)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<b>Controlling for total associational involvement</b>		<b>Not controlling for total associational involvement</b>	
	Turks	Chileans	Turks	Chileans
Interest in city politics (ORM)	-0.10	0.02	0.05	0.27*
Interest in national politics (ORM)	-0.29*	0.02	0.04	0.25*
Interest in homeland politics (ORM)	0.15	0.17	0.16	0.23*
Voting (BRM)	-0.29	-0.12	0.05	0.06
Political contacts (ORM)	-0.34*	-0.02	0.02	0.22
Loud-voiced protest acts (ORM)	-0.03	0.16	0.31**	0.37**
Low-voiced protest acts (ORM)	-0.06	-0.20	0.68	0.12
N	227	267	227	267

*Note:* BRM = binary regression model, ORM = ordered regression model. Entries are logistic regression coefficients, estimating the effects of membership of ethnic or migrant associations, controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and citizenship. \*\* =  $p < 0.01$ , \* =  $p < 0.05$ .

The most important result, given our specific purpose, is that membership in EMAs does not seem to generate any positive side-effects on political interest or participation. Thus, in our ‘most likely’ case, we do not observe the hypothesized politically integrative consequences, at least not for the specific minority groups studied in Stockholm. Taking all kinds of associational involvement into account, we even observe some negative effects. Contrary to the optimistic hypothesis, our results reveal that EMA involvement, all else being equal, decreases interest in national politics and also makes members less inclined to engage in political contacting.

Still, as already indicated, this finding does not necessarily cover the full story. In the right part of Table 6.5, we note that several un-controlled effects of membership in EMAs proved to be positive. Within the Chilean group, membership in ethnic or migrant associations is positively associated with political interest (on each measured level); and both Chileans and Turks seem to be more active participants in loud-voiced protest if they are also active in ethnically based associational life.

How, then, shall the combined result of the two panels in Table 6.5 be interpreted? Crucially, we have found that an exclusive involvement in EMAs does not seem to be sufficient for political mobilization. The positive effects of such involvement completely vanish when all other types of involvement are considered. In the absence of dynamic data, it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions about how this pattern should be explained. There is simply not enough information to clarify the direction

of all relevant causal links. Still, for the pattern to emerge in the first place, there must be a positive link between the two kinds of involvement investigated in this study. That is, involvement in EMAs tends to go together with involvement in associational life in general. Hence, the crucial question is all about time order.

From a purely analytical point of view, it is fully possible that the Chileans and Turks in Stockholm simultaneously join both ethnic (or migrant) and non-ethnic (or non-migrant) voluntary associations. Likewise, the empirical result is compatible with the interpretation that members of these ethnic minorities initially join the very same sport clubs, youth societies and singing choirs as the native Swedes, but that they later also become inclined to take part in the ethnically oriented associational life.

However, yet another possibility is that members of ethnic minorities generally find it less complicated to initiate their engagement in organizations where language (or cultural practices) do not present any obvious impediments. This, in turn, also points to what we, pending longitudinal data, consider to be the most reasonable interpretation of the causal links, indicated by our empirical results. If members of ethnically based organizations over time tend also to become active in other sectors of civil society, then this kind of involvement may indirectly lead to increased political interest and participation.

The question remaining is, however, is the extent to which Turks and Chileans in Stockholm differ from the minorities surveyed in other cities with respect to the possible indirect political mobilization of ethnic or migrant associations. According to results from a series of equivalent empirical analyses, performed on a city-by-city basis, we find that Stockholm must be regarded as a typical rather than a deviant case. Comparing, as above, controlled and un-controlled effects, a seemingly mobilizing consequence of membership in EMAs typically evaporates when associational involvement in general is taken into account (see Appendix, Tables 6.A1–6.A8).<sup>12</sup> True, in some cases (Bosnians in Oslo, Andeans and Ecuadorians in Barcelona, and Kosovars in Zurich) the results suggest that EMAs by themselves may stimulate either political interest (notably, though, these cases mainly concern interest in the politics of the country of ancestry) or participation (specifically, political contacts in the case of Moroccans in Barcelona, and voting in the case of Kosovars in Zurich). On the other hand, we also find a few cases where, as in Stockholm, this form of associational engagement rather seems to engender negative, conceivably segregation-generated, consequences for political involvement (see also Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 in this volume). Overall, however, the impression is that exclusively being involved in EMAs has no significant impact.

On the other hand, we also find several cases where — again as in Stockholm — associational involvement in general seems to be politically

stimulating. Thus, positive arena effects of taking part in civil society activities do not seem to be exclusive of the native populations of European cities.

## **Conclusion**

The study reported in this paper sheds some new light on the politically integrative functions of migrants' voluntary associations. Taking our point of departure in the idea that Stockholm, due to a history of significant support for ethnically based civil society, should be a most likely case for political integration through ethnic organization, we have made a series of comparisons with the other cities of the Localmultidem programme. Summing up our findings we may conclude that Stockholm hardly conforms to the theoretical expectations.

Although associational affiliation is higher in Stockholm than in the other cities, both among the native population and among migrants, ethnic associations do not seem to find an especially nourishing climate in the Swedish capital. The ethnic associations in Stockholm are neither more powerful as political channels, nor are they more high-quality arenas for political mobilization, in the comparative light of ethnically or migrant-oriented associational life elsewhere.

Hence, Stockholm does not seem to offer more optimal opportunities for political integration through ethnic organization than any other city in this study. The highly similar outcomes in the different cities rather indicate that this specific dimension of the political opportunity structure is less consequential than expected; considering, in particular, that ethnic minorities and their organizations face profoundly different structures of this kind across European contexts (cf. Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume). On the other hand membership in such organizations in the other European cities studied does not have a higher impact on political participation than in Stockholm, so our results provide no support for the counter-hypothesis that state-promoted ethnic associations will be detrimental to individual members' political integration.

These findings are also interesting in the light of previous research on social capital and political integration of migrants (Jacobs and Tillie, 2004). While no consistent picture has emerged from studies on separate national or urban contexts, regarding the internal relationships between different forms of affiliations and the potential political consequences (cf. Tillie, 2004: 537; Jacobs et al., 2004: 552–3), our study rather points to the similarities across contexts and ethnic groups. While this study has generated additional evidence on the politically stimulating consequences of associational involvement in general – and on the fact that ethnic minorities do not constitute an exception in this regard – we find that, typically, a membership in ethnic or migrant associations is not sufficient. We argue, however,

that the main importance of such associations in this regard may be to offer gateways to general associational life, which in turn induces political participation among members. If this interpretation is correct, ethnic and migrant associations in most cities of Europe should be able to provide access to the social settings of the majority population that – eventually – may lead to political integration.

## **Appendix: coding of variables, specific for the regression analyses in this chapter**

### **Dependent variables**

*Interest in city politics, national politics and homeland politics:* The interest variables have all been recoded into a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 stands for 'Not at all interested', .33 for 'Not very interested', .67 for 'Fairly interested' and 1 for 'Very interested'.

*Political contacts:* An additive index based on the following four political activity variables: 'Contact a politician', 'Contact government', 'Contact media' and 'Contact a solicitor'. The resulting five-point index has been rescaled to vary from 0 to 1.

*Voting:* Refers to voting in the most recent local election (coded 1 for those who turned out to vote and 0 otherwise) in the cases of Stockholm and Oslo. For all other cities, the variable (although analogously coded) refers to 'voting intention'.

*Loud-voiced protest acts:* An additive index based on the following four political activity variables: 'Work for political party', 'Badge, sticker, poster', 'Public demonstration' and 'Strike'. The resulting five-point index has been rescaled to vary from 0 to 1.

*Low-voiced protest acts:* This is an additive index based on the following four political activity variables: 'Sign petition', 'Boycott', 'Buy for political reasons' and 'Donate money'. The resulting five-point index has been rescaled to vary from 0 to 1.

### **Main explanatory variables**

*Membership in ethnic or migrant associations (EMA):* An additive index based on questions about membership in the following 16 types of voluntary associations: 'Sports club', 'Cultural organization', 'Trade union', 'Professional organization', 'Humanitarian aid organization', 'Environmental protection association', 'Human rights or peace organization', 'Religious organization', 'Immigrants' organization/Ethnic group organization',

'Anti-racism organization', 'Educational organization', 'Youth organization', 'Organization for retired', 'Women organization', 'Neighbour organization', 'Other association'. Each membership is coded 1, if the *respondent considers* a specific association, due to the very composition of its members, to be either an ethnically oriented association or an association for immigrants (that is, aside from reports concerning the obvious category 'Immigrants organization/Ethnic group organization'). Hence, the resulting index has a theoretical range from 0 to 16.

*Associational membership*: An additive index constructed as above, but in this case disregarding memberships in associations considered by the respondent, according to above, to be either ethnically oriented, or directed towards immigrants. Naturally, any reported membership of an 'Immigrants organization/Ethnic group organization' is also disregarded. Hence, the resulting index has a theoretical range from 0 to 15.

### Appendix Tables

Table 6.A1 Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Oslo)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	Controlling for total associational involvement			Not controlling for total associational involvement		
	Turks	Bosnians	Pakistanis	Turks	Bosnians	Pakistanis
Interest in city politics (ORM)	-0.09	-0.02	0.13	0.17*	0.08	0.23**
Interest in national politics (ORM)	-0.08	0.05	-0.05	0.12	0.18*	0.44**
Interest in homeland politics (ORM)	-0.21	0.26*	0.18	-0.08	0.35**	0.23*
Voting (BRM)	0.33	-0.28	0.15	0.29*	0.10	0.31**
Political contacts (ORM)	0.38	0.03	0.13	0.41**	0.23*	0.38**
Loud-voiced protest acts (ORM)	0.09	0.05	0.23	0.27**	0.30**	0.40**
Low-voiced protest acts (ORM)	-0.08	-0.25	0.33	0.18*	0.00	0.52**
N	298	286	293	298	286	293

Note: BRM = binary regression model, ORM = ordered regression model.

\*\* = p < 0.01, \* = p < 0.05.

*Table 6.A2* Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Barcelona)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	Controlling for total associational involvement			Not controlling for total associational involvement		
	Moroccans	Ecuadorians	Andeans	Moroccans	Ecuadorians	Andeans
Interest in city politics (ORM)	0.01	0.13	0.15	0.28	0.28*	0.28*
Interest in national politics (ORM)	-0.07	0.19	0.30	0.08	0.24	0.42**
Interest in homeland politics (ORM)	0.31	0.39*	0.71**	0.20	0.39**	0.63**
Voting (BRM)	0.20	0.08	-0.25	0.28	-0.05	0.08
Political contacts (ORM)	0.60*	0.35	-0.23	0.62**	0.28	0.33*
Loud-voiced protest acts (ORM)	0.44	-0.16	0.00	0.43*	0.16	0.28
Low-voiced protest acts (ORM)	0.41	0.26	-0.29	0.44*	0.35*	0.26
N	218	254	251	218	254	251

*Note:* BRM = binary regression model, ORM = ordered regression model.

\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ , \* =  $p < 0.05$

*Table 6.A3* Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Madrid)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	Controlling for total associational involvement			Not controlling for total associational involvement		
	Moroccans	Ecuadorians	Andeans	Moroccans	Ecuadorians	Andeans
Interest in city politics (ORM)	0.22	-0.27	-0.04	0.01	-0.09	0.17
Interest in national politics (ORM)	-0.23	-0.45**	-0.17	-0.01	-0.15	0.18
Interest in homeland politics (ORM)	-0.26	0.23	0.15	-0.10	0.09	0.30**
Voting (BRM)	n.e.	-0.15	-0.40	n.e.	0.05	-0.12
Political contacts (ORM)	0.33	0.04	-0.28	1.11**	0.24	0.38*
Loud-voiced protest acts (ORM)	0.57	-0.20	-0.21	1.57*	0.40**	0.41**
Low-voiced protest acts (ORM)	0.14	-0.02	-0.28	0.28	0.25	0.19
N	284	289	271	284	289	271

*Note:* BRM = binary regression model, ORM = ordered regression model.

n.e. = not possible to estimate, due to lack of empirical variation.

\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ , \* =  $p < 0.05$ .



*Table 6.A4* Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Lyon)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<b>Controlling for total associational involvement</b>			<b>Not controlling for total associational involvement</b>		
	<b>Moroccans</b>	<b>Algerians</b>	<b>Tunisians</b>	<b>Moroccans</b>	<b>Algerians</b>	<b>Tunisians</b>
Interest in city politics (ORM)	-0.09	0.01	-0.09	0.31	0.28**	0.19
Interest in national politics (ORM)	0.10	-0.06	-0.01	0.22	0.10	0.05
Interest in homeland politics (ORM)	0.14	0.14	0.27	0.30	0.27**	0.13
Voting (BRM)	-0.03	-0.13	0.72	0.29	-0.04	0.76
Political contacts (ORM)	0.39	-0.01	-0.23	0.87	0.23**	0.13
Loud-voiced protest acts (ORM)	-0.24	-0.02	-0.53*	0.60*	0.28**	-0.22
Low-voiced protest acts (ORM)	-0.76	-0.15	-0.49	-0.10	0.18**	-0.23
N	111	455	128	111	455	128

*Note:* BRM = binary regression model, ORM = ordered regression model.

\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ , \* =  $p < 0.05$ .

*Table 6.A5* Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Milan)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	Controlling for total associational involvement			Not controlling for total associational involvement		
	Egyptians	Philippines	Ecuadorians	Egyptians	Philippines	Ecuadorians
Interest in city politics (ORM)	-0.31	-0.04	-0.11	0.09	0.30**	0.46**
Interest in national politics (ORM)	-0.45	-0.05	0.16	0.26	0.34**	0.31**
Interest in homeland politics (ORM)	-0.30	0.07	0.11	0.20	0.24*	0.19
Voting (BRM)	-0.15	0.16	-0.11	0.53	0.27	0.15
Political contacts (ORM)	0.30	0.22	-0.71	0.92*	0.41**	0.46
Loud-voiced protest acts (ORM)	-0.17	-0.30	-1.04	0.22	0.35*	0.46
Low-voiced protest acts (ORM)	0.52	-0.22	-0.85	0.69	0.31 *	0.27
N	274	290	282	274	290	282

*Note:* BRM = binary regression model, ORM = ordered regression model.

\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ , \* =  $p < 0.05$ .

*Table 6.A6* Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Zurich)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<b>Controlling for total associational involvement</b>			<b>Not controlling for total associational involvement</b>		
	<b>Turks</b>	<b>Italians</b>	<b>Kosovars</b>	<b>Turks</b>	<b>Italians</b>	<b>Kosovars</b>
Interest in city politics (ORM)	-0.06	0.00	0.35*	0.02	0.22**	0.32**
Interest in national politics (ORM)	-0.09	-0.01	0.54**	0.01	0.20**	0.37**
Interest in homeland politics (ORM)	0.25	0.08	0.06	0.14	0.10	0.08
Voting (BRM)	-0.20	0.04	0.89**	0.27*	0.12	0.17
Political contacts (ORM)	0.13	0.05	0.25	0.45**	0.29**	0.39**
Loud-voiced protest acts (ORM)	0.20	0.28	-0.23	0.29**	0.36**	0.37**
Low-voiced protest acts (ORM)	0.05	-0.07	-0.25	0.51**	0.24**	0.28*
N	286	290	291	286	290	291

*Note:* BRM = binary regression model, ORM = ordered regression model.

\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ , \* =  $p < 0.05$ .

*Table 6.A7* Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (Geneva)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<b>Controlling for total associational involvement</b>		<b>Not controlling for total associational involvement</b>	
	<b>Italians</b>	<b>Kosovars</b>	<b>Italians</b>	<b>Kosovars</b>
Interest in city politics (ORM)	-0.12	0.03	0.25**	0.31**
Interest in national politics (ORM)	0.06	-0.15	0.16	0.21
Interest in homeland politics (ORM)	0.28	0.05	0.32**	0.06
Voting (BRM)	0.05	-0.31	0.23	-0.10
Political contacts (ORM)	-0.13	0.04	0.28*	0.27**
Loud-voiced protest acts (ORM)	-0.12	-0.65*	0.26	-0.16
Low-voiced protest acts (ORM)	-0.30*	-0.01	0.14	0.04
N	290	285	290	285

*Note:* BRM = binary regression model, ORM = ordered regression model.

\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ , \* =  $p < 0.05$ .

*Table 6.A8* Regression analyses of the effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation controlling for age, gender, education, employment, language, discrimination and nationality (London)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	Controlling for total associational involvements			Not controlling for total associational involvements		
	Bangladeshis	Indians	British Caribbeans	Bangladeshis	Indians	British Caribbeans
Interest in city politics (ORM)	-0.02	-0.21	-0.09	0.24	0.08	0.12
Interest in national politics (ORM)	-0.06	-0.35	-0.16	0.28	-0.14	0.20
Interest in homeland politics (ORM)	0.29	0.04	0.11	0.21	0.03	0.38
Voting (BRM)	-0.02	-0.04	0.04	0.21	0.55	0.22
Political contacts (ORM)	0.25	-2.11	-2.54	-0.49	-1.11	-1.11
Loud-voiced protest acts (ORM)	0.38	0.84	-0.51	0.99**	0.48	-0.05
Low-voiced protest acts (ORM)	0.24	-0.38	-0.78	0.72**	-0.36	-0.05
N	248	191	225	248	191	225

*Note:* BRM = binary regression model, ORM = ordered regression model.

\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ , \* =  $p < 0.05$ .

## Notes

1. See Morales and Pilati (Chapter 5 in this volume), in which the role of *ethnic* organizations is analysed from the perspective of bridging and bonding social capital. In this chapter, we focus more generally on political opportunity structures, whereby the distinction concerning ethnic 'exclusiveness' becomes less significant.
2. Cf. Cinalli and Giugni (Chapter 3 in this volume), who analyse the institutional and discursive POS related to both the individual and the organizational level. The effectiveness of the four mechanisms illustrated by Figure 6.1 may be dependent on both the institutional and the discursive political context and related to POS elements on individual ('micro'), organizational ('meso') and societal ('macro') levels.
3. This situation is largely mirrored in the 'institutional POS indicators' compiled within the Localmultidem project. Unfortunately, however, when it comes to pre-requisites of ethnic organization, these indicators are rather few in number.
4. One may argue that such bonding relations would not prevent migrants from being active, from a distance, in the politics of their country of origin. In this chapter we choose not to focus on the distinction between political activity directed toward different political arenas (cf. instead Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 in this volume). The demarcation line between these types of activities is, however, not always clear. A demonstration against conditions in Kurdistan may very well include non-Kurdish participants and it may primarily address a local audience in Stockholm. In any case, Myrberg (2007: 111–12) shows that a large proportion of all voluntary political activity in Sweden is focused on social and political conditions in other countries, but also that an unexpectedly small share of migrants' political participation concerns conditions in their respective countries of origin.
5. The data for the Stockholm study on ethnic associations were gathered through face-to-face interviews, conducted in the autumn of 2005 by professional interviewers from Statistics Sweden, with representatives of 106 associations in Greater Stockholm, organizing Chileans, Turks, Kurds (with a background from the present territory of Turkey) or Syrian Christians (with a background from the same territory). The overall response rate was 87 per cent (with very small differences across the ethnic groups). In the following comparison, we utilize equivalent data for (the selection of other) ethnic and migrant associations in the surveyed cities within the Localmultidem project.
6. In previous analyses of the material from the Stockholm study on ethnic associations we found interesting differences between associations organizing different ethnic groups. Associations that are large in number of members and have a wide repertoire of activities appear to do better in stimulating members politically. Their members tend to enjoy a more supportive structure and they also tend to be encouraged in various ways to take part in the political life of the receiving society. Associations organizing migrants with a background in Turkey, and most notably Kurdish and Syrian Christian associations, tend to be larger in size and more diversified in their activities than Chilean associations, and thereby give their members better prospects of acquiring political resources (Strömblad and Bengtsson, 2009).
7. In this index 0 would indicate a complete absence of political participation (response option 'never' is chosen for each act), while 100 would indicate high frequency (as captured by the response option '7 times or more') of participation in each of the eight political activities.

8. The only city missing in this particular analysis is Oslo, for which, regrettably, no organizational-level data is available. However, Oslo is included in the individual-level analyses (following below).
9. The data for the Stockholm population study were gathered by face-to-face interviews, conducted during the first months of 2004 by professional interviewers from Statistics Sweden. The sample included 1500 individuals living in Greater Stockholm, aged 18–74 years, and belonging to one of the following three categories: (A) individuals born in Chile and individuals born in Sweden with at least one parent born in Chile; (B) individuals born in Turkey and individuals born in Sweden with at least one parent born in Turkey, (C) individuals born in Sweden with both parents born in Sweden. The overall response rate was 58 per cent (58 per cent in category A, 49 per cent in category B and 66 per cent in category C). The selection of immigrants from Chile and Turkey and their descendants was mainly motivated by the fact that these groups have been in Sweden for a long time, which means that they have had a fair chance of creating vivid associations ‘of their own’ (Myrberg, 2007).
10. In this chapter we do not make the distinction between ‘pan-ethnic’ (or general ‘immigrant associations’) and ‘ethnic associations’, which is more salient in Morales and Pilati (Chapter 5 in this volume). This distinction is more critical within the social capital discourse than in our perspective of political opportunities of ethnic organizing in general. Due to this we categorize all appropriate associations as ‘ethnic or migrant associations’ (EMAs). Our measure of EMAs is a composite based on survey responses considering affiliation with either ‘ethnic’ or ‘immigrant’ organizations. We recoded the variable into a dichotomy, taking on the value 1 if the respondent has at least one affiliation of either type and 0 otherwise.
11. In our analysis of political participation (see also Myrberg and Rogstad, Chapter 8 in this volume), we make a distinction between *political contacts* (with politicians, civil servants and other institutions), *loud-voiced protest acts* (extrovert actions, such as participating in a public demonstration or a strike) and *low-voiced protest acts* (relatively low-key protest actions, such as signing a petition or boycotting certain products). Previous research based on Swedish data has shown that the effect of associational affiliation tends to be stronger with regard to loud-voiced protest acts than to low-voiced protest acts, which has to do with the fact that the variation in loud-voiced protests is less dependent on socio-economic resources (Myrberg, 2007: ch. 5).
12. In the empirical analyses reported in the Appendix, all cities studied are included with the exception of Budapest, where members in different kinds of associations were too few to permit a detailed examination of this kind.

# 7

## Is 'Home' a Distraction? The Role of Migrants' Transnational Practices in Their Political Integration into Receiving-Country Politics\*

*Laura Morales and Miruna Morariu*

### Introduction

Many scholars and pundits have strongly criticized the investment that migrants make in maintaining links with their homeland countries, particular identities and their ethnic enclaves because they suggest this acts against their capacity to integrate fully into 'mainstream' society and politics (see, for example, Huntington, 2004). Recent debates in the US, in fact, have especially focused on Latino or Hispanic migrants – arguing that their 'resistance' in keeping their traditions and their Spanish language additionally poses a threat to the social cohesion that English provides as the common and dominant language. Similar concerns have often been voiced in Europe regarding, for example, non-European migrants who might take longer than expected to learn the main language in the country and who form ethnic 'enclaves' in certain areas of the towns and cities where they live.

Yet a substantial body of scholarship within the migration studies field has repeatedly shown that transnational practices, and the circular exchanges that they provide, are frequently an alternative path of migrant incorporation and adaptation rather than an outright obstacle to it (see, for example, Basch et al., 1994: 247ff; Morawska, 2003; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006: 137–39). Transnational practices can sometimes contribute to generating skills that are transferable to the daily lives of migrants in their countries of residence, and migrant enclaves and migrant transnationalism can provide alternative resources that contribute to migrants' and their descendants' social mobility within the country of settlement (Portes et al., 1999: 2; Portes, 1999: 471ff). Hence, many scholars would argue, there is no trade-off between maintaining links with 'home' and making oneself 'at home' in the new country of destination.

Further to the general consideration of transnational practices in the social and economic domains, previous research in the field has repeatedly stressed the relevance of transnationalism for the understanding of migrants' political

mobilization in settlement countries (see, for example, Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). Transnational practices, and in particular political transnationalism, are viewed as leading to the political incorporation of migrants because they enable them to forge political coalitions and organizations that will allow them first to engage in 'ethnic' politics and, later, to become active in receiving-country politics. Consequently, as Portes and Rumbaut (2006: 137–38) argue, transnationalism and integration are not constituent parts of a zero-sum game. And this can be particularly the case for political transnationalism and integration into the receiving country body politic, given the special role of the transferable skills and resources that migrants can bring from their continued political practices in their countries of origin. In this regard, a number of studies analyse the political incorporation of migrants and how transnational practices relate to it in various positive ways (Guarnizo et al., 2003; Escobar, 2004; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006).

There are several reasons why this is frequently the case. On the one hand, political activism in homeland politics generates transferable political skills and capital. The cognitive and social skills that are useful for homeland activism are usually equally useful for engaging in the public arena of the settlement country. Furthermore, the mobilizing capacity that the ethnic political entrepreneurs achieve in the receiving country to rally their co-ethnics for homeland issues signals their mobilizing capacity for receiving-country politics as well (cf. Levitt, 2001). And native politicians and parties are generally quick in spotting mobilizable niches of new voters. On the other hand, the transnational activities of migrants are often undertaken from the receiving country and in the context of the settlement society and polity. Thus, transnationalism is likely to make migrants very aware of the differences between the sending and receiving societies, which fosters the gaining of a greater understanding and appreciation of the receiving country's values and ways of doing.

This chapter aims at analysing how and to what extent the ties that migrants maintain with their country of origin have an impact on their political integration in the country of residence. In this regard, we will examine the connection between political and non-political transnational practices and three forms of engagement with the political affairs of the country of residence: interest in receiving-country politics; electoral mobilization in the settlement country at the local level; and non-electoral political action. Further to this, following Morawska's (2003) emphasis of the context-dependent nature of the relation between transnationalism and assimilation, we examine whether the political context has any impact on the link between transnational engagement and political integration.<sup>1</sup>

## **Transnationalism and political incorporation**

The study of the transnational activities of migrants has served to emphasize the multiplicity of identities and roles that shape the daily experiences of



immigrants and their descendants. Transnationalism – in some of its first definitions – encompasses a wide range of activities, and has been defined broadly as ‘the processes by which migrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement’ (Basch et al., 1994: 7).

Although engaging in transnational practices is often regarded as a ‘natural’ inclination of migrants and their communities (Sayad, 1975), a number of studies have shown that transnationalism is far from generalized and substantially decreases with second generations (see, for example, Portes, 2003). Even beyond the debate on the overall scope and extension of transnational activities (see Portes, 2001 for a summary), this initial notion of transnational practices has been contested frequently, as it prevents researchers from focusing on clearly defined boundaries of the phenomenon under scrutiny. In this sense, Portes and his colleagues (Portes et al., 1999; Portes, 2001; Guarnizo et al., 2003) have proposed limiting the notion of transnationalism and transnational practices to those organized by non-institutional actors and across national borders, and that take place outside of state regulation and control. Thus, more recent conceptualizations of transnationalism have focused on civil society actors and individual migrants as the main units of analysis. Without denying the usefulness that community-based studies have, we will place our study within the body of scholarly work that focuses on the transnational practices of individuals and on the impact that these practices have on other social and political attitudes and behaviours by those same individuals. As Portes et al. (2008) argue, there is limited empirical evidence on the extent and scope of transnational practices and of their impact on migrants’ political incorporation. And this scarcity of information that goes beyond case studies is even greater in what concerns comparative analyses.

One exception is a recent comparative ethnographic study of transnational practices conducted in Europe (see Fibbi and D’Amato, 2008).<sup>2</sup> The study combined different logics of comparison of specific migrant groups to maximize variation in the cases compared. In some instances, the same group was studied in several countries (as with the Turks); in other instances, the same group was compared to different groups across countries (as with the Moroccans). Although the methods applied – most of the studies focus on qualitative interviews with a limited number of individuals or key actors – it is important to highlight that some of the conclusions we obtain in this chapter, most notably the fact that integration and transnational engagement are not zero-sum situations – are consistent with the results of their ethnographic studies, hence stressing the complementarity of quantitative and qualitative approaches. Another important common conclusion is that transnational practices are relatively uncommon for many migrant groups (cf. Busetta and Martiniello, 2008; Eve, 2008).

Consequently, this chapter will assess the empirical merits of two opposing views of the impact that migrants’ links to their ‘homelands’ may have

on their capacity to become full members of the political community of the countries where they live. On the one hand, some argue that transnational ties and identities hinder migrants' assimilation to and incorporation into the receiving society and polity (such as Lamm and Imhoff, 1985; Brimelow, 1995; Huntington, 2004; Berger et al., 2004), while other scholars affirm that transnational ties foster migrants' engagement in receiving-country politics (such as Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Escobar, 2004; Vertovec, 2003).

Further to our interest in analysing the overall impact that transnational practices have on migrants' political incorporation, we are especially interested in assessing the ways in which the effect of transnational engagement varies depending on the context and its scope. For example, we expect that transnational practices will foster political integration primarily when they generate transferable skills that are useful for engaging in receiving-country politics. Given that the scope of transnational practices matters for its consequences on integration into the receiving society (cf. Levitt, 2003), we should not expect purely private transnationalism to have any impact on the political integration of the individual (whether positive or negative).

Finally, we also have a number of expectations related to the context of settlement, the citizenship regime, and the 'philosophy' of integration. In cities and/or countries where 'assimilation' is more difficult because of more stringent naturalization regulations, transnational ties can be viewed as a 'natural retreat' option from a hostile environment and will hinder migrants' political integration in the receiving country. Thus, contexts that have more exclusionary naturalization rules and requirements will, on the one hand, drive migrants to resort more often to transnational practices and, on the other hand, multiply the negative effect of transnational engagement on political integration in the countries of settlement.

### **Comparing the political incorporation of three groups across contexts: Ecuadorians, Moroccans and Turks in European cities**

In this chapter, we have chosen to limit our analyses to seven cities and three national migrant groups, rather than considering all the cities and groups that are included in other chapters in this book. We have made a careful selection that will contribute to maximizing the comparability of the same groups across several cities (three) at the same time that for some cities we can compare several groups in the same context. Thus, we have chosen to study multiple locations for the same groups because we share with other scholars the intuition that the place of settlement is of primary importance (see, for example, Bloemraad, 2005; Martiniello and Lafleur, 2008). In doing so, we favour a methodological approach that combines the advantages of studying 'several groups' in the same context and 'one group in several' contexts (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b: 772), while also avoiding the severe

limitation of sampling on the key variables – in this case transnational engagement (Portes, 2001).

Hence, we have selected three ethnic groups that have been studied in three different cities each: Ecuadorians (Barcelona, Madrid and Milan), Moroccans (Lyon, Barcelona and Madrid), and Turks (Oslo, Stockholm and Zurich). This selection has the additional advantage of including a sufficient degree of variation in the Political Opportunity Structures (POS) that migrants face for their political integration, especially in relation to the legal regulations that govern citizenship acquisition and the promotion and/or tolerance of ethnic collective identities (see Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume).

As described in Chapter 3, the careful collection and scoring of a detailed list of indicators on various institutional, normative and policy settings in all the cities included in the study – as well as the separate scoring for each of the ethnic/migrant groups included in each city study – allows for a more systematic and accurate depiction of the POS in each context. In our case, we employ the information retrieved around the rules and requirements set in each country in order to gain access to nationality – either by naturalization or by acquisition.<sup>3</sup>

The scoring of five indicators provides an overall index of the ‘ease’ with which immigrants and their native-born descendants can access the nationality of their countries of residence.<sup>4</sup> We use the average of these five scores for each pair of migrant group and city to describe whether the situation is more open (values approaching + 1) or more closed (values approaching –1) for this aspect. Additionally, we take into consideration – as a separate aspect – whether first-generation immigrants are required to conform to some sort of ‘cultural assimilation’ standard before they can naturalize. If no language or cultural requirements are set, a score of 1 is assigned; if some test of only language proficiency is required, a score of 0 is assigned; and if additional requirements are in place – such as cultural, historic or civic tests – a score of –1 is assigned. Figure 7.1 plots the results and location for each group/city pair in a Cartesian plan defined by these two components.

As we can see, there is a high degree of consistency in the relative positions of the cases on both the aspects that determine the ease of access to citizenship. Hence, it is reasonable to treat these as elements of a single dimension of openness in nationality acquisition. This results in an index that, in the case of Turks, identifies Stockholm as an open context, Oslo as a moderately open one, and Zurich as a restrictive one; for Moroccans, the two Spanish cities are moderately open contexts and Lyon is moderately restrictive; while for Ecuadorians the two Spanish cities are open contexts and Milan moderately open (Table 7.1).

In regard to the object of analysis, in this chapter we focus our attention on three main dimensions of migrants’ political engagement in the country of residence: their political interest, their electoral mobilization and




Figure 7.1 Openness of nationality acquisition

Table 7.1 Openness towards naturalization

	Countries/Cities
<b>Open</b>	SE: Stockholm (Turks)
	ES: Bar, Mad (for Ecuadorians)
<b>Moderately open</b>	ES: Bar, Mad (for Moroccans)
	IT: Milan (Ecuadorians)
	NO: Oslo (Turks)
<b>Moderately restrictive</b>	FR: Lyon (Moroccans)
<b>Restrictive</b>	CH: Zurich (Turks)

their non-electoral political action. These variables have been described in detail in preceding chapters (Chapters 2 and 3), so we will just highlight the main aspects that relate to the cross-group and cross-city differences that are of most interest for the purposes of this chapter.

Figure 7.2 illustrates the great variation that we find in the interest in receiving-country politics (national or local) both across ethnic groups and within the same ethnic group across cities.<sup>5</sup> In most cases, there are significant – and usually large – gaps between the respective autochthonous and migrant groups in the level of interest in the political affairs of the countries where they live. On the other hand, generally speaking, there is no clear evidence of the existence of large cross-group differences between Ecuadorians, Moroccans and Turks in their interest in politics, and within-group differences are sizeable.




Figure 7.2 Interest in residence-country politics by ethnic group and city, with autochthonous group as reference




Figure 7.3 Voting behaviour in local elections by ethnic group and city, with autochthonous group as reference

Regarding voting behaviour (Figure 7.3) we find again large differences in the same ethnic group across cities. This pattern is especially noticeable for Ecuadorians and Turks. In turn, Moroccans' electoral behaviour does not differ much across cities, and they show very small or no gaps in relation to the autochthonous population.

Finally, Figure 7.4 describes the degree of engagement in any political action that manifests an expression of concern related to the country of




Figure 7.4 Political action related to country of residence concerns by ethnic group and city, with autochthonous group as reference

residence, out of a long list of 13 different forms of political action.<sup>6</sup> As we can see, unlike the previous two variables, non-electoral political participation results in the greatest variation across both groups and cities, including within the autochthonous group.

Again, it is Ecuadorians in Milan who reveal a larger gap from the autochthonous population in their city. This pattern of divergence is also considerable in the case of the Turkish and Moroccan groups. Overall, the Moroccans most resemble the majority population in their respective countries, while Turks seem to be substantially excluded from non-electoral political action, especially when one takes into account the high levels of political participation of the autochthonous groups in these three cities.

In summary, a description of our three dependent variables illustrates the varying cross-city, inter-group and intra-group patterns of migrants' political engagement in their countries of residence for the three selected ethnic groups. Though there are important specificities for each of these outcome variables, some consistent patterns emerge. First, the Moroccans in Lyon and the Turkish in Stockholm tend to be systematically among the most engaged migrant groups. Secondly, consistently large gaps in engagement with the politics of the country of residence are evident for the Ecuadorians in Milan, and the Turks in Oslo and Zurich. Finally, the engagement gaps between the autochthonous population and Moroccans in Barcelona and Lyon, and Ecuadorians in Barcelona and Madrid, are invariably small and usually not significant. We now turn to examining whether migrants' engagement in transnational practices is associated with these varying degrees of involvement in the political affairs of the countries where they live.

## Measuring transnational practices

Our analyses start from the hypothesis that transnational practices and engagement will have different spillover effects on migrants' political engagement in the receiving society depending on the type of skills they acquire or need to develop. In this regard, we expect that transnationalism that takes place – fundamentally – in the private realm will have little or no impact on migrants' political attitudes and behaviours in the settlement country, whereas transnational practices that directly relate to the political arena of the country of origin should have positive effects on migrants' political incorporation where they reside. Therefore, we distinguish between 'non-political' and 'political' transnationalism and we present the various indicators we have available to measure these different practices.<sup>7</sup> Though the boundaries between private and public transnational practices are often blurred, we believe that our indicators are sufficiently distinct to warrant this conceptual differentiation.

### Non-political transnationalism

The literature on transnationalism has frequently focused on two types of exchanges between migrants and their countries of origin: visits to the homeland and remittances. Of the two, the former more often expresses a tighter affective link, while the latter manifests lingering bonds of obligation with the family back at home. Visits to the country of origin, however, are much more often influenced by the financial capacity of migrants and, especially, by the distance between the countries of residence and of origin. Unfortunately, of the cases we analyse in this chapter, only in Barcelona and Madrid were migrants asked about both forms of non-political transnationalism and, as we might expect, the results are fundamentally different for the Moroccans and the Ecuadorians. For Moroccans a trip to their country of origin is a more common transnational practice than remittances – around 90 per cent travel to Morocco at least once a year but only around 60 per cent send money at least once a year. The opposite is true for Ecuadorians – around 15 per cent travel to Ecuador at least once a year, whereas around 80 per cent send money at least once a year. Hence, when interpreting the following results we should bear in mind this important caveat, especially for comparisons across groups – but less so within groups across cities.

Table 7.2 and Figure 7.5 illustrate the degree of transnational exchanges with the country of origin in the form of visits. The results show very interesting cross-group and cross-city variations. Overall, the Turkish and Moroccan groups are much more likely to visit their countries of origin and to visit it often – at least once a year – than the Ecuadorians, who need to be able to afford the most costly flight tickets. There are, as well, important cross-city variations within the groups. Turks in Stockholm are substantially less likely to visit their country of origin than their compatriots in neighbouring

Table 7.2 Visits to home/parents' country

Group	City	Percentage	Count (N)	Difference*
Turks	OSL	97	291 (300)	STO. ZUR
	STO	84	197 (235)	OSL. ZUR
	ZUR	90	264 (292)	OSL. STO
Moroccans	BAR	94	209 (222)	LYO. MAD
	LYO	83	94 (113)	BAR
	MAD	85	252 (295)	BAR
Ecuadorians	BAR	82	209 (255)	MAD. MIL
	MAD	73	214 (291)	BAR. MIL
	MIL	56	162 (291)	BAR .MAD

\* The city initials mark the pair-wise differences in percentage that are statistically significant for a 95 per cent confidence interval ( $p \leq 0.05$ ).




Figure 7.5 Visit homeland country at least once a year

Norway, and they rarely do so at least once a year.<sup>8</sup> Equally, Moroccans and Ecuadorians in Spain are much more inclined to visit their homelands than their counterparts in Lyon and Milan. While the difference among Moroccans is likely to be related to the different composition of this group in Spain and France – with larger second generations in the former – this is not a suitable explanation for the cross-city variations we find for Ecuadorians.

In summary, we find systematic differences across groups and across contexts for the degree of non-political transnationalism. Yet the gaps between Ecuadorians, on the one hand, and Moroccans and Turks, on the other, are largely related to the practical and economic constraints that the sheer distance between Europe and the Andean country imposes. When we compare



remittances for Ecuadorians and Moroccans in the two Spanish cities, the only cases for which we have that information, the gap is actually reversed. Nevertheless, there are important within-group variations across the cities that are not linked to these practicalities. There are no obvious reasons related to geographical distance that can explain why Turks in Oslo and Zurich are so much more likely to visit their homeland once a year than their compatriots in Stockholm. Hence, the reasons for these diverging patterns should be sought elsewhere, but given space constraints we cannot examine them in this chapter.

Given that our primary aim is to examine the link between transnational practices and the inclination to become attentive to and engaged with the political affairs of the country of settlement, we now turn our attention to transnational practices related specifically to the political domain.

### **Political transnationalism**

Political transnationalism – or transnational politics – is usually conceived as the wide range of fields, activities and practices that somehow connect migrants with the political sphere of their countries of origin. Thus, some include within this notion the direct involvement by migrants in the political affairs of their ‘homelands’, but also the intervention of state and governmental actors from the sending countries in the political engagement and activities of migrants in their countries of settlement (see Portes et al., 1999; Martiniello and Lafleur, 2008). Some scholars embrace a wider notion of transnational politics that includes all political activity in which migrants might engage in the country of settlement, so long as it is informed by political events in their country of origin (see Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b: 762).

In this chapter, we favour a more restrictive view of political transnationalism and concentrate only on the political practices that migrants engage in that directly connect them to the political arena of their countries of origin. We will not address interventions by the various political actors of the sending countries in the political activities of their migrants, even if we regard them as important to obtaining a complete view of transnational political fields. Yet our analyses include indicators that cover both ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ transnational political practices (Itzigsohn et al., 1999), as well as ‘core’ and ‘expanded’ ones (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b: 761).

In our empirical analyses, we distinguish two main components of political transnationalism: an attitudinal element related to migrants’ interest in and attentiveness to the political affairs of their countries of origin, and another one related to behaviours that allow for a more active engagement in issues and concerns related to the ‘homeland’.

#### *Attitudinal/cognitive political transnationalism*

Our surveys allow us to examine two related but distinct aspects of individuals’ psychological engagement with politics in their (or their parents’)

Table 7.3 Very or fairly interested in homeland country politics

Group	City	Percentage	Count (N)	Difference*
Turks	OSL	49	145 (298)	STO
	STO	35	80 (232)	OSL.ZUR
	ZUR	51	149 (294)	STO
Moroccans	BAR	41	90 (222)	–
	LYO	33	38 (114)	MAD
	MAD	45	130 (292)	LYO
Ecuadorians	BAR	56	144 (259)	–
	MAD	50	144 (289)	–
	MIL	53	156 (296)	–

\* See footnote to Table 7.2.

Table 7.4 Read newspapers regularly about homeland country

Group	City	Percentage	Count (N)	Difference*
Turks	OSL	–	–	–
	STO	–	–	–
	ZUR	55	161 (292)	–
Moroccans	BAR	20	43 (221)	MAD
	LYO	17	19 (114)	MAD
	MAD	8	24 (289)	BAR.LYO
Ecuadorians	BAR	53	136 (258)	MIL
	MAD	58	169 (290)	MIL
	MIL	36	108 (297)	BAR.MAD

\* See footnote to Table 7.2.

countries of origin: the interest they express in it, and how frequently they follow political events in those countries. Table 7.3 describes the degree of interest in homeland politics manifested by respondents.

It is very interesting to note that the gaps we found for non-political transnationalism for the Turkish and Moroccan groups are also reflected in the interest they express in the political events of their countries of origin. Turks in Stockholm are substantially less interested in political developments in Turkey than are their compatriots in Oslo and Zurich. Equally, Moroccans in Lyon are significantly less interested in Moroccan politics than their compatriots in the two Spanish cities. Ecuadorians in Milan are an exception, as their limited inclination to visit their country of origin does not translate into political apathy with regard to Ecuadorian politics.

Closely related to expressing an interest in politics is attentiveness to and following of political affairs in the country of origin. Table 7.4 describes how often respondents from our three groups follow the news about their countries of origin in the newspapers. Unfortunately, this item was not

included in the two Scandinavian questionnaires, so we cannot ascertain the existence of any variations within the Turkish group.

The results present interesting contrasts with those obtained for interest in homeland politics. Whereas Turks in Zurich and Ecuadorians in the three cities express a similar inclination to follow the news as the interest they manifest in their home country politics, this is clearly not the case with Moroccans. In general, Moroccans seem to be much less attentive to what goes on in the political arena of their country of origin or ancestry. Furthermore, Moroccans in Lyon show a much greater apathy towards Moroccan politics. Equally, Ecuadorians in Milan claimed to be less interested and recognize that they follow the news from Ecuador less often than their compatriots in the Spanish cities do.

In fact, other analyses not shown here suggest that these two elements of political attentiveness correlate differently across groups and cities. For Turks in Zurich, expressing an interest in homeland politics is strongly correlated with following the news about Turkey in newspapers (Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.5). Meanwhile, for Moroccans and Ecuadorians in Barcelona and Madrid, an interest in homeland politics is not transformed into following the news through newspapers (correlation of around 0.16), and for Moroccans in Lyon an interest in politics only moderately translates into news-following (correlation of 0.28). Consequently, we find different patterns in the way migrants of the same group across cities relate to their homeland politics. Nevertheless, most indicators point to a considerable gap in the psychological engagement with homeland politics of the Moroccan groups in all contexts when compared to Ecuadorians and Turks. Finally, as for the variables on engagement in the politics of the country of residence, the Turkish group in Stockholm and the Moroccan group in Lyon are quite distinct from their compatriots elsewhere.

We focus now on the behavioural components of political transnationalism and examine the extent to which migrants engage in transnational political activities, in relation to their affective and cognitive links with their homelands.

### *Behavioural political transnationalism*

We have chosen to examine four different forms of political behaviour that indicate the degree of active engagement that migrants have with the political and public spheres of their homelands. First, we look into a very undemanding or 'broad' form of transnational political behaviour: talking about the politics of the home country. Then, we analyse 'core' forms of political participation: voting turnout in homeland elections, and political action in the settlement country in relation to homeland concerns. Finally, we include membership of an ethnic organization in the country of residence as a proxy for organized 'civic' transnationalism.<sup>9</sup> In this way, we cast

the net wider than previous research on political transnationalism that rarely includes non-electoral forms of political action.

Of these four indicators, the one on ethnic associational engagement requires further justification, as it is not so obviously measuring 'political' transnationalism. However, in the scholarly literature on transnational politics, migrants' organizations are afforded a special role in the processes that structure transnational practices; to the extent that their transnational activities are often equated with political transnationalism *per se* (Portes et al., 1999; Itzigsohn, 2000; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). Hence, some scholars regard all or most transnational practices by migrants' organizations as expressions of political transnationalism, even when these associations are not *prima facie* 'political' in their aims – as with hometown associations and committees.<sup>10</sup> Given that past research in this subfield has previously considered ethnic associational engagement a core indicator of political transnationalism, we will include it here for comparative purposes (see Guarnizo et al., 2003).

Table 7.5 shows that talking about homeland politics is quite consistent with the results we have previously obtained for interest in homeland politics. Again, unfortunately, we do not have these items for the Scandinavian surveys, so we cannot make cross-city comparisons for the Turkish group. The Moroccan group is, once more, the least engaged with their homeland politics, but especially so in Lyon, where they very rarely talk about Moroccan political affairs. The cross-city variations for the Ecuadorians are relatively mild, but are consistent with our findings of somewhat less political interest by this group in Madrid and Milan than in Barcelona.

However, talking about politics is a relatively undemanding form of political activity. As we see in Figure 7.6, things change dramatically when additional factors are brought into the picture, as is the case with voting in homeland elections. A first thing to take into account is that external voting rights and arrangements differ vastly among the three countries of origin we

Table 7.5 Talk regularly about homeland politics

Group	City	Percentage	Count (N)	Difference*
Turks	OSL	–	–	–
	STO	–	–	–
	ZUR	43	128 (297)	–
Moroccans	BAR	34	75 (224)	LYO
	LYO	16	18 (114)	BAR. MAD
	MAD	28	84 (297)	LYO
Ecuadorians	BAR	51	131 (259)	MIL
	MAD	45	131 (291)	–
	MIL	42	126 (300)	BAR

\* See footnote to Table 7.2.




Figure 7.6 Voting activity in the last homeland elections

are comparing. Ecuadorians have been able to vote at their embassies and consulates – as long as they register to vote – since 2006. Turkish citizens were granted external voting rights – with voting at embassies and consulates – only in 2008 and previously had to travel back to Turkey to cast their ballots,<sup>11</sup> but all three of our surveys were conducted before 2008. Moroccans have no external voting rights and still need to return to Morocco if they want to vote.

In any event, there is a clear consistency between the expressed limited interest in Turkish politics and the electoral turnout of Turks in Stockholm: they declare the least interest in homeland politics and are – by far – the least likely to cast a ballot. In contrast, Ecuadorians in Milan are more inclined to vote in Ecuadorian elections, even if their compatriots in Barcelona are more attentive to Ecuadorian politics and even if the amount of electoral mobilization that Ecuadorians in Spain are exposed to is much larger – due to the size of the community in Spain.<sup>12</sup> Unsurprisingly, Moroccans are the least likely to vote, as we would expect from the pains they need to take in order to cast a ballot.

Turning our attention to non-electoral forms of political action, we now examine whether respondents have engaged in any of 13 distinct forms of political participation in their residence countries but motivated by issues related to their homeland.<sup>13</sup> As we see from Table 7.6, non-electoral transnational political action is quite marginal across the board. Moroccans seem to be marginally less inclined than Turks and Ecuadorians to engage in transnational political action, and this is consistent with the results we have been reporting thus far. The differences we find across cities are often not significant, except those between Turks in Stockholm and Zurich, Moroccans in Barcelona and Madrid, and between Ecuadorians in Madrid

Table 7.6 Participation in any of 13 political action forms, related to homeland concerns

Group	City	Percentage	Count (N)	Difference*
Turks	OSL	4	11 (300)	–
	STO	6	13 (232)	ZUR
	ZUR	2	6 (297)	STO
Moroccans	BAR	4	8 (224)	MAD
	LYO	1	1 (114)	–
	MAD	0	0 (298)	BAR
Ecuadorians	BAR	4	9 (259)	–
	MAD	6	16 (291)	MIL
	MIL	1	4 (300)	MAD

\* See footnote to Table 7.2.

Table 7.7 Involvement (member of or participates in) any ethnic advocacy organization

Group	City	Percentage	Count (N)	Difference*
Turks	OSL	4	11 (300)	STO
	STO	17	39 (235)	OSL, ZUR
	ZUR	6	18 (297)	STO
Moroccans	BAR	1	3 (224)	–
	LYO	0	0 (114)	MAD
	MAD	2	6 (298)	LYO
Ecuadorians	BAR	7	17 (259)	MAD.MIL
	MAD	2	5 (291)	BAR
	MIL	1	4 (300)	BAR

\* See footnote to Table 7.2.

and Milan, but given the limited size of the percentages in all cases we should not overemphasise these differences.

Finally, we consider involvement in ethnic advocacy organizations (Table 7.7) and, as we see, the picture is very similar to that for non-electoral political action: migrants rarely join ethnic associations, with the very notable exception of Turks in Stockholm, and to a much smaller degree Turks in Zurich and Ecuadorians in Barcelona. This is especially so if we take into account that more than 40 per cent of Turks in Oslo, Moroccans in Lyon and Ecuadorians in Barcelona are involved in at least one association. So it is not the case that they are not attracted into associational engagement itself, but that they are not drawn in significant numbers to ethnic advocacy organizations in most of our seven cities and for none of the three groups we are comparing.<sup>14</sup> If we bear in mind that not all of these ethnic organizations will indeed engage in transnational practices, and much less political transnationalism, we must conclude that organizational political

transnationalism is indeed marginal at the individual level for most groups and in most settings.

In the remaining sections of this chapter, we will focus on the key question that we want to address: what is the impact that transnational practices have on these patterns of political incorporation?

### **Assessing the impact of transnational practices on the political incorporation of migrants**

The main purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the transnational engagement of immigrants and their descendants deters them from becoming engaged in the political life of the countries where they live. In the next few pages, we employ various multivariate – and in some cases, multilevel – regression models to assess the effect of transnational practices on the interest in politics, the propensity to vote, and the political action of people of Ecuadorian, Moroccan and Turkish origin in the seven cities we study throughout the chapter. Equally, we are interested in establishing whether the political context intervenes in the relationship between transnational engagement and political engagement in the residence country.

For all outcome variables, we have specified two related but slightly different models. Model 1 specifies the political context as captured by the locality. This is the simplest way of modelling how the political context affects the political engagement of migrants in the places where they live. Yet, it is also the least informative, to the extent that it is difficult to ascertain what it is exactly about these localities that make these residents more or less engaged in the politics of the countries where they live. Model 2, instead, specifies the political context as relating to a specific dimension of the POS: the ease of access to citizenship in the country of residence. This model thus defines the political context in a narrower way and empirically assesses only that element of the POS. Because the POS variable varies only at the country level, we employ multilevel models to estimate properly the standard errors of the coefficients of this variable, given the small number of higher-level units (the cities within countries).<sup>15</sup>

For both models 1 and 2, we report step-wise nested models because we want to determine not just the effect of migrants' engagement in transnational practices, but also how this engagement alters the effect of other aspects related to the migration process. Hence, models 1a and 2a report the results of the regression models without taking into consideration transnational practices, whereas models 1b and 2b incorporate the latter block of variables. Finally, models 1c and 2c also report on the existence or otherwise of an interactive effect between the main variable of political transnationalism for each model and the variable that measures the POS.

We start by examining the results of the multivariate models for the interest expressed in the political affairs of the country of residence (Table 7.8).

Table 7.8 The effect of transnational practices on interest in the politics of the country of residence. Logistic regression (single level for model 1, multilevel for model 2)

	Model 1 (cities)		Model 2 (POS)		
	1a	1b	2a	2b	2c
Intercept	-1.311*** (0.375)	-1.804*** (0.465)	-1.341*** (0.337)	-2.188*** (0.408)	-2.269*** (0.414)
<i>Socio-demographic controls</i>					
Male	0.593*** (0.098)	0.585*** (0.111)	0.586*** (0.097)	0.574*** (0.110)	0.578*** (0.110)
Age	0.007 (0.006)	0.006 (0.007)	0.008 (0.006)	0.007 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)
Education	1.565*** (0.179)	1.616*** (0.204)	1.550*** (0.177)	1.626*** (0.202)	1.627*** (0.202)
Involved in any association	0.508*** (0.110)	0.541*** (0.128)	0.524*** (0.109)	0.559*** (0.127)	0.558*** (0.127)
<i>Migration-related factors</i>					
Has citizenship of country of residence (vs. does not)	0.127 (0.146)	0.171 (0.164)	0.098 (0.146)	0.129 (0.165)	0.130 (0.164)
Years since arrival	0.009 (0.009)	0.023** (0.010)	0.011 (0.008)	0.027*** (0.010)	0.028*** (0.010)
1.5 generation (vs. 1st generation)	-0.286 (0.191)	-0.507** (0.217)	-0.301 (0.190)	-0.504** (0.216)	-0.508** (0.216)
2nd generation (vs. 1st generation)	-0.366 (0.296)	-0.291 (0.346)	-0.201 (0.281)	-0.014 (0.347)	0.029 (0.354)
Fluent in language of country of residence (vs. not fluent)	0.466*** (0.145)	0.641*** (0.164)	0.622*** (0.144)	0.738*** (0.154)	0.764*** (0.159)
Is a Muslim (vs. rest)	-0.485*** (0.191)	-0.620*** (0.229)	-0.565*** (0.191)	-0.712*** (0.232)	-0.712*** (0.236)
Has felt personally discriminated against (vs. has not)	0.169 (0.127)	-0.063 (0.143)	0.162 (0.124)	-0.044 (0.141)	-0.043 (0.140)
Proportion close relations that are ethnically homogeneous	-0.261* (0.154)	-0.504*** (0.177)	-0.255* (0.153)	-0.497*** (0.175)	-0.500*** (0.175)
<i>Ethnicity (reference category = Turks)</i>					
Ecuadorian	-0.790*** (0.280)	-0.133*** (0.365)	-0.887*** (0.248)	-1.045*** (0.320)	-0.982*** (0.326)
Moroccan	0.249 (0.252)	0.093 (0.314)	0.335* (0.179)	0.575*** (0.226)	0.619*** (0.230)

(Continued)



Table 7.8 Continued

	Model 1 (cities)		Model 2 (POS)		
	1a	1b	2a	2b	2c
<i>Context as place (reference categories = Madrid for ECU &amp; MOR, Stockholm for TUR)</i>					
Barcelona	0.099 (0.138)	0.125 (0.155)	-	-	-
Lyon	0.668** (0.316)	0.838** (0.351)	-	-	-
Milan	-0.445** (0.217)	-0.363 (0.243)	-	-	-
Oslo	-0.214 (0.242)	-0.750** (0.310)	-	-	-
Zurich	0.357 (0.246)	-0.053 (0.312)	-	-	-
<i>Context as political opportunity structures</i>					
POS variable: average index of 'ease' of naturalization	-	-	-0.328* (0.205)	-0.155 (0.282)	0.075 (0.307)
<i>Transnational practices</i>					
Visits homeland country at least once a year		-0.030 (0.134)		-0.041 (0.133)	-0.046 (0.134)
Very or fairly interested in homeland politics		2.055*** (0.119)		2.036*** (0.119)	2.163*** (0.138)
Voted in last homeland elections		-0.604*** (0.157)		-0.629*** (0.158)	-0.621*** (0.158)
Has participated in any transnational political action		-0.226 (0.331)		-0.208 (0.331)	-0.181 (0.329)
Member of any ethnic advocacy association		0.040 (0.299)		0.098 (0.299)	0.097 (0.298)
Interaction interest in homeland politics & POS variable	-	-			-0.638* (0.325)
No. Cases	2102	2014	2102	2014	2014
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2	0.123	0.253	-	-	-
Percentage of positive values (interest) correctly predicted	65.64	74.16	-	-	-

\*p ≤ 0.1, \*\* p &lt; 0.05, \*\*\* p &lt; 0.01. Logit coefficients, standard errors in brackets.

As we could expect, several of the socio-demographic controls are quite important. Men are more interested in politics than women, and this is also the case with individuals with higher levels of educational attainment and those involved in any kind of association. Interestingly enough, migration and settlement-related factors are not always connected to being interested in the politics of the country of residence in the direction that one might expect. First, having citizenship of the country of residence has no significant impact on becoming interested in the politics of that country. Second, the length of residence in the country and being a 1.5-generation migrant<sup>16</sup> only become significant once we control for the transnational engagement of the individual.<sup>17</sup> Third, feeling discriminated against has no bearing on the interest migrants show in the political affairs of the countries where they live, and the coefficient for this variable changes signs once we control for transnational practices. In contrast, the effects of other aspects related to the migration and settlement process are more in line with the expectations in the literature. Fluency in the language of the country of residence is strongly related to showing an interest in politics. Muslim migrants are less likely to be interested in the politics of the countries where they live. Ethnicity also seems to be of some importance. In particular, Ecuadorians are substantially less interested in Spanish and Italian politics than Turks are in Norwegian, Swedish or Swiss politics. However, Moroccans are not significantly different from Turks in this regard.

Turning to the effect of the political context, the locality seems to be of relatively limited importance. True, Moroccans in Lyon are more interested in French politics than their co-ethnics in Barcelona and Madrid are in Spanish politics, while Ecuadorians in Milan are somewhat less interested in Italian politics than their compatriots in Barcelona and Madrid are in Spanish politics – though this effect is not significant once we take into account transnational practices. Turks in Oslo seem to be less interested in Norwegian politics than Turks in Stockholm are in Swedish politics. Yet many of the other contrasts and coefficients are not significant, so the effect of locality – while not devoid of importance – is only a limited driver of migrants' political interest.

When we operationalize the political context as POS, we find no significant effect of naturalization regulations on the interest migrants develop in the politics of the countries where they live. However, what we do find is a marginally significant negative interaction effect between being interested in 'homeland' politics and living in a country with relatively open naturalization rules. In the latter countries, the positive spillover effect of being interested in homeland politics is substantially reduced, though still positive.

Turning now to the effect of transnational practices, in line with our expectations, non-political transnational practices in the form of visits to the country of origin has no significant effect on the interest in the

political affairs of the country of residence. However, we find counteracting effects for the cases the political forms of transnational engagement. Being interested in homeland politics is highly and positively associated with expressing an interest in the politics of the country of residence, yet – once the former is controlled for – it seems as if making the extra effort of casting a ballot in homeland elections is negatively related to sustaining an interest in the politics of the country of residence.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, as we could expect from the limited following we have found that non-electoral political and associational transnationalism have, these two variables exert no significant effect.

We now turn to the examination of the results for the propensity to vote in local elections in the country of residence (Table 7.9). In this case, the effect of some of the socio-demographic controls change: gender is not relevant, whereas age is positively associated with voting. For this outcome variable and for the variable on non-electoral political action (Table 7.10) we have introduced the degree of interest in politics as an additional control, primarily because we want to be able to isolate the independent effect of interest in homeland politics. Education and associational involvement have, as in the previous case, positive and significant effects.

In regard to the variables that describe migration and settlement processes, holding the country's citizenship is – as for interest in politics – not significant, and neither is in this case the length of residence for first-generation immigrants. As was the case in the previous models, 1.5-generation individuals are less inclined to vote than first-generation immigrants, and language proficiency is also a positive asset for electoral engagement. Contrary to what we found in Table 7.8, Muslim respondents show a greater propensity to vote in local elections in the country of residence than the rest, once we control for their lower levels of interest in the political affairs of the country of residence and their engagement in transnational practices.

In this case, it is worth highlighting that both the Ecuadorian and Moroccan respondents show a substantially higher propensity to turn out in local elections in the countries where they live than Turkish ones. This is all the more an interesting finding because, as we know, the Turkish minority is one of the most studied when it comes to investigations into migrants' political transnationalism and political engagement in Europe, and much less is known about the other two communities. Often, one might get the impression that the Turkish community is the most mobilized and incorporated into the politics of their countries of residence, and our results call for caution in making these kinds of statements.

When we focus on the effect of the political context, we see that its effect seems much more powerful in accounting for variations in the propensity to vote, especially before we introduce patterns of transnational engagement. First, respondents in Madrid – both Ecuadorians and Moroccans – are significantly more likely to express their willingness and intention to vote

Table 7.9 The effect of transnational practices on the propensity to vote in local elections in the residence country. Logistic regression (single level for model 1, multilevel for model 2)

	Model 1 (cities)		Model 2 (POS)		
	1a	1b	2a	2b	2c
Intercept	-0.972** (0.449)	-1.808*** (0.487)	-1.496*** (0.410)	-1.782*** (0.430)	-1.793*** (0.431)
<i>Socio-demographic controls</i>					
Male	0.039 (0.117)	0.040 (0.120)	0.041 (0.116)	0.048 (0.120)	0.045 (0.120)
Age	0.030*** (0.007)	0.027*** (0.008)	0.029*** (0.007)	0.026*** (0.008)	0.026*** (0.008)
Education	0.381* (0.218)	0.396* (0.225)	0.396* (0.215)	0.381* (0.223)	0.362 (0.224)
Involved in any association	0.320** (0.134)	0.262* (0.141)	0.310** (0.134)	0.247* (0.141)	0.249* (0.141)
Interest in receiving country politics	0.834*** (0.126)	0.817*** (0.141)	0.831*** (0.126)	0.808*** (0.141)	0.813*** (0.141)
<i>Migration-related factors</i>					
Has citizenship of country of residence (vs. does not)	-0.155 (0.179)	-0.175 (0.180)	-0.172 (0.173)	-0.178 (0.175)	-0.175 (0.175)
Years since arrival	0.005 (0.011)	0.014 (0.011)	0.005 (0.010)	0.012 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)
1.5 generation (vs. 1st generation)	-0.333 (0.215)	-0.366 (0.224)	-0.329 (0.214)	-0.376* (0.223)	-0.370* (0.223)
2nd generation (vs. 1st generation)	-0.327 (0.330)	-0.222 (0.344)	-0.336 (0.315)	-0.331 (0.331)	-0.316 (0.332)
Fluent in language of country of residence (vs. not fluent)	0.396** (0.174)	0.383** (0.179)	0.334** (0.159)	0.360** (0.161)	0.366** (0.162)
Is a Muslim (vs. rest)	0.196 (0.203)	0.451** (0.218)	0.192 (0.200)	0.474** (0.217)	0.465** (0.217)
Has felt personally discriminated against (vs. has not)	0.195 (0.158)	0.135 (0.162)	0.197 (0.156)	0.117 (0.160)	0.114 (0.160)
Proportion close relations that are ethnically homogeneous	-0.042 (0.182)	-0.035 (0.190)	-0.013 (0.183)	0.003 (0.191)	0.001* (0.191)
<i>Ethnicity (reference category = Turks)</i>					
Ecuadorian	0.771** (0.340)	1.466*** (0.374)	0.569* (0.311)	0.861** (0.333)	0.880*** (0.334)
Moroccan	1.119*** (0.323)	1.901*** (0.340)	1.094*** (0.250)	1.310*** (0.257)	1.320*** (0.258)

(Continued)

Table 7.9 Continued

	Model 1 (cities)		Model 2 (POS)		
	1a	1b	2a	2b	2c
<i>Context as place (ref. categories = Madrid for ECU &amp; MOR, Stockholm for TUR)</i>					
Barcelona	-0.902*** (0.185)	-0.896*** (0.188)	-	-	-
Lyon	-0.991*** (0.370)	-0.992*** (0.376)	-	-	-
Milan	-0.567** (0.265)	-0.638** (0.274)	-	-	-
Oslo	-0.606** (0.277)	0.050 (0.300)	-	-	-
Zurich	-0.837*** (0.288)	-0.078 (0.311)	-	-	-
<i>Context as political opportunity structures</i>					
POS variable: average index of 'ease' of naturalization	-	-	0.682** (0.298)	0.211 (0.313)	0.242 (0.315)
<i>Transnational practices</i>					
Visits homeland country at least once a year		-0.354** (0.144)		-0.339** (0.143)	-0.343** (0.143)
Very or fairly interested in homeland politics		0.208 (0.132)		0.214 (0.131)	0.213 (0.131)
Voted in last homeland elections		0.571*** (0.184)		0.558*** (0.184)	0.697*** (0.234)
Has participated in any transnational political action		0.543 (0.414)		0.533 (0.412)	0.541 (0.412)
Member of any ethnic advocacy association		0.360 (0.343)		0.346 (0.342)	0.328 (0.343)
Interaction voted in homeland elections & POS variable	-	-			-0.600 (0.594)
No. Cases	1934	1849	1934	1849	1849
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2	0.109	0.124	-	-	-
Percentage of positive values (propensity to vote) correctly predicted	77.90	78.16	-	-	-

\* p ≤ 0.1, \*\* p &lt; 0.05, \*\*\* p &lt; 0.01. Logit coefficients, standard errors in brackets.

Table 7.10 The effect of transnational practices on country-related political action. Logistic regression (single level for model 1, multilevel for model 2)

	Model 1 (cities)		Model 2 (POS)		
	1a	1b	2a	2b	2c
Intercept	-1.933*** (0.435)	-1.814*** (0.483)	-2.378*** (0.509)	-2.237*** (0.530)	-2.231*** (0.536)
<i>Socio-demographic controls</i>					
Male	0.477*** (0.123)	0.445*** (0.127)	0.468*** (0.122)	0.435*** (0.126)	0.431*** (0.126)
Age	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)
Education	0.374* (0.210)	0.276 (0.220)	0.353* (0.210)	0.256 (0.220)	0.272 (0.220)
Involved in any association	0.862*** (0.126)	0.846*** (0.132)	0.867*** (0.125)	0.850*** (0.131)	0.848*** (0.131)
Interest in receiving country politics	0.672*** (0.127)	0.633*** (0.142)	0.678*** (0.127)	0.640*** (0.142)	0.634*** (0.142)
<i>Migration-related factors</i>					
Has citizenship of country of residence (vs. does not)	0.390** (0.163)	0.354** (0.166)	0.426*** (0.163)	0.388** (0.166)	0.401** (0.166)
Years since arrival	0.004 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)	0.010 (0.010)	0.010 (0.010)
1.5 generation (vs. 1st generation)	0.034 (0.218)	0.016 (0.230)	0.028 (0.217)	0.007 (0.229)	0.003 (0.230)
2nd generation (vs. 1st generation)	-0.260 (0.309)	-0.174 (0.327)	-0.181 (0.306)	-0.092 (0.323)	-0.106 (0.325)
Fluent in language of country of residence (vs. not fluent)	0.388** (0.186)	0.399** (0.191)	0.487*** (0.187)	0.501*** (0.193)	0.492** (0.193)
Is a Muslim (vs. rest)	-0.254 (0.198)	-0.345 (0.222)	-0.277 (0.197)	-0.366* (0.221)	-0.357 (0.222)
Has felt personally discriminated against (vs. has not)	0.219 (0.152)	0.180 (0.158)	0.219 (0.151)	0.181 (0.156)	0.170 (0.157)
Proportion close relations that are ethnically homogeneous	-0.337* (0.174)	-0.387** (0.183)	-0.344** (0.174)	-0.396** (0.183)	-0.392** (0.183)
<i>Ethnicity (reference category = Turks)</i>					
Ecuadorian	-0.797*** (0.296)	-0.852** (0.347)	-0.189 (0.479)	-0.255 (0.499)	-0.242 (0.509)
Moroccan	-1.086*** (0.285)	-1.062*** (0.316)	-0.255 (0.458)	-0.242 (0.463)	-0.243 (0.474)

(Continued)

Table 7.10 Continued

	Model 1 (cities)		Model 2 (POS)		
	1a	1b	2a	2b	2c
<i>Context as place (reference categories = Madrid for ECU &amp; MOR, Stockholm for TUR)</i>					
Barcelona	0.481*** (0.177)	0.464** (0.180)	–	–	–
Lyon	1.649*** (0.322)	1.674*** (0.328)	–	–	–
Milan	–0.571* (0.306)	–0.573* (0.316)	–	–	–
Oslo	–0.120 (0.247)	–0.114 (0.284)	–	–	–
Zurich	–0.800*** (0.272)	–0.778** (.306)	–	–	–
<i>Context as political opportunity structures</i>					
POS variable: average index of 'ease' of naturalization.	–	–	0.185 (0.549)	0.157 (0.561)	0.223 (0.575)
<i>Transnational practices</i>					
Visits homeland country at least once a year		0.050 (0.146)		0.033 (0.145)	0.023 (0.146)
Very or fairly interested in homeland politics		–0.185 (0.136)		–0.189 (0.136)	–0.185 (0.136)
Voted in last homeland elections		0.200 (0.176)		0.195 (0.175)	0.198 (0.176)
Has participated in any transnational political action		1.027*** (0.306)		1.031*** (0.306)	1.651*** (0.452)
Member of any ethnic advocacy association		0.186 (0.270)		0.195 (0.269)	0.179 (0.270)
Interaction transnational political action & POS variable	–	–			–1.867** (0.949)
No. Cases	2102	2014	2102	2014	2014
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2	0.178	0.179	–	–	–
Percentage of positive values (political action) correctly predicted	59.91	59.02	–	–	–

\*  $p \leq 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Logit coefficients, standard errors in brackets.

in local elections than those who live in Barcelona, Lyon and Milan. In turn, for the Turkish group the findings are quite fascinating: those who live in Stockholm show much more propensity to vote than the Turks in both Oslo and Zurich. However, once we control for the highly divergent

patterns of transnational engagement of the Turks in Stockholm and those in the other two cities, these differences vanish. This is a very interesting result, since it clearly points to the fact that the different transnational behavior of Turks in Stockholm largely accounts for the much greater inclination they have to vote in local elections than their compatriots in Oslo and Zurich.

When we measure the political context with the POS variable on openness of naturalization regulations, the results are in contrast to what we found for interest in politics. In this case, more open naturalization rules lead to a higher propensity to vote. However, when we introduce the variables on transnational engagement, this positive association is no longer significant, nor is its interactive term with transnational voting. This suggests that both transnational engagement and turnout in local elections are closely connected to the political context, and their effects are mutually moderating.

Turning now to the effect of the variables that measure transnational engagement, we first notice that in this case the non-political form of transnationalism (visits to the homeland country) has a negative effect. Hence, travelling to one's country of origin or that of one's parents reduces the likelihood of being inclined to vote in the local elections of the place where one lives. In contrast, political transnationalism has an overall positive effect. Except for voting in homeland elections, the other variables related to transnational political practices have no significant impact. Yet most of the coefficients are positive, thus suggesting that it is very unlikely that any of these political transnational practices are a 'distraction' from enfranchisement in the country of residence. Moreover, the positive effect of voting in homeland elections – which is parallel to the effect of interest in homeland politics that we found for the previous model – strongly suggests that political transnationalism indeed has spillover effects on the political incorporation of European migrants in their countries of residence.

Finally, we look at the results of our multivariate models of political action concerning country-related issues (Table 7.10). The findings are, in many ways, closer to what we observed for the models of interest in the political affairs of the country of residence than to those for turnout in local elections. As was the case for interest in politics, men are more likely to become engaged than women, and age has no relevant effect. Language proficiency is positively related, and ethnically homogeneous relations exert a negative effect on the likelihood to engage in these forms of political action. In this case, having the citizenship of the country of residence is much more determinant of the inclination to participate in these forms of political action, and there are no significant differences across the various generations of migrant-origin respondents.

Furthermore, the effect of ethnicity is dependent on how we measure the political context. When the political context is captured by the locality



dummies, Turkish respondents are much more likely to engage in political action than both Ecuadorian and Moroccan respondents. Additionally, migrants in Madrid are less inclined to engage in non-electoral forms of political action than their counterparts in Barcelona and Lyon, but more so than in Milan; whereas Turks in Zurich are substantially less engaged than those in Stockholm. However, when we introduce the POS on the openness of naturalization procedures, we find no significant difference between the three migrant communities we study in this chapter. This is especially interesting because it is completely consistent with the positive and significant effect of holding the residence-country citizenship. The results seem to indicate that migrants' propensity to engage in non-electoral political action is to a relevant degree related to their gaining citizenship, and that cross-group variations are in this case largely related to the ease with which they can actually obtain the citizenship of the countries where they live. This seems to be the case notwithstanding the fact that the POS variable does not exert a significant impact.

As in the previous two models, the strongest effect among the political transnational practices comes from the equivalent form of engagement related to the homeland country. Thus, migrants who engage in political actions that address concerns related to their homelands are more likely also to engage in political actions that address concerns related to the countries where they live. However, unlike in previous cases – once we control for interest in the politics of the residence country – migrants who show a greater degree of interest in homeland politics are less likely to engage in receiving-country-related political action, though the coefficient is not statistically significant. Finally, the interaction term between the equivalent transnational political engagement and the POS variable is negative and significant. The size of the coefficient indicates that the positive spillover effect that transnational political action has on country-related political action virtually disappears when the individual resides in a country with open naturalization rules. Hence, transnational political action is a mobilizing driver that will also lead to engagement in the political affairs of the countries of residence primarily for those migrants who live in countries with more restrictive naturalization rules.

## Conclusions

This chapter has examined in depth the effects of the engagement in transnational practices of Ecuadorian, Moroccan and Turkish-origin migrants in seven European cities. Table 7.11 summarizes the main findings. The first general observation that we derive from the analyses is that answering the question of whether transnational engagement 'distracts' immigrants and their descendents from becoming integrated in the political sphere of the countries where they live defies simplistic answers.

Table 7.11 Summary of findings on the effect of transnational engagement

	Interest in the political affairs of the country of residence	Propensity to vote in the local elections of the country of residence	Political action on issues and concerns related to the country of residence
Visits homeland country at least once a year	n.s.	Neg.	n.s.
Very or fairly interested in homeland politics	Posit.	n.s.	n.s.
Voted in last homeland elections	Neg.	Posit.	n.s.
Has participated in any transnational political action	n.s.	n.s.	Posit.
Member of any ethnic advocacy association	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
POS variable: average index of 'ease' of naturalization	Neg.	(Posit.)	(Posit.)
Interaction political transnationalism & POS variable	Neg.	(Neg.)	Neg.

*Legend:* Posit. = positive; Neg. = negative; n.s. = not significant. In brackets the sign of the non-significant coefficients of higher level variables, kept due to the reduced number of cases.

As we can see, the patterns of relations are quite complex and it is not possible to say that all forms of transnational engagement foster or hinder the political engagement of migrants in their countries of residence. In this sense, our results are consistent with Pantoja's (2005) conclusions about the multiplicity of the associations between the transnational engagement and the political incorporation of Dominicans in New York, and with Levitt's (2003) call to pay attention to the scope of transnational practices. Clearly, we will only advance in this field if we start to be more specific about types of transnational engagement and types of political incorporation.

A second general conclusion that we can point to is that transnational political practices primarily contribute positively to the political inclusion of immigrants and their descendents through the spillover effects of the attentiveness and skills that they bring to their new countries. In all of the analyses we have shown, the parallel form of political engagement related to the 'homeland' has the strongest positive association with each of the outcomes. Hence, sustaining an interest in homeland politics is strongly and positively associated with showing an interest in the politics of the country of residence; voting in homeland elections is strongly and positively

associated with the propensity to vote in the local elections of the country of residence; and engaging in non-electoral political action on transnational issues is strongly and positively associated with engaging in non-electoral political action on issues and concerns related to the country of residence. One form of engagement leads to the other, and as Guarnizo et al. (2003: 1239) point out, those most likely to engage in transnational political activities are also those who are most likely to engage in political activities in the country of residence.

Yet our findings also lead to a cautious view about the exact consequences of transnational practices in the political integration of migrants. Quite a few forms of engaging in transnational fields have recurring – albeit not always significant – negative effects. This is the case, particularly, of frequently visiting the country of origin, and also, to a lesser degree, of voting in the homeland elections, as the latter is negatively associated with developing an interest in the politics of the country of residence. This indicates that, in some cases, a particularly intense connection with the homeland can indeed prevent migrants from developing more of an interest in the political issues of the places where they live.

These results are consistent with the finding that a deep embeddedness in co-ethnic social relations is also detrimental to migrants' becoming engaged in mainstream politics (see Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 in this volume), and that the positive 'spillover' effects of sustaining some attentiveness to and following of homeland politics are often dependent on the political context – particularly the ease with which immigrants can become full rights-bearing citizens. In those contexts where access to citizenship is relatively easy, transnational political engagement has less of a positive effect on the political integration of migrants. It is a much more valuable resource – both cognitive and mobilizational – in those contexts that are more restrictive for immigrants. This is not so much because the immigrants as individuals become more engaged through the sole fact of getting citizenship – in most cases this has no effect on the outcome variables (see also González-Ferrer, Chapter 4 in this volume) – but probably because of the collective mobilization processes they are exposed to in the country of residence when a large mass of their compatriots are already citizens. In contexts where immigrants become citizens without major obstacles or delays, political parties and agents have greater incentives to mobilize these groups. Hence, the resources and skills gained through political transnationalism will prove less crucial.

In essence, our chapter calls for somewhat less bold statements about the virtues or the perils of transnationalism. As often happens, social processes are more complex than we sometimes wish to admit. The transnational engagement of immigrants and their children has some positive outcomes for their political integration in the countries where they live, but can also sometimes prove to be a distraction from the political issues and affairs of those same places.

## Appendix: Description of variables used

### 1. Dependent variables

Common variables (see general Appendix to this volume): interest in residence country politics (inthostpol), voting in local elections (votint), overall political action, country of residence concerns (allpolaction)

### 2. Explanatory variables

Gender, age, education, involvement in any association, citizenship, years since arrival, generations variables, fluency in the language, the dummy for Muslims, the variable on discrimination, and the variable on the proportion of close relations that are ethnically homogeneous have been coded as described in the Appendix to this volume.

*POS variable:* This variable is an average index of ease of access to nationality, by city and per group. The values range between  $-1$  and  $+1$ , and it has been computed on the basis of scores regarding: eligibility for second- and third-generation migrants (*jus soli*); access to citizenship through marriage with a national; required minimum time of continuous residence prior to requesting citizenship; economic resources required for naturalization (first-generation immigrants); grounds for withdrawing citizenship (proven fraud in the acquisition of citizenship/actual and serious threat to public policy or national security); cultural requirements for naturalization (for first-generation immigrants).

#### *Transnational practices*

##### a) Visits to homeland country at least once a year

Item wording: 'How often do you visit either your homeland country or that of your parents/ancestors?' The response categories are: 'more than once a year', 'about once a year', 'about once every three years', 'less than once every three year', 'never'. We recoded the first two, and respectively the last two categories into a dummy variable taking the value 1 for visiting homeland country at least once a year, and 0 for visiting homeland country less than once a year or never.

##### b) Very or fairly interested in homeland country politics (inthompol)

Item wording, response categories and coding as described in the general Appendix to this volume.

##### c) Voting activity in the last homeland elections

Item wording: 'Finally, did you vote in the last national elections in [homeland-country]?' The response categories are: 'yes', 'no but eligible to vote', 'no not eligible', 'can't remember' and 'refusal'. We recoded the original responses into a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for

respondents who voted in the last national elections, and 0 for all other answers.

d) Participation in any of 13 political action forms related to homeland concerns

Original item wording and categories as for variable *allpolaction3* in the Appendix to this volume. We coded 1 when the activity concerned 'people in homeland country' and 0 for all other answers.

## Notes

\*We thank Nina Glick-Schiller and Marco Martiniello for their detailed comments to previous versions of this chapter, and Zeynep Kadirbeyoglu for her help with the information about external voting rights in Turkey.

1. In previous versions we looked at the interaction between transnational practices and certain aspects of the migration and settlement process – in particular, being a 1.5th or 2nd-generation migrant, having feelings of discrimination, and the degree of ethnic homogeneity of the closest acquaintances. Given that these interactions were not significant in the empirical analyses, we have dropped their discussion in this version due to space constraints, but we considered this possibility grounded in theoretically based expectations.
2. The project was 'Migrants' Transnational Practices in Western Europe', funded by the European Science Foundation and led by the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (Professor D'Amato).
3. We focus on naturalization and citizenship acquisition regulations because these are the main drivers of the capacity of first-generation immigrants to become incorporated as full citizens.
4. See the Appendix to this chapter for a description.
5. In Figures 7.2 to 7.4, the symbol represents the average value and the bars the 95 per cent confidence interval of the mean.
6. See the Appendix to this chapter for more details.
7. See Portes et al. (1999) for a distinction between three variants of transnational practices: economic, political and socio-cultural.
8. In general, the Kurdish and Syrian Christian subgroups of migrants in Stockholm from Turkey depress all indicators of transnationalism. However, while we do not have direct estimates for the distribution of these subgroups for the Norwegian sample, approximately the same proportion of Turkish nationals in Norway and Sweden are Kurds, around 20 per cent (Rogstad, 2009a).
9. The variable of involvement in an ethnic organization is defined in a narrow sense in this chapter, as relating to those organizations that primarily aim at the advancement of the specific ethnic group – in this case, Ecuadorian, Moroccan or Turkish people – in the country of residence. In this sense, they are better conceived as ethnic 'advocacy' groups (see Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 in this volume).
10. We do not share this view, and in Morales and Jorba (2010) we show that this is indeed an excessive stretching of the concept of 'political transnationalism' and that many migrants' organizations have little or no political activities either in the receiving or the sending countries.

11. In fact, this external voting right had not yet been implemented at the time that this chapter was completed (February 2010) and is not likely to take effect until 2012.
12. The higher turnout rate of Ecuadorians in Milan captured by our surveys is confirmed by the official turnout results for the 2006 elections: of the registered voters in the respective consulates, 78.3 per cent in Milan, 70.8 in Madrid, and 75.4 in Barcelona finally cast a ballot. If official participation rates are calculated over the total resident population in each of the cities, the figures are 50.3 per cent in Barcelona, 22.3 per cent in Madrid, and 77.8 in Milan. Certainly, these calculations are problematic because in any given consulate all the Ecuadorians who reside in the catchment area are eligible to register and vote. Yet, we expect distance from the city centres where the consulates are located to be an intervening factor in turnout decisions and hence – even if the figures might not exactly be the ones reported in this footnote – it is quite likely that Ecuadorians in Milan turned out to vote in greater numbers, proportionally, than in both Barcelona and Madrid.
13. See the Appendix to this chapter for a description of the forms of action and the identification of the transnational focus.
14. See the slightly different results when 'ethnic' associational engagement is defined on the basis of the ethnic composition of associations in Morales and Pilati (Chapter 5 in this volume).
15. The models were estimated with the Stata command `xtmelogit`, given that these are all dichotomous outcome variables.
16. The term '1.5 generation' refers to those individuals who migrated – most often with their parents or other family members – in or before their early teens. Hence, this is viewed as an 'in-between' generation that shares with adult immigrants (the 1st generation) the personal experience of migration but that are mostly socialized in the settlement society and are frequently bilingual.
17. This happens because the length of stay and the interest in 'homeland' politics are significantly and consistently negatively related in all seven cities, while 1.5-generation individuals are also less likely to show an interest in 'homeland' politics, except in Milan and Oslo.
18. We should bear in mind that casting a ballot is indeed an extra effort in all cases, but particularly for Moroccan and Turkish respondents, who had to travel back to their respective countries in order to be able to vote. Ecuadorians only had to register in their consulates their willingness to be included in the electoral register, but that is still an extra effort.

# 8

## Patterns of Participation: Engagement among Ethnic Minorities and the Native Population in Oslo and Stockholm

*Gunnar Myrberg and Jon Rogstad*

### Introduction

There is a widespread understanding that participation and integration are two sides of the same coin. In this chapter we challenge this perception, and ask about the importance of different political regimes. The point of departure is a comparison between political participation among ethnic minorities and the respective native populations in Oslo and Stockholm. As Morales and Giugni write in the introductory chapter of this volume, there are at least three important strands in the literature trying to explain variation in political participation (see also Morales, 2009). First, there is the classic individual-level explanation stressing the importance of demographic and socio-economic factors. Second, there is the collective-level explanation highlighting factors such as associational involvement and informal networks. Third, there is the context-level explanation focusing on differences in the political opportunity structures at city and country levels.

By looking at only two cities in this chapter, we lose the possibility to analyse variation at the context level in a multifaceted way. What is gained, however, is the possibility to look more closely at the importance of individual-level and collective-level variables in a structured comparison between two cities that can be described as relatively similar in terms of political opportunity structures with one key exception, namely the integration regime. In fact, one of the main contributions of this chapter is precisely the comparison between the relatively multicultural political opportunity structure that we find in Stockholm and the less multicultural setting of Oslo.

Another important contribution of this chapter regards the concept of political integration and its empirical measurement. In the introductory chapter, Morales and Giugni argue that 'migrants are politically integrated whenever their political attitudes and behaviours are not indicative of their outright exclusion from the policy process'. They also stress that their 'notion of political integration leaves room for migrants to define patterns

of engagement with politics that diverge in important ways from that of the natives or the mainstream as long as this divergence does not entail their political exclusion'. In the argument leading up to this definition, Morales and Giugni ask how 'we should describe migrants' political integration in a situation where they are as active as the autochthonous population but all are equally inactive?'<sup>1</sup> What they do not discuss, however, is how we should describe a situation in which migrants are *more* politically active than the native population with regard to some modes of political participation but not to others. Since we find precisely such a pattern in our study, we discuss whether this should be interpreted as a case of migrants being more politically integrated than natives in some ways but not in others. We also discuss whether these results should be interpreted as an argument for viewing political integration simply as a sum of various modes of political participation, or if different modes of participation should be weighted differently in terms of their importance for political integration.

### **Situating the study**

In John Stuart Mill's *A System of Logic* (1967 [1843]) a distinction is made between two strategies for comparison – 'method of agreement' and 'method of difference'. In the first approach, the strategy is to find cases which are similar in what is to be explained, while seeking to uncover variation in the factors that explain. In the 'method of difference', the opposite strategy is chosen. Then variation in the dependent variable is the point of departure, while similar explanatory variables are to be eliminated. The methods are thus different with respect to what is made the object of investigation (Przeworski and Teune, 1970).

With reference to Mill, one could ask if comparing specific – and similar – situations in various countries makes sense at all. Mill would probably have responded that the cases are too complex, and that they have too many special characteristics, which in turn are problematic to take into account. For this reason it is impossible to determine when things are the same or different. The problem is partly to be found in classification, partly in the ability to keep the variables constant across complex cases. Ragin (1987), however, has launched another alternative. He states that it is possible to achieve a satisfactory comparison if the presentation is explicit about which aspects are emphasized in the analyses. In other words, the findings are contextualized in order to clarify the similarities and differences across various cases.

Norway and Sweden have a number of similar traits. Their average levels of citizen engagement, in social as well as political activities, are among the highest in the world. Moreover, organizations traditionally play a key role as channels of information and influence in their corporative political system. In terms of social citizenship, both countries compete for the title of having



the most generous welfare system (Wollebæk and Selle, 2002; Vogel et al., 2003; Myrberg, 2007). These similarities, many of which are also shared by Denmark and Finland, have led researchers to talk about a specific 'Nordic model' for welfare, or as Esping-Andersen (1990) chose to put it, a 'Social Democratic' regime, as opposed to 'Liberal' and 'Conservative' regimes. The Social Democratic regime type is characterized by a strong support for universal welfare in the form of inclusive health and social insurance systems. There is also a widespread recognition of the political goals of social equality and full employment.

Thus, both Norway and Sweden are countries with a particularly inclusive welfare state and a high provision level. However, during the past decades, some important, and to some extent intertwined, differences between the two countries have emerged. In terms of integration regimes, Sweden adopted its first official policy on the integration of immigrants in 1975. The policy was based on three keywords: *equality*, *freedom of choice* and *partnership*. In practice, the Swedish policy obliged the government to ensure equality between immigrants and native Swedes in terms of legal rights and, at the same time, emphasize the recognition of cultural diversity. Although the term was not used in those days, this policy thus had a clear 'multiculturalist' stance (Borevi, 2002). A couple of years later, Norway adopted a similar policy, but already in the 1980s the two countries' policies towards ethnic minorities started to drift apart (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2005). While Sweden by and large remained on the multiculturalist path, Norway started to tighten its policy on diversity. According to the Norwegian anthropologist Marianne Gullestad (2003), identity started to outweigh equality as the most profound ideal of the Norwegian integration policy, with the result that the goal of cultural diversity was replaced by the goal of shared identity. As a consequence, Norway has tightened its integration policy and introduced requirements in the naturalization process on basic Norwegian language skills as well as knowledge about Norwegian society.

There is also an important connection between immigration and integration regimes at play here (Brochmann, 1999). In recent years, all Schengen countries, including Sweden, have entered a kind of regime competition, in which no country wants to be known as the most hospitable place for newcomers (Brekke, 2004). However, Norway and Sweden have entered this competition from different points of departure and there are still considerable differences between the two countries in terms of their policies towards ethnic minorities, with Sweden still putting more emphasis on the value of diversity than Norway (Hagelund, 2005).

To understand Norwegian politics, one first has to consider the economic and political impact of the oil and gas fields that were discovered along the Norwegian coastline in the late 1960s (Steen, 2008). Not long ago, Norway was among the poorest countries in Europe, but today it is the third largest oil-exporting country in the world and it sits on an oil fund with an estimated

value of about \$200 billion. An important political consequence of the oil riches has to do with a restriction in Norwegian law that forbids the government to use more than four per cent of the oil fund annually to cover public expenses. Not surprisingly, this restriction is among the most debated issues in Norwegian politics, and it has become a springboard for the populist *Progress Party* (FrP), which demands that the government should be able to use a larger share of the oil money to secure and improve the Norwegian welfare system. Over the time, FrP has become more and more influential in Norwegian politics and in the national elections in 2005 the party received an all-time high of 22 per cent of the votes (Rogstad, 2007). Considering the xenophobic leanings of FrP, its electoral success marks an important difference between Norway and Sweden, namely the presence of a powerful right-wing populist party in parliament. Sweden did see a political party of this kind, when *New Democracy* (Ny Demokrati) entered the parliament in the 1991 election, but this party rapidly imploded under the pressure of actual parliamentary work. In recent years, the openly xenophobic party *The Sweden Democrats* (Sverigedemokraterna) has also had some electoral success.

In recent years, the link between a strong welfare state and multicultural recognition has been challenged. This is often referred to as the 'progressive dilemma' (Goodhart, 2004), and serves as the point of departure when Ruud Koopmans (2010: 2), on the basis of a comprehensive comparative study, concludes that multiculturalist policies, like those implemented in the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium, are not beneficial for immigrants, 'because [they] may lead to dependence on welfare-state arrangements and thereby to social and economic marginalization'. If Koopmans is right, it is interesting to move further and examine the effect of multiculturalism and welfare on political inclusion; that is precisely why we find it relevant to compare the cases of Oslo and Stockholm.

In this chapter, three ethnic minority groups in Oslo (immigrants, and their descendants, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pakistan and Turkey), and two minority groups in Stockholm (immigrants, and their descendants, from Chile and Turkey) are analysed. The reason why we focus the comparison on the two capital cities of Oslo and Stockholm is that both Norway and Sweden, at least in terms of demography, can be described as 'monocultural' nations with multicultural cities (Rogers et al., 2001). In Oslo, around 20 per cent of the population has a non-western minority background, which is a considerably higher share than in any other Norwegian city (Rogstad, 2007). Stockholm is also a multicultural urban area with currently about one-sixth of the city's population being born abroad and with another one-tenth having at least one parent born abroad (Andersson, 1998b: ch. 3; Lundén, 1999). Consequently, the number of inhabitants with a background in other parts of the world is by now large enough to include fairly substantial sub-groups of ethnic minorities in both cities. In terms of integration regimes,

however, the city level in this case, as represented by Oslo and Stockholm, is not dramatically different from the country level, as represented by the Norwegian and Swedish integration regimes.

The opportunity to focus on immigrants from Turkey, and their descendants, in both Oslo and Stockholm is of course a major advantage for this comparison.<sup>2</sup> It is important to stress that the internal heterogeneity within a category of immigrants from one specific country may sometimes be as pronounced as the differences between immigrants from different countries. Factors like ethnicity, as well as the cause and the time period of migration, may vary within as well as between different categories of immigrants. To place the Turkish minority groups in proper perspective, we will therefore also look at three other minority groups, namely the Chilean minority in Stockholm, together with the Bosnian and the Pakistani minorities in Oslo. The Turkish group, however, is the most important group in the analyses to come. To create yet another point of comparison between the two cities, we also include the respective native populations in the analyses.

### Explaining political participation

As pointed out by the Danish political scientist Lise Tøgeby (2002), the presence of ethnic minorities represents a double challenge for a democracy: firstly, ethnic minorities do not use their political rights as much as the majority. Secondly, the majority does not want interference in what they perceive as 'their' political decisions. Her solution is in line with Michael Walzer's (1998: 50), who argues that 'ultimately, they have to bring themselves in'. In other words, minorities must promote their own issues and interests. The role of society, then, is to ensure that social or political institutions do not prevent mobilization on ethnic or other grounds. However, equal political opportunities do not guarantee equality in terms of outcome, particularly not in the midst of considerable inequality in terms of resources. Consequently, the conditions for political integration in a given political regime cannot be assessed only by its theoretical potential, but must also be evaluated on the basis of practice.

In practice, political participation can take many different forms. Voting is perhaps the most important in terms of power, but other forms of involvement and influence can also be very significant. In this chapter, we look at four different modes of political participation, including voting. The other three modes – *contacts*, *loud-voiced protest acts* and *low-voiced protest acts* – are elaborated below in the section 'Modes of political participation'.

Because of the high degree of similarity between the Norwegian and the Swedish political communities, we do not expect to see any systematic differences in terms of political participation between the respective native populations of Oslo and Stockholm. However, given that Koopmans' conclusion about the relation between multicultural politics and integration

of migrants is valid also in the political sphere, we should expect to see higher average levels of political participation among the migrant groups in Oslo (Turks, Bosnians and Pakistanis) than among the migrant groups in Stockholm (Turks and Chileans).

To be able to say something relevant about the levels of political integration in Oslo and Stockholm, we must of course also look at explanatory factors beneath the context level, such as individual-level and collective-level factors. At the individual level, we need first of all to control for differences in terms of gender and age composition of the studied groups. In terms of gender, research in the Scandinavian countries has shown that the fast-growing mode of participation called political consumerism – boycotts and not buying products for political reasons – is largely a female domain, while the reverse is true for party activities and political contacts. At least in Sweden, however, the difference regarding the two latter modes of participation has decreased rapidly during the last two decades (Teorell and Westholm, 1999; Micheletti, 2004). With regard to age, political activity levels are usually curvilinear with a peak around the upper middle age (Leighley, 1995). This is of course particularly important to keep in mind when analysing participation levels of migrant groups, in which the average age is normally lower than among the native population.

At the individual level, we also need to consider the impact of socio-economic factors, such as education and employment. The group of socio-economic variables are normally good predictors of variation in political participation and among them education almost invariably stands out as the most important explanatory factor (Verba et al., 1995; Leighley, 1995). As pointed out in the introductory chapter, any study of political integration also needs to include variables related to the particular conditions of migrants, such as experience of discrimination, nationality status and language skills.

At the collective level, we will look at the importance of involvement in voluntary associations. It has become a well-established empirical finding that involvement in voluntary associations has a positive correlation with the propensity for political activity (Verba and Nie, 1972: 174–208; Verba et al., 1995: chs 11–13). There is an ongoing discussion about whether this correlation is mainly due to processes of self-selection (Armingeon, 2007; Theiss-Morse and Hibbing, 2005), or if it is due to causal processes (Teorell, 2003; Myrberg, 2010). We will not go into that discussion in this chapter, but we will look at the impact of different kinds of associational involvement on political participation.

Concerning associational involvement, Norway and Sweden compete on having the highest levels in the world and both countries are generally recognized as organizational societies (Curtis et al., 1992; Norris, 2002; Morales and Geurts, 2007). For example, about half of the Norwegian population performs volunteer efforts during a year (Lorentzen, 2004). In terms of membership, close to nine out of ten Swedes and Norwegians are members

of at least one organization; six out of ten are members of two organizations, and about four out of ten are members of three or more organizations (Sivesind, 2006; Myrberg, 2007).

One criticism aimed toward the explanations presented so far is that they are directed against conditions within a given nation-state, which thus emerges as the framework or the unit for analysis, in accordance with a concept of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002). However, there is reason to stress the importance related to the fact that many with immigrant backgrounds live in one country, but at the same time feel a sense of belonging to societies far away (Glick-Schiller et al., 1992; Portes et al., 1999; Vertovec, 2009). In the analysis of the causes of political engagement, we should therefore be able to include variables on a transnational level. Rogstad (2009b) has demonstrated the relevance, showing that among the population with a Pakistani background in Norway, transnational family-networks (clans) are of great importance for understanding variation in political orientation.

## Data

The population of the survey in the city of Oslo was defined as residents in the city belonging to one of the following four categories: (A) Individuals born in Pakistan and individuals born in Norway with at least one parent born in Pakistan; (B) Individuals born in Turkey and individuals born in Norway with at least one parent born in Turkey; (C) Individuals born in Bosnia and individuals born in Norway with at least one parent born in Bosnia; (D) Individuals born in Norway with both parents born in Norway. The definition of A, B and C thus includes both immigrants and descendants of immigrants.

The fieldwork was conducted during the autumn of 2003. In total, 1200 interviews were completed, producing an overall response rate of 36.8 per cent. An analysis of the response figures reveals considerable variation between the four categories: 21.3 per cent in category D (native Norwegians), 37.7 per cent in category B (people with a background in Turkey), 52.8 per cent in category C (people with a background in Bosnia), and 60.8 per cent in category A (people with a background in Pakistan).

The survey was carried out as telephone interviews performed by interviewers from the company Opinion AS. The interviewers were recruited from each of the four ethnic groups in the study, including native Norwegians. Thus, the respondents could choose to conduct the interview in Norwegian, English or the native language of the respondents in each minority group. Each interview lasted for approximately 20 minutes.

The population of the Stockholm survey was defined as all residents in the region of Greater Stockholm, aged 18–74 years, and belonging to one of the following three categories: (A) Individuals born in Chile and individuals

born in Sweden with at least one parent born in Chile; (B) Individuals born in Turkey and individuals born in Sweden with at least one parent born in Turkey; (C) Individuals born in Sweden with both parents born in Sweden. As in the Norwegian case, the definition of A and B includes both immigrants and descendants of immigrants. Within each category, the central government authority for official statistics, Statistics Sweden, was assigned to conduct a random sampling procedure with gender stratification based on continuously updated register data. The total net sample size was 1453 individuals.

The fieldwork of the individual survey started in February 2004 and ended in October the same year. In total, 838 interviews were completed, producing an overall response rate of 57.7 per cent. Here too, an analysis of the response figures reveals variation between the three categories: 48.9 per cent in category B (people with a background in Turkey), 57.9 per cent in category A (people with a background in Chile) and 66.1 per cent in category C (native Swedes). The survey was carried out as computer-assisted face-to-face interviews, averaging about 55 minutes in length, performed by professional interviewers from Statistics Sweden. Questionnaires and response cards were available in Swedish, Spanish and Turkish. If necessary, the interviewers were also assisted by professional interpreters (16 interviews), or by relatives or friends of the respondent (24 interviews).

## Modes of political participation

In this chapter, we have taken the liberty to define the modes of political participation somewhat differently compared to the other chapters. First of all, we have the opportunity to operationalize voting as actual reported voting behaviour rather than as voting intention, since migrants in Norway and Sweden have the right to vote in local elections regardless of having acquired citizenship in Norway/Sweden.<sup>3</sup>

Second, we introduce a distinction between two different kinds of protest acts; those that require a public expression of one's political views on the one hand, *loud-voiced protest acts*, and those that are usually conducted in a less public way, *low-voiced protest acts*. The loud-voiced protest acts include the following four activities: participation in a strike, participation in a public demonstration, work for a political party, and wearing a badge, sticker or poster. The low-voiced protest acts include: product boycott; buying products for political reasons; signing petitions; and donating money. The difference between loud-voiced protest acts and low-voiced protest acts is thus primarily a question of form. Loud-voiced protest acts require more from the participant in terms of putting oneself and one's views on display (Adman, 2004). However, there is nothing that automatically says that the overt ways of protesting included in the loud-voiced protest acts are more politically efficient than the low-voiced protest acts. In fact, the market

mechanism targeted by the low-voiced acts may be even stronger as a political tool than more openly expressed protests (Micheletti, 2004). As we shall see, the distinction between loud-voiced and low-voiced protest acts is particularly well motivated in the context of political integration studies, since it reveals some quite unexpected and thought-provoking patterns in terms of the relative political participation levels across the studied groups. Finally, contacts are also analysed alongside voting and the two protest acts. Contacts include the following four indicators: contact with media, contact with government, contact with a politician and contact with a solicitor. The distinction between the three non-electoral modes of political participation is supported by a factor analysis (see Table 8.A1 in the Appendix).

An ever-recurring topic in the study of political integration is to what extent political activities performed by migrants are actually directed towards the politics of the country of residence rather than the politics of the country of origin. Surprisingly, however, there is not very much empirical research on this issue and there is a particular lack of research that actually compares how migrants view their political activities in terms of direction compared to natives (Myrberg, 2007 is one exception). An analysis of this kind is also interesting to perform since it makes it possible to distinguish differences in content between various modes of political participation (Verba and Nie, 1972).

The results presented in Table 8.1 are based on a follow-up question on political participation. For each political activity that the respondent stated that he or she had taken part in during the last 12 months, we asked the respondent to state which people he or she believed the activity primarily concerned. The alternatives ranged from the personal level, including closest family and friends, to people all over the world. Respondents with a migrant background were also faced with the alternative of 'people in the country of origin'. The respondents were only allowed to indicate one alternative. Importantly, it is the reported activities that are the units of analysis in Table 8.1, not the respondents.

Table 8.1 reveals a number of interesting and important facts about the political participation of migrants and natives in Oslo and Stockholm. First of all, we can take a look at the sheer numbers of reported activities for each mode. As we can see, the native respondents in Oslo and Stockholm together reported more than three times as many low-voiced protest acts as loud-voiced protest acts, while the number of contacts fall in between. The migrant respondents reported about twice as many low-voiced protest acts as loud-voiced acts, while there was almost no difference between contacts and loud-voiced protest acts. Thus, we can conclude that the difference between loud-voiced protest acts and low-voiced protest acts is not only one of form but also one of magnitude, particularly among the native populations.

In terms of direction, there is not much difference between the two protest acts. About 60 per cent of all low-voiced protest acts are directed towards

Table 8.1 Direction of political activities, per cent

Which people do you think are primarily concerned by this activity?	Contacts				Loud-voiced protest acts				Low-voiced protest acts			
	Natives		Migrants		Natives		Migrants		Natives		Migrants	
	Osł	Sto	Osł	Sto	Osł	Sto	Osł	Sto	Osł	Sto	Osł	Sto
Only myself, my family or a few people	31	43	54	46	7	3	6	4	7	5	7	3
People in this city/region	29	41	21	34	15	23	16	23	13	19	14	18
People in the country of residence	33	13	13	12	29	32	20	25	16	19	10	16
People in the country of origin	–	–	6	2	–	–	9	5	–	–	8	5
People all over the world	7	3	6	6	49	42	49	43	64	57	61	58
Number of reported activities	233	235	198	228	176	62	219	229	360	544	302	608
Number of respondents	299	325	892	494	299	325	892	494	299	325	892	494

Note: Entries are percentages of the total number of reported activities for each mode of political participation.



issues concerning people all over the world, as compared to about 50 per cent of the loud-voiced protest acts. Taken together, 35 to 40 per cent of the protest acts, loud-voiced as well as low-voiced, are directed towards local or national politics in the country of residence, while only 5 per cent of the protests primarily concern the respondent personally.

Second, we see a considerable difference in the pattern of contacts compared to the patterns of the two protest modes. In fact, looking at the pattern of contacts is almost like turning the figures for low-voiced protest acts upside down. Apparently, contacts represent a mode of political participation that much more often concerns personal conditions than protests do. As a matter of fact, Verba and Nie (1972) once introduced a distinction between what they called 'particularized contacts' and 'communal activity' for precisely this reason. They argued that particularized contacts are 'just barely political in many instances' (Verba and Nie, 1972; Brady, 1999: 778). We will not follow Verba and Nie's distinction in our analysis, but we do want the reader to note the big difference in direction between contacts on the one hand and the two types of protest acts on the other.

Third, only a marginal share of all protests performed by migrants is directed towards politics in the country of origin. The same can also be said about the political contacts made by migrants in the two cities. Thus, there is nothing in Table 8.1 that points to the conclusion that migrants in Oslo or Stockholm are so busy directing their political efforts to the country of origin that they miss out on the politics in the country of residence. Of course, this analysis represents a rather crude statistical approach to the issue of transnational political activities. Nonetheless, we find it highly interesting that such a small proportion of the political activities reported by migrants in the two cities are directed towards the country of origin.

What should also be stressed in this context is that a very significant proportion of all non-electoral political activities performed in Oslo and Stockholm are directed towards issues concerning people all over the world. While this is an interesting result in itself, it places a particular strain on the discussion about political integration since it raises the question of whether differences in political participation levels between different groups in society should always be viewed as a problem for people in the less active groups. Of course, we can follow Morales and Giugni (Chapter 1 in this volume), who argue that differences in political participation are always a problem if they are due to processes of political exclusion. While we sympathize with this argument, by and large, we still think that differences in political participation may be viewed as less of a problem if they occur in modes of participation that do not primarily focus on the conditions in the country of residence. In a transnational perspective, this result should not come as any surprise. On the contrary, recognition of a global or transnational engagement seems to be of great importance among many with a minority background. Furthermore, orientation towards a country other

than where you reside does not have to prevent integration (see also Morales and Morariu, Chapter 7 in this volume). On the contrary, as Rogstad (2009b) shows, there also seems to be a mutually reinforcing effect, which implies that engagement in the affairs of the country of origin tends to go together with engagement in the community of residence.

## Operationalizations

In the following analyses, voting will be operationalized as a simple dichotomy with the value (1) denoting having voted in the last election and the value (0) not having voted in the last election. In the Swedish case, the question refers to the local elections in 2002, while the questions in the Norwegian case refer the local elections in 2003.

The other three modes of political participation are all constructed as additive indexes based on four indicators. The indexes have been recoded so as to fall into a scale from 0 to 1. The variation in voting will be analysed with binary logistic regression, while the variation in the other three modes will be analysed with ordinal logistic regression (Long, 1997). Throughout the analyses, the reader is advised to pay attention mainly to the sign of the regression coefficients and to the level of statistical significance. The analysis of the variation in participation levels between the studied groups will be performed in six steps for each mode of participation. The coefficients presented in Tables 8.3–8.6 represent the difference between the reference category *Native Swedes in Stockholm* and each of the other six categories.

In the first step, the difference in average participation levels is analysed, or just really presented in a new way, without control variables. In the second step, age and gender are added to the regression model as control variables. Since political participation is often curvilinear throughout the life-course, age is represented by two variables: age at the time of the interview and age squared. The gender variable is coded as 1 for men and as 0 for women. In the third step, the socio-economic variables *education* and *employment* are added to the analysis. Education is here measured as a scale based on the highest degree taken by the respondent. The scale is recoded as a scale from 0 to 1. Employment simply denotes whether the respondent is gainfully employed (1) or not gainfully employed (0). In the fourth step, three variables with particular importance for political integration are added. The *citizenship* variable is coded as 1 if the respondent holds citizenship in the country of residence and 0 if not. Respondents with double citizenships are coded as 1 if he or she is a citizen of the country of residence. The *discrimination* variables measures experience of discrimination on the basis of migrant background and is coded as 1 if the respondent reports having been discriminated against during the last 12 months and 0 if not. *Language skills* is a self-reported scale from 0 to 1, where 0 denotes very poor fluency in the language of the country of residence, while 1 denotes very high

fluency. In the fifth step, the variable *involvement in voluntary associations* is added. This variable is also recoded as a scale from 0 to 1. Finally, in the sixth step, a variable measuring involvement in ethnic-group associations and immigrant associations as a proportion of total involvement in voluntary associations is included. The point of including this variable is to get a sense of the relative importance for migrants of involvement in ethnic-group and immigrant associations as compared to involvement in other kinds of associations.

The idea behind this step-wise approach is two-fold. First, we want to see to what extent differences in the average levels of political participation among the studied groups are due to factors at the individual and collective levels. Second, we want to see which of the factors at the individual and collective levels are the most important for explaining the patterns of political participation that we find.

## Results

In Table 8.2, the average levels of participation are presented for the seven groups under study. For voting, the table entries are simply the proportion in each group that reported having voted in the last local election. For example, we see that 86 per cent of the native Swedes in Stockholm voted in the last election, as did 87 per cent of the native Norwegians in Oslo.

The most interesting result in terms of voting seems to be the relatively low turnout levels among the migrant groups in Oslo compared to the migrant groups in Stockholm. Here, we do seem to have a systematic difference in the migrant participation between the two cities, although not in the direction we would expect from Koopmans' argument. That is, in the relatively multicultural setting of Stockholm, migrants are apparently more active as voters than migrants in Oslo.

A similar pattern can be discerned if we look at the levels of political contacts. For contacts and the two protest acts, table entries are mean values on an additive scale based on four activities that has been recoded into a 0–1 scale. A value of 0.25 thus means that the average respondent in this category has performed one of the four activities during the last 12 months. Now, looking at the values for contacts, we see that native Swedes (0.18) and native Norwegians (0.20) once again are at about the same average level of activity, while the migrant groups in both cities are trailing behind, the groups in Oslo more so than in Stockholm. In other words, there does appear to be some consistency in the levels of voting and contacts. Native Swedes and native Norwegians are on the same high levels, followed first by Chileans and Turks in Stockholm and then by Turks, Bosnians and Pakistanis in Oslo.

The consistency dissolves, however, when we turn to the two protest acts. Looking first at the two native groups, we see a very interesting difference

Table 8.2 Average levels of political participation

	Stockholm			Oslo			
	Natives	Turks	Chileans	Natives	Turks	Bosnians	Pakistanis
Voting in local elections	0.86	0.74**	0.82	0.87	0.59**††	0.49**††	0.58**††
Contacts	0.18	0.12**	0.11**	0.20	0.07**††	0.06**††	0.04**††
Loud-voiced protest acts	0.05	0.08*	0.14**	0.15**	0.06††	0.07*††	0.05††
Low-voiced protest acts	0.42	0.25**	0.37*	0.27**	0.10**††	0.10**††	0.05**††
N	325	227	267	299	300	297	295

Notes: Voting: N = 1875. Table entries for voting are the proportion of each category that said that they voted in the last local election. The other three modes: N = 2,010. Table entries for *Contacts*, *Loud-voiced protest acts* and *Low-voiced protest acts* are mean values for additive indices ranging from 0 to 1 based on four activities for each index. For all groups, asterisks mark the difference in relation to native Swedes.

\*p ≤ .05, \*\*p ≤ .01. Two-tailed test. For the minority groups in Oslo, crosses mark the difference in relation to native Norwegians. †p ≤ .05, ††p ≤ .01

between native Swedes and native Norwegians. While the native Norwegians show the highest average level of loud-voiced protest acts, the native Swedes come out at the bottom together with the Pakistanis in Oslo. On the other hand, native Swedes are by far the most active in terms of low-voiced protest acts. Here, native Norwegians are on a par with the Turks in Stockholm, but trailing behind not only the native Swedes but also the Chileans in Stockholm. Regarding the migrants, all three groups in Oslo show relatively low levels of activity with regard to both protest acts, with the Pakistanis being the least active. In contrast, the two migrant groups in Stockholm are relatively active with regard to both protest acts. As already mentioned, the Chileans in Stockholm even outperform the native Norwegians in terms of low-voiced protest acts.

In sum, the two migrant groups in Stockholm seem to be more politically active than the migrant groups in Oslo. Perhaps most importantly, the Turks in Stockholm show higher levels of activity than the Turks in Oslo for all four modes of participation. We also see that the native populations are on a par with each other when it comes to voting and contacts but very far from each other in terms of the two protest acts, with native Norwegians being much more active than native Swedes in loud-voiced activities while the reverse holds for the low-voiced acts.

Now, the question is to what extent can the patterns of political participation across the seven groups presented in Table 8.2 be explained by variation in factors at the individual and collective levels and to what extent do they seem to be related to contextual differences between the two cities. While unable to test the latter proposition properly, we can at least get a grip on whether the differences we see between the two cities without controlling for individual- and collective-level variables remain much the same with controls or if they change.

Starting with voting in Table 8.3, we have the differences in turnout levels between the studied groups expressed as logistic regression coefficients in the top row. The asterisks indicate that the difference compared to the reference category native Swedes is statistically significant. For example, we see once again that Turks in Stockholm together with all three migrant groups in Oslo voted to a significantly lesser extent than native Swedes, while native Norwegians and Chileans in Stockholm show about the same proportion of turnout as the native Swedes.

The analyses presented in Table 8.3 are interesting for several reasons. First of all, the coefficients for native Norwegians and Chileans in Stockholm remain more or less unchanged throughout the analysis. Thus, voting propensity among the two native populations and the Chilean group in Stockholm is also the same when we control for individual- and collective-level factors. In contrast, we see that the difference in voting between native Swedes and Turks is no longer statistically significant when we control for education and employment. We also see that the difference between native

Table 8.3 Logistic regression analysis of voting in local elections

Voting in local elections	Stockholm		Oslo			
	Turks	Chileans	Natives	Turks	Bosnians	Pakistanis
Model 1	-0.76**	-0.32	0.04	-1.47**††	-1.84**††	-1.48**††
No control variables	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Model 2	-0.59**	-0.24	0.09	-1.25**††	-1.71**††	-1.26**††
Adding age and gender	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Model 3	-0.29	-0.17	0.04	-0.82**††	-1.68**††	-0.88**††
Adding education and employment	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Model 4	-0.23	-0.02	0.03	-0.64**†	-1.39**††	-0.66**††
Adding citizenship, discrimination and language skills	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Model 5	-0.10	0.15	0.15	-0.28	-1.06**††	-0.23
Adding total associational involvement	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Model 6	-0.10	0.15	0.15	-0.28	-1.06**††	-0.23
Adding involvement in immigrant and ethnic group associations as a proportion of total involvement	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.24)

Notes: N = 1875. Table entries are binary logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. For all groups, asterisks mark the difference in relation to native Swedes. \*p ≤ .05, \*\*p ≤ .01. For the minority groups in Oslo, crosses mark the difference in relation to native Norwegians (regression coefficients and standard errors not shown). †p ≤ .05, ††p ≤ .01.

Swedes, on the one hand, and Turks and Pakistanis in Oslo, on the other, decreases considerably when we control for education and employment, while still being statistically significant. For the latter two groups, the difference compared to native Swedes, and thus also to native Norwegians, becomes insignificant in a statistical sense when we add associational involvement to the model in step 5. The only group that still shows a significant difference compared to native Swedes when we control for associational involvement is the Bosnians in Oslo. Thus, both socio-economic factors such as education and employment and associational involvement are important as explanatory factors behind the differences in turnout levels that we found in Table 8.3. In fact, there is not much difference between the groups remaining to be explained when we have applied the full model, which may lead to a conclusion that differences at the individual and collective levels are more important than differences at the contextual level if we want to understand the variation in voting between natives and migrants in Oslo and Stockholm. Still, on the basis of the previous analyses, we must be careful with our conclusions. There are theoretical reasons to believe that contextual elements are of importance; consequently we need more analysis to investigate the implications of associational involvement satisfactorily.

Turning to the analysis of contacts in Table 8.4, we find both similarities and differences compared to the analysis of voting. Starting with the similarities, we see that the differences between native Swedes and native Norwegians and Chileans in Stockholm remain more or less the same throughout the analysis. Only this time, the difference between native Swedes and Chileans is statistically significant. For Turks in Stockholm as well as in Oslo, and for Pakistanis, the difference with native Swedes decreases when we control for the socio-economic indicators in model 3. There is also a sharp decrease for all three migrant groups in Oslo compared to the native Swedes when we control for associational involvement in model 5. However, that is not the case for Turks in Stockholm. In the end, we still have significant differences with regard to contacts for four groups compared to native Swedes in the full model. Interestingly, the differences between native Swedes and the two migrant groups in Stockholm have changed much less through the course of this analysis than the differences between native Swedes and the three migrant groups in Oslo. In other words, this means that the variation in factors at the individual and collective levels seem to be more important as explanations of the relatively low levels of political contacts among migrants in Oslo than they are in Stockholm.

The analyses presented in Tables 8.3 and 8.4 have all been about explaining why migrants are less politically active than natives in Stockholm and Oslo. In Table 8.5, however, the starting point is the reverse in the sense that the reference category, native Swedes, together with Pakistanis in Oslo, show the lowest average levels of loud-voiced protest acts of all studied groups. Thus, the question now is whether we will see that the differences

Table 8.4 Ordinal regression analysis of contacts

Contacts	Stockholm		Oslo			
	Turks	Chileans	Natives	Turks	Bosnians	Pakistanis
Model 1 No control variables	-0.69** (0.18)	-0.61** (0.17)	0.03 (0.15)	-1.24**†† (0.18)	-1.41**†† (0.19)	-1.68**†† (0.20)
Model 2 Adding age and gender	-0.70** (0.18)	-0.65** (0.17)	0.12 (0.16)	-1.31**†† (0.19)	-1.43**†† (0.19)	-1.74**†† (0.21)
Model 3 Adding education and employment	-0.32 (0.19)	-0.65** (0.17)	0.07 (0.16)	-0.76**†† (0.20)	-1.41**†† (0.19)	-1.33**†† (0.21)
Model 4 Adding citizenship, discrimination and language skills	-0.46* (0.21)	-0.72** (0.19)	0.07 (0.16)	-0.55*†† (0.21)	-1.16**†† (0.20)	-1.13**†† (0.22)
Model 5 Adding total associational involvement	-0.47* (0.21)	-0.63** (0.20)	-0.19 (0.16)	-0.24† (0.22)	-0.81**†† (0.21)	-0.74**†† (0.23)
Model 6 Adding involvement in immigrant and ethnic group associations as a proportion of total involvement	-0.46* (0.21)	-0.63** (0.19)	0.19 (0.17)	-0.23† (0.22)	-0.80**†† (0.22)	-0.74**†† (0.24)

Notes: N = 2010. Table entries are ordinal logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. For all groups, asterisks mark the difference in relation to native Swedes. \*p ≤ .05, \*\*p ≤ .01. For the minority groups in Oslo, crosses mark the difference in relation to native Norwegians (regression coefficients and standard errors not shown). †p ≤ .05, ††p ≤ .01.



Table 8.5 Ordinal regression analysis of loud-voiced protest acts

Loud-voiced protest acts	Stockholm		Oslo			
	Turks	Chileans	Natives	Turks	Bosnians	Pakistanis
Model 1	0.50*	1.32**	1.18**	0.20††	0.50*††	0.04††
No control variables	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.22)
Model 2	0.35	1.24**	1.28**	-0.02††	0.39††	-0.14††
Adding age and gender	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Model 3	0.76**	1.32**	1.25**	0.57*††	0.48*††	0.36††
Adding education and employment	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.23)
Model 4	0.68**	1.31**	1.25**	0.71**††	0.65**††	0.50*††
Adding citizenship, discrimination and language skills	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.24)
Model 5	0.88**	1.60**	1.53**	1.25**	1.21**	1.12**
Adding total associational involvement	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Model 6	0.77**	1.54**	1.48**	1.08**	1.08**	0.95**†
Adding involvement in immigrant and ethnic group associations as a proportion of total involvement	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.26)

Notes: N = 2010. Table entries are ordinal logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. For all groups, asterisks mark the difference in relation to native Swedes. \*p ≤ .05, \*\*p ≤ .01. For the minority groups in Oslo, crosses mark the difference in relation to native Norwegians (regression coefficients and standard errors not shown). †p ≤ .05, ††p ≤ .01.

compared to native Swedes decrease when we control for individual- and collective-level factors or if they increase.

Looking at the results in Table 8.5, we actually see increasing differences compared to native Swedes for all studied groups, including the native Norwegians and the Chileans in Stockholm. We also see that the three migrant groups in Oslo, which in the baseline model showed only marginal differences in loud-voiced protest acts compared to the native Swedes, present solid and statistically significant differences in the full model. For the migrant groups, we see particularly big increases in the difference when we control for education and employment in model 3 and when we control for associational involvement in model 5. For the first time, we also see some changes in the differences when we control for involvement in ethnic-group and immigrant associations as a proportion of total associational involvement in model 6. Interestingly, these changes are all negative in the sense that the difference compared to native Swedes decreases when we control for this variable. All in all, we have to conclude that the difference in the average level of loud-voiced protest between native Swedes and the other studied groups would be even larger were it not for the high average level of education and associational involvement among native Swedes.

The large difference between native Swedes and native Norwegians with regard to loud-voiced protest acts is perhaps the most interesting result in Table 8.5, as it points to a difference in the political action repertoire between Sweden and Norway that has not previously been uncovered. This difference is underlined by the results in Table 8.6, where we see the native Swedes coming back with a vengeance compared to all the other groups, including the native Norwegians. Interestingly, however, the difference between the two native populations in terms of low-voiced protest acts remains stable throughout the analyses in Table 8.6. While the difference between the two native populations in terms of loud-voiced protest acts seemed to be at least somewhat dependent on associational involvement, the difference in low-voiced protest acts seems to be rather independent of factors on the individual and collective levels.

Turning to the other groups in Table 8.6, we see quite sharply decreasing differences for Turks and Pakistanis in Oslo compared to the native Swedes, although they are still statistically significant in the full model. For Turks in Stockholm and Bosnians in Oslo, the decreases are more marginal in character, as is also the case for Chileans in Stockholm. In fact, the Chileans are the only group that does not differ significantly from the native Swedes in the full model.

One of the main impressions from the analyses presented in Tables 8.3–8.6 is that variation in socio-economic indicators such as education and employment, together with variation in associational involvement, account for quite a lot of the differences we saw in the average levels of political participation across the studied groups in Table 8.2. This impression is

Table 8.6 Ordinal regression analysis of low-voiced protest acts

Low-voiced protest acts	Stockholm		Oslo			
	Turks	Chileans	Natives	Turks	Bosnians	Pakistanis
Model 1	-1.12**	-0.35*	-0.93**	-2.44**††	-2.32**††	-3.03**††
No control variables	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.19)
Model 2	-1.27**	-0.43**	-0.85**	-2.64**††	-2.42**††	-3.21**††
Adding age and gender	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Model 3	-0.76**	-0.38**	-1.01**	-1.97**††	-2.46**††	-2.72**††
Adding education and employment	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Model 4	-0.86**	-0.36*	-1.01**	-1.77**††	-2.21**††	-2.55**††
Adding citizenship, discrimination and language skills	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)
Model 5	-0.76**	-0.19	-0.94**	-1.47**††	-1.89**††	-2.17**††
Adding total associational involvement	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.21)
Model 6	-0.77**	-0.20	-0.95**	-1.49**††	-1.91**††	-2.19**††
Adding involvement in immigrant and ethnic group associations as a proportion of total involvement	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.22)

*Comment:* N = 2010. Table entries are ordinal logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. For all groups, asterisks mark the difference in relation to native Swedes. \* $p \leq .05$ , \*\* $p \leq .01$ . For the minority groups in Oslo, crosses mark the difference in relation to native Norwegians (regression coefficients and standard errors not shown). † $p \leq .05$ , †† $p \leq .01$ .

Table 8.7 Explanatory variables in the full models for the four modes of political participation

Explanatory variables in the full model	Voting	Contacts	Loud-voiced protest acts	Low-voiced protest acts
Age	0.12** (0.02)	0.10** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Age squared	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Gender	-0.09 (0.12)	0.58** (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)	0.14 (0.09)
Education	0.44* (0.21)	0.87** (0.20)	0.82** (0.22)	1.32** (0.18)
Employment	0.26* (0.13)	-0.23 (0.13)	0.11 (0.13)	0.11 (0.11)
Language	0.29 (0.19)	0.40 (0.25)	0.25 (0.24)	0.39 (0.20)
Discrimination	0.13 (0.28)	0.65** (0.22)	0.25 (0.21)	0.39* (0.18)
Citizenship	0.58** (0.15)	0.40* (0.17)	0.23 (0.16)	0.44** (0.14)
Associational involvement	4.89** (0.84)	5.23** (0.53)	6.41** (0.58)	5.68** (0.50)
Involvement in ethnic group/ immigrant associations	0.01 (0.20)	-0.02 (0.22)	0.48* (0.20)	0.07 (0.19)

Notes: Voting: N = 1875. Table entries are binary logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. The other three modes: N = 2010. Table entries are ordinal logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks mark the statistical significance of each regression coefficient. \*p ≤ .05, \*\*p ≤ .01.

further strengthened when we look at the coefficients for the explanatory variables in the full model for each mode of participation as presented in Table 8.7. That is, we are now looking at the coefficients from the analyses presented as model 6 in Tables 8.3 through 8.6. Here, we see a consistent pattern in the sense that both education and associational involvement have statistically significant positive effects on all four modes of participation. Of the two socio-economic indicators, education seems to be more important than employment for all modes of participation except for voting where they both are significant at the 95 per cent level.

A brief look at the demographic indicators tells us that both voting and contacts have a typical curvilinear pattern in relation to age, while age does not seem to have an effect on either of the two protest acts. The gender variable is only significant with regard to contacts, for which men seem to be more active than women. Interestingly, the language variable is not significant for any of the four modes of participation, which really raises a question about the importance of this factor in terms of political integration.<sup>4</sup>

In contrast, both experience of discrimination and holding citizenship in the country of residence show significant effects for at least some of the four modes. It is not perfectly clear, however, how we should interpret the result that experience of discrimination has a positive effect on political contacts and low-voiced protest acts. If we can speculate a bit here, it might be the case that the discrimination variable used here is marred by the problem of self-selection in the sense that more successful migrants in terms of socio-economic status feel less ashamed, and thus more willing to talk, about their own experiences of discrimination than other migrants (Lange, 2000).

Finally, we can also note that while associational involvement has a very strong positive effect on all four modes of participation, it does not seem to be crucial for migrants whether this involvement takes place in ethnic-group associations, immigrant associations or any other kind of associations, with the possible exception of loud-voiced protest acts, where we do see a positive effect of this variable that is significant on the 95 per cent level.

## Discussion

In this chapter, we have analysed patterns of political participation among five migrant groups and the two native populations in Oslo and Stockholm. The four modes of participation that we have analysed are voting, contacts, loud-voiced protest acts and low-voiced protest acts. It is now time to sum up the main results of our analyses and discuss how these findings can be interpreted.

We have found that the average levels of political participation vary both across the studied categories and across the studied modes of participation. Much as expected, the two native populations show high average levels compared to the migrant groups with regard to both voting and contacts. However, this pattern is not repeated for the two protest acts. In fact, native Swedes have the lowest average level of loud-voiced protest acts of all groups but the highest level of low-voiced protest acts. In contrast, native Norwegians are at the top when it comes to protest acts but only at a medium level in terms of low-voiced protest acts. We have no good explanation for this pattern among the native populations but it is really something that would be worth looking into more closely.

With regard to the migrant groups, we do find one consistent pattern, namely higher average levels across all four modes of participation for the two migrant groups in Stockholm as compared to the three migrant groups in Oslo. At the outset, this points to a contextual difference between the two cities that goes straight against the hypothesis derived from Koopmans' (2010) work on social and economic integration, that the more multicultural integration regime in Stockholm would be less beneficial for political integration than the less multicultural setting in Oslo. However, the results from our regression analyses of the differences between the studied

groups urge us to be careful with such conclusions, since it turns out that the average differences across the groups are to a large extent due to differences in education levels and associational involvement, of which the latter may not be fully exogenous in relation to political participation. This word of caution is perhaps most critical with regard to voting, where we have seen that the differences in the baseline model virtually disappear when we add the individual- and collective-level variables.

Returning to the low level of loud-voiced protest acts among the native Swedes, we believe that one of the most important findings in this chapter is precisely the lack of uniformity in terms of the average levels of the different groups across the four modes of participation. In studies of political integration, it is almost taken for granted that natives are more active, or at least as active, as migrants in the political process, which also means that the discussion tends to focus on how the gap between natives and migrants could be decreased. Here, however, we find that natives are more active in some modes of participation, while migrants are more active in others. Now, the question is of course how we should interpret this finding in relation to the concept of political integration. Can we interpret the results in Table 8.5 as evidence of native Swedes being less politically integrated than Chileans and Turks in Stockholm? And can that in any way be seen as a problem?

In our view, the results in Table 8.5 must be regarded as interesting in the sense that they lead us to ask new questions about the concept and measurement of political integration. However, we do not see them as evidence of native Swedes being less politically integrated than Chileans and Turks in Stockholm. In fact, we do not even see them as evidence of Chileans and Turks being as politically integrated as native Swedes. The upside of the results in Table 8.5 from a political integration perspective is mainly that they show that participation of this kind is also possible for migrant groups. The downside is that neither of the two protest acts seems to have very much to do with local or national politics in the country of residence, that is, the politics that affect the daily lives of the people in Stockholm, and in Oslo for that matter. The direction of the protest acts is much more transnational, which is of course important as such, but not necessarily with regard to the issue of political integration. At the same time, transnational engagement does not prevent political engagement in the country of residence (Rogstad, 2009b). It might be the opposite, that engagement is self-enforcing, the more active in one setting the more likely to become active in another as well. In comparison with protests, voting and contacts are much more related to the local and national political arenas, and for these modes of participation the native populations are still way ahead of the migrant groups in this study, with the possible exception of the Chileans in Stockholm.

In conclusion, our findings do not point to any strong systematic patterns of political participation related to the context level in terms of differences

between the two cities. Still, on the basis of the previous analysis, we want to be cautious about our conclusions. There are theoretical reasons to believe that contextual elements are of importance; consequently we need more analysis to satisfactorily investigate the implications of associational involvement. There is, however, nothing in these findings that supports the hypothesis that a less multicultural integration regime would be more beneficial for political integration than a more multicultural one. We have also seen variation in the levels of participation across the four modes of participation that leads to new questions about the concept and measurement of political integration, but the main impression is still that migrants, on the whole, are less politically active than the native populations in Oslo and Stockholm. For most acts, this is also true even when we control for factors at the individual and collective levels. Finally, and as expected, our analyses have shown strong positive correlations between both education and associational involvement with all four modes of political participation.

## Appendix

*Table 8.A1* Modes of political participation (principal component analysis)

Activity	Contacts	Loud-voiced protest acts	Low-voiced protest acts
Contact: Media	<b>0.70</b>	0.11	0.02
Contact: Government	<b>0.69</b>	0.03	0.28
Contact: Politician	<b>0.68</b>	0.19	0.19
Contact: Solicitor	<b>0.55</b>	0.09	0.04
Strike	0.05	<b>0.66</b>	0.13
Work Political Party	0.24	<b>0.62</b>	0.09
Badge, Sticker, Poster	0.19	<b>0.58</b>	0.31
Public Demonstration	0.07	<b>0.53</b>	0.43
Product Boycott	0.11	0.08	<b>0.72</b>
Buy for Political Reasons	0.07	0.02	<b>0.72</b>
Sign Petition	0.23	0.13	<b>0.62</b>
Donate Money	0.17	0.08	<b>0.54</b>

*Notes:* Table entries are factor loadings from an unweighted varimax rotated solution of a principal component analysis. The retention of factors is based on the Kaiser criterion, i.e. eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The eigenvalues are 2.14, 1.93 and 1.53, respectively. The factors explain 46.7 per cent of the variation in the variables. N = 2010. Separate factor analyses for the native populations result in the same pattern as the one presented here, with the exception that the mode of low-voiced protest acts falls into two separate dimensions in the Stockholm sample of the native population.

## Notes

1. In this chapter, we will use the terms 'natives' and 'native population' instead of the rather heavy terms 'autochthones' and 'autochthonous population'.
2. In this chapter, we will denote migrants from Turkey as 'Turks' although the category includes ethnic Kurds and Syrian Christians as well as ethnic Turks (Myrberg 2009).

3. Immigrants in both Norway and Sweden have the right to vote in local elections, regardless of having acquired citizenship in the country of residence, if they have been permanent residents for three years or more (Myrberg, 2007; Rogstad, 2007). In the Stockholm sample, 35 respondents answered that they had not been eligible to vote in the last local election (2002). In the Oslo sample, the corresponding figure for the local election in 2003 was 100 respondents. About 40 per cent of these respondents (56 individuals to be precise) had arrived in the respective country of residence in 1999 or later. The remaining 60 per cent of the respondents who claimed to be ineligible to vote may have been wrong about this, but since we have no way of knowing that, all respondents who claimed to be ineligible to vote have been excluded from the voting analysis.
4. This finding is repeated in separate analyses for each of the minority groups.



# 9

## Political Efficacy and Confidence among Migrants

*Eva Anduiza and Josep San Martín*

### Introduction

Attitudes are fundamental aspects of migrants' relation to the political system where they live. Do they consider themselves able to understand and influence political decisions, or do they feel politics in their country of residence is not their business? Do migrants think that the political system is sensitive to their demands, or do they feel they can't really have a say? Do they trust the political institutions of the country where they live? It would be hard to argue that these are not crucial elements of the degree of migrants' political incorporation into their countries of residence.

Yet when talking about migrants' political engagement and incorporation into receiving political systems attention is more often put on political behaviour (see, for example, Barreto and Muñoz, 2003; Jones-Correa, 1998; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001) than in political attitudes (but see García, 1987; Cain et al., 1991).<sup>1</sup> In this chapter we analyse levels of political efficacy and confidence in political institutions among Moroccans and Ecuadorians in the cities of Madrid and Barcelona, Moroccans in Lyon and Ecuadorians in Milan. We argue that political efficacy and confidence are relevant indicators of the degree of political incorporation, and as such, it is essential to know under which conditions migrants are more likely to feel politically competent and confident in the institutions of the countries where they live.

Additionally, understanding political attitudes such as those analysed here is important for yet another reason: attitudes are expected to be consequential for political behaviour (Campbell et al., 1960) and also for political outcomes such as institutional performance (Putnam, 1993), democratic stability (Almond and Verba, 1963) or democratic quality (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). In as far as the arrival of a large number of migrants to European countries could be perceived as a threat to social cohesion and a factor that may reduce the level of support for the nation-state institutions of the receiving countries, analysing political competence and confidence of the migrant

groups and comparing it to the autochthonous population is also an important objective.

The chapter starts by discussing the relevance of these political attitudes and the factors that, according to previous works, may explain them. We then describe the main characteristics of the cities and groups considered in the analysis and justify our choice. Next, we describe and explain differences in these political attitudes. Finally, we discuss the results.

## **The question: what explains political efficacy and confidence among migrants?**

### **Political efficacy and confidence: conceptualization and importance**

Political efficacy is 'the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties. It is the sense that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change' (Campbell et al., 1954: 187). Although earlier studies used the concept of political efficacy in a single dimension, later works considered that it had a multidimensional nature. Scholars such as Lane (1959) and Balch (1974) distinguished two types of efficacy: internal and external. Internal political efficacy is the individual perception that citizens have about their own ability to have an impact on the political process through their own participation.<sup>2</sup> External political efficacy is the perception that the political system, and particularly parties and politicians, will incorporate the citizens' inputs and opinions to their decisions. It thus reflects a perception that the political system is responsive to citizens' demands.

Political confidence<sup>3</sup> in institutions implies that citizens are convinced that these will comply with their functions and obligations even when they are not being constantly controlled (Citrin and Muste, 1999: 465; Hardin, 2000). In a broader sense, confidence in institutions implies a general judgement about their levels of credibility, fairness or competence, merits that would make them trustworthy (Levi and Stoker, 2000).

Political efficacy and confidence are particularly important attitudes because they are central to the core normative principles of a democratic political system. A democracy requires that citizens feel competent to understand and participate in politics, as well as a responsive and trusted set of institutions. Even among defenders of representative conceptions of democracy, today it is hard to argue that democratic political systems can properly work with an apathetic (if not alienated) citizenry that feels unable to participate and distrusts its political institutions (Dalton, 2008a). It is precisely the decline in political confidence and thus political support that has been argued as being a worrying feature of contemporary advanced democracies (Crozier et al., 1975; Norris et al., 1999; Dalton, 2004; Torcal and Montero,

2006). Moreover, if lack of confidence and distrust are concentrated in a segment of the population with specific social characteristics and lower levels of socio-economic resources (as may be the case for ethnic minorities) the risk of political exclusion and of the reinforcement of pre-existing social inequalities increases.

The lack of confidence in institutions is considered particularly worrying, since while political leaders and parties can be replaced via elections, institutions have a more stable nature and are considered 'the basic pillars of society' (Newton and Norris, 2000: 53). Moreover, political confidence facilitates compliance. Kelleher and Wolak (2007: 707) argue that confidence in government is highly consequential because 'people are more likely to comply with laws when they have confidence in government ... For governments, high public confidence enables greater policy innovation and risk-taking, while low confidence can threaten the stability and legitimacy of government.'

Empirical studies have given support to the idea that the level of internal efficacy provides information about the individual propensity to become active in the political arena (see, for instance, Verba et al., 1995: 344), and more generally that efficacy and confidence have significant consequences for political behaviour (Gabriel, 1995). However, what the consequences are of external efficacy and political confidence for political participation remains a matter of dispute. Part of the literature argues that low levels of confidence demobilize citizens (see, for example, Almond and Verba, 1963), particularly in new democracies (Torcal, 2006). For others, low levels of confidence enhance unconventional political participation. Nilson and Nilson (1980: 386), for example, argue that this low trust may have serious political consequences: 'High trust allows authorities the power to "invest in" new commitments, which further enhance public trust in them, whereas low trust sets the stage for aggressive political protest and, if sufficiently widespread, political instability.' A well known hypothesis (Gamson, 1968) argued that a combination of low confidence and high internal efficacy was the optimum situation for political mobilization, but later analyses failed to confirm it empirically (Sigelman and Feldman, 1983).

In any case, if political incorporation is a normative goal, then the analysis of political efficacy and confidence among migrants becomes fundamental. Tillie argues that external efficacy and confidence are essential components of political integration, together with an adherence to democratic values and political participation: 'Citizens who trust the institutions of democracy are politically integrated. If citizens distrust public servants or representative institutions like municipal councils, the legitimacy of these institutions is at stake. Distrusting citizens are, in this sense, not integrated into the political system' (Tillie, 2004: 530).

The empirical analysis of these political attitudes in migrant citizens is crucial for yet another reason. In the debate on post-national citizenship

it is argued that massive immigration undermines the power and relevance of nation-states and its institutions (see, for example, Jacobson, 1996). Extending the argument we could expect lower levels of support towards those institutions from those who lack full political rights, and thus cannot fully participate. Some empirical work has already put some of these assumptions into question (Koopmans and Statham, 1999a) using protest event data. Further analysis with individual-level data comparing the political attitudes of the autochthonous and the migrant populations is required, as many studies on migrant political engagement consider only migrant groups.

### **Explanatory factors of efficacy and trust for the migrant population**

Is the migrants' level of internal efficacy conditioned by their level of resources such as education? To what extent is an irregular legal situation in a migrant a hindrance for her confidence and competence? Are these attitudes dependent on prior feelings about politics in the country of origin? Are those who belong to ethnic associations or participate politically more likely to feel competent and confident in political institutions?

When trying to explain the levels of efficacy and trust of the migrant population we must distinguish variables that may affect them just as they are expected to affect the autochthonous population (such as gender, interest in politics or associational involvement), from those that are specific to the migrant condition (such as the degree of interest in the politics of the country of origin, or having the nationality of the country of residence).

Among general predictors of efficacy and confidence we must take into account in the first place standard socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender and education. Young people, individuals with lower levels of education and women are expected to have lower levels of sense of political efficacy and competence than highly educated middle-aged men; these variables may also influence external efficacy and competence. Age, as usual, may reflect life-cycle or generational effects that without longitudinal data are impossible to disentangle. In the case of the migrant population generational effects are crucial, as assimilation theories would argue that younger generations socialized in the receiving country are more likely to be politically integrated. This is sometimes, but not always, confirmed by empirical analyses (Cain et al., 1991; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001).

Weak social ties, such as those derived from church attendance (Jamal, 2005; Harris, 1994), are also expected to reinforce attitudes of competence and confidence. Social integration through having paid work is also likely to foster these attitudes. We expect people with high levels of interest in politics to have higher levels of political efficacy (particularly internal) and confidence. We would also expect people satisfied with democratic performance to display higher levels of confidence (Denters et al., 2007). Whether exposure to mass media and particularly television has any significant

effect on political support has been a matter of academic debate (see Norris, 2000). In general defendants of the media-malaise theory would argue that high exposure to television would reduce particularly the levels of external efficacy and trust, as the focus of news is increasingly put on conflicts, scandals and strategies, and less on substantive policies. However, for migrants, exposure to television news may be an important element of socialization into their new political system.

Although in past research on political participation it is usually assumed that the causal link goes from attitudes (such as political efficacy) to behaviour (political participation) there is an extensive debate on the extent to which this may also work the other way around (Finkel, 1985). For many authors participation actually produces efficacy – with different participation modes producing very different effects (see Finkel, 1987; Madsen, 1987), particularly if the outcome of the participation is perceived as successful (Ainsworth, 2000; Clarke and Acock, 1989). These endogeneity problems are difficult to solve with cross-sectional data but participation must certainly be considered as a potential explanatory factor for efficacy and confidence.

A special mention deserves to be made of the potential effect of associational involvement. According to Warren (2001: 77ff.), membership in associations can impact on the sense of political efficacy, information, political skills, capacities for deliberative judgement and civic virtues, although these potential effects are not always empirically tested. By interacting with other members and with institutions, citizens may develop both civic skills and the feeling that they can actually influence politics, and thus their levels of internal political efficacy may increase. It is frequently considered that participating in associations increases the levels of interpersonal trust and this has spillover effects over the level of political trust. Keele (2007: 244) argues that

citizens who are not engaged in civic activity are likely to feel a lack of political influence which causes feeling of powerlessness that fuels cynicism and distrust toward political and social leaders, the institutions of government, and the regime as a whole ... moreover, civic engagement teaches interpersonal trust, and individuals with low levels of interpersonal trust are equally mistrusting of people and institutions.

Here we find the same endogeneity problems mentioned when referring to political participation. We do not know whether, as these hypotheses of developmental effects suggest, associations increase their members' efficacy and trust, or those that feel competent and trust political institutions tend to get involved in associations (Stolle, 1998). Be that it as it may, some previous empirical findings do not support the hypothesis that associational membership is linked to political confidence (Zmerli et al., 2007) and the link with social trust is relatively weak (Morales and Geurts, 2007). Diani (2000) even

finds that individuals with organizational membership present lower levels of political confidence than those that are not involved in associations.

Formal membership is important, but the intensity of the commitment to the association may also be crucial, as chequebook participation is unlikely to have the same effects than frequent interpersonal contact with other members (Jordan and Maloney, 1997). We expect stronger effects for active members because they are exposed to information exchanges, communication and mobilization processes, and only they will have acquired the social skills and resources that associations are supposed to convey to their (active) members.

We also expect political associations to have a stronger effect on political attitudes. Political associations are organized groups of citizens that pursue collective goods and have as their main objective to influence the process of political decision-making (Morales, 2009): political parties, trade unions, and environmental, human rights, peace, anti-racism or women's associations. In as far as they are likely to interact more with political institutions and to favour discussions about political matters, they are also likely to have larger effects on political attitudes than non-political organizations.

The debate on the expected (usually positive) effects of associational membership for attitudes and behaviour is intense in the field of migrants' civic and political involvement (see, for example, the special issue of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 2004). The effects of migrants' or ethnic organizations (those in which a majority of members are co-ethnics) on efficacy and trust must be considered specifically (see Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 in this volume). Fennema and Tillie make the polemic statement that 'to have undemocratic ethnic organizations is better for the democratic process than to have no organizations at all ... [because] even in authoritarian organizations people learn to solve the dilemmas inherent in collective action' (Fennema and Tillie, 1999: 723). According to Tillie (2004: 530) ethnic associations can favour the political participation of their members as well as the development of attitudes of political trust. For this to happen it is important that ethnic organizations are linked to the existing autochthonous associations. Ethnic associations may also transfer the political trust of its elites to the rank and file, thus increasing the political trust of the community. The more the elite is socially connected to various groups in the ethnic community, the greater is its potential role for increasing political confidence.

Moreover, Odmalm (2004: 473) argues that migrant organizations with an ethnic base have important specific functions that can be distinguished from non-ethnic associations. They can act as intermediary actors, linking the sending and receiving countries of immigration, as well as their members with their sending country, or the different ethnic communities in a situation of diaspora. They supplement the state of the country of residence in facilitating integration and adaptation to the new society. They can carry out

a representative function if they are part of an established network, or serve as a unified voice for their particular ethnic group in relation to the receiving society. Thus their potential effect on our variables of interest is larger.

Although Verba et al. (1995) found that the low levels of political participation among foreign-born Latinos could be partially attributed to the deficit in civic skills that results from their low levels of civic involvement, the empirical evidence fails to confirm these expectations in many other instances. Some analyses do not find the expected strong and systematic association between ethnic membership on the one hand and political involvement on the other (Togeby, 2004). Berger et al. (2004) even find a negative (though statistically non-significant) correlation between membership of ethnic organizations and political interest. We are not aware of other studies that tested the effect of this variable on efficacy and confidence.

Continuing with other explanatory factors that may have an impact only for the migrant population, a few others must be considered (see Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001). To start with, mastering the language or languages of the country of residence is a key resource for and indicator of social integration, likely to affect perceptions of self-competence and external efficacy (Jacobs et al., 2004), as we also expect from the length of the residence in the country (Cain et al., 1991). The legal situation of the respondent (whether she has a valid work or residence permit) and having full political rights through citizenship must also be considered as important factors, as they are expected to have effects on the level of both political efficacy and confidence. It is hard to feel competent when you cannot possibly fully participate, as it is also hard to trust the institutions that could actually expel you from the country where you want to live.

We also expect interest in politics in their country of origin to have an effect on our dependent variables. More generally, past political socialization, a desire or commitment to return, and national situations left behind affect immigrants' orientations and behaviour in relation to their receiving country (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006: 107; Karpathakis, 1999). In principle we would expect that more interest in the politics of the country of origin increases at least internal efficacy. On the other hand having been socialized in a non-democratic system and previous experience with political repression also may influence confidence, but it is not clear in which direction. It may produce an enduring effect of lack of political confidence or, conversely, it may increase the level of external efficacy and confidence in democratic institutions.

### **The cases: Moroccans and Ecuadorians in Madrid, Barcelona, Lyon and Milan**

The groups included in this analysis are Ecuadorians and Moroccans living in Madrid and Barcelona, Moroccans living in Lyon, and Ecuadorians living

in Milan.<sup>4</sup> This relatively restricted selection of groups and cities allows us to keep in mind their specific characteristics and contextualize the findings, bearing in mind that the focus of the chapter is on the effect of the individual characteristics discussed in the previous section.

### **Madrid, Barcelona, Lyon and Milan**

Previous work has emphasized the importance of the local political system (see, for example, Koopmans, 2004a) for the political incorporation of migrants. The four cities considered here show some significant differences but also some similarities that are worth mentioning.<sup>5</sup> In France immigration is an old phenomenon, with at least three major waves of immigrant influx taking place during the 20th century, and at least partially related to its colonial history. By contrast, in Spain immigration is a relatively recent experience that started in the early 2000s. Despite of this novelty, the cities of Madrid and Barcelona have become major immigration magnets during the past decade and their urban landscapes have changed noticeably. Milan is also a recent receptor of migrants.

Regarding political rights none of the migrant groups studied in the four cities have the right to vote in local or national elections (unless, of course they already have the country's citizenship). Access to nationality is easier in Spain for the Ecuadorians, because – as with all Latin Americans – they can acquire citizenship with only two years of legal and continued residence in Spain, while the general rule applicable to Moroccan nationals requires ten years of residence. The ten-year rule also applies to non-EU citizens in Italy, while in France the requirement is five years, which may be reduced for people with family or personal links.

As well, welfare state access is also more open in the Spanish cities because all foreigners, regardless of their legal situation in Spain, are entitled to basic social services and social assistance (primarily, education and public health services). In Milan, welfare benefits are only provided to foreigners who legally reside in the city, stateless people, asylum-seekers and refugees with a valid permit to stay. Health assistance to irregular or undocumented immigrants is granted only for emergencies and maternity care. In France, since a law passed in 1993, legal residence status is a condition for access to most social benefits. However, France scores high on anti-discrimination rights: since 1972 various types of ethnic discrimination have been penalized. The types of sanctions in cases of racially discriminatory hiring and the public structures dealing with ethnic discrimination are more developed there than in Italy or Spain. Accordingly, as shown by Cinalli and Giugni (Chapter 3 in this volume), Lyon scores higher than the other three cities in the individual rights dimension.

On the other hand, Madrid and Barcelona acknowledge cultural group rights, and to some extent Lyon does as well, while Milan scores very low in this dimension. The specific opportunity structure – that taps into the extent



to which migrants and migrant organizations are specifically considered and funded by policy-makers and institutions and are themselves involved in policy-making – is however very closed in Lyon and intermediate in the other three cities. Finally, discursive opportunities, that is, public discourse about migrants and migration policies, are quite open in Lyon, and somehow surprisingly not too low in Milan, while the Spanish cities score in-between.<sup>6</sup>

### Moroccans and Ecuadorians

Table 9.1 shows the distribution of the main socio-demographic characteristics of the two groups we study in this chapter. Moroccans have a relatively similar profile in Madrid and Barcelona, which contrasts with the characteristics of this group in Lyon, where Moroccans are an established migrant group from a former colony, over 80 per cent of whom have lived in France for more than 10 years, with about 46 per cent born in France and thus with citizenship. While the average age is similar in Barcelona and Madrid

*Table 9.1* Socio-demographic profile of Moroccans and Ecuadorians

	Moroccan			Ecuadorian			
	Barcelona	Madrid	Lyon	Barcelona	Madrid	Milan	
Women (%)	30	39	55	51	55	55	
Mean age in years	37	34	35	41	36	37	
Born after 1980 (%)	22	29	47	8	25	20	
Education level							
(1–7)	Mean	3.3	2.9	5	3.6	3.3	3.8
	Median	3	3	5	3	3	4
	Mode	3	3	7	3	3	4
In paid work (%)	67	74	48	84	82	71	
Church assistance							
0–6	Mean	1.6	0.9	1.4	2	1.9	2.6
	Median	0	1	0	2	2	3
	Mode	0	1	0	0	2	3
Muslim (%)	94	99	61	0	0.3	1	
Undocumented (%)	10	16	4	11	21	30	
Years since arrival							
(%)	Less	16	36	7	11	13	14
	than 5						
	years						
	5–10	45	43	9	81	76	73
	years						
	More	39	21	84	8	11	13
	than 10						
Nationality of	16	11	78	15	18	2	
receiving country (%)							
Not involved in any	63	94	16	60	67	77	
association (%)							
Member of ethnic	16	4	14	21	20	12	
association (%)							

(around 35 years old) in Lyon almost 50 per cent are less than 30 years of age and their average education level is much higher. The gender composition is far more balanced in Lyon (over 55 per cent of women) than in Madrid (39 per cent) and, particularly, than in Barcelona (30 per cent), although in this city their average length of residence is higher: about 40 per cent of Moroccans who live in Barcelona have been in Spain for more than 10 years, compared to 21 per cent in Madrid. While in Lyon only 4 per cent report to be undocumented, in Barcelona this percentage is 10 per cent and in Madrid 16 per cent. Levels of religious attendance and the proportion of the Moroccan-origin population in paid work are much lower in Lyon than in the two Spanish cities.

Furthermore, associational involvement seems to reflect particularly well the different situation of Moroccans in the three cities. They seem to be in a delicate situation in Madrid, where almost 95 per cent does not join any kind of association. In Barcelona this percentage goes down to 63 per cent and in Lyon non-members make up only 14 per cent. Although a high proportion of Moroccans in Lyon therefore join an association, membership in ethnic associations is low (see Morales and Pilati, Chapter 3 in this volume).

Ecuadorians are much more similar across the cities, as their settlement is more recent in all three cases. A large majority have been in the country of settlement for more than five but less than 10 years in all three cities. The proportion of women (over 50 per cent) and their level of educational attainment (slightly higher than that of Moroccans, except for Lyon) are relatively similar across the cities. Ecuadorians in Barcelona have a relatively higher average age (41) and consequently only 8 per cent are under 30 years old. In Madrid and Milan the average age is about 36. In Milan the proportion in paid work is lower than in the Spanish cities (71 per cent vs. over 80 per cent) and the level of church attendance is higher. Also in the Italian city about 30 per cent of Ecuadorians lack a legal permit, compared to 21 per cent in Madrid and 11 per cent in Barcelona. Over 75 per cent of Ecuadorians in Milan are not members of any kind of association (this proportion is 67 per cent in Barcelona and 60 per cent in Madrid), and involvement in ethnic associations seems to be higher for the Ecuadorians than for the Moroccans, particularly in the Spanish cities.

### **Explanatory analyses: political efficacy and confidence in institutions**

Political efficacy has been measured using standard indicators of agreement with certain statements ('People like me definitely have an influence on governmental politics'; 'Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like me do not understand any more what is going on' for internal efficacy and 'Parties are only interested in our votes, not in our opinion'; 'Members of Parliament do not care about people like me' for external efficacy).

For political confidence respondents were asked to state to what extent they trusted their local government and local assembly, for local institutions, and how much they trusted the national government and parliament for confidence, for national institutions, all on a scale from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (total trust) (see Appendix at the end of this chapter). Average levels of internal and external political efficacy for the groups and cities considered are displayed in Table 9.2.

The first striking finding apparent in Table 9.2 is that levels of political efficacy and confidence are relatively consistent among cities and particularly among groups. The main cross-city differences relate to Madrid and Barcelona, showing relatively lower levels of external efficacy, while Lyon scores high in this variable and in Milan lower levels of internal efficacy are the case.

The first crucial question is whether the migrant groups differ significantly from the autochthonous populations in their political attitudes. The differences are statistically significant only in 12 of the possible 40 instances, and only in four of them do the migrant groups show lower levels than the autochthonous population; in all these cases these correspond to the Ecuadorian group. The data show that Ecuadorians in Milan always score lower than the autochthonous populations in all four indicators, and they also do so for internal efficacy in Madrid. However their levels of political confidence are significantly higher in Madrid and in Barcelona. Conversely, Moroccans tend to have higher levels of efficacy and confidence than the autochthonous population. It is particularly striking that the level of confidence in the national institutions is very high among both migrant groups in Madrid and Barcelona, while in the other cities there are no significant differences.

Thus, Ecuadorians tend to have lower levels of political confidence and competence, but these differences can be modest or large depending on the city where they live; in particular, they score far lower in Milan. Conversely Moroccans tend to be indistinguishable from the autochthonous population in Lyon, but compared to the autochthonous they show higher levels of efficacy in Madrid and confidence in both Spanish cities.

All migrant groups, except the Moroccans in Lyon, tend to have higher levels of confidence in the national institutions of the country where they are living than in the local institutions. By contrast, the autochthonous groups in Lyon, Milan and Barcelona place more confidence in their local institutions than in national ones. Ecuadorians seem to have varying levels of confidence in local institutions depending on where they live. Whereas in Madrid they display higher confidence than the autochthonous population, in Milan they show lower levels and in Barcelona there is not a significant difference. The opposite seems to happen for Moroccans: regardless of where they live, they have relatively similar levels of confidence in local institutions (but slightly higher in Lyon and Barcelona).

Table 9.2 Political efficacy and confidence by group and city

		Internal political efficacy (n)	Dif.	External political efficacy (n)	Dif.	Trust in local institutions (n)	Dif.	Trust in national institutions (n)	Dif.
Barcelona	Aut	0.34 (297)	–	0.24 (298)	–	0.51 (264)	–	0.48 (283)	–
	Mor	0.37 (194)	0.03	0.25 (187)	0.01	0.57 (124)	0.06*	0.64 (146)	0.16*
	Ecu	0.32 (248)	–0.02	0.25 (247)	0.01	0.55 (189)	0.04	0.63 (204)	0.15*
Madrid	Aut	0.37 (296)	–	0.25 (297)	–	0.49 (288)	–	0.52 (299)	–
	Mor	0.45 (177)	0.08*	0.33 (207)	0.08*	0.50 (188)	0.01	0.62 (210)	0.10*
	Ecu	0.31 (273)	–0.06*	0.21 (270)	–0.04	0.59 (222)	0.10*	0.64 (245)	0.12*
Lyon	Aut	0.35 (396)	–	0.36 (397)	–	0.59 (388)	–	0.45 (394)	–
	Mor	0.38 (113)	0.03	0.34 (114)	–0.02	0.60 (106)	0.01	0.45 (107)	0.00
Milan	Aut	0.29 (291)	–	0.32 (297)	–	0.52 (275)	–	0.45 (284)	–
	Ecu	0.22 (287)	–0.07*	0.19 (265)	–0.11*	0.36 (208)	–0.16*	0.41 (227)	–0.04

Note: All variables have been rescaled to range between 0 and 1 and the figures are the mean values with the number of cases in parenthesis. The column 'Dif.' contains the difference of the migrant group with respect to the autochthonous population, and an asterisk indicates that this difference is significant for a 95 per cent confidence level.

We move now into the multivariate analysis of political efficacy and competence. Tables 9.3 and 9.4 show the results of several OLS regression models on the political efficacy and confidence variables. We report unstandardized regression coefficients that represent the effect of each explanatory variable for which we have information on each of the four attitudinal items considered. For each dependent variable two models have been estimated.

*Table 9.3* Explanatory factors of political efficacy among the migrant and autochthonous population

	Internal				External			
	Model 1 (Aut.)		Model 2 (Migr.)		Model 1 (Aut.)		Model 2 (Migr.)	
	B	p	B	p	B	p	B	p
Constant	0.265	***	0.176	***	0.068		0.133	*
Woman	-0.024	*	-0.048	***	0.019		0.021	
Age	-0.001		0.000		0.000		0.001	
Born after 1980	-0.005		0.015		0.004		0.023	
Educational attainment	0.009	**	0.018	***	0.005		0.008	
In paid work	0.000		0.030	*	-0.008		0.025	
Church attendance	-0.011	**	-0.004		-0.006		-0.007	
Muslim	0.179	**	-0.003		0.068		-0.055	
Member of an association	0.006		0.041		0.027		-0.045	
Active member in an association	-0.009		-0.010		-0.002		0.065	
Member of a political association	0.010		-0.036		0.043	*	0.020	
Member of an ethnic association	-		-0.017		-		0.015	
Political participation	0.030	**	0.037	**	0.030	*	-0.018	
Social trust	0.062	**	0.099	***	0.150	***	0.069	**
Interest in politics	0.124	***	0.138	***	0.114	***	0.078	**
Interest in politics of country of origin	-		0.063	**	-		0.053	**
No permit	-		-0.001		-		0.002	
5 to 10 years of residence	-		-0.029		-		0.022	
> 10 years of residence	-		-0.010		-		0.023	
Citizenship	-		0.011		-		-0.005	
Second generation	-		0.003		-		0.022	
Ecuadorian	-		-0.073	*	-		-0.115	***
Madrid	0.039	*	0.026		0.002		0.013	
Milan	-0.055	***	-0.056	**	0.066	**	-0.015	
Lyon	-0.027		-0.072	*	0.085	***	0.010	
N	1249		1217		1258		1221	
Corrected R <sup>2</sup>	0.074		0.145		0.077		0.045	

*Note:* Column 'B' reports unstandardized regression coefficients. 'P' reports the significance level: \*\*\* 99%, \*\* 95% and \* 90%.

Table 9.4 Explanatory factors of political confidence among the migrant and autochthonous population

	Local				National			
	Model 1 (Aut.)		Model 2 (Migr.)		Model 1 (Aut.)		Model 2 (Migr.)	
	B	p	B	p	B	p	B	p
Constant	0.379	***	0.300	***	0.372	***	0.510	***
Woman	0.012		0.016		0.012		0.005	
Age	0.001		0.001		0.000		0.001	
Born after 1980	0.043	*	-0.008		0.015		-0.011	
Education	0.000		-0.003		-0.001		-0.010	**
Working	-0.011		-0.011		-0.035	**	-0.017	
Church attendance	0.017	***	0.015	***	0.002		0.009	**
Muslim	-0.227	***	-0.011		-0.054		-0.022	
Member association	0.028		-0.009		0.052	*	0.002	
Active member assn	-0.036		-0.002		-0.028		-0.022	
Member political assn	-0.008		0.025		-0.014		0.017	
Member ethnic assn	-		-0.022		-		-0.022	
Political participation	-0.041	***	0.024		-0.032	**	-0.013	
Social trust	0.060	**	0.274	***	0.114	***	0.220	***
Interest in politics	0.134	***	0.095	***	0.094	***	0.073	***
Int. in pol. of co. of origin	-		-0.012		-		-0.020	
No permit	-		-0.052	***	-		0.009	
5 to 10 years of residence	-		-0.003		-		0.008	
> 10 years of residence	-		0.033		-		0.015	
Citizenship	-		-0.011		-		-0.026	
Second generation	-		-0.016		-		-0.024	
Ecuadorian	-		0.052		-		0.006	
Madrid	-0.033	*	0.000		0.025		-0.006	
Milan	-0.019		-0.191	***	-0.044	**	-0.213	***
Lyon	0.100	***	0.096	***	-0.027		-0.102	***
N	1190		980		1230		1079	
Corrected R2	0.099		0.238		0.048		0.234	

Note: Column 'B' reports unstandardized regression coefficients. 'P' reports the significance level: \*\*\* 99%, \*\* 95% and \* 90%. Asylum-seekers not included because they are a very small number of cases.

Model 1 includes only the autochthonous population. The explanatory variables are thus those that are generally considered in the literature on political attitudes, as explained earlier in this chapter. In model 2 the analysis is performed with only migrants. This allows us to estimate the effect of factors such as having obtained the citizenship of the country of residence, the length of residence, membership in ethnic associations, or the lack of a work or residence permit, which are relevant factors only for migrants. Hence, we can not only estimate the effects of the different explanatory factors, but also assess whether the same explanatory

variables operate differently for migrants and autochthonous residents (For details on the operationalization and coding of all variables see the Appendix.) Before turning to the analysis of the results let us summarize our expectations.

First, we expect positive effects for autochthonous and migrant populations for certain variables: age, education, church attendance, being in paid work, social trust, interest in politics, engaging in political participation, and involvement in associational membership. However, to the extent that all these variables indicate resources and social centrality they may be more important for migrants than for the autochthonous population, and thus show larger coefficients in model 2.<sup>7</sup>

Second, we expect some variables that are specific to the migrant population to have some relevance, as they are indicators of their level of social integration: being a legal resident, having citizenship, and a longer length of residence in the country should increase political efficacy and confidence.<sup>8</sup> Interest in the political affairs of the country of origin may also particularly affect internal efficacy. Younger generations of migrants and also second generations should also have higher levels of efficacy and confidence (controlling for age), if we follow assimilation theories.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, in model 1 we control for Muslim religion and city and in model 2 also for ethnic group.

Among autochthonous respondents, male, highly educated, trusting individuals that trust others, are interested and participate in politics and do *not* attend religious services show higher levels of internal political efficacy. Contrary to our expectations being in paid work and associational involvement of any type do not have a significant effect.

Among migrants neither age nor generation nor associational involvement seem to have a significant effect.<sup>10</sup> However gender and education have a stronger effect than for the autochthonous population, and being in paid employment has a significant and positive effect that was not found among the autochthonous. Trust, political participation and interest in politics do increase internal efficacy as well, as expected. Our model works better for migrants (while for the autochthonous our model explains only 7 per cent of the variances; this increases up to 15 per cent in model 2). However, this is not because migrant-specific indicators of social and political integration are important as being undocumented, having the country's citizenship, the length of residence in the country or being a second-generation migrant do not significantly increase internal efficacy (in fact some of these effects are even negative). Only interest in the politics of the country of origin has a significant positive effect, as expected.

While being a Muslim among the autochthonous population increases political competence (there are however only 11 of these cases), among migrants being a Muslim has no effect on internal efficacy, once you control for the ethnic group, as only Moroccans are Muslim. Conversely, Ecuadorians have lower levels of political competence than Moroccans do. Those living in

Madrid – both autochthonous and migrants alike – show higher levels of internal efficacy, while those in Milan and Lyon display lower levels.

Things work quite differently for external efficacy. This variable is quite hard to explain, particularly for migrants: our model 2 accounts for less than 5 per cent of the variance, leaving 95 per cent unexplained. Among the autochthonous population only being a member of a political organization, political participation, trust and interest in politics seem to have a significant effect. Socio-demographic variables bear no influence, so this attitude seems to be much more dependent on the individual's political experience than on personal attributes. Among migrants many of the explanatory variables are on the verge of statistical significance but still this is only attained with trust and interest in politics (both general and in the country of origin). Ecuadorians show lower levels of external efficacy, while the city of residence does not matter for migrants in general.

Turning to political confidence among the autochthonous population, coefficients in Table 9.4 show that trust in local institutions is higher among the cohort born after 1980. Church attenders display higher levels of confidence. However, political participation actually reduces confidence in local institutions, giving support to the hypothesis that the frustration that may arise from actual participation may reduce levels of confidence (Diani, 2000). In turn, social trust and interest in politics foster political confidence. All other variables do not show statistically significant effects.

Among migrants we find a number of similar patterns; church attendance, social trust and general interest in politics increase confidence in local institutions. However, the effect of political participation is not significant. We find no effect of interest in the politics of the country of origin on the level of confidence in local institutions. Being undocumented significantly reduces political confidence, while other variables related to social integration are not significant. In model 2 we are able to explain about 24 per cent of the variance (while for the autochthonous this is only 10 per cent)

Being a Muslim significantly reduces confidence in local institutions but the effect is non-significant for migrants. Living in Milan reduces the confidence only among migrants, while the effect of living in Lyon is similar for both groups. The autochthonous population in Madrid shows lower levels of confidence in local institutions, but this is not the case for migrants in this city.

The only socio-demographic variable that seems to affect confidence in national institutions, and it does so quite strongly among the autochthonous population, is the fact of not being in paid employment. Social trust and interest in politics have the expected positive effect. We also find a positive influence of being a member of an association, the only instance where the hypothesis about the positive effects of associational memberships is found, somehow watered down by the fact that active involvement and involvement in political organizations actually reduce confidence (though



these former two effects are not statistically significant). However, political participation also has the negative effect that we found for confidence in local institutions and we attribute that to frustration.

Unemployed migrants also have lower levels of confidence in national institutions, but the effect of this variable is smaller and non-significant. Church attendance, social trust and interest in politics increase the levels of confidence. Conversely, and quite unexpectedly, the higher the level of education the lower the level of confidence in national institutions. Among the autochthonous the sign of the effect was the same, but the statistical significance is very low. Whereas for local institutions participation increased confidence among migrants, for national institutions we find a negative but non-significant effect also present among the autochthonous group. Indicators of social integration show no significant effect on confidence in national institutions. The effects are however in the expected (positive) direction except for citizenship and second generations, for which we find negative non-significant effects.

All residents in Milan and Lyon have lower levels of confidence in national institutions, while there is no significant difference between Moroccans and Ecuadorians or between Muslims and others in this case.

## **Discussion and conclusions**

This chapter has aimed to present and explain differences in levels of political efficacy and political confidence among the autochthonous, Ecuadorian and Moroccan residents of Madrid, Barcelona, Lyon and Milan. The complexity of the research design, which includes three ethnic groups in four different cities, thus resulting in 12 potentially different populations of reference, makes necessary some caution in the interpretation of the results. However we can probably identify some relevant findings.

First, we have found some significant attitudinal differences among cities and groups. These differences are however not overwhelming across groups. More importantly, migrants do not systematically have lower levels of efficacy and confidence than the autochthonous population. Only Ecuadorians in Milan showed this worrying pattern, and the specific conditions of this group in this city could at least account for it: it is a group recently established, with a relatively high percentage of undocumented residents, low levels of associational involvement and existing in a context of political and discursive opportunities that is comparatively rather closed. Moroccans tend to have, if anything at all, higher levels of efficacy and confidence than the autochthonous populations of reference. It could be that being originally from a non-democratic country they consider the institutions of their (democratic) country of residence more responsive and trustworthy, as some have suggested but not actually proved (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001). But of course other potential differences may also

be at work: they are an established group with almost half of its members born in France.

Second, explaining these variations is, however, a complicated task. The attitudes of migrants are generally better explained than those of the autochthonous population. This is because, in general, resources and other facilitators (or depressors) of efficacy and confidence are more important for migrants than they are for the autochthonous population. For instance, the gender bias against women in political competence is much larger among migrants than among the autochthonous population.<sup>11</sup> Education is also more important for predicting internal efficacy and confidence in national institutions among migrants. Interestingly, while it increases political competence – an expected effect – it reduces political confidence.<sup>12</sup> The more educated migrants are more critical of the national institutions of the country where they live. Thus, a lack of confidence in the national institutions does not reflect apathy or peripheral social situations, but rather political alienation or a ‘critical citizenship’. This is a worrying conclusion.

However, these stronger effects for migrants are not always there; for instance, not being in paid employment has clearly more repercussions on confidence in national institutions for the autochthonous than for migrants; the latter were perhaps less likely to hold the national government responsible for their occupational situation.

Third, we have found very limited, if any, support for the theories that argue that associational involvement has relevant effects for migrants’ political integration as far as attitudes are concerned. Our analyses tend to support other work that has found very erratic patterns (for example, Togeby, 2004). Being a member of an association of any type only has a positive effect on trust in national institutions for the autochthonous population, though we may question the direction of the causality. Active involvement has negative non-significant effects. Membership of political and ethnic organizations has mostly non-significant effects. It also seems that political participation produces more frustration than confidence, though the effects are only significant for the autochthonous groups.

Fourth, we have also tested (admittedly in a crude way, given the cross-sectional nature of the data) for some generational effects and found very weak support for assimilation theories: younger generations do not display significantly different levels of efficacy and trust in the case of migrants, after controlling for age, education and other relevant variables. Previous work on political participation has found similar results in this respect (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001).

Fifth, indicators of social and political integration of migrants, such as the length of residence, legal status and citizenship, do not show the systematic positive expected effect. Only legal status clearly *reduces* confidence in local institutions. Having citizenship of the receiving country and being a descendant of migrants have no significant effects. Previous research has

also found a lack of effect of variables such as citizenship, language proficiency or length of residence. For instance, Barreto and Muñoz (2003: 429) suggest that citizenship is not so important, as many migrants are in the process of obtaining it or aspire to it, and not having the right to vote in national elections does not mean they cannot get involved in other ways.

Sixth, migrants and the autochthonous population are very similar in that for all of them social trust and interest in politics are important predictors of all four attitudes. In the case of social trust, this reinforces the conclusions of previous research using similar measurement instruments (Zmerli et al., 2007). The interest in the politics of the country of origin is important for both types of efficacy, but not for confidence (see also Morales and Morariu, Chapter 7 in this volume).

Finally, these individual-level analyses still leave some differences across groups and cities to be explained, as the coefficients corresponding to city and ethnic group often remain statistically significant.

## **Appendix: Variable coding and operationalization**

Variables with codes common to other chapters (see the general Appendix to this volume): age, education, in paid work, citizenship, undocumented, years since arrival, second generation, Muslim, social trust, interest in residence country politics (inthostpol), interest in homeland politics (inthompol), overall political participation (polpart),

The index of internal efficacy is an additive index and it is based on question q2302 and q2304 (agreement in five point scales with the statements 'People like me definitely have an influence on governmental politics' and 'Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like me do not understand any more what is going on'). The additive index of external political efficacy is based on questions q2301 and q2305 ('Parties are only interested in our votes, in our opinion' and 'Members of Parliament do not care about people like me'). In the French case (Lyon), only q2301 was available.

Trust in local institutions is also an additive index ranging from 0 to 1 merging questions q3602 and q3604 where individuals are required to say to what extent they trust in their local government and assembly on a scale from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (total trust), ('In the following, we name some public institutions in [CITY], [COUNTRY] and Europe. Specify, to what extent you do, or do not, trust them. Please use a scale from 0 (I do not trust at all) to 10 (I totally trust)': '[CITY] government' and 'The [CITY ASSEMBLY]').

Trust in national institutions is another additive index ranging from 0 to 1 merging questions q3609 and q3611 where individuals are required to say to what extent they trust in their national government and parliament in

a scale from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (total trust), ('In the following, we name some public institutions in [CITY], [COUNTRY] and Europe. Specify, to what extent you do, or do not, trust them. Please use a scale from 0 (I do not trust at all) to 10 (I totally trust)': '[COUNTRY] government' and '[COUNTRY National Parliament]').

A dummy variable for the younger generation 'born after 1980' has been computed from the age variable.

Church attendance is an ordinal variable based on q45 ('Apart from funerals, christenings and weddings, how often do you practise your religion, for example by attending religious gatherings?') where 0 is never, 1 is once a year, 2 is several times a year, 3 is once a month, 4 is once a week, 5 is several times a week, and 6 is every day.

Associational involvement is measured through four dummy variables: membership, based on q17a ('Are you currently a member or have you been in the past?', response categories as in 'involved' described in the general Appendix to this volume); active membership, based on q17b ('Have you participated in any activity arranged by any such organization during the last 12 months?', response categories as in 'involved' described in the general Appendix to this volume); membership in an ethnic 'advocacy' (invethni, as described in the general Appendix to this volume); and membership of a political organization, that takes a value of 1 if the respondent is a member of a political party, trade union, environmental organization, human rights or peace organization, anti-racism organization, women's organization, immigrants' organization, or ethnic group organization.

## Notes

1. This may well be because attitudes are both conceptually and empirically much more slippery than behaviours (see, for example, Craig, 1979 for efficacy and trust, and Newton, 2007 for trust).
2. We sometimes use the term political competence as equivalent to internal political efficacy.
3. Though sometimes referred to as political trust, we use the term trust for attitudes towards individuals (social trust) and keep confidence for the political arena, as has been suggested elsewhere (see Zmerli et al., 2007: 39).
4. Thus when we use the terms 'migrants' or 'migrant population' we are obviously referring only Ecuadorians and Moroccans, and not to other ethnic groups that live in the cities analysed.
5. The information used for this section was mostly obtained from the city reports produced within the Localmultidem project and available at [www.um.es/localmultidem/](http://www.um.es/localmultidem/).
6. It is also worth noting that these contextual factors do not operate in the same way for all groups; for instance, cultural rights are less acknowledged for Moroccans than for other groups in Madrid, and the same happens in Lyon for individual rights.

7. Unfortunately we cannot test the effect of TV news exposure and satisfaction with democracy as these variables were not available in the survey.
8. Language proficiency and asylum-seeking were problematic for Lyon (95 per cent missing cases for autochthonous and 65 per cent for Moroccans in the former and no information on the latter) so we could not include them in the analyses.
9. Considering the cross-sectional nature of the data we cannot accurately disentangle the effects of age and generation. Thus we have only included a dummy variable for people born after 1980.
10. An interaction between generation and length of residence was tested but its effect was not statistically significant in any of the models.
11. It is worth noting also that this bias is reversed for the other orientations: women, both migrant and autochthonous, tend to have higher levels of external efficacy and confidence than men, though differences are not statistically significant.
12. Attendance at religious services, as for education, also has different effects depending on the variable of interest. It reduces internal efficacy – only for the autochthonous – but increases the levels of confidence in local institutions.

# 10

## The Impact of Religion on the Political Participation of Migrants

*Nina Eggert and Marco Giugni*

### Introduction

Religion has often been found to be a strong predictor of political behaviour (Broughton and ten Napel, 2000; Lijphart, 1979; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rose and Urwin, 1969; Rokkan, 1979; Tresch and Nicolet, 2010). Alongside social class and place of residence, religion was thought to be one of the primary sociological determinants of political behaviour and, especially, voting (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Converse, 1974). However, during the past few decades, it has become almost commonplace to stress the declining saliency of the religious cleavage and its diminishing impact on politics. In particular, a number of authors have pointed to the loss of influence of religion on voting and political attitudes (Dalton et al., 1984; Franklin, 1992; Norris and Inglehart, 2004). This diminished relevance would be the outcome of a process of secularization that has affected the entire western world (Berger, 1967; Bruce, 2002). At the same time, a process of individualization has produced a change in the forms of religious expression (Hervieu-Léger, 1999; Luckmann, 1967; Pollack and Pickel, 2007), leading to post-traditional forms of religiosity.

Nevertheless, religion is at the heart of the current debate about immigration and more specifically about Islam and integration. In recent decades, western democracies have been facing a resurgence of religion in the public domain, posing new challenges in terms of the ways states deal with religion. The increasing visibility of Islam and the organizing process of Muslims (mainly of immigrant origin) along religious lines (Soysal, 1997) are seen as a threat to security, and the compatibility of Islam with European conceptions of democracy is questioned. In this context, the role of religion, specifically for migrants, in explaining political participation is a crucial issue. It is therefore important to question to what extent it plays a role in predicting the political behaviour of migrants from different origins and different religious denominations.

In this chapter we argue that, in spite of its decline and changing forms, religion still plays an important role in explaining the political participation of migrants. In addition, we suggest that the impact of religion on the political participation of migrants varies according to the context in which they live. More specifically, we hypothesize that the ways in which the local authorities deal with cultural and religious difference and the place of religion in the public sphere mediate the impact of religion on the political participation of migrants. Thus, in the following we address these two questions: (1) To what extent does religion have an impact on the political participation of migrants? (2) To what extent does the institutional context that characterizes the receiving society influence the relation between religion and the political participation of migrants?

We shall deal with these two questions in the first part of the chapter, in which we elaborate on the relation between institutional approaches to citizenship and immigration, and the impact of religion on the political participation of migrants. The second part of the chapter then presents the results of our analysis aimed at examining the impact of religion on the political participation of Christian and Muslim migrants as well as the role of the institutional setting therein. To do so we compare four cities that differ in the political opportunity structures offered to migrants for their political participation and, more specifically, in the ways the local authorities deal with religious difference: Barcelona and London tend to adopt a pluralist approach towards cultural group rights leaving space for religious difference, while Milan and Zurich follow a culturally monist approach requiring the assimilation of migrants into the receiving society (see Figure 3.5 in Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume). We suggest that such differences in the local context interact with the religious origin of migrants to mediate the impact that religion has on their political participation. In order to show that, we shall compare the two main religious groups among migrants in the four cities we are studying: Christians (primarily Catholics and Protestants) and Muslims. We argue that the mediating role of the context should be particularly important for Muslim migrants as they lack the legitimacy to intervene in the public affairs of the receiving country, while Christian migrants will benefit from the European Christian tradition to achieve the legitimacy to become politically involved. Specifically, we expect Muslim migrants to be more involved in politics in settings characterized by a pluralist approach towards cultural group rights. In such contexts, Muslim religious institutions and associations are able to foster the political participation of migrants, while in assimilationist contexts religion should have no impact or at least a weaker one on participation.

## **Religion and the political behaviour of migrants**

Religion has been found to impinge upon political behaviour and, more specifically, political participation in different ways. Different theoretical

approaches have been proposed in the extant literature, but we can broadly distinguish between three main theoretical perspectives which focus on different mechanisms. The civic voluntarism approach and the social embeddedness approach both focus on the individual resources available to members in religious institutions that have a positive impact on political involvement. Other approaches focus on collective resources such as identity and group consciousness to explain the link between political involvement and religious institutions.

The civic voluntarism model maintains that churches can increase the level of civic skills, political efficacy and political knowledge. Verba et al. (1995) found that churchgoers are more likely to be engaged in political activities. They also found that different churches (Catholic and Protestant) develop different levels of civic skills. The level of political participation thus depends on the frequency of attendance to religious services, but also on the denomination of the church one belongs to. Religious life can foster social and political participation. Participation in church-related associational life provides the social contacts and organizational skills necessary to understand political action and to exert effective influence. Church involvement can provide opportunities to practise civic skills (organizing a meeting, contacting government officials, taking and defending specific bargaining positions among committee members) that can be applied to political life. Religious life, hence, has been found to promote civic behaviour outside the institutional life of the church (Tate, 1993). The various activities associated with church life tend to spill over into other aspects of civic life.

In a somewhat similar perspective, the social embeddedness approach argues that churches matter insofar as they function in a way that is similar to civic associations (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). In other words, churches play a key associational role that plays out in political life. Even in an epoch of secularization and individualization that has diminished the role of religion in society, churches remain crucial social institutions in the lives of many people. Participatory behaviour in politics is usually positively related to individuals' engagement in their churches. In this perspective, the crucial importance of churches is not that they inculcate civic skills, but that they serve as important channels of political information and recruitment (Ammerman, 1997). This approach posits that religious institutions can play a more direct role in mobilization; instead of merely increasing the level of civic involvement, they can also serve as direct channels of political mobilization. In other words, churches influence political participation by directly recruiting their members into the political process (Djupe and Grant, 2001). These studies stress that the role in the community and the networks associated with religious institutions have an impact on the political involvement of churchgoers. Religious institutions have the potential to act as agents of political mobilization and intermediaries between the individual and the state. Similarly, church



members are more likely to be involved in politics and display higher levels of political commitment and activity.

Finally, other scholars explain the link between political involvement and religion through socio-psychological effects. Churches bring together people with similar experiences and thereby instil a group consciousness that empowers political participation. For example, Calhoun-Brown (1996) examined the mechanisms structuring group identity and political participation. She found that politicized Black churches fostered a sense of group consciousness by collectivizing the interests of the subgroup in an effort to counter prejudice and discrimination from mainstream society. In this perspective, resources favouring political participation are collective resources based on identity and awareness of prejudice against minorities.

### **The role of the context**

In spite of the different mechanisms of influence suggested by the approaches reviewed above, all of them agree on one point: religious service attendance and membership matter for political participation. We examine whether this holds for the groups of migrants in our four cities as well. In line with the main thrust of this volume, we stress in particular the role of membership in religious associations and how this may lead migrants to be more active politically. Most of the existing works examine the impact of religion in general, not specifically for migrants (Cadge and Ecklund, 2007). Yet, a number of authors have looked more specifically at the role of religious institutions in the political participation of migrants (Levitt, 2008) and Muslims (Jamal, 2005). There is little systematic research on the relationship between religion and politics for migrants. Whether religion plays the same role for migrants as for the autochthonous or not remains an open question. In addition, while there are comparative studies of the impact of religion on political behaviour (Halman and Riis, 1999; Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Wuthnow, 1999), little comparative insights are available for what concerns migrants (Koenig, 2005). Yet, comparing across countries is important as the context may play a role in mediating the effect of religion on the political involvement of migrants. In particular, different nation-states have different ways of dealing with citizenship and immigration (Brubaker, 1992). For example, the modes of incorporating migrants into the receiving society have been found to shape in important ways the political mobilization of migrants (Ireland, 1994; Koopmans et al., 2005). In particular, scholars looking at the collective claim-making of migrants suggest that cross-national variations in the level as well as issues and scope of migrants' claims depend on the political opportunities (both at the institutional and discursive level) specific to the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics (Giugni and Passy, 2004; Koopmans and Statham, 1999a; Koopmans et al., 2005). In this

perspective, the actors' mobilization in this field is shaped by the models or configurations of citizenship, that is, by the ways migrants are collectively defined and incorporated into the receiving society (see also Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume).

The citizenship models are conceptualized along two main dimensions (Koopmans et al., 2005). The first dimension refers to the formal requirements for the acquisition of citizenship and distinguishes between an ethnic conception of citizenship and a civic-territorial one. The second dimension deals with the recognition of cultural difference and distinguishes between a cultural pluralist approach and a cultural monist or assimilationist approach. Multicultural countries (such as Britain and the Netherlands) recognize cultural difference and sometimes even promote it. On the contrary, assimilationist countries (such as France, Germany and Switzerland) expect migrants to assimilate to the majority culture. The combination of these two dimensions yields country-specific sets of political opportunities for the public intervention in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. Cross-national variations in the political mobilizations of migrants are explained by the political legitimacy as well as the public resonance and visibility these opportunity structures give migrants to intervene in the public sphere of the receiving country. Thus, a country having a more exclusive way of conceiving citizenship may exclude migrants from the majority political community. Migrants would thus feel less legitimized to intervene in political issues in the receiving country and their claims would have less public resonance and visibility.

If we take this perspective seriously, the ways in which the state deals with cultural difference and the legitimacy stemming from them should be taken into account when studying the political participation of migrants. The role that religion plays for the political participation of migrants may be mediated by the context in which they are embedded and may also vary across religious groups. Specifically, Muslim migrants face different opportunities to mobilize through religious institutions from Christian migrants. Religious institutions and, even more, institutions from 'imported' religions (such as Islam in Europe) need to have the legitimacy to be politicized and to intervene in the public sphere.

Let us spell out this in some more detail. We argue that religion plays a role for migrants' individual political participation, but that this role is mediated by the context in which migrants are embedded. In other words, the role of religion will vary depending on the institutional approach to immigration and minority integration that prevails in the context in which they live. We hypothesize that, despite the decline in the overall levels of religiosity and the social change related to secularization and individualization processes, religion still plays an important role in explaining the political participation of migrants in European cities. However, such an impact will depend to a large extent on the context in which migrants are embedded. The role of

the context will be even more important for Muslim migrants. Christian migrants will benefit from the European Christian tradition to achieve the legitimacy to become politically involved. We thus expect Christian religious institutions to have the same impact in all contexts. Specifically, we expect religious service attendance and membership in religious organizations to be positively correlated with political participation. Muslims, in turn, will need to gain greater legitimacy to become politically engaged. The impact of religion for Muslims' political participation will depend on the context in which they are embedded. In settings characterized by a pluralist approach towards cultural group rights, Muslim religious institutions and associations will have accumulated the legitimacy to intervene in the public sphere and will thus be able to foster the political participation of migrants. Religion will thus play a positive role for the participation of Muslim migrants who attend religious services and are members of religious associations. In contrast, in contexts characterized by an assimilationist approach, religion should have no impact or at least a weaker impact on participation.

### **Comparative framework and operationalization**

We test our hypotheses against the data collected in four of the European cities included in the Localmultidem project: Barcelona, London, Milan and Zurich. We focus on these four cities because of the differences they display in the ways in which local authorities deal with cultural difference. Barcelona and London are rather similar in this respect, as they tend to follow a pluralist approach, whereas Milan and Zurich display a strong assimilationist one. Thus, we can assess the impact of different political opportunity structures in terms of the institutional treatment of migrants. In addition, while London and Zurich are two cities that have traditionally received immigrants, immigration is a more recent phenomenon in Barcelona and Milan. Although the recent debate about Islam and radicalism is present in all these countries, London and Zurich dealt much earlier than Barcelona and Milan with religious pluralism. The longer presence of religious minorities might influence the relationship between religion and political participation. Religious groups that have a longer experience with the local institutions and political system may be more integrated and thus be more politicized than religious minorities with a shorter period of residence in the receiving countries. The length of residence in the country can affect the degree of organization of religious minorities. For example, religious organizations and religious institutions of Muslims in London and Zurich might have a greater impact on political participation just because they settled much earlier than in Barcelona and Milan and are thus better organized. Longer-settled migrants might thus have the necessary resources for political mobilization, such as organizations, material and symbolic resources and knowledge of the political environment compared

to migrants who settled more recently. Furthermore, the longer presence of religious minorities might also have an impact on the ways the receiving society deals with religious pluralism and allow religious minorities to express themselves in the public sphere.

In each city, three migrant groups have been selected according to their size and religion (Table 10.1). The groups selected were: Bangladeshis, Indians and Caribbeans in London; Moroccans, Ecuadorians and other Andean Latin Americans in Barcelona; Egyptians, Filipinos and Ecuadorians in Milan; and Italians, Kosovars and Turks in Zurich. With one exception, these groups are rather homogeneous in terms of the dominant religious denomination within each group. In London, Caribbeans are mainly Christian and Bangladeshis are mainly Muslim. In Barcelona, two groups are Christian (Ecuadorian and Andean Latin American) and one mainly Muslim (Moroccans). In Milan, two groups are Christian (Filipino and Ecuadorians) and Egyptians are Muslim. Finally, Italians in Zurich are exclusively Christian and the two other groups mainly Muslim. The exception is represented by Indians in London, most of whom are Hindu. For the analyses in this chapter, however, we only included individuals of either Christian or Muslim denomination, hence excluding respondents from all other denominations in

Table 10.1 Migrant groups and religion in the four cities (percentages)

	Christians	Muslims	Total
<i>London</i>			
Bangladeshi	0	100	100 (293)
Indian	14.3	85.7	100 (98)
Caribbean	96.4	3.6	100 (251)
Total	40.5	59.5	100 (650)
<i>Barcelona</i>			
Moroccans	0.2	99.1	100 (212)
Ecuadorians	100	0	100 (239)
Other Andean Latin American	100	0	100 (225)
Total	68.9	31.1	100 (676)
<i>Milan</i>			
Egyptians	3.1	96.9	100 (262)
Filipino	99.6	0.4	100 (274)
Ecuadorians	99.3	0.7	100 (268)
Total	68.0	32.0	100 (804)
<i>Zurich</i>			
Italians	100	0	100 (266)
Kosovars	4.4	95.6	100 (249)
Turks	4.4	95.6	100 (227)
Total	38.7	61.3	100 (742)

Note: Includes only respondents who are either Christian or Muslim.

all four cities. These variations allow us to compare migrants from different origins and different religions in each city.

We test our hypotheses with regression analyses on two dependent variables: overall political participation, and participation in protest activities. As non-naturalized immigrants do not have voting rights in all the cities under study, we considered only political activities accessible to all respondents and thus excluded voting. Both indicators were constructed with responses to the following question: 'There are different ways of trying to improve things in society or to help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you for such reasons done any of the following?' Respondents were then presented with a list of 13 different forms of political action (see Morales, Chapter 2 in this volume). To assess the overall political participation of migrants we created a dummy variable that indicates whether a respondent has participated in any of these political activities (1) or not (0). In addition, we also look at a more specific form of participation, that is, participation in protest activities (wearing or displaying a badge, sticker or poster; signing a petition; taking part in a public demonstration; boycotting certain products; deliberately buying certain products for political reasons; or taking part in a strike) and proceed in the same way by creating a dummy variable of whether the respondent has engaged in any protest activities (1) or not (0). The reasons to look additionally to protest activities are twofold. First, given the debates on Islam and the claim that Muslims are more radical than Christians, this will allow us not only to assess whether Muslims are indeed more radical, but also the extent to which Muslim religious institutions that are often decried as being the source of Islamic radicalism indeed favour more radical forms of participation. Secondly, scholars looking at the role of religion at the individual level have focused so far on overall political participation rather than on protest activities in particular (Verba et al., 1995; Wuthnow, 1999). Yet, different factors might predict involvement in different forms of political engagement as some are more costly for individuals to engage in. Finally, the literature on social movements has shown that the context is an important predictor of the level of mobilization of migrants, particularly in the case of protest (see Kriesi, 2004 and Meyer, 2004 for overviews). By analysing separately the overall participation and involvement in protest activities we will be able to test whether the impact of the context also holds for participation at the individual level.

We include in our models three indicators relating to religion: religious denomination, attendance at religious services and membership in religious associations. First, to test whether religion has an impact on the political involvement of migrants and whether this effect is mediated by the context we run separate analyses by denomination, for Muslims and Christians.<sup>1</sup> Because of the non-exclusion of religion from the public sphere in cultural pluralist cities and the opportunities these cities provide to migrants to mobilize on the basis of their religious identity, we expect

the religious indicators to have a greater impact in these contexts than in assimilationist ones.

Secondly, to examine the role of the individual dimension of religion for political participation, we include in our analysis the frequency of attendance at religious services.<sup>2</sup> Attendance at religious services is a traditional predictor of political involvement in the literature (Wuthnow, 2002), and we expect people who attend more frequently to be more involved in political activities.

Thirdly, membership in religious organizations allows us to assess the degree to which the civic dimension of religion plays a role in explaining levels of political participation. More precisely, we look at membership in religious associations. Whereas attendance at religious services relates directly to churches and their link to political participation, this second indicator relates to church-related associations; it excludes churches or mosques themselves. Members of religious associations are expected to be more politically active than non-members. Indeed, religious associations can provide individuals with the same resources that favour political involvement as churches, that is, civic skills and group consciousness. Respondents were asked about their membership in 18 types of voluntary associations, including membership in religious associations. We assigned a value of 0 when they are not members of a religious association and 1 when they are. In addition, we also consider membership in other types of voluntary associations. This allows us to control for the impact of general associational involvement that could make any effect of religious associational engagement spurious. We assigned a value of 0 when respondents are not members of any voluntary association and 1 when they are members of at least one association, excluding religious organizations and political parties.

Finally, we include in the analysis as control variables the respondent's age,<sup>3</sup> gender and educational attainment,<sup>4</sup> which are commonly used in the political participation literature, as well as the command of the language of the country of residence,<sup>5</sup> which is an important control when it comes to the political participation of migrants.

## **Political participation and religion among Christian and Muslim migrants**

Before we turn to the regression analyses aimed at assessing the impact of religion on the political participation of migrants, we present descriptive analyses of the main dependent and independent variables. More specifically, we examine, on the one hand, participation in the various types of political activities and, on the other hand, attendance at religious services as well as membership in religious organizations in the four cities according to the religious denomination of migrants.

We start by examining the degree of engagement in political participation in general and in protest activities by Christian and Muslim migrants in the four cities (Table 10.2). Focusing on overall political participation (that is, engaging in at least one of the various specific forms during the 12 months preceding the survey), there are no consistent patterns across cities. Moreover, there is no significant difference in political participation between Muslims and Christians within cities. The only notable difference is in the general level of political participation of migrants. Migrants in London and Milan show a rather low degree of political participation ranging from 10 per cent of migrants involved in political activities for Christians in Milan to 15 per cent for Muslims in London. The level of political involvement is much higher in Zurich and Barcelona. Whereas around 20 per cent of migrants are involved in political activities in Zurich, almost 40 per cent participated politically in Barcelona. The most striking result in this respect is the overwhelmingly higher degree of political participation of migrants in Barcelona. However, this figure must be related to the higher level of migrants' participation in general in that city when compared to the other three. In fact, if we take into account the participation level by the autochthonous, we can see that in both Barcelona and London there is very little difference between them and migrants, whereas the gap is much larger in Milan and Zurich (see Morales, Chapter 2 in this volume).

Yet, the most interesting aspect is perhaps the one pertaining to protest activities, as Muslims are often decried, especially in the popular press and in certain political milieus, as being intrinsically more contentious and radical, to the extent of becoming 'potential terrorists'. These figures clearly show that this is not the case. In most cities there is no significant difference between Christian and Muslim migrants and, in sharp contrast with common views, in Zurich Christian migrants are much more often involved in protest activities. Furthermore, the participation of Muslims in political activities (as that of Christians, for that matter) varies widely across cities. Far from being an intrinsic characteristic of Islam, political radicalism or, in any event, the willingness to engage in protest activities, depends on particular features of the political system.

Turning to the religious indicators (Table 10.3), we observe important differences in the frequency of attendance to religious services, both across religious denominations and across cities. In all four cities, Muslim migrants are significantly more likely to frequently attend religious services than Christian migrants. At the same time, however, in all four cities Muslims are also more likely than Christians to never attend religious services.<sup>6</sup>

It should be noted, however, that comparing Christians and Muslims with respect to this indicator is quite problematic. First, a given frequency of attendance does not have the same meaning in terms of religiosity for the two religions. For example, someone who attends a religious service once a

*Table 10.2* Political participation of Christian and Muslim migrants in the four cities (percentages of yes)

	<b>Barcelona</b>		<b>London</b>		<b>Milan</b>		<b>Zurich</b>					
	<b>Christians</b>	<b>↔ Muslims</b>	<b>Christians</b>	<b>↔ Muslims</b>	<b>Christians</b>	<b>↔ Muslims</b>	<b>Christians</b>	<b>↔ Muslims</b>				
Political participation	38.2 (466)	n.s.	37.1 (210)	11.8 (263)	n.s.	14.7 (387)	9.6 (541)	n.s.	10.6 (255)	20.5 (283)	n.s.	18.5 (439)
Protest activities	26.8 (466)	n.s.	24.8 (210)	10.3 (263)	n.s.	12.7 (387)	7.1 (547)	n.s.	7.8 (257)	16.0 (287)	(0.06)*	11.6 (455)

*Note:* N between parentheses. The ↔ sign marks whether the difference between the Christian and Muslim respondents is statistically significant, and when it is the value of the Cramer's V statistic.



Table 10.3 Religious indicators in the four cities (percentages)

	Barcelona			London			Milan			Zurich		
	Christians	↔	Muslims	Christians	↔	Muslims	Christians	↔	Muslims	Christians	↔	Muslims
<i>Attendance at religious services</i>												
Never	29.7	↔	56.6	14.9	↔	21.2	4.0		5.6	16.7	↔	28.1
Between once a month and once a year	45.7	↔	15.1	59.5	↔	38.0	54.2	↔	34.7	61.3	↔	38.3
Once a week or more	24.6		28.3	25.6	↔	40.9	41.8	↔	59.7	22.0	↔	33.6
Total	100%	.310***	100%	100%	.214***	100%	100%	.214***	100%	100%	.226***	100%
N	464		205	262		374	531		248	287		441
<i>Membership in religious organizations</i>												
No	93.1	↔	98.1	90.5	↔	96.1	92.3	↔	99.2	94.1	↔	97.4
Yes	6.9	↔	1.9	9.5	↔	3.9	7.7	↔	0.8	5.9	↔	2.6
Total (N)	100%	.102***	100%	100%	.116***	100%	100%	.141***	100%	100%	.083**	100%
N	466		210	262		387	545		257	286		454

Note: The ↔ sign marks whether the difference between the Christian and Muslim respondents is statistically significant, and when it is the value of the Cramer's V statistic.

week might be quite religious for Christians, but not for Muslims. This bias is in part avoided by the fact that the category indicating the highest degree of religiosity in our variable includes both those who attend once a week and those who attend more than once a week. Secondly and perhaps most importantly, Muslims might be very religious even if they never attend a religious service, as the everyday prayers are most often done privately. This is much less frequent among Christians.

Concerning membership in religious organizations, there is a more consistent pattern across cities. In all four cities, Christian migrants are systematically more deeply embedded in religious voluntary associations than Muslim migrants. At the same time, it should also be stressed that organizational involvement among migrants is in general quite low, never reaching 10 per cent (Christians in London) and sometimes being less than 1 per cent (Muslims in Milan).

### **The impact of religion on political participation and protest activities**

The descriptive analyses have shown relevant variations across cities and between groups in the level of political participation of migrants as well as in the religious indicators. To explore the link between political participation, religion and the institutional context we run binomial logistic regressions on two dependent variables (general political participation and protest activities) for Christian and Muslim migrants, respectively.<sup>7</sup> We focus in particular on the impact of the two religious indicators (attendance at religious services and membership in religious organizations), and control for overall organizational membership, interest in the politics of the country of residence, gender, age, education and command of the language of the country of residence. We first present the results for the indicator of overall political participation, and then for protest activities.

The first two sets of models deal with the overall political participation of Christian and Muslim migrants in the four cities under study (Tables 10.4 and 10.5). Although they are not entirely consistent, the results support our hypothesis that the interaction between the political context and religion explains the political participation of migrants. Specifically, they suggest, first, that religion plays a role for Muslim migrants but not for Christian migrants and, secondly, that such an impact is mediated by the citizenship models. As we can see, neither of the two of the religious indicators is statistically significant among Christian migrants, except for attendance at religious services in London. In contrast, we observe a significant effect of membership in religious organizations in the case of Muslim migrants in London. There is also a sizeable positive coefficient for Muslims in Barcelona, but it is statistically not significant due to the reduced number of respondents who are members of religious associations in that city.

*Table 10.4* Logistic regression for the overall political participation of Christian migrants in the four cities (odds ratios)

	<b>Barcelona</b>	<b>London</b>	<b>Milan</b>	<b>Zurich</b>
Attendance at religious services (ref. never to once a month)	.972	3.051**	.661	1.761
Membership in religious organizations (ref. no)	.729	.409	2.263	.729
Organizational membership (ref. no)	2.773***	2.852**	2.783***	3.439***
Interest in receiving country politics (ref. no)	2.360***	2.187	1.670	8.486***
Woman	.938	.652	1.831*	2.056*
Age (ref. 45 and more)				
25–44	4.750***	.213	3.229**	.000
15–24	1.955***	.643	1.433	1.163
Higher education (ref. secondary or lower)	1.218	2.850	2.054	5.717***
Fluent in country of residence language (ref. no)	–	–	3.833***	.867
Constant	.158***	.045***	.014***	.006***
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.167	.263	.189	.439
–2 log-likelihood	552.733	113.215	270.853	191.997
N	461	196	506	275

\*  $p \leq .10$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq .01$ .

Note: The command of country of residence language in Barcelona and London is a constant for Christians (everybody speaks fluently).

These results suggest that religion does play a role in explaining the political participation of migrants but only in culturally pluralist contexts and only through religious associations. In such contexts identities different from the majority identity can be expressed in the public sphere. Furthermore, religion is not excluded from the public sphere. Groups or actors organized along different identities are thus legitimated to intervene in the public domain on the basis of these identities. Muslims can thus organize along the lines of their religious identity but can also make claims on this.

We expect to find a similar pattern when we focus on protest activities with a strong impact of membership in religious associations. Associations have been shown to be central actors in the mobilization of social movements and are thus central for mobilizing individuals in protest activities. With some qualifications, the results confirm our expectations (Tables 10.6 and 10.7). While the two religious indicators have no effect on participation in protest activities by Christian migrants in all four cities, we see a statistically significant and strong effect from membership in religious organizations for

Table 10.5 Logistic regression of the overall political participation of Muslim migrants in the four cities (odds ratios)

	Barcelona	London	Milan	Zurich
Attendance at religious services (ref. never to once a month)	1.397	1.319	.901	.755
Membership in religious organizations (ref. no)	4.018	6.715**	.416	1.359
Organizational membership (ref. no)	1.547	5.032***	6.019***	3.518***
Interest in receiving country politics (ref. no)	2.218**	6.835***	.906	2.481***
Woman	1.270	1.332	1.071	1.127
Age (ref. 45 and more)				
25–44	1.511	.801	1.381	.772
15–24	1.185	.900	.547	.613*
Higher education (ref. secondary or lower)	1.049	1.574	2.795	1.163
Fluent in country of residence language (ref. no)	1.944*	3.227*	4.460***	.849
Constant	.133***	.006***	.027***	.114***
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.135	.318	.272	.132
–2 log-likelihood	246.382	207.522	128.278	360.127
N	202	325	230	415

\*  $p \leq .10$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq .01$ .

Muslims. Again, this effect can be observed only in London and Barcelona. It confirms the central role played by associations in mobilizing individuals in protest activities and the mediation of the context.

It is worth noting that the observed impact of membership in religious organizations both on general political participation and on protest activities by Muslim migrants in London and Barcelona remains, even when we control for the effect of overall organizational membership. Indeed, one might suspect that the latter, which is the strongest and most persistent predictor of the political participation of migrants, is responsible for the effect of the more specific involvement in religious associations. However, the effect of membership in religious organizations is in this case additional to that of organizational membership more generally. Furthermore, the effect of religious organizational membership remains when controlling for political interest. We interpret this result as an indication that religion and, more specifically, religious associations serve as a vector of resources necessary for political involvement and more specifically for protest activities. Yet, whether these resources are civic skills or group consciousness still remains an open question, but religious organizations do play an important role in

*Table 10.6* Logistic regression for protest activities of Christian migrants in the four cities (odds ratios)

	Barcelona	London	Milan	Zurich
Attendance at religious services (ref. never to once a month)	1.125	1.754	1.254	1.469
Membership in religious organizations (ref. no)	.706	.632	2.461	.794
Organizational membership (ref. no)	3.079***	3.377**	2.106*	2.405**
Interest in receiving country politics (ref. no)	2.234***	2.135	1.830	5.605***
Woman	.820	.612	2.587**	1.569
Age (ref. 45 and more)				
25–44	3.488**	.000	6.184**	.000
15–24	1.665**	.559	2.446	1.385
Higher education (ref. secondary or lower)	1.632**	2.567	1.220	3.981***
Fluent in country of residence language (ref. no)	–	–	4.164***	.994
Constant	.085***	.057***	.006***	.010***
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.165	.292	.210	.317
–2 log-likelihood	481.238	99.407	215.733	191.954
N	461	196	511	279

\*  $p \leq .10$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq .01$ .

*Note:* The command of the language of the residence country in Barcelona and London is a constant (all respondents speak fluently).

the political participation of Muslims in culturally pluralist cities. Not only do these associations provide resources, but the legitimacy that the context gives to Muslims to intervene on the basis of their religious identity in the public sphere gives the opportunity to use these resources for political participation.

## Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with the impact of religion on the political participation of migrants. Our point of departure was the idea that, in spite of the fact that many have stressed its decline and transformation in the western world, religion still plays a role for the political participation of migrants. At the same time, we argued that such a role depends on certain aspects of the institutional context such as the models of citizenship and the political opportunities stemming from them. More specifically, we hypothesized that the ways in which the local authorities deal with cultural and religious

Table 10.7 Logistic regression for protest activities of Muslim migrants in the four cities (odds ratios)

	Barcelona	London	Milan	Zurich
Attendance at religious services (ref. never to once a month)	1.076	1.224	.402	.702
Membership in religious organizations (ref. no)	10.888*	10.016***	.270	.356
Organizational membership (ref. no)	1.389	5.719***	10.358***	6.257***
Interest in receiving country politics (ref. no)	2.193*	7.603***	1.050	3.717***
Woman	1.494	1.215	.754	.625
Age (ref. 45 and more)				
25–44	1.452	1.697	2.659	.489
15–24	.725	2.714	.706	.394***
Higher education (ref. secondary or lower)	1.640	2.286	2.155	1.535
Fluent in country of residence language (ref. no)	2.203**	2.149	3.883**	.709
Constant	.071***	.002***	.024**	.071***
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.167	.356	.343	.217
–2 log-likelihood	201.956	175.128	94.238	261.832
N	202	325	232	427

\*  $p \leq .10$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq .01$ .

difference and the place of religion in the public sphere mediate the impact of religion on the political participation of migrants.

We tested these arguments with survey data on Christian and Muslim migrants in four cities. The findings provide some support for our hypothesis, suggesting that religion indeed plays a role in the political participation of Muslim migrants, at least as far as membership in religious organizations is concerned. These results may seem to contradict previous findings on the impact of religious service attendance on civic and political involvement (Wuthnow, 1999). Nevertheless, these studies do not control for membership in religious associations. In his article examining religious involvement and social capital, Wuthnow (2002) shows that membership, but not attendance at religious services, is positively related to social capital. Our results are consistent with these findings and suggest that resources, be it civic skills or group consciousness, necessary to political involvement are provided by membership in associations rather than by attendance at religious services. The explanation of such a different effect of membership

in religious associations and religious service attendance might be found in the fact that many mosques are mere places of worship where no activities providing people with civic skills are undertaken and where no political issues that could provide group consciousness are addressed. Thus, people simply attending religious services do not have access to resources favouring political participation. In contrast, such resources seem to be available through membership in religious associations. It is more likely that people with certain interests and skills become members of associations and that the involvement required by associations as well as the type of activities developed within associations provide their members with skills or consciousness favouring political participation.

Our results also point to the difference in the role of religious associations for migrants from different religions. Membership in religious associations does not increase the political participation of Christian migrants. This suggests that religious associations in which Christian migrants are involved develop activities mainly oriented toward the private sphere and that Christians' intervention in the public sphere would be favoured by other types of associations. In contrast, Muslim migrants are increasingly organizing around their religious identity in Europe and some Muslim associations are agitating for their members' political, social and economic rights (Soysal, 1997).

Furthermore, this impact seems indeed mediated by the context, as it is observed in the two cities that deal with cultural and religious difference according to a more pluralist approach (London and Barcelona), but not in the two cities that opt for a more assimilationist approach (Zurich and Milan). The modes of inclusion of migrants in the nation-state and the place of religion in the public sphere determine how and to what extent migrants can participate politically. For example, Koenig (2005) finds a convergence in the development of multiculturalism and the inclusion of religion as a legitimate category of identity. In contexts favouring multiculturalism, religious organizations thus have a legitimacy for intervening in the public sphere. As religious identities are not recognized as a legitimate category of identity in assimilationist contexts, groups organized on a religious basis have less legitimacy for intervening in the public sphere. Religious organizations can thus address political issues of the country of residence and encourage their members to participate. In contrast, in assimilationist contexts, where religion is assigned to the private sphere, there is no such opportunity for religious institutions or organizations, especially for 'imported' religions such as Islam.

However, if our results give some support to our hypothesis, they do not indicate which mechanisms lay behind the relationship between membership in religious organizations and political participation. As mentioned previously, the literature distinguishes two different mechanisms: the civic skills model and the group consciousness model. But these two

mechanisms are not necessarily mutually exclusive and might combine within religious organizations. Nevertheless, a consensus emerges from these two approaches, namely that religious associations can provide migrants with resources favouring political participation. But the question still remains as to how religious organizations favour political participation and what type of resources religious associations provide for political participation.

## Notes

1. Respondents were asked: 'Most people belong to some religious denomination, regardless of whether they are practising believers or even care about religion at all. To which religious denomination would you say that you belong?'
2. The question was: 'Apart from funerals, christenings and weddings, how often do you practise your religion, for example by attending religious gatherings?' We use a dummy variable taking the values of 0 (never to once a month) and 1 (once a week or more).
3. A categorical variable that distinguishes three age groups: 15 to 24, 25 to 44, and 45 and more years old.
4. A dummy variable with a value of 0 for lower levels of educational attainment (not completed primary education, primary completed, first stage of secondary), and 1 for higher levels of educational attainment (upper secondary, post-secondary, first and second stage of tertiary).
5. A dummy variable with a value of 0 when the respondent does not speak it fluently, and 1 when he does.
6. The difference between the two religious denominations is not very large in Milan, but statistically significant.
7. We employ logistic regression because we are dealing with dichotomous dependent variables. The coefficients in the following tables are the odds that the respondent has taken part in at least one of the various political activities, and in at least one of the protest activities, respectively.



# 11

## Place Attachment, Community Cohesion and the Politics of Belonging in European Cities

*Ranji Devadason\**

### Introduction

The divisions brought about by migration in the post-war period are thought to present distinctive challenges for national and local polities across Europe. How urban residents cope with the close 'juxtaposition of strangers' within cities is an enduring theme in urban research; however, the particular juxtaposition of ethnic, national and religious differences brought about by post-war migration into Europe is thought to pose distinctive challenges for urban policy-makers and, indeed, residents of ethnically diverse neighbourhoods and cities. Policy developments relating to immigration, citizenship and minority integration across Europe have 'coalesced' around specific events in different countries (Fekete, 2004: 18). In Britain, riots in northern towns – Oldham, Burnley and Bradford – in the summer of 2001 prompted fears concerning the intensity of social bonds *within* ethnic groups, in tandem with a deficit in bridging ties *between* social categories. These events were perceived as a challenge to 'multicultural' policies and raised concerns regarding the ominous advancement of different ethnic groups leading 'parallel lives' in British cities (Cantle, 2001). The resultant 'community cohesion' agenda has inspired a number of policies and initiatives by the UK Department of Communities and Local Government which feed into local and city-level politics. Since 'community cohesion' entails an emphasis upon marginalized and, implicitly, disadvantaged categories of the population, ethnic minorities in Britain are at the fore of this contemporary policy focus. In 2005, the *Racial Equality and Community Cohesion* strategy was launched with an emphasis on tackling inequalities as well as political and religious extremism (Home Office, 2005).

In tandem with the emphasis upon 'community cohesion', the metaphor 'parallel lives' is used to encapsulate a contemporary deficit in British society; individuals and groups that live alongside each other, yet whose lives do not intersect. This prevailing disconnectedness between neighbours is thought to culminate in declining social trust in society and its institutions. The concept

of social capital has gained currency as a means of explaining this deficit in social relations and, potentially, providing solutions. Recently, Robert Putnam – its most prominent advocate – has been consulted by British politicians regarding strategies that might foster ‘new forms of social solidarity’ in a multiethnic society (*The Guardian*, 18 June 2007). Putnam (2000) defines ‘generalized reciprocity’ towards strangers as a critical aspect of social life in advanced societies. Reciprocity is dependent upon honesty and trust, which he defines as lubricants for the ‘inevitable frictions of social life’ (2000: 135). Putnam’s distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ social trust is particularly resonant here. ‘Thick’ trust is embedded in personal relationships, which are often ‘nested in wider networks’, whereas ‘thin’ trust in the ‘generalized other’ rests implicitly on ‘expectations of reciprocity’. Thus: ‘Thin trust is even more useful than thick trust, because it extends the radius of trust beyond the roster of people whom we know personally’ (2000: 136).

This chapter analyses place attachment amongst migrants and their children in four multiethnic cities, and uses affective attachment to place as evidence of their imagined identification with the political community. The analysis examines the degree to which urban residents who ‘belong’ to ethnic and religious minorities identify with these categories, their neighbourhoods and cities. It then proceeds by linking these affective social processes with perceptions of community in order to assess whether affective attachment to place underpins an inclusive sense of political belonging in European cities. Stuart Hall (2002: 28) argues that participation in political community requires imagined identification with ‘certain cultural particularities’ as well as the political system (see also Anderson, 1991; Uberoi, 2007). The relationship between place attachment and social trust which is examined here allows us to unpack empirically the extent to which place attachment is borne out of perceptions of community (that is, social trust), as well as the material and political conditions in which it arises. This analysis addresses these themes through its focus on the position of different ethnic groups in London, Lyon, Oslo and Stockholm and – in doing so – considers whether place provides a basis for community cohesion amongst so-called ‘post-immigration minorities’ in multiethnic polities (Modood, 2003).

Agnew (1987: 2) contends that the *explanatory* value of place is often neglected in social science research, particularly in the analysis of political behaviour, in favour of social categories – class and gender – and, significantly, nationality. He continues: ‘Rather than seeing local variations as deviations from a national norm, the national should be viewed as constituted by locally based structuration’ (1987: 45). For Agnew, treating place analytically as a type of social category belies its distinctive role in shaping political processes. This is not to say that national politics and policies are irrelevant at the local level but that they are ‘reconstituted and take on meaning in place through ongoing social and political practices (1987: 45). Agnew’s approach is in keeping with Massey’s (1991) conceptualization of place as

*process*. In this chapter, I adopt an approach to place attachment which recognizes that – for migrants – access to the political community and its associated rights (namely, citizenship) and material conditions (particularly, access to the labour market), as well as perceptions of belonging or exclusion, are likely to influence the extent to which they develop attachment. I thereby recognize the local structural and political conditions in which place attachment accrues rather than adopting an exclusive focus on individual characteristics, such as length of residence and home ownership (see, for example, Hernández et al., 2007). By introducing place in conjunction with other social categories – ethnicity, gender, citizenship and employment – this analysis interrogates propositions about the relationship between place attachment and political engagement upon which the rhetoric of community cohesion is based.

The contemporary British policy emphasis upon neighbourhoods and community is described as representing a ‘new localism’ in urban governance (Morphet 2007: 170). The neighbourhood is presumed to be the locus of social ties, hence the basis of social identity. Thus, the community cohesion agenda implicitly challenges what many social scientists regard as somewhat outdated assumptions about the relevance of place. In focusing on cities, the aim of the Localmultidem study is to reinstate the local into analyses of minorities’ political integration. The metaphor of parallel lives clearly has spatial dimensions, as well as encompassing tacit, less tangible, perceptions of social boundaries. It implies that social divisions and, significantly, *perceptions of distance between ethnic categories* undermine civil society and the sense of community and belonging upon which it depends. This chapter considers how perceptions of distance and proximity within and between ethnic categories contribute to or detract from place attachment to the neighbourhood or city. For the Localmultidem individual survey, urban residents are asked about their generalized social trust and involvement in voluntary organizations; these variables are used in the following analysis to empirically demonstrate ‘thin’ and ‘thicker’ trust, respectively. The chapter thereby interrogates policy-makers’ assumptions about the correspondence of community with neighbourhoods in multiethnic local polities.

Taking London as the analytical point of departure here facilitates enquiry into whether there is a case for British exceptionalism amongst European cities with regard to the political integration of its minorities.

The multiracial mix of contemporary London – particularly world famous events like the Notting Hill Carnival – is pointed to as something unique in Europe, at a time when ethnic and nationalist intolerance is on the rise. It is this multicultural self-confidence that is at the root of the bold cosmopolitan visions of ‘rebranding Britain’ and ‘cool Britannia’, at the heart of several recent grandiose statements by the leaders of New Labour. (Favell, 2001b: 40)

Favell (2001b: 35) criticizes what he calls 'homegrown commentators on race and multiculturalism in Britain', including Stuart Hall, for their failure to engage empirically or theoretically with developments in ethnic relations in other western European countries, and self-aggrandizing claims about British exceptionalism. Although the confidence of these commentators has waned somewhat in the years following the attacks of 11 September 2001 and 7 July 2005, British academics in this field remain influenced by what Favell (2001b: 42) calls the black British cultural studies 'paradigm'. The case for British exceptionalism is often made with reference to its enduring Commonwealth ties and its inadvertent colonial legacy of engagement with ethnic difference. Thus, the ethnic diversity of London, initially a consequence of post-Imperial migration, is presented as a matter of pride by politicians, policy-makers and academics (Hall, 2002; Massey, 2007; Nava, 2007). Notably, even in the face of adversity, the 'One London' campaign launched by the Mayor's office after the 2005 July 7 bombings poignantly 'celebrates the fact that London is one of the most diverse cities in the world' and, critically, is united. Yet notwithstanding this rhetoric of the political and intellectual elite, whether these evocative cosmopolitan imaginaries reflect the views of ordinary Londoners is uncertain.

### **Multiethnic cities and the logic of comparison**

Global cities provide 'hubs' for the exchanges of people, capital and information that characterize globalization (Sassen, 1991). Although, London and New York are cited as archetypal in this respect, an emergent literature addresses how medium-sized, peripheral 'globalizing cities' are also transformed by intensifying internationalization (Beauregard and Haila, 2000; Taylor et al., 1996). Post-war migration, de-industrialization and the labour-market transformations brought about by globalization, contribute to the racialization of socio-spatial inequalities in European cities (Mandanipour et al., 1998; Wacquant, 1993). Accordingly, as sites of heightened social and geographical mobility, attachment to specific neighbourhoods and places within cities may intensify, as a reaction against social change. Recent research addresses how place identities intersect with social divisions, such as class and ethnicity, in London and other 'globalizing' cities (Butler, 2003; May, 1996; Hiebert, 2002). Yet while this work engages with significant aspects of identity construction in everyday life and the meanings people invest in the places where they live, it often fails to take account of the political consequences of place attachment or disengagement.

The Localmultidem study – by examining place attachment amongst different ethnic groups – facilitates analysis of whether the distinctively diverse and global city of London somehow better includes its established minority residents in comparison with other European cities, both formally, in terms of the political process, and informally, by fostering a sense of

belonging which is accessible to minorities as well as to the ethnic majority. Hence the degree to which ethnic minority groups feel able to articulate a sense of affective attachment to place is taken as indicative of London's 'vernacular cosmopolitanism' (Hall 2002: 30). By extending this analysis to other European cities – Lyon, Stockholm and Oslo – it facilitates examination of whether leading ex-colonial states, in the cases of Britain and France, and Scandinavian countries, Norway and Sweden, for which mass migration from outside Europe is a more recent phenomenon, foster affective attachment amongst their established minorities, and considers how this varies by ethnic group and religious affiliation. This chapter, thereby, draws on the cities of Lyon, Oslo and Stockholm as case studies by which to test hypotheses that emerge in the London case. Each of these cities has *established* minority residents, that is, a sizeable generation born and socialized in the country and which has associated political rights. These cases were selected because they facilitate comparison of migrants' integration in cities, and country regimes, which comparing entirely divergent cases and citizenship regimes would not allow.

An important design feature of the Localmultidem study is the comparison of the political participation of particular migrant groups across different cities, for example: the participation of Turkish people in Oslo and Stockholm. Unfortunately, for the London study this was not possible because its established minorities do not constitute sizeable minorities in other Localmultidem cities. Nonetheless, the inclusion of the Oslo case in this comparison allows parallels between South Asians (Pakistanis in Oslo, Bangladeshis and Indians in London) to be drawn. Moreover, since Britain and Sweden are associated with multicultural policies towards their migrant populations whereas France and Norway are associated with nationalist (monocultural) regimes, these four cases facilitate comparison of how these divergent regimes, and phases and types of immigration, influence their respective established minorities' attachment to the neighbourhoods and cities in which they live. As France and Britain are prominent ex-colonial powers, the ethnic groups which are included in this study originate from their former colonies: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, and Bangladesh, India and the Caribbean, respectively. Labour migrants to Sweden and Norway in the immediate post-war period came from within Europe. Non-European migration of political refugees and displaced persons from South America, particularly Chile, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and South Asia, as well as from the former Yugoslavia, arrived more recently, adding substantially to the numbers of migrants in Norway and Sweden, countries which were formerly characterized in terms of their ethnic homogeneity. Although progressively restrictive immigration policies have been introduced in Scandinavia as elsewhere, significant numbers of non-European migrants arrived to Sweden in the 10 years preceding 1985, due to the introduction of a receptive refugee strategy. In contrast, in Norway, more restrictive immigration

policies have been in place since 1975, such that only political refugees – from Pakistan, Vietnam, Bosnia and other specific sites of conflict – have been granted leave to enter since then. Thus, the proportion of migrants and minorities in Norway is quite limited compared to the transformations that have occurred in Sweden in recent decades (Andersson, 1998a; Massey, 2005). Nonetheless, both Scandinavian cities sustain sizeable ‘mature’ migrant populations (Myrberg, 2011), as in Lyon and London.

Having discussed the logic of comparison it is worth briefly drawing attention to aspects of city life that are beyond the remit of the Localmultidem study yet clearly have a bearing on the experience and political participation of urban residents in multiethnic cities. Mercer’s *Quality of Living Index* ranks 215 world cities drawing on assessment of 39 criteria including crime, pollution, public transport and infrastructure, housing, health care provision and schools (Mercer, 2009). According to this ranking in 2009, London and Lyon were ranked at 38 and 37, respectively, whereas Oslo and Stockholm were ranked at 24 and 20, unsurprisingly given the generally high standards of living and welfare in Nordic countries. It is worth taking this into consideration when interpreting the analyses presented since it shows that attachment in Stockholm (neighbourhoods and city) and Oslo (city) is markedly higher than in their British and French counterparts (see Table 11.1).

## **Place-based identities in cities**

Hernández and Hidalgo (2001) note that there is ‘conceptual confusion’ about the concepts ‘place attachment’ and ‘place identity’. Since place attachment is usually studied by measuring the perceptions of long-term residents and – in their terms – ‘natives’ in neighbourhoods and cities, it tends to coincide with place identity empirically (Hernández et al., 2007). However, divergence between place attachment and place identity is likely for migrants, who might be *attached* to the place in which they are settled, but are yet to *define* themselves by that place. For example, migrants arriving from different parts of the world, and indeed the country, may be *attached* to living in London but not identify themselves as Londoners, whereas people who identify as Londoners – having been ‘born and bred’ there – are also likely to express attachment to it. Notably, the processes by which migrants and minorities develop place attachment are ignored in much existing research (Hernández et al., 2007, is an exception).

Arguably, intensifying processes of globalization are *disembedding* individuals from the specificities of places, and thereby disrupting established relationships between place and identity (Giddens, 1991; Massey and Jess, 1995). Doreen Massey (1991) counters this tendency by re-framing the local in reference to the global, and stating that places must be understood in reference to their linkages with the ‘outside’ world instead of conceptualizing

Table 11.1 Attachment to neighbourhood, city, ethnic group and compatriots mean scores (0–10 scale)

	Ethnic group	N	Neighbourhood		City		Ethnic group		Country people	
			Mean	95% confidence interval	Mean	95% confidence interval	Mean	95% confidence interval	Mean	95% confidence interval
LONDON	Bangladeshi	295	5.92	(5.64–6.19)*	5.52	(5.25–5.78)*	6.82	(6.56–7.08)	4.92	(4.66–5.19)*
	Indian	296	5.47	(5.24–5.70)*	5.44	(5.21–5.67)*	6.58	(6.34–6.83)	5.23	(4.98–5.48)*
	Caribbean	296	6.36	(6.08–6.64)	6.23	(5.25–5.44)*	7.29	(7.03–7.55)*	5.95	(5.68–6.22)*
	Autochthonous	300	6.52	(6.21–6.82)	6.81	(6.53–7.09)	n/a	n/a	6.95	(6.67–7.23)
LYON	Algerian	460	n/a	n/a	7.49	(7.26–7.72)*	7.02	(6.76–7.27)	7.77	(7.57–7.97)*
	Moroccan	114	n/a	n/a	7.03	(6.53–7.53)	6.57	(6.04–7.09)*	7.68	(7.27–8.10)
	Tunisian	130	n/a	n/a	6.98	(6.47–7.48)	6.86	(6.41–7.31)	7.44	(7.05–7.83)
	Autochthonous	400	6.94	n/a	6.92	(6.67–7.17)	n/a	n/a	7.52	(7.29–7.76)
STOCKHOLM	Chilean	271	7.39	(7.12–8.66)	7.47	(7.24–7.71)	6.51	(6.24–6.78)*	7.32	(7.10–7.54)*
	Turkish	225	7.81	(7.57–8.07)	7.58	(7.34–7.82)	7.25	(6.95–7.54)*	7.28	(7.04–7.52)*
	Autochthonous	324	7.86	(7.65–8.08)	7.58	(7.36–7.79)	n/a	n/a	7.79	(7.62–7.95)
OSLO	Bosnian	296	6.17	(5.92–6.43)*	7.22	(7.00–7.44)*	7.13	(6.89–7.36)	6.79	(6.60–6.98)*
	Pakistani	295	7.14	(6.93–7.36)	6.86	(6.65–7.07)*	7.10	(6.90–7.30)	6.81	(6.63–7.00)*
	Turkish	296	6.45	(6.21–6.70)*	6.23	(5.97–6.48)*	7.31	(7.07–7.55)	6.89	(6.68–7.10)*
	Autochthonous	300	6.92	(6.72–7.18)	7.47	(7.25–7.69)	n/a		7.63	(7.45–7.80)

\* Ethnic group's mean lies outside the 95 per cent confidence interval for the autochthonous sample ( $p < 0.05$ ); and in the case of ethnic group attachment, other ethnic groups.

them as bounded, fixed entities. Her theorization of place as *process* underlines the interdependent, changeable and transnational character of place-based identities in global cities.

Moreover, Agnew (1987: 2) contends that treating place as a type of social category – such as class and gender – devoid of ‘*distinctive* social and historical characteristics’ neglects its role in shaping political orientations. His theorization of place encompasses three intersecting aspects: geographical *location*, *locale*, as the setting for social interactions and institutions, and a third element, *sense of place* or – in Raymond Williams’ terms – ‘structure of feeling’ (Agnew, 1987: 25). For Williams (1977) *structure of feeling* is related to industrial history and social divisions that shape individuals’ orientations to the world. The concept encapsulates the ways in which place mediates between individuals and social structures and informs taken-for-granted ways of thinking and being in everyday life (see also Taylor et al., 1996). This third aspect corresponds most closely with the way in which I conceptualize place attachment. The following analysis aims to capture interconnections between *locale* and *sense of place*. *Locale*, as the setting for interaction, includes the spheres of the labour market, the political community, religion and the neighbourhood. Each of these spheres informs the sense of place and orientations of urban residents.

This theorization of place has parallels with Gustafson’s (2001) analysis of how respondents attribute meanings to places in their narratives. He describes how the meanings which respondents attribute to places can be mapped ‘around and between’ three poles: self, others and the environment. Yet rather than meanings being linked unambiguously with one of these three dimensions, the poles delimit conceptual space, such that associations are often related to the relations between them: *self-others*, *others-environment*, *self-environment*. Practically, *self* relates to how places acquire meanings in personal biographies, through specific events or phases in the life course. *Others* relates to the meanings which may be attributed to places because of the characteristics of their inhabitants, such that an area could be characterized as ‘working class’, ‘migrant’ or ‘gentrified’, for example. The *environment* for Gustafson can acquire meaning because of the physical properties of the natural or built environment, but it can also relate to the institutional settings and practices of particular cities, countries or regions. Thus, the relationships between *self* and *environment* and *self* and *others* form the focus of this analysis because they are particularly relevant for explaining minority respondents’ attachment to place.

These three dimensions – *self*, *self-environment*, *self-other* – are used to structure the multivariate analysis of place attachment and, thus, identify the factors which shape minority respondents’ attachment to their neighbourhoods and cities. The self here is defined by individuals’ biographies, as characterized by their ethnic group, migrant status, length of residence in the city, age and gender. Citizenship and employment are taken as indicators



of the relationship between the individual and institutions of the state and labour market, whereas affiliation with a minority religion, associational involvement and generalized social trust are taken as indicative of the relationship between self and others.

## Descriptive analyses

This section begins with an initial description of the variation in attachment to neighbourhood and city between the selected ethnic groups across the four cities; it proceeds by introducing variables which help to explain this variation: citizenship, employment status, percentage of the group which constitutes the 'second-generation' (defined by residence in the country of birth), as well as variables which capture perceived distance and/or proximity from ethnic others. A multivariate stepwise regression model combining these elements is introduced in the next section to explain the variation in place attachment. The three steps capture the facets of locale – individual, institutional and social – that are described in this section and that correspond with Gustafson's three dimensions of how meanings are attributed to places.

Respondents were asked about their *attachment to different places and people* and asked to rate their attachment on a scale from 0 (no attachment at all) to 10 (strongly attached); mean scores by ethnic group are presented in Table 11.1.<sup>1</sup> Table 11.1 shows marked variation both along ethnic lines and between cities. I begin here by identifying key patterns from the London data, before considering similarities and differences that arise in Lyon, Oslo and Stockholm.

Each of the ethnic groups, including the white British, is more strongly attached to their own ethnic group than their neighbourhoods, London or the British people. The Caribbean sample expresses markedly higher attachment to neighbourhood and London in comparison with the South Asians; given the migration history and long-establishment of the Caribbean group in London, one would expect them to have greater attachment to the city and country, as well as to their compatriots. Overall, attachment to place (neighbourhood and London) is highest for the ethnic majority, and fairly high for the Caribbean sample relative to the South Asians. Notably, the greatest attachment to fellow citizens (the 'British people') is found amongst the white Britons relative to the three non-white ethnic minorities.

Now turning to the cross-national comparison, the patterns become more complex on considering the variation across cities. The most striking finding is that each of the other three cities, Lyon, Oslo and Stockholm, sustain stronger attachment amongst their minority populations than London. Moreover, in Lyon and Stockholm their migrant populations are more attached to their neighbourhoods and cities than to their own ethnic group.<sup>2</sup> And in Lyon, Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians are more attached to the French people than autochthonous French people are themselves.

In London, each of the ethnic minority groups expresses lower attachment to their neighbourhoods and city than to their own ethnic group and, while this is also the case for Pakistani and Turkish residents of Oslo, the degree of variance between ethnic-group attachment and attachment to the city is markedly greater in the London case. In Oslo, each group exhibits a distinct type of place attachment. Bosnians are more attached to their ethnic group and city than the neighbourhoods in which they live; Turkish residents are more attached to their ethnic group and neighbourhood than to Oslo; whereas Pakistanis are more attached to their neighbourhood than to their ethnic group or the city. Notably, the comparison of Turkish residents in Oslo and Stockholm reveals that they are more markedly attached to the neighbourhood, the city and Swedish compatriots in Stockholm than are their Turkish counterparts in Oslo.

In short, attachment to the neighbourhood, city and country's people is lower in London than in each of the other cities. This data therefore presents a challenge to the presumption that London provides a uniquely inclusive cosmopolitan space which fosters a strong sense of belonging amidst diversity relative to other European cities. London's distinctive position as a 'global city' due to the very multiplicity of its transnational connections could, in fact, lend itself to heightened consciousness of ethnic difference and weaken identification with the local (see Devadason, 2010).

To give readers a sense of the contrasting profiles of the ethnic groups in each city, Table 11.2 presents a set of structural indicators for each group. Although these indicators are clearly not exhaustive, they serve to illustrate key differences and similarities between the ethnic groups in their different locales. These variables constitute *locale* – in Agnew's terms – 'locally based structuration': access to the political community, labour market, religion and local community. Here, citizenship of the country in which they are resident is taken as evidence of access to the political community. Unemployment is used to indicate relative access to or exclusion from the labour market; and identification with a minority (non-Christian) religion is taken as another aspect of locale which is likely to influence social proximity or distance from the ethnic majority. Social trust is indicative of perceived community at the local level. In addition, the percentage of each ethnic group born in the country of residence, and the proportion which has lived in the city for more than 10 years are included. These variables are indicative of the history of migration and settlement for each group in their respective cities and are critical determinants of place attachment (see Hernández et al., 2007). Notably, a small percentage of the autochthonous samples in Lyon, Oslo and Stockholm were born outside of their countries of origin, in other European countries and elsewhere, although not in sufficient numbers to significantly affect the analysis.

If we consider – in each city case – the basic propositions discussed, length of residence is likely to foster higher place attachment, having the

Table 11.2 Individual, institutional and social aspects of locale (percentage of respondents)

	Ethnic group	N	Individual		Institutional		Social		
			Resident in country of birth	>10 years resident in city	Citizens of European country	Unemployment	Minority or non-Christian religion	Associational involvement	High social trust
LONDON	Bangladeshi	294	54.3	87.4	84.3	11.1	99.7	31.7	36.8
	Indian	295	28.7	46.5	49.0	6.5	94.6	17.9	45.9
	Caribbean	285	84.5	92.1	95.9	12.7	7.0	26.6	36.8
	Autochthonous	299	100	84.8	100	8.8	4.1	24.0	51.9
LYON	Algerian	460	65.3	73.3	80.5	11.7	70.1	50.3	17.0
	Moroccan	130	45.6	57.9	78.1	11.4	61.4	49.1	26.3
	Tunisian	114	57.7	76.2	79.2	16.2	73.8	53.1	14.7
	Autochthonous	460	94.5	67.8	100	8.1	2.0	61.3	28.8
STOCKHOLM	Chilean	258	29.4	89.0	74.7	5.9	0	85.0	36.6
	Turkish	221	13.2	85.8	84.7	10.3	63.2	82.1	32.0
	Autochthonous	323	99.4	85.2	99.7	2.5	0	94.5	71.1
OSLO	Bosnian	292	0	NA	56.3	NA	65.3	59.0	61.8
	Pakistani	293	20.7	NA	70.3	NA	99.0	35.3	62.0
	Turkish	289	6.7	NA	68.3	NA	91.6	43.3	51.5
	Autochthonous	296	98.7	NA	100	NA	0.3	88.7	86.5

citizenship of the country is likely to be positively correlated with higher place attachment, whereas employment status, particularly being unemployed, and being affiliated with a minority religion, may lower place attachment. Bivariate analyses (Table 11.3) reveal that length of residence is significantly related to place attachment in each of the four cities. Moreover, in London, predictable relationships are borne out between each of the structural variables and attachment to the neighbourhood and the city; namely, having citizenship is a significant determinant of place attachment ( $p < 0.001$ ); being unemployed relative to employed is associated with lower place attachment ( $p < 0.05$ ); and being affiliated with a minority religion is also significantly related with lower place attachment ( $p < 0.001$ ).

Having said this, a rather complex picture emerges from the cross-national comparison of bivariate analyses. Broadly speaking, London and Oslo confirm predicted relationships between institutional and social aspects of locale: namely, that having citizenship correlates with greater attachment (albeit to a much greater degree of certainty in the case of Oslo); whereas being unemployed and being affiliated with a minority religion corresponds with lower attachment to London and Oslo. Moreover, being born in the country of residence and living in these cities for more than 10 years also heighten attachment to them. The latter association between long-term residence ( $>10$  years) and attachment is also confirmed in the Lyon and Stockholm cases.

However, the picture becomes more complicated when we consider that in Stockholm neither country of birth nor affiliation with a minority religion – what might be termed the ‘ethnic variables’ – nor the institutional variables (citizenship and unemployment) appear to affect attachment to it. And, in Lyon, the situation is reversed – relative to London and Oslo – since being born in France and having French citizenship correlates with lower attachment to Lyon whereas being affiliated with a minority religion is associated with greater attachment. These patterns are reproduced in the bivariate analysis of attachment to the neighbourhood in the four cities (not shown), with the exceptions that Chilean (first-generation) migrants express significantly lower attachment to Stockholm neighbourhoods; and unemployment significantly lowers Bosnian and Turkish residents’ attachment to their neighbourhoods in Oslo.

The strong parallels between the Oslo and London bivariate analyses, and the divergence in the Stockholm and Lyon data, suggest that alternative – perhaps more place-specific variables – inform attachment to city in these sites. Either way, belonging to a migrant community does not weaken attachment to Lyon or Stockholm and, in fact, heightens attachment to Lyon. The absence of an ‘ethnic effect’ in Stockholm with regard to place attachment, and the contrasting empirical relationships – with regard to institutional and social variables – in London, Lyon and Oslo suggests that these individual, institutional and social processes interact in very different

Table 11.3 Bivariate analyses of attachment to the city by individual, institutional and social aspects of locale (Pearson's r)

	Ethnic group	N	Individual		Institutional		Social		
			Resident in country of birth	>10 years resident in city	Citizens of European country	Unemployment	Minority or non-Christian religion	Associational involvement	Social Trust
LONDON	Bangladeshi	294	.225**	.296**	.282**		.138**		.412**
	Indian	295	.160**	.268**	.263**				.215**
	Caribbean	285	.145**			-.183**			.202**
	Autochthonous	299	n.a.	.292**	n.a.	-.158**			.426**
LYON	Algerian	460		.148**				.110**	
	Moroccan	130		.164*					
	Tunisian	114	-.218**	.285**					
	Autochthonous	460	n.a.	.225**		-.111*	-.088*		
STOCKHOLM	Chilean	258		.190**	.100*				.150**
	Turkish	221							
	Autochthonous	323	n.a.	.126*				-.131**	
OSLO <sup>+</sup>	Bosnian	292	n.a.	.122**	.122*				.103*
	Pakistani	293	.077(*)					-.085(*)	.121*
	Turkish	289	.147**	.253**	.189**		.159**	.145**	.160**
	Autochthonous	296		n.a.					.175**

\*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001

Note: Only the correlation coefficients that are statistically significant are shown

<sup>+</sup>In the Oslo questionnaire residents were not asked the number of years in the city; therefore, the variable on the number of years in the country has been used here instead; and social trust was included as a dichotomous rather than a scale question: 'In general most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful?'

ways in each context to inform place attachment (or not). Moreover, the history and reasons for migration, and patterns of settlement of each ethnic group in urban settings invariably shape their perceptions of place.

In Agnew's theorization of place and politics, he describes processes of '[a]ctive socialization' whereby 'place-specific social structures and patterns of social interaction give rise to specific patterns of political behaviour' (1987: 44). He notes that it is thereby possible to identify 'types of places' which are conducive to particular political orientations but – given historical and structural variation – do not necessarily establish an overarching theorization about behaviour in different places. In order to examine the intersection of variables in each context and the relative influence of the aspects of the locale described, including particular ethnic group effects, a stepwise multivariate regression model is introduced. The advantages of a stepwise approach is that it enables us to discern how the combination of variables affects attachment amongst separate ethnic groups in each city, and to identify whether the intersection of citizenship with minority religious affiliation, for example, strengthens the fit of the model. It thereby reveals the multivalent layering of place attachment in the four cities.

## **Explanatory analyses**

In the following analysis, I introduce a stepwise multivariate regression model of attachment to the neighbourhood and the city (Tables 11.4–11.7), which illustrates how these variables interact with ethnicity and influence the variance in place attachment. Since clear-cut cross-national patterns which facilitate our understanding of the relationship between ethnicity and place attachment do not emerge from the bivariate analysis, it is likely that the combination of factors – individual, institutional and social – contribute to the patterning of place attachment amongst different ethnic groups in their cities.

Stepwise analysis is carried out to examine the influence of different variables on place attachment. *Step 1* relates to individual characteristics and biography, and it therefore examines the influence of basic demographic variables such as age, gender, ethnicity and generation, and includes the binary variable for length of residence (>10 years). *Step 2* introduces the relationships between the individual and the institutions, and thus includes citizenship and employment status. *Step 3* introduces variables which reflect affect – in Agnew's terms – 'subjective territorial identity'; thus, religious affiliation, associational involvement and generalized social trust are used to signify social perceptions of proximity and distance with the wider community. The aim of step 3 is to capture boundary-drawing processes between ethnic categories and imagined sense of community, which may transcend ethnic or national categories. The realm of the social is more difficult to capture empirically than other social categories since it rests on respondents'

interpretations and (potentially) changing perceptions to a greater degree than the independent individual and institutional variables. However, since community cohesion is connected with *perceptions of proximity and distance* between individuals and groups in neighbourhoods and cities, the inclusion of the variable of trust here is intended to capture the extent to which generalized reciprocity extends beyond the radius of people whom are known within the four cities.

Table 11.4 shows that in the London case having migrated lowers attachment to the neighbourhood; having British citizenship has a positive influence on attachment and – in tandem with age – this is likely to be due in part to length of residence in the country, hence the neighbourhood; and being unemployed or in education significantly lowers attachment to

Table 11.4 Stepwise regression model of attachment to London neighbourhoods and city (OLS regression)

	Attachment to neighbourhoods			Attachment to the city		
	Step 1 β	Step 2 β	Step 3 β	Step 1 β	Step 2 β	Step 3 β
<i>Ethnic group</i> (reference: autochthonous)						
Bangladeshi	-.013	-.016	.053	-.169***	-.168***	-.096
Caribbean	-.051	-.066	.060(*)	-.064(*)	-.065(*)	-.036
Indian	.033	.030	-.048	-.092*	-.096*	-.071
<i>Gender</i> (reference: male)	.066(*)	.071*	.062(*)	.030	.036	.025
<i>Age</i>	.137***	.123**	.091*	.132***	.101**	.064(*)
<i>Generation</i> (reference: first generation)	.153***	.156***	.131**	.128**	.114*	.070
<i>Length of residence</i> (reference: <9 years)	.120**	.180***	.168***	.161***	.172***	.168***
British citizenship (reference: other)		-.078(*)	-.088(*)		.007	-.013
<i>Employment status</i> (reference: employed)						
In education		-.029	-.027		-.057(*)	-.055(*)
Economically inactive		-.008	-.024		-.034	.000
Unemployed		-.056(*)	-.028		-.105***	-.077*
<i>Minority religion</i> (reference: no religion or Christian)			-.059			-.070
<i>Associational Involvement</i>			-.005			-.046
<i>Social trust</i>			.305***			.298***
<b>Adjusted R square</b>	<b>.091</b>	<b>.093</b>	<b>.179</b>	<b>.113</b>	<b>.121</b>	<b>.204</b>

(\*) p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Standardized Beta coefficients shown

neighbourhood. The latter is likely to be due to a shorter period of residence in the neighbourhood – having moved to study – whereas the former may stem from alienation wrought by unemployment in itself. Finally, the variables that capture perceptions of ‘community’ (generalized social trust), associational involvement and minority religion, are introduced in *step 3*. The regression model demonstrates a strong positive correlation between trust and neighbourhood attachment. The inclusion of minority religion and associational involvement does not weaken or strengthen the model. However, due to collinearity between ethnic group and minority religion for Bangladeshis (of whom 99.7 per cent are Muslim) and Pakistanis and Turkish residents of Oslo (99.0 per cent and 91.6 per cent are Muslim, respectively) the introduction of minority religious affiliation may bias the final step of the regression, in London and Oslo (Table 11.5). Having said this,

Table 11.5 Stepwise regression model of attachment to Oslo neighbourhoods and city (OLS regression)

	Attachment to neighbourhoods			Attachment to the city		
	Step 1 β	Step 2 β	Step 3 β	Step 1 β	Step 2 β	Step 3 β
<i>Ethnic group</i> (reference: autochthonous)						
Bosnian	-.056	-.038	-.046	.092	115(*)	.166*
Pakistani	.159*	.183**	.166*	.005	.029	.112
Turkish	.060	.077	.064	-.095	-.079	.000
<i>Gender</i> (reference: male)	.072*	.079*	.078**	.028	.032	.035
<i>Age</i>	.149***	.156***	.155***	.070*	.069(*)	.065(*)
<i>Generation</i> (reference: first generation)		.093	.094	.158*	.147*	.140*
Norwegian citizenship (reference: other)		.054(*)	.054(*)		.076*	.057(*)
<i>Employment status</i> (reference: employed)						
In education		-.054	-.046		-.051(*)	-.041
Economically inactive		-.038	-.037		-.025	.002
Unemployed		-.011	-.010		-.022	-.009
<i>Minority religion</i> (reference: no religion or Christian)			.029			-.033
<i>Associational Involvement</i>			.004			.109**
<i>Social trust</i> (reference: mistrust)			.027			.073*
<b>Adjusted R square</b>	<b>.055</b>	<b>.057</b>	<b>.055</b>	<b>.053</b>	<b>.058</b>	<b>.070</b>

(\*)  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Standardized Beta coefficients shown



the stepwise approach demonstrates that the direction and strength of some of the correlations are produced by the other predictor variables discussed – individual, institutional and social (excepting associational involvement and minority religion) – hence underlining the significance, in particular, of the correlation between social trust and attachment to the neighbourhood in each of the four cities. A marked increase in the adjusted R square between steps 2 and 3 in each of the city models, especially the London models for attachment to both neighbourhood and city (Table 11.4), is brought about by the addition of the predictor variable ‘generalized social trust’, whereas associational involvement only emerges as statistically significant in informing attachment to Oslo.

These findings in the London context were to some extent predicted. However, the application of the stepwise regression model to explain the variance in the data in other cities yields somewhat surprising findings. Firstly, considering the ‘ethnic variables’, having migrated does not significantly affect attachment to neighbourhoods in Oslo or Stockholm (Table 11.7). Chileans in Stockholm expressed significantly lower levels of neighbourhood attachment; however, attachment amongst Bosnians in Oslo, and Turkish residents in Stockholm and Oslo, does not vary significantly from their respective ethnic majority populations. Having Norwegian citizenship has a positive influence on neighbourhood attachment that appears to mitigate the negative consequences of migration, to a greater degree than in London. Finally, women are significantly more attached to their neighbourhoods than men, in each of the four cities.

One could argue, therefore, that the socio-spatial exclusion of minorities in peripheral suburbs of Lyon, Stockholm and Oslo heightens attachment to these peripheral neighbourhoods or *banlieues* in these three cities relative to the autochthonous population. This socio-spatial patterning of segregation contrasts with the mix of ethnic majority and minorities in inner London. That is not to suggest that ethnicity does not affect access to residential areas in London, merely that the juxtaposition of rich and poor, minority and majority, high-income households and social housing within London contributes to a particular social and ethnic mix (Nava, 2007). Therefore repeating this regression model for attachment to city may illuminate whether the patterning of attachment is more *place-bounded* for minorities in comparison with the ethnic majority populations in the four cities.

The second set of columns in Table 11.4 shows that ethnicity has profound effects on attachment to London, since Bangladeshi, Indian and Caribbean respondents are all significantly less attached to the city than their white British counterparts are. Since the Caribbean group does not vary significantly from the ethnic majority with respect to neighbourhood attachment, this supports the proposition – outlined above – that the ways in which Caribbean respondents live and move in the city are more limited than those of the ethnic majority population. However, considering patterns

in the other cities, Algerians in Lyon and Pakistanis in Oslo are significantly more attached to their cities than the majority population (Tables 11.6 and 11.5, respectively). This could be related to the fact that these ethnic groups are place-bounded in their cities, relative to the rest of France or Norway; however, since the attachment of Tunisians and Moroccans to Lyon and Turkish people to Oslo does not vary in similar ways we cannot develop an overarching theorization based on this assumption.

The picture in relation to other variables suggests that attachment to the city is stronger amongst residents who have British and Norwegian citizenship in London and Oslo, respectively, but not in the other two cities. Employment status, as in the case of neighbourhood attachment, appears to be salient in shaping attachment to London, but surprisingly does not affect the patterning of attachment to the neighbourhood or the city in each of the other three cities. Thus, the patterning of attachment to cities appears to be influenced by a number of different factors that are not represented here. Having said this, introducing political behaviour and generalized social trust in *step 3* of the model for each city strengthens its 'fit' with the data. Generalized social trust is positively correlated with attachment to London, Oslo and Stockholm, whereas associational involvement positively correlates with attachment to the city of Oslo but not elsewhere (Table 11.5).

Table 11.6 Stepwise regression model of attachment to Lyon city (OLS regression)

	Step 1 ß	Step 2 ß	Step 3 ß
<i>Ethnic group</i> (reference: autochthonous)			
Algerian	.109**	.114**	.072(*)
Moroccan	.021	.024	-.001
Tunisian	-.011	-.008	-.035
<i>Gender</i> (reference: male)	.027	.018	.019
<i>Age</i>	.099**	.073(*)	-.009
<i>Generation</i> (reference: first generation)	-.069*	-.077*	.085*
<i>Length of residence</i> (reference: <9 years)	.163***	.162***	.176***
French citizenship (reference: other)		.026	.035
<i>Employment status</i> (reference: employed)			
In education		-.003	.000
Economically inactive		.044	.037
Unemployed		-.023	-.029
<i>Minority religion</i> (reference: no religion or Christian)			.078(*)
<i>Associational Involvement</i>			-.032
<i>Social trust</i>			.050(*)
<b>Adjusted R square</b>	<b>.056</b>	<b>.055</b>	<b>.059</b>

(\*) p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Standardized Beta coefficients shown

Table 11.7 Stepwise regression model of attachment to Stockholm neighbourhoods and the city (OLS regression)

	Attachment to neighbourhoods			Attachment to the city		
	Step 1 ß	Step 2 ß	Step 3 ß	Step 1 ß	Step 2 ß	Step 3 ß
<i>Ethnic group</i> (reference: autochthonous)						
Chilean	-.214***	-.221***	-.202**	-.103	-.024	-.088
Turkish	-.078	-.088	-.043	-.060	-.097	-.027
<i>Gender</i> (reference: male)						
	.078*	.076*	.077*	.040	.036	.036
<i>Age</i>						
	-.036	-.051	-.066	-.083*	-.100*	-.109*
<i>Generation</i> (reference: first generation)						
	-.121(*)	-.115(*)	-.135*	-.085	.030	-.118(*)
<i>Length of residence</i> (reference: <9 years)						
	.181***	.186***	.188***	.146***	.141***	.141***
<i>Swedish citizenship</i> (reference: other)						
		-.030	-.039		.048	.044
<i>Employment status</i> (reference: employed)						
In education		-.020	-.018		.023	.023
Economically inactive		.030	.044		.057	.067
Unemployed		-.019	-.032		-.033	-.025
<i>Minority religion</i> (reference: no religion or Christian)						
			-.032			-.028
<i>Associational Involvement</i>						
			-.002			-.020
<i>Social trust</i>						
			.119**			.089*
<b>Adjusted R square</b>	<b>.042</b>	<b>.040</b>	<b>.048</b>	<b>.016</b>	<b>.017</b>	<b>.020</b>

(\*) p &lt; 0.1, \* p &lt; 0.05, \*\* p &lt; 0.01, \*\*\* p &lt; 0.001

Standardized Beta coefficients shown

The picture that emerges from this cross-national analysis of attachment to the city serves to underline the complexities of the relationship between ethnic minorities and the places where they live. Additional information regarding the extent of segregation and the existence of ethnic enclaves is necessary for interpreting these findings. Ethnic minorities in Lyon, Oslo and Stockholm are more likely to be *spatially excluded* in stigmatized 'immigrant' neighbourhoods, whereas their ethnic majority counterparts are more likely to be *geographically and socially mobile* within these cities (Andersson, 1998a; Wacquant, 1993). Nonetheless, whether these neighbourhoods constitute ethnic enclaves varies between different ethnic groups and between cities. As Andersson (1998a) notes, the specifically Turkish 'ethnic cluster' which exists in a Stockholm neighbourhood is relatively unusual, even though all foreign-born residents are significantly more likely to

live in 'immigrant-dense' neighbourhoods in Sweden. Accordingly, Turkish attachment to neighbourhoods in Stockholm may stem from strong social bonds within an 'ethnic neighbourhood' rather than bridging ties with the ethnically Swedish population or indeed, actually, both bonding and bridging ties. Moreover, Pakistani residents of Oslo are highly segregated in the area known as 'little Karachi' or 'little Pakistan' (Bjørnskau, 2005). This informal naming of the area of 'Old Oslo' has no doubt informed Pakistani residents' stronger attachment to this neighbourhood relative to their respective Bosnian or Turkish counterparts (Table 11.5).

Given that Pakistanis are residentially concentrated in an inner-city neighbourhood of Oslo, their experience and development of place attachment could be expected to have parallels with that of Bangladeshi residents in London. Bangladeshis have been described as a 'socially encapsulated' population (Peach, 2006), with limited social and economic ties beyond their own ethnic group, partly due to their exceptionally high residential concentration in one London borough. However, parallels between Pakistanis and Bangladeshis cannot be drawn here since Bangladeshi attachment to neighbourhood does not vary significantly from that of other ethnic groups in London (once age, country of birth and length of residence are taken into account, Table 11.4). And, even though nationally a striking 41.8 per cent of Britain's Bangladeshis live in inner London (Eade and Garbin, 2006), their attachment to the capital is significantly weaker than that of other ethnic groups. Elsewhere, the exceptional situation of Bangladeshis – compared with other South Asians in Britain – has been attributed to their working-class profile, dependence on social housing and residential concentration in inner London (Eade et al., 1996; see also Devadason, 2010). The poverty and deprivation of Bangladeshis in London relative to other ethnic groups clearly has a bearing on their feelings of attachment.

How ethnic enclaves contribute to a sense of belonging and attachment, or perceived exclusion, is likely to vary significantly in different cities, depending on whether these neighbourhoods are stigmatized, amongst other reasons. For example, recent research elaborates on how political tensions in Bangladesh – between secular nationalists and Islamists – affect Bangladeshi politics in inner London (Eade and Garbin, 2006). Given the focus of this chapter, the strength of transnational ties – measured by frequency of visits to their country of origin or engagement in homeland politics, for example – have not been explored here, although they too are likely to influence the formation of local attachment. Overall, the varying salience of ethnicity as a variable shaping attachment to the four cities reveals that cross-national patterns of place attachment amongst migrants and their children in European cities are more complex than straightforward hypotheses about relationships between individual and institutional predictor variables allow. Simplistic generalizations, which transcend specific national and local contexts, cannot adequately represent the patterning of place attachment

amongst migrants and their children in European cities. The analysis suggests that although these individual, institutional and social variables are inter-linked, the ways in which they affect place attachment varies between particular neighbourhoods, cities *and* ethnic groups.

## Conclusion

This chapter has examined the patterning of place attachment by individual, institutional and social variables amongst different ethnic groups in four cities – London, Lyon, Oslo and Stockholm – in order to assess whether place provides a basis for community cohesion in multiethnic polities. How affective, social and normative aspects of everyday life influence place attachment and whether they contribute to a sense of political belonging are critical questions here. Drawing on Agnew's (1987: 2) thesis about the development of 'subjective territorial identity' and the working of '*distinctive* historical and social characteristics' of places, the analysis presented facilitates a rigorous exploration of the factors informing place attachment to neighbourhood and city (or not) amongst established minority residents.

The Localmultidem project is based on the premise that associational involvement has critical explanatory value in the analysis of political integration and, according to Putnam's social capital thesis, is a critical aspect of civil society in healthy democracies. However, this variable does not yield much explanatory mileage in London partly because involvement in all types of association – including political organizations – is relatively low for each ethnic group, including the ethnic majority (see Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 in this volume). Moreover, even in Lyon and Stockholm, where involvement is markedly higher, the variable does not contribute significantly to the modelling of place attachment. In the analysis presented, I therefore use orientations towards strangers, in Putnam's terms 'generalized social trust', as indicative of perceptions of distance or proximity to the wider community. Trust, rather than dense intra-ethnic bonding ties, is thought to lend itself to community cohesion. Orientations towards people whom one does not already know – the 'generalized other' – is captured by the variable which measures trust or mistrust. This focus on trust enables us to examine the salience of group-making processes within the local context and hints at the permeability of ethnic boundaries. This variable is therefore particularly useful for examining perceptive boundary-drawing processes between social and ethnic categories, and whether the values of reciprocity and trust are likely to be extended to strangers or neighbours who are not familiar.

The London data, more so than the findings from other cities, provides evidence that supports aspects of the community cohesion agenda and confirms the relevance of everyday values – namely, generalized reciprocity and trust – in the analysis of affective local attachment. However,

citizenship and employment also play a significant role in shaping attachment to neighbourhoods and London amongst the city's established minority groups. The emphasis upon the social and normative aspects of public life in the social capital thesis neglects these other critical aspects of political engagement (see Walters, 2002). Furthermore, policies which *accentuate* religious differences tend to implicitly *de-emphasize* access to opportunities – in education, employment and politics – which are likely to be influential in sustaining cohesion. The data does not provide evidence that religious differences are the main problem with which divided communities have to contend. The variation between the Caribbean and South Asian groups in London suggests that policy approaches require sensitivity to group differences, as well as attention to the specificities of particular neighbourhoods, in order to counter ethnic divisions and hierarchies.

If place *does* provide a basis for community cohesion in multiethnic polities, weaker place attachment amongst Britain's established minorities living in ethnically diverse inner London does not bode well for the imaginaries of 'vernacular cosmopolitanism' that the capital sustains (Hall 2002: 30). Revisiting Favell's (2001b) polemical standpoint on London's multiculturalism, this chapter presents a serious challenge to theorizations of place attachment and political belonging in multiethnic societies that are based on the thesis of British exceptionalism. Favell (2001b: 38) caricatures this thesis as follows: 'However bad things are in Britain, Europe is surely worse. And Europe's problems – the thinking goes – might in fact reveal the multi-ethnic virtues of Britain's exceptional story.' Moreover, he concludes: 'It is nationalist ideology to think that London is special because of unique British postcolonial policies or its place in the Commonwealth' (2001b: 55). For Favell, the strength of a comparative cross-national methodology rests in its capacity to challenge and disrupt nationalist ideologies and their influence in shaping policies and research agendas. Yet – as this analysis demonstrates – although the case for London's and British exceptionalism is less clear than some commentators would have us believe, this chapter instead presents evidence which concomitantly supports Lyon's, Oslo's and Stockholm's exceptionalism and thereby confirms Agnew's theorization of the historical and social distinctiveness of places in shaping political behaviour and orientations. I conclude that the blanket application of 'European' policies to the political integration of minorities in European cities that neglects the specificities of local and national contexts is therefore unlikely to be effectual.

## Appendix

*Variables of attachment to people and places:* neighbourhood, city, country people and ethnic group, respectively. In the London and Lyon surveys, respondents were asked to rank their attachment on a scale of 0–10, where 0

represents 'no attachment at all' and 10 represents 'very strong attachment'. In the Stockholm and Oslo surveys respondents were asked to rank their attachment on a scale of 1–4, where 1 represents 'very strong attachment' and 4 represents 'very weak attachment'. For comparability of both scales, the latter variables were recoded and the scale was inverted such that 1 becomes 'very weak' and 4 represents 'very strong' and were then computed into a comparable 0–10 scale, whereby 1=2.5, 2=5, 3=7.5 and 4=10, since 1 is not equivalent with '0' in the 0–10 scale.

*Country of birth:* Q3 was recoded into a binary variable to indicate being born in the country of residence or not.

*Number of years in the city:* Q6 was recoded into a binary variable to indicate living in the city for more than 10 years or not. This question was not asked in the Oslo questionnaire.

*Citizenship:* As in the common variable, described in the general Appendix to this volume.

*Activity in the last seven days:* Q55 was recoded into four employment statuses 'employed', 'in education' (full or part-time students), 'economically inactive' (aggregating those respondents who were retired, doing housework or childcare, or permanently sick or disabled) and 'unemployed' (aggregating those seeking and not seeking employment). These four categories were recoded into dummy variables for the regression analyses. The remaining options, including 'military or community service' and 'other', were recoded as system missing.

*Religious denomination:* Q44 was recoded to form the binary variable ('minority religion' = 1), whereby Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist and Jewish residents were coded as minority religions and all Christian denominations and atheists/agnostics were not (majority religion/mainstream = 0).

*Generalized social trust:* Q34, the original item (described in the general Appendix to this volume) was recoded into a binary variable distinguishing between low trust (0–5) and high trust (6–10) for Table 11.2. The original scale variable was used in the regression analyses. In Oslo respondents were asked the above question with only two opposing responses, where 0 represents 'you can't be too careful' and 1 represents 'most people can be trusted'. This binary variable was used in the Oslo regression analysis.

The variable 'Involved' was computed as described in the general Appendix to this volume.

## Notes

\*I would like to thank Professors James Nazroo and Ceri Peach for the insightful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter, and Marco Giugni and Laura Morales for their constructive engagement with successive versions.

1. A four-point scale was used in the Oslo and Stockholm questionnaires to signify strength of attachment: this has been converted to an 11-point (0–10) scale for the purpose of comparison with the Localmultidem data. See the Appendix to this chapter for details on the recoding applied.
2. Unfortunately, due to a mistake in the programming of the telephone interviews, the question about neighbourhood attachment was not administered to sufficient numbers of the Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian residents of Lyon ( $n < 10$ ) to include this data here.



# 12

## Conclusion: Towards an Integrated Approach to the Political Inclusion of Migrants

*Marco Giugni and Laura Morales*

The point of departure of this book was twofold. On the one hand, we set ourselves the objective of describing and above all accounting for the political attitudes and behaviours of migrants in European cities. With this aim in mind, we suggested that we move away from a narrow approach focusing mainly or even solely on individual factors to embrace a broader and more integrated perspective. The previous chapters have focused in particular on three aspects which we believe need to be taken into account: (1) the human capital arising from the individual characteristics and resources of migrants; (2) the social capital resulting from their involvement in voluntary associations; and (3) the political capital provided by the opportunities stemming from the political-institutional context in which they live. On the other hand, we started from the assumption that the analysis of the political attitudes and behaviours of migrants tells us something about their degree of political inclusion or exclusion.

In this concluding chapter, we try to summarize the main findings of the analyses conducted in the previous chapters and point out the main substantive issues raised by those analyses. We do so by considering each of the three aforementioned aspects. In addition, we shall stress the need for a more integrated approach to the study of the political inclusion not only of migrants, but of minority groups more generally.

Generally speaking, as the previous chapters clearly show, there is an important gap between migrants and autochthonous citizens in terms of political participation. Specifically, the former tend to participate less than the latter, and these gaps are markedly larger for some forms of participation such as voting. This is not only because often they do not have access to voting rights, but can be observed on other forms of political participation as well. Migrants also commonly show a lower interest in the political affairs of their country and city of residence, and there are also large gaps between them and the autochthonous population on other indicators of political inclusion.

However, this general statement must be nuanced in several respects. On the one hand, this picture of 'problematic' political inclusion is not consistent across all dimensions. Indeed, migrants sometimes are more confident of the political institutions and elites of the countries and cities in which they live, display similar levels of attachment to the country nationals as the native population, and feel similarly efficacious in relation to politics as the autochthonous population (see Morales, Chapter 2, and Anduiza and San Martín, Chapter 9 in this volume). On the other hand, as has been shown in several chapters throughout the volume, not all migrants are equally included politically. In other words, migrants from different national origins display different levels of political participation, interest, trust and so forth. This is partly due to the very characteristics of ethnic minorities at the *collective* level, for example in the socio-demographic composition and size of the group, its migration history, its socio-economic status and its political culture. In this volume, however, we have focused on the three sets of factors mentioned earlier in order to account for variations in the degree of political integration or inclusion at the *individual* level – human capital, social capital and political capital. Although this book should have made clear that these three sets of factors to some extent interact to explain the political inclusion of migrants, let us consider each of them separately for the sake of presentation. Our discussion will focus in particular on the components of inclusion which have represented the core of the analyses presented in this volume, namely political interest and participation.

### **Individual characteristics and resources: the role of human capital**

The study of political participation and, more generally, of political behaviour has traditionally focused on individual-level factors. In particular, since the seminal work by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) and then the equally important study by Campbell et al. (1960), political participation has been considered to be, above all, a matter of individual predispositions, attitudes and resources. In this vein, the so-called baseline or standard model of political participation (Verba and Nie, 1972; see further Nie et al., 1979; Verba et al., 1995) focuses on the resources individuals bring into the political process and the importance of the socio-economic status as measured through such variables as education, income and occupation.

The analyses provided by the chapters in this volume point to the importance of individual characteristics and resources. They provide what some have called, sometimes with a slightly different meaning, human capital (Becker, 1964; Bourdieu, 1972; Coleman, 1988). Among those stressed by the classical literature on political participation, education appears as a crucial resource for migrants. This is what comes out in virtually all of the

chapters in this volume. Thus, migrants who have obtained a higher level of education are more likely to participate politically in the country of residence than their less educated counterparts, and in some chapters it is shown that education is a more determinant resource for migrants than for the majority group (see, for example, Anduiza and San Martín, Chapter 9 in this volume). As the literature has repeatedly shown, education is an important resource insofar as it provides migrants with the necessary civic skills to first understand the political situation and then become involved in politics (Verba et al., 1995).

Political interest is a further crucial individual characteristic when it comes to account for variations in the level of political participation of migrants. Again, this is in line with previous works, both those looking at participation in general (cf. Verba et al., 1978; Parry et al., 1992; van Deth et al., 2007) and those focusing more specifically on migrants (cf. Diehl and Blohm, 2001). Thus, both education and political interest are important predictors of the participation of migrants in the political life of the cities included in our study, but probably also beyond them. Yet showing that people who are more interested in politics are politically more engaged is of little informational value and it is pointing to the endogenous process that connects both components of engagement with politics. More interesting is to look at political interest as a dependent variable; that is, as something that has to be explained, rather than something that explains something else. Some of the chapters in this volume have done so (Morales and Pilati [5], Strömblad et al. [6], and Morales and Morariu [7]), suggesting that political interest represents an important dimension of the political inclusion of migrants in European cities.

Gender also typically adds an additional layer of inequality to the study of political engagement. Although we did not have sufficient space to pursue in detail the analysis of the various possible gender gaps, as well as the various gendered processes that underpin political integration, all chapters included gender in their analyses. We find, however, a mixed set of patterns that call for further and more refined studies. For example, with regard to political attitudes and orientations, the chapters in this volume found that migrant women are less likely to feel capable of understanding politics (internal political efficacy), but were no different to their male counterparts with regard to feelings of external political efficacy or confidence in political institutions (see Anduiza and San Martín, Chapter 9 in this volume). They are, nevertheless, less interested in both 'homeland' and 'host country' politics than men (see Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5, and Morales and Morariu, Chapter 7 in this volume). Interestingly enough, women feel more attached to their neighbourhoods than men, but are indistinguishable from them in feelings of attachment to the city (see Devadason, Chapter 11 in this volume). In terms of their political participation, overall, women are less inclined to be actively engaged in politics (see Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in

this volume), but there are multiple caveats. There are no significant gender gaps in voting behaviour or voting propensity (cf. González-Ferrer, Chapter 4, and Morales and Morariu, Chapter 7 in this volume), women are equally likely to protest than men (cf. Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 and Morales and Morariu, Chapter 7 in this volume), and we find different gender patterns in some cities depending on whether migrants are of Christian or Muslim religious backgrounds (cf. Eggert and Giugni, Chapter 10 in this volume).

In addition to these individual attributes commonly analysed in mainstream studies of political participation, the chapters in this volume have also allowed us to highlight the role played by certain factors specifically pertaining to the migration and settlement processes. The most important one is certainly the capability one has to understand, read and speak the language of the country of residence. As for the level of education, language proficiency is an important skill insofar as it allows one to grasp what is going on in the social and political environment. This, in turn, increases the chances that migrants will become involved in politics. The importance of acquiring fluency in the language spoken in the receiving country has been found to be a strong predictor of political participation in previous studies (Jacobs et al., 2004), and all the chapters confirm that it has a positive and significant effect on every indicator of political inclusion that we have considered in this book.

Other individual-level factors have been found to play a role, but in a less systematic fashion. Some have to do with the relation of migrants with their country of residence. Thus, for example, how long a time they have resided there is important. The analyses reported in several chapters in this book have shown that, overall, the longer the duration of stay, the more likely is it that migrants participate in the political life of the host society. This, however, is not always true, as in some cases there is no significant relationship between the length of stay and political interest or participation. For example, length of residence is not a significant predictor of interest in either 'homeland' or 'host country' politics, of political contacting, nor of overall levels of protest participation (Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume), but this lack of significant association seems to be masking the fact that it has a negative effect on ethnic protesting, while it has a positive effect on protest around mainstream issues (Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 in this volume). Length of stay is equally not relevant for accounting for different levels of political efficacy and political confidence among immigrants (Anduiza and San Martín, Chapter 9 in this volume). Yet a longer period of stay increases the likelihood of voting – for those with voting rights – (González-Ferrer, Chapter 4 in this volume), and increases the feelings of attachment with both the neighbourhood and the city.

Curiously enough, second-generation migrants have not been found to substantially differ from first-generation migrants in most indicators of political inclusion, in spite of the fact that these are obviously those

individuals of migrant background who have spent, by definition, a larger proportion of their lifetime in the country of residence as they were born there. Though in most cases, second generations are not significantly different from first generation migrants, often the coefficients for the former group point to their lower levels of interest and participation in politics when compared to first-generation migrants. However, second generations usually show more intense feelings of attachment to the neighbourhoods and the cities where they live (Devadason, Chapter 11 in this volume) – though, interestingly this is the opposite in the case of Stockholm.

In contrast, being a citizen of the host country seems to have a more consistent positive effect on several aspects of political inclusion – particularly interest in politics and political action – suggesting that it is not simply a matter of time spent in a given place, but above all a matter of the rights and legitimacy one is granted as well as the feeling of belonging stemming from them. Yet it is important to highlight that this is not always the case for all forms of engagement with politics. For example, migrants who are in possession of the citizenship of the country where they live feel no more politically efficacious and show the same degree of confidence in the political institutions of those countries than those who do not have it (Anduiza and San Martín, Chapter 9 in this volume). Equally, being a national is often irrelevant for determining levels of attachment to the neighbourhood or the city (Devadason, Chapter 11 in this volume). And though in all but the UK having the country's citizenship is required to be eligible to vote in national elections, we do not find evidence that supports the idea that those migrants holding the country passport are more inclined to vote in local elections (see Morales and Morariu, Chapter 7 in this volume).

Other individual characteristics and resources have less of an impact than one might have expected. For example, findings concerning feelings of discrimination are at best mixed, pointing in different directions depending on the cases studied. Morales and Morariu (Chapter 7 in this volume) find that feelings of discrimination have no significant impact on interest in politics, propensity to vote or political action when individuals of Ecuadorian, Moroccan and Turkish origin are considered. In contrast, Myrberg and Rogstad (Chapter 8 in this volume) find a mobilizing effect of feelings of discrimination in the two Scandinavian cities they study when accounting for levels of political contacting and 'low-voiced' protest acts. Hence, although discrimination is an important source of social exclusion, we find no evidence that it spills over to political exclusion or, alternatively, to greater mobilization resulting from perceived grievances. Similarly, religiosity, as measured by attendance at religious services, has little if any effect on the political participation and inclusion of migrants (Eggert and Giugni, Chapter 10 in this volume). Equally, very often, religious denomination itself – and specifically being a Muslim believer, which is often portrayed in public discourses as a 'problematic' identity for integration into western

democracies – has no effect on many aspects of political integration. And in the cases where we find such an effect, the results are mixed and sometimes even contradictory. For example, Muslims seem to be less inclined to participate in politics when all forms of political action are considered jointly in a single indicator, but they are similarly inclined as people from other religions to protest (Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume). Equally, Muslims seem to be less interested in politics, but are more likely to declare that they would vote in local elections if allowed (Morales and Morariu, Chapter 7 in this volume). Yet, religion does play an important role through membership in religious organizations (Eggert and Giugni, Chapter 10 in this volume). Being a member of religious organizations, at least (or especially) for migrants of a certain religious denomination (Muslims) and in certain contexts (culturally pluralist ones), results in higher levels of political participation. In fact, organizational membership is by far the individual-level factor that contributes the most to accounting for variations in the political participation and inclusion of migrants in European cities.

### **Voluntary associations: the role of social capital**

One of the main goals of the research project upon which this book is drawn was to assess the role of voluntary associations for the political participation and inclusion of migrants in European cities. In doing so, we explicitly referred to the concept of social capital and the literature stressing its impact on various aspects of individual and collective behaviour, including political behaviour (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 2000; see Lin, 2001 and Portes, 1998 for overviews). According to this body of literature, voluntary associations produce social capital which, in turn, has positive effects (but see Portes, 1998) on society, such as increasing government performance (Putnam, 1993), creating group solidarity and civic culture (Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 2000) and improving the quality of democracy (Paxton, 2002). In fact, there are two different perspectives on the role of social capital: a group-level approach (such as Putnam, 1993, 2000) and an individual-level approach (such as Coleman, 1988, 1990). While the former argues that social capital is a product of organizational networks and density, the latter maintains that it primarily stems from individual involvement in associations. In other words, while the former stresses the collective goods arising from social capital, the latter is more concerned with individual goods (Li et al., 2005).

Social capital theory was brought into the study of the political integration of migrants by Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2001). These authors have linked variations in the political participation of ethnic minorities to different degrees of 'civic community'. This 'ethnic' social capital of migrants, in

their view, stems from participation in ethnic associational life. Following this approach, 'voluntary associations create social trust, which spills over into political trust and higher political participation' (Jacobs and Tillie, 2004: 421). Ethnic organizational networks reflect the amount of social capital at the group level which, in turn, depends on the number of organizations, the variety in the activities of the organizations, and the density of the organizational network (Tillie, 2004). Recent work has studied the role of the structure and density of organizational networks for migrants (Bloemraad, 2006a; Pilati, 2008; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008; Vermeulen, 2006), including a special issue of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (see Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005).

More recently, however, Fennema and Tillie, together with a number of colleagues, have refocused the analysis of the impact of social capital on the political participation of migrants at the individual level, arguing that such an impact should be looked at that level of analysis (Jacobs and Tillie, 2004). In this perspective, social capital does not only derive from organizational networks as such, but it is translated into individual resources through their involvement in organizations. As a result, although there is a relationship between the two levels insofar as the quality of the individual networks of members of an ethnic community is determined by the structure of the organizational network (Tillie, 2004), in order to explain the political integration of migrants we must take into account their involvement in voluntary associations at the individual level. A number of studies conducted in several European cities and published in a special issue of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (see Jacobs and Tillie, 2004) have demonstrated the crucial role of different types of associational involvement (in particular, in ethnic and cross-ethnic organizations) on the political participation of migrants.

The analyses presented in this book have confirmed the key relevance of individual involvement in voluntary associations not only for the political participation and inclusion of migrants, but also as predictors of political orientations such as interest in politics, efficacy and confidence in political institutions. Organizational membership, a variable that is included in most of the analyses presented in the previous chapters, is generally a significant predictor of most indicators of political inclusion that we use and exerts a positive effect on all. Thus, migrants who are involved in associations, either by being members of them or by participating in activities promoted by them, are more likely to participate politically and therefore are better integrated or included in the societies where they live.

The reasons why organizational involvement is so important are manifold. It may increase levels of civic skills and political knowledge, as stressed by the civic voluntarism model of political behaviour (Verba et al., 1995). In a somewhat similar fashion, it may also serve as a channel of political information and recruitment (Rogers et al., 1975; Knoke, 1982; Pollock, 1982).

In both cases, organizational involvement provides migrants with crucial individual resources to become involved in politics. But it may also foster group consciousness, as well as a sense of collective identity and awareness. In this perspective, voluntary associations stimulate political engagement by providing collective resources. The question of which of these mechanisms are operating remains open. However, it is sensible to assume that they all contribute in some way.

Yet not all kinds of organizational networks have the same impact. The most relevant distinction in this respect is that between ethnic and cross-ethnic networks. While the former refers to embeddedness in associations composed fully or primarily by migrants or, even more specifically, by migrants of the same national origin, the latter includes both migrants and members of the native majority population. This distinction is strongly related to that between bridging and bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000). Bonding social capital lies within a specific group, whereas bridging social capital overcomes certain cleavages, in this case the ethnic cleavage, and reaches out to other groups. Previous work has shown that both ethnic and cross-ethnic organizations have an important impact on the political participation of migrants (Berger et al., 2004; Eggert and Giugni, 2010; Jacobs et al., 2004; Tillie, 2004; Togeby, 2004).

However, these two types of organizational networks and social capital might have a differential impact. Specifically, as stressed by some authors (cf. Portes, 1998), social capital can also have negative externalities and, hence, denser networks alone may not be sufficient to promote political inclusion into the receiving polity if this high connectivity remains ethnically segregated and contributes to the further isolation of the migrant groups. Consequently, bridging social capital is expected to have beneficial properties for the political inclusion of migrants, both at the individual and group levels, whereas bonding social capital might have no impact or a different one that relates to the nature of participation. Although this distinction is used in other chapters as well, we devoted a specific chapter to assessing the impact of organizational networks on the political inclusion of migrants (Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 in this volume). An important finding of that chapter is that migrants embedded in ethnic social structures are more likely to be attentive to and active in politics that relates to their own ethnic group, while they are less inclined to sustain attitudes and behaviours with a focus on local, national or cross-ethnic issues. However, no evidence is found that ethnic bonding at the group level has any impact on individual-level political inclusion. In addition, the results shown in another chapter (Anduiza and San Martín, Chapter 9 in this volume) suggest that involvement in ethnic associations does not increase political efficacy and confidence in political institutions. Thus, the results presented throughout this volume show that it is important to go beyond the simple analysis of whether migrant groups with denser inter-organizational networks are more



capable of becoming politically integrated into their host communities, or whether individual involvement in voluntary associations favours political participation and inclusion, and move a step forward towards examining the differential impact that different types of organizational networks may have.

### **Political opportunities: the role of political capital**

Political inclusion does not occur in a vacuum. Quite on the contrary, both in its behavioural and attitudinal dimensions, it is likely to depend in important ways on the context and the political capital migrants can draw from it. The most obvious way in which this may occur is through effective integration policies implemented by national or local governments (Penninx and Martiniello, 2004; Penninx, 2006). Various works have shown the impact of state policies on the political incorporation of immigrants and, more generally, the relationship between the state, citizenship and immigration (Brubaker, 1992; Castles, 1995; Favell, 1998; Freeman, 1995; Joppke, 1999; Kastoryano, 1996; Safran, 1997; Soysal, 1994;). Most of these works focus on national policies, but some have looked more specifically at the role of local policies (Garbaye, 2005; Helbling, 2008; Ireland, 1994; Penninx et al., 2004).

Given our more specific focus on political participation as a core component of the political inclusion of migrants, in this volume we have borrowed the concept of political opportunities from the literature on social movements and contentious politics (see Kriesi, 2004 and Meyer, 2004 for overviews) to capture those aspects of the political context of migrants in the city of residence that may impinge on their political inclusion. In this regard, one of the major findings of our study, together with the impact of organizational membership and involvement, is evidence that political opportunities are crucial in channelling the participation of migrants and in accounting for the variations in the degree of political inclusion of migrants both across cities and across groups. This key role of political opportunities was shown above all in a chapter entirely devoted to this aspect of our research (Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume), but emerged also in other chapters in which political opportunities were taken into account, either directly or indirectly. The analysis undertaken by Cinalli and Giugni in this volume points to a significant impact of political opportunity structures on the political participation of migrants in our cities. In particular, political participation appears to be spurred by more inclusive policies that grant migrants individual rights of access to citizenship, as well as by more inclusive policies regarding the recognition of collective group rights.

This conclusion about the key importance of the citizenship and policy context can also be drawn from the analysis of the role of political opportunity structures in other chapters in this volume, especially the chapters by González-Ferrer (4), Morales and Pilati (5) and Morales and Morariu (7).

Their results confirm the fundamentally positive effect that more open citizenship regimes – in the dimension of their attribution of individual rights – have on migrants' political inclusion. These findings are consistent with Howard's (2009: 7–8, 204) assertion that naturalization and citizenship acquisition rules are of crucial importance for immigrants' inclusion and that they have long-term effects. Equally, they support the view that citizenship policies and inclusion regimes still matter despite recent trends of convergence (Alba and Foner, 2009).

Yet, the findings about the effect of open regulations with regard to group rights are more mixed. While Cinalli and Giugni (Chapter 3 in this volume) find a positive and significant effect on overall levels of political participation by migrants, Morales and Pilati (Chapter 5 in this volume) find no significant main effect for interest in politics, and opposite effects for political contacting and for protesting. Morales and Pilati also find that the attribution of group rights, interestingly enough, often moderates the usually negative effect of ethnic bonding on the various indicators studied of political inclusion into mainstream politics. Equally, the two chapters in this volume that look at the archetypical multicultural case of Stockholm (Strömblad et al. [6] and Myrberg and Rogstad [8]) do not indicate that multicultural policies are necessarily more effective than those undertaken in other countries in achieving the political inclusion of migrants. Hence, more thorough analyses are needed in this direction as the relationship between political opportunities and participation is far from being simple and linear. And, in particular, there is no clear evidence that multicultural policies are more effective in all cases, once individual rights are plentiful and generous (see also Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010).

In addition to examining the role of institutional opportunities stemming from national and local state policies, following recent work on the political mobilization of migrants (Giugni and Passy, 2004; Koopmans et al., 2005), we also took into account the impact of the discursive context faced by migrants in their city of residence. We referred to this as a 'discursive opportunity structure'. The findings shown in Chapter 3 (Cinalli and Giugni) clearly show that discourse matters a lot as more open discursive opportunities encourage the political participation of migrants, or at least they offer a favourable context to it. This, we think, represents an original contribution to the literature on the political engagement of migrants as few previous works have looked at the ways in which the prevailing discourses on immigration and ethnic relations politics impinge upon the political participation of migrants. Furthermore, these previous studies deal with the national level and focus on collective mobilizations, whereas we have examined the impact of discursive opportunities on the individual participation of migrants at the local level, showing that they also play a crucial role in this regard.

## **Towards an integrated approach to the study of the political inclusion of migrants**

Where does all this lead us with regard to the political integration or inclusion of migrants in European cities? We believe that this book is a modest example of what Bleich (2008b) describes as ‘type 4’ scholarship, which attempts to combine theory development – and in our case, also theory assessment – with theoretical roots that bridge across different subfields in political science and sociology, and that aims at reaching a wide audience beyond the subfield of immigration studies. In this sense, we hope that the contributions in this volume have shown that accounting for the political engagement of migrants and their descendants in Europe is not a simple task and requires that we look at the problem from different angles. We have proposed a multilevel approach that focuses on the individual characteristics of migrants, voluntary associations and political opportunities. In other words, adequate accounts of migrants’ political inclusion need to examine and consider the human, social and political capital – and the multiple origins of such capital – that make migrants more likely to become integrated in their places of residence.

However, looking at the various types of capital or resources that favour political inclusion is not sufficient. We need a truly integrated approach that also considers how these various factors interact, not only because political inclusion is a multidimensional concept that requires us to take into account a variety of explanatory factors, but also because the types of capital we have described are often related to each other. In this book we have only lightly touched upon such an integrated approach as most of the analyses presented in the volume have focused mostly on the individual-level factors while also considering political opportunities.

Indeed, some of the chapters have tried to go a step farther and to examine how human capital, social capital and political capital combine to explain the political inclusion of migrants (especially, Cinalli and Giugni [3], González-Ferrer [4] and Morales and Pilati [5]). The most interesting finding in this respect is that political opportunities and organizational involvement (hence, political capital and social capital) interact in important yet not always predictable ways (see Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 in this volume). But other combinations among the three sets of factors can be imagined and indeed observed as well.

Yet, as we indicated in the introduction to this volume, the theoretical framework upon which this book rests foresees a path going from political opportunities to organizational networks and finally to political inclusion, with the individual characteristics of migrants also being influenced by the other two sets of factors. Methodologically, this conceptual scheme should be tackled in more depth in further analyses of the data we have collected in this project and with more sophisticated statistical techniques. The analyses

presented in this volume constitute a first detailed foray into the rich dataset we have collectively compiled and we suggest that further research in this direction should be fruitful.

Finally, we want to highlight that the idea that the political participation and inclusion of migrants should be understood as a result of the combination or, even better, the mutual influence of human capital, social capital and political capital. This has a number of practical and policy implications. The most fundamental one, in terms of 'institutional engineering', is that public policies will not have uniform effects on all migrants indiscriminately, as if they were all in the same situation and all had the same needs. Quite to the contrary, state actors must take into account the varying discursive contexts in which different groups of migrants live, the varying social and organizational networks in which they are embedded, the varying individual characteristics and resources they bring with them, and so forth. They must also consider that the degree of social and political involvement varies substantially from one group of migrants to the other, as well as from one individual migrant to the other.

Our findings defy simplistic accounts or policy recommendations of what will work best in achieving the desired and desirable outcome of migrants' integration into the body politic. On the one hand, it leaves still wide open the debate on whether multicultural policies are the best approach to achieving integration (see the collection of essays in Joppke and Lukes, 1999, for the terms of this debate). Of course, we only evaluate one component of integration – its political dimension – but the overall conclusion is that, while we find no conclusive evidence that multicultural policies are detrimental to migrants' political inclusion, we also do not find strong evidence that would support the claim that they are to be preferred. In fact, we find that, for example, the archetypal republican and assimilationist approach preferred in France is indeed very effective in producing 'Frenchmen', as Schain (1999) has argued.

The results presented throughout this book also underscore the point that public policies, institutional design, and public and elite discourses are key determinants of migrants' political inclusion and in many cases much more so than ethnicity (see Ireland, 2004 for similar conclusions) or religious traditions. Moreover, we also show that, though important, the distinction between 'new' and 'old' countries of immigration does not always operate in expected directions, as the specific approaches to citizenship and integration often override the importance of that distinction. Thus, even if some (cf. Martiniello, 2009) would argue that the political mobilization of immigrants is not a priority on the agenda of the new destination countries like Spain, Italy and Hungary, we have found that in many cases the levels of political inclusion of migrants in the studied cities in these countries do not differ substantially from those found in countries with a longer tradition of immigration.

Overall, then, the policy implications of our study point to the need to be cautious with blanket policy recommendations. Only by acknowledging the multidimensional nature of political inclusion, as well as the multiple and interactive character of the factors affecting it, will we be in a position to ascertain whether multicultural democracy works.

# Appendix

## List of common variables used across the chapters in this volume

### Socio-demographic variables

#### *Gender*

A dummy variable taking the value 1 for male and 0 for female.

#### *Age*

A ratio variable that records the age of respondents.

#### *Education (edu)*

Item wording: 'What is the highest level of education you have achieved?' The original categories of answer are: 1 'not completed primary education'; 2 'primary education or first stage of basic education'; 3 'lower level secondary education or second stage of basic education'; 4 'upper secondary education'; 5 'post secondary, non-tertiary education'; 6 'first and second stage of tertiary education'.

From the original ordinal scale we computed a variable ranging between 0 and 1. The variable was obtained by subtracting 1 from the original categories and dividing by 5.

#### *Employment situation (employed)*

Item wording: 'Which of these descriptions *best* describes your situation in the last seven days? Please, select only one.' The response set was: 01 in paid work; 02 in education (not paid for by employer); 03 unemployed and actively looking for job; 04 unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for it; 05 permanently sick or disabled; 06 retired; 07 in community or military service; 08 doing housework, looking after children or other persons; 09 other.

A dummy variable (employed) was created that identified with a value of 1 those that had chosen category 01, and assigned a value of 0 to all other respondents.

#### *Married*

Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual is married or lives in partnership.

#### *Muslim*

Item wording: 'Most people belong to some religious denomination, regardless of whether they are practising believers or even care about religion at all. To which religious denomination would you say that you belong?' The original categories of answer are: 'Protestant', 'Roman Catholic', 'Eastern Orthodox', 'Jewish', 'Islam', 'Hinduism', 'Buddhist', 'atheist/agnostic/do not belong to any denomination'. We contrast the category 'Islam' to the others. This variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for Muslims and 0 for the other religions mentioned.

## **Variables relating to the migration and settlement process**

### *Immigrant-origin*

All individuals with at least one parent of the following descents per city. Barcelona: Ecuadorian, Moroccan, other Andean Latin Americans; Budapest: Chinese, Ethnic Hungarian, Mixed Arab/Muslim; Geneva: Turkish, Kosovar; London: Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Indian; Lyon: Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian; Madrid: Ecuadorian, Moroccan, other Andean Latin Americans; Milan: Ecuadorian, Egyptian, Filipino; Oslo: Bosnian, Pakistani, Turkish; Stockholm: Chilean, Turk; Zurich: Italian, Kosovar and Turkish.

### *Has citizenship of country of residence (resnatio)*

This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for respondents who have the citizenship of the country of residence and 0 for those who do not. Respondents were asked in which country or countries they hold citizenship (up to three possible countries). Respondents who declared they hold a citizenship corresponding to the country of residence were considered as being host country nationals.

### *Years since arrival/migration*

An interval scale variable indicating how many years the respondent has lived in the country. The variable was created on the basis of the year respondents moved to the country and the year when the interview took place. With this variable and the age, another variable (*propyrscntry*) was computed indicating the proportion of their life respondents have lived in the country, resulting in a scale ranging from 0 to 1. Individuals born in the country were given a value of 1.

### *Migrant generation variables*

To create the migrant generation variables we first computed a variable distinguishing between autochthonous (0), first generation (1), and second generation (2) on the basis of the following variables: respondent's country of birth, current citizenship, citizenship at birth, country of birth of respondent's mother and father.

2nd-generation migrant: This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for 2nd-generation migrants and 0 for all other migrants. 2nd-generation migrants are those born in the host country and whose mother or father are born abroad.

1.5-generation migrant: This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for first generation of migrants who are born abroad and socialized in the host country. These are defined as 1.5-generation migrants. To create this variable we combined the information of the migrant generation variable described above (1st-generation migrant) and the respondent's age of arrival in the host country. Respondents of the 1st generation and arriving before the age of 14 years old to host country are coded 1, corresponding to 1.5-generation migrants.

### *Fluency in language of country of residence (fluent)*

This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for respondents who speak the host country language (HCL) and 0 for those who do not. The variable was computed on the basis of three questions: the language or languages which the respondent considers as her/his native language (up to three possible languages); the host country language proficiency declared by the respondent: 'I do not speak (HCL)', 'I speak a little (HCL)', 'I speak reasonably (HCL)', 'I speak fluently (HCL)', 'I speak (HCL)

like my native language', '(HCL) is my first language'; and the control of the host language proficiency declared by the respondent as reported by the interviewer. If the respondent declared that the host country language is her/his native language we coded it as being her/his first language. Oslo and Stockholm have different variables regarding language proficiency from the other cities. The question about the native language was not asked, and regarding how well they speak Norwegian or Swedish, respectively, the categories of answer are different ('very good', 'pretty good/good', 'pretty bad/bad' and 'very bad/very bad or not at all'). These variables were dichotomized by collapsing the first two and the last two categories. The cases for which the respondents declared to speak well were checked with the interviewers' report about language proficiency. Cases of declared fluency that do not match the interviewer's report were excluded.

### *Undocumented*

Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual declares that s/he has never had a legal residence permit.

### *Refugees*

Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual declares that s/he arrived in the country as a refugee or an asylum-seeker.

### *Has felt personally discriminated against for his/her ethnic origin*

Item wording: 'And have you personally felt discriminated because of your origin in the past 12 months?' This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for those who felt discriminated against in the past 12 months and 0 for those who did not.

## **Variables relating to political participation or social capital**

### *Involved in any association* (involved)

This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for respondents who are involved in voluntary associations and 0 for those who are not. It measures membership or participation in associations except in Lyon, where information is available only on membership. We considered involvement in 18 types of association: (1) sports club or club for outdoor activities; (2) organization for cultural activities, tradition-preserving or any hobby activities (musical, dancing, animal breeding, etc); (3) political party; (4) trade union; (5) business, employers', professional or farmers' organization; (6) organization for humanitarian aid, charity or social welfare; (7) organization for environmental protection or animal rights; (8) human rights or peace organization; (9) religious or church organization; (10) immigrants' organization (that is, an organization for the support or promotion of immigrants' interests, broadly defined); (11) [ethnic group] organization (an organization that primarily seeks the advancement of the ethnic/national-origin group); (12) anti-racism organization; (13) educational organization; (14) youth organization; (15) organization for the retired/elderly; (16) women's organization; (17) residents', housing or neighbourhood organization; (18) other organization. The variable takes the value 1 if respondents declared to be members (currently or currently and in the past) of at least one type of organization or to have participated in any activity arranged by at least one type of organization in the last 12 months and 0 if not so.



*Involvement in any ethnic advocacy organization (invethni)*

A dummy variable taking the value 1 for respondents who have been involved in ethnic organizations (membership or participation), as described in category 11 above, and 0 for those who have not.

*Social trust*

Item wording: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' Response categories: a score in a 0 to 10 scale in which 0 meant 'you can't be too careful' and 10 'most people can be trusted'.

*Ethnic bonding within associations (bridethn2)*

A continuous index that ranges from 0 to 1 and is the proportion of associational involvements the respondent has reported in which 50 per cent or more of the co-members are co-ethnics.

*Proportion of close relations that are ethnically homogeneous (proethinf)*

Item wording: 'Looking back to the last few months, we would like to know the people with whom you talk and interact frequently: close family, close workmates, close friends, close neighbours, close acquaintances, etc. Can you think of anyone? Is he/she of the same [ethnic/national group] as you?' This variable records the proportion of the relationships the respondent holds (up to five) that are with co-ethnics.

*Overall political participation, non transnational (allpolaction3)*

Individuals were assigned a value of 1 if they had participated in the previous 12 months in any of the following activities: (1) contacted a politician; (2) contacted a government or local government official; (3) worked in a political party; (4) worked in a political action group; (5) worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster; (6) signed a petition; (7) taken part in a public demonstration; (8) boycotted certain products; (9) deliberately bought certain products for political reasons; (10) donated money to a political organization or group; (11) taken part in a strike; (12) contacted the media; (13) contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons. If they participated in any of these forms, they were asked to specify the people concerned with the activity. The response categories were: 'only yourself, your family or a few other people', 'people in this city or region', 'people in whole host country', 'people in the homeland country', 'people in the whole world'. We included as positive answers the three first categories and the last.

*Overall political action, country of residence concerns (allpolaction)*

Item wording and coding as for the previous (allpolaction3) but including only the first three categories as a positive answer.

*Overall political action, all concerns (polpart)*

Item wording and coding as for the previous (allpolaction3) but including any participation, regardless of concern, as a positive answer.

*Voting behaviour in local elections (votint)*

Item wording: 'If there were elections for the [city assembly] next Sunday [and you had the right to vote], would you vote?'. This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for intend to vote/has voted in last local elections (Oslo and Stockholm) and 0 for

does not intend to vote/did not vote in last local elections (Oslo and Stockholm). We use voting intention in all the cities studied except in Oslo and Stockholm, for which we use voting recollection as voting intention was not available and most immigrants have local voting rights.

## Variables relating to political attitudes

### *Attachment to 'host-country' people*

Item wording: 'Now I would like to ask you how attached you feel to different places and groups of people. [CATI: In a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means no attachment at all and 10 means very strong attachment] How attached are you to ...'

As with political confidence, the scales for most cities ranged from 0 to 10, whereas for Oslo and Stockholm they ranged from 1 to 4 (very strong, strong, weak and very weak). The same recoding was applied as for the political confidence scales.

### *Confidence in political institutions*

Item wording: 'In the following, we name some public institutions in [CITY], [COUNTRY] and Europe. Specify, to what extent you do, or do not, trust them. Please use a scale from 0 (I do not trust at all) to 10 (I totally trust).' The response scales had a range of 0 to 10 in all the questionnaires except for those administered in Oslo and Stockholm that used a 1 to 4 scale (1 = 'very strongly', 2 = 'quite strongly', 3 = 'weakly' and 4 = 'not at all'). In order to allow comparisons across the scales the 1–4 scale for the latter two cities was recoded so that 1 = 9, 2 = 7; 3 = 4 and 4 = 0.

### *Interest in residence country politics (inthostpol)*

Item wording: 'People's interest sometimes varies across different areas of politics. How interested are you personally in each of the following areas? [Host country] politics'. This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for very or fairly interested in host country politics and 0 for not very or not at all interested in host country politics. This variable was recoded from the original one, with response categories 'very interested', 'fairly interested', 'not very interested' and 'not at all interested'.

### *Interest in homeland country politics (inthompol)*

Item wording: 'People's interest sometimes varies across different areas of politics. How interested are you personally in each of the following areas? Homeland country politics'. The response categories are: 'very interested', 'fairly interested', 'not very interested', 'not at all interested'. We recoded the first two, and respectively the last two categories into a dummy variable taking the value 1 for respondents very or fairly interested in homeland politics, and 0 for those not very or not at all interested in homeland politics.

## Variables relating to Political Opportunity Structures

### *POS individual rights*

An overall score ranging between -1 and + 1 per group and per city as described in Table 3.1 in this volume.

### *POS group rights*

An overall score ranging between -1 and + 1 per group and per city as described in Table 3.1 in this volume.

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# Index

Bold page numbers indicate figures and tables. Not all author citations are listed in the index; readers wanting a complete list of cited authors should refer to the reference list.

- A System of Logic* (J. S. Mill) 173  
academic approaches 2, 272–4  
accountability 1  
active socialization 251  
age  
    efficacy and confidence study 201, 212  
    and participation 65  
    and place attachment 252  
Agnew, J. 239–40, 245, 251, 258  
Almond, G. A. 7  
analytical perspective, of book 5  
analytical tensions, in research 23–5  
assimilation 84  
    defining 20–1  
assimilationism 223  
assimilationist models 33, 52, 75, 79–80  
associational engagement 67  
    efficacy and confidence study 202–4, 212, 213–14, 215  
    Oslo/Stockholm study 194  
    and participation 116–17  
    and place attachment 255  
    summary of findings 267–70  
    *see also* ethnic organizations  
attachment 22  
attitudes 198–9, 214  
attitudinal components, of  
    integration 33  
attitudinal indicators 38–9  
Barcelona, effect of membership  
    in ethnic associations on  
    political interest and political  
    participation 132  
Barreto, M. A. 216  
behaviour, constraints upon 10  
behavioural components, of  
    integration 33  
belonging 22  
Bengtsson, B. 29, 116, 117  
Berger, M. 111, 204  
Bleich, E. 33  
Bloemraad, I. 22–4  
bonding social capital 87–8, 90, 96–101, 103  
    *see also* social capital  
book, outline 15–17  
Böröcz, J. 8, 89  
Bourdieu, P. 7  
bridging social capital 87–8, 90, 96–101  
    *see also* social capital  
Brubaker, R. 1  
Calhoun-Brown, A. 222  
Christianity *see* religion study  
Cinalli, M. 107  
cities  
    multiethnic 241–3  
    and voting behaviour 76–84  
citizenship  
    acquiring 22, 52–3, 67–8  
    efficacy and confidence study 204  
    local configurations 52–3  
    models and conceptions of 1–2  
    models of 67  
    Oslo/Stockholm study 194  
    and place attachment 249, 252, 254, 255  
    and political interest 159, 162  
    post-national 200–1  
    summary of findings 266  
citizenship models 223  
citizenship rights 9, 44  
civic community 7  
civic skills 204  
civic voluntarism model 8, 221  
civil society 3  
cleavage politics 89  
cohesion 90

- Coleman, J. S. 7
- collective action, options for 9
  - collective integration 23–4
  - community cohesion 238
  - comparison, strategies of 173
  - concepts, need for clarity 20–3
  - conceptualization, overview 19–20
  - confidence 38, 199–200
    - see also* efficacy and confidence study
  - conformity 21
  - contentiousness 40
  - contextual factors
    - importance of 8–9
    - institutional 67
    - political 43, 60–1, 96, 111
    - reception of migrants 89
  - convergence 21
  - country of birth, and place
    - attachment 249
  - ‘critical citizens’ 33
  - cultural group rights 57–8
  - cultural pluralism 223
- Dahl, R. A. 21
- Dalton, R. 8
- D’Amato, G. 142
- dataset 12–15
- decision making 60–1
- definitions, need for clarity 20–3
- democracy, efficacy and
  - confidence 199–200
- democratic politics 1
- DeSipio, L. 25–6
- Diani, M. 202
- dimensions, of institutional
  - opportunities 46
- discourses
  - in public domain 46
  - summary of findings 271
- discursive opportunities,
  - measuring 46–8
- distrust 200
- education
  - efficacy and confidence study 212, 214, 215
  - and participation 65
  - and place attachment 252–3
  - summary of findings 263–4
  - and voting 75
- efficacy and confidence study
  - age 201, 212
  - analytical models 211
  - associational engagement 202–4, 212, 213–14, 215
  - attitudes 214
  - cases studied 204–7
  - cities studied 205–6
  - citizenship 204
  - conceptualization and
    - importance 199–201
  - confidence 199–200
  - context 198–9
  - discussion and conclusions 214–16
  - education 212, 214, 215
  - efficacy and confidence by group and
    - city 209
  - employment 212, 213, 214, 215
  - explanatory analyses 207–14
  - explanatory factors 201–4
  - explanatory factors of political
    - confidence 211
  - explanatory factors of political
    - efficacy 210
  - external efficacy 213
  - gender 212, 215
  - generational effects 215
  - groups studied 206–7
  - homeland politics 212
  - internal efficacy 212–13
  - language proficiency 204
  - legal status 204, 215–16
  - levels of confidence 208
  - political attitudes 208
  - political interest 216
  - religion 212, 213
  - social integration 201–2
  - socio-demographic profiles 206
  - trust 212, 213, 216
- electoral participation *see* voting; voting rights
- employment 45
  - efficacy and confidence study 212, 213, 214, 215
  - and participation 65
  - and place attachment 249, 252–3, 255
  - and voting 75
- enclaves, and place attachment 257
- ‘escape into naturalization’
  - hypothesis 81–2

- Esping-Andersen, G. 174
- ethnic bonding 98–9  
 and opportunity structures 108–9
- ethnic-bonding social capital 100–1,  
 103–8
- ethnic cohesion 90
- ethnic disadvantage model 21
- ethnic homogeneity 99–100
- ethnic or migrant associations  
 (EMA) 122, 126–8
- ethnic organizations 153, 203–4  
 as arenas for promoting political  
 action 122–5  
 involvement 155–6, 155  
 memberships 122–4  
 and participation 115  
 participation in 67, 80, 103  
 as participatory arenas 118  
 participatory consequences 125–9  
 as political channels 119–21  
*see also* associational engagement
- ethnic pluralism model 21
- ethnic politics 92
- ethnic social capital 7, 96–101  
 summary of findings 267–8
- ethnicity  
 and place attachment 254–5, 257–8  
 and political interest 159, 166
- exclusion, and place attachment 254,  
 256–7
- family characteristics 88–9
- Favell, A. 240–1, 259
- Feldblum, M. 2
- Fennema, M. 7–8, 10, 66, 87, 203,  
 267–8
- Fibbi, R. 142
- France 205–6
- FrP (Progress Party, Norway) 175
- Gamson, W. A. 200
- gender 45
- efficacy and confidence study 212,  
 215  
 Oslo/Stockholm study 193  
 and place attachment 254  
 and political interest 159, 166  
 summary of findings 264–5  
 and voting 75
- generational effects 45
- efficacy and confidence study 215  
 summary of findings 265–6
- Geneva, effect of membership in  
 ethnic associations on  
 political interest and political  
 participation 134
- Giugni, M. G. 67, 172–3, 182
- global cities 241
- globalization 243
- Gordon, M. M. 21
- gradualism 24
- group polarization 58
- guest-worker model 52
- Gullestad, M. 174
- Gustafson, P. 245
- Hall, P. A. 7
- Hall, S. 239
- Hansen, J. M. 7
- Hernández, B. 243
- Hidalgo, M. C. 243
- Hochschild, J. L. 22, 24–5
- homeland countries  
 maintaining links 140  
 visiting 148–9
- homeland politics 92–3, 141, 204  
 efficacy and confidence study 212
- human capital 263–7  
*see also* individual characteristics
- Huntington, S. P. 140
- identities, place-based 243–6
- imagined identification 239
- inclusion, integration as 40–1
- incorporation  
 indicators of 22  
 and integration 22–3  
 as linear process 21
- indicators, attitudinal 38–9
- individual characteristics 6, 45,  
 263–7
- individual integration 23–4
- individual participation 54–5
- individual rights 57
- individualization 219
- inequality, political 115
- informal social capital 99–100
- institutional opportunities,  
 measuring 46–8
- integrated approach 272–4



- integration  
   absolute versus relative notions 29–32  
   defining 172–3  
   as inclusion 40–1  
   and incorporation 22–3  
   individual and collective 23–4, 25–9  
   as outcome or process 24–5  
 integration via associations 116  
 interest groups 47–8  
 Islam *see* religion study  
 Italy 205–6
- Jacobs, D. 6  
 Jones-Correa, M. 1, 8–9  
 Joppke, C. 2  
*Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 8  
 juxtaposition, of diverse groups 238
- Keele, L. 202  
 Koopmans, R. 9, 10, 45, 46, 67, 87,  
   175–6, 194, 222, 223
- language proficiency 45  
   efficacy and confidence study 204  
   Oslo/Stockholm study 193  
   and participation 66  
   and political interest 159, 166  
   summary of findings 265  
   and voting 75, 79  
 legal status, efficacy and confidence  
   study 204, 215–16  
 legitimacy 223  
 length of stay  
   and participation 66  
   and place attachment 247, 249  
   and political interest 159  
   summary of findings 265  
   *see also* ‘years since migration’
- Levitt, P. 167  
 Lin, N. 7  
 local contexts 8–9  
 local policies 3  
 London 240–1  
   effect of membership in ethnic  
     associations on political interest and  
     political participation 135  
 loud-voiced protest 179–80, 182, 194–5  
   Oslo/Stockholm study 190  
 low-voiced protest 179–80, 182, 191,  
   194
- Oslo/Stockholm study 192  
 Lyon, effect of membership in ethnic  
   associations on political interest and  
   political participation 132
- Madrid, effect of membership in ethnic  
   associations on political interest and  
   political participation 133  
 marital status, and participation 65  
 Massey, D. 239–40, 243, 245  
 McAdam, D. 9, 44  
   measurement, of opportunities 46–8  
   media-malaise theory 202  
   ‘melting pot’ 21  
   membership 88–9, 96–8, 122–4  
     Norway and Sweden 177–8  
   Mercer 243  
   method of agreement 173  
   method of difference 173  
   methodologies, individual and collective  
     perspectives 26  
   migrant background, effect of 26–7  
   migration  
     disruptive effects 66  
     and place attachment 254  
 Milan, effect of membership in ethnic  
   associations on political interest and  
   political participation 133  
 Mill, J. S. 173  
 Minnite, L. C. 24, 32  
 mobilization, and opportunities 53  
 models of citizenship 67  
 modes of participation 92  
 Mollenkopf, J. H. 22, 24–5  
 Montero, J. R. 92  
 Morales, L. 4, 172–3, 182  
 Morawska, E. 141  
 Morphet, J. 240  
 multicultural models 33  
 multiculturalism 175  
 multidimensionality 32–40  
 Muñoz, J. A. 216  
 Muslims *see* religion study
- nationality 52–3  
 naturalization 22–3, 26  
   and voting 63–4, 69, 73–84  
 naturalization regimes  
   and participation 82–3, 84  
   and transnationalism 143

- naturalized voters 65–8  
 new localism 240  
 Nie, N. H. 5, 182  
 Nilson, D. 200  
 Nilson, L. 200  
 Nordic model of welfare 174  
 normative concept, of integration 29  
 norms, regulatory 68  
 Norway 174–6, 242–3  
   *see also* Oslo/Stockholm study
- Odmalm, P. 203  
 operationalization, dimensions of  
   opportunities 46  
 opportunities, and mobilization 53  
 opportunity structures 49–50, 84  
   cultural group rights 57–8  
   dimensions 44  
   dimensions of analysis 46–8  
   effects on participation 56–7  
   and ethnic bonding 108–9  
   impact on participation 55–60  
   individual and collective 45  
   individual and collective rights 51  
   individual rights 57  
   institutional level 89  
   measuring institutional and  
   discursive 46–8  
   open 111  
   open and closed 96  
   open-closed continuum 53–4, 108  
   organizational level 89  
   overview 43–4  
   and political interest 159  
   for political participation 44–6  
   protest activities 58–60, 59  
   specific and discursive 51  
   specific opportunities 58  
   summary of findings 270–1  
   and voting 80–1  
   *see also* political opportunities
- organizational capacity 89–90  
 organizational membership 8  
   *see also* associational engagement;  
   ethnic organizations
- Oslo/Stockholm study  
   associational engagement 194  
   citizenship 194  
   context and overview 172–3  
   demographic indicators 193  
   direction of political activities 181,  
   182–3  
   discussion 194–6  
   explanatory variables 193  
   gender 193  
   language proficiency 193  
   levels of participation 185  
   loud-voiced protest 190, 194–5  
   low-voiced protest 192, 194  
   method and data 178–9  
   methodology 176–7  
   modes of participation 179–83, 196  
   nature and extent of political  
   activity 176–7  
   operationalizations 183–4  
   participation 194  
   patterns of contact 182  
   perceptions of discrimination 194  
   political contacts 184, 188, 189, 191  
   political participation 176–8  
   protest activities 184, 186, 190, 192,  
   194  
   results 184–94  
   situation of study 173–6  
   socio-economic indicators 191, 193  
   voting 184, 186–8, 187, 194  
   *see also* Stockholm study
- Østergaard-Nielsen, E. 150  
 outcome, integration as 24–5
- Pantoja, A. D. 167  
 ‘parallel lives’ 238–9
- participation 1, 36–7, 38, 39–40, 55  
   comparison 242–3  
   effects of opportunity structures  
   56–7  
   explaining 176–8  
   impact of opportunity structures  
   55–60  
   individual 54–5  
   modes of 92, 179–83, 196  
   and naturalization 63–4  
   Oslo/Stockholm study 194  
   political context 60–1  
   promotion of 84  
   religion study 228  
   summary of findings 262–3  
   variations across cities 54–5
- participatory distortion 115  
 Passy, F. 67

- patterns of engagement, defining 41
- Pattie, C. 7
- perceptions of discrimination  
Oslo/Stockholm study 194  
and participation 66  
and political interest 159  
summary of findings 266  
and voting 75, 79
- place attachment  
and age 252  
aspects of locale 248  
and associational engagement 255,  
258  
attachments 244  
bivariate analyses of attachment 250  
cases studied 242  
and citizenship 249, 252, 254, 255  
conclusions 258–9  
and country of birth 249  
definition 240  
descriptive analyses 246–51  
dimensions 245  
and education 252–3  
and employment 249, 252–3, 255  
and enclaves 257  
and ethnicity 254–5, 257–8  
and exclusion 254, 256–7  
explanatory analyses 251–8  
and gender 254  
and length of residence 247, 249  
logic of comparison 242–3  
and migration 254  
overview 239–40  
place-based identities 243–6  
and place identity 243  
and religion 249, 259  
stepwise regression model of  
attachment 252  
stepwise regression model of  
attachment to Lyon 255, 256  
stepwise regression model of  
attachment to Oslo 253  
and transnationalism 257  
and trust 253, 254, 255, 258
- places, attribution of meanings 245
- polarization 58
- policies  
impact of 270–1  
local 3  
restrictive 58
- political action 39–40, 147, 155, 165–6  
nature and extent 176–7
- political associations 203
- political attitudes 34–5, 38–9  
efficacy and confidence study 208
- political behaviour  
and religion 220–2  
religion as determinant 219
- political candidacy 121
- political capital, summary of  
findings 270–1
- political claims analysis 47
- political consumerism 40
- political context 43  
and participation 60–1  
and political interest 159, 165, 166
- political cultures, and participation 66
- political efficacy *see* efficacy and  
confidence study
- political inequality 115
- political integration 29–31  
lack of clarity of concept 4  
micro, meso and macro factors 5–10
- political interest  
efficacy and confidence study 216  
summary of findings 264
- political marginalization 1
- political mobilization 25
- political opportunities  
defining 9  
variations across cities 48–54  
*see also* opportunity structures
- political opportunity theory 9–10, 87  
weaknesses 67
- political participation 30, 33  
opportunity structures 44–6
- political systems, responsiveness 25
- political transnationalism 150–6, 160,  
165–6  
attitudinal/cognitive 150–2  
behavioural 152–6  
ethnic associational engagement 153  
ethnic organizations 155–6, 155  
interest in homeland politics 151, 152  
political action 155  
read newspapers about  
homeland 151–2, 151  
talking about politics 153, 153  
voting in homeland elections 153–4,  
154

- politics, levels of interest 26–9, 27, 28  
 Portes, A. 7, 8, 89, 140, 141, 142  
 process, integration as 24–5  
 proclaiming 120  
 progressive dilemma 175  
 protest 40  
 protest activities 58–60, 59, 95–6,  
     105–6, 109–10, 120, 184, 186, 232,  
     233–4, 234, 235  
     direction 182–3  
     loud-voiced 179–80, 182, 190, 194  
     low-voiced 179–80, 182, 191, 192, 194  
 protest event analysis 47  
 public domain, discourses in 46  
 Putnam, R. 7, 8, 118, 239, 258
- Quality of Living Index* 243
- Ragin, C. 173  
 Ramakrishnan, S. K. 32  
 reception of migrants 89  
 reciprocity 239  
 regulatory norms 68  
 religion  
     as determinant of political  
         behaviour 219  
     efficacy and confidence study 212,  
         213  
     and place attachment 249  
     and political behaviour 220–2  
     and political interest 159  
     theoretical approaches 221  
     and voting 73, 79–80  
 religion study  
     comparative framework and  
         operationalization 224–6  
     conclusions 234–7  
     descriptive analyses 227–31  
     impact on participation 231–2,  
         233–4  
     impact on protest activities 232, 233–4  
     indicators 226–7  
     method 226  
     migrant groups and religion 225  
     overview and scope 219–20  
     participation 228, 229  
     participation of Christian  
         migrants 232  
     participation of Muslim  
         migrants 233
- protest activities of Christian  
     migrants 234  
 protest activities of Muslim  
     migrants 235  
 religious indicators 228, 230, 230  
 role of context 222–4  
 summary of findings 266–7  
 remittances 148, 150  
 representation 1  
 research, analytical tensions 23–5  
 research study  
     cities, overview 11–12  
     data and methods 12–15  
     dataset 10–11  
     funding 13  
     groups selected 14  
     outline of book 15–17  
     socio-economic indicators 12  
     surveys 13–14  
 residence-country politics 92–4  
 resource model 5–6, 65, 75, 79–80  
 respondents, selection 12–13  
 restrictive policies 58  
 rights, individual and collective 51  
 Rosenstone, S. J. 7  
 Rumbaut, R. G. 141
- scholarship  
     geographical levels 3–4  
     US and Europe 2  
 Schuck, P. H. 20  
 secularization 219  
 segmented assimilation model 21  
 selection hypothesis 68, 82–3  
 Shefter, M. 22  
 Simmel, G. 88–9  
 social capital 7–8, 118, 239, 258–9  
     ethnic 96–101  
     factors affecting impact 90  
     impact on political engagement  
         88–91  
     overview 87–8  
     summary of findings 267–70  
 social capital hypothesis 80  
 social capital study  
     bridging and bonding social  
         capital 96–101  
     cases 91  
     co-ethnic ‘bonding’ in associational  
         involvement 98

- social capital study – *continued*  
 conclusions 110–11  
 core explanatory variables 96–101  
 cross-city variations 96  
 data and methods 91–101  
 dependent variables 91–6  
 effect of social capital on political engagement 101–10  
 ethnic bonding and interest in politics 101–2  
 ethnic bonding and political contacting 104–5  
 ethnic bonding and protest action 106–7  
 ethnic bonding social capital 100–1, 103–8  
 ethnic homogeneity 99–100  
 ethnic homogeneity of immediate social circle 99  
 ethnic vs. mainstream contacting 94  
 ethnic vs. mainstream protest 95  
 family, friends and close associates 99  
 index of group-level organizational ethnic bonding 100  
 informal social capital 99–100  
 interaction of opportunity structures and ethnic bonding 108  
 interactive effect of ethnic-bonding associational social capital and POS on mainstream political contacting 109  
 interactive effect of ethnic-bonding associational social capital and POS on mainstream protesting 109  
 interest in the politics of homeland vs. residence-countries 93  
 involvement in ethnic ‘advocacy’ organizations 97  
 overview 91  
 participation 94–6  
 protest activities 95–6, 109–10  
 social construction 29  
 Social Democratic welfare regime 174  
 social embeddedness model 221–2  
 social integration 7  
 efficacy and confidence study 201–2  
 social trust 239  
 socio-economic status (SES)  
 approach 65
- socio-psychological models 222  
 Spain 205–6  
 specific opportunities 58  
 Statham, P. 67, 87  
 Stockholm study  
 associational involvement by city 123  
 associational-level political participation 120  
 associational memberships 122  
 associations’ activities 119–20  
 comparative study of political activity 120–1  
 conclusions 129, 136  
 context and overview 115–16  
 effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation 127, 129  
 ethnic associations as arenas for promoting political action 122–5  
 ethnic associations as political channels 119–21  
 participatory consequences of ethnic organization 125–9  
 political activities 120  
 political activity of ethnic or migrant associations in nine cities 121  
 political candidacy 121  
 political integration through ethnic organization 117–18  
 political interest and political participation 125  
 primary activities of associations 119  
*see also* Oslo/Stockholm study  
 structure of feeling 245  
 surveys, overview 12–13  
 Sverigedemokraterna (The Sweden Democrats) 175  
 Sweden 174–6  
 integration policy 115–16  
*see also* Oslo/Stockholm study;  
 Stockholm study
- Tarrow, S. 9  
 tensions, analytical 23–5  
 Teorell, J. 92  
 theoretical approach, of book 5, 6  
 Tillie, J. 7–8, 10, 66, 87, 200, 203, 267–8

- Togebly, L. 176  
 Torcal, M. 92  
 transferable skills 140–1, 143  
 transnationalism 195  
   definition and scope 142  
   and naturalization regimes 143  
   overview 140–1  
   and place attachment 257  
   and political incorporation 141–3  
 transnationalism study  
   analytical models 156  
   assessing impact of transnational practices 156–66  
   citizenship 159, 162  
   comparison and descriptive statistics 144–7  
   conclusions 167–9  
   discrimination 159  
   effect of political context 159  
   effect of transnational practices  
     on country-related political action 163–4  
   effect of transnational practices on interest in politics of country of residence 157–8  
   effects of transnational practices 159–60  
   ethnicity 159, 166  
   gender 159, 166  
   inclusion 168  
   interest in residence-country politics 146  
   language proficiency 159, 166  
   length of stay 159  
   measuring transnational practices 148–56  
   method 144  
   non-political transnationalism 148–50, 165  
   openness of nationality acquisition 145  
   openness towards naturalization 145  
   opportunity structures 159  
   overview 143  
   political action 147, 165–6  
   political context 165, 166  
   political transnationalism *see* separate heading  
   propensity to vote 160–2  
   religion 159  
   remittances 148, 150  
   summary of findings 167  
   visits to home country 148–9, 149  
   voting 160–2  
   voting behaviour 146–7, 146  
 trust 38, 67  
   efficacy and confidence study 212, 213, 216  
   and place attachment 253, 254, 255  
   thick and thin 239  
 United States, current model of incorporation 25–6  
 Verba, S. 5, 7, 8, 90, 115, 182, 204, 221  
 voluntary associations  
   and participation 115  
   summary of findings 267–70  
   *see also* associational engagement  
 voting 32, 69  
   effects of migrant characteristics 72–3  
   electoral context 68  
   in homeland elections 153–4, 154  
   local elections 146  
   and naturalization 63–4, 69, 73–84  
   and naturalization regimes 82–3, 84  
   naturalized voters 65–8  
   and opportunity structures 80–2  
   Oslo/Stockholm study 184, 186–8, 187, 194  
   transnationalism 160–2, 161–2  
   voting decisions, influences on 65  
   voting rights, overview 63–4  
   voting study  
     analyses and results 73–84  
     city effects 75–6  
     conclusions 84  
     data and samples 68–9  
     dependent variable 69–73  
     electoral participation and cross-city differences 76–84  
     electoral participation and cross-ethnic differences 73–6  
     logit coefficients of participating in national elections versus not 77–8  
     logit estimations of probability of voting 74–5  
     openness of naturalization rules and participation gap 81

voting study – *continued*

- predicted probabilities of voting 76
- probability of voting as the rules
  - regulating residence rights become more open 83
  - regulating residence permits and participation gap 82
- sample size 70
- turnout 71, 72, 72

- 'years since migration'
  - and participation 66
  - and voting 79
  - see also* length of stay

Zurich

- effect of membership in ethnic associations on political interest and political participation 134

- Walzer, M. 176
- Williams, R. 245
- Wuthnow, R. 235