BEYOND DOMINATION

An essay in the political philosophy of education

PATRICIA WHITE

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Volume 23

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in 1983

This edition first published in 2010
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010.

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Taylor & Francis or Routledge's collection of thousands of eBooks
please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,
an informa business

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the
British Library

Publisher's Note
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ISBN 0-203-86100-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 10:0-415-55946-4 (Set)
eISBN 10:0-2038-6097-7 (Set)
ISBN 10:0-415-56271-6 (Volume 23)
eISBN 10:0-203-86100-0 (Volume 23)

ISBN 13:978-0-415-55946-1 (Set)
eISBN 13:978-0-2038-6097-7 (Set)
ISBN 13:978-0-415-56271-3 (Volume 23)
eISBN 13:978-0-203-86100-4 (Volume 23)

Beyond domination

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Patricia White

Routledge & Kegan Paul

London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley

First published in 1983
by Routledge & Kegan Paul plc
39 Store Street, London WCIE 7DD, England
9 Park Street, Boston, Mass. 02108, USA
296 Beaconsfield Parade, Middle Park,
Melbourne, 3206, Australia
Broadway House, Newtown Road,
Henley-on Thames, Oxon RG9 1EN, England

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010.

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please go to www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

White, Patricia, 1937–

Beyond domination.
International library of the philosophy of education.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. School management and organization. 2. Politics
and education. 3. Democracy. 4. Educational law and
legislation. 5. Parent and child (law). I. Title
II. Series.
LB2805.W476 1983 370'.1 83–9507

ISBN 0-203-86100-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-7100-9765-4 (Print Edition)

To my parents
Reginald Arthur and
Lilian Marian Middle

Contents

General editor's note

There is a growing interest in philosophy of education amongst students of philosophy as well as amongst those who are more specifically and practically concerned with educational problems. Philosophers, of course, from the time of Plato onwards, have taken an interest in education and have dealt with education in the context of wider concerns about knowledge and the good of life. But it is only quite recently in this country that philosophy of education has come to be conceived of as a specific branch of philosophy like the philosophy of science or political philosophy.

To call philosophy of education a specific branch of philosophy is not, however, to suggest that it is a distinct branch in the sense that it could exist apart from established branches of philosophy such as epistemology, ethics and philosophy of mind. It would be more appropriate to conceive of it as drawing on established branches of philosophy and bringing them together in ways which are relevant to educational issues. In this respect the analogy with political philosophy would be a good one. Thus use can often be made of work that already exists in philosophy. In tackling, for instance, issues such as the rights of parents and children, punishment in schools, and the authority of the teacher, it is possible to draw on and develop work already done by philosophers on 'rights', 'punishment', and 'authority'. In other cases, however, no systematic work exists in the relevant branches of philosophy—e.g. on concepts such as 'education', 'teaching', 'learning', 'indoctrination'. So philosophers of education have had to break new ground—in these cases the philosophy of mind. Work on educational issues can also bring to life and throw new light on long-standing problems in philosophy. Concentration, for instance, on the particular predicament of children can throw new light on problems of punishment and responsibility. G.E. Moore's old worries about what sorts of things are good in themselves can be brought to life by urgent questions about the justification of the curriculum in schools.

There is a danger in philosophy of education, as in any other applied field, of polarization to one of two extremes. The work could be practically relevant but philosophically feeble; or it could be philosophically sophisticated but remote from practical problems. The aim of the new International Library of Philosophy of Education is to build up a body of fundamental work in this area which is both practically relevant and philosophically competent. For unless it achieves both types of objective it will fail to satisfy those for whom it is intended and fall short of the conception of philosophy of education which the International Library is meant to embody.

Twelve years ago the children's rights movement, as represented by the Little Red School Book, was an unknown phenomenon. In the first chapter of his book Dr Wringe gives an interesting and well-documented account of how the movement developed. At the end of the book he assesses the claims made for and by children during the course of the movement—e.g. the right to refuse to wear uniforms, to participate in school government, to enjoy social relations, etc. This brings the philosophical discussion of rights in the middle of the book down to earth and gives Dr Wringe's book a sense of reality. So also does his admission at the start that his interest in the topic of rights arose from his

experience as a young teacher, when he was confronted with the conflict of preserving order in class and the claims of independence for his pupils.

The philosophical section of Dr Wringe's book discusses traditional theories of rights and their justification. Rights as freedoms are distinguished from welfare rights and the question is raised whether the latter are properly called rights. His analysis is applied to the various rights claimed for the children. He is very judicious, when dealing with claims for participation by pupils in school government, in de-limiting the spheres in which such claims are reasonable. He also makes the important point that the claims for children's rights go far beyond the more moderate appeals of the child-centred movement.

There are many teachers who are hostile to claims for children's rights—often because of ignorance of the type of philosophical case that can, with reservations, be made for them. Dr Wringe has written a clear and interesting book that throws light on a controversial issue of considerable importance. It should be read by teachers, parents, and administrators and anyone else interested in the welfare of children.

R.S.Peters

Acknowledgments

I would like first of all to thank the four people from whom I received a basic grounding in the disciplines of educational theory, Basil Bernstein, Paul Hirst, Richard Peters and Roger Wilson. They and their work are very different. What they have in common is that they have shown to generations of students that education matters and that nothing less than the highest standards of argument, analysis and theory construction will do for the critical commentary on educational practice which educational theory should provide.

I would also especially like to thank my husband, John White. Without his continuing support and encouragement over many years this book and the papers which preceded it would never have appeared. More particularly, this would have been a very much less adequate book without the benefit of his careful reading of successive drafts and his philosophical and literary advice. To my daughter, Louise, I owe two debts. I must thank her, first, for enrolling in two successive summer vacations for courses in diving, advanced swimming, tennis, badminton, volley ball, trampolining, gymnastics, golf and football, so that I could be left in peace at my desk. (She is not particularly inclined towards sports.) The second debt is an intellectual one. To Louise I owe many perceptive comments on instances of domination—sexual, generational—which would have escaped me. To her indeed I owe the title.

Thanks are also due to colleagues and students, particularly my research students, past and present, with whom I have discussed many of the ideas in this book.

For a woman in our society with professional and family responsibilities to produce any extended piece of writing, considerable material support behind the scenes is necessary. For unfailingly providing this my thanks to go Ann Denny and Betty Green.

For typing a first draft of parts of this book I would like to thank Oscar Munoz. For typing the final draft and preparing the manuscript for publication I am indebted to Bernadette Cifuentes for a superlative job.

Part of chapter two first appeared in a paper, ‘Work-place Democracy and Political Education’, in the *Journal of Philosophy of Education,* 13, 1979. Parts of chapter three originally appeared in a paper, ‘Political Education and School Organisation’, in *Issues for the Eighties: Some Central Questions of Education* edited by Brian Simon and William Taylor, published by Batsford and in a paper, ‘Political Education in a Democracy: The Implications for Teacher Education’, in the *Journal of Further and Higher Education,* volume 1, no. 3, 1977. Chapter four is a modified version of a paper, ‘Democratic Perspectives in the Training of Headteachers’, which appeared in the *Oxford Review of Education,* volume 8, no. 1, 1982. I would like to thank the publishers and editors of the book and the journals for permission to use material from those papers, in each case with certain changes and amendments, in this essay.

Introduction

A book with this title, dealing as it does with the political machinery and political education appropriate to a democratic society, might appear to belong to the growing corpus of Marxist, or neo-Marxist, works on education and politics. In one sense, as they say, we are all Marxists now and this essay accepts and uses much of the classical and neo-Marxist critique of contemporary capitalist liberal democracies. The theoretical bases of its recommendations for education in a participatory democracy are not Marxist, however, but in the liberal democratic tradition. While I have drawn on the ideas of Marxists like Gramsci and C.B.Macpherson, much more fundamental has been the work of thinkers like Dworkin, Ackerman, Lukes, Giddens, Carole Pateman and Gutmann. It is these radical liberal thinkers, it seems to me, who have gone furthest in clarifying key issues to do with a democratic society, issues like the nature of power, the proper control of economic power, control of the majority's power and dissent within a democracy.

This essay is unashamedly radical in the use to which it puts much of this work—in curbing the power of teachers, including headteachers, in stripping parents of their rights and in making political education the keystone of education—but it is not Marxist. I stress this because many people appear to believe that there are just two sorts of philosophy of education—either a radical Marxist one or one which serves as an ideological prop to the status quo. But these are not the only possibilities. Recent work in liberal democratic theory is capable both of mounting a fundamental critique of contemporary political and educational practice and of suggesting more defensible alternatives. It is in this latter respect that it has more to offer, I would submit, than any Marxist analysis with which I am familiar. I cannot be the only reader of Marxist works on education who finds much to agree with in their blistering critiques of capitalism but who feels that waiting for the Revolution to lead us into an ill-defined Utopia is not the most practical of suggestions as to how we can escape our present troubles.(1)

In its discussion of democracy the book does not remain at the level of general principles—justice, freedom, fraternity—but attempts to devise machinery through which these general principles might be implemented. In this respect it bears the marks of American influence and the considerable work done in political philosophy in the United States on practical political issues like civil rights, positive discrimination, a just scale of incomes and so on. This type of work has not figured to any great extent in British philosophy of education. British philosophers of education, anxious to make the subject as respectable as its purer cousins like philosophy of religion or philosophy of science, have often been reluctant to offer partly empirical claims and recommendations. Working in a large institution with professional colleagues in other educationally related disciplines, psychology, sociology, economics, etc., has made me see what an opportunity has been lost by such a purist stance. If philosophers do not sometimes trace the institutional and policy implications of their work, making certain nonphilosophical assumptions, and necessarily sticking their necks out, it is most unlikely that anyone else will do so. If one thinks, therefore, that philosophy of education has important contributions to make to educational policy-making one has, I believe, to demonstrate this one-self—even at the risk of a little 'impurity'.

This essay is unlike other work in the field because of its focus on machinery rather than principles. It is also different in placing political education at the centre of education as a whole. Many writers have recently lamented the political ignorance and apathy that exists among young people and have urged us as a society to do something about it. What they most often recommend is that we try to fill the ignorance gap by plugs of political education. Nothing could be more inappropriate. Political education provides the context or framework for the whole of education: it is not in any sense peripheral or an 'extra'. This essay does not make the usual modest claims for political education but a bold one for its centrality.

How does all this concretely translate into chapters? The first chapter is concerned with the basic principles and assumptions underlying democracy, their justification, and why, given an understanding of these principles, the presumption must be in favour of what has come to be called a participatory democracy. Chapter two discusses the kind of machinery and attitudes which must characterise participatory democracy as well as practices and attitudes which are ruled out. At this point the essay changes tack. I consider what kind of educational strategies would be appropriate to help move a society like our own towards greater democracy. I suggest in Chapter three the kind of political education needed by all children as part of their basic education and outline various policies for teacher training, the curriculum, and research required to realise that education. Chapter four is concerned with a crucial role in our current educational system if we are interested in making it more democratic—the role of the headteacher. I give reasons for thinking that there will be no such role as we know it in a fully participatory democracy. In the transition to such a system, however, headteachers, with suitable training, can be powerful agents for change. Chapter four. outlines this strategy and the training involved. In Chapter five the role of parents is examined, both in the fully fledged participatory democracy and in our society. The claim is made that parents have no independent rights as parents in respect of their children's education: whatever rights they have are dependent on their duties. These duties are fairly extensive and demanding but they need not prove too onerous, even for single parents, because they can be complemented by a well-developed system of community support. This whole essay is about power and therefore the possibilities for domination. It is common in treatments of power for those with an interest in reducing the power of teachers and the educational system over students to champion the rights of parents and give to parents all they have taken away from teachers. This does little, if anything, to reduce indefensible exercises of power over young people. I suggest a whole pattern of parental duties and community support designed to control exercises of power in education to enable the development of autonomous morally responsible citizens. Chapters three, four and five need to be taken together as a set of complementary policies. For solid and even progress towards a participatory democracy the kind of political education outlined and a changed role for parents are both necessary. The suggested plan for training programmes for heads is a practical suggestion for moving educational institutions further along the democratic path now.

Given its policy orientation, I hope this book will be read not only by students of philosophy of education but also by policy-makers and not least by individual teachers and parents. I have put forward for critical scrutiny policies which are implementable at national and local level as well as ones implementable at school level or in individual

classrooms and homes. Critical debate amongst interested parties will reveal whether any of them are, in whole or in part, worth considering as practical propositions.

Two final topical points. I am assuming in this essay a multicultural society whilst being aware that I am not able to consider all the issues that are raised for democratic principles and practice by a culturally plural society, given my particular focus of interest here. Some issues have, however, impinged on my treatment at various points. One of the preoccupations of this essay is, for instance, the position of minorities whether temporary or permanent, and of whatever kind, whether bound together by a common religious pattern of life or by some other common interest or tradition. The majority/minority problem is one of the most intractable for any democratic community, as this essay shows, but I try to argue that the participatory democracy is able to cope with this problem better than most in that, for instance, many activities and enterprises are devolved to a local level so that the minority in the national community becomes the majority in the local one. In this, and in other ways, what are often referred to as issues of the multicultural society are dealt with pari passu. It would be surprising if this were not so in a conception of democracy which takes as its starting point the assumption that people should lead autonomous lives of their own choosing as morally responsible citizens.

Apart from my stylistic use of 'she' rather than the conventional 'he' and some brief discussion of sexism in Chapters three and five, I have not devoted much space to the position of women within the participatory democracy. Again the reason is obvious: if the basic framework of the community is so structured as to allow people to live out autonomous lives this applies as much to women as to men and there is no point in arguing the case twice over—for men and then for women. (2) I cannot help remarking, however, that amongst prominent contemporaries working in the area of democratic theory the best known advocates of participatory democracy are women. Considering the very much smaller number of women working in the field, this is quite striking. (3) As a philosopher I have simply dealt with these ideas in the following chapters regardless of their provenance. But perhaps as a conclusion to this introduction I can allow myself a little speculation on this phenomenon. Is it simply coincidence? My early sociological training makes me suspicious of such coincidences. Is it that women are drawn to explore theories which plan for the control of power so that everyone can flourish and live autonomous, morally responsible lives, because, whatever their country or social class they are likely to have experienced domination in many forms before they ever get to the stage of writing philosophical books?

1
Democratic principles and basic assumptions

In this chapter I want to make explicit the bedrock principles and assumptions underlying democracy in any society. In fact of course democratic governments and institutions will always be situated in particular historical societies and in the following chapter I want to examine the kinds of institutions and practices appropriate to realise democratic principles in industrialised societies of the late twentieth century. The kind of thing I shall be doing in Chapters two to five—attempting to match institutions in a particular historical situation to the general principles outlined in this chapter—is, it seems to me, a task as important as the original formulation and refining of the principles. It is a task which political philosophers have increasingly been tackling for the twentieth century—classical political philosophers always did this, after all—especially in a great burst of publications in the 1970s. I am thinking particularly of work in the United States on, for instance, just and unjust wars, just income policies, children's rights, racism, feminism and positive discrimination, much of which is represented in the journal Philosophy and Public Affairs. It is, however, a kind of philosophical work which has not as yet, as I indicated in my Introduction, made much of a showing in British philosophy of education. In the general area of democracy and democratic theory work has tended to remain at the level of the exposition of general principles. There has been little attempt by philosophers of education—except perhaps in the area of issues to do with the democratic control of the curriculum (see, e.g., Sockett, 1980)—to attempt to offer suggestions on the concrete implementation of principles in our particular historical situation. One might say, of course, that there is a good reason for this. Philosophy is a matter of the formulation and refining of concepts and general principles. It is for someone else to apply these to the concrete situation. But who? Within the educational field I cannot see any 'detail worker' to whom I could pass on this job. In any case the classical political philosophers did it (cf. Plato on the domestic arrangements for the Guardians, Locke on decision-making machinery and Hegel on the family), American political philosophers tackle these questions, and in the UK there is work like The Sceptical Feminist (Richards, 1980), which must surely support the case that there is an important job for philosophers to do in applying general principles to the particular situation. It is of course a messy job in that one has to make empirical assumptions of all kinds, any one of which, if false, may destroy one's case. One must, however, be robustly prepared for one's work to be rapidly overtaken and to see this sort of endeavour as a kind of brainstorming in print. Its value is to be measured as much by the sheer number of ideas it throws up directly or indirectly as by the 'correctness' of the ideas put forward. The foregoing should not be seen as a digression, or material which might more appropriately have been placed at the head of Chapter two. It needs to be said here because the corollary of it is that the statement of the general democratic principles, which is the subject of this chapter, will be of lesser importance. In the context of this essay, therefore, relatively little attempt will be made to compare in detail even major writers on democratic theory like Rawls, Dworkin

and Ackerman, though from time to time signposts will be erected, linking points made here to their influential work in this field.

Let me turn then to the general principles and basic assumptions underlying democracy. I take as my starting point the normal person, in particular the normal person as a chooser. (1) People all over the world all the time, make choices. They decide what to have for lunch, to take baths, to curl their hair, when to irrigate their crops. The common-sense presumption is that the onus is on anyone who wants to interfere with another's choices to justify the interference. The interference may be justifiable (the chooser is insane, an infant risking her safety, etc.), but it has to be justified. This is the barest statement of a principle of freedom which takes as unproblematic for the moment the notion of what is involved in 'making choices'.

Even this bare statement of the principle will, however, make the most stringent demands on anyone wanting to justify the exercise of political power. Political power, after all, may be exercised in such a way as to coerce me into filling up forms, driving on a certain side of the road, giving up part of my income, taking up a certain occupation, not publishing my thoughts, even killing people. If anyone ever thought that the way to avoid this clash with the principle of freedom was to reject the whole idea of political power, then this view has been quashed by Nozick (1974, especially Part I). Whatever else Nozick has shown, he has surely demonstrated that if states did not exist we would have to invent them—or back into them by degrees at least. If however one rejects the anarchistic alternative and accepts that it is in any person's interest that there be some political power, some state apparatus, can any guidelines be established as to the morally permissible form of such a state? Anyone tempted, in an unthinking way, to claim that a democracy like the United Kingdom or the United States would constitute such a morally permissible state, might do well to reflect that according to Habermas (1976) these countries, as advanced capitalist states, are held to be experiencing a 'legitimation crisis'. They are not then unproblematically acceptable. It may be that the demands for justifications for their principles and practices can be met, but such justifications have to be produced. And if they do not stand up, the question arises again of the form political power would have to take to be acceptable.

If we lived in a radically different world, the form a political state might take might be rather more obvious. In a world where a minority of the population were normal people, moderately rational, moderately benevolent, not conspicuously lacking in strength of will, (2) and the rest were feeble creatures, irrational, weak in understanding, weak in will power and with strong tendencies towards the psychopathic, there would be grounds for maintaining that the political state should take a paternalistic form. A benevolent despotism with the normal minority taking care of the interests of the weak minded majority, with careful and impartial benevolence, might well be the most justifiable political arrangement. Our world, however, is not like that. Overwhelmingly we are all normal people. And there are no super-people around, constant in wisdom, rationality and strength of will, who might have a claim to exercise power over us. I say 'might have a claim' because the case has not actually been made that if these super-people did exist, they would be justified in virtue of the fact of their superior wisdom, rationality, etc. in interfering with the plans, intentions, purposes of us normal people. If superior intelligences from another planet arrived, would they be justified—just like that—in taking over our political affairs, national governments, the United Nations, etc., reorganizing them and running things for us? Do we not have

to be shown to be incapable of conducting our own lives in some way (i.e., very weak in understanding, etc.) for such interference to be justified? Will it do to argue simply that the super-people will do it better? What could 'do it better' mean here? If it means help us realize ends we already have in view more efficiently, this is to supply advice and does not amount to 'running things for us'. If it means direct us towards 'better ends', who is to say that they are better for us if we do not recognize them as such?

This fanciful example brings us back to our normal world in which there are no super-intelligences, anyway, so that even if such beings might have a claim to run our political affairs for us, they are not available to do so. As things are no one has a better claim to exercise political power over the rest of us, on grounds of superior insight Into the ends of life, for us individually and collectively. Therefore the only way to dispose of political power in a morally acceptable way is to allow each individual access to an equal share in the exercise, or control, of power. This, I take it, is the basic case for democracy. When it is claimed that democracy rests on the twin principles of freedom and justice, this is what is enshrined in this basic formulation: each person must have access to an equal share in the exercise, or control of power, so that no conception of the good life is arbitrarily imposed on anyone, and no one is subject to arbitrary interference. In formulating the case for democracy in this way I am taking the view that the appropriate stance towards democracy is not to see it, for instance, as a splendid way of encouraging the development of certain sorts of admirable people, perhaps co-operative or fraternal people. One should rather see it negatively, as the most morally acceptable form of government available to protect individuals from the abuse of power by an individual, a minority, or even a majority. Democratic governments will also concern themselves with the impartial promotion of the well-being of their citizens but, after all, a benevolent despot might do this. What is uniquely characteristic of democracy is the demand that the individual must share equally in the exercise, or control, of power, a demand which recognizes that no individual or group should have the power to impose preferences for a certain style of life on others. This conception rests in turn on three basic assumptions which should be made explicit at this point.

THREE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

The first, most important and most basic assumption is that there are no moral experts on the good life for individuals in detail. In the long history of ethical theory, despite continual attempts, no one has even managed to demonstrate conclusively that broad styles of life are to be preferred over other styles, for instance, the active over the contemplative life or vice versa, the life of the enthusiastic specialist over the urbane all-rounder or vice versa and so on. (3) The only authority on the good life is therefore the individual himself or herself who has had the chance to reflect on possible lives. The considered, reflective choice of such an individual after he or she has been able to assess the possibilities is not corrigible by any moral experts. A democratic government cannot therefore pursue policies which endorse one conception of the good life as intrinsically superior to others. This is an assumption held by most liberal democratic theorists, like for instance Dworkin (1978b) and Ackerman (1980). Indeed Dworkin sees this assumption as one of the constitutive elements of the

liberal position. Interestingly it is also an assumption which has a close parallel in a similar one made by Marx and also contemporary Marxists, like for instance C.B. Macpherson (1977). They are not prepared to specify the form of the good life for individuals in the future Communist society, because as they see it it is for the future individuals to choose how best to fulfil their natures. Since human interests and needs evolve historically, it is only possible to be agnostic about the choices future individuals in a changed social context might make. This theoretical similarity in one important aspect of Marxist and liberal theory, namely their agnostic views on the good for man, suggests that in so far as their practice in each case realized their theory there would be a real possibility for some reconciliation between Marxist and liberal political systems.

So unless and until some breakthrough is achieved in the determination of the good life for individuals by experts (if that is indeed a conceivable project and I am not sure that it is) the democratic assumption that the government and other institutions in the society shall not, either directly or indirectly, favour one conception of the good life over another must remain unchallenged.

Secondly this agnosticism about the good life gives firm guidelines on a number of further assumptions which a government must make and embody in its policies if it is concretely to realize this stance. These assumptions—about particular goods which a government should guarantee to its citizens—are commonplace among democratic theorists. Perhaps more remarkably, there is considerable agreement on the list of such goods. The basic idea is that certain goods and rights are necessary means to the realization of a wide number of different conceptions of the good life. The kinds of goods I have in mind are opportunities and wealth and the traditional civil rights: freedom of thought and conscience and the rule of law, and the right to participate in the exercise, or control of power. This bare and abstract list, which closely follows Rawls's list of 'primary goods', is unlikely to be controversial (Rawls, 1972, section 15). What is more likely to be so are the kinds of institutions and practices which will be suggested in Chapter two as ways of realizing policies which will secure these goods to people. To cite a case particularly relevant to this essay, Rawls includes in his list of primary goods 'opportunities and powers' but does not explore the kind of institutional machinery which might secure 'opportunities' to people. A fundamental piece of such machinery, It seems to me, must be education, but Rawls is not alone amongst contemporary political theorists in not tracing the implications of his political theory for a theory of education. As Dworkin (1978a) has said:

> It does seem to me that liberalism is rather weak at this point and needs a theory of education and a theory of culture-support that it does not have. That, I think is part of the answer to the question: 'Where must political theory go?'

Some suggestions for machinery necessary to secure these primary goods to citizens will be made in Chapter two, particularly in respect of the goods—e.g. opportunities, freedom of thought and conscience, participation in the exercise, or control, of political power—which are relevant to the topic of this essay.

Third, come assumptions about the nature of the persons who inhabit the community in question. These assumptions fall into two sets. The first set comprises those capacities and abilities which it may be supposed all normal human beings possess by nature and to which H.L.A. Hart has drawn attention (Hart, 1961, pp. 189–95). I am thinking of things like limited understanding and strength of will, which make it possible, for instance, for our behaviour to be rule-guided. Into the same category would come our capacity for altruism, the fact that we are neither undeterrable devils nor angels. It is these attributes which make any government both possible and necessary.

The second set of assumptions relate to the attributes of democratic citizens in particular. A great deal has been written on the 'democratic character' presupposed by the democratic state. It is into this tradition, I think, that Rawls's work on his suggested primary good of 'self-esteem' fits. There is considerable work to be done in examining these accounts of the democratic character and sifting out what is necessary for citizens in a democratic state, what is permissible and what is unnecessary, if not directly in conflict with democratic ideals. That is not a job to be attempted here. I will simply restrict myself to what I want to claim are some necessary attributes of the democratic citizen which the community will want to have developed in its members.

Given the fundamental agnosticism on the good life which is a basic assumption the community will have to see that citizens develop who are capable of appreciating ideals of life and reflectively considering them as possible options for themselves (a). In other words they will need to be able to make choices. They will need as well of course the kind of institutions which permit and enrich choices, but do not enforce them (cf. Chapter two). Going along with these attributes they will need an absence of certain character-traits like servility and a desire to follow the crowd. They will also need confidence and courage to adopt unfashionable ways themselves if they consider these to be right and/or to defend others who wish to do so. This second point leads us beyond the self regarding attributes noted under (a), to (b), the unprejudiced tolerance of others and their chosen ways of life which the democratic citizen will need to manifest. This is the point perhaps at which to emphasize that this is not an individualistic conception of democracy in the sense that its rationale is the autonomous citizen standing up for his/her rights in the face of state power, or the power of institutions or other individuals. Since, as we have seen, the state (or any other institution) has no reason to show any preference towards any conception of the good life rather than any other, if citizens find a way of life preferred or downgraded by the state they will, quite literally, have no reason to endorse this and every reason to oppose it and attempt to get the state of affairs redressed. If by some design, or even lucky chance, my chosen way of life happens to be favoured by state policies, given the assumptions of agnosticism about the good life which we are working with, I have no reason, it would be irrational of me, not to oppose this. Agnosticism about the good life brings with it reasons for justice and tolerance towards others' chosen ways of life and no reason for me to accept a policy which gives mine or anyone else's a privileged place.

The attributes noted under (a) and (b) are not exhaustive even of the main attributes of the democratic citizen but they are an attempt to make a start in this area, which is supplemented in Chapter two. (4) The whole account has far-reaching implications for the conduct of education in its widest sense.

Before discussing the applications of the basic democratic principle to actual historical societies in Chapter two let me make four general points about the democratic exercise, or control, of power in any society.

PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

The first is that if the basic principle is equality in the exercise, or control, of power, then the presumption always must be for what has come to be called a participatory democracy. As things stand in the literature of democratic theory at the moment the reader gets the impression that participatory democracy is only one of a number of possible forms that democracy can take. There is supposedly some core of democratic values which all forms of it share but for those holding some particular constellation of values, which either give special emphasis to something in the core or which tack on additional values—those, for instance, of markedly egalitarian leanings or those anxious to promote the ideal of the active citizen—there is the option of participatory democracy. It is held that those wanting to give this particular twist to democracy must produce arguments to justify their version. It is not like this however. In fact the case is exactly reversed. The presumption is for participatory democracy, i.e. equality in the exercise of power, and it is departures from this which have to be justified. That is why until this point I have talked about equality in the exercise, or control of power, because in those cases where equality in the exercise of power would either be totally impracticable or would defeat or seriously damage the realization of justice, freedom or other democratic values, it will be necessary to move to equality in the control of power, the second best situation. Needless to say, the cases for impracticability or damage to democratic values will need to be strong ones, if they are to defeat the presumption in favour of equality in the exercise of power. As we have seen, this presumption for the democratic exercise of power, i.e. for a participatory democracy, rests on the basic principle of justice as impartiality and thus is not lightly defeated and cast aside. It is worth emphasizing this point because some of the cases which have been made for participatory democracy (neatly summarized by Amy Gutmann in Liberal Equality (Gutmann, 1980, pp. 178–83)) rest on empirical assumptions about, for instance, human motivation or the best way of gathering information about the consequences of policies. Clearly if these proved to be false those cases for participatory democracy would go with them. By contrast the present case for participatory democracy rests on the fundamental moral presumption of the equality of all normal human beings as choosers. This case will not be defeated by the discovery of new empirical facts. The citing of examples of human beings who are not normal in this respect (e.g. who are perhaps brain damaged) is irrelevant to this presumption since, whatever provision should be made for them within the democratic state, they will necessarily be excluded from the exercise or control of power since this pre-eminently involves choice.

The case for participatory democracy is then a strong one and it poses a challenge to three current assumptions of industrialized, capitalist democracies.

(i) The first is the assumption that democracy is to be seen as a certain method for arriving at political decisions. As Schumpeter, still perhaps the most well-known exponent of this view, puts it, the democratic method is ‘that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a

competitive struggle for the people's vote' (Schumpeter, 1976, p. 269). On this view what is characteristic of democracy is a competition for leadership. There is no question of the people participating in the exercise of power by participating in decision-making at any level, because Schumpeter holds 'the electoral mass is incapable of action other than a stampede' (Schumpeter, 1976, p. 283). The only role for citizens is to vote when required and so keep the leadership competition going.

What is curious about this conception of democracy is that it is arrived at by arguing from an alleged fact about the political interests and abilities of citizens in particular societies to the value judgment that therefore such poor creatures should have a certain kind of arrangement for making political decisions. This is generally characteristic of the so-called elite theorists of democracy whose positions Carole Pateman has documented in considerable detail (Pateman, 1970, Chapter 1). As I have argued, this procedure must be reversed. One must start from the presumption of equality in the exercise of power and then see if a case might be made out which can defeat it. All well and good, an objector might claim at this point, but this is simply a quibble, for when the presumption in favour of equality in the exercise of power is made, it can be defeated by referring to the sorts of facts which Schumpeter and later theorists cite. Low turn-out rates at local and national elections, little interest even in participating in local community affairs, the low-level, personality-oriented presentation of politics in the media and in political advertising campaigns indicate both a lack of interest in politics on the part of large parts of the population and also an inability to grasp the intricacies of political argument. These points do not defeat the case, however. To take first the media point. From the current policies of the media in presenting political affairs, as well as from the inane slogans and campaigns dreamed up by advertising companies for political parties, we can deduce nothing about what people might, or might not, be able to understand or take an interest in where political matters are concerned. In our present societies we have strong grounds for thinking that the media and the parties are not, even half of the time, making an all-out effort to raise the political consciousness of the population, with the idea of encouraging an interest in, and a vigorous examination and critique of our society's dominant institutions and their policies and practices. We cannot judge the level of political understanding that might be achieved, therefore, by the current presentation of political affairs by the media and the party propaganda machines. Before we could get any purchase on that problem we would at least need to have had an opportunity to see the kind of political education policies outlined in Chapter three in action.

The points I want to make about participation rates are not unconnected with these points about the media. There is first a formal similarity between the two cases. Just as in the media case, we can respond to the data on low participation rates, e.g. low electoral turn-outs, etc. by saying that since these data were collected in the kind of democracies Schumpeter and the elite theorists are describing we cannot draw any firm conclusions about what levels of participation one might expect in a participatory democracy. What seems clear from various studies (Verba and Nie, 1972) is that people tend to participate politically if they believe that their participation will significantly affect the outcome. In contemporary democracies many people judge realistically that they literally have better things to do than vote. Secondly, there are claimed to be cross-cultural correlations between levels of participation and levels of education and socioeconomic status (Verba, Nie and

Kim, 1971). The higher the socioeconomic status and level of education of a person the more likely she is to participate. These correlations tend to suggest that one's knowledge of political matters, wealth, concomitant style of life and amount and timing of leisure are most probably connected with one's willingness and ability to participate in political affairs.

As things stand at the moment, therefore, it would be a wildly injudicious person who would judge on the basis of the studies of political participation rates and the presentation of political matters in the media that the presumption in favour of equality in the exercise of power has been defeated. Indeed it would be distinctly odd if investigations did find high levels of political participation in contemporary capitalist elite democracies, because, as Habermas points out, the public realm of such societies with its periodic plebiscites is 'structurally depoliticized.' Essential to the maintenance of the system is 'civil privatism'—'political abstinence combined with an orientation to career, leisure and consumption' (Habermas, 1976, p. 37). As Habermas argues later, efforts at participation and initiatives by citizens threaten the depoliticized realm.

Participatory democracy withstands, then, the first challenge from the elite theorists and their data on political apathy and ignorance. The case against participatory democracy on those grounds is simply not proven. There remain, of course, a number of questions about the kind(s) of machinery appropriate to realize a participatory democracy in contemporary societies. These will be tackled in Chapter two.

(ii) The first challenge to participatory democracy came from a position which wanted to restrict the exercise of political power to an elite. This was shown to be an arbitrary and indefensible restriction. The second challenge involves a claim to restrict the area of political power itself, with the parallel claim that other areas in which power is exercised are not political and must not be subject to political 'interference'. Thus advocates of minimal government argue that the organization of industry and commerce must not be interfered with for 'political' reasons, private education must similarly not be queried for purely 'political' reasons and so on. However, like Ackerman, I would want to say: 'While proposals for "minimal" government differ in detail, I take their essence to be a refusal to permit the state to question the overall distribution of power in society' (Ackerman, 1980, p. 253). Participatory democracy, however, rests on quite the opposite presumption, namely that any exercise of power should be shared equally between all those involved, unless this can be shown, as I said above, to be either impracticable or damaging to the realization of democratic values in other ways.

The presumption is therefore that in all the institutions of any society—all work-places, schools, hospitals, libraries, sports centres, theatres, etc.—power will be exercised democratically or subject to democratic control. Needless to say the division between exercise and control of power will be different for different institutions and the kind of machinery appropriate will also vary. In Chapter two the kind of machinery suitable in the workplace will be discussed. In Chapters three, four and five questions of the exercise and control of power in the conduct of education in some of its formal and informal aspects will be examined.

(iii) These last points about the extent of the participatory democracy may well provoke a general objection to what might be termed the 'politicizing' of virtually the whole of a person's life. Some people, it might be argued, are not interested in politics: they

simply want to do an honest day's work, get treatment in hospitals when they need it, and enjoy their leisure and so on. They do not want to be involved in running their factory, the hospital where they go for treatment, their local sports centre, etc. Have such people (perhaps most of us?) a duty to participate in the exercise or control of power in these various institutions?

There are three main points to be made here.

First, if, as I have argued, there are good grounds, deriving ultimately from the principle of justice, for thinking that power in any institution should be subject to democratic exercise or control, then the fact of people's apathy or even hostility to what they might see as an illegitimate extension of the realm of the political, cannot, just like that, count as an argument against it. It will rather be a matter of getting people to appreciate, through political education, that they have both moral rights and, more pertinently here, moral duties in an area where it may not have occurred to them that the they did, or where they are reluctant to acknowledge them.

To anticipate, secondly, the discussion in Chapter two, the exercise and control of power will not take the same form in all institutions. The kind of machinery required in an institution which has a massive capacity to affect its members and/or the community's interests will be very different from that required to regulate the lesser power available to be wielded at, say, the local sports centre. It would be quite misleading, therefore, to imagine every citizen overwhelmed by meetings to be attended, and committee papers to be read for every institution with which she has any connection. In this respect participatory democracy has had a bad press: an image of endless discussion in smoke-filled rooms has served as a substitute for the concrete examination of the machinery which might be involved. When that has been done the bureaucratic burden on individual citizens may not seem so oppressive.

The burdensomeness of burdens, thirdly, is relative. To someone who, say, wants to devote all her energies to a work on ethical theory, even the slightest involvement in the running of her work-place, local residents' association or whatever will appear as a monstrous encroachment. What is the position of such a citizen? This, it seems to me, is the familiar case of a person faced by a clash between two prima facie moral duties. On any <u>particular</u> occasion, or at any <u>particular</u> period of time, it must be a matter for individual moral persons to decide which of their duties takes precedence over others with competing claims on their time and energies. Clearly any particular decision one makes will be made in the light of familiar moral considerations and will be potentially criticizable in familiar ways as, e.g. thoughtless, selfish, etc. I am not, however, concerned with the particular way in which any individual might make her decision on any particular occasion. I want rather to point out that what a citizen cannot do, as a rational moral agent, is to decide, in general, that moral concern stops on the other side of the factory gates, the sports centre threshold, etc. As a rational moral person she has to remain at least minimally politically aware in respect of the institutions in society with which she is involved, ready to judge, for instance, that her duties at the work-place at the moment take precedence over other moral duties, for the possibility that they might cannot be ruled out in advance. People cannot decide, <u>once and for all</u>, that they will simply do an 'honest day's work' and let others get on with the politics, because to do so would be to run the risk of, e.g. not having done what one might to prevent some serious injustice.

In general, then, there is a duty to participate in the exercise, or control, of power in relevant institutions. It is not an absolute one, because the citizen must be free to decide on any particular occasion that it is overridden by another more pressing one, but it is a prima facie duty.

POWER

In this chapter I have made repeated references to the exercise, or control, of power. This notion is a central one in this essay and I need now to lay bare what I am understanding by it. This is important because, as we shall see, different conceptions of power have different implications for the moral acceptability of different political arrangements and their associated educational arrangements.

In this section I shall be following closely Steven Lukes's account of different conceptions of power in Power: a Radical View. In that book Lukes is concerned not with 'power to'—i.e. a capacity or ability—but with 'power over'—i.e. a relationship. Lukes discusses three views of power which he sees as alternative interpretations of one and the same underlying concept of power. According to the underlying concept, A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests. In so far as one person affects another significantly without there being a conflict of interests, that is not an instance of one person exercising power over another but something else—for instance some form of influence.

The first interpretation which Lukes discusses is that of the American 'pluralists', notably R.A.Dahl. This focuses on the making of decisions on issues over which there is a conflict of interests embodied in different policy preferences. A classic example of an exercise of power on this view would be a clash between a government and a trade union, where each favours a different policy and where one side is induced by some threat of sanctions on the part of the other to give up its chosen policy. This is all right as far as it goes but it does not manage to capture even all major instances of the exercise of power in the real world.

The second view, represented by the work of Bachrach and Baratz, is something of a corrective to the first in that they are interested not only in decision-making but also in nondecision-making. A decision is 'a choice among alternative modes of action' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p. 39); a nondecision is a 'decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p. 44). Thus, nondecision-making is

> a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arenas; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p. 44).

For Bachrach and Baratz therefore it is important to identify potential issues which nondecision-making prevents from being actual. In taking this stand they are of course firmly rejecting Dahl's view that 'a political issue can hardly be said to exist unless and until it commands the attention of a significant segment of the political stratum' (Dahl, 1961,

p. 92), which leaves them with the problem of identifying key political issues. This they resolve by regarding a key issue as 'one that involves a genuine challenge to the resources of power or authority of those who currently dominate the process by which policy outputs in the system are determined', that is, 'a demand for enduring transformation in both the manner in which values are allocated in the polity…and the value allocation itself' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, pp. 47–8). Bachrach and Baratz mark an advance on the first view in focusing on nondecision-making as well as decision-making, but like the holders of the first view they still want to stress the importance of actual observable conflict in revealing exercises of power in nondecision-making. They say 'if there is no conflict overt or covert, the presumption must be that there is consensus on the prevailing allocation of values, in which case non-decision-making is impossible' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p. 49). The conflict they consider necessary is that between the interests of those engaged in non-decision-making and the interests of those they exclude from a hearing within the political system. The latter interests will, they claim, be 'observable in their aborted form to the investigator' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p. 49). The second view, then, allows for consideration of the ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues over which there is an observable conflict of interests, seen as embodied in express policy preferences and sub-political grievances.

The second view, although an improvement on the first in incorporating into the analysis of power relations the question of the control over the agenda of politics and the ways in which potential issues are kept out of the political process, still fails to pick up important instances of the exercise of power. According to Lukes it is inadequate in three ways. First, in focusing on decisions and assimilating all cases of exclusion of potential issues from the political agenda to decisions to suppress issues, etc., it gives only a partial picture of the way in which groups and institutions succeed in excluding potential issues. In fact 'the power to control the agenda of politics and exclude potential issues cannot be adequately analysed unless it is seen as a function of collective forces and social arrangements' (Lukes, 1974, p. 22). In Schattschneider's well-known phrase 'the mobilisation of bias' results from the form of the organization, from the socially structured and culturally patterned practices of institutions, which may be manifested by individuals' inaction. Organizations are of course made up of individuals, but the power they exercise cannot simply be accounted for in terms of individuals' decisions. We shall see the importance of this interpretation of power when we come in due course to look in Chapter three at the organization of educational institutions.

In assuming secondly that where there is no observable conflict, even in some abortive form, there is no exercise of power, Bachrach and Baratz made a big mistake with farreaching implications. Clearly power can be exercised in the absence of conflict and this is so in perhaps the most successful exercises of power. A may exercise power over B by getting B to do what B does not want to do but he also exercises power over B by controlling, shaping and determining B's very wants, so that B comes to want exactly what A wants him to want. The most secure governing elites, for instance, are those in a situation where the governed accept both the elite and their own subordinate role as the legitimate order. so that secret police and the accompanying paraphernalia of state coercion are unnecessary. Any account of power must allow for the fact that the most successful forms of power do not involve conflict but prevent its ever arising.

The third mistake is closely connected with the second. It is the assumption that if people feel no grievances, they they have no interests which are harmed by the use of power. Again, however, the supreme exercise of power will prevent people from having grievances by shaping their desires, perceptions of the world and their place in it. To assume that the absence of grievances means that there is genuine consensus on values and the allocation of resources is to ignore the possibility that consensus can be manipulated.

The third view of power, developed by Lukes, builds on and considerably extends, the second view. It allows for the many ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics, whether by individuals' decision or, perhaps more likely, by the very organization of politics and institutional practices. It also allows that this may occur in the absence of any observable conflict, which may have been successfully averted. There is however always a potential conflict present, but one which may never be realized, between the interests of those exercising power and the 'real interests' of those they exclude.

There are three points to be made about Lukes's interpretation of the concept of power which together elaborate it and raise, and answer, obvious objections.

(i) In the first place Lukes rejects an analysis of power which takes people and their wants as they are as a matter of fact. Wants, as I have suggested above, can be manipulated and many exercises of power consist in exactly this. What A is doing may not be contrary to B's wants, but it may be an exercise of power, or rest on a previous exercise of power, for all that. Lukes therefore introduces the notion of 'real interests'. A exercises power over B when he affects B contrary to B's real interests, even if not contrary to his wants. B's 'real interests' are what he would want or prefer were he in a position to make a choice, i.e. were he in a position to be autonomous. Lukes points out that this claim needs to be supported by 'a substantial discussion of the nature off and conditions for, autonomy' and refers to the beginnings of such a discussion in his Individualism (1973). This present essay, although not offering a sustained discussion of autonomy, attempts to outline some aspects of the kind of social structure required to permit people, as far as possible, to live autonomous lives (Chapter two) as well as to sketch some of the necessary educational conditions for the development of autonomy (Chapters three, four and five). I would hope that these discussions would lend support to the kind of distinction Lukes wants to draw between wants and 'real interests' because some such distinction is vital to any analysis of power.

(ii) However, if in his analysis of power Lukes wants to say that to exercise power is to affect a person contrary to his interests, does this mean that power cannot be exercised by A over B in B's real interests? If so, this would seem to rule out classic cases of the exercise of power, for instance, snatching the knife away from the drunkard, pulling the unwary person back from the rotten bridge, preventing the child from drinking weedkiller. Lukes of course recognizes such cases (Lukes, 1974, p. 33) and sees them as instances of 'short-term power', where there is an observable conflict of 'subjective interests'. However if, and when, B recognizes his 'real interests' (in all the above three straightforward cases—in staying alive) the conflict ends and with it the power relationship. The safeguard against paternalism is that the identification of B's real interests is not up to A but up to B when he is able to exercise autonomous choice.

(iii) The real problem for Lukes, though, arises in the application of this analysis to the real world. How does one identify exercises of power in those important cases where A does nothing and there is no observable conflict with B? How does one study a non-event?

It is precisely the difficulty of identifying empirically such exercises of power that has led so many investigators, Lukes claims, to concentrate on those exercises of power in which there is actual observable conflict. He argues, however, that in the non-event cases, too, it is possible to set up empirically supportable and refutable hypotheses. It is not easy but it is, in principle, possible. One needs (a) to justify the expectation that B would have thought or acted differently and (b) to specify the means by which A has prevented, or else acted in a manner sufficient to prevent, B from doing so.

Lukes mentions one empirical study in which this was done, a study which asked why the issue of air pollution was not raised as early or as effectively in some American cities as in others (Crenson, 1971). To quote Lukes:

> Crenson's analysis is impressive because it fulfills the double requirement mentioned above: there is good reason to expect that, other things being equal, people would rather not be poisoned (assuming in particular, that pollution control does not necessarily mean unemployment)—and even where they may not even articulate this preference; and hard evidence is given of the ways in which institutions, specifically U.S. Steel, largely through inaction, prevented the citizen's interests in not being poisoned from being acted on (though other factors, institutional and ideological, would need to enter a fuller explanation). Thus both the relevant counter factual and the identification of a power mechanism are justified (Lukes, 1974, p. 45).

Lukes see the difficulties, then, of identifying instances of the suppression of latent conflicts within a society but refuses to see these as overwhelming.

The exercise of power by a person or a group or an institution is always objectionable and always to be regretted. It always involves affecting a person in a manner contrary to his/her interests. It would clearly be ideal if power relationships could be completely eliminated from human life. This is however impossible. Even without the complication of what Lukes terms 'short-term power' being exercised over babies and children, the absence of a total consensus on values and the allocation of resources amongst adult human beings means that sometimes some people will be affected by institutions and policies in a way contrary to their (or some of their) interests.

Power relationships cannot be eliminated from human life but in different social set-ups they can be present to a greater or lesser degree. The claim of this essay is that in a democracy exercises of power are fewer than in other political systems.

I make this claim basically on two grounds.

(i) In a democracy, which is of course a participatory democracy, there will be considerably more control by individuals themselves over matters in which they have interests. If individuals participate in decision-making in political arenas, in their work-places, sports centres, schools, hospitals, etc., or have some control over the decision-makers, there is less likelihood of their interests being simply ignored, or overruled because they are in some sense misperceived. This is of course John Stuart Mill's argument for people being 'able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for their [rights and interests]' (Mill, 1910, p. 208) so that these interests are not overlooked or seen with very different eyes by a ruling elite, which is not necessarily concerned knowingly and deliberately to sacrifice their interests. If I have some control over the arrangements at my work-place there is more chance of arrangements being in line with my interests than if my foreman, manager or boss makes

them without reference to me and perhaps contrary to my interests, thus, even if unwittingly, exercising power over me.

This claim may well be questioned, however. It might be argued that individuals will be subject to exercises of power just as much in a democracy as in any other system. They will have, after all, to participate even if this seems to them to be contrary to their interests. Also since participation will be all-pervasive, the pressures on them to be involved will be hard to escape. It may indeed be easier to escape the tyrannical rule of a totalitarian state apparatus by lying low and, when necessary, confusing the bureaucracy. To make this kind of objection is, however, to ignore the points made earlier about the duty to participate' (see above p. 17f). Without repeating those in detail I should nevertheless link two of them with the analysis of power advanced here. In the first place convinced democrats will not see their participation in the exercise of power in general as against their interests, since, on the account presented here, they will have strong interests in the equal promotion of their own and others' capacity to make autonomous choices. [Those who take a very different view in general of their interests, who, say, would see it as in their interests to have their lives directed entirely by some spiritual being, could obviously not be citizens of a democratic society in the sense outlined here and would perhaps hive themselves off to establish some form of theocracy.] Secondly, in so far as the democratic citizen's interest in autonomy clashes with other interests, or in so far as the interest in the exercise of autonomy in one sphere clashes with its exercise in another, in a particular case the individual is clearly free to make her own choice as to where her duty lies (cf. the case of the writer of the Ethics book and the clash of duties). This kind of objection—that people will be forced, contrary to their interests, to participate—cannot be made to support the case that a democracy will exercise as much if not more power than other political systems over its citizens.

(ii) The second ground for claiming that there will be fewer exercises of power is that the manipulation and shaping of people's wants, contrary to their interests, will be outlawed. The subtleties of the processes which may be at work in moulding people's wants are such that the total elimination of such moulding is probably impossible. Nevertheless education in understanding the phenomenon of the exercise of power, will alert people to the many and subtle ways in which it may be manifested so that they will be enabled to combat it in both personal and institutional ways. In such a society, where people are intent on identifying and nullifying such manipulative exercises of power and building institutional bulwarks against them—watchdog committees, Ombudspersons, judicial reviews, etc. etc.—other things being equal, there must be fewer exercises of power than in a society where, say, an elite ruling group is bent on keeping the people happy. Of course an education which aims, in part, to get people to understand the complexities and mechanisms of power may not necessarily lead every moral agent to become a democrat. I am not concerned with the person who puts herself outside the moral framework altogether and decides to seek as much power over others as possible but with the moral person who appreciates the connection between the exercise of power and interests and realizes that if she has the kind of interests which power-wielders cannot attack, she is effectively out of their range. She has the perfect defence against them and needs no institutional shields. In the extreme case I am thinking of the kind of religious mystic, who has (literally) no interest in the world, and simply desires to enter the next world as soon as possible. Clearly few exercises of power are going to affect her. However, as I said above, I am not concerned in this essay

to argue for appropriate political arrangements for a person with a religious picture of the good life which either dominates over her other interests, or constitutes her sole interest. Otherwise, for most people with varying conceptions of the good life, the institutions of democracy constitute the best safeguard against arbitrary exercises of power.

In my general claim that in a democracy there will be fewer exercises of power I am in agreement, I think, with Carole Pateman in The Problem of Political Obligation. The only difference between us is, if I have understood her correctly/that she thinks there will be very, very few exercises of power in a political society characterized by 'self-assumed political obligation'. Pateman takes this view, I think, because she sees power and authority relationships as quite distinct. She says:

> It is often assumed that the 'political' refers to power relationships…. A democratic transformation of the liberal democratic state can then appear to presage an end of the political itself. However,…the collective dimension of social life cannot disappear; rather the aim of democratic political change is, as far as possible, to transform power relationships into relationships of authority in which citizens collectively exercise political authority (Pateman, 1979, p. 175).

Pateman does not make clear exactly what she has in mind in talking about the transformation of power relationships into authority relationships. I presume it is something like the following. Both power and authority are causal notions. In power situations A affects B in some way or other contrary to B's interests. This does not involve consent on B's part. In authority situations, A also affects B in some way or other, possibly contrary to B's interests, but here A has the right to do so and in the kind of democratic society Pateman and I have in mind, A's right to direct B's actions (etc.) is always exercised with B's consent. Pateman is thus making the following distinction: in a democratic society the dictator's power has been transformed into the collective exercise of political authority. This latter, according to Pateman, is wrongly construed as an exercise of power since it involves the consent of citizens. Therefore there will be fewer exercises of power because power has been transformed into authority. Lukes would also probably accept this, I think, since he wants to say that 'Consensual authority, with no conflict of interests, is not, therefore, a form of power' (Lukes, 1974, p. 32). Peters, too, makes the same point. 'The concept of "authority" is necessary to bring out the ways in which behaviour is regulated without recourse to power' (Peters, 1967, p. 93).

I am left with a residual doubt however. If we make this sharp distinction between authority and power, and furthermore if we talk about power relationships being transformed into authority relationships in the democratic society, we shall be tempted to overlook some possible exercises of power in a democratic society through the democratic machinery itself. What I particularly have in mind are the kind of conflicts which arise between majorities and minorities in a democratic society. I am not even assuming that these are permanent majorities and minorities—though the problem is exacerbated if they are. Citizens have agreed, let us assume, to the practice of majority voting to decide certain issues. Without anticipating the discussion in Chapter two, let us imagine that one of these issues is the allocation of certain resources. The particular case we might take is the provision of some leisure facility in a small community. (5) Money is available for either a swimming pool or a theatre but not for both, and any division of resources will not be sufficient to finance

either adequately. People have to vote and it is agreed that they do so according to their personal preference for one facility or the other. (There is no need to complicate matters at this point by introducing Dworkin's distinction between personal and external preferences. See Chapter two, pp. 55–6.) The result is, let us say, that a majority want the swimming pool and a minority the theatre. Let us assume that the minority is not won over to the majority's point of view. Those in the minority would still prefer the theatre, but since they assent in general to the democratic machinery and previously assented to this particular way of settling the policy decision, they decide to go along with the majority vote. In such cases Pateman wants to say that 'a kind of unanimity results' (Pateman, 1979, p. 161). Certainly this is one way of describing the situation, if one focuses on the fact that both majority and minority are united in agreeing that the decision to go ahead with the swimming pool should be implemented. There is, however, another way of looking at the situation. One can see it, to put matters simply, as a situation in which the majority has two interests satisfied and the minority has one interest satisfied and one denied. By that I mean that the majority's interest in taking the decision within a democratic framework and according to the agreed procedure of majority voting is satisfied; so also is its interest in having a swimming pool. The minority's interest in taking the decision within a democratic framework, etc. is also similarly satisfied; but its interest in having a theatre is not. According to the analysis of power with which we have been working, therefore, a practice (majority voting) is affecting the minority in a way contrary to one of its interests. Viewed in one way, therefore, the minority is subject to an exercise of power. Whilst I agree that the situation can be viewed differently as an example of 'a kind of unanimity', if one focuses on the agreement over the implementation of the decision, it seems to me important also to see that it can be viewed, as one might say, as 'a kind of exercise of power', if one focuses on the fact that the voting procedure is affecting the minority contrary to its interests. With a permanent minority the situation is, of course, very much worse and aptly described by the phrase 'the tyranny of the majority'.

Some people might want to resist this second way of viewing the majority/minority case. They might want to rule out the possibility of 'permanent majorities' in a self-managed democracy and to argue that policy decisions would be taken with the good of the whole community in mind and would not be contrary to individuals' interests. However, without dealing with these points now so as not to anticipate the discussion of Chapter two, I want to suggest that even in a democracy there will be, on occasion, decisions of the kind described above and in so far as that is the case the minority can be seen as in a power situation. Democrats must be aware of this way of viewing the situation and monitor the frequency of these occurrences so as to counterbalance these exercises of power as far as possible, since they are unlikely to be completely eliminable. It may be useful in some contexts to talk of citizens in a democracy as exercising political authority rather than power so as to highlight the difference between democratic societies and any form of tyranny, namely that in a democracy there is consent to procedures by means of which the wielding of power is shared, or controlled. It is however dangerous to see the democratic society as transformed from a power society into a consensual authority one, since this may produce an undue complacency and make us less alert to exercises of power embedded in political procedures. Since there is a measure of indeterminateness about the application of the concepts of power and authority, (6) and since one's use of them is going to be

determined in part by the context, I have in this essay preferred to describe democracy as the kind of political arrangement where the exercise of power is shared or controlled, according to certain agreed procedures. This is because exercises of power harm people and I have wanted to focus on the prevention and control of this harm—by literally keeping it before our eyes on the page—rather than on the procedures for controlling it—which is what tends to happen if one talks of democracy in terms of consensual authority.

ECONOMIC POWER AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH

I have stressed so far the basic equality of access to the exercise, or control, of political power which must obtain in a democracy. That, however, must be matched by a similarly egalitarian approach to the distribution of income and wealth. I want to make just two points about this of a general sort because to pursue the issues raised by it in detail would take me too far away from the main educational themes of this essay. There are two reasons, which must apply in any democracy, for an egalitarian approach to the distribution of wealth and income. On the one hand there is the basic egalitarian assumption that any individual has as much right to an equal share in the resources of his/her society as any other and any departure from this principle must be justified. As far as a citizen's basic welfare is concerned, therefore, each has a right to a basic minimum to cover needs like food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education and so on. This is absolutely essential whatever conception of the good life he/she may wish to realize. It is essential if he/she is even going to be able to raise and reflectively consider that question. At this point many readers will no doubt query my use of the word 'essential' and feel tempted to produce examples of people who lack these things and nevertheless reflect on this question. It is not hard to think of struggling artists, desperately sick people, people in concentration camps whose basic needs are not met and who yet manage to reflect on the question of the good life for man. These kinds of examples cannot be denied but on the one hand many of these people could not realize their conceptions and, more importantly, one can ask whether one should rest one's assumptions about the basic needs of citizens in a democracy on these rather exceptional individuals or on the 'normal citizen'.

The second reason for an egalitarian approach to the distribution of income and wealth is that if equality of access to political power is to be secured, it must not be possible for an unequal distribution of economic power to frustrate this. This is a familiar point made by a great number of writers in this area both classical and modern—e.g. Rousseau, Rawls, Honderich—and nicely summed up in this quotation from Dahl: 'if it could be quantified, I suppose that Mr.Henry Luce has a thousand or ten thousand times greater control over the alternatives scheduled for debate and tentative decision at a national election than I do' (Dahl, 1956, p. 72). This kind of economic power over the political agenda must be ruled out in a democracy. This second reason for an egalitarian approach does not absolutely rule out any differences in income and wealth between citizens (since the presumption in favour of equal treatment may be overridden; all may receive equal consideration but different treatment may be justifiable), but it does limit the permitted range of income differences. If reasons can be produced, therefore, to justify differences of income (e.g. perhaps motivational reasons: the society needs to pay people more to go down mines,

clear out sewers, become doctors in geriatric hospitals), this would be possible provided that they were not large. It is not for me to say how large is 'large' but presumably they should be as small as is compatible with getting the job done. Neither should it be assumed that a democratic society would necessarily want to use income differentials as incentives, the point being simply that it would be compatible with the second reason for an egalitarian approach to income and wealth for it to do so within a limited range.

The twofold egalitarian approach which any democracy must have towards the distribution of income and wealth leaves open, to a considerable extent, how the division between public and private property is to be made in any particular society. Once resources have been set aside to cover the minimum welfare provision (which should not incidentally be assumed to be a low minimum, as is usually the case in contemporary societies), there is the question of how the residue is to be distributed. Several issues arise at this point which may be resolved differently in different democratic societies. For instance, is the residue to go largely to individuals or is it to go largely to public projects for communal use? Clearly this issue need not be settled in an either/or way; societies may differ in how they tip the balance. There is also the question, raised already, of whether the residue should be used in a modest income incentive scheme or not. Democratic societies in different historical situations may answer this question differently.

In any democratic society some institutions or organizations will have to be publicly owned by the community by the nature of the function they perform. Democratic communities cannot have private armies or private police forces, but, those institutions aside, is it possible to argue that in principle other resources and organizations must be publicly owned?

I think that democrats should probably reject the question in the way that it is posed. For as Dahl points out, '"property" is a bundle of rights' (Dahl, 1970, p. 132) and these rights can be parcelled out in different ways, as the rights of ownership over economic enterprises are in Yugoslavia. Once democrats view property in this way, the conventional categories of public or private ownership break down and it makes more sense to take the bundle apart and consider an appropriate distribution of the rights involved between central government, local communities, institutions themselves (industrial enterprises, hospitals, libraries, banks, etc.) and individuals. Therefore, after having hived off those institutions which must be under direct state control, like the army and police force, citizens would look at the bundle of rights attached to any particular enterprise and see, in the light of the basic principle about the equal sharing, or control, of power, how these might be distributed. Once again, it is a matter of finding the appropriate machinery to realize the basic principle. There is room for considerable play here, with different societies dividing up the bundle very differently, according to values they hold which are permitted within the democratic framework, though not required by it: some, for instance, may favour communal projects over private ones and so on.

This discussion moves us on to Chapter two and its examination of the general kinds of machinery which might be appropriate to realize democracy in actual, historically situated societies. It also anticipates the strategy which will be employed later in tackling issues to do with the control and organization of education.

2
Realising democratic principles: institutions and attitudes

Chapter one set out basic democratic principles and assumptions. Many people may find it possible to support these broad principles and most of the associated assumptions, albeit from different (e.g. Utilitarian or Marxist) standpoints. These principles, however, have to be realized in particular historical societies and there is likely to be much more controversy over how this should be done. For two reasons. First, suggestions about institutions which might instantiate the principles are unlikely to command wide agreement. Different people are likely to conceive of alternative practices, policies, etc., which seem to them much closer to the spirit of the principles. In the political systems with which we are familiar, for instance, there are wide differences of opinion on the relative fairness of such different voting systems as first-past-the-post or proportional voting. Second, the suggestions which follow are likely to encounter the objection that they are 'utopian' or at least untried in practice, since the machinery suggested has not been in operation anywhere in its complete form. (1) Constructive brain-storming, however, as suggested in Chapter one, can be useful in ironing out some of these problems. To some extent this process, as we shall see, has begun already amongst theorists working in the participatory tradition of democracy.

PARTICIPATORY MACHINERY FOR POWER-SHARING

Before considering detailed pieces of machinery it is useful to get a general picture of the kind of institutions and practices which would best realize equality in the exercise, or control, of power in a whole society. There is already a slender tradition of theorizing about such machinery. It is worth looking briefly at the work of someone within this tradition whose basic principles and assumptions, as also the problems which his suggestions for realizing those principles raise, are still the concern of contemporary theorists.

In his Guild Socialism Restated G.D.H.Cole (1920) suggests machinery to realize very much the basic principles set out in Chapter one. He was anxious to secure equality of access to power, averse to any idea that it was appropriate for leaders to lead the masses and opposed to political centralism of any sort which might put the levers of power in a few hands. He said in 1917 that the fundamental social evil requiring eradication is not poverty but slavery (Cole, 1917). In this view he was obviously very close to Tawney, who had written in his Commonplace Book in 1912, 'The supreme evil of modern industrial society is not poverty. It is the absence of, liberty, i.e. of the opportunity for self-direction' (quoted in Wright, 1979, p. 51, note 2). It is clearly liberty in this sense of self-direction which is at the heart of Cole's suggestions at that time for the form of work-place democracy called 'Guild Socialism'. In 1918 he expresses similar sentiments in distinguishing his views from those of Sidney Webb, of whom he says:

> He still conceives the mass of men as persons who ought to be decently treated, not as persons who ought freely to organise their own conditions of life; in short, his conception of a new social order is still that of an order that is ordained from without, and not realised from within (Cole, 1918).

This is not the place to go into the details of Cole's plans for a participatory society, interesting though they are in suggesting a blue-print for a totally participatory society. It is sufficient to note that Cole centres participation on the work-place, with some subsequent modifications to take in, for instance, neighbourhood-based participation. He seems to assume that by some pluralist balancing of the different groups the resources of society and its social arrangements will conform to principles of equitable distribution. It is true that at the apex of the complex system of regional communes and guilds there is to be a National Commune, but as Cole conceives it this is to be a purely co-ordinating body which will not adjudicate in any way between the policy decisions of other bodies coming to it. This is largely because he does not envisage any conflicts between groups once a participatory system is established. This assumption of harmonious decision-making is, however, as several critics have pointed out (Wright, 1919, p. 66f; Gutmann, 1980, p. 203f), quite unfounded, with the result that Cole's suggested participatory machinery is severely flawed, for any democratic society will want some means of resolving conflicts equitably when they arise.

It is interesting to note, parenthetically, that Gramsci's ideas for factory councils give rise to a similar theoretical problem to that arising within Cole's Guild Socialism. There are important differences of course, in that Gramsci was working out his ideas within the Marxist tradition and for him the establishment of factory councils was a transitional phase on the way to the fully communist society. It was not, so to speak, conceived as a desirable end in itself. Gramsci, however, saw the factory councils as complemented by a political party which would provide general leadership and organizational co-ordination in the struggle against the bourgeois state. Indeed he felt that the final failure of the councils which were established in factories in Northern Italy (they never anyway conformed exactly to Gramsci's theoretical blue-print and he always referred to them as the 'nucleus' or 'embryo' of the fully-developed council) was a result of the lack of an experienced, developed political party to co-ordinate grassroots efforts. Clearly Gramsci was concerned with a revolutionary strategy, but his problem of the relationship between the party and the councils exemplifies the recurring difficulty for participatory theorists (whether within a democratic framework or not) of how the decisions and policies of the many grassroots decision-making bodies can be equitably incorporated into an overall policy for the whole society. To say that Gramsci recognized this problem is not to say that he solved it, since it is not at all clear how in his system the councils and the party are to be organizationally related without the party adopting the elitist role which Gramsci explicitly rejected (see Boggs's comments, 1976, pp. 95f; and also Kolakowski, 1978, pp. 244–52).

More recently, in the last chapter of The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, Macpherson attempts a sketch of a participatory democracy which sets out very clearly how the different decision-making bodies are to relate to one another. In his view such a system must take a pyramidal form, with direct democracy at the base and delegate democracy at every level above that. Thus, he says:

> one would start with direct democracy at the neighbourhood or factory level—actual face-to-face discussion and decision by consensus or majority, and election of delegates who would make up a council at the next more inclusive level, say a city borough or ward or a township. The delegates would have to be sufficiently instructed by and accountable to those who elected them to make decisions at the council level reasonably democratic. So it would go on up to the top level, which would be a national council for matters of national concern, and local and regional councils for matters of less than national concern. At whatever level beyond the smallest primary one the final decisions on different matters were made, the issues would certainly have to be formulated by a committee of the council. Thus, at whatever level the reference up stopped, it would stop in effect with a small committee of that level's council. This may seem a far cry from democratic control. But I think it is the best we can do. What is needed, at every stage, to make the system democratic, is that the decision-makers and issue-formulators elected from below be held responsible to those below by being subject to re-election or even recall (Macpherson, 1977, pp. 108–9).

Macpherson then outlines three situations in which such a pyramidal councils system will not work, but suggests that, if these situations can be avoided, there is no flaw inherent in the system which should make it fail. If the situation is not an immediately post-revolutionary one, not a deeply class-divided one, and not one in which the mass of the people are apathetic, there is every reason for the pyramidal councils system to work. Macpherson then discusses an approximation to this model since there is no space in it for political parties. It is likely that any Western society which attempted to move towards such a participatory structure would do so not via a oneparty system but via a multi-party system, perhaps initially via a coalition of social-democratic and socialist parties. Macpherson therefore considers the problem of how far participatory structures are compatible with a competitive party system. His conclusion is finally that 'genuinely participatory parties…could operate through a parliamentary or congressional structure to provide a substantial measure of participatory democracy' (Macpherson, 1977, p. 114). Leaving aside the approximate model, it seems to me that Macpherson's full-blown model exhibits serious flaws. At first sight it appears to overcome the problem noted in Cole and Gramsci of how grassroots decisions are to be related to a society-wide policy. In one sense, indeed, it does do this. It is very clear how the decisions on the various sub-bodies are to be passed up through the system so that a decision necessarily emerges from the national council, either from consensus or as a resulted of a majority vote. There is therefore an implementable decision which has come from the grassroots decision-making bodies; it is not clear, for different reasons, that there would be one in the Cole and Gramsci arrangements. There is, however, a problem with Macpherson's model.

In the process of feeding decisions upwards from lower to ever higher bodies, it could be the case that the preferences of some people are always voted out. On almost every issue some people may always be in the minority. They may be easily identifiable minorities, the old in a predominantly youthful society, or less identifiable ones, people who are concerned about noise pollution in a robustly boisterous society. At this point one could take two possible stances. One might argue that this state of affairs would be unfortunate but, sadly, must be regarded as an unavoidable fact of life once all the appropriate procedures for decision-making have been observed. This may, however, be to give up too soon, especially if one accepts the arguments in Chapter one about the majority vote as an exercise of power

over the minority. Alternatively one may feel that the situation described is unrealistic in a democracy because those participating at the various levels would not be voting 'selfishly' but in the public interest. Even if, however, one accepts for the moment the distinction between selfish voting and public interest voting, it does not help, unless one also assumes that decisions about the public interest will somehow be unanimous. Without that assumption the majority/minority problem simply arises again. The only answer, it seems to me, is to accept something like the Macpherson participatory structure on a neighbourhood basis but to build into it constitutional constraints which secure to the individual certain rights which are not overridable. I am, of course, not claiming that this will totally solve the majority/minority problem. There will be occasions when minorities will not get what they want. What I am advocating is a bill of rights to secure at least basic needs, defined in terms of the 'primary goods' mentioned in Chapter one. This idea of a participatory structure with constitutional constraints securing to the individual certain rights is very close to Amy Gutmann's 'incomplete sketch of the core governmental framework required by any democratic and egalitarian society' (Gutmann, 1980, p. 202). It is not, however, identical with her account, even in its major points. It will be clearest, therefore, if I present it as an independent account, referring from time to time to points Gutmann makes.

Let me start, first, with the basic rights which must be secured to every citizen by the constitutional framework. These are related, as I say, to the 'primary goods' listed in Chapter one.

(i) In line with the points made about wealth at the end of Chapter one, each citizen will have a right to a basic minimum of welfare provision. The level will vary between different historically situated societies but, unless extreme circumstances dictate this, it will not be a bare minimum sufficient only to support life at subsistence level but what is judged appropriate to a decent human life. This will of course involve a number of judgments of value at various points. However the need to make such judgments does not in itself constitute a reason to avoid coming to some judgment about the requirements for a decent human life in a given historical situation. In addition there will be a framework for permissible income variations written into the constitutional framework (see Chapter one, p. 31). Within this broad framework it will be possible to make recommendations for appropriate incomes for different jobs if the society wishes to do this, perhaps because, for instance, it decides to use this method to motivate people towards certain jobs rather than others. Written into the constitutional framework, too, will be a provision for citizens to determine the assignment of surplus wealth to private individuals and/or to public projects as they deem best.

(ii) Citizens will also have certain constitutional rights where opportunities are concerned. They will have a right to a basic education in a democratic setting and a right to sample as many further perspectives, ways of life and activities as their society is able to make available. What is implied in more detail by this right in both formal and informal education, as also the rationale for it, are developed in Chapters three, four and five.

Other 'opportunity' rights guaranteed by the constitution will largely be of a negative sort, i.e. rights which lay down that the citizen shall not be discriminated against in respect of employment, enjoyment of leisure facilities, etc., on grounds of race, sex or religion.

(iii) Citizens will also be guaranteed constitutional rights with respect to freedom of thought and expression.

(iv) Citizens will also have the right to protection by the rule of law, with an independent judiciary guaranteeing their other rights by this means.

(v) Finally citizens will have the constitutional right to participate in the exercise and control of power whether this is in their work-place, or neighbourhood, or in some society-wide forum.

What I have termed constitutional rights constitute the very framework of the democratic society and in their most basic form can only be changed by near-unanimous consent of the citizens. The right to minimum welfare provision, to equal opportunities, to freedom of thought and expression, the rule of law and the equal right to participate in the exercise and control of power fall into this category, although rights deriving from these and formulated with respect to the conditions prevailing within historically situated societies (e.g. the right to a particular income for a particular job within the permitted scale of incomes) may be changed with considerably less than unanimous consent. This is not the place to specify what level of consent is appropriate to different kinds of rights: I simply want to make this crude distinction to underline the necessarily entrenched position of the constitutional rights as underpinnings of the democratic society.

The institutional complement of the basic constitutional framework set out above is a national representative forum to which members are elected on the basis of one person, one vote. Such an institution is necessary if decisions affecting the whole society are to be made, in the light of the basic constitutional framework, for the whole society. In this I agree with Amy Gutmann who, suggesting such a forum, says:

> The choice among candidates should be considered by citizens a choice based upon the criterion of 'judicial competence': Each citizen should ask who will most justly interpret the spirit of the constitution in particular cases…national representatives are not to see themselves simply as mandated delegates of their constituencies. They are to be interpreters of the constitution and representatives of the public good first and of the particular interests of their constituencies second, as far as is consistent with the interests of society as an egalitarian whole (Gutmann, 1980, p. 200).

In implementing such a structure questions arise about the sphere of competence and responsibility of this central body vis-à-vis those of the other participatory organizations. The division of labour is in one sense fairly clear. Matters which are the exclusive concern of groups within the society and which have negligible repercussions on the wider society (e.g. decisions to do with some aspects of services provided by local police forces, hospitals, civil service departments, etc.) will be decided at local level, while matters which affect the whole society (e.g. decisions to do with defence, with societywide income differentials, with aspects of policing policy which apply to all areas) will eventually come for decision to the national forum, which will have the decisions of the local and regional participatory organizations in some summary form before it.

This suggested structure does not assume a consensus on major policy decisions (as Cole seems to), nor does it cast the national forum in an elitist role (Gramsci's problem), nor does it simply give the ultimate body a rubber-stamping role, always endorsing the majority decision. This is clear if we examine two different cases which may come to the national forum for decision. The first is one in which the combined decisions of various participatory organizations in the society would, if put into effect, involve discrimination

in relation to job opportunities. Perhaps they are such as to exclude women or West Indians from certain jobs. Here, in the light of the constitutional rights listed, the national forum will simply veto the proposed policy. It violates the constitutional rights under (ii) designed to secure all members of the society certain 'primary goods'.

The second case is more interesting because less straightforward. The national forum has to make a decision on a matter in which preferences in the society are divided between different policies, where none of those policies would involve a violation of constitutional rights. Perhaps, for instance, a majority want income differentials whereas a minority want flat equality with other kinds of incentives to lure people into unattractive jobs. In such a case the national forum has a duty to make sure that the implications of the two policies are clear to citizens, but, after people fully understand the likely effects of the two policies, in many cases it simply has to follow the preferences of the majority. Not always, however. In the case of some preference clashes it may be able to suggest some compromise policy which attempts to cater equitably for all interests. There may, alternatively, be some way of making special provision for minority interests, whilst implementing the majority decision. The democratic society is, after all, steadfastly opposed to endorsing one conception of the good life over another in its policies and will want its national decision-making body to use whatever judgment and ingenuity it possesses so to arrange matters as to allow individuals to realize their own conceptions of the good life. It is, as well, an elected body and if its compromise decisions or special arrangements are not acceptable to the electorate, its members will not be re-elected. If, however, it is successful in upholding constitutional rights and arriving at acceptable solutions where permissible preferences clash, it Will be acting in the spirit of the constitution and for the public good, because the public good in such a society involves, inter alia, promoting the basic principles of democracy to ensure as far as possible that individuals' conceptions of the good life can be realized.

There is a problem, however, as Amy Gutmann recognizes, in choosing individuals who display 'judicial competence' and who can be relied upon to interpret the spirit of the constitution and represent the public good. She thinks we must presume the 'potential judicial attributes of all citizens' (Gutmann, 1980, p. 200). We must not forget, however, the role of education in such a society. Liberals are sometimes accused of using education like glue to make stick political proposals which rest on an optimistic view of human beings. Perhaps, however, in a case like this that is the role for education. The important question is only whether education can perform it. In Chapter three I give some reasons for thinking it can.

PARTICIPATION IN THE WORK-PLACE

It was suggested in Chapter one that in a society aspiring to be a full democracy appropriate democratic arrangements would have to be extended beyond what is conventionally regarded as the political sphere to the work-place. This has been assumed, too, in the immediately preceding section. What would constitute 'appropriate democratic arrangements'?

My initial concern is with the internal democratic structure of work-places and not with their accountability to the wider society. We touched on issues of accountability in an earlier point about local and national monitoring of, for instance, policing policies and

towards the end of this section we shall be considering them again, because issues of internal democracy are inextricably linked with the democratic relationship of work-places to the wider community. Let us, however, focus first on a number of suggestions which have been made for rendering the internal structure of work-places democratic.

Work-place democracy equals the existence of strong trade unions

There is a persistent view that all the fuss about extending democracy to the work-place, attempting to devise schemes of greater worker-participation, investigating the desirability and feasibility of worker-co-operatives is really rather beside the point: if we take the trouble to look around our actual empirical democracy, we shall find that we have adequate work-place democracy now. A notable exponent of this view is Professor H.Clegg (1951, 1960). For Clegg what is crucial to the notion of political democracy is the existence of an official opposition so that the electorate may choose between men and parties. The mirror-image of the official opposition party (parties) in the political sphere is the strong trade union in the industrial sphere. If we have strong trade unions opposing management we have industrial democracy.

This account of work-place democracy can, it seems to me, be dismissed fairly briskly. First, as the sole criterion for the existence of democracy an official opposition is certainly not sufficient and may not be necessary. It is not sufficient, for one can point to historical examples where an official opposition has existed but the political system has not been a democratic one. One example would be the UK before the series of reform acts which extended the suffrage in the nineteenth century. Further, an official opposition party (parties) may not even be necessary to democracy as long as policies can be opposed by dissenting groups or individuals. This would allow small-scale groups, e.g. consumers' co-operatives, to be democratic even if they do not, as they almost certainly will not, contain organized opposition parties. But even if one granted Clegg's point that to have an organized opposition is to have democracy, his position is an untenable one because the crucial point about organized opposition parties is that they can replace the government, if the electorate so chooses. This a trade union cannot do. Clegg even recognizes this, he says: 'The trade union is thus industry's opposition—an opposition which can never become a government' (Clegg, 1951, p. 22). He does not seem to realize that with this admission his whole argument collapses.

I shall not spend any longer considering the view—surely a non-starter—that strong trade unions constitute fully-fledged industrial democracy. Anyone still finding that view plausible I would refer to Paul Blumberg's witheringly thorough demolition of Clegg's position in Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation (Blumberg, 1968, Chapter 7).

Work-place democracy equals worker-directors

Another version of work-place democracy which I shall not linger over is that found in the British Bullock report, which I take as an example of a worker-directors' scheme. The Bullock committee, constrained by its terms of reference only to consider 'the need for a radical extension of industrial democracy in the control of companies by means of representation on boards of directors, and accepting the essential role of trade union

organisations in this process' (my emphasis) (Bullock, 1977, p. v) came out, in these circumstances, with predictable recommendations. The main suggestion which concerns us was that in enterprises with more than 2,000 employees new joint boards should be established which would reduce the existing sole power of shareholders over a company's affairs, although the shareholders would retain the right to veto certain matters such as acquisition and sales of company assets. The new boards would be constituted according to a 2 x+y formula. This would mean that the 2 'x' groups, shareholders and employee representatives (chosen through trade union machinery) would each have an equal number of representatives and they would jointly choose a third 'y' group which would be an odd number greater than one, but smaller than x. (The Report suggests that the 'y' group could be representatives of senior management or experts like solicitors, bankers or full-time trade union officials.)

How far can these proposals be seen as an extension of democracy to the industrial sphere? Despite the fierce opposition they provoked from employers' federations, banks and other City interests, they must be judged, I think, as a very minimal extension of democratic forms into industrial life.

Although superficially such a scheme of union-based worker-directors looks somewhat like an extension of representative democracy into the industrial sphere, it is clearly more unlike than like. Elected representatives in the political sphere, although remote from those who elected them as the worker-directors are not, do at least exercise sovereign political power on behalf of the electorate. The worker-directors have no comparable power. Considerable power, amounting to the power of veto in some cases, is still held by the shareholders. Worker-directors are merely one voice on the board, one influence on any policy. In response it might be argued that this is wholly democratic as the shareholders have an interest too since they are putting up the capital. But why should the contribution of capital rather than labour give one ultimate power over an enterprise? What makes the contribution of money to an enterprise more significant than time, energy, ingenuity, perhaps, in some cases, even health? (These questions raise in turn another question to which we shall have to return. This is the question of the type of ownership appropriate to a fully-fledged system of work-place democracy.)

Even if the worker-directors system could escape the above objection, it still would not necessarily represent a thorough-going example of work-place democracy. For such a system of worker-directors could be compatible with a rigid determination of the day-to-day running of the enterprise in every minute particular from the top. It could be consistent with a policy which treated individual employees as so many more or less reluctant bodies to be shunted around or manipulated as seemed to be most efficient. Such a system of worker-directors, in other words, need be no particular respecter of the autonomy of the mass of the individual workers as moral agents.

The Bullock report recommendations, then—taken as one example of a worker-directors' scheme—fall short as institutional embodiments of democratic values.

Work-place democracy equals workers' co-operatives

Perhaps a more promising organization, democratically speaking, is the workers' co-operative, for an enterprise run by its work-force would seem to represent the ultimate

in the institutionalization of moral autonomy, in that the work-force determines the organization and policies of the enterprise. Certainly there were many who thought so in the period 1910–22, in the heyday of syndicalism and Guild Socialism. In the 1970s a number of worker-co-operatives were established in the UK, though often in slightly dismal circumstances as a last-ditch stand against redundancy. There are also more longstanding examples in the UK and elsewhere, probably the most well known being the Mondragon co-operatives in Spain (see, e.g., Oakeshott, 1978, Chapter 10).

Doubts about the desirability of worker-co-operatives have, however, been raised by Robert Nozick (1974, Chapter 8). Nozick first questions the likelihood of long-term investment in a workers' co-operative since workers will have little incentive to invest in long-term projects on which they will see no return. Secondly, he suggests that if profits are to be shared amongst workers, it may be in their interests to prevent the growth of the workforce so as to maximize average profits per worker rather than total profits. Finally, he points out that there may be great discrepancies in pay between workers doing basically the same jobs in different co-operatives. The first two points rest, it is true, on a rather pessimistic view of human nature and the possibilities of political education, but let us for the moment take them at face value. Certainly the force of Nozick's three points is to suggest that a system of worker-co-operatives would fit uneasily into a democratic society. It could in fact become a society composed of numerous producer groups, each characterized by a spirit of corporate selfishness. The problem is that the very structure institutionalizes group selfishness. Why should the workers making a particular product have total control over what they make and how they invest? What about the consumer's voice and the voices of all members of the community in what they want produced and how they want communal resources used? Independent worker-co-operatives may guarantee the autonomy of their work-force but at the expense of the autonomy of the rest of the community.

Work-place democracy equals state control of the economy

Is the next logical move state control of the economy with planning from the centre by democratically elected representatives? Here the problem for democracy—there may of course be other problems too!—is that when authority is exercised from outside the work-place in the interests of the whole community the position of the individual worker can be as morally depressed as under the most rigid system of individual control and ownership. She may have no say in the organization of her work-place and no recognition of her autonomy as a moral agent.

Work-place democracy equals worker-co-operatives plus community policy co-ordination

If we put together the last two possibilities, we arrive at a demand for machinery reminiscent of that described in the preceding section for the society as a whole. Workers of all kinds, in industry and in other organizations, hospitals, libraries, shops and so on have primary responsibility for the internal running of their own concerns. They must determine a form of democratic machinery for the management of the enterprise which enshrines the values of autonomy and justice and allows for equal access to the exercise, or control, of power.

This will undoubtedly be different in different contexts, though enshrining the same values. For this reason it is impossible to say anything in general about the kind of machinery that might evolve, except of course that it will always involve processes of consultation and accountability. At the same time the community oversees the general development of such institutions to guarantee that the public interest is not overlooked. Two kinds of policies contrary to the public interest might otherwise occur.

First, policies in the broadly economic area which might infringe constitutional rights. The need to protect these rights is the reason, as we saw in the last section, for establishing the national forum. That forum would be as concerned with the infringement of rights in the economic sphere as in any other, as indeed the previous examples about income differentials and employment policies indicated.

The second sort of policy, whilst not infringing constitutional rights, might well be contrary to the public interest when considered, not in isolation, but in the light of other policies. The need for a body (or bodies) to oversee community development for this reason has been underlined by the work of a number of people, including Barry and Hirsch (Barry, 1965; Hirsch, 1977). It is easy to demonstrate, for instance, that for some particular individual in the UK rationally considering her situation, the decision to buy a motor car seems a sensible one which will make life more pleasurable, comfortable and convenient. If enough people make that decision, though, as we know, roads are choked, journeys take longer than envisaged, there is air pollution, medical services need to be expanded to cope with road accident victims, and so on. This is one of the many examples that could be adduced where millions of 'sensible' decisions, discretely made, do not necessarily produce a desirable situation from the point of view of the whole community, including the original 'sensible' chooser. Consideration of this case suggests that a community transport policy would be preferable to a situation where any workers' co-operative can simply set up in business to make motor cars, motor scooters, helicopters or what you will to try and attract individual consumers.

The proposal is, then, for the extension of democracy into the work-place by means of self-governing workers' co-operatives with some machinery for community policy oversight and co-ordination (the national forum or some sub-committee of it) to protect constitutional rights and the public interest.

Participation in the work-place: two problems

Such is the general framework of machinery for the extension of democracy into the work-place. It may be thought, however, to raise more intractable problems than participatory democracy in what is traditionally regarded as the political sphere proper.

First, the problem of ownership. What form of ownership is compatible with participatory democracy in the economic sphere? More concretely, who owns the worker-co-operatives? Can the workers composing them own them or must the community own them? This raises questions about the justification for individual groups of workers owning such social goods as the resources and means of production of the enterprise in which they work. There is no need to go over again the problems of determining exactly what kinds of goods may, or may not, be owned by individuals in a participatory democracy (see Chapter one, p. 31f). But aside from the general moral issues raised by the question of ownership, a particular

problem emerges in a system in which individual workers own the co-operative. This is because part of the understanding of what it is to own something is that the owner has ultimate control over the thing owned. She can, after all, refuse to allow others to use it or continue using it. This being so, an individual in a co-operative who wanted to leave it would have the right to take her share, even if this seriously damaged the enterprise. Such problems can be avoided if the community owns the resources and means of production and leases them to the workers. So, for this practical reason alone, community ownership with the cooperatives leasing resources would probably be the preferred mode of ownership. In a situation, however, when talk of ownership in the conventional sense, as we saw in Chapter one, may not be appropriate at all, it would be foolish to claim that only one form of ownership is possible in a participatory democracy. As Dahl says of the Yugoslav situation:

> no one owns the enterprise. It is not, certainly, owned by the state or by shareholders. It is not owned by the workers in the enterprise. The point is that 'property' is a bundle of rights. Once the pieces in this bundle have been parcelled out, nothing exactly corresponding to the conventional meaning of ownership or property remains (Dahl's emphasis) (Dahl, 1970, p. 132).

In the light of Dahl's caution about too readily attempting to apply conventional notions of ownership to the participatory situation, it seems to me that leasing of resources from the community is permissible but other forms of ownership may be too. The acid test must be whether any given form is compatible with the kind of self-management and community policy co-ordination argued for earlier.

A related problem arises from the market economy. Is the latter compatible with the kind of participatory democracy described? Influenced by David Miller (1977), I am persuaded that at least a modified form of it may be; indeed that it may be essential for the realization of some democratic values. Let me explain. I take it to be basic to the idea of the market that decisions to produce goods or services are made not by some authority but by the producers themselves with a view to selling to customers who have no obligation to buy from them. In the kind of democracy I have described the initiative for the setting up of a co-operative would come in the main from individuals who would probably be leased the means of production from the state and. set up in business, attempting to make a profit from selling in the open market. I say 'in the main', because as I have indicated there would have to be the possibility of community control over the provision of goods and services. Profits would be taxed to build up resources for the community and to finance a welfare state. Co-operatives unable to make a profit, and which there were no public interest reasons for supporting either in the short or longer term, would clearly fold up. Their members would receive some kind of unemployment benefit until they were either able to find a more profitable line of production or move into other co-operatives. Such a market system allows for individual initiative, flair and ingenuity in producing goods in a way in which non-market public ownership systems do not. Those, in practice, often over-produce unwanted goods and foster black market systems. The market system in the participatory democracy allows for the exercise of imaginative business flair extolled by businessmen in our present society but without the morally obnoxious motivations often associated with that in practice—the desire for individual aggrandizement, for instance, or

the desire to exercise power over others ('I run 26 women and girls now,' as a production manager in a small firm proudly said to me). Here the motivations are rather different, the desire to make a profit for the community generally, to enhance the quality of life in it and the satisfaction of working with others on a project which has been jointly planned, developed and organized.

Participation in the work-place: three objections

There are a number of possible objections to the extensions of participatory democracy to the work-place. Let me consider three.

(i) The first springs from what is taken to be a crippling paradox in this position. The argument for workplace democracy is based on the assumption that moral autonomy is a value fundamental to democracy which must be enshrined in relations in the work-place as it is in democratic government. So far so good, a critic might argue, but the proposals advanced here, far from enshrining autonomy, are more likely to destroy it.

If everyone is to be herded into co-operatives what about the autonomy of the person who enjoys working alone, running a business, say, single-handedly? I am thinking of the taxi driver, peanut seller, flute teacher or what you will who finds a certain satisfaction in her independent mode of life precisely because she values the autonomy it gives her. Here, however, I see no problem and no paradox.

Individuals who want to freelance in whatever way they choose, can, like co-operatives, offer their wares on the open market. No authority relations are involved here and my only concern is to arrive at a democratic form of authority relations where they exist. Here they do not.

Potentially more serious is the same objection directed at work-place democracy where it does exist. Here, it might be argued, the aim is autonomy but in fact the participatory democracy would be tediously bureaucratic. Endless consultations and meetings would sap individual initiative and fetter autonomy. But this need not follow at all. There is no question, for instance, of a central government imposing some preconceived 'rational' framework of committees and so on on all institutions. Quite the contrary. The idea is self-management: that individual institutions—industrial enterprises and other organizations—work out their form of management. Within broad guidelines from the community, an individual enterprise determines its own organization, from the way it organizes accountability internally to the frequency of its various meetings. There is nothing to suggest that this system would be bureaucratic. One suspects in fact that a number of pressures would operate to keep the administration as functional as possible. It would obviously be in the interest of the whole work-force to have the enterprise run economically and efficiently.

(ii) There might be an objection (noted already in Chapter one) to what might be called the 'politicizing' of working life. Some people, it might be argued, are not interested in politics, they simply want to do an honest day's work. If, however, work-place democracy as an extension of political democracy is a moral matter, then I have suggested the alleged fact of apathy towards politics cannot count as an argument against introducing it. It will rather be a matter of getting people to realize that they have moral duties in an area where perhaps it had not occurred to them that they did (see Chapter one, p. 17f).

In any case I am not sure of the truth of the allegation. There seems to be considerable evidence to suggest that whatever may be the case about national politics, as far as having a say over working conditions is concerned, there is no lack of interest (Blumberg, 1968, p. 133 and research reviewed in Chapter 5).

This leads me to draw attention to two advantages of work-place democracy.

For many people it may be a way in to a more general understanding of political matters. As Blumberg puts it at the end of his book:

> To the extent that workers' management is successful, it enables—or rather, compels—the worker to see the narrow horizons of his minute task and to take on a greater perspective which encompasses his economic unit, his department, his factory, his industry, and, in fact the entire economy (Blumberg, 1968, p. 233).

And, he might have added, his community and its relations to other states.

Further, for some people it may even be a second chance for education more generally. It is now a cliche to say that education is a chancy business, but given our inadequate understanding of motivation we cannot afford to ignore the possibility that involvement in work-place democracy may awaken in some people an interest in economics, history or perhaps sociology or philosophy which they would never have dreamed could have had any interest for them.

(iii) Finally, there is the question of whether the 'average working person' will be able to cope with workplace democracy. As a recent pamphlet has it, 'Can Workers Manage?' There is much that one could say here, but I will make just three quick points.

When this question is raised, it is often forgotten that we do actually have many examples of workers managing, in this country, in the Mondragon co-operatives and in Yugoslavia. Unless therefore one is to argue that all these count as 'special cases', there seems to be no doubt that workers can manage.

One form of opposition to the kind of work-place democracy I have been arguing for may stem from a misunderstanding. Some critics are opposed to any such arrangements because they see them as an irrational absurdity. How is it possible for a firm's workers to assemble round a table and, e.g., correct a design fault in Concorde, work out a new computer programme or decide on the most appropriate overseas markets for its products? This is to assume, though, that work-place democracy implies that there must be no experts and that each member of the workforce must contribute to all decision-making at every stage. I cannot see that this is implied. What <u>is</u> implied if one is concerned to institutionalize democratic values is something rather different: a freely working, well-developed process of consultation and accountability. This may take various forms, depending on the context, but whatever precise concrete form it takes it must meet two conditions. First, no one, whatever her particular job in the firm, must be debarred from making a contribution to decision-making and indeed an ethos must prevail such that people feel free to offer suggestions and criticisms. Second, those involved in specialized decision-making must be accountable to fellow members of the work-force. I do not pretend that it will be easy to devise machinery, appropriate to a given context, to institutionalize such a process of consultation and accountability and equally difficult will be the development of attitudes of concern for others, willingness to have one's errors pointed out and so on which alone

could allow such machinery to work. When we can devise such machinery and encourage such attitudes, however, Blumberg, Braverman and Edgley all cite material to suggest that there is a vast amount of knowledge and expertise highly relevant to grassroots work-place democracy to be tapped. If our present organization of work assigns people jobs which require hardly any skill or training, it does not follow that those people could not exercise skill or judgment. We must not fall into the trap of thinking that a woman spraying a toy or filling a pickle jar can do only that (Blumberg, 1968, Chapters 5 and 6; Braverman, 1974; Edgley, 1978).

Finally, the dynamic role of political education is forgotten when people raise this question. We have hardly tried formal political education and even less have we tried education for work-place democracy, so whether or not workers can manage must, at least for the moment, remain an open question.

DECISION-MAKING

The question of how different groups in the participatory democracy come to decisions has been mentioned more than once. It is tempting to imagine that, in conditions of equal access to power, their members will, through reasoned discussion, come to an agreed view. But although this may sometimes be the case, there is no guarantee of unanimity. Citizens can be expected to hold different views on the priority to be given to different policies, for instance, and although some may modify their views on hearing the arguments for other policies, others may well find themselves confirmed in theirs. In the face of conflicting, considered and sincerely held views on a given set of policy options what can be done? In most cases citizens cannot simply agree to differ and shelve the decision: <u>some</u> policy has to be adopted and implemented. A quick review of the possibilities suggests that where there is conflict the most sensible course is to follow the wishes of the majority. What, after all, are the alternatives? One might insist on unanimity: but this allows one member of the group to veto a policy desired by all the rest. This hardly seems defensible, since why should one person have this power to determine affairs? Also constant striving for unanimity on all issues would effectively rule out any policies designed to change the status quo, since there is a strong likelihood that there would always be at least one person against any change. Going by the wishes of the minority seems equally to be a non-starter, for what grounds could be found for giving a small group of people the power to determine the policy for all? This appears to leave majority preference as the only reasonable solution. But, as we saw in Chapter one reasonable though majority voting may appear, grave and worrying problems face any democrat who attempts to justify it. The temptation is to go for a crude justification along the lines that majority voting is the best of a rather poor set of options because it at least satisfies more people than it disappoints on any given policy decision. Even leaving aside the familiar problems (some of which are discussed below) involved in the summing up of wants in this way, such a justification must make a democrat very uneasy. She is, after all, committed to democracy as that form of government which can best take account of the autonomy of the individual citizen, yet here she has to countenance a form of machinery for decision-making which overrides the autonomous choices of the

minority. Why are some people's autonomous choices to be preferred to others?' Can this be simply because more people happen to share them?

I wish now to discuss six specific problems raised by the majority principle. This will lead me to qualify the principle in various ways so that when we return to the problem of justification, we will be dealing with a different, modified majority principle. It will be a majority principle with some of its sharper corners knocked off: for that reason its justification may present less of a problem.

(i) To adopt the majority principle neat permits the possibility of majority decisions which repeal basic democratic rights. If enough people agree, the franchise could be limited, habeas corpus repealed, free speech outlawed, etc. etc. It seems clear that rights which guarantee the democratic framework of government must be safeguarded. The exact means of doing so need not detain us here (this may be an appropriate place at which to demand unanimity, or near unanimity), but it is clear that the wishes of the majority cannot be overriding, as these could be inconsistent with the values to which democrats are committed. A piece of machinery like majority voting cannot be allowed to destroy the democratic framework of society. That would be absurd.

Someone may raise the reasonable objection that democrats would not want to destroy the democratic framework. That is surely true in the abstract, but when people feel strongly about particular issues they may sometimes be prepared to vote for partial infringements of fundamental rights and in some circumstances contribute unintentionally to the piecemeal dismantling of the democratic framework. The best way for democrats to protect themselves against witting, or unwitting, attacks on the framework is to make the basic democratic rights (i.e., the rights securing access to the primary goods), constitutional rights and as such immune from majority voting procedures. Making constitutional rights immune in this way deals with the familiar problem, raised, for instance, by Bernard Williams (1973, p. 105), of the possibility of a majority depriving a racial minority of their rights. First and foremost, then, the a cross-the-board application of the majority principle must be restricted in the interests of safe-guarding democratic values (Pennock, 1979, p. 378 makes a similar point).

(ii) We have already touched on the use of majority voting procedures for decisions between preferences. In Chapter one we imagined a community with resources for one type of leisure facility only choosing between a swimming pool and a theatre. We raised the question, why, given a view of democracy which lays stress on the moral autonomy of individual citizens, one should give more weight to that view which simply happens to be shared by more citizens.

It might be argued that even those whose policy choice was not implemented still had their choices considered and that majority voting is consistent with democratic values, particularly egalitarian values, in taking the considered preferences of each person each to count for one. As I pointed out in Chapter one, however, a problem of injustice still remains (there I talked about it in terms of an exercise of power, p. 28f), in that the majority has its preferences considered and implemented and the minority only has its preferences considered (and not implemented). This is problem enough. But the injustice can be further compounded. It may well be the case that even the egalitarian consideration of all preferences is corrupted by the presence of 'external' preferences, as Dworkin has called them. Dworkin, in the paper 'Reverse Discrimination' (Dworkin, 1977), distinguishes

between 'personal' preferences—preferences a person may have for his own enjoyment of goods or opportunities—and 'external' preferences—preferences a person may have for the assignment of goods or opportunities to others. In considering the community's choice between the swimming pool and theatre, up to this point I have presented the case as if each member were voting according to his or her personal preference ('I can see plenty of drama on television, I will vote for the swimming pool! etc. etc.). But it may not be like this, I may not have any personal preference for either the swimming pool or the theatre: for whatever reasons I may not envisage myself ever using either facility. But I may well cast my vote in favour of the swimming pool because I would enjoy seeing firm-bodied athletic people strolling around the town, their graceful postures the result of much use of the swimming pool. Here, because of my liking for athletic-looking people, the swimmers are getting an extra vote. The contest is not, therefore, a straightforward one between personal preferences: external preferences are entering in too. The chance of anyone getting his or her personal preference is going to depend in part on how many people esteem or like him or her, or his or her way of life. This is a corruption of the original rationale for majority voting where each vote supposedly counts for one.

I must admit that I am at a loss to know how to tackle the problem of external preferences. There seems to be no foolproof way of detecting external preferences and discounting them. (2) Is the only safeguard political education? Clearly it can be a task within political education to point out the problem posed by external preferences in a democratic community, where the extent to which others esteem one's choices should not have the power to determine whether or not those choices are implemented. Within such an education people can be invited to reflect on the problem of external preferences and, when they have no personal preference on an issue, to consider abstaining from the vote. If people still wish to exercise external preferences, however, there seems to be no machinery which can be brought into play to weed out such preferences. Not unless, that is, one can use a piece of machinery which has been suggested to deal with the connected problem of intensity of preference.

The person who, as far as personal preference is concerned, is indifferent on an issue is obviously in the exactly opposite situation from the person who feels intensely on some issue. They are at opposite ends of a continuum of feeling. The problem of devising democratic decision-making machinery to take account of intensity of preference has exercised political theorists for some time. Various suggestions have been made for machinery which might be sensitive to different intensities of feeling amongst different voters. Pennock mentions an ingenious device by which individuals might register the strength of their feelings on a given issue. He suggests that individuals might be given a 'quantum of votes' which they could then distribute as they preferred, perhaps at the extreme using them all on one issue (Pennock, 1979, p. 416, note 3). Pennock does not go into details, about for instance the number of votes that individuals might be given in relation to the number of issues to be decided, and there is certainly no need for us to do so. Use of this device, it seems to me, might go some way to coping with the problem of external preferences. One might hypothesize (and what follows can be no more than a hypothesis) that if individuals had such a quiver of votes they might tend to husband them for use on issues in which they had a personal interest rather than let them loose on issues where the outcome was

a matter of personal indifference to them. Although, therefore, the intrusion of external preferences would always be a possibility, in practice this might reduce their incidence. Even if, however, the quantum of votes suggestion proves to be unworkable, we should try, by whatever means we can devise, to modify the majority principle to take account of the linked problems of external preferences and intensity of feeling.

(iii) A phenomenon associated with majority voting is the 'pork-barrel'. This term labels the well-documented tendency of elected bodies (e.g. the US Congress) to vote for benefits for particular groups in excess of what is justifiable. This occurs when two conditions obtain. First when representatives, to achieve a majority and secure a benefit, must have the co-operation of others with no interest in the benefit. Perhaps, for instance, the representatives of some locality are anxious to ensure that there is a decision to vote resources to enlarge its harbour because this will bring employment to the area. Representatives of other localities may be persuaded to vote for this project on the understanding that they will be supported in some future vote to secure some benefit for their constituents. This is the practice of logrolling. The second condition necessary for the porkbarrel obtains when the benefits go to determinate groups and the costs are borne by the general taxpayer. When this is the case support for particular projects is easy to come by because the benefits are highly visible to the beneficiaries and the costs not so visible to the general taxpayer.

No democrat wants this kind of waste of resources and whilst keeping the practice of majority voting there are at least two ways of combating it. The first, as with (ii), is political education. Log-rolling is accepted in large part because people are unaware of its tendency to overprovide goods at the expense of increased costs to citizens as taxpayers. Increased awareness of the hidden costs of 'I' ll scratch your back, if you scratch mine' would probably go a long way towards eradicating it. Secondly, the national forum argued for earlier (see Chapter one), with representatives acting as protectors of the constitution and concerned for the public interest, would also serve as a check on the policies coming from the representatives of the particular constituencies. It would be the specific responsibility of the national forum, as a kind of second chamber, to judge the policies arrived at by those interested parties from the point of view of the public interest.

It is possible in principle, then, to check the problems of overprovision and waste sometimes caused by majority voting by both educational and constitutional means.

(iv) It might be thought that if instead of voting individualistically or with sectional interests in mind people cast their votes according to what policy they thought was in the public interest, there would be no question of minorities having their preferences overruled. This would only be so, however, if people could agree unanimously on what policy was in the public interest. People do not agree on this. One is left with majority and minority opinions on what is in the public interest, so the problem does not go away but just reappears in another place.

(v) We have assumed so far that whatever difficulties there may be with majority voting, at least after a vote on any given issue we shall know clearly and unequivocally what the majority wants. This, however, may not be so. We may be confronted by Condorcet's paradox, which gets application when no policy is the clear favourite of 51 per cent of the voters and minority factions so disagree as to the relative merits of policies A, B and C that each gets one first-place vote, one second-place vote and one third-place vote, as indicated in Table 1.

Table 1

		Voting factions		
		1	2	3
Order of preference	First choice	A	B	C
	Second choice	B	C	A
	Third choice	C	A	B

Ackerman explains clearly how it is possible in this situation to get three different answers to the question 'What does the majority want?'

> An inspection of the matrix indicates that two groups of statesmen [voters] (1 and 3) will vote for A in preference to B; that two (1 and 2) will prefer B to C; and that two (2 and 3) prefer C to A. In this situation, the winning program [policy] will be determined by the group in charge of parliamentary procedure. If the citizenry is first required to choose between B and C, B will emerge victorious, with groups 1 and 2 voting against 3. If B is then paired against A, A will be victorious, with groups 1 and 3 voting against 2. In contrast, if A and C are first put up to the voters, A will be defeated on the initial vote; C emerges victorious from the first round of balloting only to be defeated by B on the second round, with 1 and 2 voting against 3! And it is easy to specify yet another order of balloting where C emerges as 'the' majority winner' (Ackerman's emphasis) (Ackerman, 1980, p. 290).

The Condorcet paradox situation does not yield a clear-cut answer to the question of what the majority wants. Furthermore it provides an opportunity for an individual or a group to exert unjustified power over others by manipulating the agenda so that her or their preferred policy achieves a majority of votes. Ackerman's proposal for a random-number machine to arrange the order in which A, B and C will be paired against each other deals with the problem of agenda manipulation at the expense of making what emerges as 'the' majority decision on policy a matter of chance.

(vi) So far we have been looking at the problems and difficulties which arise if we conceive of people voting according to their preferences, leaving out of account any question of what is morally right. A new and different order of problem arises if we conceive of people voting, as Wollheim puts it (Wollheim, 1962), according to their evaluations, that is for that policy which they think is the best one or the one which morally ought to be pursued. As Wollheim admits, this is a 'somewhat harsh' distinction, since of course there are connections between wants and evaluations, but these need not detain us now.

The problem, simply stated, is this. I may reflect earnestly on the many relevant considerations and sincerely come to the view that some particular policy, say a policy of positive discrimination for women and blacks in educational and job opportunities, is the morally right one. I am also, however, a democrat, committed to the principle that where opinion on policy is divided one should follow the decision of the majority. In this case let us suppose that the majority are resolutely opposed to positive discrimination. Given my two beliefs, about the desirability of positive discrimination and the desirability of following the majority decision, I find myself forced to be a highly inconsistent person. At 11.10 am, say, I am committed to positive discrimination, yet at 11.20 am,

following the majority decision, I am committed to a policy which roundly rejects it. Can democrats afford to adopt the majority principle if it involves them in this kind of extreme inconsistency? The argument throughout has been for democracy as the appropriate social arrangement for morally autonomous human agents. But how can this be if one of its prominent decisionmaking procedures will often involve individuals in a morally unacceptable inconsistency of view?

Wollheim attempts three resolutions of what he regards as the democrat's paradox. He suggests (a) that we might see an individual's policy choice as an interim evaluation. Interpreted in this way an individual's view is that policy A ought to be enacted if enough others think so too. But this is a very odd conception of political choice. Often, after all, an individual will vote in a certain way, knowing that few others will vote similarly, but thinking that she must do so as a matter of principle. Consider, too, that if the majority vote for policy B, on this interpretation, the individual revises her interim evaluation and supports policy B as that policy which most people think is right. The most damaging implication of this interpretation is, therefore, that it does not really matter what view the individual takes, A or B, since any policy could get her approval—if enough other citizens vote for it. This clearly makes a complete nonsense of political choice.

Alternatively, says Wollheim, one might take the view (b) that the result of the majority vote is not a policy which the individual morally ought now to follow but one which it would be wise or prudent for her to follow. Here there is no paradox. The individual thinks that policy A morally ought to be enacted but, at the same time, believes it would be prudent to enact policy B. The trouble with this way of resolving the paradox is that one cannot distinguish the person prepared to go along with democracy, perhaps to achieve power, from the genuine democrat who believes that the policy chosen by the majority ought to be enacted.

Having failed to resolve the paradox in the ways described, Wollheim attempts a quite different resolution (c) which consists in his attempting to show that an individual's belief that policy A ought to be enacted and her belief that policy B, the policy chosen by the majority, ought to be enacted (where A and B are not identical) can be quite compatible and do not lead her into a radically inconsistent position. He does this by positing the existence of direct and oblique principles. Direct principles refer to the morality of actions, policies, etc. where these are picked out by some general descriptive expressions, e.g. positive discrimination, justice, telling lies, etc. Oblique principles refer to the morality of actions picked out by some artificial property bestowed upon them either as the result of an act of will of some individual or in consequence of the corporate action of some institution. An example of a direct principle would be 'Positive discrimination is the fairest policy'. An example of an oblique principle would be 'What the majority wills ought to be done'. It is clear now that an individual can assert that 'Policy A ought to be enacted' as a direct principle and without inconsistency that 'Policy B ought to be enacted' as a derivation from an oblique principle, i.e. the principle that one should pursue the policy voted for by the majority. Wollheim's argument shows, if it works, that it is possible to be a democrat committed to following the decision of the majority without being inconsistent. I do not now want to pursue the debate in the considerable literature on Wollheim's paper (3) because even if Wollheim's arguments hold, they still leave the substantive moral dilemma for the democrat who is faced with following a policy the majority thinks is right but with

which she does not agree. She may not be inconsistent, but she may be involved in a clash of principles between a direct principle and an oblique one. In other words there may well be times when the democrat, seeing to what the oblique principle of following the majority decision commits her, will judge that another principle must, on this occasion, take precedence over this one. There is no reason, after all, why what is commanded by the oblique principle of the majority decision should take precedence over other moral duties. It is no more than a prima facie principle. The democrat may therefore be involved in a clash of principles, about whose status, thanks to Wollheim, we are now clearer. She may have to contemplate resisting the majority decision, perhaps in the extreme case by some form of civil disobedience. This substantive moral dilemma I discuss below (see p. 75f).

It is worth noting at this point that with Wollheim's arguments we have in a sense come full circle because although Wollheim may have shown that the democrat cornmitted to the majority principle need not be inconsistent, we have been given no reason why she should adopt the oblique principle of majority decision, even as a prima facie principle. This is a fitting point at which to conclude this section with the problem with which it began.

We have found no arguments wholeheartedly in favour of majority decision-making, but neither have we found any viable substitute for determining policy in the absence of unanimous agreement. The consideration of the problems raised by majority voting—the possibility that minorities might be deprived of basic rights, the possible overprovision of goods, the inability to discriminate between personal and external preferences and so on—suggests, however, that its use must be qualified. This is not the appropriate place to go into detail on the kind of machinery which might be used. We have, however, considered in passing some of the kinds of devices which democrats might want to use—devices like constitutional constraints to protect civil rights, the provision of a quantum of votes for voters to distribute as they please so that intensity of preference can be discerned, the use of a lottery to prevent agenda manipulation. These can all serve as correctives to a crude operation of a majority voting system. There may well be others too.

Bruce Ackerman advances a more radical proposal. He suggests the possibility of a lottery in place of a majority vote (Ackerman, 1980, p. 288). Where there are conflicting policies all of them go into a black box and the one drawn out is implemented. In the more familiar device of majority voting the judgments of voters are 'added up' whilst in the lottery every voter has a finite chance of deciding the political outcome. In this respect the lottery recognizes the individual's autonomy and also enshrines an equality amongst all voters. On the face of it it should be more appealing to democrats as a mode of decision-making than majority voting. Indeed it may be so to some people. But others may judge that majority voting, with all its flaws, has more to commend it. Unlike the lottery it at least always pleases more people than it displeases. This is perhaps a feature which should not be lightly disregarded. As Ackerman points out, however, finally to decide between these two modes of decision-making we perhaps need more research.

Some people may have missed in this section a special discussion of the 'permanent minority' and proposed solutions to that problem. (4) It seems to me, however, that the general devices I have suggested for modifying the majority principle are sufficient to cope with the problems of respecting the autonomy of an entrenched (e.g. religious) minority within the society. It is important to bear in mind that their basic civil rights are constitutionally protected and also that in the democratic society we are considering

many decisions are made at local, regional or work-place level. There should therefore be considerable space for such minorities to live out their particular life-style. Finally there is the safeguard of the overview by the national forum of those cases where a particular viewpoint, which does not violate any constitutional rights, is persistently overridden over a number of years. These arrangements taken together would seem to cover the problems raised for democracy by permanent minorities.

Several times in this section I have referred to the need for political education to encourage people to consider the questions provoked by majority voting. Information and discussion of the issues is clearly badly needed. As we saw at several points machinery, however sophisticated, cannot replace an understanding of the problems. In Chapter three we will look at the role of political education in providing the kind of understanding required.

DIRTY HANDS AND OPEN GOVERNMENT

We have discussed at a general level the kinds of institutions and machinery which might realize the principles underlying a participatory democracy: the structure of councils to allow for grassroots participation in decision-making; the national forum to monitor decisions in the light of the constitutional framework of rights; provision for participation in decision-making at the workplace; and the kind of modified form of the majority principle which might be used when there is no consensus on a policy or set of policies. Before we move on to look at the educational institutions required in such a society, we need to consider three topics all of importance for political education, which have not been covered by the institutional framework so far outlined. First is what I shall call for short the problem of 'dirty hands'. More precisely, the issue I want to consider is whether anyone involved in politics, particularly any officeholder, will have, on occasion, to do something morally reprehensible to forward some important and worthy political project. Bernard Williams, for instance, clearly thinks that such office-holders will have to dirty their hands:

> it is a predictable and probable hazard of public life that there will be these situations in which something morally disagreeable is clearly required. To refuse on moral grounds ever to do anything of that sort is more than likely to mean that one cannot seriously pursue even the moral ends of politics (Williams, 1978, p. 62).

It is clear from the paper that Williams has a number of morally unacceptable acts and omissions in mind, including 'lying, or at least concealment and the making of misleading statements' (1978, p. 59). Although Williams does not give any concrete examples, two examples which might fit the bill are provided by Sissela Bok in Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. She refers to two similar cases of deception in presidential election campaigns (Bok, 1978, Chapter XII). First, Roosevelt, whilst moving the USA closer to entry into World War II, was making statements like the following in his 1940 campaign to be re-elected: 'I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars' (quoted in Bok, 1978, p. 179).

Similarly Lyndon Johnson in 1964, whilst professing himself to be the candidate of peace, was preparing to escalate the war in Vietnam should he be re-elected.

Since Williams does not consider these examples I do not know whether he would think that in these cases the deception of the electorate was a necessary, and therefore justifiable, part of politics. It seems to me, however, that it is clearly not and that in a participatory democracy it would have no place. If this reasoning is correct, this would provide further grounds for preferring participatory democracy to other kinds. Let us consider why Roosevelt and Johnson might have felt themselves to be justified in concealing their true policies from the electorate. Presumably both of them were working with some Schumpeter-like conception of themselves as rulers who were chosen by competition to make policy decisions on behalf of the electorate before presenting themselves again for re-election. Within this conception the electorate of course is seen as, by and large, politically incompetent. This being so, benevolent rulers will often face a problem. On the one hand they will have formed a view of what they see as the wisest policy which any responsible statesman should follow, while on the other, they may well judge that the electorate, lacking access to all the available information and, for this and other reasons, being unable to make an informed political judgment, will not share their view of the best policy. This will have the disastrous consequence that the 'right man' (i.e., Roosevelt or Johnson) with the political will to carry through the 'right policies' will not be elected. Assuming that Roosevelt and Johnson were not resorting to deception simply to stay in power for some selfish end, then something like the foregoing is the only kind of justification that either could advance for his campaign. Given certain assumptions it is the best defence for deceiving the electorate about the policies each would pursue if elected.

Is it necessary, however, to make 'certain assumptions'? The participatory conception of democracy does not. It is based on the assumption, not that individual citizens are politically incompetent, but that they are responsible moral agents and should, as far as possible, be involved in the making of political decisions themselves rather than have them made for them. There is no conception of 'consent' to a political elite who are entrusted with political power to make the 'right' decisions and thus shoulder what might be considered to be impossible moral burdens for the ordinary citizen. In so far, therefore, as in any participatory democracy there is any system of representatives (as there certainly would be in the case of the national forum and in other contexts too), then those representatives must be expected to place before the electors honest accounts of the policies they would pursue if elected. Any concealment of policies means that citizens are not able to vote according to the candidates' policies and this is necessarily destructive of the democratic system. It is impossible to make a rational choice amongst possible representatives and subsequently hold them to account for their performance in office if one does not know what their policies will be. This defence of deception as ultimately in the citizens' best interests cannot, therefore, be reconciled with the fundamental rationale for a participatory democracy. Put the other way round, participatory democracy rules out such deception and should on that account be preferred to the Schumpeter-type conception. It might be argued that this claim assumes that honesty must always be treated as an absolute value. On some occasions, however, perhaps deception should be permitted in order that some greater good may be realized. This may well be the case in some few circumstances and I shall try to deal with those below. To allow, however, that it applies in this case is to

make a whole range of assumptions, for instance about the existence of political elites and politically incompetent masses, which would run quite counter to all the arguments for self-determination and against paternalism which were presented earlier in arguing the case for participatory democracy. These arguments would suggest that it is not possible to justify political arrangements which rest on systematic and carefully planned deception of citizens by rulers.

What about those cases, however, where some minor deception of citizens by rulers will secure some greater good? There must surely be a place for white lies in an emergency and so even in a participatory democracy it seems that politicians will have to dirty their hands. Cases which might be thought to count as acceptable deceptions might include, for instance, those where the government denies that it is going to devalue (when in fact it is) so as to avoid unfair profits to speculators, and those where a 'cover story' is issued to the press to the effect that it is a cold which is forcing a President to return to the White House when in fact it is an international crisis.

There is a temptation to think that these are innocent lies which are easily justifiable and that it would be almost over-scrupulous to hold government spokesmen to account for them. As Sissela Bok points out (Bok, 1978, pp. 170–81) however, by allowing such deceptions it is all too easy for lying to become all-pervasive as a practice in government. Almost any lie can come to be justified for the eventual greater good of the people and lies can come to be used to keep the 'right people' (the honest, upright politicians!) in power, to cover up past mistakes or simply to sustain the present administration. Lying is an insidious practice. It spreads and it is habitforming: those involved in it gradually become insensitive to considerations of veracity. Sissela Bok eloquently describes this process.

For all Sissela Bok's eloquence and the stern moral demands for honesty echoed here, will not the participatory democracy still have to countenance white lies in a crisis like the ones mentioned? Where devaluation is concerned, it is not at all clear that it must, since a firm policy of 'no comment' for such situations can be established. To be workable, however, this policy itself must be strictly and honestly adhered to so that no comment means what it says and is not simply used when the government does not want to admit that it is about to devalue. The 'cover story' case is harder to deal with. First, without knowing a good deal more about the context of this particular deception, it is hard to decide whether it is justifiable or whether it falls into the same category as the Roosevelt or Johnson deceptions. If the thought behind the deceptive cover story is that if 'the people' know the truth they will panic and this will have all kinds of unhappy consequences, then this again rests on a view of 'the people' which is incompatible with the assumption behind a participatory democracy. Let us sup-pose, however, that some more substantial defence can be put up for the cover story. Perhaps for instance it is essential if international tension is not to be increased. If we further suppose that such a case cannot be covered by a policy agreed to in advance by citizens, we may have an example of an excusable deception. Who is to judge, however, whether it is an excusable deception? Only in my view the citizens with hindsight. Any government or member of a government which has practised such deception must subsequently offer to resign and stand for re-election. This is, I think, the only way that one can ensure that governments are accountable for their deceptive practices. Failure to comply with this procedure would have to attract the heaviest penalty, for instance individuals' being debarred from holding public office again.

The rationale of and basic assumptions underlying participatory democracy rule out, or put considerable curbs on, a great number of the deceptions which politicians feel justified in employing within a representative democracy like our own. What are seen as permissible deceptions from the standpoint of rulers conceived of as a benevolent and wise political elite taking care of the interests of their subjects are ruled out by an egalitarian stance towards the exercise of political power which assumes that, as far as possible, power must be shared amongst morally responsible and morally competent citizens. Ruled out too, and for the same reasons, is unnecessary secrecy on the part of government. British government, whatever party is in power, is notoriously the least open of the democratic governments with which we are familiar. In fact if a British citizen wanted to have information about all kinds of things which she might well think she had a right to know—from, for instance, the hygiene and safety standards in British cooked meat processing plants and details of defective British bicycles and motor vehicles, to plans for the evacuation of areas around nuclear plants in the case of accidents—she would need to get such information from US government files, as British researchers do (Michael, 1982, Chapter one). In Britain the relevant reports are secret and unavailable; in the USA, under the Freedom of Information Act, they are open to inspection. I do not want to go into details about the boundary between necessary and unnecessary secrecy in government, since this would take us too far from the main issues of the institutions and machinery for democratic government with which this chapter is concerned. It will be clear that, as with deception, the presumption must be in favour of openness and the free availability of information to citizens, since only in these conditions can they take decisions or assess the wisdom of decisions taken by others on their behalf. Openness must be the rule except in those cases where it would lead to considerable harm being done to quite innocent communities or individuals. Certainly whatever policy is finally adopted must be the result of open debate and discussion on the issue of what is and what is not to be secret and confidential.

In this treatment of the topic of 'dirty hands' I have concentrated on the deception which might be thought to be justifiable on some views of democracy and so built into the democratic arrangements. It is expected that election campaigners like Roosevelt and Johnson will not be telling the whole truth but presenting their respective cases in the best possible light, which may well involve omitting some facts or considerations. I have concentrated on this kind of deception and the related topic of secrecy by governments because, as I have tried to show, these undesirable practices, whilst ruled in on some conceptions of democracy, are firmly ruled out on a participatory view. I have not considered practices, like the accepting of bribes, which would be ruled out on any view of democracy. I have also not yet examined the problem Thomas Nagel raises in 'Ruthlessness in Public Life' (Nagel, 1978). Here Nagel is concerned not with deception but with another claim made about political systems, namely that the use of coercion and manipulative methods is permissible in the public sphere when they would not be in private life. Nagel gives two examples, conscription and taxation. Of taxation he says:

> If someone with an income of $2,000 a year trains a gun on someone with an income of $100,000 a year and makes him hand over his wallet, that is robbery. If the federal government witholds a portion of the second person's salary (enforcing the laws against tax evasion with threats of imprisonment under armed guard) and gives some of it to the first person in the

> form of welfare payments, food stamps, or free health care, that is taxation. In the first case it is (in my opinion) an impermissible use of coercive means to achieve a worthwhile end. In the second case the means are legitimate, because they are impersonally imposed by an institution designed to promote certain results (Nagel, 1978, p. 88).

In Nagel's view it is not because of the citizens' consent to it that taxation is legitimate:

> Consent is not needed to justify such legislative action, because the legislature is an institution whose authority to make such decisions on consequentialist grounds is morally justified in other ways. Its periodic answerability to the electorate is one feature of the institution (another being the constitutional protection of rights) that contributes to its legitimacy—but not by implying each citizen's consent to its actions (Nagel, 1978, p. 87).

I find Nagel's views puzzling. It seems to me that consent does enter into the justification of taxation. There has to be consent on the part of citizens to a system of taxation (of whatever kind) and to a body, or set of bodies, which will determine actual taxation policy, if the moral autonomy of citizens is to be equally respected. It may be that Nagel would allow such consent to the whole system and that what he is denying is that a particular taxation policy is legitimate, if, and only if, every citizen has consented to it. If we assume that that is what he intends, this particular problem of ruthlessness in politics is clearly different from the issues of deception and secrecy discussed already and it will be clear why I have separated it off from those. The problem in the taxation (and perhaps the conscription) case (5) arises with those citizens who do not support the policy and are therefore coerced into conforming with it. This however is the problem discussed in the previous section, the problem of the minority which cannot agree with the majority decision. To label it in this way is not of course to dismiss it, for it is perhaps the most intractable problem for democratic theory, particularly on a participatory view of democracy which lays stress on the conception of the citizen as a responsible moral agent. It is, however, to suggest that since it is a different problem, it cannot like the cases of deception be almost entirely eliminated from democracy (on the participatory view of democracy): a whole variety of means will have to be considered to modify the operation of the majority principle to take account of it. This was suggested in the previous section and will be considered again in the discussion of civil disobedience.

The participatory democracy, then, in its basic rationale and procedures is antithetical to deception, even benevolent deception, and to secrecy. It also recognizes the problem of the coercion and manipulation of the minority and must, given its rationale, be committed to a search for practices and procedures (e.g. devolution of decision-making, the device of the quantum of votes, etc.: see previous section) to mitigate the operation of the majority principle. Other things being equal, this provides further grounds for preferring this form of democracy over others.

FRATERNITY

In Chapter one certain basic attributes of the democratic citizen were discussed, but since at that point the conception of the participatory democracy had not been outlined a complete

treatment of the kind of attitudes which citizens in such a society should have towards each other had to be delayed. Among the points about attitudes that were made in Chapter one, it was stated that in any democratic society individuals must be tolerant of others involved in very different activities and styles of life. This is a delineation of an essentially stand-off relationship. It is necessary but not sufficient in a participatory democracy, for its citizens must also stand in a fraternal relationship to each other. What does this mean? What is demanded over and above the tolerance referred to, if people are to have fraternal attitudes to their fellow-citizens?

Perhaps this attitude is best delineated by contrast with a number of others which are similar to it, or contingently connected with it but distinct from it. A simplistic approach to fraternity regards it as the attitude which necessarily obtains between those involved in a communal project. The rough idea here is that if people are putting up tents together, or playing in orchestras, feelings of comradeship and togetherness will be generated. There are two points to note. First, engagements in communal projects may not generate such feelings, but feelings of competitiveness, envy, even hostility. Second, even if they do generate more positive feelings of, for instance, liking to be in the company of others, such feelings may not be sufficient or even necessary, for the fraternal attitude. This will become clear, I think, as we probe this and related attitudes further.

Suppose we consider people engaged in co-operative ventures. Here, it might be thought, if people actually want to co-operate with others in some joint leisure activity like sailing a boat or in some business enterprise, this involves their being willing to fit in with others, to do their share, to display, in other words, cooperative attitudes. And if one has such attitudes, is this not just another way of saying that one stands in a fraternal relationship with the others involved? After all such a person need not see her colleagues simply as functionaries to be judged only in terms of their contribution to the venture. It is quite compatible with this view for her to regard them also as people with lives outside the enterprise and with their own interests, projects, hopes, fears and worries. Yet, I want to claim, this need not be a fraternal relationship. What is lacking, then? Why should one want to resist the idea that these people stand in a fraternal relationship to one another?

Some have suggested that it is affection or liking which is missing. These are difficult notions in an area where one needs to make a number of fine distinctions, because the feelings and emotions here range from those of sexual attraction, to a kind of aesthetic delight in the configuration of features found in another person, to a pleasure in the company of someone sharing similar values to oneself, or perhaps radically different ones. For this reason it is easy to say very silly things about liking and friendship, as even Aristotle does. I shall try to avoid that by not making any attempt at a fullscale examination of these notions. Instead I shall simply try to state what I think people may have in mind when they suggest that something like liking is the elernent required. This is that liking someone involves, among other things, enjoying that person's company and wanting, other things being equal, to spend more time in it. Even if, however, the members of the co-operative group enjoy one another's company, they may do so in the way that a nephew might enjoy the company of four eccentric aunts. They are fun to be with, they are all really rather 'cards'. One may have those feelings, and they are quite common in groups which have worked together over time and whose members have come to appreciate each others' foibles and eccentricities, but one may still not feel fraternal to one's aunts or workmates. What, then, is the elusive

missing element? It seems to be the feeling of a bond between oneself and other as equals. To feel fraternal towards others is basically to relate to them as equals. That is why the co-operative group whose members see one another not simply as co-operators but also as people with lives outside the enterprise is not necessarily a fraternal one, because the members may not perceive any common bonds relating them as equals. It is common, for instance, to find employers who appreciate their employees as good members of the workforce (as good co-operators) and who realize that they have lives outside the plant (they have hobbies like angling and take holidays in Margate) but who feel no common bonds with them as equals. Indeed they may feel that their own attitudes to life, the whole pattern of their sensibilities and sympathies set them in a world apart from their employees.

As we noted, liking one's colleagues is not a sufficient condition of having fraternal attitudes towards them. Is it even necessary? In the sense in which I have taken it, as enjoying people's company and wanting to spend time with them, it seems not to be. If something like this is right, why do I claim that citizens in a participatory democracy must feel fraternal towards each other? If they are tolerant of others with different styles of life and so on, as suggested earlier and in Chapter one, why do they need, in addition, to stand in a fraternal relationship? Fraternity as I have outlined it, namely as feeling a bond between oneself and others as equals, as moral beings with the same basic needs and an interest in leading a life of one's own, is the necessary emotional attitude between citizens who hold that one of the basic principles of their society is that power must be exercised, or controlled, equally by all moral agents who form the citizen body. It is the only appropriate attitude for one citizen to have towards another. Servility on the one hand, or patronage on the other, or any related attitudes on the continuum in between, must be ruled out by the basic values underpinning the participatory democracy. Fraternity is the attitude which accompanies the principles outlined in Chapter one and serves as the dynamic motivating force behind the setting up of the institutions designed to implement those principles and in their subsequent operation.

This is clear if we recollect our earlier discussion of the majority principle. At the end of that discussion we were left with the nagging problem of the minority, a worse problem if it is a permanent minority, but always bad. It was suggested that there is a need to try and find new machinery which will cope with the problems of conflicts over policies in a way which more perfectly realizes the underlying principles of the participatory democracy. Meanwhile it was argued that citizens have a duty to mitigate the worst effects of majority voting on the wants and interests of minorities by, for instance, striving to reach compromises or in some situations devolving decision-making so that minorities in the whole community become majorities in some local decision-making body. To undertake the search for new machinery or to attempt to mitigate the effects of current decision-making procedures on minorities, citizens have to want to make the whole situation a more equal one. They will want to do these things, other things being equal, if they feel themselves to be related to their fellows in the community as equals. If I strongly feel myself linked by fraternal bonds to others in my community I shall want not to profit at their expense, but want their interests and projects to flourish along with my own. Exactly the same point can be made in relation to the cases of deception and secrecy discussed in the section on dirty hands. If one feels oneself to be in a community of equals, one will not want to practise the deception or secrecy considered there because both the selfish desire to maintain oneself

in a position of power and the paternalistic desire to protect weaker brethren from their follies are not motives compatible with such a feeling. Fraternity amongst the citizen body is the vital motivating force if the machinery through which the democratic principles are implemented is to be constructed and used in the right spirit.

This account of participatory democracy puts considerable weight on the necessary role played by fraternity. Critics may suggest that this is where the whole project must founder because such feelings, whilst strong in some individuals, do not occur naturally in all of us. Some may even wish to oppose the development of such feelings, even if it were possible. As Donald MacRae says:

> The doctrine of alienation is related to the most dangerous and least rewarding aspect of the French revolution: the terrifying injunction to fraternity. To speak very personally and seriously, I approve both liberty and equality; I regard it as an essential liberty that I am not promiscuously called 'Brother'. I welcome the division of labour and the diversity, even the anomie of advanced society (MacRae, 1969, p. 69).

Let us take the point about the naturalness of such feelings first. In this respect the feelings of fraternity I have talked about are no different from, say, feelings of sympathy or gratitude or indignation. All of these are learned. There seems to be no reason why people should not learn to feel fraternal. This will involve acquiring both certain beliefs about one's fellow-citizens and also a certain attitude towards them. It should not be impossible for education, broadly conceived, to do something about both aspects. We cannot at the moment dismiss that possibility. We cannot regard the fact that children do not at present develop into fraternal citizens as a failure of education to achieve an aim to which it is seriously bending enormous effort and energy, since in the communities with which we are familiar the promotion of fraternity is not a significant educational aim. We should also note that in a fully-fledged participatory democracy fraternal attitudes will both underpin the institutions of the society and also be themselves undergirded by the social structure which does not permit gross discrepancies in the share of primary goods between citizens. This will minimize the structural obstacles in the way of citizens relating to each other as equals. In our society, although it is possible for individuals to relate to others as moral beings with the same basic needs and an interest in leading a life of their own, it is made harder rather than easier by a structure which, for instance, permits some an income ten times that of others. The participatory democracy can turn what can be a vicious circle in our society into a benign one; it can encourage individuals to relate to each other as equals so that they want, for this reason, to ensure that intstitutions secure to all their fair shares.

In Chapter three we will be examining a political education in which the promotion of fraternity is a prominent aim. We can consider there the strategies suggested to achieve it and their likely success. Certainly there seem to be no a priori grounds for pessimism about the possibility of people coming to acquire fraternal attitudes.

Even if it is possible to develop fraternal attitudes, however, should we do so? MacRae's outspoken rejection of the ideal is echoed by many of those working in the liberal democratic tradition. But is MacRae attacking the ideal of fraternity I have been developing here? He seems concerned that if he embraces fraternity he will be committed to uniformity in life-styles and to an unlookedfor 'togetherness'. But as I was careful to argue, the notion of

fraternity employed here goes along with a tolerance of diversity in others' life-styles and interests and carries no demands that people should engage in communal projects or should enjoy spending the major part of their time in the company of their fellows.

This account has attempted to separate fraternity from apparently related ideas. I have tried to argue that a fraternal attitude, necessarily connected with the principle of justice underpinning the democratic state, must be encouraged in all citizens.

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

In Chapter one we examined the principles underlying participatory democracy and in this chapter we have considered the institutions and arrangements for decision-making which might realize those principles. We have ruled out certain practices inimical to the working of democratic institutions and we have explored the attitude citizens should have towards their fellows if the institutions are to work well. If the institutions, arrangements and attitudes all worked perfectly according to this rationale there would be no need for this present section. Even a society, however, which conscientiously tried to organize itself in every detail according to this plan could not expect perfection. We have to face the possibility of mistakes, negligence, selfishness, authoritarian attitudes, all interfering with the working of the democratic institutions. Most of the errors and anti-democratic attitudes and their consequences will be taken care of by the inbuilt procedures of accountability in the democratic system and any wrongs redressed.

There are cases, however, which the accountability machinery will not pick up. One such is the minority which strongly objects to the majority decision but can do nothing about it within the framework of the decisionmaking process. We can imagine, for instance, the majority agreeing to fight what the minority considers to be an injust war. The minority tries all the legitimate methods usually used to get a political body to change its mind. Letters and articles putting the opposing case appear in the newspapers, spokesmen of the minority appear on television, informal lobbying goes on, there are even large peaceful protests, marches and rallies. But the majority stands firmly by its decision. What can the minority do? They might simply accept the decision, holding it to be foolish and even morally wrong, but going along with it. But if this is too much for their consciences to bear there remains the possibility of civil disobedience.

Let me make clear what I understand by civil disobedience. An act of civil disobedience is similar to a crime in that it involves the breaking of a law, but there the resemblance ends. In the case of civil disobedience the law will be a minor, or unimportant one, say, a traffic or parking regulation, but one where its infringement, especially by large numbers of people, is likely to cause considerable disruption. The law will be broken not for some personal objective of a worthy or unworthy kind—for instance stealing a loaf of bread to feed starving children or a jar of caviar from Harrods to impress one's friends—but for a political objective. The objective will usually be to draw attention to an act or omission on the part of a political body which is held to be a grave injustice and/or seriously harmful to the interests of a segment of the population. Acts of civil disobedience are not violent acts, where the intention is to threaten or use violence. If they were, they would be acts of political violence or terrorism. The intention behind an act of civil disobedience is to draw

attention to a political grievance in a dramatic way. It is rather like a protest march, but goes beyond the protest march in causing inconvenience and disruption, often to the participants themselves as well. Traffic obstruction, for instance, not only disrupts the flow of traffic, but may well clog the courts with hearings of many hundreds of minor offences, as well as causing the participants to be fined.

The above account gives a rough and ready picture of civil disobedience and marks it off reasonably well from political terrorism. There are further points one could attempt to settle—for instance, is willingness to suffer punishment a criterion of civil disobedience?—and there is a considerable literature through which this and other issues could be pursued; but for our immediate purposes these can be left on one side. (6) Our immediate task is to see if civil disobedience can be justified and for that the present account will suffice. I should add at this point that I am not discussing political violence and acts of terrorism which, unlike acts of civil disobedience, may have as part of the intention behind them that fellowcitizens be injured or killed. In a participatory democracy these could never be justifiable. Recall that we are not concerned with a political body bent on policies of oppression but with one which seeks to further citizens' interests but which, operated as it is by human beings, may be adversely affected by mistakes, negligence, cover-ups, authoritarian attitudes. In certain regimes it may be possible under certain conditions to justify carefully specified types of political violence (see Honderich, 1980, Chapters four and five). It is hard. to see how this could ever be justifiable in a participatory democracy. In so far as anyone might judge that political violence was necessary, it seems clear that the society would have moved far away from the participatory ideal and would thus be outside the scope of this essay.

Given that we are concerned only with civil disobedience, under what circumstances would it be justified? One might be tempted to think that it would be ruled out as firmly as political violence. There could after all be a great number of official and permitted activities, protest marches, demonstrations and so on, so could people ever be justified in breaking the law to achieve a political objective? I want to argue that they might be but that they would need to acquire political judgment through political education enabling them to see whether or not they would be justified on any particular occasion. This is because in any particular case a number of factors need to be weighed against each other. Judgment is necessary first of all to determine (i) whether or not the political objective is sufficiently important to merit the likely disruption the law-breaking will cause. Extreme cases present few problems. Clearly the civil rights issues and the anti-Vietnam war campaign in the USA in the 1960s and early 1970s were important enough. If a local council wanted to change the colour of the litter bins this would almost certainly not be. There are likely to be many cases between these extremes where the individual will be considerably exercised over whether or not her political objective is sufficiently important to merit illegal action. Political education, although it cannot provide a slide rule to measure the importance of political objectives, can at least prepare the individual to face such judgments. Importance must, in any case, be considered alongside the question (ii) whether or not the political authority concerned is or is not going to do anything about the issue. The objective might be an important one, but if it seems likely that the government is going to take action over it in the very near future civil disobedience may be an unnecessary indulgence. Finally

(iii) the means chosen to draw attention to the grievances must be as limited as is compatible with their achieving the objective, which is to get authorities to reconsider their policies.

Even if, however, all three conditions are satisfied, there may still remain doubts about whether civil disobedience is ever justifiable in a participatory democracy. Would this perhaps be tantamount to political blackmail? I am not sure if civil disobedience is correctly described as political blackmail, but I am certainly suggesting that in some instances a limited illegal use of power is justifiable. In the particular instance with which we began, that of an implacable majority exercising power over a minority, those indulging in civil disobedience are using a limited amount of power to bring home to the majority that there are people who take a different moral view of the situation. The majority are being asked, fairly forcibly, to reconsider their views. In this respect civil disobedience may be said to even up somewhat the power relationship between the majority and the minority. In certain circumstances, as where the minority is faced with a policy to fight what it considers to be an unjust war, individuals may judge that a limited illegal use of power is justifiable.

It will be important in political education programmes to bring home to people that besides their political duties of participation and so on they may, on some occasions, have a duty to be civilly disobedient. When and how will often be difficult to determine but historical cases of civil disobedience may help one to judge. Were the suffragettes, the anti-Vietnam war campaigners justified in civil disobedience viewed from the perspective available to them at the time? The whole topic will need careful treatment in a political education programme pupils should, for instance, be disabused of the idea that civil disobedience is the only option if a vote goes against one—but it is not a topic that should be avoided. It can obviously profitably be linked with work on decision-making and majority voting.

STRATEGIES

In the course of Chapter one and this one I have elaborated the basic principles of democracy and discussed in some detail their implementation within the institutions of a fully democratic society—or at least a society as democratic as human frailty will allow. That setting is not, however, the democratic society in which any contemporary readers will find themselves. How then should I proceed from here?

After setting out the arrangements for the provision and control of education in a participatory democracy, I could just stop and let these thoughts stand as a suggested blueprint for a future democratic society, to be discussed, approved or rejected by any interested readers. I am not, however, inclined to do that. I want rather to move on and talk about strategies and policies for changing from the kind of constitutional democracies (7) we are familiar with to the participatory democracy outlined. It seems to me that there are better and worse ways of moving from our present situation to a participatory democracy and these can be publicly debated. The rest of this book can be seen as a contribution to such a debate. At this point some readers may feel uneasy. Whilst they may have been reasonably happy to follow the case presented thus far for the basic principles and institutions, they may wonder what kind of credentials I can present to justify adopting certain policies rather than others to bring about the desired participatory arrangements. It might be thought that these policies about ways and means are matters for empirical investigation by political scientists rather

than a philosopher. To some extent this is true, of course. At a number of points we shall have to leave some aspects of certain policies to be settled when the outcome of empirical investigation is known. There are, however, points for the philosopher, too, to make about acceptable strategies. First, certain policies can be shown to involve inconsistencies: some, for instance, may presuppose an encouragement of competitiveness amongst citizens which would fit ill with the democratic society they are endeavouring to realize. Identifying such unacceptable policies is clearly a philosophical task and there are many worthy examples in political philosophy of philosophers at work in this way. (8) Second, given her reflection on the principles involved, there is no reason, it seems to me, why the philosopher should be debarred from suggesting policies which might realize these principles—given always that further empirical work may be required to see if these suggestions are worth entertaining.

In the following three chapters I shall be talking about one aspect of education, namely political education, and two social roles, those of parents and headteachers, which will be very different in the participatory democracy from the forms in which we know them in contemporary society, and I shall be suggesting policies which might bring about those changes. Given the educational focus of this essay the pivotal role of political education in this process of change will be apparent. The next chapter deals with this. Parents and headteachers are less obvious cases for treatment. However, for anyone interested in an advance towards participatory democracy, the rights and responsibilities traditionally associated with these roles require careful examination and revision. Interestingly both roles often seem to cause their contemporary occupants much trouble and heartsearching. This attempt at a reassessment of them is perhaps timely.

3
Political education

This chapter begins with a discussion of the control and provision of education in general in a participatory democracy. As we shall see the issues raised bear closely on the topic of political education, the nature of which in a participatory democracy is discussed in section two. A third section is devoted to some philosophical considerations relating to the form political education should take now in our society. The chapter ends with two policy recommendations.

THE CONTROL OF EDUCATION

In talking about education in this essay I am, for the most part, confining myself to the basic formal education provided for young people, e.g. that provided in schools in our own society for pupils from five to sixteen. In some future work I would like to talk about the democratic society's policies towards higher education, professional trainings of all types, the provision of opportunities for learning activities outside the education system, and the potentially educative effects of social institutions and the media. Here I shall only gesture towards some of those areas whilst concentrating on the provision and control of basic education.

It might seem that we already know who is to determine what this basic education should consist in and how it should be organized. In the previous chapter the point was made that work-places, like other organizations, must be subject to democratic organization and control. Schools, like factories or hospitals, are work-places, so it would seem to follow that what is provided in any particular school will be a matter of what its work-force decides to offer, subject only to any general guidelines laid down by the national forum (see Chapter two, p. 39f). Formally speaking this is correct, but there is an important difference between factories and schools in the way in which each is affected by the national guidelines. For the most part a factory is likely to be only lightly regulated. The role of the national guidelines is to protect constitutional rights (to outlaw, for instance, practices which discriminate against ethnic groups) and to ensure that policies which favour sectional groups are not pursued at the expense of the public interest (see, for instance, in Chapter two the example of the transport policy, pp. 46–7). Within these boundaries individuals are free to set up enterprises to produce whatever they please from elastic bands to machine tools.

On schools, however, the national guidelines will bear more heavily. Their role is still, of course, to protect constitutional rights and ensure that the policies of individual organizations do not run counter to the public interest. The difference is that the school is in business to provide people with a primary good, namely education, which is one of their constitutional rights (see Chapter one, p. 11). As I have argued elsewhere, in a democratic society it is in the individual's interest and the public interest that she has an education which enables her to participate in society as a responsible citizen (White, P.,

1973). That means an education which encourages her to develop autonomously, to be able to distinguish what is in her real interests from what she may currently want, or have been brought to want and enables her to understand and participate in the exercise and control of power. The provision of such an education as a primary good, itself a means to further primary goods, is the whole raison d'être of educational institutions and thus their activities must be subject to considerable control by the national guidelines.

Some people may accept that there should be political control over education but question why it should come from the centre. Why national guidelines? Why not devolve educational decisions down to local groups and let each locality or community interpret the constitutional right to education as it sees fit? Against such total devolution, it seems to me, there are no moral arguments but there are practical and political ones. The practical ones need not detain us. They are concerned with, for instance, the desirability of a certain uniformity of learning objectives and school organization so that the training of teachers and also the transfer of teachers and pupils between different educational institutions in different parts of the country is facilitated. The political arguments concern the most appropriate machinery for guaranteeing the constitutional right to education for all citizens and ensuring that educational policies are in the public interest. As we saw in Chapter two, this monitoring/co-ordinating role has to be performed by some accountable authority standing outside the network of local groups. We introduced there the institution of the national forum. This body is required just as much in the educational sphere as in the industrial one.

The details of the division of labour between the national forum and the schools and teachers in any locality will be for any participatory democracy to decide in its historical situation. But it is possible to make three general points about how the guidelines will bear on schools.(1)

(i) One aspect of the individual's constitutional right to education concerns her entitlement to an education which will enable her to become a responsible citizen, able to exercise and control power. Either to exercise power herself or to hold other wielders of power accountable she will need certain necessary intellectual equipment. This will constitute the minimum we can demand of citizens, even those who are not themselves directly involved in large-scale decision-making. The process of accountability is not a straightforward matter of the political bodies presenting their records to the individual citizen for her discrete, individual consideration. In the participatory democracy there will be a complex machinery of accountability—checks within political bodies, watchdog committees, comment from independent media like newspapers and television—but ultimately, using these resources, the individual, as a morally responsible person, will have to arrive at her own assessment. The educational bedrock enabling her to do this is a broad understanding in the main areas of knowledge. Given the institutional structure we are assuming, this means that institutions providing basic education must ensure that all their pupils enjoy a broad curriculum, including, for instance, mathematics, the human and physical sciences, history and the arts. If political bodies are to be held accountable, the citizen must be able to judge that they have taken all relevant considerations into account in arriving at their policies. Even this fairly modest requirement will be impossible unless the citizen has some awareness of the considerations which could bear on political decisions. The extent to which tackling such political problems as pollution, conservation and population control

depends on a great range of different kinds of knowledge is demonstrated in masterly fashion by John Passmore in Man's Responsibility for Nature (Passmore, 1974). It may well be that some of these considerations, for instance mathematical ones, bear on political problems more rarely than others, but with political problems, as with moral ones, one cannot say in advance what knowledge will bear on them and what not. A broad general curriculum is thus the first requirement for citizens in a democracy if they are to act in a politically responsible manner and the broad framework of this curriculum will be laid down by the national forum. Within this framework individual localities and teachers in them will determine the more particular selection of content in the light of their own strengths and local conditions and opportunities.

As well as laying down the framework for the broad curriculum the national forum will have to ensure that explicit attention is given to political education, both (a) on the theoretical side, enabling pupils, e.g., to develop coherent frameworks of political concepts and also the ability to assess political arguments which will involve the acquisition of relevant factual political knowledge; and, (b), on the dispositional side, so that pupils are disposed to care about political matters. (2) Again the broad objectives will be nationally determined, whilst working out the means to achieve them will be the task of the local schools and teachers in them.

(ii) As well as guidelines on the content of education—the broad curriculum required and on political education in particular—there will be general guidelines on teaching methods and the organization of educational institutions. These are likely to take the negative form of, for instance, ruling out indoctrination and certain kinds of hierarchical authority structures, unnecessary secrecy, and manipulative devices. Within these boundaries members of each institution will be left to work out their own teaching and organizational arrangements.

The case has already been made for content guidelines if the child's constitutional right to exercise and control power is to be guaranteed. Guidelines for teaching and the organizational structure of the school are equally necessary, not least since the child acquires a considerable amount of her political knowledge in an informal way through her membership of the educational institution. It would be foolish to have carefully worked out content guidelines whilst leaving teaching procedures and particularly the structure of the school unregulated.

(iii) The guidelines elaborated under (i) and (ii) concern the individual's education as a democratic citizen, although the broad curriculum provided for in (i) would also obviously contribute to her more general development. To foster her development as an autonomous person the national forum would also need to lay down guidelines to ensure that as wide as possible a range of activities and learning experiences were available in any locality. This would take the negative form of outlawing any restriction of activities and the positive one of using sports and arts subsidies to help widen options for young people beyond basic education. An elaboration of this argument will be found in Chapter five. There I shall argue that it is in large part the parents' responsibility to guide their children towards such options, although it is the community's responsibility to provide the resources for them.

The preceding three points indicate the three broad areas of the national guidelines. The details of the machinery for producing these, including that regulating the relationship between the central body and the teachers in any given locality, will need to be determined in the historical situation in which people find themselves.

Some readers may think that while it is reasonable for me to refuse to provide a detailed blue-print, they have been told enough to feel considerably troubled about the role of teachers in a participatory democracy. Whatever the details of the machinery turn out to be, teachers must necessarily come out, they may argue, as a depressed class. They are the people who know about the process of education but their professional judgments about, for instance, the aims of education are to be overruled by a political body, the national forum, whose behests they must implement as mere functionaries. Leaving aside the highly coloured language of behests and functionaries I make no bones about endorsing this as a correct expression of the way things must be. Teachers can be in no privileged position as regards the aims of education, since these are necessarily connected with views on the good for man and the good society. They are not moral experts on these matters any more than any other sectional group is and they cannot be allowed to determine the community's overall goals and policies, as they would be doing if the control of education, including its aims, were solely in their hands. But this is not to say that teachers' professional judgments are to be discounted as they obediently carry out the tasks assigned by their political masters. On curriculum and school organization the national forum only lays down guidelines. Within the broad framework for the curriculum it will be for teachers in individual schools, or localities, to decide on detailed syllabuses. Here their professional judgment will come into play as they decide in the light of their pupils' abilities and experience, local resources, their own strengths and weaknesses, what particular topics they will cover and in what way. Similarly where school organization is concerned teachers, along with others working in the institution, will be able to establish their own internal arrangements for the running of the school. On the detailed means to be employed in achieving educational aims the teachers and educational theorists are authorities, able to deploy their educational judgments on appropriate programmes, sequences of topics, modes of teaching and so on as completely autonomous professionals.

It is perhaps worth pointing out as a kind of aside that there are certain modes of teaching and certain subjects which will be ruled out by the aims of education in the participatory democracy. As we saw in (ii) above, any kind of indoctrination—that is getting people to believe propositions unshakeably against all possible evidence—is not allowable. The organizational guidelines will explicitly rule out all forms of this. A full-blown case of indoctrination through the structure of educational institutions would be the intentional design of the organization to induce in its members certain unshakeable beliefs. Clearly this would be antithetical to participatory democracy and fairly unlikely to occur. What the organizational guidelines are intended to prevent, however, is unintentional indoctrination via the structure of educational institutions whereby, for instance, members came to believe that they held an elite or lowly place within the society. Teachers are unlikely to find such attempts to improve practice unduly irksome.

Certain subjects, too, will be ruled out, most notably perhaps religion if taught as a faith to be accepted. Religion as a social phenomenon considered sociologically, historically and as a background to the various literatures of the world will, of course, be studied in its major forms. What will not be permitted is conversion of children into good Christians, Moslems, Hindus and so on. This is because imparting and encouraging of particular faiths runs counter to the basic aim of encouraging personal autonomy and allowing children to choose a way of life. What of parents' rights in this matter? In Chapter five we will be

looking at the parents' right to convert their child into a good Christian, etc. outside the basic education system.

With such qualifications as these in respect of teaching methods and subjects ruled out by the basic principles of the participatory democracy, teachers are free to interpret national curriculum and organizational policies as they see fit in their own contexts. For them to demand the right wholly to determine educational aims and curricula would clearly be unjustifiable and would amount to a claim to exercise more power over the future shape of the society than any sectional group can be allowed.

This then is a sketch of the broad structure for the provision and control of basic education within a participatory democracy. It provides a background for the sections more specifically on political education which follow.

POLITICAL EDUCATION IN A PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

Political education in the participatory democracy is not conceived as an extra subject to be tacked on to the curriculum. In this respect there is the strongest contrast with our society in which in recent years there has been considerable agitation about widespread political ignorance and apathy among young people and recommendations have been made for beginning political education as a specific subject in the first school and introducing it into the secondary school curriculum (see, e.g., Crick and Porter, 1978; and Robins and Robins, 1978). By contrast in the participatory democracy people are politically educated through all the structures of the society and this process is made explicit in basic education.

Let us consider how this operates by looking first at the education system. What one needs to grasp here is that political education provides the framework for the whole of education. It is not simply one element within it, either tacked on or integrated: it is the context for the whole enterprise. At this point I need to dispel obvious misinterpretations of what I am saying. I am not suggesting any such crude politicizing of the curriculum and whole educational process as is often associated with totalitarian regimes. I am not suggesting, for instance, only those literary texts with an explicitly political aspect, like Brecht's Galileo or Trollope's novels, or those parts of science which have some explicit bearing on contemporary problems like pollution or population control, or political history concentrating narrowly on the activities of parliaments and other ruling groups. By saying that the whole of education is set within a political framework I mean that the structure of the education itself expresses a certain political stance. The education has the structure it does because this is the way the community thinks it can best realize the values and attitudes to which it is committed. If a child within the system asks why it takes the form it does—in basic education, in the particular organization of her school and so on—the answer must come back in political terms. The rationale for the basic education involves spelling out the community's conception of the development of the individual as an autonomous person and a citizen; detailing the reasons for the range of optional activities young people are encouraged to sample involves an elaboration of the community's conception of the person and the pluralistic society in which people can best be supported in making the best of themselves; the rationale for the particular organization of the school involves an account of the form authority structures must take to accommodate the conception of people as

autonomous citizens. This bare account can be supplemented with comments on the role of education as a primary good and its consequent protection as a constitutional right. Within this framework, of course, there will be whole areas of study and the learning of all kinds of practical activities—from astrophysics to basket-weaving—in which politics as such and the kind of topics we have been considering in this book will never occur. (There will, however, be some explicit consideration of political matters as I indicate below, p. 90f.) It nevertheless remains true that all these learning activities take place within a political framework, which in some sense provides a rationale for them and which can be made explicit.

This is probably the point at which to dispel another possible misconception. I have suggested that the political rationale for the educational structure can be made explicit but have not said anything about whether, and how, it should be. I pictured a child asking about the education system only to make my point about the political context of education more graphically. I am not suggesting that when a four-year-old asks 'Why do I have to go to nursery school, Mummy?' the parental response should take the form of an abstract rigmarole about primary goods, constitutional rights, defensible authority structures and the like. There are two points to be made here. First, it is a matter for educational judgment as to when, as part of the child's political education, one makes explicit the political framework of the education she is experiencing. All kinds of factors come into play here, motivational ones as well as ones to do with the level of the child's understanding; it would be foolish of me to attempt to lay down pedagogical guidelines in a general, abstract way. This is a judgment to be made by practitioners within the field of political education. Second, we must not forget that simply by being within the educational structure one acquires, implicitly, and by degrees, and not necessarily in logical order, some understanding of the political structure of society, particularly as it bears on education. This is not unique to the participatory democracy, of course. Many sociological commentators on our own society, like Paul Willis in Learning to Labour, have noted what one can learn from the organization and curriculum of the school about one's society and one's place in it (Willis, 1977). The difference with the participatory democracy is that for everyone learning through the structure is a matter of coming to understand how the system works, what one's place in it is, what rights, obligations and opportunities one has. Most important of all it is a matter of developing fraternal attitudes to one's fellow citizens which inform and give a context to all the knowledge acquired about rights, obligations and opportunities. In this respect growing up in the participatory democracy is very much like becoming a member of a club, where each member enjoys the support and encouragement of the others in developing her own particular interests and style of life. This makes a contrast with political learning in the constitutional democracies we are familiar with where some individuals can certainly acquire a great deal of political knowledge but where citizens differ vastly in what they learn, and where there is no thread of fraternity underpinning the whole. In our society blacks, workingclass people and to a lesser extent, women are likely to learn that society is indeed in some sense a club but that to different degrees they are only associate members of it without full status. Certain jobs, educational opportunities and styles of life seem to be open only to full members: those with partial status, although they have legal and political rights, find that whole areas of the society's life and opportunities are closed to them. The

education system in the participatory democracy, however, provides a context for growth into the status of a full member of a society of fraternal, autonomous citizens.

Later, after the end of formal education the educational development of the individual continues through the structures of work-place democracy, as she learns to become a contributing member of a working group. Here again the organization of the school has given her an introduction to work-place democracy which is filled out when she herself joins the work-force. In many other pects, too, participation as an adult in the institutions of the society—leisure centres, hospitals, libraries will constitute a further development and refinement of the individual's political education. This learning will be cumulative, with little, if anything, that needs to be unlearned, since as we have seen the participatory democracy is all of a piece in its attitudes to its social arrangements. It will not be a case of learning one set of co-operative, concerned attitudes in school only to have to forget these when one joins an atomistic workforce locked into an adversarial relationship with its employers.

I have gone on at some length about the development of the individual's attitudes and dispositions through the structures of the participatory democracy since this will be by far the largest and most important form which political education will take. It is particularly important since in this form principles, machinery and appropriate attitudes can all come together in a coherent way. It cannot, however, constitute the whole of an individual's political education both because the knowledge and experience acquired would tend to be haphazard and somewhat patchy in its coverage of the main items with which citizens should have some acquaintance and because of the dangers of indoctrination. It will need to be supplemented during basic education by a theoretical or formal political education. This will have three main elements.

(i) It will be concerned to make explicit and available for critical consideration the principles, attitudes and assumptions underlying the participatory democracy, that is values, like justice and benevolence, the fraternal attitude and assumptions about man and society. The links between these bedrock principles and attitudes and the actual political machinery of the society will also be drawn out so that the contingent status of the latter becomes clear. Then arrangements for and against particular realizations of the principles can be examined.

(ii) Relevant political knowledge, too, will need to be made available to pupils. All types of knowledge will fall into this broad category—for instance, knowledge about the political debates in which the society is currently engaged, which will include some historical account of how these issues became politically important; knowledge about social structure; detailed knowledge of particular institutions; knowledge about the international political scene in so far as this is not already covered.

(iii) (i) and (ii) have centred on the principles, machinery and concerns of the participatory democracy. Citizens will, however, also have to be aware of alternative forms of disposing of power within communities: they will need at least some theoretical acquaintance with other political systems. This broader perspective will counteract any parochialism which might otherwise develop. It will also constitute some safeguard against indoctrination in that it may do something to prevent people coming to believe that the most desirable form of society is the participatory democracy without ever having considered other possible forms.

This section on political education in a participatory democracy is only a sketch, to give some indication of how the constitutional right to education might, in broad outline, be implemented. I have not attempted to go into detail, partly because any details would necessarily be speculative since they would be produced without knowledge of the particular historical circumstances, and partly because I am more interested in the forms which political education might take now, in our society, as a means to helping to bring about participatory democracy. With this rough picture of the general objectives of a political education in a participatory democracy in mind, we can turn our attention to the detailed shape political education might assume in the here and now.

POLITICAL EDUCATION IN OUR SOCIETY

Political education in our society will have the same broad aims as in the participatory democracy. Of the highest importance will be an understanding of the principles underlying democracy and an appreciation of the contingent status of the machinery devised to implement them. Relevant political knowledge will also be required. Necessarily going along with the principles and knowledge and of equal importance will be the fostering of a fraternal attitude amongst citizens. Again, as in the participatory democracy, the education will have two aspects, a theoretical one and a practical or institutional one. The second, I want to argue, is immensely significant for the individual's political learning. To emphasize this I want to discuss it first.

Political education: the school organization

In the participatory democracy, as we have seen, the content and organization of education will be democratically controlled both nationally and locally. We also saw that for teachers, dinner supervisors, helpers, caretakers, secretaries and so on schools are work-places and like workers in any enterprise those working in a school should be able to expect that its decision-making arrangements for all internal matters will recognize their autonomy. This means concretely that all those working in the school should participate in decisions which affect their work and be accountable to their colleagues for their delegated responsibilities in the running of the institution. I have argued for similar arrangements on general grounds to do with the appropriate relationship between workers in any enterprise in Chapter two. Here I want to argue for democratic arrangements among workers (i.e., non-pupils) in any educational institution from the point of view of the pupils' political education.

There is certainly room for debate over what precise parts of political education should be the responsibility of the school. There is, however, one aspect of political education about which there is no choice. Any school must have some kind of organization, some procedures for making decisions among its employees. (For instance, some things may be decided at staff meetings, some things may be decided by the head, some decisions may be left to individuals.) A fair proportion of these decision-making procedures, in turn, are bound to be known to most pupils. There is no way in which all the procedures could be secret or confidential. Indeed it would not cross anyone's mind in most schools to attempt to keep them so. It follows, therefore, that as well as learning their French, maths,

environmental studies and so on pupils are also learning how their particular school is run. They are developing conceptions of authority, power, what it is to be responsible for something, what are considered appropriate decision-making procedures and so on. What I am suggesting is that if we are to provide children with an acceptable political education we have to be sure that we can defend our decision-making procedures and the roles and statuses we assign to different members of the institution as the ones most suitable for a school in a democratic society. In this connection we may need radically to revise a common British conception of the school head. Is it appropriate, for instance, for the head of an educational institution to be the (often) unchallengeable determiner of both major educational policies within the school as well as the details of the dress of its members? Could the role of head as often presently conceived be replaced by administrators covering some of her functions and, say, a school's council covering others? (see Chapter four)

If you feel inclined to doubt what I have said about the pupils' knowledge of the school organization, you might like to find ways of asking pupils about the organization of their school, who decides what and so on. In my experience even infants' school-children give a pretty accurate picture of the way things are, organizationally speaking. That being so, the important thing is that it should be a defensible picture. In so far as pupils are getting a picture of an indefensible authoritarianism they are being led into an inconsistency. There is talk of democratic ideals, practices, etc., but they see that important institutions in society are actually being run on anti-democratic lines. A political education which involves these unexplained contradictions and inconsistencies is clearly falling short.

It seems to me very important not to underestimate the educative influence of a well-run democratically organized school. The point I am making here is essentially that made by R.B.Haldane about the civil service in 1923 in his presidential address to the Institute of Public Administration. There he said:

> It is not only by rendering highly skilled service to the public in dealing with administrative problems and questions, even of policy, that the civil servant of the future may serve the public. The Civil Service, if itself highly educated, may become one of the greatest educative influences in the general community. It may set a high example and may teach lessons which will have far-reaching influence. I believe in its own interests, not less than in those of the State, it is well that it should set this ideal before itself as one which is of immense practical importance in its tendency to raise the standards in business and in life generally of those with whom it will have to be dealing constantly (quoted by Thomas, 1978, p. 159).

The same might be said of the day-to-day dealings of all the staff—teachers, secretaries, dinner supervisors, caretakers—in a school.

I now want to say something about the participation of pupils in the school organization. There are various ways of viewing such participation. One could argue for it on instrumental grounds—if pupils are involved in their school organization, it improves their school work—or on grounds of children's rights. I do not want to take either of those lines. Instead I want to argue for participation as a necessary part of children's political education in a society which aspires to be a more thorough-going democracy. Of course, even if you accept that experience in the running of democratic institutions is a necessary part of political education—and I shall give reasons in a moment for thinking that it is—you might argue that children could get it elsewhere, in voluntary organizations like youth clubs,

sports clubs, Scouts, Guides and so on. I would accept that point in general. As I have said, there is room for debate over precisely what aspects of political education should be the responsibility of the school. In a society rather differently organized from our own children might well get this experience in voluntary organizations. In our society, where education is compulsory up to 16—two years before people are expected to participate responsibly in national politics—but where not every child belongs to a voluntary organization, there is a strong case for pupils getting their experience of participation in running an institution, in school.

Now, if one accepts that one important place for such participation is the school, this still leaves the question: is participation in the running of democratic organizations a necessary part of political education?

At this point it is important to recall the conception of democracy developed in Chapter one. Then I argued that the presumption in all authority structures must be in favour of direct participation in decision-making unless good reasons can be found to the contrary. From that it follows that political education must prepare people for such participation in later life. This gives us four reasons why the experience of participation is an essential part of political education.

(i) The first reason is the crucial one. It relates to the acquisition of political attitudes, for instance, attitudes to authorities, power, working with others and so on. The point about attitudes—familiar from discussion about moral attitudes—is that people do not acquire them overnight. Attitudes develop, they build up. None of us were silly unreasonable children until some magic age at which we suddenly became reasonable, considerate, etc. It is the same with the kind of political attitudes we want to encourage in democratic citizens. People can acquire all sorts of knowledge about democracy. They can learn that citizens should be, for instance, appropriately critical of authorities, tolerant of other viewpoints, willing to have their mistakes pointed out and to rectify them especially if they are wielding power and so on, but they need political experience to learn how to do these things in context. For instance if you say to a 12-year-old before a meeting 'If we're going to get through all the agenda items before 1 pm I think you will need to be a fairly firm chairperson. Don't stand for any long, irrelevant contributions' she will be unable to take your advice, even if she wants to, unless she has had some experience of attending meetings, having her attention drawn to the way in which they are chaired and having already had some experience of chairing meetings herself. She has to know how to be firm without being autocratic and actually be able to do it—judge the right moment to intervene in an overlong contribution and find the right form of words with which to do it on this particular occasion.—and this, given human beings as they are, is unlikely to be possible unless she has had the opportunity to try, and been advised and corrected on the job. In our society it is the school par excellence which can provide such carefully guided practice in participation in decision-making if it shapes its school organization with that end in mind. The remaining three points follow from this one.

(ii) This kind of experience of decision-making would provide a valuable model of small-scale political organization, often lacking in the kind of political education which in concentrating on national politics, gives people the impression that politics begins and ends with the activities of central government. Such school experience could be useful in connection with consumer groups, residents' associations, shop-floor committees and

so on, making them more accessible to people who might otherwise see them only as self-help associations for the informed and socially assured. Providing such experience in school would allow people to develop the abilities and social confidence to permit them to function in such groups when they judged this to be appropriate.

(iii) Guided experience of decision-making in school would also provide a yardstick against which in due course to measure the authority structure of the work-place and it would enable people to make some contribution to the organization of work-places on democratic lines.

(iv) Properly planned school experience in decision-making, as an integral part of political education, should provide opportunities for everyone to feel that they can be politically effective, can contribute to decision-making. This would make a not insignificant contribution to the struggle against sexism and racism in our society. In addition it would concretely illustrate ways of life in business, public administration and so on which would give people some understanding of jobs which might otherwise remain closed books to them. Again, this would be an attempt, if only a small one, to even up job opportunities for different sections of the population.

Three objections

The above arguments will by no means convince everyone. Let me try and deal with what seem to me to be three important objections. Before I consider these, however, there are two qualifications to be made without which there could be some misunderstanding of the position argued here. First, I am not concerned to determine precisely what children should and should not decide and at what ages. For reasons already explained, they will not be taking decisions about the shape and structure of the whole curriculum. Beyond that it is not possible to go further here than the general principle that the presumption must be in favour of direct participation in decision-making unless good reasons can be given as to why that is inappropriate. The detailed work on exactly how children can contribute to decision-making in their schools must necessarily be done by others, taking into account the details of local conditions. Second, what I have outlined is certainly not to be taken as constituting the whole of political education. The kind of experience in decision-making argued for is only one part, although an important part, of the whole task of political education. Now the objections.

First, it might be argued that this treatment neglects the obvious point that politics is about power, that

> political skills, whether exercised within a democratic framework or not, are predominantly those that enable one to impose one's own views on others, and get one's own policy or one as like it as possible—whether or not one regards it as in the best interests of all concerned—translated into corporate action…. The love of power, the competition of rival factions—surely these things are absolutely typical, indeed of the essence of any political acitivty.

Therefore, the argument goes on, democratic participation in schools is likely 'to prematurely whet the appetite for power and intrigue' (Dunlop, 1979, pp. 45–6).

In one particular this is right. Any politics, as I have repeatedly stressed, is about power in that the decisions made necessarily affect people's lives and interests, crucially or trivially. In this sense decision-makers may be said to exercise power over others—most obviously, as we have seen, in compelling them to pay taxes, less obviously, in determining what gets on to the political agenda. This is a fundamental point which no one involved in decision-making should lose sight of. Indeed, in the kind of experience in decision-making in schools I have been advocating the force of this point can be brought home to every single pupil, since, if the organization is planned intelligently, everyone will, at some point, be involved in decision-making and therefore in wielding power. Pupils can therefore be made aware of the fact that they are morally responsible for the decisions to which they contribute. Far from neglecting the point that politics is about power, my argument in favour of experience in decision-making, actually emphasizes that point and its moral implications.

On the other hand, I would reject the view expressed that political skills in a democracy must necessarily be exercised with the purpose of imposing one's views on others. Of course, in organizations which claim to be democratic this can happen—no institution is proof against human frailty—but there is no reason to regard it as a necessary part of political life. One of the functions of the school experience of decision-making would be to help pupils to make judgments about the nature of sectional interests and the common interest and their mutual relationship. These distinctions and judgments are among the most difficult in politics, as we have seen, but there is no reason why pupils should not slowly build up some understanding in this area over time so that at least they are not limited to the simplistic view that politics can be no more than a sophisticated means of getting your own way. Rather, they are able to consider and aspire to a conception of politics which sees its task as attempting to order people's lives together so as to allow individuals to flourish in a fair and fraternal society. Furthermore, the experience of participation can help pupils to acquire the habits of working within the conception of politics to which they aspire. Thus the educative force of the school ethos can help them to acquire habits and intellectual conceptions pari passu. My point is, very emphatically, that there is no reason why the school ethos should necessarily emphasize power-seeking, thus whetting the appetite for power, rather than a concern to do what is right in the context of the whole community.

A second worry about pupils' participation in school organization is that it may constitute a form of indoctrination or, at least, an undesirable kind of moulding. In other words, there may be openness at the level of formal political education—all kinds of possible forms of political organization may be discussed—but the structure of the school will carry a determinate message: this is how an institution should be organized.

Undeniably this is how things must be, I think. As I have hinted already and as I shall argue again (see below, p. 109f), however, one can escape the charge of moulding pupils' views of democracy through the structure of the school by encouraging them to appreciate this very problem. As part of pupils' political education one must ensure that they appreciate that the school has to have some decision-making structure. They must then come to understand the particular one which has been devised for their school, whatever form it takes, and finally they must grasp that as a democratic structure it is not fixed for all time. It can be changed in all kinds of ways.

A third and different kind of objection might be levelled at the proposals here, not in principle but as a practical possibility. It might be argued that although it would be

desirable to have schools run democratically, it is not possible because teachers, never mind dinner supervisors, caretakers and so on, would not be able to cope with the demands it would make on them. Teachers, as well as non-teaching staff, might find it difficult to cope with the experience of being questioned by children, having to justify school policies and so on. They might also find it hard to give pupils responsibilities for which the pupils would be accountable. Something of this sort might well be true and I think it has two interesting implications. First, it suggests that people seeking employment in schools, in any capacity, might have to give evidence of their willingness and ability to work within such a democratic system. In other words, if we are to take these proposals seriously, superb teaching qualifications or fast typing speeds and efficient office practice will not be sufficient for someone who seeks employment as a teacher or a secretary in a school. How the evidence of willingness to work within a democratic system is to be obtained raises questions, but if such a system is to be introduced this will have to be tackled. Second, there could be training schemes for school staffs, probably of a fairly practical work-shop nature, although—and this goes back to the first point—for people to be considered for schemes they would have to want to work within a democratic framework. These are stringent demands but necessary ones if the school is fully to realize its potential influence in creating an ethos which will foster democratic habits in its pupils.

Political education: the curriculum

(i) In our society the education system as a whole cannot provide the political education which it does in a thoroughgoing participatory democracy. The system as it stands cannot be made explicit to pupils so as to indicate to them their future status as autonomous fraternal citizens because it does not have that rationale. As commonsense observation and much work in educational theory has made plain, our education system is warped throughout by its selective function which overshadows all else. From the start of their school lives children are progressively channelled into large occupational groupings—professional, middle class, white collar and skilled and unskilled manual worker—and given an education which is deemed to match their occupational status. Solicitors, doctors and accountants need Jane Austen, Virgil, modern history, physics and so on, hairdressers, transport workers, hospital porters need English lessons based on their own experience, computation, art and technical drawing. Teachers and schools could of course make all this explicit to their pupils as part of a political education, but it would be wholly negative.

As we have seen however, the essential bedrock of a political education is a broad grounding in all the main areas of knowledge, which will enable children to make personal and political choices. What can teachers do here constructively? Where the whole curriculum is concerned, individual teachers can do relatively little beyond pressing for a broad curriculum in their schools and at any other educational level where pressure can be applied. Individual schools with sufficient like-minded teachers can do very much more because in the British context they have considerable curricular autonomy and so can make conscious efforts to ensure that children enjoy a broad curriculum. I know a number of schools, both primary and secondary, where attempts to provide a broad curriculum for each child are meeting with considerable success. One obvious reason for this is that people of very different particular political persuasions can support such a curriculum.

(ii) Politics is not a discipline like mathematics. It is, rather, constituted by several areas of knowledge—sociology, history, political philosophy, economics and law—in its central concerns. As well as a broad curriculum, therefore, children, if they are to receive an adequate political education, will need relevant economic, historical, sociological, philosophical and legal knowledge (see White, John and White, Pat, 1976). These studies will have to form part of everyone's course of study, either taught independently or in an integrated course. They have clearly, a special status in relation to political education. The information and the insights they provide are indispensable to political understanding. Nothing can substitute for them. If they are not available, there is just a gap in the individual's political awareness. Any school intending to provide a political education must ensure that it has a well-thought-through curriculum policy in these areas. I suggest some elements of the philosophical component below (see below, Political education: politics teaching: a philosophical perspective).

(iii) Other subjects—English, drama, music, art, science—could make specific contributions to political education. In addition there are several reasons why it would be desirable for a school to have a 'political education across the curriculum' policy. Let me explain how such a policy might work and the reasons for it. First, the policy. What I have in mind is that when the syllabuses dealing with those studies comprising politics history, economics, sociology and so on—have been made available to the whole staff, it will be possible for teachers responsible for other areas of work to suggest, if they want to, work they might do which would relate to political education. It is easy to think of political novels or work in science connected with pollution and conservation, but equally there may be music or art teachers who would be interested in digressing from their instrumental teaching or their object drawing to introduce political issues which bear on the arts. I do not think it is essential for all teachers of non-political subjects to do this continually. It would be bad if they did, since it would tend to give too great a significance to politics, as though for everyone political activity should be an end in itself of the highest importance. However if at some once-yearly forum teachers of apparently nonpolitical subjects are able to offer suggestions on topics or issues they would be interested to cover, these can be considered and co-ordinated into an overall programme without unnecessary overlap. The topics covered, the issues raised or the links made might occupy little time in lessons or on the time-table. What is helpful in developing political awareness is not to be measured in lesson hours or exercise book pages but in how much it contributes to the synoptic view of the place of politics in human life. A three-minute digression in a science or art lesson could be very illuminating coming at a certain point in an individual's developing understanding of political affairs. There are at least three reasons, I want to suggest, for the staff to co-ordinate such contributions into an overall programme.

First, in a participatory democracy through their basic education, their understanding of the education system and its links with other social institutions citizens will have a synoptic view of politics. This is not to say that this will be all-important to them or dominate their thought systems. For some it may, but for most it will simply constitute one conceptual framework through which they view the world and which brings with it certain obligations. My guess is, however, that in our society even amongst teachers, who might be regarded as some of the better educated citizens, there are relatively few with such a synoptic view of politics. Most of us I imagine who are in any way connected with the education of young

people, whether teachers, parents, youth leaders or whatever, could benefit from a forum" in which what I have suggested are the politically central subjects—economics, history, sociology and so on—as well as the non-political ones are discussed from the point of view of their contribution to political understanding. This kind of once-yearly forum is just one way in which we as teachers might so to speak pull ourselves up by our bootstraps in this area. Whatever direct benefit this brings to the political education of the pupils, there is almost certain to be a growth in the synoptic political understanding of the teachers. This cannot but be an indirect plus for the pupils. After all, such understanding is what we are aiming for in our pupils, and if we are to be politically educated persons we need it too. Acquiring it in this piecemeal, and possibly somewhat difficult fashion, largely by our own efforts, will also offer insight into what we are demanding of our pupils and may suggest ways in which we might facilitate similar learning for them.

A second reason for a 'politics across the curriculum' policy is that it is likely to make the staff a more cohesive and therefore more effective working group. If teachers have forged a common policy to which they are committed they are likely to be more successful in achieving it than a staff who, although nominally committed to a policy, have not talked it through.

Sceptics—and half of me is very much a sceptic—will want to challenge this claim and to suggest that common efforts at intellectual understanding are just as likely to produce deep and divisive rifts amongst working groups. That may be so and it would be interesting to study places where this has happened because it seems to me from personal experience of working in such groups that it does not have to happen. What are the ingredients accompanying communal efforts to improve intellectual understanding which tend to produce cohesiveness? What might be relevant is the tacit awareness that the participants constitute a group and that only through their own efforts will a policy be produced. It is counter-productive to mince teaching colleagues' arguments into shreds or to use this forum to pursue some personal vendetta. The most effective way of proceeding is likely to be by way of constructive consideration of cases. Irrelevant points and obviously potty suggestions are best left on one side rather than ruthlessly exposed. Discussions will focus on what most people want to develop rather than on those contributions which people regard as useless. This, I would claim from experience, is likely to be the kind of situation in which communal efforts to arrive at intellectual understanding will tend to produce co-operativeness and cohesiveness in other activities. If I am right this tends once again to suggest that a necessary element in feelings of cohesiveness or what we earlier called fraternity is the intellectual grasp of a common bond with others—here the awareness of the bond between oneself and others as members of a group trying to achieve certain kinds of intellectual understanding. This of course would explain why the fraternity continues into the subsequent activities. It would be rather odd if it did not, if we take it that these are directly or indirectly connected to the understanding.

Undoubtedly we need research here, both philosophical and empirical. Once given these mutual efforts at understanding, to get full benefit from them we need to know what kind of conditions produce the cohesiveness and cooperativeness which sometimes seems to result. Here I have only been able to make some suggestions.

Third, if teachers in schools do attempt to forge a 'politics across the curriculum' policy in this way, their efforts can only serve as the best kind of model for their pupils. Not

that they should self-consciously draw their pupils' attention to their efforts, but, as I said earlier, there is likely to be no way in which these proceedings could be kept secret from the pupils. Knowledge of these activities will offer pupils an insight into how groups can rationally debate and implement policies. This may seem a small' point, but it is of the greatest importance for political education. Pupils, being human, are likely to be far more impressed by one concrete example of communal policy-making than by numbers of theoretical lessons on participatory democracy.

Political education: politics teaching: a philosophical perspective

The need for a broad curriculum for an adequate political education has been made clear. I have also argued that certain subjects within that curriculum constitute the disciplines which make up politics—history, economics, sociology, law, political philosophy—and relevant parts of these must be studied in some depth. I want now to focus on political philosophy in particular and on the basis of arguments presented earlier to suggest certain topics and distinctions in this area which would have to figure in any education for democracy.

But before that, three disclaimers. First, I am not going to suggest how these topics might be taught since speculative accounts of possible teaching methods would not be appropriate in an essay of this degree of generality, where the learners, stage of cognitive development, the resources available and so on are unknown. This connects with my second disclaimer. I have not yet said what stages of education and what age of children I am concerned with. This has been intentional since in talking about the whole curriculum it is irrelevant. A child requires a broad curriculum for political education but it probably does not matter when she studies the different components, whether, for instance, the natural sciences are a continuing component or only occur at some periods. As far as the specifically political studies are concerned, I have so far only argued that they should be present in everyone's education and have not suggested whether they should come earlier, or later, or more continuously. In the last section of this chapter where I make recommendations about policies for political education, I shall argue that there are good reasons for not delaying the introduction of political knowledge, argument and ideas but for beginning to bring them in quite early in the child's formal and informal education. Third, what I am doing here for political philosophy—namely picking out certain distinctions and topics which would have to be covered in any political education—is only a first shot. The whole project would need further research and refinement, and similar work would also be needed in the other relevant disciplines of history, economics, sociology and law.

(i) Of first importance for an understanding of politics in a democratic society is a grasp of the distinction between (a) principles and assumptions about human beings and the world they live in and (b) the institutions which depend on those assumptions and attempt to enibody and implement those principles. I am not implying that this distinction should be taught before anything else but that it is logically rather than temporally basic in the organization of anyone's conceptual scheme in the political area. It is in fact a point which one could not grasp until one had some concrete understanding of particular institutions and their functions. Once this learning process begins however continual reference will need to be made to this distinction as political education proceeds. The reason for this should be clear. Unless the very different status of values like justice, fraternity, and benevolence is

distinguished from that of institutions like the British parliament, the American congress, the German Bundestag and so on, there is a danger that pupils will come to see the latter as democracy. Societies which have, for instance, a parliament elected on a one-person, one-vote basis, modes of decision-making which involve majority voting and no imprisonment without trial will be regarded as democracies and any societies with different arrangements will be beyond the democratic pale. It is also likely that if people regard a collection of institutions and procedures as democracy, they will think that 'making one's society more democratic' can only mean either maintaining or strengthening those institutions. They may see suggestions for additional or very different structures to embody the principles as the brainchildren of cranks or fanatics. Things may be changing now but, until recently, this was very much the reaction which greeted suggestions for establishing authority-structures in work-places on a participatory basis.

(ii) I have argued for the need to make explicit the distinction between bedrock principles and basic assumptions on the one hand and institutions on the other. I need to indicate now in broad outline what falls into each of those categories. Let us take the principles and basic assumptions first. Of prime importance for the pupil is an understanding of political power and its place in human life. Here the points made in Chapter one will be relevant, the distinction between wants and real interests, the connection between real interests and paternalism and so on. This understanding of power will be easier to develop now than when I first began thinking along these lines about political education because a number of philosophers and educational theorists have been working on analyses of power and their application to educational issues (see, e.g., Nyberg, 1981; Benton, 1982). It will need to be connected with work on two other fundamental notions—the good for man and justice. And open-minded explorations of the possibilities of determining, in general, and substantially, what the good for man is will be required. The outcome of these will have to be connected to the analysis of power. Issues like the following will need consideration: can exercises of power be justified if they advance the good of individuals? Can they be justified even if they do not? If they are necessary to advance certain human goals, how is this compatible with any view of an individual's good which puts a high value on his/her autonomous choice? These investigations will need in turn to be linked to a consideration of the notion of justice. This was hardly attempted in Chapter one but clearly the idea that each individual should be guaranteed equal access to the exercise or control of power needs examination. Only my broader and more policy-oriented interests in this essay have kept me from considering the intricate web of notions connected with justice, notions like equality, fairness, positive discrimination and criteria of distributive justice based on desert, merit or needs. A study of justice would be a prominent topic in political education. Linked to it, as I indicated earlier, would be a consideration of fraternity as a value. Fraternity is a difficult notion to pin down and one easily confused with seemingly related notions of friendship, togetherness, co-operativeness and so on. Fraternity, however, as we saw, is the motivational undergirding of all the basic structures of the participatory democracy and if we are to move in that direction as a society we need to explore this attitude and distinguish it from related attitudes which we may mistake for it. Also needed is a consideration of the basic characteristics and capacities of human beings as well as what capacities are presupposed to the democratic character. This topic is linked in turn with that of the good

for man. As we saw, its detailed consideration will underpin arguments for each person's need for primary goods.

It is no accident that this sub-section draws so heavily on Chapter one, for I am suggesting that each individual's political education should provide him or her with the chance to develop a skeletal picture of the principles and basic assumptions underpinning democracy. In broad outline this will take the form of the framework set out in Chapter one—or more likely some revised version of that framework. I am not advocating that these principles should be taught in clinical isolation. The purpose of this arrangement here, under headings and subheadings, is simply to indicate the categories to be covered in political education and to stress the distinctions between them. Very likely the principles will be taught pari passu with the teaching about the institutions covered in the next section. This is not to rule out abstract discussion of principles but only to stress that it is not being laid down as the norm.

(iii) If the last section echoed Chapter one this one will do the same for Chapter two. Pupils will need to consider the broad institutional structures which might embody democratic principles. As we saw in Chapter two problems to do with reconciling the equalization of access to power with the formulation of society-wide policies taking into account the public interest have proved a stumbling-block for many theorists. Pupils will be encouraged to think hard about the kind of institutions which might capture the spirit of the principles in a defensible way. How acceptable is the system of neighbourhood groups with considerable control over local affairs, arranged in a pyramidal structure with a body at the top which refers its resolutions about society-wide concerns to the national forum? There are certainly problems with this conception and there is scope for imaginative alternative attempts to devise a system which better embodies the principles.

Power, as we saw, is exerted as much in the work-places of our society as in government departments and town halls. How can equal access to the exercise and control of power be achieved here? A case was argued for the democratization of work-places. Pupils might examine it and other schemes and discuss their acceptability as well as their limitations. Some issues to be considered might be: are there any general principles which apply in the case of all work-places? Do very different arrangements apply in the case of those enterprises supplying goods and services on the market from institutions like hospitals, libraries, television and newspapers, the police or the army? Or is this a false distinction? Should all goods and services be regarded as supplied to a market? Or should none be so considered? The issues here are complex and merit an airing in schools, particularly because in our society it is hard to think of another forum where all potential citizens could be introduced to them.

(iv) As well as considering how to make the general political institutions and work-places of our society more democratic, pupils also need to study a number of particular institutions and issues. What looms largest is what modes of decision-making the participatory democracy should employ, and whether these should include majorityvoting. The main thrust of this essay has been the need for democrats to reduce exercises of power which necessarily attack their autonomy and to make powerholders accountable to those over whom power is exercised. The problem is that the device of majority voting, seemingly indispensable to decision-making in a democracy, necessarily involves

exercises of power over others. The issues it raises need to occupy a prominent place in any programme of political education. Without straying too far into the area of teaching methods and strategies, it is worth pointing out that these issues need not be dealt with in a totally theoretical way with pupils poring over Pennock and Wollheim or potted versions of these, or even worksheets on the potted versions. The topic of majority voting not only can be linked to practices within the school or wider society but, if it is really to come home to potential citizens as a problem which vitally affects the implementation of their centrally held values, it needs to be linked to their actual experience of decisionmaking.

My own efforts in discussing the issue of majority voting, even with adult students, suggest to me that teachers may have to work quite hard before its problems are appreciated—in particular the connections with power and with fraternity. This is not so where issues to do with 'dirty hands' and political secrecy are concerned, since it is easier to find telling examples from societies pupils are familiar with. Questions to do with the role of and justification for civil disobedience in a democracy also merit discussion, particularly, as we saw, in relation to some instances of the operation of majority voting.

In this essay I have limited myself largely to what I have termed basic education or school education. At some other time I would like to consider the role of other formal educational institutions in political education in particular institutions of higher education. I should also like to examine the possible educational role of television, radio and newspapers. Here further questions arise: can the media be seen as having an educational role? If they can, should there be any control over them in the interests of the best performance of this role or would this constitute undesirable censorship? Should they be made accountable for their programme and publishing policies and, if so, how and to whom? Although there has been no discussion of these issues in this essay, this is not to say that the same policy of self-denial should apply in the political education provided in schools. The role of other formal educational institutions and the media needs to come under scrutiny here too.

(v) Finally to be included in this catalogue of the elements which must figure in a political education if one is viewing that education from a philosophical perspective, are a number of topics of a critical or justificatory kind. This is not to suggest that the topics previously discussed—from the principles/institutions distinctions to particular values like fraternity and particular institutions like majority voting—will be treated uncritically: the stuff of philosophy is obviously argument and counter-argument. What I have in mind here are a number of more general topics which question the whole rationale of the education provided. Perhaps the largest of these is the justification of democracy, and particularly participatory democracy, as a political arrangement. Linked with this is the justification of the compulsory political education which is provided. Political education should invite pupils to consider why, given the rationale for the participatory democracy in terms of the individual as an autonomous chooser, they are being compelled to follow a broad curriculum which includes a political education covering certain pre-specified topics. The answer lies, I suggest, in coming to understand what it is to become an autonomous person, living among other autonomous persons, in a society. This will demand certain social arrangements—the participatory democracy—and in turn certain educational arrangements: every potential citizen will need to be involved in these. At this point the arguments discussed in relation to compulsory political education will link with those concerning the citizen's obligation to participate in the political system in Chapter one (see Chapter one,

pp. 17–19). Obviously related to the two previous issues are a cluster of questions connected with the possible indoctrinatory nature of the whole system. As we have seen already, this is a particular problem in a scheme of political education which is not simply a presentation of facts about systems of government and institutions but is also concerned to encourage people to develop certain attitudes, for instance, fraternal attitudes to their colleages and fellow-citizens and to do this, in part, by having them participate in certain structures which are likely to foster the development of these attitudes. This seems to be just the environment which could be a hothouse for the growth of attitudes and commitment to values in an unquestioning way. To some extent that is right, I think—it resembles in this respect the child's earliest experiences of home life where the world simply is as her parents or 'gran' has structured it. The school, whilst bending all efforts to make itself a fraternal community, can adopt a reflexive attitude to its efforts and encourage its pupils critically to examine the values it is trying to promote as well as the particular ways in which it is attempting this. It is easy to lay this down as a precept, of course, but much harder to implement it sensitively and intelligently. One has to promote honest reflection on the values rather than indulge in a sham exercise which is in fact only a subtle reinforcement of them. On the other hand, the school has to avoid purely destructive criticism which negates its efforts to promote fraternity and caring attitudes amongst its pupils for no good reason. Some institutions can seem to manage a constructively critical attitude to their own arrangements without either becoming corrupt or destroying themselves in the process. Here research into good practice would be useful.

As a first sighting shot I have tried to indicate what, from the perspective of political philosophy, would need to be included in a political education in school. Further work is called for, however, both here and in the other politically relevant areas of sociology, economics, law and history.

I would like to finish by considering two specific policies in this area.

Political education in the first school

When is political education to begin? Must it be delayed until the upper reaches of the secondary school because children at the primary stage are too young to grasp principles or concepts or acquire political attitudes? (3) I want to advance four considerations which, taken together, seem to me to suggest that it is both possible and desirable to begin political education in the primary school. The first three arise out of research done on the political understanding and political attitudes of young children and the last out of the nature of political education itself.

(i) Any politically intelligent observer can confirm that primary school-children—from, say, six upwards—do operate with political concepts and embryonic forms of political argument. Research confirms this too (see, e.g., Connell, 1971; Greenstein, 1965; Stevens, 1982). Children, even at this early stage, often have views about the government, other countries and politically related matters rather closer to their hearts, such as what counts as a fair share, sex differences and how these might/should affect the allocation of work roles, the amount of pocket money an eight-year-old should get and so on. Given, therefore, that children are already operating, albeit crudely, with political and economic concepts and forms of argument, the skilful teacher has an opportunity to encourage them to reconsider

and develop these. This does not show that the teacher should do so, but it at least shows that in one important respect young children cannot be said to be too young for political education as they are already on the threshold of this way of thinking. This combined with the second consideration gives the beginning of a case for political education in the primary school.

(ii) A number of researchers have shown, mainly, but not wholly, in the area of the attitudes of children to foreign people, that 'quite firm likes and dislikes are held in conditions of quite primitive ignorance' (Heater, 1977, p. 131). In other words strong political attitudes develop in under-lls in the absence of much political knowledge. It also seems that these political attitudes remain firmly embedded in pupils' minds so that attempts at systematic political education in early adolescence have little noticeable effect on them. This vigorous growth of political attitudes in primary school-children and their relative immunity to revision later seems to me, along with (i) above, to constitute a strong reason for attempting to subject such attitudes to rational scrutiny early on. At least we have nothing to lose by helping young pupils rationally to assess their attitudes in the light of appropriate knowledge. If, as research seems to show, later attempts are doomed, why not try at an earlier stage to marry knowledge and attitudes more rationally? This is surely a better policy than leaving young pupils to form strong attituces 'in a conceptual vacuum' (Tajfel, 1966).

(iii) Commitment to democracy of whatever particular form—representative or participatory—necessarily commits one to a belief in the basic equality of all persons as citizens. Where political knowledge is concerned, though, the following statement seems to sum up what is generally the case: 'boys score significantly better than girls and middle class children much higher than working class. The social class difference is greater than the sex difference' (Johnson, 1970, p. 35). These differences must surely disturb any democrat. But might not a determined attempt at political education in the primary school do much to reduce them? Admittedly I am only speculating in suggesting that early political education could have this effect, yet it seems plausible and worth testing, given what we know about the stunting effects of stereotypic self-images on individuals' conceptions of what they can do. By the time girls and working-class children come to formal political education at the moment—those, that is, who are lucky enough to get even that—they are no doubt already set to see it as 'not for them'. Society's stereotypes are too strong for the teacher's reasoned arguments to break through.

(iv) It will not be disputed, I imagine, that all teachers have a responsibility for the moral education of their pupils. Certainly the primary school teacher will be insistently faced with this responsibility in the day-to-day running of her classroom. She will be constantly reminding children—however she does this—to share, not to snatch, to pick up rubbish they drop and so on. More generally she will be encouraging them to think of others—'To whom should we send parcels of the produce from our Harvest Festival? Does anyone know an old person living alone?' So far, so good. But concern cannot stop with one's family and friends and the people in one's locality. It would be arbitrary to do so and democratic political arrangements are attempts to institutionalize some of the moral values which inform our relationships with our family and friends.

But this broad application of our moral principles so that, for instance, the moral indignation we feel over injustices is not confined only to those in our own, or even our

own national backyard, but is aroused by the oppressive treatment of people further afield, is not something that just develops naturally as we grow older. If it is to develop it needs to be thoughtfully fostered. That this is so is shown, I think, by the indifference of most of us in our everyday lives to the fact of the gross and widening differences in wealth between the rich and poor people of the world. At government level there is obviously some awareness of the increasing divide as conferences on the issue and, more concretely, aid to poorer nations show. It has also been tackled in philosophical books and articles (see, e.g., Honderich, 1980, Chapters 1 and 2; Singer, 1979, pp. 158–82). But neither the general problem nor the amount and kind of aid which richer nations might give to poorer ones have ever, to my knowledge, been election issues or the subject of large-scale demonstrations in the richer countries. It is certainly easy to forget the problem living in a very rich country where the facts of poverty do not impinge. Indeed in our national misery at our economic plight we forget that this plight is an enviable one for most people in the world. Would the situation be any different if a properly thoughtful political education existed in schools which gently but consistently widened pupils' feelings of concern for others and encouraged them to think about the use of political machinery to tackle these problems? For the most part, as adults, no one has to prompt us to feelings of concern towards our parents or children or colleagues. We, as we say, 'naturally' help them if they are in some kind of trouble and we are 'naturally' happy when something makes them happy. But such concern is not 'natural' in the sense that it flows spontaneously from us, it is something we have learned over many years from our moral community. What I am suggesting is that concern could be learned for all our fellow-men. It would not, for all kinds of psychological reasons, be of the same quality as that for our family and friends or issue in the same kind of actions, which would be inappropriate. But if it is to be learned, an important task for the primary school is gently but consistently to widen pupils' sympathies towards people in their own country and beyond, indicating at the same time that it is largely through political means that these sympathies can be expressed.

Some people may yet wonder whether this is not all rather remote from primary school-children and perhaps better left until the secondary school. But why wait? Primary school-children are, I have argued, intellectually capable of this kind of concern, so it is not ruled out on those grounds. It might also be important to begin to broaden children's concern for others early so that it becomes habitual to them as much 'second nature' as concern for family and friends. Otherwise there is a danger if one waits until the secondary school that these concerns are seen as 'tacked on', as an optional extra which one is not blamed for disregarding.

There is an additional point. At a later stage of political education one will want to discuss a number of issues which presuppose that pupils do already feel concern for people beyond their immediate circle and even beyond their national boundaries—issues for example to do with priorities amongst moral responsibilities or the rights of states to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. Without this concern children quite simply will not see the moral/political problem. Again this argues for attempting to widen sympathies early on.

Taking these four considerations together there seems to be a case for beginning political education in the primary school. Children can grasp political notions at that stage; it would be desirable to attempt to counteract early on the development of political attitudes without the corresponding political knowledge; starting political education earlier might do

something to offset some of the inequalities between different bodies of citizens where political knowledge is concerned; appropriate political dispositions towards one's fellows need to precede the intelligent discussion of political problems and might take root better if introduced early.

Political education and teacher training

A policy consequence of the arguments presented in the main body of this chapter and of the arguments advanced for beginning political education in the first school is that we need to provide specifically for political education studies in the professional training of all teachers. This may seem an extravagant step. Is it really necessary to prepare all teachers for this work? Could we not rely on specialist teachers of political education, politics graduates and others with the politically related specialisms mentioned earlier? Now although, as we saw, there is a place for specialist politics teaching, political education cannot be left solely in the hands of such specialists. There are at least three reasons for this:

(i) In the first school most opportunities for the development of political understanding will present themselves informally in the day-to-day running of the class or school, as they do in moral education. Skill is needed at this stage to see a chance for political education and use it in such a way as to build on what a child knows, to leave her curious about political concerns and anxious to know more, because she is getting the idea that these things matter. To orient the child towards the political in this way requires the knowledge and skill that a professional training can provide: this cannot be restricted to just a proportion of teachers.

(ii) At the secondary stage there will be specialist contributions to political education from teachers of sociology, history, economics and so on, so there miqht seem to be less reason to provide specific training in political education for all secondary teachers. But at this stage too there is much that can be done informally. More than this, given the importance of a broad curriculum for political education, it is essential for teachers to understand the role of their subject in promoting a democratic society. As we saw earlier they should have some understanding of how particular areas of human concern art, science, mathematics, etc.—inform and relate to the political dimension. We are demanding this of pupils as potential citizens: we cannot demand less of their teachers. An appropriate training, although not necessarily an extensive one, would supply this orientation.

(iii) Finally, and most important of all, whatever the responsibilities of any particular teacher in the political area, all teachers will need to be introduced to political education in their professional training because we are now only too aware of what may be learnt from the 'hidden curriculum' to be insensitive to the political implications of school and classroom organization. However much or little direct political instruction teachers introduce, they will need to be aware of their responsibility for the political messages they may be transmitting to their pupils by their school and classroom practice. A professional training in political education will help the teacher to adopt a self-critical attitude to, for instance, the decision-making methods she uses. When, if at all, does she use voting? What might children learn from this about the appropriateness of voting as a decision-making device? Again, how does she most commonly attempt to motivate pupils? Do attempts, e.g. to stimulate competition between pupils cut across her stress at other times on the value of co-operation in the community?

Let me assume that the case is established that all teachers, both primary and secondary, should have some responsibility for the political education of their pupils. Given the present state of political education in this country is it possible to say anything in detail about the form the teachers' professional preparation for political education should take? It would be arrogant to imagine that one could lay down a masterplan all ready for implementation. Equally, mere hopes expressed in a vacuum are a poor basis for further development. Let me therefore offer a few provisional notes. The following suggestions represent elements to be covered. Not all require equal attention, but I have not attempted to specify the amount of time to be spent on each. There is also no particular significance in the order in which the elements are mentioned and it is certainly not intended to indicate a teaching order. What follows is not a blue-print but an agenda for debate.

All intending teachers should be offered what one might call the minimum essential studies for those involved in political education at any level. This would give them some orientation towards the political dimension of education and it would give primary school teachers the conceptual framework for the content they would be teaching. The studies would include a course in political theory which would cover basic notions like the state, law, rights, social principles as well as the various theories of democracy—participatory and representative. The study of democracy would pay particular attention to what the democratic citizen needs in terms of knowledge, skills and attitudes to operate politically. Certain parts of moral theory would also be treated, for instance, notions like 'fraternity', 'community' and 'personal autonomy' and the relationships between them would merit special attention. Some relevant and basic elements of sociological and economic theory should also find a place. These studies, which would give the teacher a firm conceptual grasp of the political area, would be placed in a concrete setting in two ways—by some study of recent political and social history and by illustrative comparative studies of political education and its implications in two or more countries. The comparative studies would be a valuable, integrating factor exemplifying in an immediate and concrete way the factors studied in political theory.

This body of studies may strike some as rather abstract and high level, especially for primary school teachers who will be involved only in the first stages of political education. I regard it, however, as essential for anyone developing children's political consciousness, especially in the open setting of the contemporary British primary school where so often political notions will come up informally and the teacher will need to have a well-articulated framework of political and economic concepts in order to have the flexibility to recognize and build on the opportunities as they present themselves. If there are great problems of pressure on the time-table, the comparative studies could be omitted, since I see them, in this context, largely as a way of making some of the abstract notions more lively and immediate. Otherwise I see this body of studies, as forming the essential theoretical framework for teachers.

It is probably unnecessary for secondary school teachers to do more than this but to the studies outlined above there would be added for primary school teachers some considerations of the content, methods and organization of political education in formal education institutions and elsewhere. Here they would be able to familiarize themselves with existing curricula and also consider what reforms, changes, etc. might be made. As well as considering the construction of curricula for different ages, there would be

opportunities to examine the appropriateness of different methods, e.g. explicit instructions, games, simulations, etc., for the development of conceptual frameworks, the ability to assess political argument and the fostering of political dispositions. Discussion of issues connected with indoctrination, impartiality and bias would also come in here.

I am assuming that as well as these courses followed by all teachers there will continue to be specialized courses for those intending to be politics specialists in the secondary school. These will cover the ground outlined above (i.e., those parts not already covered in undergraduate studies) in rather greater depth. They will also include, on the one hand, studies in the social sciences relevant to political education, e.g. psychological studies of attitude formation and change and sociological studies of political socialization, etc., and on the other some study of the particular institutions of our society with which citizens need to be familiar.(4)

4
Headteachers: a changing role

In Chapter three it was argued that certain changes are needed in school organization both to make schools more democratic work-places for their staffs and to promote the political education of their pupils. The role of headteachers in this process of change is crucial and they need special training for it. In this chapter I want to discuss the form this training might take. This chapter does not end like Chapters three and five with a set of policy recommendations since the whole chapter constitutes the detailed working out of one recommendation.

In another way too this chapter differs markedly from three and five. There I spend considerable time discussing, respectively, political education and the role of parents in a participatory democracy. It might be expected that a good part of this chapter would be an elaboration of the role of the headteacher in such a society, but this is not so. The reason is simple. There would not be headteachers, as we know them, and therefore special heads' training programmes would not be required. In a participatory democracy there would be training for the whole staff in school organization and the role of the 'head' would be radically different from that role in our society. Framework guidelines for the curriculum of the school and its organization would be determined by the central decision-making body, the national forum, and as far as school organization is concerned, as we have seen already, the guidelines would specify that the whole staff would be responsible for the running of the school. Beyond that the guidelines would probably only indicate forms of organization which would be ruled out (e.g. arrangements which totally excluded pupils, or in which all decision-making was left to one person), leaving the detailed arrangements to be decided by the staff themselves. This might result in 'head-like' roles being created, but with important differences from the ones with which we are familiar. In some situations, for instance, there may be administrative chairpersons with a limited term of office, in others several limited-term chairpersons with responsibilities for different aspects of the work. Any arrangements, however, which fell within the broad guidelines covering school organization and which were subject to review and modification by members of the institutions would be acceptable. For this kind of system to be workable, however, all staff would have to be prepared for it. This would involve some introduction to it in their initial professional training and some subsequent in-service training. There is nothing more of a general sort for me to say about such training and, given the fundamental importance of personal autonomy in this account, it is for the participants to settle the details.

Heads in our society could, however, benefit from special training programmes. Many people will think that in these days of very large schools with perhaps 2,000 pupils and 150 staff, heads need at least some kind of 'management training' to cope with the administrative, financial and personnel problems they are likely to face. But I want to claim that they need something more. All too often the assumption of 'management training' courses for heads—the kind of short courses run by LEAs—is that the head needs to be helped to develop skills and techniques to run a good, harmonious school with few staff or pupils'

problems. To this end courses concentrate on interviewing techniques, time-tabling, ways of delegating routine work to leave oneself free to cope with major trouble-shooting, and even perhaps the latest group dynamics theories so that one can get one's 'body-talk' right. This however tends to take for granted, and therefore leaves unexamined, the context of the head's work and what it is he or she could, or should, be aiming at.

It is all well and good, however, to talk about the inadequacy of 'management training' programmes and to say that they should be supplemented; but can one get away from tedious cliches about 'the need for heads to engage in fundamental reflection on the aims of their work' and specify concretely what form such reflection might take and how it might figure in a training programme?

To see how courses might be structured, extended or supplemented, one needs to look at the reasons which might be advanced for encouraging heads to reflect upon their role. The reasons are all-important because the kind of case that is made will determine the content and even the pedagogy to be used in the training. With this in mind let us look at three cases.

THREE CASES FOR TRAINING HEADS

(i) The consistent head

There is first what might be called the minimal case for heads' training. It might be agreed that this should go beyond the nuts and bolts of time-tabling, etc., to reflections on the nature of the job because this is implied in the role itself. However one conceives the role in detail, the head must be, inter alia an administrator and, as such, she must work according to principles which enable her to operate consistently. This is not easy because she has to be both consistent over time and in respect of her dealings with different groups, governors, advisers, colleagues, pupils, parents and so on. This is the kind of thing sometimes probed at appointing committees when a prospective candidate for a headship is asked what her personal 'philosophy of education' is. When she reveals her views, she is pressed with further questions like 'If you incline towards a child-centred view of education, would it follow that you would do X?' Sometimes, of course, the point of these questions is to find out exactly what the candidate means by a catch-all phrase like 'child-centred education', but it is just as likely that the point is to see how far she has thought through her views and how far they form a coherent set of principles.

There is some pressure, then, for the head to get her principles into order and to see to what she is, or is not, committed. This is, however, in two ways a very minimal claim. First, and more trivially, it is minimal in the training demands it makes. In many cases one might need to do no more than urge heads to get their views into some consistent shape. More important, it is minimal in that it will not necessarily involve any reflection on the whole framework of one's beliefs. It may be that the drive for consistency will cause some people to reflect on their fundamental assumptions about educational institutions, authority relationships, conceptions of children's abilities, etc., but it need not do. A head might well formulate her own educational principles, perhaps on the basis of certain religious convictions, without ever questioning this basis. In that case her views may be

thought through, able to be implemented without any internal contradictions, but rest on unquestioned assumptions.

The head needs, then, to be consistent in her beliefs and practices, but to pitch the demand for training at the level of the consistent head is to pitch it far too low.

(ii) The linch-pin head

The second case I want to consider is the dynamic head who keeps abreast of contemporary educational developments. What one might call the 'linch-pin' conception of the head. Anyone espousing this case will find the minimal view of the consistent head outlined under (i) literally archaic. An advocate of this second view will suggest that in the British autonomous, decentralized educational system, where the head has so much de facto responsibility for the running of the school, she must be able to reflect on the often conflicting aims of education canvassed in our society, if' she is to direct the running of the school on properly educational lines and, for instance, encourage her staff to pursue profitable lines of curriculum development. The merely consistent head is totally inappropriate to run a school anywhere in Britain today. The problems of our society are such that the woman who has simply got her own views into some sort of order will be unable to deal adequately with the kind of conflicts of values which will be forced upon her attention as a head.

These conflicts will occur in various contexts. With staff, whose views conflict with her own, the head will need to be able to debate the viability of different conceptions of education. There may be agreement amongst colleagues that the school should educate its pupils for a multi-cultural society but sharp disagreements on interpretations of what it would be to do this. The head must be in a position at least to understand this debate and at best to attempt some resolution of it which results in a defensible multi-cultural policy for the school. With governors too the head may well find herself having to explain and justify school policies and, as a consequence, having to participate in a wider discussion of the aims and objectives of education. In so far as parents come with complaints to the head, these may well contain, implicitly at least, different conceptions of the aims of education from those of the school or, more likely, different priorities amongst aims. Once again the head needs to have reflectively considered what is involved in aims like education for independence, self-realization, the world of work, or happiness. To be in a position to understand, help and advise parents, she needs to have examined the assumptions underlying aims like these, their possible justifications and how, if at all, they are to be related to one another.

As well as coping with conflicts, however, the head will also have to adapt school policies and practice in the light of governmental policies and other external pressures. At the present time, for instance, she would need to think how she might protect her conception of the school curriculum from the impact of falling rolls and government cuts. Even in happier times, however, there would be the constant flow of government and schools council documents into her in-tray to await her judgment on their applicability to her particular context.

Advocates of this second view often have their own cases of actual heads who are wonderful examples of what training with these objectives should produce at its best. They are described to one as 'a very bright young man, who's transformed the school in three

years', 'a wonderfully dynamic head', or 'an intelligent woman, knows what she wants from her staff and. absolutely dedicated to the school'. A visit to a school run by one of these superheads usually bears out all the claims. There exemplified in this individual, who is usually brimming with energetic resourcefulness, is intelligence, dedication, determination and considerable knowledge about the impact of central government and local authority policies in her area. Questioning usually reveals that this knowledge and these qualities are indeed used to inspire staff, resolve internal conflicts and negotiate tactfully with parents, so as to exploit every opportunity—and even some reverses—for the educational good of the school. What more could one want of the head of an educational institution of whatever size? If training programmes could be devised which would produce heads of this calibre, would not any society, with even moderate resources to spend on education, have to regard their support as a good investment? Paradoxically, perhaps, I do not think so.

At this point we need to look at the reasons why anyone would support the kind of training programme which aims at producing the knowledgeable, resourceful head. I labelled that conception of the head the 'linch-pin' view, for that is indeed what she is: the prime mover, the initiator, the Athene of the institution. Someone holding this view would see the head's position as the key one in the institution and in recruiting to the training programme would look for people with 'leadership qualities', which the training could enhance and channel appropriately. The final realization of this ideal would be, I suppose, a whole educational system with an appropriately trained head steering each institution. These heads would form the élite corps of the educational world, leading and inspiring their colleagues and pupils. This conception of authority relationships within the educational system is however quite at odds, I would claim, with what is appropriate to a democratic society. It is contrary to what is required by democratic principles of the authority relationships in any institution and, in the educational context, it will have a mis-educative effect on pupils. Some people may find the comments on the undemocratic character of the 'linch-pin' conception of the head unconvincing. It may seem to them that one can hold a view of the democratic society which is not at all at variance with this conception. I can best attempt to deal with such doubts by delineating the third conception of the head. This is developed by contrast with the second and involves a brief reminder of what I am taking to be implied by democratic principles.

(iii) The democratic head

The third conception I am labelling the 'democratic' conception of the head's role because it is appropriate to an educational institution in a society which aspires to be democratic. By a society which aspires to be democratic I mean one which is attempting to organize itself according to the democratic principles set out in Chapter one but one in which those principles are not as yet anything like fully realized in all areas of the society's life. Clearly societies can be more or less far along the way to democracy and progress may be uneven as between different institutions and aspects of the society's life. Let us assume therefore a society patchy in its commitment to democratic principles and their realization.

It is clearly unnecessary to repeat here a detailed characterization of a society run on democratic principles but since, as I have said, the reasons supporting conceptions of the head's role are all-important, the view of democracy must be briefly outlined as a reminder

because it constitutes the case for the third conception of the head's role. That views rests basically on twin assumptions. (a) The first is that there are no authorities on the good life for individuals. No one is in a position to tell another individual authoritatively that she should pursue for instance the active or the contemplative life or that she should become a well-balanced all-rounder. That judgment must be left to the individual who is aware of the options available and the significance of her choice. This assumption gives rise to a connected, subsidiary assumption, namely that there are a number of things which any individual must consider to be goods, since they are necessary to making and attempting to realize her choice amongst possible options. These are goods like wealth, education, freedom of thought and other civil liberties, the rule of law and the right to participate in the exercise and control of power. (b) The second assumption is related to the exercise or control of power mentioned under (a) The assumption made by this view of democracy is that no individual has any 'natural' right to stand in a power relationship over others. Therefore there should be an equal right to share in the exercise of power. In those cases where equality in the exercise of power would defeat, or at least seriously damage, the realization of justice or freedom in other ways, it will be necessary to move to equality in the control of power, the second-best situation, where the representative wielders of power are accountable to their constituents. The other goods mentioned under (a) could be administered impartially for the population by a benevolent despot; but what makes this a democratic conception is the demand for equality in the exercise, or control, of power.

This brief résumé will suffice as we consider the role of the head in a society which aspires to be democratic but is only patchily so. This, I believe, is the case with our society. It is patchily so in the educational area in that we do not have the kind of democratic guidelines, argued for in Chapter three for the content and organization of what goes on in school. Nor do we have any clear rationale for what should be left to central direction and what to teachers, parents, the local community and so on. The question I want to put is: what is an appropriate role for a head who accepts the kind of democratic principles set out in Chapters one and two but works within our present society? Crucially, how will she differ, if at all, from the linch-pin head?

In many respects the democratic head will share the latter's characteristics. Ideally, she will be dedicated, resourceful, determined, knowledgeable about government policy as it is likely to affect the educational system and her school in particular and so on. The difference comes in the ends towards which she directs her dedication, determination, knowledge and the rest and, it follows, the attitudes which she takes towards her own role, her staff, governors, parents and pupils in pursuing those ends. Given her commitment to the democratic principles outlined above, she will want to work towards an educational institution in which there is equal access to the exercise, or control, of power amongst members and in which the pupils are at least introduced to this conception of the democratic society. Let me give four instances to indicate how this commitment might get application in our society.

(a) First and foremost, the democratic head will attempt to involve all staff and pupils in the running of the school. This will require considerable trial and error to find the best kind of machinery in present circumstances to share power and to make those responsible for certain

aspects of the school's work accountable to the other members of the school. It certainly will not mean a jumbo-sized school council meeting daily and discussing everything from the abolition of French from the curriculum to whether girls should be allowed to wear trousers to school. This is clearly foolish and the kind of decision-making body which would be inappropriate in any institution. Unfortunately it is the kind of apparatus which is sometimes found in schools and which brings efforts at democratization into disrepute. It is not for me to attempt to draw up a blue-print for appropriate machinery for the exercise, or control of power in very different situations. This must be the responsibility in the first instance of the staff and older pupils of the school. Staff including head and older pupils rather than head alone, because no democratic head will think that there is any reason why she should impose her conception of the appropriate machinery. And staff and older pupils rather than staff and all pupils, because the former are likely to have more knowledge about the workability and effectiveness of different sorts of machinery. This is, however, only in the first instance. Once in operation it will be open to any member of the institution to criticize the machinery and suggest improvement. Appropriate review procedure and arrangements for amendments, modifications and so on will obviously be built into the apparatus.

Some people may feel that what has been lost here is the' possibility of what they may term 'genuine leadership'. Interpreted in one way this is right. If one is thinking of the dynamic leadership of the linch-pin head then this is indeed incompatible with the democratic conception, because there is no place for a head who runs her school in what I might call the entrepreneurial manner. Incompatible attitudes must be at work here. The head cannot on the one hand be working towards a devolution of power and responsibility so that some members do not arbitrarily impose arrangements on others and on the other take the kind of action and adopt the attitudes of the best kind of benevolent head of a family firm. It is worth noting when talking to heads how often they talk about 'my staff' and also how often the staff in such a school will refer with affectionate reverence to the head, much as their grandparents might have done to a good employer. And these are the attitudes in 'good' schools with 'good' heads. Authoritarianism need not have an ugly face and yet it is authoritarianism for all that.

In another sense, however, the possibility of leadership has not been lost, but enhanced. In an institution run on democratic principles there should be increased opportunities for individuals to exercise 'genuine leadership'. In saying that I am assuming that by such leaders people have in mind dynamic individuals who are able either to describe ends, or strategies for achieving ends, in such a way that other people are inspired to think that there might be something in them or that they might be possible to achieve. The organization of the school on democratic lines will present ample opportunities for such 'inspirational' leadership without tying it to a person or an office, so that the leader's suggestions can be subject to debate and can stand or fall on the persuasiveness of the case made for them.

In the arrangements for decision-making and the devolution of power within the school it might be thought that parents have been forgotten. This is not the case. Since they are not in any sense members of the institution they do not have the right to participate in its internal decision-making arrangements. However, as part of their responsibilities towards their child's education, they have certain rights to comment on these decision-making arrangements from an educational point of view. These are mentioned under (d) and in Chapter five.

In connection with the proposed moves towards equality in the exercise, or control, of power, there may be doubts about the head's legal position if she devolves power over matters for which she is ultimately responsible, like, for instance, the appointment of staff or the expulsion of pupils. There are two points to be made here. First, in many aspects of the school's work and organization it will be possible and straightforward for the head to arrange decision-making procedures which give equal access to power and which do not affect her legal responsibilities at all. It is all too easy for people in positions of responsibility to accrete more powers and responsibilities to themselves without this being in any sense necessary. A useful exercise therefore for any head attempting to run her school on democratic lines is to see in detail just how much of the power she now exercises can be shared without this affecting her legal responsibilities. Second, there are those matters where the head is legally responsible and could in the final resort lose her job if it was judged that she had acted irresponsibly. Here it is useful to make a distinction between those cases where the Authority's Articles of Government for schools lay down that certain matters are the head's decision, or the head's and governors' decision, alone and those cases for which the head is held ultimately responsible. As far as power-sharing goes, there is clearly nothing to be done about those matters falling into the first category. Anyone taking on a headship and also holding the view that these things should be not solely for the head's and governors' decision will have to accept that this is one way in which the society in which she lives is only patchily democratic. The second category presents a more difficult problem, for matters falling under it could in principle be decided by staff, or staff and pupils, as long as the head was prepared to accept responsibility for the decisions taken. The general line that should be taken here can, I think, only be left to the individual decision of the democratic head. It is clearly a difficult situation in that in a more completely democratic society the assignment of responsibility would be very different and therefore whether the head decides to devolve decisionmaking, or not, she is struggling to arrange the running of the school along democratic lines in highly unfavourable circumstances. It must be left as a difficult moral choice for the individual to decide in the light of the particular circumstances in which she finds herself. Having, however, made her decision on the general line she will take, she will make this and her reasons for it plain to staff, pupils, parents and so on.

There is a further point on the legal position of the head. The head, or head and staff, may be left with decisions to make, for instance, about the broad structure of the curriculum, which in a more completely democratic society would be matters for decision by the whole democratic community. Again, in the imperfectly democratic situation they can only make what seems to them the best decision, whilst at appropriate times and places making the case that this decision should not be left to them (see Chapter three, pp. 81–7).

An advantage of progressing towards more democratic educational institutions via heads training programmes is that much of the nuts and bolts restructuring of the decision-making machinery will be a slow trial and error affair which ought to be started as soon as possible. Heads are in an excellent position to take the initiative here: training programmes can encourage them to do so.

(b) The democratic head will want to do more than clarify her own ideas about the aims of education in a democratic society. She will want to offer opportunities for the staff, pupils and the wider local community to discuss these matters. But not at all in the same

spirit as the linch-pin head. The linch-pin head debates with staff, discusses with parents and so on because, as the major determiner of school policy, she needs to know what others are thinking and to persuade them of the desirability of the courses of action she is proposing. This is why, within her own terms, the linch-pin head is so effective. Careful preparation of the ground beforehand ensures that there are no, or very few, confrontations. Likely opposition is investigated and coped with in advance. The democratic head needs, however, to try to promote discussion of the aims of education and the best arrangements for realizing these as a necessary adjunct to the powersharing she is committed to. People cannot, after all, be expected to make decisions unless they have both the necessary factual information and also, a chance to consider what their aims are, how those aims relate to one another, what the priorities are amongst them, and so on.

In promoting reflection on, and discussion of, the aims of education, the democratic head is, as I said, acting in a different spirit from the linch-pin head. This is clear from an observation of the activities she promotes. Heads with this perspective are anxious that teachers, parents, pupils, etc. should think seriously about the aims of education but they do not feel that they have to 'manage' this in any sense. It does not have to go on under their auspices, as it were. Such heads are happy to encourage their staff to go on courses at teachers' centres, polytechnics, institutes; they are happy for their PTAs to organize discussions; and for their staff to discuss with parents the aims, teaching methods and organization of the school. In line with their whole conception of education in a democratic society they feel no need to stagemanage these kind of discussions and tend only to take an active role reluctantly when this is the only way to spark things off.

(c) The democratic head will also be keen that pupils should take a more active role within the school, both in the management of their own and others' learning and in the organization and running of the school itself. I have suggested under (a) and in Chapter three that this will be so, but it can well be underlined again because for pupils such participation will be a part of their earliest formal political education. I am not suggesting that all pupils should be involved in <u>every</u> decision made in the school because in some cases their extreme lack of knowledge might militate against some of the basic aims of education in a democratic society. However, when the spheres in which pupils may participate in decision-making have been determined, the head will not immediately abandon efforts to involve them in the running of the school if the first ventures in this direction lead to their taking what seem to the head and staff foolish or shortsighted decisions or lead to them becoming aggressive or troublesome. Learning to exercise judgment in the conduct of practical affairs is not something that is done in a week or two. Neither is acquiring the appropriate attitudes to one's colleagues. Just as no one would expect to walk into a school and find stacks of exercise books filled with flawless work, so no one should expect to hear of schools which run like clockwork with pupils exercising the judgment of a Nehru or a Kissinger and demonstrating the attitudes of a Martin Luther King. That children make mistakes, are prejudiced and intolerant in their judgments, etc., can never be reasons for giving up attempts to involve them in the exercise of power in educational institutions because those are the places <u>par excellence</u> where misperceptions and inappropriate attitudes can be corrected and redirected through the structure itself in innumerable subtle ways with least damage to self-esteem.

(d) This point follows directly from the last one. We have been considering how a school run by a democratic head might differ from a school run by a linch-pin head. In respect of the political education pupils receive through the organization of the school itself it will be totally different. I have argued in Chapter three that as important as any formal instruction in political education is what pupils learn through the way the school itself is organized. In this I am including not only those parts of the organization in which the pupils participate but, just as important, those in which they are not involved. For within a short time any pupil (even an infant school pupil) will be aware of the organizational structure of the institution, who is the most powerful person, or persons, in it, who can safely be ignored as of little account and so on. So the pupils of a linch-pin head and those of a democratic head (if we could imagine, for a moment, 'pure' examples of those two categories) would be literally living in different political worlds and learning quite different things about hierarchy, the distribution of power in institutions, ways of making decisions and so on.

It is at this point that parents come into the picture. Whilst they have no rights to participate in the organization of the school, they do have a duty as monitors/coordinators of their child's educational experiences to make sure that, inter alia the institution is not affecting their child adversely (see Chapter five, pp. This is obviously an aspect of school which teachers will monitor independently but the parent is in an almost unrivalled position from which to get a very clear picture of his child's perception of the organization of the school. It may well be a misperception of the way things are, but that is irrelevant. In the kind of democratic society we are envisaging, the head and staff will be keen to hear any comments on the organization of the school coming from parents directly, or from parents via children, because this is one of the ways in which they can evaluate the educational impact of the school's organization on children.

I have tried to indicate the aims and attitudes of the democratic head, stemming from her understanding of democratic principles, and I have attempted to indicate, as concretely as possible, how such a head might work within our kind of society. I want now to suggest the kind of training programme which might be appropriate to encourage the development of such heads.

TRAINING PROGRAMMES FOR HEADS

Let us look at training programmes for heads with regard to their content and form, looking at content first.

(i) The democratic head needs to be aware of democratic principles. (1) This means work covering all relevant aspects of democratic theory—different traditions of democracy (elitist and participatory), majoritarianism, criteria for citizenship, freedom of expression and the necessary social arrangements to ensure it, dissent within a democracy, and the role of education. These topics in turn will lead into work on the kind of ethical notions which might support democratic conceptions. This will mean work on autonomy, utilitarianism and different conceptions of a person's interests and the public interest. What is emerging here, in other words, is the need for a political and social philosophy course. One element of this will, however, need to be treated as a large topic in its own right. That is education. Possible aims and conceptions of education—education, for instance, for the good of the

individual or for the good of society, both of which can be conceived in various ways—will need to be examined and priorities amongst them considered. Different possible realizations of those aims in different historical societies will need discussion. This work, particularly that in political and social theory, can fruitfully draw on work in the neo-Marxist tradition, like that of Habermas and Macpherson, as well as that which is firmly within the liberal democratic tradition, for as Tucker (1980) and others have shown, there are certain convergences of interest between those traditions which are missed by anyone who confines herself to one of them. This general theoretical work needs in turn to be applied to actual situations in actual schools. An ideal situation for this is the discussion by heads from the same locality, in a work-shop setting, of the implementation of democratic principles and aims of education in their schools. The common background of experience and the considerable overlap of problems encountered is likely to contribute significantly to the usefulness of such sessions, especially if by some device, like role-playing, they can be turned into 'brainstorming' sessions, where ideas can be tried out without those involved necessarily being seen to be committed to them.

(ii) This last point edges us from the content of the course towards its form. This is just as important, because the participants can learn as much which is relevant to their jobs from the form of the course as from its content. The course should be run on a participatory basis, with participants determining the topics, their order of priority and, to a large extent, by whom they are to be tackled, i.e. whether there is to be an input by an 'expert' lecturer or by participants contributing seminar papers. This 'participatory' approach is vital if heads are to get the feel of participation and to know what it is like to run an enterprise, relevantly similar to their own, on such lines. This is not a trivial point or an optional extra. It is the heart of the training programme, for such participatory experiences are relatively rare in our society. Interestingly in the pioneering work in heads' training in Sweden which was begun in 1976 this element was neglected and in the first report on that training (Ekholm, 1977) Ekholm comments that the school leaders taking part tended, because they were not consulted about the programme, to slip into the familiar role of passive student. This is unfortunate both from the point of view of their own learning and because of what they failed to learn about what it is to be part of a selfmanaged enterprise.

I have indicated what must constitute the bare bones of content in a heads 'training programme and what form such training must take. I have also implied that an organized course is required. This leaves unanswered a number of questions which I will attempt to answer now.

One might ask: why an organized course? How long should a course be? And should it be compulsory for all heads? The query 'Why an organized course?' almost answers itself in the light of the point made above about its participatory nature. If one arranged a programme of reading, and essay writing, perhaps even with tutorials, covering the topics outlined above, the vital experience of participation would be lost. In one sense the participatory course is part of the content and the same programme cannot be offered either as an organized course or by correspondence or whatever. The second question of how long the course should be breaks up into other questions of whether such a course should be a standard academic course covering a term or a year, full-time or parttime, or whether it should have some other format. What is best here will clearly be in part a matter of trial and error, finding out what formula produces the best results. The Swedish programme I

mentioned takes twenty-five days spread over two years in short bursts of two to four days. In between the participants are in their schools, usually with certain problems to resolve relating to their own institutions. Given the nature of the course this is probably a useful format. The very modest heads' course we have been trying in an experimental way in the department where I work has been run on a part-time basis, with heads from the same local area coming, at their own choice, after school and occasionally for whole day-schools. (2) This format seems to allow for the reflective arguing through of issues whilst keeping theory closely tied to practice.

Should such courses for heads be compulsory? In Sweden the courses, which overlap somewhat in content with that outlined in (i) above, are compulsory and by 1985 all Swedish heads will have participated in such a course. In any society which is aspiring to extend the application of its democratic principles courses on aims and conceptions of education in a democratic society probably will be compulsory because such a society will be anxious to enlist the help of its headteachers in discussing how it might best further its development along democratic lines and also on the role of the school in this process. A society less dynamically democratic may permit such courses but not make them obligatory.

Questions of a different sort might be raised about who is to teach these courses and what disciplines they will draw on. Although some of the issues raised in them will stray into other areas, they have their natural home within philosophy of education and in the overlapping and closely related studies of political philosophy and ethics. When I referred above to 'inputs' of lectures from experts I was thinking of people working within philosophy of education with a particular interest in the ethical and political foundations of that study. Whether these courses are run as discrete units or as part of a larger training programme including other sociological and administrative courses relating to the heads' work, is another matter to be decided by reference to particular circumstances and the provision already available. These issues, however, to do with the aims of education and the nature of a democratic society fall within the field of philosophy of education and need to be approached by people who have been philosophically trained and are used to looking at educational issues and problems in the light of that training.

Is the suggestion, then, that people trained in philosophy and working on problems within the philosophy of education are the real democrats who are going to train the young generation, via their headteachers, into democratic ways? No. The role of the philosopher of education is that of an expert who can be immensely useful to people pondering on the desirability of different political arrangements. She can demonstrate to them the need to understand what is involved in an exercise of power, and the cases that can be made for different distributions of power within a society, including the democratic case. And she can help them to acquire the philosophical skills to assess such cases. The philosopher is <u>not</u> the 'real democrat' training up others in her likeness; but she <u>can</u> provide indispensable tools for democrats.

CONCLUSION

My conclusion is mainly concerned with strategy. Let me put the question in this way. If the main objective is to move as quickly as possible to the establishment of more democratic educational institutions in which there is equal access to the exercise, or control of power,

is the best means to this training programmes for people who are currently heads? Such people, it might be argued, may have been motivated to apply for their headships for reasons which make the idea of sharing power with their colleagues peculiarly unpalatable to them. In addition, the habits they will have learned in office are likely to make them resistant to the values and associated attitudes of participatory democracy. Why, it might be asked, advocate this uphill path towards more democratic educational institutions? One could, after all, argue that there should be legislation establishing guidelines for school organization like those suggested above, and in the process simply cut out the role of head as we know it. In this way one avoids having to persuade people in attractively powerful positions to adapt and restructure those positions so as to give up as much of their power as possible.

Anyone who is convinced that our educational system could be more democratic can campaign for legislation to enable it to become so by joining pressure groups, using the press and television to put the case and so on. This, however, does not rule out taking other action in the meantime. Campaigns for legislation and heads' training programmes can go on side by side. There is every reason indeed for them to do so. Acquiring democratic attitudes is not like acquiring even a moderately complex skill—in mathematics say—which one might expect to master in a few hours with a competent teacher's help. For many reasons, some to do with the great range of application of such attitudes, learning to be democratic takes time and requires the help and encouragement of other democrats. Constructing appropriate democratic machinery can also be a slow business as attempts are made to fit institutions and practices to principles. If, therefore, the restructuring of our educational system via legislation is to be a success, there must be opportunities for us, who are to work within it, to learn to build up democratic attitudes and practices. In saying this, I am not denying Edgley's claim (1980) that education is not sufficient to bring about a more thoroughgoing democracy and that structural changes within society are needed. I am simply making the point that for those structural changes to stick, those living and working within them have to want them, and want to further and develop them. Providing heads' training programmes <u>now</u> is one way of introducing heads and their colleagues to the possibility of extending democracy and getting some of the problems involved in its extension considered.

At this mention of heads <u>and colleagues</u> someone, whilst agreeing that campaigning for legislation does not rule out action in the meantime, might argue that that action should not be simply heads' training but whole staff training. To which I would respond: why not indeed, if local authorities can be persuaded to allow such programmes and release the whole staff of a school for such a purpose? That indeed is another route to the further development of a more democratic educational system.

I am simply advocating the heads' training route as <u>a</u> possible one, which may recommend itself for eminently practical reasons, to anyone who favours making a start now. This suggestion is a practical one in two ways. First I am suggesting that it may be easier for local authorities to release heads for the limited periods indicated earlier rather than whole staffs of schools. Second, I am assuming that a heads' training programme has, course for course, a potentially wider effect on the educational system than a whole staff programme. Heads involved in such programmes can be expected to go back to their schools and start to initiate amongst their colleagues considerations of how their particular institution might

be run along more democratic lines. In effect the heads themselves are playing a crucial link-role in a wider school-based training programme.

The claim is then that heads 'training programmes are a means towards a more democratic educational system (even if not necessarily the best means—if there is a best means) and one which we can try now. Provided that there are no obvious reasons for thinking that this route towards a more democratic society actually obstructs the realization of that objective, should we not at least try it? Ultimately, of course, the test of such programmes is whether the participants' schools do indeed become more democratic. It is not in the end any claims which I, or anyone else, may make but what actually goes on in schools run by participating heads which is the decisive evidence for or against such training programmes. Therefore perhaps the best way to test this claim is to establish some experimental, either nationally or locally sponsored, heads' training programmes and subsequently subject the schools from which the participating heads come to an evaluation.

5
Parents' educational rights and duties

This chapter attempts to establish a policy on parents' educational rights and duties which citizens of a democratic state at a certain level of economic well-being would want to adopt. This policy, it is suggested, will have two linked aspects. First, citizens will lay down certain guidelines on parents' rights and duties. Second, complementing these rights and duties, and in consequence of them, certain duties towards the education of young members will be established which will devolve on the whole community.

This is not a biological treatise and so I am not understanding 'parents' here simply as the producers of the child. 'Parent', as I understand the term, is the name of a certain social role, which differs between societies. In this social sense, the role of parent, and its appropriate rights and duties, cannot be determined in isolation; it is necessarily linked to the political form of the society in which it occurs. This point can be illustrated from the classical political theorists. In Plato's Republic, for political reasons which do not need to be rehearsed here, Guardians are not parents to their individual children but to the whole class of Guardian children. Hobbes and Locke with their differing conceptions of a minimal state assume the existence of independent parents and families competing for resources, with the state as arbiter. So does Nozick, Locke's latterday admirer. In Hegel's political theory the family plays an important role as a kind of social building block, fostering certain attitudes in the citizen. In much contemporary work in philosophy of education, however, the existence of shadowy parents in the background is simply assumed and the kind of political theory in which they find their place is left unexamined. The several attempts which have been made in philosophy of education to establish the rights and duties of parents have started from the biological fact of conception and have tried to hang whatever rights and responsibilities the author would like parents to have on that. I hope this chapter will show that that way is doomed because no defensible rationale for parental rights and duties can be determined independently of the political context. But such rationales are the exception. More common is an unreflective assumption of parents with certain rights and so on, particularly in discussions of equality of educational opportunity. Mary Warnock's reference to parents is worth quoting as an example;

> To remove the concept of the ladder may well be to remove hope, and, it must be said, hope extends naturally to one's children's lives, perhaps even more than to one's own. Many people feel it is wrong or inappropriate to aim for too much for themselves, but these same people would feel purposeless and futile if they could not aim to 'better' their children. For the satisfaction of this desire, the ideal of equality of opportunity remains essential (Warnock, 1977, p. 46).

Against the assumption that parents have rights to 'better' their children, it is worth setting Hegel's doubts about parents' rights.

> civil society has the right and duty of superintending and influencing education, inasmuch as education bears upon the child's capacity to become a member of society. Society's right

> here is paramount over the arbitrary and contingent preferences of parents,… (Hegel, 1942, paragraph 239)

and in the addition to that paragraph:

> Parents usually suppose that in the matter of education they have complete freedom and may arrange everything as they like. The chief opposition to any form of public education usually comes from parents and it is they who talk and make an outcry about teachers and schools because they have a faddish dislike of them (Hegel, 1942, p. 277, addition 147).

How is one to assess these opposing views? What rights do parents have?

Before I try to answer this I ought to set about determining what is meant by 'a right'. Some will find it shocking that I am going to take the short way with this notion. (1) In this chapter when I say that someone, or some official body, has a right to do X or receive Y, I mean simply that there is a rule permitting them to do X or receive Y. The justificatory backing for the rule will in turn determine the kind of right involved. In other words such rules with legal backing are legal rights, those with moral backing (assuming such to be possible) are moral rights. This is a fairly rough-hewn notion of rights, then, which incorporates the distinction between the rights of the citizen and welfare rights but little else. It is sufficient, though, to allow us to make some headway with the substantive issues. It is thus justified on the principle that one should not load oneself down with vast amounts of philosophical baggage, if one can manage with a conceptual toothbrush.

Let me begin with rights often taken for granted in our society, those which allow parents to withdraw their children from the RE provided in state schools, which permit them to send them to a fee-paying school of their choice, to enrol them for dancing classes, piano lessons and so on. What is permitted is very different but these rights can all be queried on the same grounds. There is, first, the possible infringement of the children's autonomy and the possible damage to their interests by their parents' directing their lives in these ways. Second, even if the exercise of these rights is in the child's interests, other citizens also have interests, which may be infringed. It is questionable, for instance, whether the existence of public schools (like ours, with the access to positions of power which they provide for their alumni) in a society aspiring to be a democracy is in everyone's interest.

Should one conclude then that parents in a properly democratic society have no rights over the education of their child, because such rights may infringe either those of their offspring or those of other citizens?

This seems to be a wild conclusion. It seems to deny parental rights which would be regarded as matters of common sense; for instance, my right to discuss my child's progress or lack of it with her teacher, the right to know what report the head is sending to my child's secondary school about her, the right to know why my daughter must play with beanbags when the boys in her class are taught to play football—and many more such rights. They are, however, I will claim all derivative from duties, relating to the child's education. Basically they all derive from a duty given to parents in our society to take some responsibility for their child's education. This provokes three questions in the context of a properly democratic society;

1 What are the interests which children have which give their parents certain duties?
2 Must the resulting duties necessarily devolve on parents? What is the rationale for this?
3 Have parents in a properly democratic society any rights where their children's education is concerned, unconnected with these duties?

These questions provide the programme for the next section of this chapter.

PARENTS' DUTIES AND RIGHTS

What interests do children have which give their parents certain educational duties?

Perhaps the best way into this question is to consider what might be in a child's interest in a democratic society at a certain level of economic well-being. I have argued in Chapter three that in a democratic society what is in the public interest and the individual's interest is a moral/political education which will enable her to act as a responsible citizen of her society. This includes a basic general education covering the various areas of knowledge and experience, e.g., mathematics, the human and physical sciences, history, the arts, as well as a specific introduction to political concepts and forms of argument and the opportunity to acquire relevant political knowledge and experience.

The child, however, is not only a potentially responsible citizen but also a morally autonomous person. This is a basic assumption in this account of the democratic society. As we have seen, it is the mainspring for the political arrangements. It follows therefore that educational arrangements must provide the conditions for the development and flourishing of autonomous persons. Without such provision there would be no point in the political arrangements since their explicit rationale is to provide a context in which morally autonomous people can live together. There is of course an overlap here: the basic education will provide opportunities for personal, as well as citizenly, development. However, in a democratic society at a certain level of economic well-being—a vague phrase I chose deliberately to cover societies some distance above subsistence level—there will be further activities, perspectives and ways of life beyond basic education, to which citizens will want children introduced. This will be so because a basic general education, whatever that is finally determined to cover, and however well it is done, can only give the barest indication of the range of human activities and perspectives on the human condition. A child can only benefit from the opening up of broader possibilities if she is, as a morally autonomous person in a democratic society, encouraged to form her own conception of the good life.

Democratic citizens will want then a basic, broadly based education set in a moral and political framework, plus opportunities to appreciate, reflect upon and, in some instances, participate in some of the variety of human activities and ways of life. I have said nothing yet about any institutional provision of this education but I will say something about it now.

It is useful to make a distinction here between (i) those things which can only be taught if one has a detailed, intimate knowledge of the educand, her state of mind, motives and feelings and a close personal relationship with her and (ii) those things which can be taught without having this knowledge and standing in this relationship. This is a rough distinction because every teacher needs to know something of her pupil's state of mind. But a teacher

of, say, German can find out in her first meetings with pupils how much they know of the language and, using a mixture of common sense and elementary psychology, can work out how to interest them in learning the next stages of the language. She does not need to have a close personal relationship with her pupils. The success of the various BBC language programmes underlines this. But the BBC could not teach a baby her first language or the beginnings of her moral education: this has to be done by someone standing in a personal relationship to her who knows her mind, attitudes and feelings in detail, because such teaching has to take advantage of the moment.(2)

These two types of teaching (i) and (ii) do not exhaust the possible forms education can take because people can learn without specific teachers from the ethos of society and its institutions and in other ways too. This has important consequences. Because education for any individual comes from a variety of sources there is a need for someone to monitor and co-ordinate these experiences in the early stages of education to make it a coherent whole for the pupil and, very important, to help her to assume the responsibility for this co-ordination and monitoring for herself. This demands a person with an intimate knowledge of the educand.

In any society it will be possible to have professional teachers to teach what falls under (ii) above. But who is to be given the job of (i) and the job of co-ordinator/monitor of the child's educational experiences? It is tempting to say 'parents'. But on what grounds?

What duties, if any, must devolve on parents in consequence of the above proposals?

The answer in a properly democratic society would run something like this. As a matter of fact most people seem to like having children and bringing them up. They enjoy family life and a great source of their sense of leading a worthwhile life comes from bringing up their children, teaching them all kinds of things, playing with them and so on. This seems to be true of most human beings. Therefore in determining who should perform the duties under (i) and assume the role of monitor/co-ordinator, one can rely on this natural fact and give parents the relevant duties. The rationale for giving parents these duties becomes clearer if they are specified in a little more detail.

They cover (a) the parents' responsibility for that part of the child's education which depends on intimate personal knowledge of her and a personal relationship with her. I am assuming that this includes at least early learning of the mother tongue and early moral education but these are not exhaustive. They cover (b) the duties of co-ordinator/monitor, which are of two types. There are (b, i) duties of an intermediary kind between formal educational agencies and the individual child. These can relate to the child's ability to cope with the school curriculum. It would be a parental duty to find out, say, why a child is apparently falling behind her peers in mathematics. They can also have to do with the school's organization. Given that this has an important part to play, as we saw in Chapter three, in the child's moral and political education, parents might need to consult with teachers about, say, their child's reluctance to take part in a school council, or her cynical attitude towards it or perhaps her desire for a more authoritarian set-up. Then (b, ii), the duties of co-ordinator/monitor also require the parents to introduce the child to the myriad activities and perspectives on the good life which go beyond basic education. This point is developed further below (see p. 164f).

It hardly needs to be pointed out that most parents most of the time will not experience these duties as irksome, since they will be things they naturally want to do with or for their

children. Sometimes, however, it will be very much a matter of duty, e.g., to turn out in bad weather, missing half of a favourite TV programme, to escort one's daughter to the electronics workshop at the local community centre or to have to discuss with an irascible teacher what seems to be professional neglect in respect of one's son's work. It should not be assumed, though, that parents will be shouldering these duties, pleasant or otherwise, totally unaided. A democratic society will want to provide guidelines on parental duties and information where necessary about how to fulfil them. It will also want to monitor their performance and provide help to enable any parents falling short to come up to the mark. I say something about guidelines, parental education and monitoring in the final section of this paper when discussing duties of the state complementary to parental rights and duties.

I have assumed that parents have these duties deriving from the need to ensure that children get what is in their interest because they seem naturally to want to bring up their children. (Foster parents would have the same duties since they have, by formal contract, assumed the parental role.) I assume too, that they want, for the most part, to do this in nuclear families. If, however, at some point, this is no longer true and either parents want to live in extended family groups or isolated singleparent families become the preferred mode of family life, then the assignment of duties outlined will have to be reconsidered. There is in other words nothing logically necessary about parents' undertaking these duties. As things are there is a convenient fit between the existence of certain duties and people who naturally, for the most part, want to perform them and are in a position to do so. If that position changed citizens in a properly democratic society might well think that duties hitherto assigned to parents would have to be re-examined. I say more about this in the final section when discussing the state's duty to monitor family arrangements.

We can now see where in the properly democratic society parental rights come in, namely as derived from duties to do with that part of education requiring intimate knowledge and a close personal relationship with the educand and in connection with the duties involved in the co-ordinator/monitor role. This chapter is concerned only with general principles and I cannot specify exhaustively what these rights might be. They might, however, include moral and legal rights permitting parents to require educational agencies to give them information about their child's educational progress. They might involve moral and legal rights to certain resources, financial or otherwise, to enable them adequately to pursue their job of mother tongue teaching or moral education. Again, parents would have to have moral and legal rights to correct their children and, in certain circumstances, to punish them, although the forms that punishment can take would no doubt be circumscribed. These rights would all, so to speak, be 'enabling rights', enabling parents to perform duties in the child's interest. They would thus all be derived from those duties.

Have parents in a properly democratic society any rights where their children's education is concerned, unconnected with these duties?

There seems to be something counter-intuitive, against common sense, about the position discussed so far where parents have rights only in connection with the duties involved in those parts of the child's education which require the educator to stand in a personal relationship to her and those involved in the role of co-ordinator/monitor of the child's educational experiences. Do parents not have the kinds of rights I mentioned earlier—to select single-sex or co-education, to bring up their child as a believing member

of a religious faith, to send their child to a private school? They must, one might argue, have these rights—trumps, as Dworkin puts it, to protect the child's interests when faced with unacceptable and monolithic state provision. For instance, the legislative body of a community may decide on rigidly sexist schools, Outward Bound type institutions for boys, finishing schools for girls. Surely it could then be argued that parents should have the right to send their child to a non-sexist private school staffed by liberal teachers. Similarly, should not devoutly religious parents have the right to withdraw their child from the secular state school in favour of a school were religion is interwoven with all other aspects of life? Again there might be a situation where a private school is realizing the aims of education outlined above much more adequately than the available state school. In that situation should not parents have the right to send their child to the school they judge to be the better? Again, have not parents who detect an unusual musical talent in their child the right to select an education for her centred on the development of this talent? Then there are the parents who want to introduce their child to their own enthusiasm, say, for collecting hat pins, going to concerts, or playing cricket. Do not parents have this right? It would seem to be a curious society in which parents had no right to introduce their children to their interests and enthusiasms.

Let us look specifically at these examples and the broader issues they raise.

(i) As is perhaps becoming apparent, in the democratic society envisaged, the problem of state educational institutions being deliberately sexist in their educational programmes or organization will not arise. A sexist education offends most deeply against the principle of personal moral autonomy. It is particularly offensive because it is likely to be pervasive and entrenched for any individual, making it very hard for him, or her, to detach himself, or herself, from its effects. This is brought out very well by Sharon Bishop Hill describing the case of the liberal couple, Harriet and John, when considering their daughter's education. John is clear that women should not be deprived of economic or political rights, nor humiliated or degraded. However,

> What he envisages is a world in which these injustices are eradicated but one in which women remain sensitive, understanding and charming, and in which most take up a domestic life while most men take up a paying vocation. Since he thinks it only efficient to prepare people for these likely different but quite natural futures, he thinks sound educational policy calls for certain subtle differences in the training of males and females (Hill, 1979, p. 121).

Sharon Bishop Hill goes on to show that Harriet's sense that her daughter would be wronged by such an education is a well-grounded one. Such moulding and shaping of her daughter would offend in explicit and subtle ways against the principle of self-determination. (Self-determination is used in much the way I have been using moral autonomy.)

In a democratic society, the rationale of which is provided in large part by the idea of moral autonomy, education will not be intentionally sexist. In so far as sexist elements inadvertently creep in—and with the best liberal will in the world that is all too easy—anyone could, and should, draw attention to them. Parents have a particular duty here which falls under their second set of duties as co-ordinators and monitors of their child's educational experiences. It is, however, a duty rather than a right, it should be noted, and one which would apply of course in a less than perfect democracy like our own. The reverse

applies too. Parents have no right to give their child a sexist education. John, in the article, has no right to bring up his daughter to be 'ladylike in figure and personality' and in just the same way would have no right to bring up a son to be tough and masculine and perhaps protective towards his mother and sisters because they are females.

(ii) Similar arguments can be used against devoutly religious parents, if their intention is to bring their child up in such a way that the child sees herself unquestioningly as a religious person. This again is to foreclose options which it is difficult—though not as difficult as in the sexist case—to open again later. In the kind of democratic society I have described, parents would have no right to send their child to a school which was permeated with the values, attitudes and doctrines of a particular religion—Moslem, Christian or whatever—and where children were expected and encouraged to become believing members of the faith. In fact in such a society there would be no such schools for the young, although as many religious establishments for adult members of the population as the proponents of particular religions chose to set up. The society is not an anti-religious one, nor an intolerant one, it is simply concerned to safeguard the moral autonomy of its members. That concern demands special care over educational provision so that the child's development is not predetermined in some arbitrary way by an influence which manages to capture him at an early stage. I have singled out an education permeated by religion in this way because this is an option in our society at the moment and one which parents, if they are concerned with their child's moral autonomy, have no right to choose. Needless to say, the same strictures would apply if specialist 'scientific schools' existed, where the whole practice of education was permeated by a scientific, technical attitude and the aim was to turn out people who regarded scientific knowledge as the only true knowledge and the 'scientific attitude' as the attitude which should properly inform a person's dealings with his fellows as individuals and citizens.

It hardly needs to be stated that the democratic citizen, who is against schools committed to turning out believers, is not of course against religious—or science—education as a necessary part of every individual's education for autonomy and democratic citizenship.

It may be of course that parents represent their position as that of people not having a right, but a duty to bring up their child in a certain faith, perhaps a duty falling under their general duties as co-ordinators/monitors of their child's educational experiences. If so, then the argument goes back again to the question of whether anyone ought to induce some very particular conception of the good life in someone else. In other words the onus is on the parents to show that this particular conception must take priority over the ideal of moral autonomy as an educational aim. This would presuppose the existence of moral experts (see Chapter one, p. 10).

(iii) The question of the parents' right to introduce their child to their own enthusiasms and interests follows on from this. Let us assume that there is no question of forcing on the child some very particular conception of the good life. The parents, interested in Baroque music, collecting cheese labels or World War II military decorations, are asking simply that they should have the right to introduce their children to the joys of their hobbies. This seems not only unexceptionable but positively desirable. How else, after all, do we develop enthusiasms than by being taken to football matches, opera houses or junk shops by enthusiasts? There are, however, two qualifications. First, in conceding this I have not conceded a special parental right. Parents merely have the right of anyone in the democratic

society to talk about their interests, invite others to ask them more about them, take others along, where appropriate, to exhibitions, shows, etc. It is just that parents are likely to be able to exercise this right in relation to their own children rather more since the children are in a position to be aware of their father's and mother's interests and hobbies. It is in fact a right, stemming from a more general right to freedom of expression. There is no peculiar parental right to mould one's boy into a Liverpool supporter, for instance, as the practice of some parents might suggest.

Second, this right that a person has to talk, etc. to others about her interests, with of course, the usual prima facie caveats about the appropriateness of the occasion, the listener's willingness to be drawn into the subject, etc., has to be slightly modified in the case of young immature people. The right has to take into account the child's stage of moral development. Interests which may be permissible for adults, aware of the dangers they bring with them, may not be so for children.

At this point someone might accept these qualifications in the abstract but suggest that they, particularly the first, do not take sufficient account of the facts of family life in our society. Children, after all, grow up in families where parents tend to take them for the kinds of holidays, outings, etc. which they, the parents, enjoy and appreciate especially as the children grow older. In many cases they hope that the children too, will become enthusiastic campers, concert-goers or whatever. I do not think, however, that this constitutes any difficulty for the position I have argued. It is in the nature of family life that it must for some time be shaped by the desires and preferences of the parents but they should be aware of their position and their rights here. As the younger members mature and themselves have settled preferences, there is no reason why the desires and preferences of the parents should prevail in a situation where some collective solution (rather than everyone going their own way) is required. Indeed in their handling of the family situation, where different preferences for activities and outings obtain, reasonable parents take the opportunity to show that there are no parental rights to shape family life so that it imposes on all members a particular conception of the good life.

A final more general qualification. It is perhaps important to stress that in this sub-section I have been concerned with the issue of rights in this area of interests and hobbies. In our society parents—particularly middle-class ones—often take their children in the school holidays to various exhibitions, plays, films, musical entertainments and so on. In so far as these trips are conceived to have an educational aspect—and they may well be just fun—then I think that this would rightly be conceived by parents as part of their duties. They would see themselves as broadening their child's interests or whatever—although few parents represent it to themselves in this rather formal, dessicated way—and in my classification this would then fall under their second bundle of duties as co-ordinators/monitors of their child's educational experiences.

(iv) Another situation in which it might be claimed that parents have rights to determine their child's education, can be seen as a mirror-image of the last case. Here it is not the parents' interest or enthusiasm but the child's which is relevant. Parents detect in their child some gift or—to represent the facts as they more usually seem to be—are overwhelmed by the realization of their child's consummate talent in some particular field like music, dance, athletics. The child shows a great passion for the activity, considerable skill and artistry at an early age, with the potential to become, very likely, a first-class performer. To achieve

such a level of performance, however, special training is required from the age of four or five or so—ballet school, special music lessons supported by six hours' practice daily, or many hours spent in the swimming pool along with the requisite regimen for building up stamina. Attendance at a conventional school with all the demands on time that the attempt to provide a broad, well-balanced education makes would not permit the full flowering of this talent. Have not parents the right to place their child in an environment where her talents can be allowed to develop to the full? It does not seem to me that parents have such a right. What would be the basis for it? Clearly not the assumption that parents know best what would constitute the particular conception of the good life which their child should come to adopt. This would go quite against the grain of a society which places a high value on moral autonomy. One might argue that parents have a right to facilitate the bringing about of the child's own choice of a particular way of life, but this can hardly hold for the four-year-old dancer or six-year-old violinist. Yet it is at the early stage that parents usually want to claim the right to put their child in a talent-developing situation.

To suggest that parents, qua parents, have no rights in this context is not to solve the real problem here. Confronted by a highly musical (or gymnastically inclined or whatever) child, who is to decide if that child should be allowed, or even encouraged, to devote herself for a considerable part of each day to the development of that talent? It may well be to the benefit of the whole community that a supply of highly trained and gifted dancers, musicians and gymnasts is assured, but what of the individuals who enter these rigorous training programmes at an early age? It seems hard to avoid the suggestion that in some cases particular conceptions of the good life are imposed on them.

Some may object that although the problem is a real one the difficulties I am raising are not. For two reasons. First, most children who have this kind of exceptional musical or gymnastic talent are only too happy to be allowed to exercise it and, as a matter of fact, most find that their adult lives, as concert pianists or whatever, do realize a possible conception of the good life for them. After all, for most of us there are many possible variations on the good life. We would be fulfilled living a considerable number of different lives; it is not an all-or-nothing affair. These exceptional individuals are satisfied with their lives as they have developed, although this is not to say that nothing else would have been possible for them. Second, responsible parents and teachers try to ensure that other options are not closed to them. This is done by ensuring as far as possible that the specialist training goes along with a more general education so that the child who later comes to feel that she has made the wrong choice has a basis from which to work towards alternative choices. Along with this, responsible parents of budding gymnasts or concert pianists try to bring home to them as they mature the implications of the kind of life they have chosen so that they are able to appraise their likely future with a deepening understanding of all it involves. They are then in a position either to reject that way of life or self-determinedly to embrace it.

There are three comments to be made on these objections. The first objection need not detain us, since it is an empirical one. If it is the case that for most children guided into the life of dancers or athletes that way of life does become a self-chosen one, then the difficulty I raised about imposition is largely dissolved. Whether it is so or not, must wait what will have to be rather delicate investigations.

The second objection indicates a very clear parental duty falling under the parents' general duties as monitors/co-ordinators of their child's educational experiences. This, as

we have seen, is a duty for all parents and for parents of exceptional children it gets a special application. They have to make sure not only that options are not closed to the child because she is having a specialised training, but also that she is aware of the kind of life-pattern to which she is committing herself and what it is, and is not, compatible with. This will have to be done with appropriate sensitivity to the child's level of intellectual and emotional development. This illustrates again that these monitoring/co-ordinating duties should be the concern of people who know the child well—usually the parents.

Finally, what has still not emerged is who, or what body, has the right to place the young child in the talenttalent-developing environment. But in the democratic society we are assuming this may be the wrong sort of question to ask. We have to remember that in such a society people are not interested in who has the right to direct others' lives since they do not believe that such rights should exist. The question is rather: who has the right to offer the child certain opportunities which bring with them the possibility that they may have harmful effects on her overall development and which therefore, if taken up, necessarily give her educators certain important duties? Put in this way, it seems likely that in such a society citizens will take the view that any of a child's educators, qua educators, should have the right to ask whether she should have a specialised training. Since this is an important issue, it should then be discussed between all those involved in her education, parents, teachers, gymnastic coaches, etc., and a solution arrived at which attempts to safeguard the child's autonomy in the face of the dangers we have noted. It would follow, too, that citizens of such a society would have to devise machinery to be used in the case of a complete failure to agree on what course should be taken. We need not pursue here the form it might take. It is likely, however, that it would err on the side of keeping options open, so that where there was strong doubt about whether a child should follow a specialised training she would probably continue with a broad education.

It might be suggested that since specialised training carries dangers with it, the democratic society might forgo the heights of excellence in ballet, musicianship, gymnastics, etc., and not permit its children to receive such a training whilst very young. This is an understandable objection given the weight I have suggested this society puts on personal autonomy and also the dangers to that ideal represented by early specialization. But members of the society will also take into account that for some people a life of dedication to a particular art or sport will embody their conception of the good life. In some cases this will necessitate an early training. It seems to me that they will be prepared to countenance this, given certain safeguards. I may be wrong about this, as about other recommendations made in this section. But however the society tries to solve the problem in general it is clear that it cannot be solved by assigning to parents the right to direct their child's future.

(v) We come now to the parents' right to remove their child from the state school and select a private education for her. In this connection Brenda Cohen notes what has been agreed 'at an international level…to be of fundamental moral importance' (Cohen, 1978, p. 122). She quotes Article 26 (s) in the United Nations' declaration of Human Rights, which states: 'Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children' (Cohen, 1978, p. 122). She quotes, too, from the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 of the Protocol, which runs:

> No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the state shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions (Cohen, 1978, p. 122).

She notes the stress in both statements on the parents as the ultimate authority in educational matters and goes on to claim that

> although these parental rights might to some extent be met within a state-provided system, the possibility of opting out of that system is an essential safeguard against the degeneration of apparent guarantees of parental rights into a mere sham—paper rather than real entitlement (Cohen, 1978, p. 123).

Brenda Cohen is aware that evidence of present and historical consensus on parental rights does not constitute an argument for them. She suggests, however, that evidence of such consensus at least undermines the position of those who hold that there is a self-evident moral objection to private provision of education. This, I suppose, is true if stress is put on the self-evidence of the objection. It clearly cannot be self-evident if there is evidence of so many dissenters. For this defence of private schools to get off the ground, however, it has to be shown that such parental rights exist. This Brenda Cohen does not do. Can one show that there are—perhaps must be—parental rights to select private education in a society which aspires to be a democracy? This question needs to be examined in two different contexts: in the fully-fledged democratic society based on moral autonomy and justice, and in the imperfectly democratic society.

In a fully-fledged democracy is there a place for private schools? As we have seen, a basic belief of its members is that no one has the right to determine what shall constitute the good life for another person. It follows that parents do not have the right to try to determine the particular form their child's future shall take. This rules out the rationale for several types of private schools. Schools, for instance, which aim to bring up their pupils to be stereotypic men or women are excluded (as we saw in (i) above), as are schools which aim to make pupils into adherents of a religious faith (see (ii) above). Whilst there may be certain kinds of specialist education, perhaps given in specialist institutions, for the musically, athletically gifted and so on, these are not privately-funded institutions and it is not (as we saw in (iv)), the parent's right to select her child for such an education. What scope does this leave for private schools? Could it leave room for institutions like the public schools in our society? Could not a democratic society support the possibility of alternative schools to the state ones for those parents who chose to send their children to them? Not, it must be clear, if those schools really are 'like the public schools in our society'. The morally autonomous citizens we are envisaging could not accept a system whereby parents could pay for children to acquire certain life-chances, with the result that powerful positions in the society tended always to be occupied by a limited social group: in our society Church of England bishops, Cabinet Ministers, governors and directors of the Bank of England and so on come predominantly from public schools. Citizens would have to reject such a system in favour of one in which the chance to acquire the knowledge and develop the qualities of character (e.g., the ability to exercise power responsibly) necessary for such positions was not arbitrarily limited to those whose parents chose, and were able, to pay for them.

To do otherwise would be contrary to the basic principles of moral autonomy and justice. It cannot therefore accept the basic principle lying behind private schools, namely that parents have a right to determine their child's education because they can pay for it. The ability to pay cannot provide a ground for the moral right to determine the kind of education a person shall get. Even if, in a case where state education has deteriorated, the private education is very much in line with what is considered appropriate for the development of autonomous people, democratic citizens cannot allow parents' ability and willingness to pay to determine which children are to be allowed to develop in this way. This "would be to allow an irrationality into their arrangements—to say there are good reasons why children should have this education but whether or not they actually get it depends on whether their parents will pay or not. As Bernard Williams points out, 'reasons are insufficiently operative; it is a situation insufficiently controlled by reasons' (Williams, 1962, p. 122). The democrats we are envisaging could not accept it. Like Williams, they would want to make the reasons why someone should have a certain education both relevant and socially operative. To do otherwise would be to undermine the just and rational basis of their society. For these reasons citizens will seek other means than private schools to keep their education system up to the mark. This is not the place, and it is not my business, to speculate about what form such machinery might take but there are clearly options like inspection systems, commissions of inquiry and so on to be considered. It is important to remember too that parents, as co-ordinators/monitors of their child's educational experiences, will have a duty to try and ensure that educational provision is of the appropriate kind and quality. In so far as an educational institution is falling short in some respect there will be informal and, if necessary, formal ways in which parents will be able to try and do something about it. I have mentioned this above and in the concluding section I also say something about how parents may be advised and supported in their efforts by state agencies. This is, so to speak, the 'institutional' side of their activities but there is also, of course, the question of what they can do in the here and now for their own child in the situation where the child is getting an inadequate education in a formal educational institution. As we have seen, there is no question of parents having a duty to send their child to a private school, but this is not to say that there is nothing they can do whilst the unfortunate school situation is being sorted out and remedied. This is not quite the formidable task it would be in our society since schools are by no means the only educational institutions. There are, as we shall see, many other possible arenas for educational activities—libraries, hobbies workshops, art and craft centres, television programmes and so on. In the fully democratic society, then, there is no place for private schools and parents have no right to send their child to one. They do, however, have a duty to attempt to improve institutional provision for their child where they find it to be falling short and a duty to make for their child the best educational arrangements they can in the circumstances.

Let us turn now to an imperfectly democratic society. Let us suppose that private schools exist there, as they do in our society. Parents have a legal right to send their children to them. Have they a moral one? Clearly for this question to be an interesting one we have to assume that the parents are morally responsible citizens who aspire to live in a fully fledged democracy. Let us assume further that, convinced by arguments similar to those used here, they accept that qua parents they have no right to determine their child's particular conception of the good life. They wonder, nevertheless, given their conception

of their parental duties qua co-ordinators/monitors, whether they do not have a duty to send their child to a private school. They represent to themselves the dilemma in which they are placed in this way. The state schools to which they can send their child fail, in various ways, to live up to the aims of education to which a full-bodied democracy might aspire. The schools might be sexist, bent on making religious converts, bent on moulding their pupils in other ways, or might simply offer poor learning situations with much disruption. These defects are clearly different and I will need to say something about these differences; but for the moment let us ignore these. Parents might feel that they ought to send their child to a private school which embodies the aims of education as they see them. But they are not clear that their duty unequivocally lies this way because they also accept Bernard Williams's arguments about the basic irrationality of not making the relevant reasons for giving people education socially operative. There is no good reason why their children should receive this education—which there are good reasons for all children to receive—simply because they have the money to pay for it. As a reason for giving children education, parental wealth is irrelevant. If they support the private schools they are supporting an educational structure which militates against the kind of democracy they hope to see develop. On the other hand, they reason their situation is not that of parents in a fully-fledged democracy faced with an inadequate state school. Those parents have all kinds of ways in which they can register their grievances about the shortcomings of the institution. They also have all kinds of strategies by which they can further their child child's educational development outside school. For parents in the imperfect democracy there may be few such opportunities. They must resign themselves to seeing their child moulded in all kinds of undesirable ways or, more likely, simply turned off education in a noisy, large, disruptive class where the teacher has little sense of where the whole enterprise is going and is resigned simply to attempting to 'keep order'.

I could continue to fill out this dilemma, adding in various details which might seem to favour sticking with the state system or withdrawing from it—things like how much time the parents can spend on their children's education, how far the school is from realizing the aims of education in a full-bodied democracy, and so on. To do so would be only to underline that we are faced here with a moral dilemma, a clash of principles. Whatever aspiring democrats do, they are likely to feel that they should perhaps have taken the opposite course. To support private schools goes against their beliefs about the place of education in a democratic society, but to let their children endure an inadequate education is likely to affect their development as morally responsible people. Given the context of the imperfect democracy I do not think it is possible to provide any principles which will supply an answer to this dilemma for all cases. Like all such conflicts it can only be resolved in context, bearing certain considerations in mind. The prime considerations here are: how bad is the education and in what ways exactly and how remediable is the situation with the use of imagination and ingenuity?

Let me just indicate how I see these considerations being applied. If state schools are sexist or bent on making religious converts it is probably possible in most circumstances for committed democrats to combat these influences. If the state school is generally bad and in many respects anti-educational, this may be more difficult, especially for busy and/or uneducated parents. A private school may have to be the answer. This, I think, is all one can say in general when faced with the situation of the individual parent in an imperfect

democracy. Unlike the fully-fledged democracy, where it is a matter of establishing principles about the provision of education compatible with the aims of a democracy, with the imperfect democracy it is a matter of individual choice in many different kinds of imperfect situations which can only be individually assessed bearing in mind certain general considerations. I am not saying of course that such individual decisions cannot be critically examined and held to be inadequately grounded, but only that one cannot say, in general, that in an imperfect democracy it is never, or always, a parent's duty to use private schools when faced with inadequacies in the state educational system.

The conclusion to this lengthy consideration of whether there are any parental rights as such is that there are none. Parents have no right to give their child sexist, religious or indeed any kinds of education which impose a particular conception of life upon her and attempt to mould her into that conception. If these arguments hold, parents have no right to impose any particular conception of life at all upon their children. They may well have manifold duties, and consequently some rights necessary to the successful carrying out of the duties, but what they do not have is rights qua parents which allow them to direct their children's lives along certain particular tracks.

CONCLUSIONS

This concluding section is subdivided into three parts. The first two summarize conclusions reached on parental duties and rights derived from these. The third indicates the policy considerations which arise for a democratic community which takes this view of parental rights and duties.

1 Parental duties in a democratic society

As we saw above parents' educational responsibilities can be divided into two main categories. (a) The first set concerns those parts of the child's education which involve an intimate personal knowledge of her. Early learning of the mother tongue and early moral education fall into this category. (b) The second covers the duties of monitor/co-ordinator of the child's educational experiences. The latter come from many sources and take many different forms so the child needs help to enable her to make something of herself and put together a coherent education. There is no necessity for this role to be performed by parents and as children grow older it will very likely be taken over in part by others to whom the child may turn for advice. In a society, however, which is concerned that its members develop as morally autonomous beings the performance of the role of monitor/co-ordinator cannot be left to chance. There may after all be no one around at the crucial time prepared to offer support and advice. The society will assign this duty to parents on the grounds that they are usually in the best position to perform it and that given their natural interest in, and concern for, their children, they will want to do so. Not that in performing this duty parents will eschew all help from others. They will clearly be quite prepared for their child to receive all kinds of advice and support from others. The point is simply that there are people, parents, whose duty it is to see that the child is being helped to integrate her educational experiences into a whole, whether they do it themselves, see it in part being

done by others—a sympathetic teacher, for instance—or, increasingly, as she matures, by the child herself.

This second set of parental duties to do with the integration of the child's educational experiences subdivides into two specific responsibilities. The first (b, i) is that of intermediary between the child and the formal educational agencies. Institutions are run on general principles and even in the best of them an individual's interests can slip through the mesh. If, as well, the institution is an educational one and the individual a child, there needs to be someone to keep an eye on her progress and well-being, e.g., to make sure that what she is getting is making sense to her, that it is appropriate to the stage she is at and that she is generally able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the institution to develop into an educated person. As we saw earlier parents are very well placed to take on these responsibilities. They are in a position to have considerable understanding of, and insight into their child's aspirations, inhibitions and interests and, as well, to be the recipient of their child's confidences about difficulties at school, youth club or wherever. Parents, then, have a duty to mediate between the child and the educational institutions of which the child is a member. Not that it will necessarily be the parents themselves who see the head, class teacher or subject specialist, since they may judge it best to encourage their child to take up the cudgels on her own behalf on some particular issue. The point here, as I have stressed before, is that it is the parents' responsibility to make sure all is going smoothly. How they set about tackling any hitches or difficulties will depend on their judgment of the specific situation and the kind of action called for. Further, in the democratic society we have envisaged parents will not have to deal with such problems completely unaided. There will be specific provision to help them to see if their children are getting all they should from the educational possibilities within the society and to provide them with advice about what to do in the case of any shortcomings (see section 3 below).

The second responsibility falling under the parents' monitoring/co-ordinating duties is (b, ii) helping to enrich their child's understanding of activities and perspectives on life beyond what can be provided by the basic education. The orientation of the latter will be towards widening the child's awareness and appreciation of the activities one can indulge in and all the stances one can take to life. For even the best planned and executed education can only be an opening-up. Parents will need to encourage the investigation of further possibilities. In this they will be aided by the institutional support discussed in section 3 below.

These, then, are the broad duties assigned to parents in the democratic society envisaged. To some readers they will seem tediously familiar. They may claim with justice that this is exactly what good parents do in our society. This is true and perhaps not surprising if it is the good practice of parents one has in mind. The difference however between our society and the democratic society envisaged will become apparent when we consider the support (outlined in section 3 below) which is given to parents in performing their duties.

2 Parental rights in a democratic society

As we have seen there are no, so to speak, self-standing parental rights. That is, there are no rights possessed by parents qua parents which permit them to direct their children's lives

along certain tracks. In relation to **their** child's education parents do, however, have two sorts of rights.

(i) They have what I have referred to already as 'enabling rights'. These are rights which enable them to carry out the duties specified in the first section of this conclusion. Exactly what rights these are in detail will depend on all kinds of contingent factors about the society, its levels of wealth, education, technology and so on. There cannot, for instance, be rights of access to computerized information in a society without such hardware; but there may be rights to certain financial provision to enable parents to carry out some duties. Certainly there will be rights of access to all kinds of information about one's own child's abilities and what teachers say about her, and about the educational institutions themselves and the way they are run. Such information is essential if parents are properly to do their job as monitors/co-ordinators of their child's experiences.

(ii) Parents will also have the right, noted already, of all citizens of a democratic society to interest others in their hobbies, pastimes, concerns, with the normal provisos about the appropriateness of the occasion, other people's willingness to let themselves be interested, etc. In particular, they will have this right in respect of their children. Since children are involved, as well as the usual provisos, there will be further qualifications limiting this right with regard to the stage of the children's moral development. For instance, whilst it might be very appropriate to introduce an adult foreign visitor to the delights of a convivial evening spent in a British pub, this would not be acceptable for a four-year-old child.

Also, as we have seen, parents have the right to raise the question of whether their child should receive specialized training as a musician, gymnast, etc. This is not a right to determine that she shall have such a training, the legal right which parents in our society have at the moment. It is only the right to raise the issue for discussion amongst relevant parties—teachers, coaches, the child herself—so that the best course of action for the child to safeguard her development as an autonomous person can be instituted.

Although parents may have other rights (e.g. to do with their responsibility for their child's more general wellbeing and health) the above define the limits of their rights in relation to their child's educational development.

3 The role of the community in relation to parents' rights and duties: some policy considerations

(i) In the kind of democratic society outlined, the community will want to make provision for parents to fulfil the duties set out in section 1 above. This will involve at least the following arrangements.

(a) Some form of parental education will need to be provided, for parents cannot perform their duties unless they have knowledge and understanding of them. A start can be made on this in basic education for, as we shall see in (c) below, it is important for non-parent citizens to be acquainted with the general duties of parents, since they will be called upon to support parents financially in their duties through the public provision of certain amenities. All prospective citizens, then, will need some awareness of the duties of a parent but parents and prospective parents will need rather more extensive and detailed provision. This will cover matters to do with mother tongue teaching, moral/political education and

the duties of parents as monitors/co-ordinators. It could well be seen as parallel to the professional training of teachers in our society, particularly in-service training.

But, who, it might be asked, is going to set themselves up to teach parents their job? There are all kinds of specialized knowledge found in educational studies for teachers which would be just as useful to parents: knowledge to do with philosophical and psychological aspects of concept learning or moral development for instance. It simply is not the case that parents know these things by the light of nature. Reflective parents in our society realize this, as is evidenced by the vast sales of Dr Spock's, Hugh Jolly's books and so on. As for the machinery to be used, that will be a matter of detail for a society to determine itself, by looking at other related provision (perhaps, e.g., teacher training) and seeing how this service for parents might be dovetailed in with it.

Should such parental education be compulsory? A general orientation towards these duties will be included in basic education. What of more specialized provision? There is perhaps little to be gained in making it compulsory. From what we know of most parents' concern and aspirations for their children, they will be keen to take up what is on offer. And after all, we do not have to imagine a society making this provision in a slab-like way, ten lectures for all prospective parents in the local parish hall. The provision can suit all temperaments and learning styles. There can be books, television programmes, radio programmes, discussion groups as an adjunct of the local health clinic or schools, and so on. Although there would be some machinery for drawing the attention of parents to this provision, there would be none compelling them to use it. But citizens might well want to make provision for more persuasive tactics with failing, inadequate parents. I take this up under (iii) below.

(b) In addition to the provision of parental education, designed to guide and inform parents about the performance of their educational duties, the community will need to make provision to enable parents adequately to perform their monitoring role in relation to their child's education. As we have seen, this has two aspects, each with different implications for community policies. Let us first take the mediating aspect and its implications. What changes in institutions and other kinds of support are required to enable a parent to act as an intermediary between his child and the formal educational agencies of the society? Schools, for instance, will have to adopt a different attitude to parents from that adopted by many today. The appropriate attitude will be one that recognizes the parent as a co-operative partner in the educational enterprise. Concretely, it will mean that all kinds of information about curriculum policies and about school organization will have to be made available to parents and teachers will have to be prepared to discuss with them the bearing of these policies on the life of their child within the school. For some matters at an early stage, and for many matters at a late stage in a child's education, it will be more appropriate for the child, with parental advice and support, to discuss her problems or suggestions with her teachers herself. Learning to take responsibility for one's relations with institutions is after all, an essential part of everyone's education. Whether the initiative is taken by the parents or the child, or by both together, the same open, positive attitude towards parents is required of the school if parents are successfully to help their child to get the best out of it.

It is a curious fact that many schools feel at the moment that they have to adopt a defensive attitude towards parental attempts to get information or to proffer it. It is especially curious when individual teachers will often say how useful a chat with a parent

at a parents' evening has been in illuminating a child's attitude to a subject or in explaining some hitherto unexplainable piece of behaviour. Presumably part of the reason for the defensive attitude is the belief current in our society that the teacher is the expert educator who must not brook amateur meddling by non-experts. Conscientious teachers with this belief would regard themselves as irresponsible if they let parents dictate pedagogical practices, just as a lawyer would regard himself as irresponsible if he let a keen, legally inclined client influence him on a point of law. As the previous arguments about the nature of the parent's role show, however, there is a place for parents' contributions. Acting within the bounds of his role, the parent is no officious meddler. The teacher has no grounds to reject all the parents' requests for information, suggestions, etc. as illegitimate.

A teacher who accepts this re-drawing of the parental role may still feel that it could not be implemented, on the practical grounds that teachers just do not have enough time to consult with parents about individual children on the scale that seems to be implied. Without specifying exactly how many hours of teacher-time this would involve, one would speculate that it would be more than the 15–20 minutes per parent per term usual, at best, in the present system of parent/teacher evenings. Any more, overworked teachers will say, would be insupportable. On this score, it seems to me, they would be right. British teachers at the moment work far longer hours than their continental counterparts. Indeed to mention the hours the British teacher is expected to spend in the classroom is to evoke gasps of horror from French, German, Belgian colleagues at international conferences. To pile on yet more hours of work would be unjust and anti-educational: 'anti-educational' in that the educational enterprise requires time for reflection on its proper conduct, if day-to-day classroom practice is not to fall into the doldrums of habitual tasks—pages of sums, French exercises, copying from reference books, etc.—just because teachers have little time, and less mental energy, to reflect on the fundamental aims of what they are doing and how, concretely, these can best be realized. To accommodate the necessary consultation with parents, and because teachers already spend too much time in the classroom than is good, educationally, for them and their pupils, I would suggest a shortening of the school day. This is in no sense a curtailing of education, quite the opposite. Absolutely necessary to solving some of its most intractable problems, problems to do with pupils' motivation and other reasons for failures to learn, is setting aside time for parents and teachers to talk these through. Every teacher must have experienced the gratifying feeling of making a breakthrough with a child after having reflected on why the child is not coping and possible reasons for her lack of interest, disruptive behaviour or whatever. At the moment these experiences are all too rare. More time set aside for teacher reflection and teacher/parent consultation might well increase them. The same institutional openness as that displayed by the school would have to be shown by youth clubs, Brownies, Cubs, Scouts, and any other organization to which the child might belong. With respect to these, too, the parent would have a mediating role to play and so would need the same access to information, leaders' time, etc.

If there is to be teacher/parent, parent/youth leader consultation there will inevitably be disagreements at times over what is best for the child. Sometimes it will be possible to talk these through and arrive at an agreed solution. Where it is not the society will need to have some kind of independent educational Ombudsperson to step in and resolve the matter.

There would probably be relatively few such cases, but clearly some kind of machinery is necessary to cope with those that prove to be intractable.

(c) Parents will also need support in that aspect of their monitoring role which concerns the enriching of their child's understanding of activities and perspectives on life which go beyond those available in basic education. Citizens will not want to leave provision for this area as uneven as it is in our society. They will probably want to make considerable public provision for children to pursue all kinds of interests, independently of parental financial, and other, support. I am thinking, for instance, of libraries, art galleries, museums, swimming pools, sports centres, riding schools, craft centres, science centres, theatre seats, concert seats, opera seats which all young people, say up to the age of 21, can use without payment. Given their commitment to the development of morally autonomous citizens such provision is a necessity, for if parents have to pay for all the activities their child wants to explore, this will impose a heavy financial burden on most of them. It will fall particularly heavily on those who have large families and/or whose children are keen to explore costly activities. Even in a society without large income differentials (see Chapter one) the cost of the extension of basic education is still going to be intolerably high for some parents. Hence the need for public provision. Citizens of a democratic society will be quite prepared to spend their collective wealth like this because it will be one way of trying to ensure that certain activities do not become the prerogative of children of parents of certain social groups which would be quite opposed to the general principles underlying a democratic society.

This point is independent of the issue of arts and sports subsidies for adults in a democratic society. As Dworkin (1978b) and Ackerman (1980) have shown, there are problems for liberals who want to argue that the government should support certain cultural activities, like opera and ballet and so on, and, by implication, not others like motorcycle racing. For this is apparently to suggest that the government should endorse one particular set of values and that seems to contradict the very idea of liberal democracy. My argument leaves aside the question of whether or not the market approach is the right one for adult citizens simply that a policy of free access to cultural, sporting, scientific, etc. facilities for the young is one which must be in the public interest for a society of morally autonomous citizens. In practice this may sometimes mean a subsidy to sustain some little-supported activity. But the argument for this subsidy would be a strictly educational one—based on the need for the widest choice of options for individuals—and not one based on the claim of a particular group that this activity is 'too valuable to be allowed to decline'. As Ackerman shows, in a related discussion of this point, the educational argument is open to abuse. It may be used to protect objects that rank high in the value scheme of groups who happen to be powerful at the moment. But he does suggest three guidelines which might be used to inform 'good-faith judgment' in this area: (a) history: the dominance of a value structure in the past which suggests that its re-emergence is a possibility; (b) the overall pattern of objects protected: this can be reviewed for bias towards the interests of powerful groups; (c) simple passage of time: if a thousand years have passed with no generation placing any intrinsic value on a natural object, like, e.g., Niagara falls, perhaps objections to its use as a source of energy could be seriously reviewed (Ackerman, 1980, pp. 216–17). With further refinement on these lines the kind of argument needed to support my case could be forthcoming.

However, is the educational case independent, practically speaking, of the question of subsidies for adults? What about the child who does not avail herself of the free offers, but only becomes interested in them later? There are two possible answers to this question. It could be argued that it is the responsibility of parents, as we have seen, to bring these opportunities to the child's attention and, children being what they are, most of them will want to sample what is on offer, so the problem will not arise to any large extent. Alternatively one could attempt to implement the same basic policy by the use of 'first-time-user vouchers' for these activities, usable by anyone at any age. This could be cumbersomely bureaucratic and should probably only be entertained if the more administratively straightforward everything-free-to-21 proves in practice to be unfair to large numbers of individuals who are only interested in extending their basic education after they are 21.

Finally, to underline a point already made, this policy assumes a society with a certain level of wealth. Not limitless wealth, because then the above problem would not arise, since subsidies could support all activities any citizen wanted to engage in; but sufficient wealth to make the subsidizing of these activities for the young (or first-time-users) a practicable policy. But this, as we saw earlier, is not a straightforward empirical matter of inspecting the public coffers to see how much is available. For what money is available for public interest policies (like this one) as against what is available for the private use of individuals will itself be an outcome of a political decision to apportion the total wealth of society in a particular way (see Chapter one, p. 31f). There will, too, have to be a political judgment as to the amount that should be spent on extending educational options as distinct from the amount that should be spent on other public interest policies, like, e.g., defence. Any liberal democratic society will have to make these judgments which will necessarily be partly conditioned by historical factors. The extension of educational activities, however, should have a high priority because after basic subsistence needs for food, shelter and defence of citizens have been attended to, this is a policy essential for the survival of democracy itself.

(ii) The discussion so far in this chapter has assumed, implicitly at least, that the exercise of parental rights and duties will take place within the conventional nuclear family. Should we make this assumption, however, when we know that in the UK one in three marriages break up and that there are increasingly large numbers of one-parent families? We cannot. Parental duties will obviously be exercised in different family contexts and outside them. This has a clear policy implication for a democratic state. On the one hand it will not interfere with citizens' personal and social relationships. This would drastically infringe their personal autonomy. On the other hand, in the interests of the developing autonomy of its young citizens, the state will need to monitor the social context in which parents perform their duties. In case this has a sinister ring, all that is intended is that the community should attempt to investigate how far the <u>form</u> of family life permits or militates against parents fulfilling their educational duties. In the light of those investigations it will be the task of the community to determine what should be done where parents cannot perform their duties adequately. To determine, in other words, what changes could be made which would safeguard the autonomy both of the parents (to live out a certain life style) and of their children.

It is not appropriate for me to attempt to outline the kinds of machinery required for monitoring and support since this case is pitched at the level of general principles and

it will be for the democratic citizens to determine these in their particular situation. It is enough to indicate that various levels of machinery will be required for, e.g., investigation at the macro-societal level as well as for intervention and help at the individual level.

(iii) What, however, of parents who, despite the policies of aid and support outlined under (i) and (ii) above, fall short in their parental duties? What does the democratic society do about backsliding parents? If this is due to ignorance it can insist that they avail themselves of some parental education. Not, again, in a slab-like way, so that they are prescribed ten weeks of such-and-such a course; but some provision might be prescribed appropriate to their particular failings. If the failure is a motivational one—they do not want to extend their child's basic education or to monitor their child's relationship with the educational institution—then the only recourse may be to give these responsibilities to some other person, perhaps another family member, or a family friend. As we have seen before there is no reason why some named person should not fill this newly designated role of educational guardian in respect of these two duties and why the child should not continue to live with her parent(s), assuming that it is only these educational duties which the parent(s) find irksome. These duties, after all, do not necessarily have to be performed by parents. But if the parents' distaste is for the duties which must be performed by someone standing in a personal relationship to the child (i.e., early mother tongue teaching and moral education) then the child will have to be put in the care of people willing and able to perform them.

The solution to the problem of backsliding parents depends very much, therefore, on the reason why they are not performing their duties (is it ignorance or lack of inclination?) and which duties they are not performing. The solution must match the particular respect in which the parent is falling short.

Conclusion

The last three chapters indicated ways in which a liberal democratic society might move beyond a dominatory structure towards a participatory education system. Political education has a key role in this, reflected in its prominent position in this essay. The role of the headmaster, although unnecessary in the fully participatory democracy, can be used to transform schools into more democratic work-places for all their members. The role of parent, too, often regarded as a bulwark against the domination of the state or the teaching profession over the pupil, is seen in this essay as another power source which needs to be kept within appropriate bounds.

These three topics represent only a selection from the areas requiring attention in a move from a constitutional liberal democracy to a participatory system. Aside from the further work necessary on these three areas a number of other topics need to be tackled. I have restricted myself to basic education, but the area beyond this requires attention. What attitude should the participatory democracy take towards post-basic education? Should it hold fast to a distinction between professional education, i.e. the training required for jobs, both manual and nonmanual, and education for personal development? Some might argue that whereas the moderately wealthy society considered here might maintain fairly strict controls over recruitment to the former to avoid imbalances between, e.g., ethnic groups and men and women represented in different occupations, in the case of the latter it might allow equal freedom of access, for instance via a voucher system, to be used when the individual chooses. Is such a policy justifiable? It is not clear.

The role of research institutions in the participatory democracy also requires investigation. At the moment, in universities, teaching and research functions are usually combined. It is not obvious that they should be or what kinds of control should be exercised over research.

Also, as I have said several times already, echoing Dworkin's plea for a liberal democratic theory of culturesupport, the educational role of the media needs investigation in the light of work on freedom of expression in a liberal society and on bias.

These three areas are not unconnected. But it must be left to another study to develop a framework within which rational and coherent policies for each of them can be worked out.

Notes

INTRODUCTTON

1 Much of Kevin Harris's (1979) book for instance is a convincing Marxist critique of current educational practice. In its positive suggestions for 'anti-education', however, we are not presented with any well-worked out strategies for a change towards a more desirable society.

> Anti-education can hardly be defined precisely at this point of time; but it would be a matter of people talking, acting and working informally among themselves; discussing their lives, their freedoms, their constraints, their situations, their visions and their knowledge of the world; discovering the world for themselves through experience and with authorities, and linking up with movements in other areas of society, in a gradual process of changing themselves, education and society. It would seek out new forms, new goals, new directions, new processes and new social relations for the transmission and assimilation of knowledge; and in so doing it would have to continually recreate its research programme as it sought, adopted and promoted new and, (hopefully) undistorted ways of seeing the world (Harris, 1979, p. 188).

Harris gives a number of reasons why we 'should not realistically expect a rush on anti-education' (Harris, 1979, p. 188). These are connected, for the most part, with the stakes which people have in the status quo. Another reason, however, for any reluctance which people might show in taking up 'anti-education' is that it is unclear what one should do and how success might be measured.

I have tried to suggest a number of possible ways forward to a less dominatory society, including suggestions for political education, a changed role for headteachers and so on. I do not claim that these are 'the answers' but they are specific concrete policies to be considered on their merits.

2 I recognize that on the way to a participatory democracy from a society like our own there may well have to be preferential policies, or policies of reverse discrimination, where women are treated differently from men. The same would be true for other groups in the population, e.g., blacks, who have been unjustifiably discriminated against in the past. I do not argue for these in this book as I am concerned to discuss other policies to achieve an equitable distribution of power. I would support such policies, however, on the grounds, which Dworkin does in 'Reverse Discrimination' (Dworkin, 1977).

3 I am thinking here of Carole Pateman (1970, 1979) and Amy Gutmann (1980).

CHAPTER 1 DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

1 See Benn (1976) for the notion of a person on which my account relies.

2 See Hart (1961, pp. 189–95) for an elaboration of this account of the normal human person.

3 For an exposition and development of this position in relation to the aims of education see John White (1982).

4 In Chapter two I attempt to give an account of the fraternal attitude which should obtain between citizens in a democratic community. This supplements the account of the democratic citizen sketched here. It cannot be spelt out at this stage because it would anticipate the treatment of participatory democracy at the end of this present chapter.

5 The example is Ronald Dworkin's (1977, p. 234ff).

6 For instance, Oppenheim (1981, pp. 22–3), Peters (1967, p. 93) and Lukes (1977, p. 32) distinguish between the concepts of authority and power in different ways, indicating at the same time that other drawings of the conceptual map in this area for other purposes could be acceptable.

CHAPTER 2
REALIZING DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES: INSTTTUTTONS AND ATTITUDES

1 There are, however, some elements of the machinery suggested here in the Yugoslav system of self-management and in the Mondragon co-operatives of the Spanish Basque country. (See, e.g., Oakeshott, 1978, Chapter 10.)

2 This is also the view of Ronald Dworkin who says, 'it will be impossible to devise political procedures that will accurately discriminate between personal and external preferences' (Dworkin, 1977). I do not know if Dworkin would think that there is anything in Pennock's idea of the 'quantum of votes', which I discuss. It clearly does not guarantee accuracy in discrimination but it may none the less be a useful device in some situations.

3 See, e.g., Barry, 1965, Note B, and 1973; Weiss, 1973(a) and 1973(b); Pennock, 1974.

4 I have not discussed the idea of 'consociational democracy' (see Barry, 1979 and the references in that article in note 24) since, the solution of taking minorities into the government as equal partners, is one which has been developed for representative democracies. The focus of my interest here has been participatory democracy. As a way of coping with the minority problem in a situation in which representation is necessary there seems much to be said for the consociational solution.

5 I do not discuss the conscription case since this raises further issues which I do not want to develop here. In a different context I would want to raise the question of whether a policy of conscription is ever justified.

6 For discussions of definitional and substantive issues to do with civil disobedience, see, e.g., Bedau, 1969; Held, Nielsen and Parsons (eds), 1972, Part Two; Honderich, 1980, Chapter three; Rawls, 1972, Chapter VI, sections 53–9; Singer, 1973.

7 'Constitutional democracy' is a useful term used by a former doctoral student of mine, Dr Michael Zlotnik, in his thesis, to describe states which have a democratic constitutional structure (e.g., elections, legal opposition parties, procedures for fair trials, etc.) but where other social arrangements (e.g., authority structures in the work-place) are not democratically organized.

8 I am thinking here of work I have referred to before in this essay by, e.g., Bok, 1978; Dworkin, 1977; Honderich, 1980; Passmore, 1974; Singer, 1979.

CHAPTER 3 POLITICAL EDUCATION

1 I am well aware of the sketchy nature of the first section of this chapter. It leaves many issues undiscussed and unargued. It is intended, however, only to provide a background to some of the points made about the relationship between political education and the formal organization of education later in this chapter.

In a fuller treatment, for instance, I would need to say more at this point about the possible forms which the organization of education at local level might take. In an earlier draft I attempted to do this but it made this section complicated and unwieldy without adding substantially to the main argument about the necessary interconnections between political education and the organization of education—whatever particular form the latter takes.

2 See the next main section of this chapter, Political education in a participatory democracy, for a spelling out of the main outlines of the political education referred to here.

3 I do not think political education is ruled out in the first school by the problem of indoctrination because as I have indicated here (see p. 109f) and elsewhere (White, 1977, pp. 52–4) I do not think there need be such a problem.
4 This suggestion for a political education element in professional training programmes should not be viewed in isolation. In so far as there was such an element, this should increase the chances of success of the co-ordinated 'politics across the curriculum policies' advocated earlier.

CHAPTER 4 HEADTEACHERS: A CHANGING ROLE

1 The proposals here about the content of the heads' training programmes overlap with the proposals for the content of the more general professional training programmes advocated in Chapter three. This degree of repetition seemed to me unavoidable since some users of this book might be interested in one policy rather than the other and would find it useful to have all the relevant material in one place.
2 I should point out that this course did not have as its focus a consideration of what would be involved in running a school along democratic lines, although its participants chose this topic for discussion.

CHAPTER 5 PARENTS' EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES

1 There is now an extensive literature on rights. Colin Wringe's (1981) bibliography is an excellent source of books and papers in political philosophy on rights. For anyone interested in general issues to do with rights it could profitably be consulted in conjunction with Wringe's useful review of different kinds of rights and their justifications (Wringe, 1981, parts II and III). The same book also discusses children's rights in particular. For a brief, readable overview of the main issues concerning education and rights, see Snook and Lankshear (1979).
2 D.W.Hamlyn (1978, pp. 130–1) makes a similar distinction.

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