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# Merchants of Canton and Macao

## SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHINESE TRADE

PAUL A. VAN DYKE

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Dedicated to all Chinese who have no records or memories of their ancestors
who lived, worked and died in the Pearl River Delta.

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# PREFACE

Since I wrote the first volume of this work several new studies have been completed on China's foreign trade and the Hong merchants. Fred Grant Jr.'s study *Chinese Cornerstone of Modern Banking: The Canton Guaranty System and the Origins of Bank Deposit Insurance 1780–1933* (2014) analyses the Hong merchants' system of collective guarantees and how that became an early version of present-day bank deposit insurance. This work is the first of its kind. It shows more clearly the pressures faced by the Hong merchants under the guarantee system, whereby they were responsible for paying the debts of failed merchants.[1]

John Wong's 'Global Positioning: Houqua and His China Trade Partners in the Nineteenth Century' is the first exhaustive study of the famous Hong merchant Houqua (Wu Bingjian 伍秉鑑). Wong spent many years researching this topic and has made good use of the American China trade records in the New England area and the English East India Company's records in London. He has also gone extensively through the Chinese records in the British National Archive, the Number One Archive in Beijing and other records available in China, as well as various versions of the family genealogy. In the early nineteenth century, Houqua was one of the most successful merchants of the Canton trade. Wong covers in detail Houqua's extensive investments worldwide. His influence stretched far beyond the Pearl River Delta.[2] Two of Houqua's predecessors, Geowqua and Puiqua, are discussed in Chapter 5 of this volume.

Wang Shuo is completing her PhD dissertation on Houqua as well. It is entitled '*Wu Bingjian* and His Friends: The Relations Network of a Chinese Merchant in the Early 19th Century'. I have not seen the finished product yet but, as I understand it, Wang's focus is on Houqua's social relationships and interactions rather than trade.[3] It will be interesting to see how her story differs from John Wong's.

Another recent PhD study by Li Yun 李雲 is focused on the Ye family.[4] I did not know about Li Yun's research at the time I wrote the first volume. I have a chapter on the Ye family merchants in that book. Li Yun has explored the Chinese sources very thoroughly including the Ye family genealogy. In my chapter I show that the last Ye merchant, Yanqua (Ye Shanglin 葉上林), retired to the tea lands after he quit the trade in 1804. The foreign records say this and there is an undated Chinese source showing a benefactor by the name of Ye Shanglin 葉上林 living in Wuyuan County in Jiangxi Province.[5]

Li does not agree with this outcome. He has pointed out that Yanqua was buried in Canton and therefore could not have gone to the tea lands to retire. Unfortunately, we have insufficient data to resolve these differences. Yanqua could have returned to

Canton either while still alive or posthumously—we simply do not know. Consequently, we now have two possible theories of what happened to Yanqua after he retired: he might have stayed in Canton and died there (Li's story) or he might have retired to the tea lands as planned and then at some later point (alive or dead) returned to Canton and was buried there (my story). There is little information about Yanqua's involvement in the foreign trade in Chinese sources, so Li's study does not change our understanding of that part of his life.

There are several recent PhD dissertations about the trade, which also have connections to the Chinese merchants. Jessica Hanser completed her study on British private traders involved in the Canton trade; Susan Schopp completed her dissertation on the French traders in Canton; and Lisa Hellman completed her study of the Swedes in Canton and Macao.[6] Many of these Englishmen, Frenchmen and Swedes were loaning money to the Chinese merchants so their stories are relevant for this study. This new research adds much to our understanding of the creditor side of these transactions and the risks involved therewith.

In 2015, Maria Mok and I published a book on the *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822*.[7] That study is primarily concerned with artistic expression and whether or not paintings of the Canton factories can be trusted as historical documents in their own right. However, we do include quite a bit of new information about the factories and their Hong merchant owners. The more stable environment that emerged after the Co-hong was created gave rise to the Westernization of the factories and to new items being introduced into the Chinese export art market. The book covers issues such as changes in the management of the buildings and how the Hong merchants dealt with the need for more rooms to let when private traders in China began to increase in the late eighteenth century. We also discuss how Chinese artists adapted themselves to the demands of the market. Artists were also businessmen so much of that discussion is relevant to this study.

There are many other academic studies as well that were either recently completed or are currently ongoing, which have marginal connections to this study. I will not list them all here, but the authors include John E. Wills Jr., Jonathan Goldstein, Yu Po-ching, John Carroll, Thomas Cox, Gary Sturgess, Stephen Davies, Frieder Sondermann, John Haddad, Caroline Frank, Michael Block, Hanna Hodacs, Richard Grace, and numerous others. These new studies contain much data and new insights about the trade and how it operated. Research on the Canton trade has gained renewed emphasis in recent years owing partially to China's rise in importance in international commerce.

Besides new studies there are also new electronic databases that have helped advance the research.[8] Some of these digitized records from the Qing Dynasty have references to Hong merchants. I have done many searches through these records for both the first and second volume of this study, but found nothing new that had not already been used in the past. As I pointed out in the first volume, I have also made use of the Chinese records held in the British National Archive at Kew.[9] In recent years, there have been many scholars making use of these Chinese sources in the United Kingdom.

When doing research on the Hong merchants, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the sources. If we do not understand the nature in which documents were created, and the extent to which they can be trusted, then they will likely lead us to a misinterpretation of history. The Chinese sources are essential to understanding Beijing's views on trade. Records that were sent to Beijing, however, were often doctored and heavily censored. They do not always present a clear picture of what was actually happening in Canton.[10] There is almost nothing in the records sent to Beijing about the daily activities of merchants. Numerous references can be found in the Chinese sources to Hong merchants such as Swequa, Poankeequa and Monqua, but I found nothing in the Chinese documents that add anything new or significant to their stories.[11]

With almost all of the histories of the trade that have made use of the Chinese records, the authors have failed to acknowledge the limitations of those sources. The dependence on one work especially—the *Yue haiguan zhi* 粵海關志 (Gazetteer of Guangdong Maritime Customs)—has resulted in many historical misunderstandings. Scholars have assumed that everything they read in that document is the truth, when in fact it is full errors.[12]

One very obvious example is the list of ships at Whampoa from 1751 to 1838 in volume 25 of the *Yue haiguan zhi*. There are only a few years when the figures are actually correct. If we compare that list with Dermigny's list we see hundreds of ships missing from the data. From 1751 to 1833, Dermigny shows 4,797 ships arriving at Whampoa, whereas the *Yue haiguan zhi* shows only 4,443 ships. That is a difference of 354 ships.[13] The new ship data that I am collecting (some of which is presented in Table 2.1) concurs with Dermigny. They show that the *Yue haiguan zhi* list is missing hundreds of ships, which the Hoppos failed to report to Beijing. There are numerous other errors in the *Yue haiguan zhi* as well, such as the operations of the Bengang Hang 本港行 and the Waiyang Hang 外洋行 (see below). Besides wrong information, one of the biggest problems with the *Yue haiguan zhi* is the omissions. The document does not tell us about the exact amounts of the administrative fees that were collected, the exactions and charges that were applied to the trade, the bribes and connivance fees that customs officers collected, and the many unwritten responsibilities of the Hong merchants such as paying for the costs of large celebrations and entertainments at Canton.

In short, if all we had was the *Yue haiguan zhi* to tell the story of the trade, we would have a grossly misrepresented history. It might tell us correctly what was supposed to happen, but fails miserably in representing what actually happened. This does not mean we should not use that document. On the contrary, the *Yue haiguan zhi* adds a lot to our understanding of the administration of the trade. We just need to acknowledge its limitations and only make use of the parts that are backed up by other evidence.

Of course, all historical documents—including those of the East India companies—need to be cross-referenced to determine their credibility. If we do not understand and acknowledge the limitations of our sources, then we leave ourselves open to being misled and to misleading others. Just because something is written in the English East India Company's (EIC) records, such as a Chinese merchant being of a questionable character or the Hoppos being overbearing and unreasonable, does not necessarily

mean that is the way it was.[14] Each of those statements is simply one opinion that needs to be checked against other data.[15]

Genealogies are valuable resources as well, but with some limitations. The Chinese genealogies collected by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon Church) have been available on microfilm at many different world-wide locations for decades. Previous studies of the merchants, such as those of Ch'en and Cheong, did not make use of these sources. Recently these genealogies were digitized and are now accessible online. This collection includes family genealogies from all over China including Guangdong and Fujian provinces. They are important records for establishing relationships within and between families and birth and death dates. However, because the Chinese used many different names, it is often difficult to match the trade names in foreign records with names that appear in the genealogies. Another limitation is that genealogies everywhere tend to leave out negative information about family members such as crimes, debts, bankruptcies, illegitimate relationships and births, illegal activities, problems with government, and anything else that might tarnish their reputations. Chinese genealogies in general contain little or no information about the daily activities of family businesses. Moreover, only a very small percentage of the merchants discussed in this study actually have genealogies of their families in eighteenth-century Canton.

We know that Chinese merchants kept detailed records of their activities. I have shown in *The Canton Trade* and also in the first volume of this study that records were essential for them to keep track of their profits and losses. The Hong merchants handled huge volumes of trade each year, which amounted to hundreds of thousands of taels. They had extensive connections to inland suppliers; they were often involved in the Chinese junk trade to Southeast Asia; and they traded with numerous foreigners at the same time.

Contrary to what Ch'en has suggested in his studies—that the Hong merchants traded mostly in tea and that we can therefore evaluate their operations by simply looking at that single commodity—we know now this approach is much too simplistic (see below).[16] The Hong merchants traded in a wide variety of products and had extensive involvements in the Chinese interior as well as in Southeast Asia. In order to keep track of all those transactions, it was essential for them to keep records. We have both visual images and written records showing them doing just that.[17]

However, it was not wise for merchants to keep detailed financial records longer than needed to complete the transactions. If those documents fell into the hands of officials it could result in the government extracting more revenues from the owners. The same was true for public officials such as the customs superintendents (Hoppos). Financial figures could bring about unforeseen problems for government officials and merchants alike, which help to explain why few of them have survived.[18]

Because there are so many unknown variables of trade it was almost impossible for foreign contemporaries in Canton to calculate Chinese net profits. To arrive at a rough estimate, they would have needed to know each man's costs, including but not limited to whatever interest he paid on loans and advances, taxes, fees, government exactions, presents to superiors, the cost of building and maintaining shops and

warehouses, connivance fees, the cost of chop boats, depreciation on fixed assets, and wages paid to employees. None of the foreigners in Canton had detailed knowledge of these particulars so, at best, all they could calculate were gross profits. Efforts have been made in the past by historians to estimate Chinese merchants' net profits but, because the historical records do not contain sufficient details, in the end all we get are a bunch of meaningless figures that tell us nothing.[19]

Owing to the nonexistence and/or limitations of the sources, the only way we can reconstruct the merchants' stories is by making use of the records created by their customers. This is perhaps a backward way of approaching history, but we have no other alternative. It is equally important, however, that we do not just rely on one customer, such as the EIC, to tell the whole story—as has been so often done in the past. We must make use of all the records available, including Chinese sources, the archives of other East India companies and private traders' records (such as those of the Americans). This multi-archival approach, then, is the only way to gain an overall understanding of the China trade and the influences it had on global commerce. It is also the only way to understand the multifaceted operations of the Canton merchants.

In addition to acknowledging the limitations of sources, we need to also understand that none of them are complete. Most of the previous studies have almost exclusively based their research on the British and Chinese sources. Those collections are incomplete in both chronology and content, with many important years missing and gaps in sequence. The heavy dependence on British sources has resulted in the misreading of documents and inconsequent misunderstandings of history, all of which has been passed on from one generation of scholars to another for more than one hundred years. As I have mentioned numerous times in the past, it is time to break this cycle and reexamine the evidence anew. Just because ten history books say something happened, it does not mean that those ten history books are correct—because almost all of them have based their information on the British sources. Enormous amounts of data are missing from their analyses.

Since previous authors have only used a fraction of the sources, they have also only told a fraction of the story. I am very sympathetic to the reasons why previous studies have not made use of all the available materials. However, with all the research tools that we now have available, we should no longer be limiting our studies to simply using the English and/or Chinese sources—especially with a subject like the Canton trade.

Because scholars of this history are still depending heavily on Chinese and/or English sources to tell the whole story (Ch'en 2005; 2014), and looking at the trade from the top-down (Zhao 2013; Ch'en 2014), I provide some examples below of the fallacy of this approach.[20] If we do not acknowledge the limitations of our sources and the approach we take to research, then we are not only deceiving ourselves but everyone else who follows our misinterpretations.

## HISTORICAL MARKERS AND POLICY VERSUS PRACTICE

In this study, I employ a bottom-up approach. I started this project by collecting the minutest details I could find, such as names, costs, expenses, prices, weights of chests,

tea mixtures, exchange rates, etc. I worked my way up to trading houses, partnerships, Co-hong, government regulations, and foreign influences. I did this because I wanted to know what happened, rather than what was supposed to happen. The traditional histories of the trade and of the merchants have been largely top-down approaches. Historians have overwhelmingly focused on government policies, the actions of officials, the decisions of companies' officers, and the actions of Hong merchants, etc., to interpret what happened. All of these factors are important, but we must not ignore the minute details as they often hold the key to unlocking the mysteries of the past.

Of course, bottom-up and top-down approaches both have their strengths and weaknesses. With a bottom-up history, it is easy to get lost in the detail and forget about the big picture. Moreover, sometimes, after spending weeks collecting data, we find out that they are of little use. I have many files filled with information on this or that subject—files that are of no use to me because they reveal nothing of significance.

The bottom-up approach requires enormous amounts of time and, in the end, might produce only small amounts of usable data. This outcome is not conducive to academic expectations that require scholars to publish two articles per year. Moreover, to do a bottom-up approach of the Canton trade requires visiting many archives in many countries, which means a large amount of funding is needed. Of course, they are written in many different languages as well. It is thus understandable that scholars have primarily depended on British records and concentrated their attention on the upper management records. By limiting the source materials, authors can find and collect the data in a short time, and then produce a paper or chapter.

With top-down histories, there is a tendency to take officials and senior officers' words as if they were the *truth*, without checking the validity of their statements. Depending on these reports and correspondences to tell the story means that historians only discuss what their historical actors discuss. Everything else is considered unimportant. Even in our modern world it can be seen that the 'experts' often do not agree on the causes and effects of what happens in certain economies. It is not until decades later that all the factors are known and assembled to show us more clearly what actually happened. It is important to know changes that took place in government and business policies, but those events by themselves do not necessarily reveal to us what was actually happening in trade.

Policies and decrees were rarely carried out to the letter in Canton. Chinese officials rarely recorded what was truly happening around them. They only wrote what they thought the emperor and other senior officials needed to hear and/or would accept. Foreign supercargos in Canton had very limited access to information—especially knowledge of the operations of the Hong merchants. Supercargos knew a great deal about their own company's operations, but had only a brief understanding of what other companies in Canton were doing. Their views and opinions are very subjective and often present incomplete and skewed pictures of the world around them.

The many statements that were made by supercargos of the various East India companies, that the China trade would end and that everything would come to ruin when the Co-hong was established in 1760, is clear testimony to their myopic knowledge, understanding and insight. How can we then take their words as 'truth' and say

that what they said is what happened? Most of what they claimed would happen to the China trade never came about. This was the case because they did not have knowledge of all of the factors affecting the Co-hong's establishment. Their complaints were expressions of the fears they had of what might happen to the trade, and might have nothing to do with what actually happened.

Historians have been all too eager and/or willing to accept this or that statement from a supercargo or Chinese official as if it were fact without checking to see if there was any validity to their claims. We now have many histories telling us how corrupt everything was in the Canton trade, without anyone—until recently—asking why it continued to grow. This is a result of historians failing to cross-reference their sources with other data. I am very sympathetic to the reasons why historians of the twentieth century primarily relied on this top-down approach. I also began with a pencil and paper and could not afford to purchase a laptop computer in the early 1990s. They were just too expensive.

In the twenty-first century, we now have many more tools at our disposal that allow us to collect and cross-reference data from different archives quickly and easily. We can order digital documents, take pictures of collections and, in some cases, view the documents online free of charge. These new tools have made many of the excuses of the past irrelevant.

Another tendency of previous studies has been to divide history into eras. These partitions were largely based on changes in policy. We separate the China trade into eras before and after 1684—when China opened its doors to foreign trade. Another dividing line is the Nanking Treaty of 1842, when other ports were opened to foreign trade. These markers are very effective and help us to generalize and conceptualize large blocks of time. There were indeed very different factors affecting everything with very different outcomes before 1684 and after 1842.

Other policy-based historical divisions are less meaningful. An overwhelming majority of Chinese historians divide the history of the Canton trade into periods before and after 1757, when other ports were officially closed to foreign trade. As I point out in *The Canton Trade*, this separation makes little sense, because it changed almost nothing. It rather kept the status quo in place—that is Canton being the centre of the trade. When we impose this division on history we are suggesting that the period before and after 1757 are somehow very different, when in fact the policy hardly changed anything. All across China there are endless publications that give the impression that something new began in 1757 and everything was different before that year. In reality, however, everything continued in the trade after 1757 as it had before. In terms of understanding the trade, this division has no historical meaning and only leads to more misunderstandings.

Another division that top-down historians make is the creation of the Bengang Hang 本港行 and the Waiyang Hang 外洋行 in 1760. The junk trade to Southeast Asia was administered out of the Bengang Hang, and the foreign trade in Canton, was administered out of the Waiyang Hang. Ch'en has been a strong promoter of this division, which also makes no sense.[21] On the administrative level, these two bodies were separate, but on the daily operation level, there was no clear division between them.

In Chapter 3, I discuss Poankeequa's involvement in the Dafeng Hang. After 1760, that firm was part of the Bengang Hang through which the junk trade to Southeast Asia was administered.[22] Poankeequa and his brother, however, did much of their trade with foreigners out of this firm from the 1750s to the early 1760s. Poankeequa traded directly with Spanish merchants in Manila out of the Dafeng Hang as well, from at least the 1740s (see Appendix 3B). He and his successors continued trading with the Spaniards into the early nineteenth century. Trade continued after the Bengang Hang was established as it had before.

As I showed in the first volume of this study, many of the Canton junks of the Bengang Hang were sponsored, owned and managed by Hong merchants of the Waiyang Hang firms. Merchants connected to the Bengang firms were regularly involved in the Waiyang firms, and even communicated directly with foreigners (such as Hongsia in the first volume). Foreigners of the Waiyang firms were regularly investing in the junk voyages of the Bengang firms. The latter junks, in turn, supplied imports needed in the foreign export trade, such as woods, dyes, sago, etc. All of this was going on after the Bengang Hang was created, as it had before. This is another meaningless division that Ch'en and others have imposed upon history, and which makes no sense.[23]

If we define the trade simply by its policies, then we are blinding ourselves to all of the activity that was going on between periods and groups. Scholars have not seen these exchanges in the past because they have held preconceived notions that the Waiyang and Bengang Hangs operated as separate entities. If we dig deep enough into the details, however, we begin to see that these barriers are simply fabrications that historians have placed upon us. It is like saying that there was no opium problem in China after 1729, because that was the year that the Yongzheng emperor banned its sale;[24] that the security merchant system did not begin until 1740, because that is when a policy was established for the same; that no foreign women went upriver to Whampoa or to the Canton factories, because they were forbidden by law from doing so; that Chinese merchants did not deal in yellow or red fabrics or in gold, because those items were forbidden to trade; that the Canton trade did not begin in earnest until 1757, because that was the year that other Chinese ports were closed to trade; that foreigners did not stay the entire year in Canton, because they were required to leave for Macao every year in the off-season; and that non-Portuguese did not rent apartments in Macao in the early eighteenth century, because they were forbidden from doing so. None of these statements are true. They are simply policy-based generalizations that historians keep replicating and that blind us to what was actually happening.

Let us take a look at the sources to see more precisely why we need to examine all the evidence. Since I wrote the first volume of the *Merchants of Canton and Macao*, I have explored quite a few more sources. In the summer of 2012, my PhD student and research assistant Susan Schopp and I went through the French records that I had not previously explored very thoroughly. We photographed some 40,000 pages of documents. If I exclude the ship journals and other documents that do not talk about China but, rather, other places passed en route, then we come up with about 20,000 single pages of documents that were created in Canton. In the past decade I have also been involved in ordering copies of tens of thousands of pages of documents for libraries and

archives in Macao and Guangzhou. The archives in Europe generally charge by the page, which makes it a simple matter to come up with a total. I have also photographed some of these collections myself. All of this activity makes possible the assembly of data shown in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 shows the approximate number of pages in each of the East India companies' archives that discuss various aspects of the China trade. These figures only include records that were created in Canton and Macao, such as the English East India Company's Diaries and Consultations, the Dutch East India Company's (VOC) *dag-registers*, the Danish Asiatic Company's (DAC) *negotiepotocoler*, and numerous other reports, ledgers, journals, resolutions, correspondences and documents. The figures do not include the records that were created in Europe, such as warehouse inventories, sales catalogues, instructions to officers, internal company matters, etc. The records created in China are the ones that include discussions about individual merchants, problems encountered, and everything else connected to the trade. These records are the most important for understanding what happened in Canton on a day to day basis.

The figures in Table 1.1 are approximates but are nonetheless fairly accurate. For example, we know exactly how many pages there are in the EIC Diaries and Consultations. The figures in Table 1.1 do not include ship journals. The British, Dutch and French archives have documents about China from the seventeenth century as well, but I have omitted those. I only include the documents that discuss the Canton trade from about 1698 to 1833. A list of all the records can be seen in the bibliography.

The non-British figures in Table 1.1 include many different types of documents, some of which cannot be found in the British archives. The Dutch and Danish records, for example, contain daily entries of trade transactions similar to the British consultations, but from another point of view. In Belgian, Dutch, Danish, French and Swedish archives there are many resolutions, ledgers, daily journals (different from EIC Consultations), contracts, packing lists, invoices, stowage charts, bills of lading, expense books, manifests, receipts, and thousands of pages of correspondences. All of these documents were created in China by the respective companies' officers. There are many details in these records about Chinese merchants that cannot be found in British archives. These other companies operated very differently from the EIC and, consequently, often recorded a different side of the merchants' activities.

The British records in Table 1.1 include the Consultations and Diaries in the series G/12/1–291. In 2007, the University of Macau Library ordered digital copies of the entire G/12 collection, so we have a very accurate figure of the total number of pages (72,300).[25] About 6,000 of those pages, however, are from the seventeenth century, many of which do not concern China, so I have eliminated them from the figures in Table 1.1. The G/12 total for the years from about 1699 to 1833 comes to about 66,300 single pages. I have included another 3,700 pages from the R/10/3–9 series, which fill a gap in the G/12 records from approximately 1752 to 1772. The remaining R/10 records are either copies of the G/12 or instructions sent from Britain.

In all of these collections, there are duplicates of documents and blank pages with nothing on them, so these are just rough estimates. The Belgian, Dutch, Danish and Swedish records tend to have a much higher level of detail than what we normally find

**Table 1.1 European China Trade Records 1698–1833 (Excluding Navigational Journals)**

| Nation | Years | Single pages | % | Description | Languages |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Holland | 1729–1830 | 135,000 | 44% | VOC, Canton, OIC, RAB, HRB and NHM collections in the National Archives, The Hague, but only the pages that discuss activities in China. | Dutch |
| Britain | 1699–1833 | 75,000 | 25% | Canton Factory Records G/12/1–291 and R/10/3–9, all of which discuss activities in China, but only the records that cover the years from 1699–1833. | English |
| Denmark | 1731–1806, 1820–1833 | 50,000 | 16% | DAC Negotieprotocoler, Kassehovedboger, Regnskabsjournaler and other documents in Copenhagen, but only the pages of those books that discuss activities in China. | Danish |
| Sweden | 1732–1816 | 20,000 | 7% | All SOIC records that discuss activities in China, including those in various libraries and archives in Stockholm, Gothenburg, Uppsala, Kalmar and the Irvine Papers in JFB (USA). | Swedish and several other languages |
| France | 1698–1830 | 20,000 | 7% | All trade records that discuss activities in China, including those in various libraries and archives in Aix-en-Provence, La Courneuve, Lorient, Nantes, Montigny-le-Bretonneux and Paris. | French |
| Belgium | 1723–1733 | 5,000 | 2% | All records that discuss activities in China, including the IC and other collections at the Municipal Archive in Antwerp and Ghent University Library. | French, Dutch and English |
| Total | | 305,000 | 100% | | |

in the British records. I have not included the Portuguese records here because they contain very little about the trade in Canton or the Chinese merchants.[26]

Between the Macau Historical Archives, the University of Macau Library and Sun Yat-sen University's Department of History Library in Guangzhou, there is now almost an entire duplicate set of Dutch China trade records (records created in China—excluding ship logbooks).[27] I was involved in ordering many of those documents and that has enabled me to come up with this estimate. As can be seen, for the eighteenth century, the Dutch are perhaps the single most important documents for this study, with the British being second.

The Danish records are mostly bound journals, parts of which were created on the voyages out and back by the supercargos. I have only included an estimate of the pages that were actually created in China. In a 250-page journal written by a Danish supercargo, for example, there might be only 150 pages that were actually written in China and which discuss the day to day transactions. I photographed all of the 50,000 plus pages of the Danish records shown in Table 1.1 so I can attest to the accuracy of that estimate. The Belgian records provide the best details of the daily operations of company trade in the 1720s; and the private records of the Swedish company's supercargos (who were not all Swedes) provide the best details of private trade in China from the 1720s to the 1770s.[28]

The French records, on the whole, tend to be less detailed than the British and other European records. They are nonetheless important for cross referencing. They do, however, contain information about Canton and the trade that cannot be found in other sources. For example, there is good information in those records about the factory fire of 1743; the Chinese merchants who supplied the French with cargos from the 1740s to the 1770s; the establishment and operation of the Co-hong in the 1760s and its dissolution in 1771; the Imperial Company trade in the late 1770s and early 1780s; the British attempt to take over Macao in 1802; and the private trade in Canton from 1818 to the late 1820s. Of course, there is also much discussion in the French records about the trade in general and numerous other topics.

Together, all of these non-English language sources contain an enormous amount of data about the operations of the Canton and Macao merchant houses. Much of this detail cannot be gleaned from British, American or Chinese sources. Because these non-English European records have never before been used by historians researching the Chinese merchants, we obviously have only heard part of their stories.

I did not include information about the American records in Table 1.1. At present, I am still unable to quantify those collections. Over the years, I have gone through most of the major China trade collections in Salem, Boston, Providence, Mystic Seaport, Philadelphia and several other cities. In their studies of the China trade, Ch'en and Basu included a few of the American collections in their research. White also made use of records in the Library of Congress in her dissertation on the Hong merchants.

The American records were especially helpful in piecing together information about the smaller operators in Canton such as the porcelain and silk dealers. If we could estimate the total number of documents in American repositories that discuss the China trade, it would likely be in the hundreds of thousands of pages.[29] There are not

a lot of documents from the eighteenth century, but the volumes of American China trade records from the nineteenth century are enormous.

In *The Canton Trade*, I mentioned that previous to that study, our knowledge of the port, and of the Chinese merchants, has come from a mere '25 to 30 percent of the commerce'.[30] This estimate was based on the EIC percentage of the total trade at Canton in the eighteenth century. As we can see in Table 1.1, the number of documents that have survived corresponds roughly with this estimate.

Previous studies of the merchants by Liang, Ch'en and Cheong depended very heavily on EIC records.[31] Besides a few American records, Ch'en also went through the Chinese records in the UK and Taiwan. These previous studies have added a lot to our understanding of the merchants. But they are not histories of the merchants' businesses. They are rather very selective studies of the Hong merchants' trade with the British. A summary of the secondary literature can be found in the preface of *The Canton Trade* so I will not repeat that information here.

Every chapter in this volume contains significant new data enhancing each man's story. There has been very little written about some men, such as the porcelain and silk dealers. Jörg has discussed some of the men who are mentioned in the Dutch records in his many books and articles (see bibliography). The Hong merchants Monqua, Poankeequa, Geowqua, Tan Anqua and Tjobqua have also had quite a bit written about them in previous studies. I have added new data to all of these stories. Teunqua (Monqua's father) and Swequa (Tjobqua's brother) have been mistaken for other men, in the past, making their stories confusing. I have tried to clarify these ambiguities in the nomenclature sections in the appendixes.

As I mentioned in the first volume, the collection of data for this study began in 1996. However, the actual writing of the merchants' stories did not begin until 2002, when I was involved in the translation (from Dutch to English) and annotation of *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters* (the daily records of the Dutch East India Company in Canton and Macao).[32] In the endnotes of the *dagregisters*, I wrote summary histories of each of the Chinese merchants that appeared in those records. Those stories were later expanded.

A couple of the earlier versions of these family histories were previously published in Macao. Much of the information in Chapter 10 on Weaver Suckin, for example, was published in the *Review of Culture*.[33] Both of these projects, the translation of the *dagregisters* and a few of the Chinese family histories, were funded by the Macao Cultural Affairs Bureau. These two volumes of the *Merchants of Canton and Macao* are the culmination of this work.

It is perhaps appropriate to say a few words here about the massive amount of information one needs to digest in order to put these chapters together. This second volume has taken many years longer than expected, simply because of the enormous amount of data that had to be collected, compiled, categorized and analysed, before the actual writing could begin. The porcelain and silk chapters (Chapters 6 to 10) were especially time consuming owing to the fact that there were hundreds of these men. Weeding through all of the names and selecting the ones to include in the book took many months.

It took many months to go through the 20,000 or so pages of French documents that we collected in 2012. This was necessary in order to tell Swequa and Poankeequa's stories. Both of those men were major suppliers to the French ships. The French records contain some good information about Tjobqua and a few other men as well.

The French archives also yielded new information about merchants discussed in volume one. While the new data expands our understanding of those men's operations, they do not change the outcome. The new references are few and of only marginal significance.

Because there are many records missing from the EIC Diaries and Consultations before 1775, I needed to spend time in the British Library filling in as many of the gaps as I could from other records. During several visits to the British Library from 2010 to 2014 I read through about 900 of the EIC ship journals (the L/MAR/B series) and also consulted numerous other records to fill in the gaps such as the many volumes of miscellaneous documents and letters in the D, E and H series. Some of those documents came from Canton (see bibliography).

In 2014 I discovered a letter in the British Library from the ten Hong merchants in Canton to the EIC directors (Plate 01.11). The document is dated 14 February 1770. It is a request from the Hong merchants for the directors to reduce the amount of curiosities and British fabrics shipped to China. Besides showing what was happening in the trade, the *real* significance of this letter is that it has all ten of the Hong merchants' names written in Chinese. The document shows several new names that we did not have before, including the ubiquitous Cai Hunqua. The new names shown in this document are as follows: Cai Hunqua (Cai Huangguan 蔡煌官), Chowqua (Chen Zuoguan 陳左官), Kousia (Zhang Guoguan 張果官), and Conqua (Chen Jiangguan 陳江官). All of these men are discussed in the first volume. Up until now, we have not known Cai Hunqua's Chinese name so this is a significant discovery. We already had Chinese names for the other three men, but not the ones shown in this letter. Chinese usually had three or four different names, and it is important to have all of them in order to find them in those sources.

Because the British and Dutch collections are so large, I created indexes so that I could better navigate through them. These indexes have taken many years to assemble, and are enormously helpful in finding all the references to merchants. The G/12 and R/10 series of the Diaries and Consultations have now been indexed from 1700 to 1775—amounting to about 100,000 entries. I recorded every person, place and ship name, as well as commodities, with their corresponding dates and page numbers. I have also indexed many of the Dutch records from Canton (the Canton and VOC collections) covering the years from 1729 to 1835. The Dutch index now has about 44,000 entries.

There are 69 Dutch *dagregisters* from Canton and Macao that have survived. They cover the years from 1729 to 1816. Many of the *dagregisters* are missing from the 1730s to the 1750s. These records are the Dutch equivalent of the EIC Consultations. All 69 of the *dagregisters* have now been either indexed or transcribed, which means they are searchable. Three of them (1762, 1763 and 1764) have been translated into English and published with extensive annotations and indexes.[34]

I also indexed the Jean Abraham Grill papers in the Nordic Museum Archive. That index has about 35,000 entries, which took seven years to complete. The Grill papers were written in about seven different languages but mostly in Swedish. They were vital for this research because they are the most detailed documents we have of Canton and Macao for the 1760s. All of these documents can now be searched very easily for any commodity, ship, date, event, person or place. This indexing needed to be done before I could complete these merchant histories. I had already done much of this work before I wrote the first volume. In that book, I also mentioned that I assembled name lists of all the Chinese merchants I found in the records. Those lists are separate from the indexes mentioned here.[35]

Another helpful research tool has been the assembling of a more comprehensive list of ships at Whampoa. There are a number of lists of ships in the British and Dutch archives from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. A few ship lists from China have survived in the Belgian, Danish, French, Swedish and American archives as well. Dermigny, Rhys Richards, and others have extracted data from these lists in the past. I made copies of every ship list I could find.[36] The records usually include the ship names, captains, arrival and departure dates, and the company the vessels belonged to. Sometimes they also contain information about previous ports visited and destinations. The lists were usually compiled at the end of each season, so they include all ships that arrived at Whampoa each year. With all of this new data, I was able to assemble a more accurate list of ships than what we have previous had.[37]

Dermigny's list of ships has been enormously helpful to scholars for many decades. On the whole, I have found his numbers of ships for each year to be fairly reliable. It is quite amazing that he was able to assemble such an extensive list during a time when there was not a lot of data available. My numbers of ships differ for some years, but there are many years when we have the same figures. It might be asked why one would go through all this trouble of collecting more data when we already have Dermigny's ship list?

It was important to have an accurate count of the ships each year so that I could more clearly identify the ups and downs of the trade. Because there are so many gaps in the records before 1760, and because there are very few ship lists for those early years, I went through all of the ship journals I could find from the eighteenth century. These include the EIC logbooks in the British Library from 1700 to 1800 (there are 760 of them), plus 140 journals from the early nineteenth century. I have also gone through the French ship logbooks in the National Archives in Paris; the Danish logbooks in Copenhagen; the Swedish logbooks (many of which are available online); and the Flemish logbooks in the Municipal Archive in Antwerp and Ghent University Library. I had already gone through hundreds of the American logbooks when doing the research for *The Canton Trade*. These documents often contain information about the number of vessels at Whampoa and the new arrivals and departures. I also made use of the British and Dutch diaries to extract what I could find about ship arrivals and departures. This data has enabled me to come up with a more precise list of ships than what Dermigny had assembled, with ship names, captains' names, and dates of arrivals and departures.

This new data is very important when trying to understand the pressures placed on merchants when ships did not arrive or arrived late. In 1746, for example, Dermigny shows three French ships in China, but I found none that year. In 1749, Dermigny shows no French ships in China, but I found two arrivals that year.[38] The Hong merchant Swequa (Chapter 1) was a main supplier of the French ships in the 1740s and 1750s. It would have made a big difference to him if there were three French ships in 1746 or no ships. He fell into debt during the years when no French ships arrived. Having a more accurate count of arrivals was essential to gain a better understanding of the pressures faced by the Chinese merchants.

For the first volume, I had already gone through the Chinese records at the British National Archive at Kew and the collections in the Caird Library at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich. All of these documents were helpful in filling in bits and pieces of data. But there are still many years before 1775 for which the British records are missing or incomplete. These gaps can only be filled by seeking out other sources such as the French, Flemish, Dutch, Danish and Swedish records.

## SUMMARY OF VOLUME ONE

It is perhaps appropriate, for the sake of readers who have not seen the first volume, to provide a brief summary here of that book. In the 1720s and 1730s, the trade went through many transitions. Some foreigners, such as the Ostenders, left the trade while others, such as the Dutch, Danes and Swedes, entered the trade. Overall, there was an increase in the number of ship arrivals from the 1720s to the 1760s, but with many up and down years.

The Chinese administration began tightening up control of Macao and other initiatives to better manage the larger number of foreigners arriving each year. During the transition in the early 1730s, a scuffle broke out between two of the top merchants, Tan Hunqua and Tan Suqua (they had the same last name but, as far as we know, were not related). Both men were accused of manipulating trade for private benefits, which brought them many difficulties and excluded them from the commerce for a couple of years. In their absence, other merchants jumped in and grabbed market shares.

The outcome of this conflict was that trade become more tightly controlled. Tan Hunqua was a great advocate of free trade and did what he could to push through reforms in government policies but, in the end, most of his efforts were unsuccessful. Chinese merchants were banned from communicating with foreign entities outside of China. This became one of the fundamental factors that disadvantaged them from their foreign counterparts. Eventually Tan Hunqua and Tan Suqua were both exonerated and all charges were dropped but, when they returned to the trade in the mid-1730s, several new merchants had moved in. With all of these new players in operation, the environment had changed significantly from the previous decade.

In another section of the first volume I discuss the creation and dissolution of the Co-hong in 1760 and 1771, respectively. It was found that growth was much hindered owing to the unpredictability of the number of ships that arrived each year in the 1740s and 1750s. In some years, war between Europeans greatly reduced the number

of ships sent to China and/or the amount of silver they brought. In some years, there was as much as a 60 percent increase or decrease in trade from one year to the next. This irregularity made investing in expansion very risky. As more ships began to arrive, demand outpaced supply and resulted in numerous ships having to layover in China an entire year in order to obtain enough cargo to fill their hulls. In fact, one of the main reasons for the English attempting to open up other Chinese ports to trade in the late-1750s (which is often referred to as the 'Flint Affair') was to ensure that they could obtain sufficient cargos for their ships, at reasonable prices, so that none of them would have to layover.[39]

With 100 to 150 men aboard each of the East India companies' ships, it was very costly paying for the crew's sustenance when ships were unnecessarily stuck in port. Of course, a layover also meant that a ship could not be used for other voyages. Chinese officials and merchants were correct to recognize that if inland production did not expand fast enough to keep up with demand, growth would be much hindered.[40]

The solution to these problems was to have foreigners finance the expansion themselves by providing larger advances each year. This made perfect sense. Foreigners had the power to determine how many ships would arrive each year, whereas Chinese did not. If captains and supercargos wanted to ensure they would have sufficient merchandise to load their ships, then they should provide larger advances. In this way, foreign investments were used to finance the expansion of China's inland production.

Over time, Hong merchants came to realize that if they joined together into partnerships, they could gain more control over the foreign money advances. Those funds, in turn, gave them more control over inland supplies. One noteworthy partnership was formed in 1758 between Cai Hunqua, Swetia and Chetqua. Together this new triple alliance gained control of close to one third of the export market in Canton. As partnerships captured a greater share of the supply side of the market, those merchants could assure their foreign customers that there would be no delays.

Even though government officials were keen to maintain competition between Hong merchants, they saw the logic in partnerships. Not all Hong merchants, typified by men like Swequa and Poankeequa, however, benefitted from the triple alliance. By 1760, these two men were much in arrears to their creditors. In order to rectify the situation, they came up with a plan that government officials would agree with, which was the creation of the Co-hong. That organization limited the number of Hong merchants to ten men. The members were not allowed to conduct any trade without the Co-hong's consent. Prices, advances, exchange rates and even weights and measures were standardized. Cai Hunqua, Swetia and Chetqua were allowed to continue their partnership, but they had to submit to the Co-hong's new policies.

The Co-hong solved the problem of making foreign advances more uniform so that inland production could expand in unison with demand. At the same time, the new society kept partnerships from monopolizing parts of the trade, by ensuring that they always had competition. Once the output in the interior caught up with demand, foreigners could buy all the merchandise they wanted at market prices. The Co-hong had effectively taken away the need for foreigners to go to other Chinese ports to

trade. This provision, together with the emperor's edict forbidding trade in other ports, effectively prevented another incident like the Flint Affair from occurring.

By 1770 the environment had changed significantly. The head of the triple alliance, Cai Hunqua, died that year in May. Within a very short time, it became clear that Poankeequa would now be running everything if the Co-hong continued. With Cai Hunqua gone, he emerged as the most wealthy and powerful man in the port. With the triple alliance now in shambles, the Co-hong had outlived its purpose and was dissolved. Some of these factors are discussed further in Chapter 3 of this volume.

The first volume also contains a chapter on the uses of written contracts in trade, and a chapter on the Canton junk trade to Southeast Asia. I analyse the contents of 64 contracts that are reproduced in the plate section of that volume. The appendixes also contain cargo lists from 280 Canton junks. Some of those Southeast Asian imports were used in the export trade, all of which makes the merchants' businesses much more complex than was previously understood.

With the completion of this second volume, these merchants' stories are now more comprehensive, but they are still far from complete. Many gaps in content and sequence, which we may never be able to fill, remain. The stories are now at least more focused. Hopefully, other documents will emerge in the future that will give us new insights into the trade and the lives of the Canton and Macao merchants. I leave that work for future scholars to investigate.

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# MONEYS, WEIGHTS, AND MEASURES

1 candrin = 10 cash
1 maes = 10 candrin
1 tael = 10 maes
1 pauw = 10 taels
1 catty = 16 taels
1 picul = 100 catties or 133$^{1}/_{3}$ English pounds
1 covid = 14.1 inches
1 zhang = 10 covid

# ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| Aanw | AW 1.11.01.01. Aanwinsten: generaal rapport, missiven, bylagen en diverse stukken betreffende de China handel 1758–1779. In NAH. |
| AEAD | Affaires Étrangères Archives Diplomatiques (AEAD), La Courneuve |
| ADY | Archives Départementales des Yvelines (ADY), Montigny-le-Bretonneux |
| AHU | Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon |
| ANP | Archives Nationales, Paris. Colonies, C.1.__ |
| Anson | George Anson, Esq. *A Voyage Round the World in the Years M, DCC, XL, I, II, III, IV.* (1740–1744) 3 vols. [London?]: John Wilson, 1790. Reprint, Philadelphia: D. N. Goodchild, 2002. |
| APL | Archives du Port, Lorient. IP299 liasse 31 (same as SHD below) |
| Ask | Danish Asiatic Company Archive in the National Archives, Copenhagen. |
| BD | *Bataviasche Documenten* |
| Bishop | Michael Roe, ed. *The Journal and Letters of Captain Charles Bishop on the North-West Coast of America, in the Pacific and in New South Wales 1794–1799*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967. |
| BL | British Library |
| Bonke | Hans Bonke. *De Zeven Reizen van de Jonge Lieve*. Nijmegen: SUN, 1999. |
| C.1.7–20 | Chine Correspondences, mémoires et documents concernant l'Inde, Compagnie de la Chine, la Compagnie des Indes Orientales, consulat de Canton et documents relatifs au commerce entre la France et la Chine, 1658–1803. Aix-en-Provence, Archives Nationales d'Outre-mer (ANOM). |
| Campbell | Paul Hallberg and Christian Koninckx, eds. *A Passage to China*, by Colin Campbell. Gothenburg: Royal Society of Arts and Sciences, 1996. |
| Can | Canton Archive in the National Archives, The Hague. 1.04.20 |
| CFI | French East India Company and French in China |
| CHD | These references appear in Chinese Documents. |
| Ch'en | Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony. *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*. 2 vols. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990. |

| | |
|---|---|
| Cheong | Weng Eang Cheong. *Hong Merchants of Canton*. Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997. |
| CL | The Caird Library (CL), National Maritime Museum, Greenwich |
| CMD 1762 | Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*. 1762. Macao: Cultural Institute, 2006. |
| CMD 1763 | Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*. 1763. Macao: Cultural Institute, 2008. |
| CMD 1764 | Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*. 1763. Macao: Cultural Institute, 2009. |
| Constant | Louis Dermigny, ed. *Les Mémoires de Charles de Constant sur le Commerce a la Chine*, par Charles de Constant. Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964. |
| Cordier (1902) | Henri Cordier. 'Les Marchands Hanistes de Canton.' *T'oung Pao* 3 (1902): 281–315. |
| Cordier (1922) | Henri Cordier. *Mélanges. D'Histoire et de Géographie Orientales*. Vol. 3. Paris: Jean Maisonneuve & Fils, 1922. |
| Crossman DA | Carl L. Crossman. *The Decorative Arts of the China Trade: Paintings, Furnishings and Exotic Curiosities*. Suffolk: Antique Collectors' Club, 1988. |
| CSQYJP | *Caishi qian Yue jiapu* 蔡氏遷粵家譜. 光緒三十三年 (1907). |
| DAC | Danish Asiatic Company |
| doc. | Document |
| Dermigny | Louis Dermigny. *La Chine et l'Occident. Le Commerce à Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*. 3 vols. and album. Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964. |
| DR | *dagregister* (diaries in the Dutch records) |
| EIC | English East India Company |
| Fu | Fu Lo-Shu, ed. *A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644–1820)*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966 (same as Lo-Shu Fu below). |
| G/12/__ | English East India Company's Canton Factory Records in the British Library (BL), India Office Records (IOR). |
| GB | *Grootboeken* |
| GHL | Universiteits Bibliotheek (University Library), Ghent. Ms 1985 is a copy of the VOC *dagregister* from 1791. |
| GIC | Ostend General India Company, Belgium |
| GL | Gothenburg Landsarkivet (Provincial Archive). Öijareds säteris arkiv A 406. |
| GM v.6 | W. Ph. Coolhaas, ed. *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. 1698–1713. Vol. 6. The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1976. |

GM v.7 W. Ph. Coolhaas, ed. *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. 1713–1725. Vol. 7. The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1979.

GM v.8 W. Ph. Coolhaas, ed. *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. 1725–1729. Vol. 8. The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1985.

GM v.9 J. van Goor, ed. *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. 1729–1737. Vol. 9. The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1988.

GM v.10 J. van Goor, ed. *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. 1737–1743. Vol. 10. The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2004.

GM v.11 J. E. Schooneveld-Oosterling, ed. *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. 1743–1750. Vol. 11. The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1997.

GM v.12 J. E. Schooneveld-Oosterling, ed. *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. 1750–1755. Vol. 12. The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2007.

GM v.13 H. K. s'Jacob, ed. *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. 1756–1761. Vol. 13. The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2007.

GSR *Generaal Staat Reekening* (included in the VOC trade reports)

GUB Gothenburg Universitetsbibliotek (University Library)

Hamilton Alexander Hamilton. *A New Account of the East-Indies Being the Observations and Remarks of Capt. Alexander Hamilton from the year 1688–1723*. 2 vols. London: 1739.

Hickey Alfred Spencer, ed. *Memoirs of William Hickey (1749–1775)*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1921.

HRB Hoge Regering van Batavia in NAH, 1.04.17, 71–140

HSP Historical Society of Pennsylvania

IC Ostend General India Company Archive in the Stadsarchief, Antwerp

Imp Imperial Company from Austria

Inglis Robert Inglis. *The Chinese Security Merchants in Canton, and Their Debts*. London: J. M. Richardson, 1838.

IOR India Office Records, British Library

JCB John Carter Brown Library, Brown University

| | |
|---|---|
| JFB | James Ford Bell Library, University of Minnesota. The B 1758 fNe collection contains Dutch records from Canton in 1758. Irvine refers to the Charles Irvine papers. |
| Jörg | Christiaan J. A. Jörg. *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. |
| KKB | Karlskrona Stadsbibliotek (City Library) |
| KSB | Kalmar Stadsbibliotek (City Library) |
| KVB | Kungliga Vetenskaps-akademiens Bibliotek, Stockholm (Library of the Royal Academy of Sciences) |
| Lau | Lau Fong 劉芳 and Zhang Wenqin 章文欽, eds. *Qingdai Aomen Zhongwen dang'an huibian* 清代澳門中文檔案匯編 [A collection of Qing Chinese documents concerning Macao]. 2 vols. Macao: Aomen jijinhui, 1999. |
| Liang | Liang Jiabin 梁嘉彬. *Guangdong Shisan Hang kao* 廣東十三行考 [Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton]. 1937. Reprint, Taipei: 1960; reprint, Guangdong: Renmin chubanshe, 1999. |
| Lin | Lintrup family archive number 5893 in the RAC. |
| Lo-Shu Fu | Fu Lo-Shu, ed. *A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644–1820)*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966 (same as Fu above). |
| MHS | Massachusetts Historical Society |
| Morse | Hosea Ballou Morse. *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926. Reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966. (Numbers listed as: 1: 266 refer to: vol. 1, page 266; Morse 1, 5 refers to vols. 1 and 5.) |
| Mudge | Jean McClure Mudge. *Chinese Export Porcelain for the American Trade 1785–1835*. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1962; reprint, East Brunswick: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1981. |
| MQSL | *Ming Qing shiliao gengbian* 明清史料庚編. 2 vols. Taipei: Zhonghua chuju yingyin chuban, 1987. |
| MQSQ | Yang Jibo 楊繼波, Wu Zhiliang 吳志良, and Deng Kaisong 鄧開頌, eds. *Ming-Qing shiqi Aomen wenti dang'an wenxian huibian* 明清時期澳門問題檔案文獻匯編 [Collection of Ming-Qing documents concerning Macao affairs]. 6 vols. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999. |
| NAH | National Archives, The Hague. |
| NLA | National Library of Australia, Canberra. |
| NM | Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm. |
| NM: F17 | Godegårdsarkivet Archive F17 in NM. |
| Noble | Charles Frederick Noble. *A Voyage to the East Indies in 1747 and 1748*. London: T. Becket and P. A. Dehondt, 1762. |
| OIC | 2.01.27.01, Comité Oost-Indische Handel en Bezettingen (OIC). National Archives, The Hague. |

| | |
|---|---|
| OIO | Oriental and India Office Library, London (now in the British Library, and same as IOR). |
| PEM | Peabody Essex Museum, Salem. Phillips Library |
| Pigou | Frederick Pigou, Esq., 'An Account of the Tea Tree.' *The Annual Register or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature, for the Year 1802*, 763–70. London: R. Wilks, 1803. |
| PL | Phillips Library, Peabody Essex Museum, Salem |
| PMA | Plantin-Maretus Museum, Antwerp |
| Pope | Anne Bulley. *Free Mariner: John Adolphus Pope in the East Indies 1786–1821*. London: British Association for Cemeteries in South Asia (BACSA), 1992. |
| PRU | Prussian Company |
| PYXZ | *Panyu xian zhi/ Panyu shi difang zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui* 番禺縣誌/ 番禺市地方誌編纂委員會 [Panyu County Gazetteer / edited by the Party Committee of Panyu City]. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1998. |
| QDGZ | Li Guorong 李國榮, and Lin Weisen 林偉森, eds. *Qingdai Guangzhou Shisan Hang jilue* 清代廣州十三行紀略 [Chronicle of the Hong merchants in Canton during the Qing dynasty]. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2006. |
| QGY | *Qing gong Yue Gang Ao shangmao dang'an quanji* 清宮粵港澳商貿檔案全集, edited by Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'an guan 中國第一歷史檔案館 and Zhongguo guji zhengli yanjiuhui 中國古籍整理研究會. 10 vols. Beijing: Zhongguo shudian, 2002. |
| QSL | *Qing shilu Guangdong shiliao* 清實錄廣東史料. 6 vols. Guangzhou: Guangdong sheng chubanshe, 1995. |
| R/10/__ | English East India Company's Canton Factory Records in the British Library (BL), India Office Records (IOR). |
| R | *Rapport* (in the VOC archive) |
| RAB | 2.01.27.02, Raad der Aziatische Bezettingen en Etablissementen (RAB). National Archives, The Hague. |
| RAC | Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen. |
| RIHS | Rhode Island Historical Society |
| SAA | Stadsarchief (Municipal Archive), Antwerp. |
| Shaw | Quincy, Josiah, ed. *The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, the First American Consul at Canton: With a Life of the Author*. By Josiah Quincy. Boston: Wm. Crosby and H. P. Nichols, 1847. Reprint, Documentary Publications, 1970. |
| SHD | Service Historique de la Défense, Lorient (same as APL above) |

| | |
|---|---|
| SMG | Stadsmuseet (City Museum), Gothenburg |
| Smith | Philip Chadwick Foster Smith. *The Empress of China*. Philadelphia: Philadelphia Maritime Museum, 1984. |
| SOIC | Swedish East India Company |
| Tiffany | Osmond Tiffany Jr. *The Canton Chinese, or the American's Sojourn in the Celestial Empire*. Boston: James Munroe and Company, 1849. |
| UPL | University of Pennsylvania Library, Philadelphia. Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets. |
| UUB | Uppsala Universitetsbibliotek (University Library), Sweden. |
| v. | Volume |
| Viraphol | Sarasin Viraphol. *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652–1853*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977. |
| VOC | Dutch East India Company and archive of the same in the National Archives, The Hague. 1.04.02. |
| White | Ann Bolbach White. 'The Hong Merchants of Canton'. PhD diss., Department of History, University of Pennsylvania, 1967. |
| Xing | Xing Yongfu 邢永福, et al., eds. *Qing Gong Guangzhou Shisan Hang dang'an jingxuan* 清宮廣州十三行檔案精選 [A selection of Qing imperial documents of the Guangzhou Shisan Hang]. Guangzhou: Guangdong jingji chubanshe, 2002. |
| XS | *Xiangshan Ming Qing dang'an jilu* 香山明清檔案輯錄 [Collection of Xiangshan (County) Ming-Qing documents]. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2006. |
| YeSJP | Ye Guanqian. *Yeshi jiapu* 葉氏家譜. 民國十三年 (1924). |
| YSJP | *Yanshi jiapu* 顏氏家譜 |
| YHGZ | Liang Tingnan 梁廷楠. *Yue haiguan zhi* 粵海關志 [Gazetteer of Guangdong Maritime Customs]. 1839; reprint, Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2001. (YHGZ 25: 493 refers to vol. 25, page 493.) |

**ABBREVIATIONS FOR PRODUCTS IN ABBREVIATIONS**

| | |
|---|---|
| A | Amber 琥珀 (*hupo*), fossilized tree resin, thought to have medicinal qualities, used as an ingredient in perfumes, and to make jewellery, also known as barnsteen |
| ag | agar agar 海菜 (*haicai*), seaweed |
| Ak | Arrack, can be two different items. If it is measured by weight such as a catty or picul then it is betel nut 檳榔 (*binglang*, the areca nut). If it is measured by volume such as in so many bottles, kegs or barrels, then it is liquor 亞叻酒 (*ya le jiu*). |

| | |
|---|---|
| Al | alum 礬 (*fan*), 礬石 (*fan shi*) or 百礬 (*bai fan*), an inorganic chemical compound used in dyeing, tanning, medicine, and clarifying water. There are several varieties including white 明礬 (*ming fan*) and green 青礬 (*qing fan*) |
| An | Ankay tea 安溪茶 (*anxi cha*) |
| AnC | Ankay Congo tea 安溪工夫茶 (*anxi gongfu cha*) |
| arm | armosijnens (fabric) 紡織品 (*fangzhipin*) |
| Arm | Armenians 亞美尼亞人 (*yameiniya ren*) |
| B | Bohea tea 武彝(夷)茶 (*wuyi cha*) |
| Bg | Bing tea 坪茶 (*ping cha*) |
| bn | birds' nests 燕窩 (*yan wo*) |
| br | binding rattan 藤片 or 藤條 (*teng pian* or *teng tiao*). Used for binding and packing goods in the hulls of ships. Same as snor rottingen. |
| Bx | Borax 硼砂 (*pengsha*) |
| By | Bottomry loan 航海洋利 (*hanghai yangli*). Marine insurance. |
| C | Congo tea 工夫茶 (*gongfu cha*) |
| Ca | Cambodia 柬埔寨 (Jianpuzhai) |
| car | carmozijn (fabric) 紡織品 (*fangzhipin*) |
| CC | Cochin China 安南國 (Annan Guo) |
| CHD | These references appear in Chinese Documents. |
| Cht | Chouson tea (a corruption of Souchon?) |
| ci | cinnabar 硃砂 (*zhusha*), 長沙 (*changsha*) or 銀珠種 (*yinzhu zhong*) |
| CK | Congo Kampoy (Campoi) tea 工夫揀焙茶 (*gongfu jianbei cha*) |
| cl | caneel (cinnamon) 玉桂 (*yugui*), 安桂 (*angui*), 桂皮 (*guipi*) or 肉桂 (*rougui*) |
| co | cochineal 呀蘭米 (*yalanmi*). A dye made from an insect. |
| cp | camphor 樟腦 (*zhangnao*) or 冰片 (*bingpian*) |
| crl | coral 珊瑚 (*shanhu*) |
| crt | china root 土茯苓 (*tufuling*) or 冷飯頭 (*lengfantou*). Used as a medicine, also called radix china. |
| cs | candied sugar 冰糖 (*bingtang*) |
| ct | cotton 棉花 (*mianhua*) |
| cu | curcuma (turmeric) 薑黃 (*jianghuang*). A dried root used as a dye and for medicine. |
| cv | cloves 丁香 (*dingxiang*) |
| cvo | clove oil 丁香油 (*dingxiang you*) |
| Db | Debt |

| | |
|---|---|
| et | elephant's teeth/tusks 象牙 (*xiangya*) |
| FOB | free-on-board 免費船上 (*mianfei chuan shang*) |
| FR | Factory Rent 商館租金 (*shangguan zujin*) |
| fur | fur 毛皮 (*maopi*) |
| G | gold 黃金 (*huangjin*) |
| ga | galingale 稿良薑 (*gaoliangjiang*) or 良薑 (*liangjiang*). A mild ginger from Gaoliang Fu 高良府. |
| gg | gumi gutti/gomme gutta 藤黃 (*tenghuang*) |
| gi | ginseng 人蔘 (*renshen*) |
| gm | Gom Mirrhe 沒藥 (*moyao*) |
| gn | gorgoran (fabric) 紡織品 (*fangzhipin*) |
| gr | grijnen (fabric) 紡織品 (*fangzhipin*) |
| gs | golt gioris for saxiste (?) |
| GS | Gau Semqua 邱崑 (*Qiu Kun*) |
| gt | green tea 綠茶 (*lücha*) |
| H | Heysen/Hyson tea 早春茶 (*zaochun cha*), 熙皮 (*xipi*), 熙春 (*xichun*) or 熙珠茶 (*xizhu cha*) |
| HC | Hyson Chulan tea 熙珠珠蘭茶 (*xizhu zhulan cha*) |
| Ho | Hongsia 顏享舍 (Yan Xiangshe) |
| HS | Hyson/Heysen Skin tea 皮茶 (*pi cha*) |
| Hu | Huiqua (Gau Semqua's writer 書記) |
| HY | Hyson Young 雨前茶 (*yuqian cha*) |
| I | interest 利息 (*lixi*) |
| J | Joosjes (Gunpowder) tea 珠茶 (*zhu cha*) |
| jc | Japan copper 日本銅 (*Riben tong*) |
| K | Kampoy tea 揀焙茶 (*jianbei cha*) |
| Kt | Kautjon tea 曹墩茶 (*caodun cha*) |
| Kz | Keizer (Imperial) tea 圓珠茶 (*yuanzhu cha*) or 大珠茶 (*dazhu cha*) |
| ld | lead, has various forms, including 紅丹 (*hongdan*), 鉛丹 (*qiandan*), 黃丹 (*huangdan*), 鉛粉 (*qianfen*), 黑鉛 (*heiqian*), 鉛塊 (*qiankuai*, pig lead), 鉛片 (*qianpian*, sheet lead) |
| ln | linen 麻布 (*mabu*) or 竹布 (*zhubu*) |
| LO | Layover 臨時滯留 (*linshi zhiliu*) |
| Lt | left 左邊 (*zuobian*) |
| lu | illustering (fabric) 紡織品 (*fangzhipin*) |
| lw | lacquerware 漆器 (*qiqi*) |

| | |
|---|---|
| Mo | Monqua 蔡文官 (Cai Wenguan) |
| mp | mother of pearl shells 雲母殼 (*yunmu ke*) or 海珠殼 (*haizhu ke*) |
| ms | muscus (musk) 麝香 (*shexiang*) |
| Msw | Malabar sandalwood 印度檀香木 (*Yindu tanxiang mu*) |
| Nc | cotton cloth 棉花布 (*mianhua bu*) |
| ng | nutmeg 肉荳蔻 (*roudoukou*) |
| Nk | Nankins (Nankeens) 紫花布 (*zihua bu*), 土布 (*tu bu*) or 赤布 (*chi bu*). Usually refers to cotton cloth from Nanjing but could be cotton cloth from other places in China as well. |
| Nl | Nanking linen 南京麻布 (*Nanjing ma bu*) |
| oli | Olibanum 乳香 (*ruxiang*), used for incense |
| P | Porcelain 瓷器 (*ciqi*) |
| Pc | Peco tea 白毫茶 (*baihao cha*) |
| PcZZ | Peco-Ziou Zioun tea 白毫雀舌茶 (*baihao queshe cha*) |
| pd | poisedamasten (fabric) 紡織品 (*fangzhipin*) |
| Pg | Palembang 巴鄰旁 (Balinbang) |
| pj | putchuck 木香 (*muxiang*). A fragrant spicy root that is burned as incense in Chinese temples. It also helps preserve clothes against insects. |
| pl | pelangs (fabric) 紡織品 (*fangzhipin*) |
| pm | polemiten (fabric) 紡織品 (*fangzhipin*) |
| POR | Portuguese (Macao) |
| pp | pepper 胡椒 (*hujiao*) |
| pq | Pekings (fabric) 紡織品 (*fangzhipin*) |
| ps | powder sugar 沙糖 (*shatang*) |
| Ps | Passiak (place between Cochin China and Cambodia) |
| psy | Pordesoys (fabric) 紡織品 (*fangzhipin*) |
| pt | Perpetts (fabric) 紡織品 (*fangzhipin*) |
| Pou | Pouchong tea 包種茶 (*baozhong cha*) |
| PZZ | Padre Ziou Zioun tea 僧人雀舌茶 (*sengren queshe cha*) or 包雀舌茶 (*baoqueshe cha*) |
| Q | Quicksilver (mercury) 水銀 (*shuiyin*) |
| R | Rhubarb 大黃 (*dahuang*) |
| rat | Rottinger (rattan or cane) 沙藤 (*shateng*) or 藤子 (*tengzi*) |
| rc | rice 米 (*mi*) or 洋米 (*yangmi*) |
| Rg | Radix galingale 高良薑根塊 (*gaoliangjiang genkuai*) |
| rm | ras de Maroque (Marrocco) 摩洛哥織物 (*moluoge zhiwu*) |

| | |
|---|---|
| Rt | right 右邊 (*youbian*) |
| rw | redwood 紅木 (*hongmu*) |
| Rx | Radix china 土茯苓 (*tufuling*) or 冷飯頭 (*lengfantou*). Used as a medicine, also called china root. |
| S | Soulong tea |
| sa | sago 西米 (*ximi*) or 西穀米 (*xigumi*) |
| sat | satin 倭緞 (*woduan*) or 緞 (*duan*) |
| Sc | Souchon tea 小種茶 (*xiaozhong cha*) |
| Siam | Thailand 暹羅國 (Xianluo Guo), present-day 泰國 (Tai Guo) |
| Sk | Skins tea 皮茶 (*picha*) |
| Sl | Songlo/Singlo/Zonglo tea 松羅茶 (*songluo cha*) or 松製茶 (*song zhi cha*) |
| SlS | Songlo Skin tea 松皮茶 (*song pi cha*) |
| spr | spelter (zinc) 白鉛 (*bai qian*), sometimes incorrectly referred to as pewter or tutenague as well. It is generally softer than tutenague. |
| spw | sappanwood 蘇木 (*sumu*) |
| SR | Snor Rottinger (rattan cord) 藤片 or 藤條 (*teng pian* or *teng tiao*). Used for binding and packing goods in the hulls of ships. Same as binding rattan. |
| sta | Star Anise 大茴 (*dahui*) or 八角 (*bajiao*) |
| su | sugar 糖 (*tang*) or 食糖 (*shitang*) |
| sw | sandalwood 檀香木 (*tanxiang mu*) |
| ta | taffaties (fabric) 紡織品 (*fangzhipin*) |
| tea | tea 茶葉 (*chaye*) |
| t/f | to/from 去 / 從 (*qu*/*cong*) |
| tin | tin 錫 (*xi*), 洋錫 (*yangxi*) or 番錫 (*fanxi*) |
| Tn | Touchon tea (Bohea tea of the first picking, *Tou chun Wuyi cha* 頭春武夷茶) |
| tu | tutenague 白銅 (*baitong*) or 山銅 (*shantong*). It is sometimes confused with spelter. |
| tx | textiles 紡織品 (*fangzhipin*) |
| Ty | Tunkay tea 屯溪茶 (*tunxi cha*) |
| v | vermillion 銀硃 (*yinzhu*) |
| w | woollens 毛紡織品 (*mao fangzhipin*) |
| wax | wax 蠟 (*la*) |
| XR | Exchange Rate 匯率 (*huilu*) |
| z | silk 絲綢 (*sichou*) |
| zg | silk-geschilderde (painted silk) 綵絲 (*caisi*) |

| | |
|---|---|
| zr | silk-raw (unprocessed) 生絲 (*shengsi*) or 湖絲 (*husi*) |
| zt | silk textiles 絲綢紡織品 (*sichou fangzhipin*) or 緞子 (*duanzi*) |
| ZZ | Ziou Zioun tea 雀舌茶 (*queshe cha*) |

**SOURCES FOR ABBREVIATIONS**

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# Introduction

## GLOBAL INFLUENCES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

The eighteenth century was an important period not only for the China trade, but international commerce in general. Over the course of ten decades East India companies saw their trade vastly transformed. It went from companies attempting to control the sources, sales and distributions of key commodities—like pepper, spices and tea—to the opening and expanding of more private enterprises. Catholic controlled ports such as Macao and Manila also saw their environments transform from restricting access to a select group of people in the early eighteenth century—based on their nationality, race or religion—to opening to all people wanting to trade. By the early nineteenth century, many of the political, cultural and religious barriers that had hindered free trade had disappeared and access to commodities and markets became open to everyone.

Because China maintained a policy throughout the Canton era (ca. 1700–1842) of welcoming all foreign traders—company and private, large and small, regardless of their race, religion or creed—it became one of the centres fostering and supporting this pulling down of trade barriers. The port even created its own language—Pidgin English—to accommodate a multiplicity of people.

Canton was one of the earliest ports to allow access to everyone. Small private ships from India and, later, Americans and others, anchored at Whampoa alongside the large East India companies' vessels. Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Parsees, and all colours of races were equally welcomed. The only exceptions were the Russians and Japanese who were not allowed at Canton, because they had been granted special privileges to trade in other Chinese ports. Asian traders from Siam, Cochin China and the Philippines traded alongside Chinese junks from Guangdong and Fujian Provinces. Canton was one of the few major ports in Asia where Europeans had no control over who came or went or what was purchased or sold.

During years when the Europeans were at war with each other, China remained neutral. There were several years in the eighteenth century when enemy traded alongside enemy at Canton. The Qing government protected them from being molested while in port. French, British, Flemings, Portuguese, Spaniards, Danes, Swedes, Greeks, Prussians, Americans, Austrians, Italians, Hungarians, Muslims, Armenians, Arabs, Indians (from India), Southeast Asians, Hawai'ians and numerous other people from Africa and elsewhere traded at Canton at one time or another in the eighteenth century and all of them were welcomed.

Everyone was guaranteed entry as long as they came to trade. No prior agreements or permissions were necessary. Just show up with a ship and some merchandise and permission was granted to go upriver. Qing officials initiated policies that kept any

company, partnership or group—Chinese or foreign alike—from forming monopolies of parts of the trade. They did this by maintaining transparency with trade figures. Any foreigner or Chinese merchant could gain knowledge of their competitors by simply going to the Hoppo (customs superintendent) and ask for information about what business others were doing in Canton. This data was given freely to anyone who wanted it.

Access to Chinese merchandise was open to anyone, with no restrictions—as long as it was a legal item of trade. The captain of a small private ship could carry home the same high quality merchandise, in whatever types and varieties of tea, silk or porcelain he wanted, just like any of the large European companies. Qing officials made sure that everyone had access to everything, and that no monopolies were formed on specific products. The small private traders might be restricted in their home ports as to which items they could deal in, but in China those men could sell or purchase anything they desired as long as it was legal. All foreigners paid the same amount in export duties on the items they purchased, regardless of who they were, where they came from, or the volume they handled. A man who arrived with a pocket full of coins was just as welcomed as a captain with a ship full of merchandise. There were few maritime ports in the eighteenth century that operated with such openness to outsiders. But that was not necessarily true for the Chinese merchants themselves.

Chinese merchants in Canton and Macao did not have the same freedoms in trade as their foreign counterparts. They operated in a very different environment and with a set of cultural rules that applied only to them. Some of these restrictions were written down in edicts that spelled out what they could and could not do, while other limitations were just understood. By examining the daily activities of the Canton and Macao merchants we can see more clearly where these cultural barriers lay.

Before I begin their stories, I will briefly summarize the trading environment discussed in the first volume. This will provide a context for understanding the activities of the merchants discussed below. In the eighteenth century, there was a gradual increase in the demand for Chinese products in India, Europe and the Americas. For most of the period, the trade was very competitive and forced many Chinese merchants into debt. This was partially the result of the unpredictability in the number of ships that would arrive each year.

In the 1730s and 1740s there could be upwards of 60 percent increases or decreases in the volume of trade from one year to the next.[1] This unstable environment gradually gave rise to a small group of the largest houses doing whatever they could to restrict the trade of the smaller houses. In the mid-1750s, the hundred or so small shopkeepers known as 'outside merchants' were divided into groups of five. Each group was placed under the supervision of one of the licensed Hong merchants. The ranks of the licensed Hong merchants also began to shrink—from more than twenty houses in the early 1750s to ten in the 1760s.

In order to show how the ups and downs of trade may have affected the outcome, we need to know exactly how many ships were in port each year. This information is especially important for the years leading up to and including 1757, because that was the year other Chinese ports were closed to foreign trade. I have already noted in the Preface that Dermigny's ship list is much more reliable than the one in the *Yue haiguan*

*zhi*. There are hundreds of ships missing from the latter list. However, there is an exception. For the 1750s, the figures in the *Yue haiguan zhi* are actually more accurate than Dermigny's. For most of those years, the Hoppos reported the correct number of ship arrivals, whereas in other years they did not.

Table 2.1 shows a comparison between Dermigny's figures, *Yue haiguan zhi's* figures, and the new ship data that I collected for the years from 1751 to 1760. I have not included the Macao ships here because they were not counted in the Guangzhou customs reports.

In the 'New Confirmed List' of Table 2.1, I have the arrival and departure dates of each ship so we can be assured that they were actually at Whampoa that year. The records also confirm that there were no other foreign ships in port during those years. The three sets of figures in Table 2.1 are close—except the year 1757. For some reason Dermigny shows twice as many ships at Whampoa that year than what actually occurred.

We know that the number of vessels in port each year and the export volume rose and declined in unison with each other. All ships were required to leave with their hulls full of merchandise, so these numbers give us a fairly reliable picture of what was actually happening in the volume of trade. By analysing the data, we can draw some conclusions about how the foreigners and Chinese merchants might have been affected by those trends.

As can be seen, the years from 1755 to 1757 saw a sharp decline in the number of ships arriving. In the years from 1752 to 1754, there was strong demand and weak supply, which is what pushed prices up and caused the English to send James Flint to check out other Chinese ports. In the years from 1754 to 1757, there was 74 percent decline in demand, which resulted in strong supply, and lower prices. Profit margins of the Chinese merchants were severely squeezed in those years which undoubtedly contributed to Beaukeequa's insolvency in 1758.

It was at this time that Cai Hunqua (Cai Huangguan 蔡煌官) and his two associates, Swetia (Yan Ruishe 顏瑞舍) and Chetqua (Chen Jieguan 陳捷官), formed a partnership that gave them control of about a third of the export trade and an equal share of inland supplies. This partnership was allowed because it helped to channel funds to inland producers so that they would increase output. The alliance, however, made it increasingly more difficult for other merchants like Swequa (Cai Ruiguan 蔡瑞官) and Poankeequa (Pan Qiguan 潘啟官) to compete. These two men often found it difficult to acquire enough commodities to fill their ships, resulting in delays.

In busy years, some ships had to layover an entire year because there was insufficient cargo to load them. With 100 to 150 men aboard most of the East India companies' ships, it was very expensive paying the crew and tying up assets during the time they were sitting in China. Something needed to be done to increase output or the growth of the trade would be badly hindered. Partnerships pooled resources and enabled Chinese merchants to gain more control over inland supplies by channelling more foreign investment capital to producers. They could then, in turn, assure their foreign customers that the merchandise they ordered would arrive in time for their ships to leave on schedule.[2]

**Table 2.1 Number of Ships at Whampoa 1751–1760**

| Year | Dermigny | *Yue haiguan zhi* | New Confirmed List | 1754 = 0 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1751 | 19 | 19 | 19 | |
| 1752 | 22 | 25 | 25 | |
| 1753 | 26 | 26 | 26 | |
| 1754 | 26 | 27 | 27 | 0 |
| 1755 | 24 | 22 | 23 | –15% |
| 1756 | 17 | 15 | 15 | –44% |
| 1757 | 14 | 7 | 7 | –74% |
| 1758 | 13 | 12 | 12 | –56% |
| 1759 | 22 | 23 | 24 | –11% |
| 1760 | 13 | 13 | 12 | –56% |

Sources: Liang, *Yue haiguan zhi*, 485; and Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2:522. The figures for the 'New Confirmed List' were assembled from the following sources. ANOM: C.1.10 f. 80v; ANP: 4JJ 133.48-55, 134.56-8, 134.61-2, 135.68bis-71, 135.70 'Noms Des Vaisseaux . . . Chine en 1759'; GUB: SOIC H22.1 *Hoppet* Brevkopiebok 1752-3, H22.3D *Götha Leijons* Beskrifning, H22.4A *Prins Carl* Dagbok, H22.4A Rådplägningsbok; KKB: *Prins Carl* Journal; BL: IOR G/12/55 p. 29, G/12/56 p. 96, G/12/57 p. 37, R/10/4, 1756.07.02 p. 42, 1756.08.01 p. 47, 1756.08.16-09.09 p. 50–51, 1759.07.19 p. 79, 1759.07.22, p. 86, 1759.07.31 p. 89; L/MAR/B/4D, 125D, 164G, 229E, 229G, 235-I, 285GG, 285HH, 293K, 297B, 317G-F, 325D, 366A, 366B, 366C, 390A, 397B, 397C, 397E, 400A, 404F, 404G, 404H, 438G, 438H, 452A, 456A, 458A, 486C, 498A, 507E, 507E, 525A, 549B, 549C, 549D, 551A, 558A, 558B, 560D, 571B, 572B, 572C, 578E, 578F, 578G, 584G, 585E , 588D, 589E, 590A, 593F, 594H, 596C, 596D, 596E, 599B, 599D, 601C, 602-I, 603B, 603D, 606D, 614B, 614C, 622E, 800A; NAH: Canton 108, Canton 117, Canton 120, letter dated 1756.08.03, VOC 4380 letter dated 1754.11.17 p. 11, report dated 1755.12.31, p. 56r, VOC 4555 pp. 348–51; RAC: Ask 896, 898, 1130-1, 1135; UUB: L183 *Success Galley* Journal; Karine Beauciel, 'La vision de la Chine en Bretagne au XVIIIe siècle 1700–1790' (MA thesis, Université de Rennes II Haute Bretagne, Centre d'Histoire, Octobre 1995), Annexe 2; Jean Boudriot, *Compagnie des Indes 1720–1770* (Paris: Collection Archéologie Navale Française, 1983), 196–99; Anthony Farrington, *Catalogue of East India Company Ships' Journals and Logs 1600–1834* (London: British Library, 1999); J. R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, and I. Schoffer. *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987); Erik Gøbel, 'Asiatisk Kompagnis Kinafart, 1732–1833. Besejling of Bemanding' (PhD diss., University of Copenhagen, 1978); John Reinhold Forster, trans. *A Voyage to China and the East Indies*, by Peter Osbeck. Together with a *Voyage to Suratte*, by Olof Torren, and *An Account of Chinese Husbandry*, by Captain Charles Gustavus Eckeberg (London: Benjamin White, 1771), 184; Christiaan Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade* (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, 1982), 195–201; Sven T. Kjellberg, *Svenska Ostindiska Compagnierna 1731–1813* (Malmö: Allhems Förlag, 1974), 177–84; Christian Koninckx, *The First and Second Charters of the Swedish East India Company (1731–1766)* (Belgium: Van Gemmert Publishing Co., 1980), 'Expeditions'; Marion Veyssière, 'Les Voyages Français à la Chine. Vaisseaux et Équipages (1720–1793)' (PhD diss., L'Ecole du Louvre, 2000), Tableau II, 132–45; and Susan E. Schopp, 'The French in the Pearl River Delta: A Topical Case Study of Sino-European Exchanges in the Canton Trade, 1698–1840' (PhD diss., Department of History, University of Macau, 2015).

The three-family alliance, however, was not necessarily good for other merchants. By 1760, Swequa, Poankeequa, and another merchant, Teunqua (Cai Yongjie 蔡永接) had built up a substantial debt, while Cai Hunqua and his partners were thriving. If we look at the figures in Table 2.1, we see that 1756 to 1758 were very lean years for the trade—reaching crisis levels in 1757. The volume recovered again in 1759 with 24 arrivals, but then dropped by 50 percent to only 12 arrivals in 1760. It was these severe ups and downs that needed to be evened out in order to bring more consistency to the collection of government revenues and more stability to Chinese merchants' businesses. The Co-hong was Swequa and Poankeequa's answer to their solvency issues, which gained government's support as well because it could help even out the ups and downs in the revenues collected.

The number of licensed merchants was reduced from about seventeen before 1760 to only ten members in the Co-hong. In order to ensure that the men offered competitive prices, the government was involved in the decision making process. The four largest merchants became the chief officers, who more or less dictated the terms of trade for the six smaller houses. The top merchants came up with a proposal each year of the terms and prices that would be offered to foreign customers, which was then passed to government officials for approval. This new administrative body helped to stabilize the trade and ensure that no merchant, or group of Chinese merchants, controlled any part of the commerce.

Up to this point, inland producers had been reluctant to invest in expansion, because the export market was too volatile. If more products were pumped out and fewer ships arrived than expected, then they would likely be big losers owing to unsold stock leftover in their warehouses. Hardware such as porcelain might retain its price from one year to the next, but tea, raw silk and other perishable products lost value over time. Those items could lose upwards of 25 to 50 percent of their value within one year.

Money that was tied up in stock also did not earn interest. Even if prices were maintained, such as with porcelain, the loss suffered from unearned interest squeezed profit margins. It was simply not economical to have warehouses full of unsold goods. In order to avoid that outcome, Canton merchants only ordered—and inland suppliers only produced—what they thought they could reasonably anticipate selling in the coming year. However, this was easier said than done. The figures in Table 2.1 show how difficult it was to make projections. No one could have guessed that there would be only seven ship arrivals in 1757, when there had been more than twice that many in previous years. Considering the volatility of the market, everyone from inland producers to merchant houses in Canton had good reasons to under-estimate future sales and keep orders to a minimum. As a result, when more ships arrived than expected, there was insufficient merchandise to load all of them, and a few had to layover. If inland suppliers did not increase output, then the overall growth of the trade would obviously be hindered.

Foreign directors, captains and supercargos had control over how many ships would arrive each year. This advantage made it less risky for foreigners to finance the expansion than for Canton merchants and inland producers. If customers wanted to

ensure that their ships were not delayed, then they had to put money down in advance for the goods they wanted. Co-hong policies stipulated that all foreigners must pay advances on certain items and in the same amounts. This money was sent to the interior in the off-season (ca. February to June) to finance the trade of the next season (ca. July to January). In this way, foreign capital was used to increase China's output in three key commodities: tea, silk and porcelain. After 1760, it was very rare to see a ship having to layover a season owing to insufficient cargo.

The Co-hong also set prices on tea and other products. This price fixing has often been confused by historians with monopolistic control, when in reality the market determined what the prices would be each year. If there was strong demand and weak supply then prices rose. If there was weak demand and strong supply then prices dropped. Government officials reviewed the terms and prices of trade each year to ensure that they were within the range of the market at the time.

In 1764 the emperor opened up 30 percent of the export tea trade to inland tea dealers. This move provided an additional gauge to help determine market levels. These tea men operated outside of the Co-hong. They were allowed to negotiate sales directly with foreigners, agree upon terms and prices, and make their contracts. They had to channel the sales through one of the ten licensed merchants in the Co-hong, who then became responsible for the duties owed. The latter men received a commission for this service. The terms and prices that these tea agents agreed upon became another means by which government officials could determine whether the Co-hong's stipulations were reasonable.

Officials were also keen to ensure that competition was maintained between members of the Co-hong. They saw the wisdom in allowing Cai Hunqua's three member consortium to continue, because it brought more stability to trade by guaranteeing that customers would receive their goods on time. As long as the Co-hong regulated the terms to which everyone had to follow, there was no fear of the three partners gaining a private monopoly over any part of the trade.

Advances, exchange rates, weights and measures and a few other factors were determined arbitrarily and not necessarily according to the market. These standardizations brought more security to the licensed merchants. They helped the trade to become more predictable and thereby lowered risks to Chinese investors. All of these factors combined resulted in more funds being channelled to the interior and the expansion of output.

Without these stabilizing factors that were initiated by the Co-hong, the overall growth of the export trade would have been hindered. Other factors, such as purchase prices of imports, sale prices of exports, interest rates on advances, demurrage fees on late shipments, reimbursements for damaged goods and breakage, etc. were all set according to what the market dictated each year. Government officials were well aware that if prices were not allowed to fluctuate according to the pressures of supply and demand then growth would not continue. Thus, rather than call the Co-hong a monopoly, which gives the wrong impression, it might be more correctly described as a market management group. Its prime objective was to initiate policies that brought

more stability to the economy—but at the same time ensured that competition prevailed so that growth would be encouraged.

The four top merchants of the Co-hong always had difficulty agreeing with each other on the terms and prices each year. Nevertheless, the Co-hong did indeed accomplish most of its objectives. By the end of the 1760s, the problems of earlier decades had largely disappeared. After the death of Cai Hunqua in May 1770 and the resulting imbalance that emerged within the Co-hong—with Poankeequa controlling everything—the organization was no longer effective. It was consequently dissolved in February 1771.

The Co-hong was an important experiment that had long term ramifications. It has been suggested in previous studies that Qing China had no foreign trade policy.[3] This argument is based on there being nothing in writing showing the adoption of a specific plan or strategy. But, as I have shown in *The Canton Trade* and in the first volume of this study, just because we do not have written records does not mean something did not happen. Many things concerning the trade were never recorded or the documents that did record them did not survive. We need to look at the broader historical evidence to see what actually happened.

One example that I often cite is the Canton junk trade to Southeast Asia. For more than 100 years scholars have treated this part of the commerce as insignificant to the point of not being worth mentioning. We have dozens of studies on the history of the China trade, most of which say nothing about the junks or quickly dismiss them and move on to a discussion of the European East India companies. This was the case because we previously had no records that discussed the junks. With new data that have emerged, we now know that the Canton junk trade was just as important in terms of volume as the British East India Company's (EIC) trade in China.

In the past, we have also not known the full extent of the roles that Chinese pilots and compradors played in the trade. We have not known the extent to which high interest rates affected the trade in China or the connections that rice had to the opium trade. We have not known why most of the Hong merchants were so willing to trade in gold—despite it being illegal—because we did not understand that sales of gold helped to replenish merchants' working capital. We did not know that some of the imports that came into Canton from Southeast Asia were actually being exported again, because we did not have information about that part of the commerce. We also did not know how the outside merchants were affected by changes in government policies or that Hong merchants were financing many of the Canton junk voyages to Southeast Asia. As mentioned in the Preface, we did not know that merchants of the Waiyang and Bengang Hangs were actually working together and investing in each other's trade. None of these factors are mentioned in the *Yue haiguan zhi*, but as I pointed out in the Preface, historians nonetheless continue to use that document as if it were the bible of the trade. Very little information is available about any of these factors in history books published in the twentieth century because there was simply a lack of data about them.

These are just a few examples of many that show how important it is to consider all the evidence. Documents from the Qing government and records from foreign

companies are far from complete. They have many gaps in sequence and content. It is impossible to get the whole picture by just using one or two of those language sources. We must assemble all of the data and then examine the trade objectively from a distance, rather than subjectively from the writings of local officials and company officers. Their opinions are important and part of our analysis, but they must be cross-checked against the broader historical evidence. Even in our present day, contemporaries often do not understand the full extent of what is happening around them. It is not until decades later that we gain hindsight and can more clearly explain the outcome.

We might rightfully ask why, if Chinese merchants in Canton had their own vessels (as we know they did), they did not carry their merchandise to Europe and sell it directly. Certainly they could have purchased maps from their foreign customers and gained all the navigational knowledge needed to sail to India, Europe or the Americas. In fact, they could have hired any number of foreigners to navigate the vessels for them or have one of their junk captains go with the foreign ships to Europe and learn the routes. I argue here that it was Qing policies that prevented them from doing this. As I have shown in volume one, Tan Hunqua (Chen Fangguan 陳芳觀) and his partner Chinqua contacted British and Dutch directors in Europe in the early 1730s. They attempted to set up direct linkages. As soon as the Qing government learned of those exchanges, however, officials quickly reacted with a ban on all communication with companies or authorities outside of China.

Tan Hunqua was a great advocate of free trade and wanted to liberalize Qing policies so that they corresponded more closely with what was happening outside of China. Having been involved in the trade at Batavia for many years, he was well aware that things operated differently outside of China. Qing officials, however, saw his communications with Europe as a threat and an attempt to sidestep their authority. They consequently banned outside correspondences on pain of death. For the time being, this action effectively put an end to any thoughts of Chinese merchants in Canton sending their own ships to Europe or consigning foreign ships to carry merchandise for them.

Ng Chin-Keong has shown, through his example of Chen Yilao 陳怡老, what might happen to a merchant who went abroad on his own in the eighteenth century to do business. Chen Yilao went to Batavia, Semarang and other places in Southeast Asia, and married a Macassarese wife. He traded on his own and also helped the Dutch in Batavia with commercial matters. When he returned to China in 1749, he was accused of 'sneaking out to foreign lands, rendering services to foreigners, smuggling into his native district, bringing back foreign nationals [his wife and children], and possessing a wealth'. Some Qing officials saw men like Chen Yilao as 'no difference from the barbarians'.[4]

In 1754, a change in Qing policy forgave Chinese sojourners and allowed them to return without punishment. Ng asks whether Chen Yilao would have escaped his plight had he returned after 1754, instead of before. He concludes that it 'would depend very much on how the authorities would have viewed his services under a foreign government during his sojourn in Batavia'.[5] There was a fine line between what one could and could not do with respect to communicating with outside authorities.

The fact that none of the Hong merchants throughout the Canton era (ca. 1700–1842) attempted to send their own junks to areas outside of Southeast Asia, is testimony in itself that something was holding them back. They had vessels, they had the foreign contacts, they knew how to communicate, they knew the markets, they could get sponsors to finance voyages, and they had all the products available that the Europeans wanted. What was missing was the willpower to put the plan into motion. The reason why Chinese merchants did not make these direct linkages, in their own vessels, is probably because they feared for the safety of themselves and their families in the event that Qing officials should find out about it.

In 1757, English officers in China mentioned that it was 'the Chinese themselves who do not chuse [*sic*] to send their junks' to Europe. The British pointed out to officials in Ningbo that Chinese vessels would be welcomed in any European port.[6] Chinese merchants often consigned cargos to foreigners on credit, which might go to India, Europe or North America. This was fine because once those goods were loaded onto the ships at Whampoa they became the possession of foreign consignees.

If Chinese merchants rented space on foreign ships and tried to send their own cargos to Europe, they would likely have been suspected of doing the same thing that Tan Hunqua had done. Officials were keen to keep the Hong merchants under their control as then they could step in if any disturbances arose. If merchants ventured off to Europe on their own, or began negotiating directly with companies in their home ports, then the Qing government lost a good deal of authority over them. In the early decades of the eighteenth century, Hong merchants often ventured off to other parts of China or to Southeast Asia. By mid-century, however, Hong merchants had much less freedom to move about. There were exceptions, but for the most part they were often expected to be in Canton during the trading season. They could go to the interior to place orders and leave for Fujian or other places to visit family, but most of these journeys were carried out in the off-season from February to June.

There have been rumours circulating in history books for many decades, and displayed on Museum websites, that Poankeequa took off a couple of years in the mid-eighteenth century to go to Sweden.[7] So far there has been no solid evidence brought forth to support these claims. Moreover, we have substantial data showing Poankeequa in China consistently—almost every year from 1750 to his death in 1788. We know that some of the small outside merchants went abroad, on occasion, but not the Hong merchants. In fact, by the mid-eighteenth century Hong merchants had ceased their travels to the Philippines and Southeast Asia as well. Whether this change was their doing or the result of pressures from officials is unclear. We do know that they were expected to be in Canton during the trading seasons. A trip to Southeast Asia could arouse suspicion and raise serious concerns with the Hoppo or governor general, which could then put them and their families at risk.

I show in this volume that Poankeequa wrote letters to the Swedes concerning various aspects of his trade. In Chapter 3, I also discuss a letter that he wrote to the EIC directors in 1767 asking for preferential treatment in the future to make up for losses he suffered on a silk contract with that company. Fred Grant has shown that Conseequa communicated directly with persons in the United States in the early 1800s

in his efforts to collect on bad debts.[8] Caroline Frank has also shown how the Canton shopkeeper Punqua Winchong made several trips to the United States in the early nineteenth century.[9] One of his objectives was to collect on bad debts. John Wong has shown how Houqua invested in American enterprises in the 1830s.[10]

Except for Poankeequa's letter to the EIC in 1767, all of these foreign correspondences and investments were quite different from what Tan Hunqua had attempted to do—open up direct trade and communications with foreign companies. Attempting to recover debts would likely be viewed very differently by Qing officials than attempts to open up direct trade. The former action did not pose any significant threat to Qing control or authority, but the latter action certainly did. These two actions were not one and the same.

In 1770, the English East India Company's directors in London received a letter that was sent to them by all ten of the Hong merchants in the Co-hong (Plate 01.11). The letter requested that the company stop sending curiosities (clocks and other gadgets) to China because they were obliged to purchase them at a loss. They also asked that the company reduce the amount of British fabrics sent to China, because the market was saturated.

It is unclear what might have happened if the Hoppo or governor general in Canton had discovered these letters sent to the EIC directors. In the 1767 letter, Poankeequa was attempting to manipulate the market for his own benefit—which was not likely to have been looked upon favourably by officials. The 1770 letter was asking for a reduction in imports, which would presumably also mean a reduction in duties collected. Qing officials were keen to avoid any shrinkage of revenues sent to Beijing, so this request to reduce imports would have likely aroused their attention as well had they known about it.

It should be pointed out, however, in both of these letters the Hong merchants were not attempting to trade directly with Europe. They were rather trying to change the way the trade was operating in Canton. If they had gone directly to Europe themselves they could have negotiated these things on the spot. These examples again beg the question, why did they always remain in China?

In 1763, British factors at Fort Marlborough (Bencoolen, Sumatra) sent a request to the EIC officers in Canton asking them to encourage Chinese junks to sail to that port. If it would help to convince junk captains, the British officers were willing to provide details about what cargos they should bring. Chinese merchants could then be assured of a profit. As far as I know, nothing resulted from these requests.[11]

The English were eager to encourage Chinese settlers to go to Bencoolen as well—especially Chinese from Manila. Before the British handed Manila back to the Spanish in 1764, they transported some 6,000 resident Chinese to Bencoolen. These immigrants had assisted the English in taking over Manila and feared Spanish reprisals.[12]

Many of the Chinese at Bencoolen had extended families in Fujian and Guangdong Provinces. As the following letter reveals, in 1777, a few of them tried to make commercial linkages to Canton by consigning space on the EIC ships.

1777, Jul 17: Gentlemen

> Mr. Wood having wrote me from Prince Island and acquainted me of the trouble Mr. Pan Khequa [Poankeequa] met with on account of the treasure sent by the China Merchants on the *Lord Holland* Capt. Lawson last year and desiring me to acquaint them that if the[y] made any more Consignments to be careful not to direct it in their own Language nor direct it to him, but to the Council of Canton in consequence of this information they have requested of me to direct their Treasure to you three Parcels of it and enclose their Letter to Mr. Puan Khequa in this which I have accordingly done and hope it will arrive safe without trouble to you or Mr. Puan Khequa.[13]

1777, Nov 24: Wrote the following Letter to the Governor and Council of Fort Marlbro

> Gentlemen
>
> By the *Alfred* who import'd here on the 20th of August we received your Letter dated 17 July with another from Mr Hay about the money sent to the families of the Chinese which we got on shore without any trouble and delivered to Puan Khequa.[14]

Poankeequa obviously did not want government officials finding out about any more of these exchanges between Canton and Bencoolen. This was why he requested that no correspondences be written in 'their own Language' (Chinese). As the second letter shows, as long as everything appeared to be part of the EIC trade and not that of the Hong merchants, all was fine. These are other examples of Chinese merchants attempting to make direct linkages to outside markets via foreign ships, but they were hindered from doing so owing to contrary government policies. There may not have been a written policy in force stating clearly what one could or could not do. However, Poankeequa's apprehensive response clearly shows that government practices did indeed discourage these types of interactions.

In 1790, Chinese in Batavia suggested carrying Dutch cargos on 'European junks under Chinese flag'. Presumably those vessels would pay fewer import and export duties in China, because there was a lower rate for junks than for European ships. The Dutch, however, rejected this offer, arguing that the junks were less seaworthy and more vulnerable to pirate attacks.[15] Moreover, there was also the problem that, once officials in Canton discovered that the junk cargos were actually European owned, the vessels would be charged the same rates as foreign ships. In 1783, for example, Hoppo Li Zhiying 李質穎 in Canton pressured the Hong merchants who supplied merchandise to the junk *Tayon* (泰安, Plate 08.09) to pay the European rates on its cargo. The Hoppo argued that because the vessel was carrying goods to Batavia for the Dutch, it should be treated as a foreign ship.[16]

Chinese junk owners were in a unique position to take part in the carrying trade during the conflicts that took place in Europe from the 1780s to the 1810s. Chinese merchants were not supposed to deal directly with Europe, but it is unclear whether the Qing government would have had a problem with those vessels if they were consigned to foreigners. The Dutch had been doing this all along with the Canton junks that sailed to Batavia each year under a Dutch flag.

As James Fichter has shown, the Americans were quite successful in the carrying trade during the war years owing to their neutral status.[17] Chinese merchants were possibly in a better situation than even the Americans. The former men had access to all of the products that Europeans wanted, and they had close connections with foreign shippers in Canton. Chinese junk owners did not take advantage of these windfalls probably owing to the fear that it might arouse the anger of Qing officials.

Another factor that discouraged Chinese from financing overseas ventures in the eighteenth century was that the Qing government did not protect its nationals abroad. Nor did it make any efforts to protect the commercial interests of Chinese citizens at sea, as Europeans and Americans did. As a result, whether or not a junk was sailing under a Chinese flag or a European flag was of little consequence. I show several examples in the first volume of Chinese junks being captured in the eighteenth century simply because certain foreigners thought that their cargos might belong to a merchant who owed them money or to one of their enemies.[18] In one case, the British officers in Canton even warned a Hong merchant shipping cargo to Batavia for the Dutch that his junk would be subject to attack, just like a Dutch vessel.[19] Chinese who lost their junks and cargos at sea did what they could to right the wrongs done to them but they had little or no backing from the government to force captors outside of China into compliance. Qing policy allowed Chinese merchants to engage in the trade to Southeast Asia so long as they were licensed but the risks of the sea were entirely borne by the owners and sponsors of those vessels. Once the junks left China, they were on their own.

These are only a few examples, but they nonetheless show that Chinese merchants did indeed try to open direct linkages with Europe. In most of these cases, however, they were not attempting to trade directly with those places, but rather make changes in how the trade operated at Canton. As Tan Hunqua and Chen Yilao found out, it was a very risky business dealing directly with foreign powers. By 1770, the ten Hong merchants no longer feared sending a letter to Europe, but that was different from going directly there themselves.

As far as the foreigners were concerned, shipping merchandise to Europe or the Americas on Chinese vessels, regardless of what flag they sailed under, was not a viable option. Either they did not trust the junks to carry their goods, did not want to risk their goods being captured by an opportunist at sea, or they did not want to deal with the problems that might arise in Canton if they should make such an attempt. In the end, it was perceived to be more advantageous to ship their goods on foreign owned vessels.

As far as the Hong merchants were concerned, consigning space on a foreign vessel or outright hiring foreigners to carry their goods was also not a viable option. Many of them consigned cargos to foreigners, but that was different. Once those goods were delivered to the ships at Whampoa, they became the property of the foreign consignee. He was responsible for paying for the goods after they were sold. The consignee had freedom to sell the items in the best way he knew how. There is still much research that needs to be done with regard to the consignment trade. As far as we know, however,

Chinese merchants did not actually ship their own goods on foreign bottoms. Again, we must ask why?

The fact that none of the Hong merchants during the Canton era dared to open direct trade, in their own junks or on other ships, despite the fact that many of them were capable of doing this, strongly suggests that such a move was outside the boundaries of what was deemed acceptable. As I pointed out in the first volume, Qing officials in Canton had warned Hong merchants not to go to Fujian in the late 1720s as the foreigners were asking them to do. If they tried such a move, officials warned that they would be beaten and their families in Canton would be punished.[20] Fear for the safety of their families and of Qing reprisals is probably what kept Hong merchants from opening up direct trade.

It is important to understand these limitations because they help to define the parameters within which all Canton and Macao merchants had to operate. Those men could expand their businesses into various ports throughout Southeast Asia; they could form multiple linkages to inland suppliers within China; and they could create business connections with a variety of foreigners in Canton and Macao. I will also show an example below of an outside merchant even advertising his business in foreign newspapers. However, those were the limits of their expansion. In the eighteenth century, stretching out further into the Indian Ocean, Europe or the Americas—in their own vessels—was out of the question. It was simply too risky. The vulnerability of their vessels being attacked at sea or in a foreign port—combined with the fear that Qing officials might not look kindly upon such attempts—prevented anything from happening. These limitations were largely placed on Chinese merchants—directly or indirectly—by the Qing government. This was not written policy, but rather a cultural policy that was simply 'understood'. Circumstantial information and the non-actions of the Hong merchants are what show us where the *real* boundaries of commerce lay.

These events can only be understood when placed in their international contexts. The establishment of the Co-hong was China's answer to meeting the growing demand for Chinese products. The growing demand for China's goods—which were mostly luxury items and tea—was fuelled by the rise in expendable incomes outside of China. Many of the problems and challenges faced by the Chinese merchants that are discussed on the following pages were partially the results of changes taking place in the global environment.

Internal factors within China, of course, also affected Hong merchants. They were responsible for giving expensive gifts to superiors every year for the privilege of trade. Officials in Beijing and Canton often forced merchants to finance parties, supplement insufficient budgets and underwrite military campaigns. These impositions resulted in Hong merchants trading in contraband and seeking high interest loans from foreigners to supplement their insufficient working capital. When men failed, other Hong merchants were held responsible for repaying their debts. Qing policy granted freedom to trade to a select group of individuals, but that privilege came at a high price.

Government exactions impacted smaller, outside merchants as well. In the late 1770s, the duties on many products were raised by 50 percent in order to generate more revenues to pay the arrears of failed houses. Additional surcharges were later added to

export silk. At this time, many of the outside merchants were suffering from the failures of several Hong merchants. When fewer ships arrived than expected in the 1780s and 1790s, Hoppos did what they could to generate funds from wherever possible to make up for the shortfall in revenues sent to Beijing.

The chinaware merchants were particularly affected by all of these impositions. Inland producers tried to compensate for higher prices (owing to increased duties and the rise in food costs) by cutting back on quality. At the same time all this was happening, the demand for chinaware was shrinking in Europe. Locally produced ceramics were becoming more popular there. By 1792, the EIC quit ordering chinaware owing to its warehouses being full and no buyers for the items.

There were many up and down years for the porcelain trade in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Overall, the porcelain market went from exporting around 20,000 to 25,000 piculs annually before 1800, to around 5,000 piculs in 1814 (Appendix 6C). By the 1820s and 1830s, the trade had levelled off at about 6,000 piculs exported annually. This was shrinkage of 75 to 80 percent from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century. Of course, many porcelain dealers were pushed out as the trade declined.

Silk dealers also experienced difficulties. Their trade was restricted by imperial quotas, whereby only so many piculs of product could be exported on each ship. The rise in food costs and export duties made it increasingly more difficult for Chinese silk producers to compete with domestically produced silk in Europe and the United States. One American trader in Canton in the 1830s mentioned that 'it is difficult to procure Silk here worth sending home for the French far excel the Chinese at this time in all descriptions of Silks–perhaps with the exception only of heavy Goods and in Embroidery'.[21]

We have the advantage today of hindsight, which enables us to place the merchants of Canton and Macao into their broader historical contexts. During their lifetimes, however, those men would have had only a vague understanding of what was actually happening around them. They had to deal with all the pressures from their foreign customers to keep prices low, without sacrificing quality; they had to deal with added impositions placed on them even while their profits and trade were shrinking. For many men, the only alternative was to take out high interest loans from foreigners to keep their businesses going. They would then hope for a windfall in the future. Of course, this practice led many men to ruin. When they failed, the remaining merchants assumed their debts.

In all of these examples, the practice of Qing officials was to maintain revenues sent to Beijing—even if it meant sacrificing a few merchants. Although growth was also encouraged, initiating policies that maintained annual revenues was more important than initiating policies that might provide long term security. It was not that the Qing government failed to encourage foreign trade, as Ch'en has suggested, but rather that its policies tended to be short sighted.[22] That outcome was largely the result of the Co-hong, which showed officials that growth could be maintained so long as they kept around ten licensed merchants in operation and replaced failed merchants with new men. After the Qing adopted the policy that merchants were expendable, there

were fewer incentives to initiate policies to protect them. The accumulation of debts was always illegal and discouraged. In most cases discussed both here and in the first volume, the merchants really had no choice other than to delay their failures by taking out more loans.

Interest rates inside and outside of China remained unequal. China was well known in the eighteenth century as 'a country remarkable thrô the world for the height of its interest [rates]'.[23] The positive effect of high interest rates, of course, was that it attracted a lot of foreign capital. The more foreign investments that flowed into China, the more that trade could grow; and the more that trade grew, the more revenues that Beijing received. As far as the government was concerned, it did not matter that high interest rates were detrimental to Chinese merchants; nor did it matter that Chinese merchants were at a disadvantage in international trade, because they could not go abroad or make direct linkages to foreign markets; nor did it matter that Chinese merchants were pressured, under the practice of 'truck', to purchase foreign imports, even though they made no profits from those sales. The more import duties collected, the more revenues sent to Beijing.

It did not matter that Chinese merchants had no protection or recourse in collecting the debts owed to them by foreigners; it did not matter that Chinese merchants were penalized for all infractions committed by foreigners, even when the latter men failed to pay their duties and fees; it did not matter that Chinese merchants were forced to pay duties on ships that left without a cargo (such as those sold to Portuguese in Macao) or forced to pay import duties on goods that arrived damaged or destroyed (owing to water leakage, etc.); it did not matter that porcelain dealers were pressured to pay higher duties in the late eighteenth century even when their market was shrinking; it did not matter that silk merchants suffered losses owing to Hoppos increasing duties on goods that they had already contracted with foreigners, which meant they could not raise the prices to cover those increased costs; and it did not matter that silk painters and embroiderers suffered when silk weavers went broke. All of them were expendable.

In the end, all that mattered was that harmony was maintained in Canton and that officials did what they could to protect the annual revenues sent to Beijing. Foreigners were given preferential treatment in trade because that was the best way to ensure the latter goal was accomplished. By the late eighteenth century, it also mattered that officials initiated policies to encourage more rice imports. Of course, if officials initiated policies that led to a decline in trade they would suffer because of it. Or if they tried to extract funds from local merchants for personal gain they ran the risk of being recalled to Beijing to give an account. But, if a couple of Hong merchants failed and a couple of outside men went broke owing to new government exactions placed on them, those failures were of little consequence.

I will show on the following pages that the Qing government's concept of 'solvency' had nothing to do with balancing assets with liabilities or credit with debit. It rather had everything to do with balancing resources and creditors. As long as merchants kept their creditors satisfied, they were considered solvent. When creditors were no longer willing to wait for their payments, merchants were declared bankrupt.

A couple of merchants discussed in this volume seemed to have operated in debt for most, if not all, of their existence. However, despite their debts they were licensed to trade and one of them, Monqua, was even promoted to head merchant. Monqua was in fact a good example for junior merchants to follow because he was an expert at keeping his creditors at bay, even while carrying a heavy debt load.

In order to understand the men discussed on the pages that follow, we need to place them not only within their local environment in China but also within their broader international contexts—otherwise our analysis does them an injustice. Now that we have many more details about their trading activities, making generalizations about their failures, such as being the result of 'vanity and extravagance', 'bad management' or 'financial incompetence'—when all we have are a handful of details about them—are entirely unacceptable.[24] Historians sometimes forget that we are talking about real people with real families and reputations. Just because they lived 200 years ago does not mean their reputations are unimportant. The subjects we choose to examine should be treated with as much fairness and respect as we would want future historians to write about us. We need to take all of the factors into consideration and not just rely on the English supercargos' varied opinions.

There are two success stories in this volume, Poankeequa (Chapter 3) and Tan Anqua (Chapter 4). Both men kept their businesses going up to their deaths, and their successors continued the trade after them. The evidence suggests that both firms were solvent when the owners died. The reasons for their success were very different. Poankeequa, on the one hand, had all the backing and personal skills necessary to manipulate the Hong merchant system to his own advantage. Tan Anqua, on the other hand, had the good sense to realize that his best course of action was not to be a Hong merchant but rather an inland tea agent and, later, an outside merchant. Even though they were both successful, their outcomes were very different—Poankeequa became rich and famous and Tan Anqua died in obscurity.

There are several points to take away from this discussion. China maintained a fairly consistent trade policy throughout the Canton era that aimed to protect imperial revenues and encourage growth. Some practices, such as high interest rates, mandatory acceptance of imports and, possibly, the fear of opening up direct trade with Western companies, favoured foreigners to the detriment of Chinese. Because these factors encouraged growth and because there were always more merchants to replace failed ones, nothing was done to correct these imbalances in the system. The Qing government's policies concerning solvency had nothing to do with balancing credit against debit. Merchants carrying debts could continue trading for decades so long as they kept their creditors at bay. And finally, circumstantial evidence suggests that Chinese merchants did not send their own vessels to India, Africa, Europe or the Americas, because Qing policies prevented them from doing so.

## LAYOUT OF THE BOOK

I begin with a discussion of five merchant families in Chapters 1 to 5. Chapter 1 is the first extensive study that has been done on Swequa and his brothers. Swequa was an

important figure in the trade in the 1750s. His story is followed by Monqua's family in Chapter 2. Previous studies have already brought out much of Monqua's story, but little has been written about his father, Teunqua. I include a section about Teunqua and have expanded the discussion of Monqua.

Chapter 3 is devoted to one of the giants of the trade, Poankeequa. In recent years, there have been numerous Chinese articles written about the Pan family. Most of these articles, however, use only the Chinese sources and Morse's *Chronicles of the East India Company* to tell his story.[25] I have expanded the discussion with much new information about Poankeequa and his associates.

Chapter 4 retraces the story of Tan Anqua and discusses some of the inland tea agents. Tan Anqua is one of the rare examples we have of a man starting out as a Hong merchant, changing to an inland tea merchant and, finally, becoming an outside merchant. In Chapter 5, I turn to two members of the Wu 伍 family, Geowqua and Puiqua. They began the family trade which Houqua later inherited and expanded into a small empire.

In Chapter 6, I provide a summary of the porcelain trade. This sets the background for Chapters 7 and 8, where I discuss the porcelain dealers. Chapter 7 retraces the activities of thirteen prominent dealers. These men were not necessarily the only important merchants—they are rather men for whom I had at least some data through which to tell their stories. Chapter 8 discusses miscellaneous porcelain dealers for whom I have only bits and pieces of information. I talk about them more as a group. All of the porcelain dealers are summarized at the end of Chapter 8.

In Chapter 9, I provide a summary of the silk trade, which sets the background for the silk workers discussed in Chapter 10. The latter chapter includes silk weavers, painters and embroiderers. For several of the weavers we have significant data through which to recount their activities. The painters and embroiderers are discussed more as a group, owing to the brevity of the information.

In the plate section, I include about 70 documents all of which concern the men discussed in this volume. Most of these records are bilingual, with Chinese and one European language (English, French, Dutch, Danish or Swedish). There are, of course, many other documents besides these. I simply selected the ones that were most important for the telling of each man's story. I have numbered the plates to correspond with the chapters to which they belong. Plates that are numbered 01.01 to 01.12, for example, are for Chapter 1, and Plates 03.01 to 03.26 are for Chapter 3. Zeros were added before numbers so that the computer would keep them in their proper order. This numbering system is not exact because some of the documents belong to multiple chapters and involve several houses.

The appendixes are also numbered according to the chapters to which they belong. Appendixes 2A to 2G are for Chapter 2, and so on. They are arranged in the same order as the first volume. The appendixes for Chapters 1 to 5 begin with schedules of activities. Those are followed by trade figures, and the final appendixes for each chapter are discussions of problems in nomenclature. Appendixes 6A to 8E are data that I collected about porcelain dealers. Appendixes 10A to 10D contain data that I collected about the silk trade.

Appendix 9 is an exception. It does not correspond to Chapter 9, as its numbering might suggest. Rather, it provides a breakdown of the 34 contracts that are reproduced in the plate section. I explain the reasons for including this data at the beginning of Appendix 9.

I now turn to Chapter 1, which is the story of Swequa. He was instrumental in establishing the Co-hong in 1760, and the story helps to lay the foundation for the following chapters.

CHAPTER ONE

# SWEQUA 蔡瑞官 AND BROTHERS 1741–1772

| Relation | Trade Name | Mandarin | Chinese |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brother no. 1 | Swequa | Cai Ruiguan | 蔡瑞官 |
| Brother no. 2 | Sequa | Cai Xiguan | 蔡璽官 |
| Brother no. 3 | Tjobqua | Cai Yuguan | 蔡玉官 |

In the eighteenth century, there were three prominent merchant families from the Cai lineage who were active in the foreign trade in Canton. In the first volume of this study, I wrote about one of those families, Cai Hunqua and sons (Chapter 7). In this volume I include the other two Cai families. As far as we know, none of the families were related to each other. They all operated at about the same time and competed with each other for a share of the foreign trade. This chapter is about Swequa's branch.

Very little has been written about Cai Swequa and his brothers in the past. Those omissions are partially the result of the brothers favouring the French traders many of whose records have not survived. But the omissions are also partially owing to the ambiguities in the way the names were recorded, which is explained in Appendix 1F. I begin with the two oldest brothers, Swequa and Sequa.

## SWEQUA AND SEQUA

Swequa's Chinese name was Cai Ruiguan 蔡瑞官. He was also known as Cai Guohui 蔡國輝, and was originally from Quanzhou.[1] He was probably active in the trade in Canton as early as the 1730s but clear references to him do not begin to appear until the 1740s (Appendix 1F). Swequa traded with his brother Sequa (Cai Xiguan 蔡璽官) out of the Jufeng Hang 聚豐行. In later years, Swequa often went by the alias Long Swequa (spelled various ways).

Not much is known about Sequa so this section will mostly focus on Swequa. Sequa traded with his older brother in the 1750s and shows up in the records from time to time. After Swequa died (1761), his younger brother Tjobqua succeeded him. We then hear nothing more about Sequa.

I only have a few references to Swequa in the 1740s.[2] In 1741 he shows up trading tea with the English (EIC) and Swedish (SOIC) East India companies.[3] In 1742 and 1743, he also shows up in the French records (spelled 'Seikoua' or 'Sioukoua').[4] Swequa's factory is noted on a Swedish map from 1748 (spelled 'Svikva').[5] It was located a little north of Thirteen Hong Street (*shisanhangjie* 十三行街).[6] He later moved into a building next to the Dutch factory.[7]

Because Swequa catered to the French and many of those documents have not survived, we do not have much information about his trade.[8] From 1730 to 1745 there were usually about two to five French ships in port each year. Owing to conflicts in Europe, no French ships arrived in China in the years from 1746 to 1748. These must have been very lean years for Swequa, and may have been the beginning of his financial difficulties that emerged later.[9]

Beginning in the early 1750s, Swequa appears in all of the foreign records with the alias 'Long' attached to his name (Long Swequa, Lan Swequa or Swequa de Lange, etc.). He may have adopted this alias in order to avoid getting mixed up with other traders. From 1750, he shows up fairly regularly in the EIC records; from 1751, he appears in the Danish Asiatic Company (DAC) and Dutch East India Company's (VOC) records; and from 1752, he shows up fairly regularly in the SOIC records. Swequa supplied his foreign customers with the usual products of tea, lacquerware, rattan, porcelain, silk fabrics, linens, raw silk, etc. He took foreign imports in exchange for those goods, including tin, sappanwood, lead, woollens, and, of course, silver coins (Appendix 1A).

Like most of the Hong merchants, Swequa also traded illegally in gold. In volume one I show how trading in gold was a way for merchants to gain quick working capital.[10] Because they often received full payment in advance, they could realize their profits on gold immediately. Swequa sold gold to the VOC in 1751 and 1752, and was probably supplying other foreigners with the metal as well (Appendix 1A).[11]

Appendix1C shows Swequa's family trade with the DAC, VOC and SOIC. The volume of trade he did with those companies was not large, ranging from a mere 2.5 percent to 6 percent of the cargos each year. Plate 01.01 shows one of Swequa's contracts with the DAC dated 29 September 1752. He contracted 150 whole chests of first grade Bohea tea, which was to be delivered in 55 days. This was tea he had in stock, so there was no advance involved. He was paid in full after delivery.

In November 1752, Swequa was listed in the VOC records as owing 2,000 taels. He managed to repay 1,000 taels, but had to defer paying the remainder until a later date. At some point after 1748, Swequa rented an apartment in a building owned by Wan Tang Ju that was located next to the Dutch factory. On 19 January 1758, the Dutch mentioned that he had been living in that building for many years.[12] The loss of the French trade from 1746 to 1748 may have been one of the factors that led to him changing residences.

In 1753, Swequa purchased the Dutch factory, which was owned by Tan Conqua and Xantqua (also spelled Chemqua). The Chinese government had taken possession of the building in order to collect the debts those men owed. It is not clear from the records, but what often happened in these cases was that the government ordered one of the other Hong merchants to purchase the property. The money collected from the sale was then used to pay the arrears. Whatever the case may have been, after Swequa purchased the Dutch factory he entered into negotiations with them for a rental agreement.

Before signing a rental contract with Swequa, the Dutch supercargoes wanted to have a better idea of his financial situation. After investigating the matter, they concluded that at the end of the 1753 season Swequa was in a very 'pitiable' state. He

was indebted to the French Company, and still owed customs duties on imported tin. He was said to be 40,000 taels in debt to inland agents for tea he had received but not paid for.[13]

Swequa managed to juggle his resources enough to make purchases and fulfil his contracts in 1754, but not without difficulty. In order to get him through the year, Cai Hunqua, Semqua and Taiqua of the Yifeng Hang were asked to pay his duties that were in arrears. These men stood security for some of the ships that Swequa had supplied, which meant they were responsible for the export duties.[14]

From 1749 to 1756, two to five French ships were again arriving in China each year, which gave Swequa a much needed boost in trade. A few Prussian ships also arrived, which Swequa supplied. The Prussians and French advanced him money for tea contracts in 1754 and early 1755. He was given upwards of 60,000 Spanish reals. However, the Dutch believed that he would not advance the money to the tea agents as was expected, but would rather use the funds to pay his outstanding debts. Swequa also managed to land a contract with the EIC.[15]

The Prussians, French and others were, of course, just as concerned as the Dutch about the financial status of their merchants. The best way to ensure they would be repaid the money owed to them was to keep Swequa active in trade. He could then deliver some tea with payment and other tea without payment. The withheld money was applied to his debts. If they had given him no contracts, then he would not have had the wherewithal to pay anything to anybody. The Dutch estimated that Swequa would have profited some 30,000 taels from his contracts in 1754. They could not understand what he had done with all that money, because he remained in very poor standing with the inland tea agents. Of course the Dutch had only partial knowledge of Swequa's extensive operations and would not have known the full extent of his arrears.[16]

There was considerable unrest within the foreign community in the mid-1750s about the China trade, which created difficulties for Swequa. During the 1753 season, the English presented a petition to the Hoppo when he came to Whampoa to measure their ships. Among the demands they listed was the removal of the security merchant system that held one person (or a consortium of persons) responsible for all the duties on vessels they secured. The system also dictated that those local merchants be held responsible for anything that happened with the crews of the ships they secured (such as injury, death, theft, etc.).[17]

A week after the Hoppo received the EIC demands he gave an order to have the man who had translated them into Chinese arrested. This petition was answered with the simple statement from the Hoppo that he knew what was best for the trade. This dismissive response resulted in the English ordering three of their ships to remain below Bocca Tigris when they arrived in the fall of 1754. This action brought trouble for Swequa, because he had agreed to secure those ships.[18] The English hoped that this move would pressure the Hoppo into reconsidering their demands.[19]

The English interpreter James Flint, who worked for the EIC and had learned Chinese, drew up a new petition that reiterated, with greater emphasis, the company's distaste for the security merchant system. The Hoppo delayed his response, and the

English, in turn, sent a request for permission to land some of their merchandise, without specifying who would stand security for the goods. The EIC officers did not want anyone assigned to their ship. The permission chop was denied, as expected. The English used that refusal as an excuse to march up to the city gate and demand an audience with the governor general.[20]

Swequa had learned about the English plans and rushed out to intercept them. He met the British at the gate and 'made great entreaty that we [the English] would return to our factory, pretending that our taking this step without giving any previous notice of it, would bring him [Swequa] into a great deal of trouble.'[21] The English persisted, however, and after waiting at the gate for some time, they were escorted to the governor general's residence. An audience was granted, and Swequa was required to attend. The English supercargoes presented their petition, and Swequa explained to the governor general its contents in Chinese. Mr. Flint confirmed to the EIC supercargoes that Swequa had presented their demands clearly and without omission.[22]

The governor general did not address all of their demands, but the English supercargoes were temporarily satisfied with his response. The Hoppo informed them that he would make the entire body of local merchants responsible for the charges levied on those who stood security, rather than one person. Because the British had been unwilling to declare who would stand security for their ships, the Hoppo, on 7 August 1754, named the merchants himself. The securities for the EIC ships were divided between Chetqua, Poankeequa, Swetia and Teunqua.[23]

Surprisingly, Swequa was not allotted any EIC ships. This outcome must have been a disappointment to him, considering that he had put himself on the line by offering to provide temporary security for the ships. He had spent much time mediating between the English and Chinese officials. Moreover, he was clearly in need of income to service his debts.

On the positive side, Swequa was also relieved of having to deal with an unfortunate incident that followed shortly thereafter. On 15 August 1754, an English officer had 'discharged a musket loaded with Ball and pointed towards a Chinese Guard house' at Whampoa.[24] An investigation was launched and the Chinese officials demanded that the security merchants deliver the man who had fired the shot.[25]

Another incident occurred in late September, which also involved the English. This time, however, Swequa was held partially responsible because the French were involved and he was their principal merchant. On 30 September 1754, a linguist informed the English officers in Canton that a brawl had occurred on French Island between some English and French sailors, and an Englishman had been killed. A long investigation followed, with the French claiming it was self-defence, and the English claiming it was murder. The Chinese demanded that the person who committed the crime be delivered to them so justice could be served. There are no specific entries mentioning Swequa, but there are references to the French security merchants being involved, and he was one of them. A Frenchman was finally apprehended, charged and held in custody by the Chinese authorities, but was later released in 1755.[26]

At the start of the 1755 season, the English tried to get all of the Europeans united in their effort to push through changes to trade. The debts that Swequa owed the French, however, prevented that from happening.

> 1755, Jul 17: The Dutch Director acquainted us that he had proposed to the French, Swedes and Prussians to deliver a further remonstrance to the Tsongtouk [governor general] on account of the last edict: That the Swedes and Prussian were ready to come into it, the French seemed cool and unwilling to carry on a farther opposition, which he could not account for, unless it were with a view of favouring Suequa [Swequa] who was their principal merchant last year and probably indebted to them, and he being one of the leaders in the present monopolizing scheme the French might perhaps have altered their first opinion and think it now their interest to support the new regulation, which, if established, must throw a much larger share of business into Suequas hands than he could otherwise expect. This falling off of the French deprives us of the hopes we had yet entertained of redress since it is pretty certain that nothing less than a general agreement amongst the several European Agents could effectually serve us in the present case.[27]

Not being successful in uniting the Europeans, the English officers ventured off on their own. They sent Flint up the coast to see if he could establish trade connections in some other Chinese port. This story and its consequences are well known, so there is no need to repeat them here.

Despite his financial difficulties, Swequa still ranked among the top six merchants in Canton in 1755. As I discussed in the first volume of this study, the six houses tried to tighten the merchant ranks this year, all of which was an effort to bring more security to trade.[28] No one was in greater need of more security than Swequa.

At the beginning of the 1755 season, Swequa presented the following proposal to the EIC.

> 1755, Sep 24: Sweequa proposed to us the sending a person into the Bohea Tea Country to purchase tea there a month or two hence, when all other purchasers of that comodity for this year will have left the place, he supposes the tea must then be sold cheap, & remain unsold until next year, he offer'd to run the risque of it, & to procure for us 3000 peculs of good Bohea tea at 12 tales the pecul clear of all charges, to be pack'd after the China new Year he desired to be advanced ten chests of treasure for the purpose.[29]

The EIC officers agreed to his proposal, which was advantageous to both parties. Up until the late 1750s, almost all foreign ships arrived in (and departed from) China in concert with changes in the monsoon winds. The vessels would normally arrive from July to September and depart from November to January.[30] The tea would be purchased either in the off-season (February to June) or at the start of the season soon after the ships arrived. It took several weeks to travel to the interior, so Swequa's man mentioned in the extract above would have arrived there around mid- to late October, when all of the best teas had been purchased for the year. Whatever remained would be sold the next year as new tea, even though it was in fact leftover from the previous year.

As the entry below reveals, by purchasing the tea at the end of the season, the EIC was able to secure it 3 to 4 taels more cheaply than they would have paid during the more active trading season.

> 1756, Jan 17: In the Close of the last Year we several Times wrote to your Honors, first by the *Drake* & lastly by the *Warren*, by which Ship we sent you all our Books, Papers, Duplicates, & Accounts. We now by the *Bombay Castle* send you a Copy of our Diary as Residents here from ye 24th Sept. last, by which you will see that about that Time we sent Ten Chests of Treasure into the Bohea Country to purchase all the Tea that was left there, which otherwise would have been brought to this Place Six or Eight Months hence as Tea of this Year's Growth, and would probably have been sold at 15 to 16 Tales the Pecul. We have secured between 3 & 4000 Tales [piculs?] of it at 12 Tales.[31]

After Swequa's man purchased the tea and shipped it to Canton, it was warehoused until the ships arrived in the next season. This arrangement not only helped Swequa procure 'ten chests of treasure', but it also gave the EIC an advantage in the trade. By the 1760s, new sea routes had been established whereby ships could avoid the monsoon winds by going east of the Philippines and arriving in China at any time of the year. After ships began arriving regularly in the off-season months, the advantage of going to the tea lands late in the season disappeared.[32]

Considering that many of the French records have not survived, we are fortunate to have a couple of Swequa's original contracts. Plates 01.02 and 01.03 are two contracts that he and Sequa made with the French East India Company (CFI) in 1756. The French only had one ship in China this year. The contracts provide us with a glimpse of what Swequa might have been doing in other years.

Plate 01.02 is dated 6 April 1756. It is for Bohea and Tunkay tea. The Bohea tea was to be of the first picking (*tou chun wuyi cha* 頭春武夷茶). The price was set at 13 taels per picul. The price of the Tunkay tea (屯溪茶) was 20.5 taels per picul. Combined, the total tea to be delivered came to 350 piculs.

Plate 01.03 is a contract dated 17 March 1756. It was for Bohea, Song Skin and Tunkay tea, and raw silk. The Bohea tea was again to be of the first picking and priced at 13 taels per picul. The price of the Song Skin tea (松皮茶) was 18.5 taels per picul. The Tunkay tea was 20.5 taels per picul. The price of the raw silk (湖絲) was 185 taels per picul. The total amount came to 1,450 piculs of tea and 60 piculs of silk.

The advances that the French paid on both contracts came to 6.5 taels per picul on Bohea tea (50% of the total owed) and 14 taels per picul on the Tunkay tea (ca. 68% of the total). The Song Skin tea also required 14 taels per picul in advance (ca. 76% of the total) and the raw silk required $123^{1/3}$ taels per picul in advance (ca. 67% of the total). These advances are what Chinese merchants were eager to get better control of, because foreign money was needed to finance the expansion of inland production.

The Bohea tea was to be delivered in the 8th lunar month, and the Tunkay, Song Skin teas and silk were to be delivered in the tenth lunar month. These two contracts amounted to 38,025 taels. This would have been just a fraction of the total trade that Swequa and his brother Sequa had with the French in 1756. Unfortunately, these are the only two detailed documents that have survived. Sequa does not seem to have

done much, if any, other trade on his own. There are other Sequas who show up in the records, from the late 1750s to the 1780s, but those men were connected to the Pan family (Chapter 3).

The money that was advanced to Swequa was supposed to be forwarded to the inland tea suppliers to place orders for the items requested. These inland agents would not save the products for Swequa unless he gave them money up front. The balance was paid after Swequa delivered the tea and received payment from his foreign customers. When Hong merchants were short on funds, they might not pay off the entire balance to the inland agents, which accounts for Swequa's indebtedness to these men. In slack years, when fewer ships arrived, Hong merchants were caught short. Inland agents would then grant them credits, with the expectation of getting paid in the next season. If fewer ships arrived the next year as well, then the Hong merchant gradually became increasingly indebted to their inland suppliers.

We have some data from the trade Swequa did with the Dutch in 1756. In March of that year, Swequa made a contract with the VOC on similar terms as the French. He contracted 1,000 piculs of new Bohea tea at 13 taels per picul, and 50 piculs of raw silk at 184 taels per picul. The Dutch paid an advance of 6 taels per picul up front (ca. 46% of the total) on the tea plus a 70 percent advance on the raw silk (129.5 taels per picul).[33]

We can see that the terms Swequa agreed to with the Dutch appear, on the surface, to be similar to the terms with the French. What we do not know, however, is whether there was any difference in the quality of the products that he delivered to the two companies. We also do not know the size of the picul that was used for each company; what weights were used to weigh the products; the number of chests that were used to pack the tea; or the exchange rates used. All of these variables affected Swequa's potential profits. For example, if more chests were needed to pack one company's tea compared to another, then that was additional expense that Swequa had to build into the delivery terms and prices. If the French and Dutch used their usual exchange rates of one Spanish dollar to 0.72 and 0.74 taels respectively, then that also affected the local prices. Thus, even though we have these wonderful details from 1756 about Swequa's French and Dutch trade, we still cannot compare them precisely because of the missing variables.

In 1757 and 1758, there were again no French ships in port. Two French ships arrived in 1759, but then, again, no ships from 1760 to 1762.[34] These were undoubtedly very difficult years for Swequa and his brothers. He managed to land contracts with other companies, although not without difficulties.

In November 1757, when the Dutch were taking the tare weights of Swequa's empty tea chests, they discovered that the lead in the chests was of very poor quality. Because this metal was essential to preserving the taste of the tea, they insisted that the lead be replaced with better quality. Swequa replaced the lead, and then packed the tea as requested.[35]

On 8 January 1758, Swequa and his brother Sequa landed two contracts with the VOC. They were each for 500 piculs of new Bohea tea of the first picking (Plates 01.04 and 01.05), at 11.5 taels per picul. The total of each contract came to 5,750 taels.

Swequa received an advance on each contract consisting of cash (4,250 taels) and spices (775.347 taels), amounting to 87.4 percent of the total. The remaining balance of 724.653 taels on each contract was to be paid after delivery in late September. With so much of the total paid in advance, these were very good contracts for Swequa.

There was, however, some risk involved in taking the spices in exchange.[36] The amount of spices that Swequa received was not large. The advance he received was interest free, which would help to cover any loss he might incur on the spices. All together Swequa supplied the VOC with over 50,000 taels worth of merchandise in 1758 (Appendix 1C). This Dutch trade helped to make up for no French ships showing up that year, but it was certainly not sufficient to replace that business.[37]

Investing in real estate was also an important part of many Hong merchants' operations, and Swequa was no exception. He and his brothers owned the Dutch factory from 1753 to 1763 (Appendix 1E). In September 1758, Swequa received 2,000 Spanish dollars for the annual rent.[38] At this time, the Dutch sometimes rented two buildings. In 1759, Swequa rented the main Dutch factory to the EIC instead.[39] The English were in need of extra living space and found Swequa's factory to be 'very large, and extremely comodius.' Swequa demanded $2,000 for rent, but the English negotiated him down to $1,806 (1,300 taels).[40]

In 1760, the Dutch regained possession of their building. Plate 01.06 is a rental contract that the Dutch made with Swequa dated 1 August 1760. The annual rent was set at $1,800 (1,332 taels). The contract mentions that this was the same building that the Dutch had occupied for many years and that they had rented in 1758.

It was wise for merchants to have some of their money tied up in properties. These assets were more difficult to liquidate in short order, and thus provided some protection from anxious creditors wanting their money. Moreover, by owning the Dutch factory, Swequa might stand a better chance of gaining a greater share of their trade, or perhaps a private loan on the side.[41]

By the end of the 1758 season, Swequa was again hunting for ready cash to meet his obligations.

> 1759, Jan 27: Swequa desired to be paid for the above Tea, and to have an advance for that we are to pack in ten days. The Tea being ready to deliver, but the China New Year happening to be in three days puts a total stagnation to business. We therefore consented to pay him five Chests of Treasure, knowing that his inducement to sell the Tea at the prices we have given, was his urgent necessity for this money. We accordingly gave the following order to Mr Lockwood.
>
> You are desired to advance Swequa five Chests of Treasure amounting to Tales 14437.090.[42]

Some of this money had to be sent to the interior to reserve tea for the upcoming season. Within a couple months, Swequa went to the EIC again for another advance. He needed to pay the duties on the tea he had delivered to the ship *Pitt*.

> 1759, May 6: Most of the merchants we bought tea of, informing us they could not pay the duties on that, we send home by the *Pitt* unless assisted by us, they having sent all their money into the country to make purchases for the approaching season, not expecting the dispatch of a ship at this time. We find ourselves

> under the necessity of agreeing to advance them what may be sufficient to pay the Hoppo, upon taking their bonds for the same. In consequence of this Resolution we advanced Swequa this day tales 1440 which he promises to pay in the ninth China moon.[43]

The *Pitt* had taken the route east of the Philippines and arrived at Whampoa on 14 April.[44] As mentioned above, these off-season arrivals continued to increase over time. From the late 1750s to 1800, more than 200 ships arrived in China during the off-season.[45] Chinese merchants eventually adapted to this change. They had to reserve funding and products to supply these ships. In 1759, however, they were still operating by the old standards. Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that the EIC had no hesitation in loaning Swequa the money he wanted—despite his seemingly precarious financial status.

Swequa was one of the instigators behind the establishment of the Co-hong in 1760. As is discussed in another chapter, Poankeequa was the other main instigator. Both of these men were in a rather unstable financial state at the time, and they needed something to brighten their future prospects. As discussed in the first volume, the Co-hong was seen as the solution. Swequa was required to pay entrance fees of 10,000 taels to join the Co-hong, and he became one of the chief officers.[46]

When the Dutch arrived in Canton in August 1760, they joined in protest with the English against the creating of the Co-hong by refusing to bring their ships upriver.[47] There was much confusion among the foreign community as to whether the organization had government approval and what effect it would have on trade. They asked for a meeting with the Hong merchants to have their questions answered.

Plate 01.12 shows the result of the meeting with the merchants, which took place in the Dutch factory. It is a declaration dated 16 August 1760 from the EIC supercargos Francis Kinnersley and Francis Wood, who also attended the meeting. They stated that the ten Chinese merchants had declared that they had formed a company, with the approval of the governor general (Tsongton), and that they had permission from all the appropriate courts of justice. Upon receiving confirmation of the legitimacy of the Co-hong, there was nothing more the Dutch could do and ordered their ships upriver. Questions about the creation of the Co-hong and whether it had the emperor's approval continued to be raised in Canton, but there was nothing foreigners could do about it since it clearly had governmental support.

The Dutch mentioned that the reason the VOC did little trade with Swequa in 1760 was because he was always short on credit. He was also viewed as a man of questionable character. They mentioned that he had broken his contract with the English in 1759, and was therefore barred from their business in the following year. The Dutch also heard a rumour that Swequa was now employing any means possible to get his hands on foreign capital in order to pay his inland creditors.[48]

It was around this time that Swequa moved out of Wan Tang Ju's building and took up residence in an upper apartment at the rear of the Dutch factory.[49] We know he continued to keep his factory, located to the north of Thirteen Hong Street, because we later hear of a fire in that building after Tjobqua took over the Jufeng Hang (see below). By the early 1760s, we find references that show Swequa (with brother Tjobqua) and

Poankeequa were the main suppliers of the Swedish cargos.[50] The Swedes purchased products from other merchants as well, but they tended to favour these two men with the bulk of their cargos and as security for their ships.[51]

In January 1761, the Danes mentioned that Swequa had contracted merchandise with the Swedes for the coming season. This meant he would have received a good amount of cash in advance. Swequa was certain to have been hard pressed in these years, because the Seven Years War (1756–63) drained the French resources, which had been the source of much of his capital. No French ships arrived from 1760 to 1762. Owing to money being diverted to the British attack and occupation of Manila, some EIC ships showed up in China with insufficient silver to purchase return cargoes. In these years, then, it was difficult for merchants to find enough capital to finance their trade.

To make up for the shortfall in cash in 1761, the EIC ships were loaded with more woollens, which made the situation even worse for the Chinese merchants. Not only were they deprived of their customary silver advances, but they were pressured to take more EIC fabrics, which produced little or no profit. With the market now saturated, the woollens would most likely have to be sold at a loss in order to be quickly converted into cash so that orders could be placed with inland suppliers. It was thus very timely for Swequa to land a contract with the Swedes, who could pay in silver coin.[52]

As luck would have it, however, one of the Swedish ships ran aground on 3 September 1761 at the Pratas Islands (Dongsha Qundao 東沙群島) on its way to China. It sank the next day. The crew managed to sail to Macao in service boats. Swequa was spared the agony of this misfortune, because he died on 15 July 1761.[53] The loss of the Swedish ship would have certainly weighed heavily on Swequa's conscience had he been alive at the time.

Because it was common for merchants to arrange secret loans and conduct private transactions that other family members and trading partners knew nothing about, it was often the case that the true financial status of a merchant was not revealed until he went broke or died. We know that Swequa had been shuffling funds around to keep his trade moving forward for at least a decade. The Dutch mentioned that he died insolvent.[54] He was suffering from cash-flow problems for years prior to his death, but he managed to keep things moving forward just enough to avoid bankruptcy.[55]

We do not know the extent of the Jufeng Hang's debt at this time. We will see below, however, that his brother Tjobqua kept the firm afloat by continually arranging more foreign loans. This practice was likely a continuation of what Swequa had been doing all along. For the time being, the house was not considered by Chinese officials to be in serious trouble and was allowed to continue.

The English hoped that Swequa's passing would weaken 'the late ruling party', meaning the leaders of the Co-hong. This factor, combined with the arrival of a new governor general and the constant infighting going on between Co-hong members, raised hopes that the end of the society would soon come about.[56] All of the Europeans were anxious to get rid of it, as were some of the Chinese. They wanted things to go back to how they were before 1760. Swequa tended to side with Poankeequa, and both of them had pushed for the establishment of that mutual organization.

Swequa's brother, Tjobqua, was allowed to continue in the Jufeng Hang, but he was not allowed to hold his brother's administrative position in the Co-hong.[57] As we will see below, Tjobqua voiced strong opposition to that society. He also did not have as much experience as other senior members. These factors probably contributed to his exclusion from the administration.

**TJOBQUA**

Tjobqua's Chinese name was Cai Yuguan 蔡玉官. He was also known as Cai Tinggang 蔡莛(廷)岡 (see stamps on Plates 01.08 and 01.09). He shows up in the EIC records as Yokqua, in French records as Yokua or Jokoa, in SOIC and DAC records as Jauqua, and in VOC records as Tjobqua. Because the first four names are similar to other merchant's names and/or have been confused with other men in previous studies, I will use the Dutch spelling here. In 1762, the Dutch referred to Tjobqua as the 'third brother of the deceased Tswaa Suyqua'. Swequa was the first son and Sequa the second son. It is unclear what happed to Sequa.

Tjobqua does not begin to appear regularly in the records until after Swequa's death (Appendix 1B). He was already well-acquainted with the trade by that time so we can assume that he had been working behind the scenes in the Jufeng Hang. Throughout the 1760s, Tjobqua was classed among the six small merchants who were part of the Co-hong. The others were Chowqua, Consentia Giqua (and son Tiauqua), Monqua, Fat Hunqua (and son Conqua) and Foutia (and brother Kousia).[58]

The small merchants often commented to their foreign patrons how much they hated the Co-hong. Part of their dislike for that organization was because the four large houses ran everything. The smaller houses essentially had no voice in the trade. The smaller men might be asked from time to time what they thought or preferred on certain issues, but then the actual regulating of commerce was left to the four large houses. Of course, the government had to approve the final terms of trade each year before they were enacted.[59]

Like Swequa, Tjobqua catered to the French traders. The Dutch mentioned in July 1767 that he had been securing one of the French ships each year.[60] Most of the French records from the early 1760s have not survived. However, there are many entries in other records that mention Tjobqua being one of their main suppliers.

In September 1762, the Dutch approached Tjobqua to rent his factory once again. He was asking $1,900. The Dutch offered $1,600 and they settled on $1,800. Tjobqua wanted to reserve the apartment in the upper-rear section of the building where Swequa had been living for his clerks and domestic helpers. The Dutch refused Tjobqua's offer because they were afraid these servants would be 'smoking tobacco and cooking tea all day long' which they considered to be a fire hazard.[61]

The VOC officers found out later that Tjobqua had already agreed to sell the building to the Hong merchant Swetia. He was undoubtedly in need of capital to service the debts he had inherited from his brother. Swetia advanced Tjobqua 12,000 taels for the building, with the understanding that he would take possession of it the following year.[62]

The new landlord arrangement made the Dutch somewhat apprehensive about renting the building because it was in need of many repairs. As stipulated in the rental contract in Plate 01.06, it was customary for tenants to make normal repairs to their factories at their own expense. This policy was acceptable so long as the occupants were guaranteed use of those apartments after making the repairs. In the end, Swetia and his partners allowed the Dutch to continue occupying the building for the same rent they had paid Tjobqua ($1,800)—and for as many years as they wanted it.[63]

The Dutch had refused to continue renting the building unless they could also take possession of Swequa's old apartment at the rear. In the end, however, they seemed to have acquiesced, because later we find Tjobqua living in that space. Tjobqua had also 'insisted on having two years' rent in advance' which the Dutch refused. This demand for an advance was probably another sign of his cash-flow problems.[64]

Selling the factory undoubtedly helped Tjobqua, but the money he received was not enough to make a significant difference. He continued to have cash-flow problems. In early January 1763, Tjobqua pleaded with the Dutch to pay him for the Songlo tea he had delivered. He was insistent because his inland supplier was anxiously waiting to be paid. The balance owed to Tjobqua was not large, 4,401 taels, but he had insufficient funds to pay it (or so he implied).[65]

In August 1763, the French officers began spreading news that they were expecting several ships in the year.[66] This must have been reassuring news for Tjobqua. The rumour proved to be correct. From 1763 to 1778, there were usually two or three ships in port each year. In a couple of those years they had as many as six or seven ships in port.[67]

In July 1763, the Dutch reported that the six small merchants had gathered at a local temple to discuss what they could do to end the Co-hong. A ceremonial concoction of blood from two pigs and two goats was mixed together with wine, and each of them drank of it. This was a sacrificial offering and a sign of their sincerity in joining the pact. According to what the Dutch heard, their objective was to force open the trade or to quit it altogether. Tjobqua was appointed their spokesperson. His job was to voice their complaints to the Mandarins.[68]

Unfortunately, we learn nothing more about this pact in the records. However, there are several references that relate to the dispute between the small and large houses in the Co-hong. In 1764, the Dutch recorded the following.

> 1764, Mar 18: Tjobqua wants a much higher price, should he have to contract for Souchon [tea] as he did last year. His is not reliable enough for us to make a deal with him from which disputes might arise afterwards.
>
> . . .
>
> The other small Co-hongists are of the same character as Tjobqua. If we want to do any business with them, we must be able to investigate and take care of it on the spot, otherwise there is nothing to be gained but agreements, for they will rarely keep their word longer than an agreement is profitable to them.[69]

The small houses in the Co-hong were at the mercy of the larger houses. If the latter decided to change the rules, with government approval, then whatever agreements the small men had already made were rendered null and void. This is why

everything had to be agreed on the spot and made binding. Otherwise, it could all change the next time they met. In June 1764, the Swedes also mentioned a dispute between four of the small houses and the Co-hong, which including Tjobqua. The small houses were unhappy with the prices that were set that year.[70]

As I pointed out above, the Co-hong had the government's blessing. It was viewed as a necessity to even out the ups and downs of the trade and, likewise, to protect the revenues sent to Beijing. But in the minds of the small operators, the negative effects that the society had on their trade, with new restrictions placed on what they could and could not do, was intolerable. For the time being, however, the Co-hong was the government's answer to its own problems and nothing the small operators could say or do was going to change that.[71]

In August 1763, the tea that the Dutch had ordered in the off-season arrived early in Canton. Tjobqua pleaded with the Dutch to pay him upfront for the tea. He promised to make delivery (according to his contract) in November—when the ships were ready to receive their cargo. The quality of the tea was found to be acceptable, so the Dutch agreed to pay him as requested. However, they insisted that he pay 2 percent interest per month for the three months that the loan would be outstanding. Tjobqua agreed, and he was handed 8,000 Spanish dollars on 25 August. In the end, the Dutch requested that the tea be delivered earlier (11 September), which meant Tjobqua was responsible for only a few weeks of interest.[72]

Tjobqua obviously had no funds in reserve, which is understandable considering the debt he was left with after his brother died and that no French ships had been in port for several years. He must have been exuberant when the French supercargos began buying tea again in 1763. This was the first clear sign that the trade would resume. By 23 August of that year, the French officers had settled a contract with Tjobqua and other merchants.[73]

When the French officers landed in Canton from Whampoa in September 1763 they brought with them 100 chests of silver coins. Once word got out of all the bullion that had just landed, the Chinese merchants were no longer interested in taking French imports. They only wanted money.[74]

The return of the French ships strained inland supplies. By November, rumours began circulating that one of their ships might have to layover in order to fill out its cargo space.[75] The tea trees were stripped of their leaves so extensively to meet the requirements of the unexpected French ships that many of the trees were destroyed.[76] This must have been an uplifting year for Tjobqua but, unfortunately, no figures have survived. From 1763 to 1770, three or four French ships arrived each year. Tjobqua was now on track again with a steady income.

In March 1764, the Dutch commented that Tjobqua was one of the small merchants who were 'always pressed for cash'. The Dutch used this financial handicap to their advantage by pressuring him to give them better deals in exchange for more cash up front.[77] In May 1764, the Dutch tried to push Tjobqua even further. They had already given him 4½ piculs of nutmeg and 4½ piculs of cloves as a 10 percent advance on the tea he had contracted. The Dutch proposed to pay him the remaining 20 percent advance with spices rather than cash. They also wanted to pay him after

the tea was delivered, rather than upfront. Tjobqua refused the offer.[78] He undoubtedly needed cash and speculating in more spices put him at greater risk.[79]

Tjobqua traded with the English, Swedes, Danes and others in the 1760s. Despite his precarious situation, he still had several sources of income. Tan Anqua (Chapter 5) and some of the inland tea merchants also sold tea to foreigners under his license, for which he received a commission.[80] If those men failed to pay the duties, then Tjobqua would be held responsible.

On 11 November 1764, between 6 and 7 in the evening, a fire broke out at the rear of Tjobqua's factory where he kept his tea. The Danes mentioned that the building was located not far from their factory.[81] The French and English rushed to the scene with their fire engines to help extinguish the flames.[82] Tjobqua had about 80 canisters of Bohea tea in his warehouse at the time, each filled with sixty catties. Thirty canisters of tea were consumed. Disasters such as this were among the risks of trade that often go unmentioned in the history books.[83]

After the Dutch arrived in Canton on 1 July 1767, they discovered that there was a big dispute going on within the Co-hong. The four large houses suggested that in the event that there were fewer ships to arrive than in the previous season then none of the six small operators should be permitted to secure ships. Apparently, certain members of the small houses had purchased a large part of the pepper that the EIC had brought in 1765. Up until this point, however, they had not paid all the duties owed on those imports. The large men who stood security for those ships were held responsible for the duties, but they refused to pay. The Hoppo issued an order stating that no one would be appointed security merchant (fiador) this year until those duties were forthcoming.[84]

The Hoppo also refused to issue permission chops for transport sampans until the money owed had been paid. The repairs that the Dutch had ordered to be done to their factory during the off-season of 1767 had also not been completed. The Chinese carpenters were not allowed to work so long as the unpaid duties were outstanding.[85] The small houses had no money to pay the duties. Eventually, the large men reluctantly solved the matter by paying the duties out of the Co-hong's slush fund. This outcome is why the large houses wanted to ban the small operators from securing ships. Fortunately for Tjobqua, the matter was settled, and he was able to secure his annual French ship.[86]

It was common for Hong merchants to loan money to their patrons even when they were themselves in need of funds. This was another means used to maintain patronage. Plate 01.09 is a bottomry contract between Tjobqua and the SOIC. On 10 January 1763, he gave the Swedish supercargo, Gustaf Gabriel Loodh, 360 Spanish dollars (called 'pesos' in the document) to help finance the return passage of the *Stockholms Slott* to Sweden. Tjobqua was to be repaid when the first Swedish ship brought news of the *Stockholms Slott*'s safe arrival in Gothenburg, which would be about eighteen months later. The document, however, shows that the loan was not paid until 5 February 1768.

Appendix 1D shows the loans Tjobqua received from Swedish supercargos in the years 1764 to 1772. We are fortunate to have these figures because most of the information about private loans has not survived. Tjobqua and his brothers before him were probably borrowing money from foreigners all along for which we have no figures. Most

of the loans in Appendix 1D carried 20 percent annual interest, but a few were at 17 percent and one at 12 percent. Foreigners would often offer loans at lower interest rates in exchange for better terms and prices in trade.[87]

Appendix 1D also shows the loans Tjobqua took out from the Swedes from 1764 to 1770 to finance the voyages of two junks, *Ecktay* 益泰 (Plate 08.08) and *Wansun* 源順. In 1764, he borrowed money from the Swedes to purchase junk cargos. This loan carried 17 percent annual interest. From 1768 to 1770, he took out several bottomry loans. Because bottomry loans also included marine insurance, they carried the higher interest rate of 40 percent per voyage.[88]

The two junks that Tjobqua sponsored made voyages to Cochin China and Batavia. We only have a few figures, but the junk trade seems to have been something the family had been involved in all along. On 10 September 1768, for example, Tjobqua delivered a package to the Dutch that came from Batavia. This packet had been forwarded to him by three Fujian junks that had recently returned from Southeast Asia.[89] Tjobqua would have needed some of the junk imports for his export trade (such as sago to pack porcelain) so it makes sense that he would invest in those vessels.[90]

Plates 01.07 and 01.08 are Bohea tea contracts that Tjobqua made with the SOIC in 1766 and 1767, respectively. Both agreements were made in the off-season. They called for tea to be delivered in October or November of the coming season. The customary advance of 10 taels per picul was paid up front, with the remaining 5 or 5.5 taels per picul to be paid when the teas were delivered. If the tea was not delivered on time, Tjobqua was to pay an indemnity of 2 taels per picul.

As mentioned in the introduction, one of the reasons for establishing the Co-hong was to standardize the advances foreigners paid. The Co-hong set the advance on Bohea tea at 10 taels per picul. All foreigners had to pay the same amount, which was then forwarded to the inland tea men. As we saw above in Swequa's earlier tea contracts, before the Co-hong was established advances were negotiated with each foreign company separately. In the 1750s, it was common to pay 6 taels per picul in advance for Bohea tea, but that amount was not fixed. By negotiating a better price on exports, a different sized picul, an interest free advance (as opposed to an interest bearing advance), a different exchange rate, or a better price on imports, foreigners could increase or decrease the amount of money that had to be put up front. Sometimes Hong merchants were hard pressed and anxious to land any tea contract they could get and might agree to no advance being paid.

After 1760, most these factors were set by the Co-hong. Everyone had to use the same sized picul, the same interest rate, the same amount in advance, the same exchange rate, and the same terms. The advances on Bohea tea contracts were increased to 10 taels per picul. These larger advances are what financed the expansion in production and enabled inland suppliers to finally be able to keep up with demand.

In 1766, Tjobqua contracted Bohea tea with the French. The Dutch mentioned that Tjobqua was the French 'oude debireur' (old debtor), which means he was probably supplying some tea to them without payment in order to reduce his existing debt.[91] Sometimes advances were in the form of earnest money. On 8 February 1763, for example, the Dutch made a verbal contract involving 400 quarter chests of Souchon

tea with Tjobqua. He told the Dutch that he would deliver the 400 chests in the coming season. He assured them that it would be of equal quality to his previous deliveries. The Dutch gave him 2 taels per picul up front as earnest money.[92] If the Dutch did not take the tea, then they ran the risk of losing that money.

It is possible that this contract might have been made secretly and not reported to the Co-hong. On 18 August 1763, for example, the Dutch mentioned that they had secretly contracted some fine tea with Tjobqua in the off-season. They did not elaborate about what kind of tea it was or what they meant by 'secret'.[93]

Normally, advances were required by the Co-hong on tea contracts. On 2 April 1763, Tjobqua contracted 105 chests of Bohea tea with the Dutch, and he received the customary (according the Co-hong's policies) 80 percent in advance.[94] By only requesting 2 taels per picul in earnest money on the Souchon tea contract above, he could secure the sale, and then use that money immediately. Tjobqua apparently did not have any doubts that he would be able to get the good quality Souchon tea, which is, perhaps, an example of his special connections to inland suppliers.

In early 1767, the Dutch mentioned that Tjobqua went to visit his family in Tschin Tchou (Quanzhou). By 25 June he had still not returned. Around that time a controversy arose that implicated the linguists and merchants. It was discovered that a French Jesuit, Le Fevre, who had been expelled from China, had managed to stay illegally in the French factory along with his attendant. Officials in Canton went looking for someone to blame. Tjobqua stood security for one of the French ships but he was not around to question. As a result, the linguists were put in chains, but later released. Tjobqua was fortunate, because by the time he returned to Canton in October, the matter was settled, and he went to work packing tea for the French.[95]

Tjobqua contracted a substantial amount of Congo, Ankay and Bohea tea with the SOIC in 1767 and 1768. He received imported textiles as partial payment.[96] In the previous year, the Swedes mentioned that Tjobqua's Bohea tea was the best.[97] The Swedes were known for their perfect mixture of Akay and Bohea teas, which found a good market in Europe and which the Dutch had tried to emulate.[98] But getting the right tea was essential to getting the right mixture. His reliable sources gave Tjobqua an advantage.

In order to get superior quality tea, Tjobqua needed to have good connections with inland suppliers. In 1763, the Dutch stated that his Songlo tea was the best they had purchased that year. They also mentioned that the reason Tjobqua was able to deliver such excellent Souchon tea was because he and his predecessor, Swequa, had exclusive rights to the tea from a small area that consistently produced excellent leaves. The brothers had reserved a certain amount of this tea each year for the French. This area only produced a few hundred piculs annually, so there was not a lot to go around. The Dutch mentioned that for larger quantities of Souchon or Congo tea, they had to approach other merchants.[99]

Having access to exceptionally good Souchon tea gave Tjobqua an advantage in the trade, but it was not enough to make a big difference. Hong merchants usually traded in low grades of tea as well, and Tjobqua was no exception. On 10 March 1763, the Dutch sampled 400 canisters, which they said would 'pass for very good Bohea tea',

but Tjobqua had another batch of 900 canisters, which was labelled 'very bad'. The Dutch would only consider the latter tea if it was 'exceptionally cheap'.[100]

As I mentioned in the Introduction, Hong merchants were often pressured by foreign companies to take their imports even if they made no profit on them. Plate 01.11 is a letter to the directors of the EIC dated 14 February 1770 from the ten Hong merchants. They asked the company to stop sending such large quantities of curiosities to China 'which the Governament here obleeged the Merchant to buy with their loss'. This is probably a reference to clocks and other novelty items that many of the EIC officers carried to China on their private accounts. Chinese officials were eager to obtain these objects as presents for superiors. They would often pressure Hong merchants to buy them and then offer them at a huge discount or as gifts to the officials. The letter also requested the company stop sending such large quantities of European fabrics to China 'as it is impossible to sell it here and we Merchand will be obliged to refuse buying it'. As previously mentioned, this attempt to manipulate the market at the source (Europe) would probably not have been looked upon kindly if the governor general or Hoppo had found out about it.

By 1769, Tjobqua had built up a debt with the EIC. Before the supercargoes went to Macao in the spring of 1770, he paid them 5,000 taels and agreed to deliver 3,400 piculs of tea in the next season. Despite these efforts he was still 8,061 taels short. Tjobqua (spelled Yokqua) disappears from the English records thereafter. It is unclear what became of the remaining arrears.[101]

Tjobqua sold some tea to the Dutch in 1769, but then that trade also stopped. The poor status of his financial situation then began to emerge. By 1770, Tjobqua was in debt beyond recovery. He had fallen behind on his payments to the Swedes and to other private traders. In 1772, it was revealed that Tjobqua (Jocqua) had borrowed 170,000 Spanish dollars at 20 percent annual interest to keep his trade going (see Plate 01.10). Of this amount, $100,000 was from six Frenchmen, $40,000 from Chinese creditors (probably inland suppliers), and $30,000 from the Swedes.[102] In January 1772, the chief of the French factory, Chevalier Roth, mentioned that Tjobqua was behind to the tune of $26,904 on his payments to the French.[103]

Poankeequa, Ingsia, and Chetqua each became responsible for one-third of Tjobqua's debt to the French. According to government policy, no interest was to be applied to outstanding debts.[104] Practice, however, did not always follow policy. We find in the French records that 20 percent annual interest was applied to the outstanding balance until it was paid. By 1777, Poankeequa had apparently paid off his share, because he no longer shows up in the French records in connection to that debt. As late as 30 December 1779, however, Ingsia and Chetqua were still listed as owing $8,640. Each of them was responsible for one half of this amount and 20 percent interest was still being applied to the balance.[105]

By March 1772, Tjobqua had been declared bankrupt. His debts were distributed to other Hong merchants for repayment. Tjobqua and his domestics were asked to move out of the apartment at the rear of the Dutch factory.[106] The Dutch planned to take over this part of the building at an additional cost of 400 Spanish dollars each year (bringing the total factory rent to $2,200).[107] On 20 September, the Dutch mentioned

that they had taken possession of Tjobqua's apartment.[108] Tjobqua is mentioned briefly again in the VOC records in 1772, but he then disappears.[109]

In May 1772 Tjobqua sold his women's house for 5,000 taels. He used the money to pay the Hoppo's duties that were in arrears.[110] In November, the Swede Jacob Hahr, who had loaned Tjobqua $20,000 at 20 percent annual interest, mentioned that a rumour had been circulating that Tjobqua was very ill and close to death. Hahr asked Poankeequa to help settle his outstanding balance.[111]

Under the governor general's suggestion, Tjobqua joined with Ayau and managed to finish out the 1772 season, albeit under the latter man's name. Tjobqua discounted the tea he delivered to the French by 1 to 2 taels per picul. The transaction reduced the debt he owed to them. Other foreigners, however, would not have anything more to do with him given his precarious financial status. His name disappears from their account books.[112]

In 1775, the Danes mentioned that Tjobqua's house went bankrupt in 1772.[113] On 6 January 1781, the French consul Vauquelin mentioned in a letter that Tjobqua (Yokoa) had been dead for four years. If true, he must have died sometime around 1776.[114] In December 1779, Tjobqua (or Yokqua) is not listed among the debtors owing money to the English. He may have settled that debt before he died.[115]

In a letter dated 8 January 1784, the Swede Olaf Lindahl mentioned that the bankruptcies of Tjobqua (spelled Zey Jauqua) and Tan Coqua put into motion the failure of others, including Cai Hunqua and son Tsjonqua of the Yifeng Hang.[116] In January 1785, French records show that $121,000 was still outstanding on Tjobqua's debt.[117] This amount is larger than the original principle mentioned in 1772 ($100,000), which suggests that the debtors were not keeping up with the interest payments.[118] It is unknown how or when Tjobqua's debts were finally settled. At some point, they were probably divided up and distributed to the hong collective for payment.[119]

## SUMMARY

It was not until new information emerged from the European archives about the Hong merchants that we have been able to piece together the histories of the different branches of the Cai lineage. Swequa and Tjobqua's stories have been particularly difficult to reconstruct. The ambiguities surrounding their names in the foreign records and the fact that previous studies have confused them with other men have complicated the telling of their stories.

By the 1750s, Swequa and Sequa had become regular players in the trade, but they were constantly short of capital. Tjobqua was always classed among the small merchants. The brothers did business with almost every foreign company in Canton, but their main trade was with the French. Swequa's early years are a mystery. It is not until the 1750s that we have clear references showing him trading with the DAC, VOC, SOIC and EIC. The French trade, however, was always the most important.

Depending primarily on one foreign customer was not necessarily a healthy way to carry on trade in Canton. If those ships did not show up, for whatever reasons, then the bulk of the brothers' income vanished. The French were among the most unpredictable

traders in Canton in the eighteenth century. This was partially the result of an unstable political situation in France, financial problems within the various French companies, and wars between Europeans. Consequently, there were no French ships in China from 1746 to 1748, 1757 to 1758, and 1760 to 1762. These years were certain to have been devastating for the Cai brothers.

As early as 1752, there are signs of Swequa having cash-flow problems. Insufficient capital continued to haunt the family business for the next twenty years. Swequa managed to scrape together enough funds to purchase the Dutch factory in 1753. He may have reached the height of his influence and prestige in 1754, when he represented the foreigners in discussions to the governor general but, even then, his financial situation was often characterized as questionable at best and 'pitiable' at worst.

When Swequa died in 1761, Tjobqua was allowed to continue in his place. Tjobqua, however, was burdened from the start with the debts left by his brother. The Dutch found that they had to establish a contract with him on the spot; otherwise he would turn very quickly to the next offer. They attributed this behaviour to an intense need to acquire capital quickly, in order to service debts.

Although he survived another ten years, Tjobqua was never able to get ahead of the game. He remained among the smallest of the Hong merchants. In 1762, he sold the Dutch factory to Swetia to generate funds.[120] Tjobqua borrowed regularly from the Swedes, French and others to finance both his foreign trade and his junk trade to Southeast Asia.[121] He needed some imports from Southeast Asia to carry on his foreign export trade.

Tjobqua was a fairly shrewd negotiator and managed to conduct some trade with each of the foreign companies. He was constantly thinking of ways to get foreigners to advance him more money, and he was fairly successful at accomplishing this goal. He did not give in to foreign pressures easily. Instead, he used all the advantages at his disposal to negotiate very favourable terms.

Tjobqua did his best to encourage the end of the Co-hong. The organization was eventually abolished in early 1771, and he should rightfully be credited for helping bring that about (even though his brother had helped establish it). By this time, the Jufeng Hang was beyond recovery. The many years with few or no French ships and the need to borrow money to service old debts eventually caught up with Tjobqua. He very likely saw this outcome long before it happened, but found no way out. The firm was declared bankrupt in 1772. A few years later, Tjobqua died.

The Jufeng Hang was not the only house that survived for many years under the load of heavy debt. In the next chapter, I discuss another branch of the Cai family, that of Teunqua and Monqua. They operated at the same time as Swequa and Tjobqua, and were also accepted into the Co-hong as small merchants.

CHAPTER TWO

# MONQUA 蔡文官 AND FAMILY 1734–1796

| Relation | Trade Name | Mandarin | Chinese |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grandfather | Tehanqua | Cai Zhaobang | 蔡兆榜 |
| Father | Teunqua | Cai Yongjie | 蔡永接 |
| Son no. 1 | Seequa | Cai Shihong | 蔡世洪 |
| Son no. 2 | Monqua | Cai Shiwen | 蔡世文 |

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter is about Monqua's branch of the Cai lineage. The members of the family whom we know to have been involved in the trade include Tehanqua, Teunqua, Seequa and Monqua. The family was originally from Quanzhou. Very little is known about their business dealings until Teunqua appears in the English East India Company's (EIC) records in the 1730s. In 1759, the British officers mentioned that Teunqua's father, Tehanqua (Cai Zhaobang 蔡兆榜), was the owner of the Yee-ho Hang.[1]

Tehanqua's great grandfather moved to Guangdong Province at some point in the seventeenth century, where he established a residence in Macao.[2] Tehanqua had three sons and one daughter. The only son who shows up in the foreign records trading in Canton was the eldest, Teunqua 永接. Nothing is known about his sister, Xiegu 燮姑, or brothers, Yongfu 永孚 and Yongbing 永炳. Since I have no other information about Tehanqua or the other members of his family, I will begin the story with the eldest son Teunqua.[3]

## TEUNQUA

Teunqua's Chinese name was Cai Yongjie 蔡永接, but he was also known as Cai Chunxing 蔡純興. The name of his business was the Fengyuan Hang 逢源行.[4] Teunqua and/or his father were undoubtedly involved with the Portuguese trade in Macao in the early eighteenth century. Unfortunately, no references have survived about those activities. The earliest information we have for Teunqua being active in Canton are from the 1730s. He may have entered the trade during the shakeup of the merchant ranks in that decade.[5]

From 1734 to 1750, Teunqua appears fairly regularly in the EIC records. We do not have clear references to him in other company records until the 1750s. The small amount of trade that he later conducted with other Europeans suggests that the EIC

may have been Teunqua's main source of income from the beginning. All of the earliest information about him comes from EIC sources.[6]

In 1734, Teunqua sold tutenague and gold to the EIC. On 22 September of that year he delivered 20 ingots (shoes) of gold of 98 touch (98 percent pure) to the company. Other Hong merchants were trading gold this year as well. The amount of gold that Teunqua supplied was just a small percentage of the total exported by the EIC that year. As I have pointed out in the first volume, gold was illegal to export but it was a way for merchants to gain much needed working capital.[7]

In 1735, Teunqua appears again in the EIC records selling tutenague.[8] From 1736 to 1741, he supplied the EIC with tea, porcelain, silk and other commodities. Unfortunately, we have no references to Teunqua for the period stretching from 1743 to 1749. It remains unclear whether this is a result of missing documents, confusion in the names, or whether he was simply absent during those years (Appendix 2A).

As Appendix 2A shows, Teunqua traded with the Swedish East India Company (SOIC) and Dutch East India Company (VOC) in the early 1750s. Only a few financial figures have survived, and they show his transactions to be rather insignificant. He supplied the SOIC with about 6,500 taels worth of Bohea tea in 1752/1753. In 1752, he supplied the VOC with 400 piculs of Bohea tea at 15.5 taels per picul, which totalled 6,200 taels. From 1751 to 1753 Teunqua also sold gold to the VOC, but the exact amounts are unclear. These transactions were presumably rather small.[9]

In their 1753 trade report, the Dutch mentioned that Teunqua (spelled Thee Onqua) was much indebted to the inland gold suppliers. He was in arrears to the Hoppo as well for customs duties he had not paid. Swequa and Cai Hunqua were fiadors (security merchants) for the ships he supplied and were therefore responsible for paying his duties.[10] Teunqua appears in the VOC records almost every year thereafter until his death in 1760. From 1754 onwards, however, the Dutch conducted no trade with him.[11]

As far as the surviving records reveal, the Danes had no trade with Teunqua in the 1750s. In 1755, they ranked the nine top merchants in Canton, and Teunqua (spelled Tounqva) appeared in the seventh position—just after Cai Swequa and before Consentia Giqua.[12] The family business remained in about the same position—comparable with Consentia Giqua's firm up to the early 1760s. Unfortunately, we have no references from the private ships that arrived in Canton from India, so it remains unclear whether Teunqua had any business with them.

Teunqua continued to contract with the EIC throughout the 1750s. On 9 August 1754, the English mentioned that the Hoppo had appointed Teunqua as one of their security merchants. In 1755, he secured the EIC ship *Prince George*. However, the main reason he was granted the trade of this ship was because he was the only person who would contract Bohea tea for a lower price than 17 taels per picul (his final price was 16.5 taels per picul).[13]

The strong demand for Bohea tea in the previous year had pushed prices up. Some of the Hong merchants were very reluctant to contract Bohea for less than 18 taels per picul. Teunqua's eagerness to accommodate the English, when no one else would, is probably a sign of his financial distress. The EIC pressed him on 10 October 1755 to

give them an abatement of 0.5 taels per picul, owing to the tea having 'a larger & more open Leaf'. Teunqua's final price came to 16 taels per picul. Even though the English officers found the tea to be much the same everywhere, owing to the wetness of the season, Teunqua again gave in to their requests.[14]

It turned out well for Teunqua, because fewer ships arrived than expected. Table 2.1 shows that 26 ships arrived in 1753, 27 in 1754, and 23 in 1755. By the end of September 1755, some of the Hong merchants were of the opinion that they might be left with unsold Bohea tea at the end of the season. Chetqua and Cai Hunqua responded by dropping their price to 15 taels per picul.[15] On 11 October 1755 Conscentia Gigua sold 1,000 baskets of Bohea tea to the EIC for 14.7 taels per picul.[16] On 1 November, Poankeequa sold 150 chests of Bohea tea to the EIC at 14.7 taels per picul.[17] Later in November, the EIC managed to outfit the entire cargo of Bohea tea on the ship *Rhoda* at an average price of 14.6 taels per picul.[18] As the entry below reveals, the price of tea continued to drop owing to a glutted market.

> 1756, Jan 17: Since the Departure of most of the Ships for Europe Tea has fallen here in its Value, & contrary to our Expectations or Hopes, there was a larger Quantity left unsold, than either We or the Chinese expected.
>
> This Quantity or some of it the Dutch Supracargoes intended to purchase, but we have had the good Fortune to get it all, at, and under ten Tales the Pecul and there is of it about 12,000 Pec[ul]., We have seen a great deal of this Tea, most of it very good, and the rest very Merchantable, we intend to pack it soon and to adjust the Price of it, at that time according to the Goodness of it, a method we have chozen to prevent paying the same for the Best, and that w$^{ch}$ is inferior.
>
> We flatter ourselves the Company will save by these Purchases at a moderate Computation 5 Tales the Pecul on 16000 Pec[ul]s w$^{ch}$ is more than £ ## 25,000.[19]

Teunqua's speculation in 1755 paid off because the supply was stronger than demand. In April 1756, the English officers calculated that there was an excess of 21,550 piculs of tea left over after the ships had sailed and 15,800 piculs of that total was Bohea.[20] This was enough tea to load three or four ships. Almost all of this leftover tea was sold in the spring at a discount. Teunqua may have started out with the lowest prices, but he ended up receiving more for his tea than the others.

In 1756, Teunqua mortgaged the Yee-ho Hang to the EIC in order to raise funds.[21] He was evidently having cash flow problems. What these foreign sources do not tell us is that Teunqua was financing both of his sons in preparation for the imperial examinations. Besides paying for their sustenance, they needed a full-time tutor. This means that Teunqua was supporting at least three people, besides his wife and daughter, all of whom probably produced no income of their own. Of course, if the sons succeeded in passing the exams, their future prospects of becoming influential and affluent were very good.[22] But as we will see below, the sons ended up working in the family business instead.

I have found no references to Teunqua from 1757 or 1758 so he may have had little trade in Canton during those years. Unfortunately, no references to his Macao trade have survived. His connection to Hongsia (mentioned below) may indicate that

he was investing in the junk trade to Southeast Asia—as his son Monqua later did in the 1760s.

In 1759, Teunqua shows up in the records as someone short on funds. He sold the Yee-ho Hang to Tan Tinqua (Chen Zhenguan 陳鎮官) in order to meet his obligations.[23]

> 1759, Nov 3: Teunqua son to Tehanqua the late owner of Yee-ho-Hong came with Tinqua and paid off the mortgage the Hon^ble^ Company had on the said Hong amounting to Ta^s^: 3000._._. In Consideration of the several Repairs we have made, they agreed to let us live in it until the Chinese New Year, and to continue in it after that Expiration, for one year longer at the Rent of six hundred Tales p annum, they being at no Charge for Repairs. We then deliver'd up Tehanqua's assignment, the Namhoyens Certificate of the assignment, the Writings or Deeds of Yee-ho-Hong, and to M^r^ Flint his acknowledgement that the assignment which was made in his name was for the Company.[24]

According to this source, Teunqua's father, Tehanqua, died shortly before this date (probably 1759). Tehanqua does not appear to have been active in the Canton trade. He may have been involved behind the scenes. From the reference cited above, we see that he was obviously investing in real estate.

In May 1759, Teunqua found a way to engage the EIC again. He introduced the prominent Canton financier Hongsia (spelled Yong-ty-yee) to the English officers. He also proposed a contract in partnership with him. As was pointed out in volume one, Hongsia was one of the major sponsors of the Canton junks and their annual voyages to Southeast Asia. Unknown to the English at the time, Hongsia had actually been suffering from insufficient funds as well. He too had to seek out family members to stand security for his loans. The EIC officers characterized him as 'a man of substance', which was a fair assessment. Teunqua and Hongsia were successful at landing a contract with the EIC for 500 piculs of Bohea tea at 11.5 taels per picul. They received 7 taels per picul in advance.[25]

A Chinese document from 1759 shows Teunqua as one of the ten licensed merchants in Canton.[26] He was one of the smallest and least stable among them. Teunqua was accepted into the Co-hong in 1760. He was asked to pay a 3,000 taels entrance fee. The amount of the fee was based on each man's perceived capacity to trade. Teunqua paid the same amount as Consentia Giqua, which means the two men were still considered to be at about the same level (see above). Both of these men were suffering financial difficulties at the time. Foutia and Tan Hunqua were the only members of the Co-hong who paid smaller entrance fees (2,000 taels each). This ranking gives us an idea of where the merchants themselves felt Teunqua stood amongst them.[27]

The Swedes contracted 1,400 piculs of Bohea tea with Teunqua in early 1760. As was customary, Teunqua received money in advance. When it was time to deliver the tea, however, Teunqua could only produce 500 piculs of very poor quality. The Swedes complained and said they would give Teunqua no more credit. In the meantime, Teunqua became very ill. He died on the evening of 21 November 1760.[28] The Swedes had advanced him 9,000 taels for the 900 piculs of Bohea tea that he had not yet delivered. They had also given him 6,000 taels in advance on a contract for fine

teas and drugs (herbs and medicines).[29] On 21 December 1760, the Dutch reported that the Swedes had finally received the remainder of their goods from Teunqua's house. However, Chinese informants told the Dutch that the Swedes had accepted very poor quality tea in order to close out his account.[30]

The English had also contracted Bohea tea with Teunqua in 1760. Fortunately, by the time of his death, their contract had been fulfilled. The Dutch suspected that, after Teunqua had fallen ill, the EIC had compromised and accepted poor quality tea in order that they too could close his account. Considering Teunqua's precarious financial situation, and his rather poor reputation, it might be asked why he was accepted into the Co-hong. After he died, the Co-hong declared to the foreign community that it would not stand security for Teunqua's arrears. This denial was presumably because Teunqua's contracts had been made before the establishment of that organization. This failure to respond probably accounts for why the Swedes and English were willing to accept whatever merchandise they could get in order to partially fulfil his contracts.[31]

Unfortunately, the records do not provide a good answer as to why Teunqua was accepted into the Co-hong. One explanation could be that, in the first place; because he was a man of few resources, little power and no influence, he would pose no threat to the Co-hong's management. This idea has some merit when we consider that another, more capable man, Tan Tinqua, was barred from that society owing to his opposing opinions and controversial views. Attay and Awue were two others who were also forbidden entrance despite their many years of experience.[32]

Monqua was appointed in his father's place and became responsible for the Fengyuan Hang's debts.

> 1761, Jul 21: Monqua, the late Teunqua's son. Nothing more need be said of him than that he has honorably paid many of his late father's debts & promises to discharge the whole, whenever it shall be in his power. He has not equal merit and capacity with Shi Kinqua but they have both equal merit / or interest / in sincerely wishing the dissolution of the Cong Hong.[33]

According to the family genealogy, Monqua was Teunqua's second son. It is unknown why the first son Seequa was not appointed to succeed him. Seequa appears in later years helping Monqua behind the scenes.[34] Because we know little about Seequa, I turn now to a discussion of Monqua.

## MONQUA

Monqua's Chinese name was Cai Wenguan 蔡文觀. He was also known as Cai Shiwen 蔡世文. In the early 1780s, he changed the name of his business to Wanhe Hang 萬和行. Throughout the 1760s Monqua operated as one of the six small (junior) Hong merchants within the Co-hong. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the junior merchants did not like the restrictions placed on them by that organization. For the time being, there was nothing they could do about it.

Monqua continued to depend on the EIC for most of his trade (Appendix 2B). Unfortunately, we do not have figures to show the volume of business he might have handled with the English. In 1762 and 1765, he had a small amount of trade with

the VOC (Appendix 2D). In 1764, he landed a small tea contract with the French company. In 1766 and 1767 he also had some trade with the SOIC (Appendix 2B). Monqua had apparently regained the Swedes' confidence after the unfortunate incident with his father in 1759. With each of these companies—except the EIC—these transactions were not large. They amounted to anywhere from 100 to 500 piculs of tea per company per year. This volume was similar to what his father had traded in the early 1750s.[35]

Monqua also invested in the junk trade to Southeast Asia. Appendix 2E shows the bottomry loans he took out from the Swedish supercargos to finance junk voyages from 1764 to 1769. These Swedish references are the only ones that have survived, but Monqua and his father were probably active in this trade all along.

Monqua regularly sponsored about ten different Canton junks. They sailed to Cochin China, Cambodia, Siam, Conghau, Passiack and Batavia (Appendix 2E). One of the junks he financed was the *Samkonghing* (*Sanguangxing* 三廣興), which is shown in Plate 03.01.[36] This junk operated out of Poankeequa's Dafeng Hang (Chapter 3). All of Monqua's bottomry loans with the Swedes carried the customary 40 percent interest per voyage. If the junks returned safely, then Monqua had to repay the loans with interest a month or two after their arrival. The delay gave him time to sell part of the cargos to pay off the loans. If the vessels did not return and were lost at sea, then he paid nothing. This was the insurance part of the loan. As I show in Chapter 3, the *Samkonghing* was lost at sea in 1772. If Monqua continued to sponsor that junk as he had done each year from 1765 to 1769, then he would have suffered from the loss of the vessel. The junk trade is another one of the grey areas in history, which affected Hong merchants' profitability, but for which very little information has survived.

One of the entries in Appendix 2E was not a bottomry loan, but rather an outright business loan. It was for three months at 1 1/3 percent interest per month (or 16 percent per year). This money was used to outfit one of the junks. There was no worst-case insurance connected to this loan, so it was issued at a lower interest rate.[37] The going rate for a business loan of this nature was 20 percent per annum, which means this short term loan at 16 percent may have been given to him as a favour from the Swedes.

Appendix 2F shows other loans that Monqua took out from the Swedish supercargos from 1766 to 1769 to finance his foreign trade in Canton. These were business loans that carried no insurance, and therefore were set at 20 percent interest per annum. The amounts of these loans were not large, ranging from 280 taels to a couple thousand taels. Monqua was likely borrowing money from other foreigners as well, for which we have no details. It is not until the 1790s that other references emerge to reveal the private loans that he was taking out each year with foreign investors (see below).

There is one very curious entry in the Swedish records concerning Monqua's father. In a letter dated 2 February 1764, the Swedish supercargo Grill mentioned to his colleague Grubb that he was expecting to receive a 'Certificat' [certificate, perhaps a declaration?] from Monqua stating that Grubb had not received any money from the Swedes to pay for his father's funeral.[38] Monqua's father, of course, died three years earlier, so this was apparently a reference to his reburial. I have found no other

entries to this matter in the Swedish or other European records. The entry suggests that Monqua was trying to collect donations from foreigners to help finance the funeral. It was common to rebury relatives several years after they had died and to place their remains in a new grave. These funerals could be very elaborate and expensive, so it was not unreasonable to solicit donations from persons who had known his father. The extra money would allow Monqua to arrange the best burial possible, and thereby pay proper respects to his deceased father.[39]

Like his father, Monqua also traded in contraband. By the 1760s, the gold trade had declined considerably. Opium began to take its place as an item that could produce quick profits.[40] In 1765, Monqua purchased 1,119 catties (ca. 11 piculs) of opium from the private English trader Captain Joseph Jackson.[41] Some of the opium in the 1760s was brought from India on the private accounts of the Swedish supercargos. The Swedes were also involved in this same transaction with Jackson.[42] These men were the same persons who were loaning money to Monqua to help finance his trade. The EIC surgeon Thomas Arnot was also involved in these opium transactions.[43]

We know that Monqua used opium (mentioned below), so some of the drugs could have been intended for his personal use. However, the amount of 11 piculs suggests that some of it was intended for resale. Other Hong merchants were speculating in the drug at this time as well (such as Chetqua's family).[44]

Throughout the 1760s, the EIC continued to be Monqua's main source of income. Unfortunately, we have no total figures. In June 1765, the Dutch mentioned that he was 'a man who owes everything he has and ever will have to the English'.[45] This statement may be true, but in the late 1760s, he began to gain some ground with other companies. As noted above, Monqua did a few thousand taels worth of business with the VOC in 1762 and 1765. In 1768, he supplied over 13,000 taels worth of goods to the Dutch (Appendix 2D).

In 1764, Monqua made a small transaction with the Danish Asiatic Company (DAC). From 1765 to 1767 his trade with the DAC expanded to circa 20,000 taels each year (Appendix 2C). Plate 02.01 is a tea contract Monqua made with the DAC in March 1766, for 1,100 piculs of Bohea tea. Plate 02.02 is another DAC contract he made in July of that year for silk fabrics.

Plate 02.03 is a tea contract Monqua made with the SOIC in 1767. If we compare it with the DAC contract above (Plate 02.01 and Appendix 9), we gain insights into his business. On the surface, it appears as though he may have been favouring the Swedes with a lower price for tea but this assumption is not necessarily correct. Both of Monqua's contracts (Plates 02.01 and 02.03) were for first grade Bohea tea. They both stipulate how the tea was to be packed, and state that the chests were to be delivered in the coming season to the ships at Whampoa Free on Board (FOB). The Swedes agreed to pay 15.5 taels per picul, and they gave Monqua the customary 10 taels per picul in advance at the time the contract was signed (10 March). They used an exchange rate of 1 piaster (Spanish dollar) to 0.74 taels.

The Danes agreed to pay a higher price of 17.5 taels per picul, but would not pay the customary 10 taels per picul until the first DAC ship arrived (around August). The Danes would pay for the tea with silver coins of 94 touch (94 percent silver). The

exchange rate is not mentioned, but at this time the Danes typically used a rate of 1 piaster to 0.72 taels.[46] In both contracts, the remaining balance was due after the tea was delivered (November or December).

The 2 taels difference in price between Monqua's contract with the Swedes and the Danes, for the same type of tea, is not necessarily an indication that one company paid more than the other. There was a 3 percent difference in the exchange rates between the two companies (1 piaster to 0.72 taels or 0.74 taels). After making that adjustment, we find that the Swedes were actually paying 16 taels per picul (using the Danish exchange rate of 0.72 taels per piaster) which means there was a 1.5 taels difference in price. The DAC contract was for 1,100 piculs, which means they were paying 1,650 taels more than what the Swedes were paying for the same amount of tea.

In order to arrive at the *real* price, we need to take into consideration the 10 taels advance that the Swedes paid Monqua in March. The Danes paid the money five months later. At a usury rate of 3 percent per month, five months interest on 11,000 taels comes to exactly 1,650 taels. This may seem like a high rate of interest but, in March 1766, the Danes made another contract with Chetqua for the same amount of tea also without an advance. In that transaction they paid 4 percent interest per month—or 48 percent annually.[47]

As I pointed out in the first volume, when we compare prices between companies the raw numbers do not tell the whole story.[48] Part of the 1,650 taels that the Danes paid to Monqua would have been used for the additional packing and labour costs. The Danes used a standard of 275 catties of tea per chest, whereas the Swedish standard was 320 catties per chest (as shown in Plate 02.03).[49] Because the Swedes packed 45 more catties of tea into each chest, they could get by with fewer chests and less labour to pack them. For example, in Plate 02.01 the Danes needed 400 chests to pack 1,100 piculs of tea. The Swedes only needed 344 chests to pack the same amount of tea. Thus, another reason for the Danes paying a higher price for their first grade Bohea tea was the need for an additional 56 chests.

Monqua also had to supply additional lead lining for those extra chests, additional labour to pack them, and possibly additional transport costs to send them to Whampoa (with more customs fees to pay at each of the toll houses). Without having all the data in hand, there is no way to arrive at the *actual* overall prices for Danes and Swedes. This means that we cannot judge Monqua's (or any other merchant's) actions, strategies, preferences or prejudices simply by citing the different prices they charged in dealing with foreign companies. All of these factors help to explain how complicated it was for Monqua to negotiate the terms of the contracts.

During the 1767 trading season, Monqua experienced a couple of catastrophes. One of the junks he had invested in, the *Eckhing*, returned from Cochin China, but caught fire while anchored at Canton. The fire began on the morning of 1 November, at 10 o'clock. The Europeans rushed to the scene with their water pumps (called 'fire engines'). Despite their efforts, *Eckhing* continued to burn and by 5 o'clock in the afternoon all three masts had fallen. With the tide coming in, it was feared that the burning vessel would drift away from its anchor, so it was towed a safe distance away from the city. The junk burned the entire night until nothing of value was left.[50]

Monqua had taken out bottomry insurance on this junk (Appendix 2E), but that protection only covered losses that occurred during the voyage. After the junk returned to port the bottomry bond expired. If anything happened to the vessel or cargo while at anchor at Canton, it was not covered by this insurance. Whatever portion of the vessel and/or cargo that belonged to Monqua was his loss to bear alone.[51]

Unfortunately, this was not the end of Monqua's troubles. At about 6 o'clock in the evening of 10 December 1767, a fire swept through Monqua's factory. It destroyed the Bohea and Ankay tea that he had on hand. Monqua's building was close to the Danish factory. The Danes went to work moving their chests of silver, account books and trade papers into sampans in case the fire should spread to their building. After the sampans were at a safe distance offshore, the Danes joined the other Europeans with their water pumps in helping Monqua put out the flames. The fire raged for a couple hours but was finally extinguished at 11 o'clock in the evening.[52]

The 275 piculs of Bohea tea that Monqua was to pack for the Danes (in the 100 empty chests) were completely consumed by the flames. That loss alone amounted to about 4,800 taels, without considering the damage to the building, the loss of the empty tea chests and other merchandise he had on hand. The Dutch stated that he lost 900 chests of Bohea Ankay tea in the fire, which would put his loss at upwards of 40,000 taels. As Plate 02.03 shows, Monqua had contracted 800 piculs of Bohea tea with the SOIC, and he likely had other tea on hand for the EIC, so the Dutch estimate seems more likely.[53]

Fires always presented a problem because not only was there a loss of products and damage to buildings, but Monqua still had to fulfil his contracts. He had to buy up tea quickly to replace the burnt stock. When catastrophes such as a fire struck, the prices of tea often rose rapidly owing to strong demand. Merchants had to stick to the same prices as stipulated in their contracts, despite the fact that their original stock had been lost. This meant that merchants sometimes had to buy tea at higher prices than what they were selling it for, which of course produced more losses. Of course, Monqua's factory was now unusable, so he had to find other space to pack his exports.

I have found no information about where Monqua got his replacement tea. Within a couple days of the fire, he was packing tea chests again for the DAC. Conqua (Chen Shiji 陳世積), who was a fellow sufferer in the loss of the *Eckhing*, provided Monqua with space in his factory to finish out the season.[54]

The dissolution of the Co-hong in 1771 and rise in competition that followed led to the failures of Tjobqua (Chapter 1), Wayqua (Ni Hongwen 倪宏文) and Tiauqua (Ye Chaoguan 葉朝官). Their debts were redistributed to the remaining Hong merchants, including Monqua.[55] In order to cope with the added debt load and the increased competition that emerged after the Co-hong was dismantled, Monqua joined in partnership with Chowqua (Appendix 2D).

As is mentioned above and shown in Appendix 2A, Monqua's father Teunqua had been much involved in the porcelain trade. As far as the data in Appendix 2B reveal, however, Monqua seems to have shied away from that trade. Plate 08.11 shows porcelain being unloaded and carried into one of the Fengyuan warehouses along the river, but it is unclear what period this painting might represent. It is obviously before

Monqua changed the name of the firm to Wanhe in the early 1780s. He may have traded porcelain with some of the small private traders, but tea and silk seem to have been the main products that he sold to the East India companies.

It was not until the end of the Co-hong that the English began to record the exact shares that they had granted to each of the Hong merchants. Even though they did not list these figures for every year, the existing numbers give us a glimpse of Monqua's trade with that company. From 1771 to 1776, Monqua was granted a 1/8th share. This translated into him securing one EIC ship each year.[56] In 1777 and 1778, Monqua was granted 1/4th share.[57] In the former year, he secured two EIC ships but in the latter year he only secured one ship.[58]

Beginning in 1775, the English began recording with more regularity the merchants who secured each of their ships. From 1777 to 1785 Monqua secured one or two ships each year. In 1784, he was only granted 1/16th of the EIC trade. However, the number of EIC ships arriving each year was gradually growing (with some up and down years). He had a smaller share than previously, but the whole pie was now much larger.[59]

In 1774, the EIC decided that for each share of its woollens that merchants purchased, they would be granted a contract for 1,000 piculs of Bohea tea.[60] We know that Monqua was usually allotted 1 share of woollens each year so he sold at least 1,000 piculs of tea to the EIC.[61] He had other trade with the EIC as well.

The figures for Monqua's trade with the VOC from 1762 to 1792 are shown in Appendix 2D. In 1771, and again from 1775 to 1778, he supplied VOC cargos in partnership with Chowqua. At the bottom of Appendix 2D, I have added one-half of the joint trade to Monqua's individual trade in order to come up with an estimate of what he normally handled each year. From 1762 to 1792, he supplied an average of 14 percent of the annual Dutch cargos. In the late 1770s, he and Chowqua supplied from 15 to 27 percent of the cargos. Then from 1779 to 1792 Monqua conducted all of his trade with the VOC in his individual account. He supplied anywhere from 14 percent of the total cargos each year to as much as 24 percent. By this time, he was clearly one of the major players in trade.

When analyzing these figures, however, we need to keep in mind that one of the reasons Monqua was granted more Dutch trade was because he took over failed merchants' shares. This takeover made him responsible for the debts of those houses. One example is Wayqua, who was Monqua's nephew. After Wayqua went broke in the early 1770s, Monqua took over some of his shares and became partially responsible for the repayment of his debts. As late as May 1777, 11,000 taels of Wayqua's arrears were still outstanding. Wayqua's younger brother and Monqua were ordered to pay 6,000 taels of the balance. As punishment for not settling the debt sooner, the emperor ordered that the remaining 5,000 taels had to be paid forthwith by local officials including the governor general, governor, provisional commissioners, magistrates, and county and district officials. These men, of course, would, in turn, squeeze the Hong merchants to cover that expense.[62]

On 8 February 1773, a fire broke out in the factory area. About 430 homes were destroyed, including many surrounding Monqua's factory. Several of the foreign factories

were damaged. Shy Kinqua and Kousia lost their warehouses in the fire. Monqua was very fortunate to have survived this disaster.[63]

By early 1775, several of the Hong merchants were very unhappy with the intense level of competition that had emerged after the Co-hong was abolished and was partially responsible for the three bankruptcies mentioned above. They were considering establishing another Co-hong to set prices as previously and thus provide more security to their trade. The English suspected that Monqua and Ingsia were behind this initiative. On 2 June 1775, Monqua arrived in Macao and told the resident Danish supercargo that a new Co-hong was going to be formed. By August, however, it was made clear that the Mandarins would not allow it.[64] As the next chapter will show, discussions about forming a new Co-hong continued into 1776. Poankeequa was actively involved in these initiatives.

From 1776 onwards, Monqua joined together with Chowqua, Ingsia and Tan Tinqua to buy up as much of the Dutch imports as they thought they could reasonably sell. This arrangement was similar to what the Dutch had done in the 1760s. In those years they contracted imports and exports with the same group of merchants as a consortium. In this new arrangement, Monqua and his partners contracted for imports as a group. The exports, however, were agreed upon separately under each individual account and not as a group. This practice was very different from the way the Dutch traded in the 1760s.[65]

On 8 February 1777, another fire broke out that threatened Monqua's business. At 3 o'clock in the morning, the flames spread and moved towards the west end of the quay. The fire moved past most of the European factories, and then headed towards Monqua, Chowqua and the Danish factories. With the aid of water pumps, foreigners and Chinese managed to stop the fire at a tollhouse that lay between their buildings. This fire consumed between 300 and 340 shops and houses. Monqua, Chowqua and the Danes were very fortunate to have escaped.[66]

Monqua suffered from another debt crisis that emerged in 1778 and 1779. A couple of large houses failed and their debts were redistributed to the surviving merchants. In 1778, Monqua was handed a portion of Coqua's (Chen Keguan 陳科官) debts. This failure was followed the next year by the collapse of Ingsia and Kousia (Zhang Tianqiu 張天球) firms.[67] It was not long thereafter that Monqua began to fall behind on his payments. In March 1778, the Dutch listed Monqua as one of four merchants who were indebted to both the French and English.[68]

In order to help Monqua service the debts owed to the VOC, the Dutch supercargoes awarded him a greater portion of their trade. This means that part of the cargos shown in Appendix 2D was supplied without receiving a payment. These exchanges were a direct charge against his profits.

All of the companies tended to tie the repayment of old debts to promises of future trade. In 1778, for example, before dividing up the trade shares, the EIC officers suggested to the Hong merchants that each of them accept a part of Coqua's debts as a condition of being allotted a representative part of the company's trade. Monqua responded as follows.

> 1778, Sep 26: The Merchants having been previously summoned we desired their final determination about the debt due to the Hon'ble Company from Coqua and proposed to them that each should pay a proportion thereof, and discharge it in two years to this they would not by any means consent, but judged it would be a much more eligible means for the person who took the share of our business which had formerly been allotted to Coqua should take the whole debt upon himself to pay in two years to this we acquiesced and accordingly asked Munqua whether he was willing to continue to hold this part of the woollens on those terms or would rather chuse [choose] to give it to some other merchant many of whom were eager to get it. He desired until the next day to consider of it when he promised to give his answer.

Monqua accepted their proposal 'to pay Coqua's debt on having his share of the woollens continued next year'.[69] Monqua would not have been allotted any of Coqua's trade unless he had agreed to assume a part of his debts. The usual way of repaying debts was to supply a certain amount of tea without payment.

We do not know the exact financial status of Monqua, but from all the information presented so far, he seems to have been operating in the red from when he took over the business from his father in 1760. By taking on Coqua's debt and assuming his trade, Monqua probably hoped that his situation might soon improve. He would have been well aware that, by taking advantage of this opportunity, it could end with his debt growing even larger. This possible outcome is probably why he needed time to think it over. In the end, however, the choice was obvious. If he did not accept the EIC's proposal, his financial situation would likely grow worse.

From at least 1778 until his death in 1796, Monqua was making annual payments on the previous debts of failed houses, including the Yifeng and Guangshun Hangs. Some of this money was owed to the VOC.[70] In 1785 the Hoppo ordered Monqua and his partners to pay a portion of the debt owed to the Dutch in four annual instalments.[71]

In 1779, the English supercargoes mentioned that Monqua 'owes money which would embarrass him to pay immediately; but which it is believed he can in a very little time discharge'.[72] The foreign companies knew he was carrying a heavy debt load. The amount he owed to private foreigners in 1780 was said to be 158,451 dollars (ca. 114,085 taels). This total had built up over the years and was a continuation of what he had been borrowing from foreigners since at least the 1760s (Appendixes 2E and 2F). In the eyes of the government, however, Monqua was still considered to be 'solvent' (meaning he could still keep his creditors at bay). He proposed settling his debts with the English over three years. This gesture helped to maintain their confidence, and resulted in his trade increasing.[73]

In 1779, Monqua also contracted with the Swedish and Imperial companies.[74] The Danish ledgers are missing from 1773 to 1781, which is why there are no figures from those years in Appendix 2C. Other Danish records show Monqua supplying them with cargo almost every year (Appendix 2B). Meanwhile, his trade with the VOC continued as well.

The Chinese, Dutch and Danish records show Monqua still trading out of the Fengyuan Hang up to at least 1779 (Appendix 2B).[75] At some point in the early 1780s,

he changed the name of his business to the Wanhe Hang. The first reference we have to that firm is in a Dutch declaration dated 22 August 1786. Monqua used the seal of the Wanhe Hang to stamp this document.[76] From this time forward, the name Fengyuan Hang no longer appears in the surviving records.

Monqua's trade with the Dutch expanded considerably in the 1770s (Appendix 2D). It grew from around 20,000 taels per year in the early 1770s to 158,000 taels in 1780. From 1781 to 1783, several Dutch ships failed to arrive owing to a war with the English, so Monqua's trade declined. The EIC trade dropped in 1782, with only six ships in China when there were eleven in 1781 and fifteen in 1783.[77]

The decline in the EIC and VOC trade in the early 1780s probably had a negative impact on all of the Hong merchants—especially Monqua. These two European companies had been his main sources of income. Not only was his trade much reduced, but it also resulted in another Hong merchant, Tsjonqua of the Yifeng Hang, going bankrupt. Monqua was, in turn, handed a portion of those debts to repay.[78] By 1784 his Dutch and British trade had resumed, but he still had to make up for the losses he suffered in slow years.

In January 1781 Captain Montgomerie of the EIC ship *Besborough* accused Monqua's servants of stealing sandalwood during its shipment from Whampoa to Canton. By the time the wood arrived on board, there was a deficiency of 19 piculs. Monqua recovered 16 piculs of the missing wood, and he had those under his employ who had stolen it put into prison. The other 3 piculs were not recovered. Captain Montgomerie later sent a letter of protest to the EIC committee in which he requested that the owners of his ship not be charged with this deficiency.[79]

The EIC committee decided in Monqua's favour, and did not ask him to pay for the missing 3 piculs. He had done his best to recover the sandalwood, and that was enough. Moreover, it was the responsibility of the ship captains to ensure that these transport boats were sufficiently guarded with four to five trustworthy men.[80] If theft occurred en route, these foreign guards should rightfully bear some of the blame. If this affair had been reported to the Hoppo, however, Monqua would probably have been held responsible for the full amount.

In June 1782, the Hoppo appointed five new Hong merchants to replace those who had failed. He also issued a decree stating that no other merchants but the customary three—Monqua, Chowqua and Tsjonqua—could trade with the Dutch. This was done to prevent any new men from grabbing shares of their Dutch trade. Monqua and the other two men needed those revenues to pay the debts of the failed houses of the Guangshun and Taihe Hangs.[81] This example shows that even though it often appears in the historical records that Hoppos were constantly draining merchants of their capital, they also initiated policies, from time to time, to protect merchants' incomes. While this was probably a welcomed gesture, there was nothing the Hoppo could do about the Dutch ships failing to arrive in the early 1780s.

In January 1783, Monqua asked the EIC for an additional advance of 10,000 taels. The English officers discovered that the decline in trade during the past two years had resulted in Monqua not being 'able to pay the share of his debt ordered by government'.[82] The English feared that without the company's help he would be 'a

ruined man'. If the inland merchants found out that he no longer had credit with the Europeans, they would likewise stop advancing him tea. In order to ensure he did not fail, the EIC increased his share of their trade from two ships per year to three ships. In 1784, his share of the EIC trade was set at 1/16th. After Poankeequa died in 1788, Monqua was appointed head of the Hong merchants. The EIC then increased his share to 2/16ths.[83]

In August 1783, the Danes mentioned that Monqua was on rather weak footing.[84] He had now joined 'in company' with Howqua (spelled Hauqua, Lin Shimao 林時懋). This man had previously worked for Poankeequa and was rumoured to be of some wealth (see Chapter 3).[85] With Howqua now joining the firm, the Danes thought it would help Monqua's status.[86] The partnership only lasted one year, however, because Howqua became a Hong merchant in 1784.[87] It should be mentioned here that Monqua also had a writer (secretary) from at least 1774 to 1787 whose name was spelled similarly to Howqua. He was a different person from Monqua's partner in 1783 (see Appendix 2G).

Being a Hong merchant, Monqua was involved in the system called 'truck' whereby he was forced to accept foreign imports even though he might not make any profits from them. I showed an example of this in the previous chapter, when the ten Hong merchants wrote a letter to the EIC directors in 1770, asking them to reduce the amount of fabrics the ships carried to China. Monqua's name is also on that letter (Plate 01.11). In 1784, we have another example. Monqua sold 2,000 piculs of pepper that he had purchased from the VOC to the Portuguese in Macao. The Portuguese, in turn, carried the spices to Lisbon, where they were sold. The reason he gave for selling the pepper in Macao was because there was little prospect of a profit in China that year.[88] If Monqua wanted a contract with the VOC, he had to take their pepper as partial payment and at the company's prices.

Monqua had a very good year with the DAC in 1786, trading just under 200 thousand taels. This was his last year with the Danes (Appendix 2C). From 1786 to 1789, his Dutch trade had expanded dramatically to over 300 thousand taels per year. In 1790, Monqua traded 89 thousand taels with the VOC. In 1791, he traded over 150 thousand taels and, in 1792, more than 250 thousand taels. These up and down years were very difficult for merchants because debt payments remained the same each year, but income could change drastically. Monqua had no trade with the Dutch after 1792 (Appendix 2D).

On 5 September 1786, Chowqua reported to the Dutch in Canton that Monqua would not be able to keep his appointment with them as planned. He had been called to Whampoa to investigate the apparent transferring of some pepper and other merchandise from one of the private English ships to another without permission—and without paying duties. The Dutch did not specify, but Monqua must have secured one of the private English ships this year, which made him responsible for the duties owed. The ship, under Captain Jamison's command, was about ready to sail for Manila to pick up another load of rice. Under the circumstances, he was not allowed to leave until the matter was settled. We do not know the outcome, except that the Dutch reported on 7 September that Captain Jamison had set sail and left Whampoa bound for Manila. This incident undoubtedly cost Monqua a considerable sum.[89]

In January 1787, another altercation occurred between Monqua and the Hoppo. It was customary every year for the Hong merchants to contribute an amount of money to the local temple to insure the continuance of peace and prosperity. On the 15th of that month, the Hoppo discovered that Monqua had declined the request this year, with the excuse that he had already paid a good sum. If he paid any more, he would allegedly run further into debt. The Hoppo was very displeased with this reply and put a stop to the trade until Monqua's 'donation' was forthcoming.[90]

Later in 1787, Monqua suffered a couple of additional setbacks. In August, the emperor requested the Hong merchants to contribute to the cost of sending troops to Taiwan. Each of the eight Hong merchants was asked to pay 40,000 taels or more to raise a sum of 400,000 taels to finance the military campaign.[91] The trade was halted until the contributions were forthcoming. The merchants were required to pay the money in sycee silver. On 20 August, Chowqua and Geowqua approached the Danes and asked if they could send silver dollars to Canton. The two men needed the dollars to exchange for sycee silver ingots and thereby pay the emperor.[92] On 22 August, Poankeequa requested the EIC committee to advance the eight merchants twenty chests of silver dollars, which was to be divided between them.[93] These dollars were either melted down or exchanged for sycee silver, so that the men could pay the emperor.

Meanwhile, a private English captain, Larkins, had suffered a loss in 1787 which the Hong merchants were asked to pay for. Larkins had shipped 5,204 piculs of raw cotton from his ship at Whampoa to Canton. But when the bales were landed on the quay, there were 731 piculs missing. After further investigation, it was discovered that several bales had been opened en route and some cotton had been stolen. After the theft, the bags were sewn up tightly again so that they appeared to be intact. Upon learning of the incident, the Hoppo made the Hong merchants responsible for Larkins's loss of 8,000 dollars. Monqua's share came to 500 Spanish dollars.[94] Although this was not a large sum, it is yet another example of the endless exactions that Hong merchants had to endure.

Being the head merchant also meant being a target for government 'contributions'.[95] Those additional costs were supposedly balanced with increased shares of trade (which was somewhat determined by the Hoppo). However, no one could provide assurance that the same number of ships would arrive each year. There was no way to be certain, from one year to the next, that Hong merchants would generate enough income to meet their obligations.

The reduction in the trade resulted in a string of failures. In early 1790, Eequa (Wu Zhaoping 吳昭平) failed and was exiled to Ili as punishment for his unpaid debts. Monqua was ordered by the emperor to repay a part of those arrears. Eequa's outstanding balance was said to be 283,300 taels, and it was scheduled to be settled in six instalments over five years.[96]

By 1791, Monqua had made considerable progress with his debt payments, but he still owed money to the VOC. Plate 05.01 is a declaration dated 12 September 1791 signed by Monqua, Geowqua and Locqua stating that they agreed to settle the Dutch debt by the end of the 1791 season. Later that year, Monqua, Locqua and Geowqua

were made responsible for paying Pinqua's debt to the VOC. Monqua's share was about 11 thousand taels, which was to be discharged in three instalments over three years.[97]

Monqua's former partner, Chowqua, whose house was now under the management of his son Locqua, failed in 1792. The firm was closed the following year. By the end of 1793, Shy Kinqua (Shi Zhonghe 石中和) was also deeply in debt and declared bankrupt the next year. Their assets were liquidated to pay the duties that were in arrears. The debts that remained were distributed to the hong collective—of which Monqua received a share.[98]

These were not the only problems Monqua faced. In 1792, the emperor requested another 300,000 taels from the Hong merchants to help finance the military campaign against the Gurkhas. Ch'en has shown that the War of American Independence (1779–1785) drained the EIC of silver coin. From this time forward, the Company initiated a policy of forbidding, or greatly restricting, the shipment of silver coin to China. In place of silver, Chinese merchants were pressured to accept more English imports (especially raw cotton from India) in exchange for their tea contracts. This practice deprived the merchants of much needed working capital and put them at greater risk.[99]

Later in 1792, the Hoppo appointed four new Hong merchants to replace those who had failed. One of them was Mowqua, who had been working in Monqua's house. Hoppos often selected persons out of the existing houses, which depleted them of valuable staff. There was nothing the Hong merchants could do about this commissioning of their employees.[100] Other houses were weakened because of these appointments as well.[101]

On 27 April 1793, an order from the emperor was received in Canton stating that two merchants and two linguists should be sent to accompany the Macartney embassy to Beijing. In July 1793, Monqua and Geowqua were summoned to Ningbo to greet Lord Macartney and escort him to Beijing. Monqua did not want to go. He asked the Dutch to send a letter to the governor and the Hoppo requesting that he and Geowqua be allowed to stay behind to take care of the Dutch business. The Dutch complied and wrote two letters in French to the Chinese officials. As noted above, Monqua had no trade with the VOC at the time, so this was just a favour to him. On 15 May, Monqua went to Macao to plead with the English to help in the matter. In the end, both men were exempted from having to accompany the ambassador.[102]

Monqua may have escaped from having to accompany the Macartney mission but he was asked to contribute to a Dutch embassy a couple years later. Plate 02.04 is a declaration from March/April 1796 signed by five of the Hong merchants, including Monqua. The document states that they agreed to pay the port fees and import duties of the ship carrying the Dutch ambassador Isaac Titsingh. The amount was split between them and was not large, 8,533 taels. It is, however, another example of the many burdens Monqua and his colleagues were asked to endure.

With all of these responsibilities and debts piled on Monqua's shoulders; with the many failures of relatives, friends and colleagues; and with the enormous difficulties he faced in procuring enough silver to finance his trade, Monqua's future looked very bleak. Ch'en mentions that, at some point in the late 1780s or early 1790s, he tried to commit suicide. As it happened, he survived for a little while longer.[103]

In the early 1790s, Monqua was frequently ill and his brother Seequa took over the management of his affairs. Sometime around October 1794, Monqua's mother died. He was excused from joining the other merchants in greeting the new Hoppo upon his arrival.[104] After Monqua returned, he had to deal with the settling of Shy Kinqua's debts.[105]

The Wanhe Hang was now about half a million taels in debt. On 13 October 1796, the EIC recorded his debt to be about 128 thousand taels to that company, 100 thousand taels to private Europeans, and an additional 270 thousand plus taels to inland suppliers.[106] There was no easy way out for Monqua. Up-country merchants and other creditors became very persistent in demanding payment. In a final act of desperation, Monqua ate a quantity of opium and ended his life in the early morning of 10 April 1796.[107] He was found lying dead in his bed.[108]

The following entries from the EIC records explain how Monqua's house was to be managed thereafter so that the emperor's duties would be paid and secondly so that his properties would not be plundered by anxious creditors.

> 1796, Apr 10: Munqua the senior Hong merchant died suddenly this morning about 2 o'clock he has been some time complaining but whether his death was occasioned solely by his disorder or been hastened by violent means is uncertain, but the latter is we understand strongly suspected. His affairs have been for some time in a very embarrassed state, but as he received great assistance from his friends particularly Mowqua in the payment of his duties, & had contracted for the sale of his woollens, and the purchase of his teas in return on very favorable terms, great hopes were entertained that he would be able to fulfill his engagements, especially as his European creditors were neither numerous, nor clamorous, & having received very considerable payments in goods of different kind this season were willing to allow him any time for the final liquidation of their claims. The teas of which he had sent in musters though not fully equal to the quantity contracted for, were sufficient to balance his debts to the company and the country merchants who were proprietors of the tea were ready to deliver it to him on receiving the advance of the purchase, many agreed to be paid them in woollens, & give him credit for the remainder, as well as a further time for the payment of any former arrears, but it appears that instead of applying his woollens fairly as agreed on, he had been prevailed on by the importunities of particular individuals among them to apply it to the liquidation of old debts, or sold it to procure money for the payment of the emperor's duties and it is supposed the embarrassment, this imprudent, not to say dishonest conduct has involved him in, & the difficulty of extricating himself without having further assistance from the company, whose present demands were such as forbad him to hope for it, impelled him to put an end to his existence; a supposition rendered the more probably from his having as it is said some years back, under difficulties of a like nature made a similar attempt; at any rate it is not unlikely that the anxiety of mind from these causes operating on a frame already much debilitated by sickness has been the ultimate cause of his death.
>
> On receiving information of this event we immediately sent for Puankhequa who now becomes the first Hong Merchant in rank as before in consequence, & Mowqua the friend of the deceased to consult with them on the emergency, & to request that they would take measures to prevent the property in his factory from

being made away with as it is very common on such occasions for creditors to seize violently, & carry off whatever they can find, we likewise sent a compadore to all his factories & packing houses to observe whether there was any appearance of disturbance of that kind.

The compradore returned in about an hour, and acquainted us that every thing was quiet in the packing houses, and the property and goods in the same state as before; but Puankhequa & Mowqua had been sent for into the city by the Hoppo in the same account.

About 12 o'clock Puankhequa & Mowqua came to the factory, & acquainted us that the Hoppo had ordered them to take charge of Munqua's houses for the present, & to be careful that none of the property was made away with; that they therefore stationed proper persons for that purpose, & that we need not be under any apprehension on that score; they acquainted us likewise that the Hoppo had sent for Seequa Brother of the deceased who had been his assistant in his business to require him to go on with the Hong, & if security could be found for the payment of the duties now due, they were in hopes its failure might be prevented, and no ill consequences ensure from the death of its late principal; they informed us likewise that they themselves were going to meet the tea merchants to concert with them, means for supplying the house with the teas agreed on, as well as to prevail on them to allow him time for liquidating his old accounts.

1796, Apr 11: Mowqua came to acquaint us that himself, and Puankhequa had been with the tea merchants whom they found very reasonable with regard to their old accounts they said, they were willing to allow Munqua any length of time he might require, & as to the teas not delivered they were willing to let him have them on paying the advance, & would readily give him credit for the remainder, but the losses they had sustained at different times were such that they could not go on without some assistance.

1796, Apr 14: This day Puankhequa & Mowqua attended Seequa to the Hoppo's office by whose exertions, & interference a sum was subscribed by Seequa himself another brother of Munqua's & some relations of the family for the payment of the duties and the consoo consented to give–up to him immediately his share of Looqua's property whose debts had been paid by the Hong Merchants, th__ by the settlement made at the time is ought not to be divided till next years, ___Looqua's last dividend will have been paid. The amount of these sums w___ be sufficient for the purpose required, & Seequa would then go on with the business as usual, they observed however that in the state Munqua had left his affairs, some assistance would be necessary for which he had nobody to look to, but ourselves; this we told them must be a subject for future deliberation, but if we found Seequa deserving our confidence he certainly should receive it.[109]

The Dutch and English listed Monqua's outstanding debts in 1797. Unfortunately, we cannot give a clear account of how his affairs were finally settled. Tracing debts and debt payments in the records is not always straightforward. Officers often loaned money privately to Chinese merchants, which were separate from their companies' debts. The private payments were not entered into the records.

If we look at the list of Monqua's creditors, for example, we see that he owed money to several EIC officers, including James Drummond; to the private merchants George Smith, Hamilton and David Reid; to the Armenian Matheus Joannes; to

several Muslim and Parsee merchants; to the Dutch officers Zeeman and Van Braam; to the Dutch ambassador Titsingh; and to the VOC.[110]

Plate 02.05 reveals some of the transactions that were going on behind the scenes to recover Monqua's arrears. In October 1795, the VOC officers had received tea from him, but had not paid for it. They had the tea sitting in their factory. The tea was to be shipped to Reid and credited to Monqua's Dutch account. Reid would then apply the tea to the debt owed him by Monqua. Poankeequa was to stand security for the duties on the tea.[111]

Seequa did what he could to find a solution to the settlement of Monqua's debts. It soon became obvious that the business could not continue under such a heavy burden. When the new Hoppo arrived, he arrested Seequa. All of Monqua's relatives fled except an 'old infirm uncle from whom no redress can be expected'.[112] It soon became clear that the family had no means of meeting the arrears. Monqua's close friend and associate, Mowqua, was put in charge of settling the balances outstanding. He also became responsible for discharging Monqua's debt with the EIC.[113]

Ch'en has characterized Monqua's experience as a case of 'financial incompetence', but provides no explanation of how he could have done better in managing his affairs.[114] This judgment seems a bit unfair considering that all but a few Hong merchants failed and that Ch'en only looked at the EIC part of Monqua's overall operation. Even the great houses of Tan Suqua, Texia, and Cai Hunqua were brought down in due course. If we were to look into the future from the year 1760, Monqua's firm would be listed as one of the least likely, out of the ten houses in the Co-hong, to outlive the others.[115]

Monqua was burdened from the start with the debts of his father. It required incredible dexterity to continue running such a large operation for more than three decades while carrying such a huge debt load. It is quite amazing that depression did not destroy him much earlier. Perhaps the question we should be asking is how he managed to pacify his creditors for so long. Between Monqua and his father, the family seems to have been indebted to inland suppliers for a good part of four decades. Of course, we know that one way he was able to keep things going was to borrow from one lender in order to pay another. But then we should ask how he managed to keep his foreign creditors faithful for so long? If this is what Ch'en means by 'financial incompetence', then all of the merchants who failed are equally guilty, because almost all of them were likewise borrowing to pay pressing debts. They had no other choice, since quitting the trade was not an option.

As in previous failures, Monqua's arrears were distributed to the remaining merchants, and the firm was closed.[116]

## SUMMARY

Teunqua's family migrated from Fujian Province to Macao in the early Qing Dynasty. At some point thereafter the family became involved in the trade at Canton. In the 1730s references begin to emerge revealing their activity in the foreign trade.

Teunqua's Fengyuan Hang parallels that of Mandarin Quiqua's Zhengfeng Hang 正豐行, with several differences, as well as similarities.[117] Teunqua and Mandarin Quiqua

were small operators who traded in the shadows of the large houses. They struggled along, trading off and on with various foreign companies and handling small volumes each year. Both families dabbled in the junk trade to Southeast Asia and had a rather sporadic business throughout the 1730s and 1740s. Teunqua's family tended to favour the EIC at this time, whereas Mandarin Quiqua's family did not seem to favour any single company. The latter men dealt with whomsoever they could. The former family was constantly in need of capital and indebted to inland merchants, but the latter family seemed to avoid those entanglements.

By the late 1750s, both families owned properties in Canton. Both families were admitted into the Co-hong as small operators. In 1760, Monqua took over management of the Fengyuan Hang after his father died. Chowqua succeeded his father in the early 1760s and changed the name of the firm to the Yuanquan Hang 源泉行. During the years of the Co-hong, the exports that both firms handled were similar, and probably fell within the range of about 50 thousand to 100 thousand taels each year. If we add imports to those figures plus whatever the men were doing with the Canton junks and private traders, they probably had gross annual incomes in the 1760s of around 100 to 150 thousand taels.

Considering their similarities, it made sense for Monqua and Chowqua to join forces after the Co-hong ended in 1771. The families traded together for the next twenty years, conducting some trade as partners and other transactions as individuals. From 1771 to 1775, both men had 1/8th share of the EIC trade. From 1775 to 1789, both men were intently focused on advancing their VOC trade. At the same time, both men continued to secure several EIC ships each year; they had smaller transactions with other companies; they were both investing in the junk trade to Southeast Asia; and they suffered together when several VOC ships failed to make port in the early 1780s.

Monqua and Chowqua likewise survived the debt crisis of the late 1770s. In fact, the failure of others actually gave them a boost since they took over shares of those houses' trade. But they were eventually brought down by the debts that they had to assume.

Out of the ten original houses of the Co-hong, only three survived into the 1790s—Monqua, Chowqua and Poankeequa. The latter was the only house that survived into the nineteenth century. At some point in the early 1780s, Monqua changed the name of his business to the Wanhe Hang. By the late 1780s, the Yuanquan Hang was in serious trouble. Chowqua died in 1789, and the firm struggled along for a few more years until it was closed. Monqua had to absorb some of Chowqua's debts as well as those of other merchants who failed in the early 1790s. Like Chowqua, Monqua struggled along and kept things going by taking out more loans each year, which made his ultimate failure even more devastating than Chowqua's. By the time of Monqua's death in 1796, the Wanhe Hang was half a million taels in debt. It was declared insolvent and closed. In reality, however, both Chowqua and Monqua's firms were insolvent many years before they were declared bankrupt.

Teunqua and Monqua provide two examples that help to define what the Chinese government considered to be the fine line between solvency and insolvency. It is

important to keep in mind that bankruptcy was not determined by one's balance sheet, between black and red accounting, but rather by one's ability or inability to shuffle resources. The point at which a merchant was declared insolvent was the point at which he could no longer juggle resources enough to keep his customers and creditors at bay. Some merchants reached that point when they were 50 thousand taels in debt; others reached it at 150 thousand taels; and the more proficient men, like Monqua, kept things going until they were half a million taels in debt.

If we only look at the balance sheets, the Fengyuan and later Wanhe Hangs were probably in the red for most of their existence. However, it was still considered by the Chinese government to be solvent. This is why Teunqua, despite his ongoing debts with inland suppliers, was allowed to join the Co-hong. It also explains why Monqua was elected head of the merchants in 1788, despite the fact that he was deep in debt; and it also explains why the Hoppo was upset with Monqua in 1787 when he refused to contribute to the local temple. Monqua knew he was insolvent and that he had no extra money at the time. But the Hoppo considered him to be solvent because he was still keeping everyone reasonably satisfied.

The late 1770s and 1780s were probably the most optimistic years for Monqua. He and Chowqua picked up additional market shares and expanded their operations enormously in these years. Their ambitious efforts suggest that they had some hope that their profits might one day expand to the point that they would outpace their obligations. Other merchants had successfully done this in the past—such as Cudgin and Beaukeequa in the 1720s and early 1730s. Poankeequa was very successful as well, so there must have been some hope in sight for others to do the same.

By the time of Chowqua's failure, however, Monqua was sure to have known that his fate was going down a similar path. By this time, he saw no way out—which probably accounts for his plan to end his life early. He surely knew that the longer he continued in the trade, the worse the situation would become. His father had passed the debt to him and, in order to pay it, Monqua kept borrowing more money. He was simply exchanging one debt for another obligation. His ability to keep things going resulted in Hoppos assigning more debts to him. He undoubtedly knew that when the end came, his family, friends and fellow merchants were all going to suffer. The only way to limit the harm caused to others was to end his life early.

This ends the chapter on Teunqua and Monqua, but it is not the end of their story. In the next chapter I turn to Poankeequa. He operated at the same time as Monqua and shows another side of the experience of being a Hong merchant.

CHAPTER THREE

# POANKEEQUA 潘振承 AND FAMILY 1748–1788

| Relation | Trade Name | Mandarin | Chinese |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brother | Poankeequa | Pan Zhencheng | 潘振承 |
| Brother | Pan Sequa | Pan Seguan | 潘瑟官 |

## INTRODUCTION

The Pans are among the most famous of all the Hong merchant families in the Canton era (ca. 1700–1842). They were the only family business to survive for more than one hundred years. The founder of the family's fortune Pan Zhencheng (Poankeequa) is perhaps as well-known today as he was 250 years ago. When we think of the Canton trade and the Thirteen Hongs 十三行, his name and portrait instantly come to mind (see cover jacket). The Pans were so central to the trade that it is difficult to imagine a history without them.

Pan Zhencheng 潘振承 (1714–1788) was also known as Pan Wenyan 潘文巖. In Canton, he was more commonly called Pan Qiguan 潘啟官. Foreigners, however, called him Poankeequa or simply Keequa (with many different spellings). His successors in the trade were also called Poankeequa, so we often refer to the first one as Poankeequa I. Because I am only dealing with Pan Zhencheng in this study, I will simply refer to him as Poankeequa. His sons and successors will be referred to by their Chinese names.[1]

The Pans were from Fujian and were initially involved in the trade with Manila. When Poankeequa was young he spent time in the Philippines with his father, where the former became fluent in Spanish. The family had close connections to a branch of the Chen 陳 family that was involved in the Sino-Manila trade. In 1737, when his father died at the age of 48, Poankeequa was 23 years old. According to the family genealogy, Poankeequa worked in the Chen family business after his father's passing. The exact years that he lived in Manila are unknown.[2] Considering Poankeequa's age and the development of his Spanish language skills (he could speak, read and write), he probably spent considerable time in Manila during the 1720s and early 1730s.

Poankeequa's first son, Youneng 有能, was born in Canton in 1742, so he was clearly living there by then.[3] He was probably active in the Manila trade in these early years for which we do not have records. The first clear reference to him in other foreign records does not emerge until 1748 (Appendixes 3A and 3F). His name appears on a Swedish map that was drawn that year showing the location of his trading house

(factory). This building would have belonged to the Chen family and was called the Dafeng Hang 達豐行. This was where Poankeequa worked and learned the trade. The building was located on Lantern Alley (Denglong Xiang 燈籠巷), which is today called Heping Dong Lu 和平東路. The street ran parallel to the famous Thirteen Hong Street 十三行街.[4] In the 1740s and 1750s, the Dafeng Hang was managed by Chen Zheng (陳正, Appendix 3B). In the 1760s it was managed by Tan Quiqua (Chen Guiguan 陳貴觀). As we will see from many examples below, the foreign trade that was conducted out of the Dafeng Hang was managed by Poankeequa. This is probably why it is his name that appears on the Swedish map, rather than the Chens.

Poankeequa gained much of his experience trading with the Spanish in Manila. His language skills made him a natural choice for that part of the Dafeng Hang's business. He was also actively involved in the junk trade to Southeast Asia. The Spanish trade and the junk trade were the foundation of his business, his sources of capital, and his eventual success.

Unfortunately, we have very little information about these parts of his business activities in the 1740s and 1750s. It is not until the 1760s and later that we learn about his extensive involvement in the Manila trade, but we have a great deal of information about Poankeequa's foreign trade in Canton during the 1750s and 1760s. I will first discuss his foreign trade, and then return to his junk trade later, when sources begin to emerge.

The first reference I have found to Poankeequa trading with other foreigners in Canton is from the English East India Company's (EIC) records. On 11 September 1750, the English mentioned that they had purchased some winter teas from P. Khequa. In the next paragraph we learn that this abbreviation stood for Puan Khiqua (Poankeequa), who was now one of the merchants with whom the company was doing business. By this time, he was already competing with the top merchants in Canton, including Texia and Beaukeequa. Poankeequa had good access to teas and silks and was treated equally with these other men, all of which points to a man who had been in business for many years.[5]

By 29 October 1750, Poankeequa had gained the confidence of the British company.

> PwhanKhiqua having used us extremely well in the Tea he has already delivered, we have been desirous of making a farther purchase of one hundred chests, which we understood he had not yet disposed of.[6]

Poankeequa was an aggressive competitor. On 27 November 1750 the English recorded that

> Pau Keequa [Poankeequa] having bought up 520 tubs of Twankay tea, before our agents Tekqua & Teinqua could agree for it, we have been endeavering for some days past to recover it.[7]

In 1751, Poankeequa appears in three other companies' records—Swedish East India Company (SOIC), Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Danish Asiatic

Company (DAC).[8] His name shows up regularly in those records thereafter. In 1753, he appears for the first time in the French East India Company's (CFI) records.[9]

It is a shame that we do not have figures for Poankeequa's trade with the Spanish, English, Swedish, or French. The trade with any of those four companies would likely have been much larger than the business he had with the Danes and Dutch. The records of these latter two companies contain the only detailed figures we have for Poankeequa's trade.

Appendix 3C shows Poankeequa's trade with the DAC from 1752 to 1788. He supplied an average of 13 percent of the Danish cargoes. The DAC figures are missing for the years from 1773 to 1781, but we can imagine him supplying a similar volume in those years. Several of Poankeequa's contracts with the DAC and other companies have survived, and a few are reproduced in the plate section. The stamps (chops) that Poankeequa used on these contracts are curious and deserve some explanation.

Before 1760, Poankeequa stamped his contracts with these four characters *xian pu yuan ji* 暹圃源記 (Plates 03.03 to 03.06, 03.08 to 03.09 and 03.17). There is also a painting in France of the inside of a tea factory in Canton with *xianpu* 暹圃 written on the tea canisters. This scene is probably intended to represent Poankeequa's Dafeng Hang.[10] It is unknown what the characters mean. *Xianpu* could refer to a name. The only person I have found in the family genealogy with that name, however, is one of Poankeequa's grandsons, but that relative was born many years after the dates of these contracts.[11] All of Poankeequa's trade at this time appears to have been done out of the Dafeng Hang.

Beginning in 1760, Poankeequa stamped his contracts and letters with his personal chop Pan Zhencheng yin 潘振承引. Plates 03.07, 03.11 to 03.13, 03.19 and 03.24, and one of his contracts reproduced in the first volume of this study, all show this stamp.[12] A couple of these contracts were made out of the Dafeng Hang and the others out of the Tongwen Hang 同文行. The *xian pu yuan ji* chop no longer appears on his contracts after 1759. This coincidence makes one wonder if perhaps the stamps with *xianpu* 暹圃 could have been from a member of the Chen family in the Dafeng Hang. After the Co-hong began in 1760, the Chens did not trade directly with foreigners, which could account for that chop no longer appearing in the records.

Besides the normal items of tea and porcelain, Poankeequa also traded illegally in gold and forbidden silks, for which we have a few figures. Poankeequa offered gold bars to the VOC in 1751. He did little or no other trade with the Dutch at this time, but they did consider purchasing his gold.[13] Plates 03.03 and 03.13 are silk contracts Poankeequa made with the DAC in 1755 and 1764, respectively. Included among the items are the forbidden crimson and yellow fabrics.[14] In December 1767, the Mandarins intercepted silk of those two colours being shipped from Foshan to Canton, which Ingsia and Poankeequa had contracted with the Danes. The two men secured the release of their goods with the aid of a few bribes to the Mandarins.[15]

By 1754, Poankeequa was included among the top six merchants in Canton.[16] In that year, he and the other top five men—Beaukeequa, Swequa, Chetqua, Cai Hunqua and Swetia—pushed for more control over the trade.[17] They barred some of the smaller merchants from trading in certain types of tea, and they pushed for the roughly 100

outside merchants (non-Hong merchants) to be brought under their supervision. In 1755, they convinced government officials to order the outside merchants to form into groups of five, and each group was assigned to one of the licensed Hong merchants. This tightening of the ranks continued over the next five years, with the number of licensed merchants eventually reduced to ten in 1760 (there had been over 20 previously).[18]

Beginning in 1755, Poankeequa's youngest brother Sequa (Seguan 瑟官) begins to show up in the records as his active partner. Sequa was born in 1739 so he was only 16 years old when he began signing contracts with his older brother (Plate 03.04).[19] The two men took care of the foreign trade in Canton, while the Chens managed the junk trade to Southeast Asia.

In 1758, Beaukeequa died in debt, which brought about additional challenges and changes that had adverse effects on Poankeequa's profits. Beaukeequa's debts were distributed to the other Hong merchants for repayment. A month before Beaukeequa died, the Dutch already had apprehensions about trading with him and Poankeequa, whom they thought to be financially unstable.[20] The Dutch did a small amount of trade with Beaukeequa that year, but nothing with Poankeequa.[21] In order to bring more security to their business, better manage the repayment of debts, and gain access to foreign capital, three of Poankeequa's competitors—Cai Hunqua, Swetia, and Chetqua—joined into an alliance shortly after Beaukeequa died.[22]

The new consortium gained control over about 38 percent of the total market.[23] This partnership helped to bring more stability to the trade, but it did not help Poankeequa. By 1760 he was said to be over 100,000 taels in debt. The Dutch claimed that he had squandered a lot of money in supporting his sons to become Mandarins (which probably meant he had hired tutors to prepare them for the imperial examinations).[24] He was also having trouble purchasing enough merchandise to load the ships he was supplying. This problem resulted in several Swedish ships, of which he and Swequa were major suppliers, being much delayed in their departures. In some cases, they had to layover for an entire year.[25] The triple alliance, on the other hand, was dispatching their ships on time. They were gaining control over a good share of inland supplies, to the detriment of Poankeequa, Swequa and other merchants.[26]

The English also mentioned Poankeequa and other merchants' distress shortly after Beaukeequa died in 1758.

> Very honorable in Swetia to take upon him the Beaus [Beaukeequa] debt, he hopes for favor from the Comp.
>
> The distress the China Merch[ants]. have been in for want of ships to take off their tea, is the reason P.Khiqua could not fulfil his contract, the year he made, it was therefore necessary to allow him time.[27]

Allowing three of the largest houses to control a third of the trade was not something that benefitted the other top players. This led Poankeequa and Swequa to come up with an alternative plan. They convinced government officials to create the Co-hong which allowed the three-family consortium to continue, but under the management of this new administrative body.[28]

## THE CO-HONG AND RISE OF THE TONGWEN HANG

Poankeequa was elected president of the Co-hong. Chetqua became treasurer, Swetia was the tax accountant, and Cai Hunqua's partner, Semqua, was named secretary. Swequa was one of the original officers as well, but he died the next year. His brother Tjobqua continued the family business, but he was not allowed to take his father's place in the administration of trade.[29] This is when the Tongwen Hang 同文行 begins to appear in the records.[30]

The early 1760s were difficult years for Poankeequa. Not only had the trade gone through a dramatic restructuring with the rise of the triple alliance and establishment of the Co-hong, but events outside of China affected the profitability of his business as well. The Spaniards and Swedes were the main sources of his capital at this time (explained below). On 3 September 1761 one of the Swedish ships ran aground on the Pratas Islands (Dongsha Qundao 東沙群島) on its way to China. It sank the next day. The crew were saved and managed to sail to Macao in their service boats. Poankeequa helped to assemble a salvage team to recover the silver. The diving team found most of the treasure, but not the Swedish imports. The Swedes were now one ship less, which meant Poankeequa would lose the export sales. The Swedish ships were about twice as large as the EIC ships and maybe three or four times as large as Spanish ships so this sinking was a significant loss to his trade that year.

The English characterized Poankeequa as follows.

> 1761, Jul 21: PuanKeyqua, the leading man, I always found, just in his dealings, with the commissions I have been in. He would formerly in my opinion have made a most excellent merchant, had not his circumstances prevented his being trusted equally with some others and I have reason to believe nothing but his distresses have thrown him into the forming this Company! His present character is that of a man of sense amazingly powerful in resources, strongly attach'd to his own interest, with little adherence to truth. He has the greatest, & he is not the only merchant who has interest with the Mandarins.
>
> How true this sketch of him may be, I cannot positively pretend to say, but as to lying, there is no one among the principals / Chetqua except'd / who is not equally guilty of this vice–for I have caught many of them, even in the short time I have been here, endeavouring to impose upon me the grossest falsehoods.[31]

The 'distresses' referred to in this entry are undoubtedly Poankeequa's debts, and the 'Company' is, of course, a reference to the Co-hong. It took several years for Poankeequa to recover from the adverse effects that Beaukeequa's failure and the triple alliance had on his business. Now that the Co-hong was keeping the three families in check, he could concentrate on earning money to pay his debts. But not everything went smoothly.

In September 1762, the English invaded the Philippine Islands and occupied Manila. From this time to the return of Spanish rule in September 1764, the silver shipments from Mexico did not arrive in China. Poankeequa was not only deprived of this silver, which he could usually depend on every year, but he also lost the profits which he could have earned from export sales to the Spanish.[32]

In order to make up for these shortcomings, Poankeequa made a secret transaction with the Swedes in 1762 for 15,000 piculs of tea. The Co-hong required that he seek approval for all tea sales, and declare all amounts and prices, before making a contract. He was expected to pay 3 taels on every picul to cover the Co-hong's administrative costs. Even though Poankeequa was president of the organization, he did not report the sale in this instance and kept the 3 taels commission. He had shorted the Co-hong 45,000 taels.[33]

In 1764, this secret transaction was discovered, and Poankeequa was called to appear before the other merchants and government officials in the Co-hong to give account of the missing funds. Now that he had been exposed, there was not much he could do but admit his errors, apologize, and make amends. The Dutch recorded his dramatized reply as follows:

> I, Poankeequa, wish that if it is true that I have received money in advance from the Swedes for Bohea tea contracts in 1762, then my father (who is dead) and all my other ancestors will have no rest in their graves. Furthermore, that my mother, children and grandchildren, and so on, together with me are cursed and wiped off this earth, so that no memory of us remains.[34]

Even though he had been caught and confessed, great leniency was shown in settling this matter. It was later announced that the Swedish supercargo Michael Grubb had actually been responsible for a good part of the connivance. Grubb arrived in China in 1758 and stayed for several years carrying on private trade and making preparations for the arrival of the SOIC ships each year. In 1761, he was joined by another Swedish supercargo, Jean Abraham Grill, who also stayed behind in China for several years. Together, the two Swedes carried on an extensive private trade. It is unknown whether Grill was involved in this questionable transaction in 1762. Grubb and Poankeequa had apparently split the money saved from failing to pay the 3 taels per picul commission. After much discussion, the members of the Co-hong decided that Poankeequa was only responsible for paying 20,000 taels rather than 45,000 taels.[35]

In addition to managing the trade, the licensed merchants were also responsible for organizing special events to welcome and honour prominent officials and their relatives. On 23 December 1761, the Danes reported that a party had been arranged to celebrate the birthday of one of the members of the imperial family.[36] The records do not say whose birthday it was but it may have been the emperor's mother, who would have turned 71 in 1761.[37] Poankeequa invited both Chinese and foreign officers to attend. They gathered at noon at a place called 'Siams Pagoda'.[38] The meeting place was furnished with fabulous furniture, which the governor general (Jontock) had asked the merchants (Poankeequa in particular) to supply. They had an elaborate meal and were entertained for the entire afternoon. The evening closed with the performance of a traditional Chinese comedy. Everyone returned home at about 8 o'clock. Sponsoring large gatherings such as these were a regular part of the Hong merchants' unwritten responsibilities.[39]

In 1762, Poankeequa supplied tea to the DAC out of both the Dafeng and the Tongwen Hangs. He contracted some of this tea in concert with three other

houses—Taihe 泰和, Guangshun 廣順 and Guangyuan 廣源 Hangs. Plate 03.07 is a contract dated 2 July 1762 for 7,450 piculs of Bohea tea, signed by the four houses. Poankeequa made this contract out of the Dafeng Hang. Each house was to deliver a portion according to the terms agreed upon on 30 June. The terms are shown in Appendix 9. The tea was to be packed in 2,600 whole chests. 2,000 of the chests were to be packed with 2/3rds first grade Bohea tea and 1/3rd second grade Congo tea. The remaining 600 chests were to be packed with only first grade Bohea tea. Each house was to supply an equal amount. Packing was to begin 116 days from the date of the contract, and completed within 25 days thereafter. Each house was to pack every day, or every other day, until the contract was fulfilled.

Plate 03.11 is a contract dated 14 September 1762 for 1,800 chests of Bohea tea, which all four houses signed. Poankeequa made this contract out of the Tongwen Hang. Poankeequa (Ponkeiqua) was to supply 500 chests, Swetia (Suesia) 500 chests, Chetqua (Schequa) 400 chests and Giqua 400 chests. Packing was to begin 48 to 50 days from the date of the contract and be completed within 95 days. As in the contract above, each house was to pack every day, or every other day, until the contract was completed.

In both of these contracts, each of the four houses agreed to the same price, same quality of tea and same conditions (chests with lead lining, and so much tea in every chest, etc.). The reason for the contracts specifying packing 'every day, or every other day' is because other companies were purchasing tea from these houses as well. In the off-days, they would pack tea for those other companies. Sometimes it rained and the packing might have to stop so that the tea leaves did not absorb moisture. By stipulating the days that packing had to be done and completed, the Danes avoided delays in the departure of their ships.

All four houses had to agree to the same terms or they would not be included in the DAC orders in a given year. This was similar to the way the EIC operated. The company set the terms and then looked for trusted merchants who would agree to them. We often find in the records adversaries supplying tea to the EIC on the same terms that others had agreed to.

It should be pointed out that these two contracts were very different from the three-family alliance mentioned in the first volume.[40] In that partnership, the three houses sold their tea together at agreed prices and terms, and they often took no action without consulting the others. Two of the houses in these contracts (Plates 03.07 and 03.11), the Taihe and Guangshun Hangs, were members of this three-family alliance. Each house had some trade that it conducted on its own, but they generally consulted each other before making those contracts. This collaboration is what the English often complained about. They wanted those three families to operate separately so that they could negotiate better terms, but the three men often refused to comply.[41]

The contracts in Plates 03.07 and 03.11 were distinct and one-time agreements. Poankeequa had supplied tea to the DAC with the other three houses in 1761 as well, but that was also just a one-time agreement.[42] These DAC contracts were very similar to how the merchants traded with the EIC. The merchants could agree to all the same terms and sign the contracts at different times without even being in the same room

with each other. This was not a consortium, alliance, or anything of the sort, but rather four individual men agreeing to deliver tea on the same terms.

The operation of the Co-hong in its early years was far from efficient, smooth, timely or systematic. Poankeequa was often at odds with the three members of the consortium, Cai Hunqua (and his partner Semqua), Ingsia and Chetqua. The government was also involved in the decision making, so it was not easy to reach a consensus each year.

> 1763, Jun 8: The Cong-Hang still continues, with the additional grievance of a Mandareen being appointed this year to settle their accounts; who was likewise present when they raised the price of new Bohea tea to 15 tales a pecul; with additional advance of 10 tales; at which price the Dutch contracted for 12,000 peculs. They likewise made an agreement not to take less than 17 tales a pecul, for any contract made without an advance; so secure they seem of doing what they please.[43]

The Dutch characterized the situation as follows.

> 1764, Mar 3: The hate and envy, mainly between our three merchants and Poankeequa, increases almost by the day. And were he not able to reinforce his authority in a special way through the mandarins, with the advisory votes of the small merchants, who are usually on his side, he would find himself crossed by them even more than he is now.[44]
>
> 1764, Apr 11: The six small [merchants] complain that the four main ones cheat them. And among the four main merchants the president, Poankeequa, shifts the blame onto our three merchants; and they shift the blame back to Poankeequa. The result is a continuous counter charge back and forth.[45]

By regulating the prices and advances, the Co-hong kept the triple alliance from undercutting Poankeequa's trade. Everyone had to offer the same prices and same terms. However, as I have shown in volume one, merchants found ways to accommodate their patrons despite the regulations. They made secret adjustments in weights, provided kickbacks, offered preferential terms in other products, gave interest free loans, and came up with numerous other incentives to keep their customers loyal to them.[46]

Despite the Co-hong's control over trade, the members could not regulate the internal animosity that existed among different factions. The distrust and conflicts between Poankeequa and the three-merchant consortium continued to disrupt trade year after year. This situation did not change until Cai Hunqua, the leader of the three-family alliance, died on 1 May 1770.[47] Throughout the 1760s, Poankeequa did what he could to influence and guide trade into directions that would benefit him.[48]

In 1763, Poankeequa had a disagreement with the inland tea man Wonsamye (also spelled Uhn-Sam-Ja). He had apparently promised a batch of tea to the EIC that Wonsamye had brought to Canton. The particulars surrounding this matter are unclear. In the end, however, Wonsamye offered the tea to the Dutch. Wonsamye told the Dutch that he wanted to channel the sale through one of the members of the three-family consortium, rather than through Poankeequa, who had allegedly deceived him. The Dutch were pleased to learn of this turn in events because it gave them the

opportunity to purchase some good quality tea, and, at the same time, to disadvantage their English competitors.[49]

In April 1764 Poankeequa's partner in the Dafeng Hang, Tan Quiqua, applied for permission to become a member of the Co-hong. The other members of the association, however, rejected the application. It is unclear who was behind this initiative—whether Poankeequa, Tan Quiqua or someone else.[50] If Tan Quiqua had become a licensed Hong merchant, it would certainly have boosted Poankeequa's influence over trade. After being rejected, Quiqua continued in the Dafeng Hang managing the junk trade to Southeast Asia, which Poankeequa continued to sponsor (Appendix 3B and 3E and Plate 03.10).[51]

On 15 June 1764, Poankeequa's eldest son Youneng 有能 died at the young age of 21. The meeting of the Co-hong, and trade negotiations with foreigners, were suspended for a short period to mourn his death. The Swedes mentioned that this son was married to 'Sonping's' daughter, but it is unclear who this man was. After a couple of weeks, trade resumed.[52]

In early 1765, Poankeequa returned to Xiamen to pay respects to his mother.[53] By this date, he seems to have recovered fairly well from his previous debts and misfortunes. The Swedish and Spanish trade was back on track, and he had picked up significant shares of the French trade. As mentioned previously, the French sent no ships to China from 1760 to 1762, but then the trade resumed again in 1763 with several ships arriving each year.

In 1765 a Chinese official listed all of the Hong merchant houses doing business in Canton, with their family names attached to their hong names. Poankeequa was listed as Pan Tongwen 潘同文.[54] By now, all of his foreign trade seems to have been channelled through the Tongwen Hang. We find no more references to the Dafeng Hang, except in connection with the junk trade to Southeast Asia.

There are some discrepancies between the foreign records and the Pan family genealogy regarding the deaths of Poankeequa's siblings. The family genealogy shows Sequa's death to be 1777. References in the English, Danish and Dutch records, however, show it to be 1765. I have not been able to resolve these differences. I will show here the entries in the foreign records. Perhaps they will help a researcher in the future to solve these mysteries.

On 31 March 1765, the Swedish supercargo Jean Abraham Grill arrived at Macao from Canton. Soon after his arrival, the Dutch, who were in Macao, recorded that they had heard (probably from Grill) that Poankeequa's brother had died a few days before. This brother was said to be involved in Poankeequa's trade with Chinese as well as Europeans. Sequa's name is not mentioned in this reference, but he was the one who was conducting trade with Poankeequa up to this point.[55]

In reference to a meeting the English had with the Hong merchants at the end of May 1765, they stated that

> PoanKhequa however, was not of the number [of Hong merchants] . . . he pretended that his brother Seequa's death, had greatly embarrassed him, as he had the care of his accounts; and that it would be some time before he could bring them into order.[56]

On 13 July 1765, Poankeequa was unable to pack tea for the Danes because of his brother's death.[57] Three companies recorded the death of Poankeequa's brother, but there is nothing about this tragedy in the family genealogy. From this year forward, Sequa disappears from the foreign records. Obviously, one of these dates is incorrect.

Another discrepancy appears in 1769, when the Dutch recorded the following:

> 1769, Jun 4: We learned that PoanKeequa had gone to Amoy on the 28th of last month, and that it would be at least 2 months before he would be able to return. The reason he gave for having to undertake this trip was that his brother, who had been sick there for some time, died, and he has lost much from his brother dying, and must go to settle his affairs.[58]

The Swede Jacob Hahr was in Macao at the time and also mentioned the death of Poankeequa's brother in a letter.

> 1769, Jun 21: Poankeyqua has gone to Amoy and won't be back until the middle of August. His brother in Amoy is dead, who had given him much service in tea and other trade.[59]

The Pan genealogy shows his brother Zhenwen dying on 18 March 1770, but no brothers or sons dying in 1769.[60] Perhaps these relatives were brothers-in-law or close members of the family whom Poankeequa treated as brothers? Or perhaps these were just excuses to return to Fujian? It is unclear.

As president of the Co-hong, one of Poankeequa's responsibilities was to provide expensive gifts each year to top officials in Canton and Beijing for the privilege of trading. These presents varied according to what items were available in Canton each year. There was a wide range of gifts available, from a few hundred to thousands of taels.

The large mechanical clocks that were so popular with the emperor and Chinese elite could cost upwards of 40,000 taels.[61] Other items were much cheaper. In 1770, for example, Poankeequa purchased 28 watches from Grill for 3,100 Spanish dollars (2,232 taels).[62] This came to about 80 taels per watch. These items were undoubtedly purchased to offer as presents. Poankeequa complained continually to the other Hong merchants about these expenses. He argued that the costs should rightfully be divided between all of them. Despite these inconveniences, he did fairly well in trade.

In 1766, Poankeequa made a large contract for silk with the EIC. We do not have all the particulars of this transaction, because the EIC Diaries and Consultations have not survived for this year. However, we do know from the following letter written to the EIC Directors in London, that he lost a lot of money on this contract.

> Gentlemen,
>
> Having, for several years, had the honour of transacting Business with you thrô the Channel of your Council here, my Name will not be unknown to you thô it is the first time I have taken the liberty to write to you.
>
> Mess. Pigou, Misenor, Liell, Blount, Garland, Mackenzie and all the other Supra Cargoes who have been here are well acquainted with what Zeal, Readiness and punctuallity I have always served your Company and all of your Nation, and that on every Occasion, and very often when, on account of the Trouble & Risks, no other Merchant here would undertake it, This, among others, was the Case

last year in the Purchase of Raw Silk, which I alone concluded at a much lower price than any other Merchant here would deliver it; I plainly foresaw I could not benefit thereby, but I had the misfortune to lose a great deal by it, occasioned by an unforeseen mortality among the Silk Worms in the Province of Nankeen from whence the scarcity and dearness of the Commodity arose, But thô I lost so much I chose rather to bear it than forfeit my Word; At present it is a Thing determined, Which thô I am very Sensible I ought to take it with patience and live in hopes of repairing it, being the Consequence of Trade, Yet what seems reasonable to me at present (as I have mentioned to your Supra Cargoes here thô without Success and therefore take the liberty of representing it to you Gentlemen) is, that as I have suffered so much by this Contract, thrô my Zeal for your Interest by undertaking it at a much lower Price than any other Merchant here would do it, I ought to have the Preference of the other Merchants in other Lucrative Contracts when my Goods and prices are equal with Theirs, in order, in part, to make good my Loss without occasoning any to you.

Be so kind therefore Gentlemen to write to your Council here to grant me such preference in Some Affairs, and I can assure you that by my Zeal and Acknowledgement I will render you all the Services in my Power, which such Silk Contracts (without the help of other Business) would soon deprive me of doing, thô never of my Good Will and Sincere Prayers for the Glory & Success of your Company. I have the honour to be with the most profound Respect.

Gentlemen
Canton the Your most Obed. and most
10th Febry 1767 humble Servant
Pan quey qua[63]

The original letter was written in Spanish, signed in Chinese and stamped with his personal chop.[64] As I pointed out in the first volume of this study, the Chinese government forbade merchants from communicating directly with foreign authorities in their home countries. Hong merchants were free to interact with foreigners in Canton and Macao, and they could communicate freely with the various East India companies' representatives in China, but that was the extent of their freedom. Poankeequa mentioned that this was the first time he had written such a letter to the EIC directors. He probably did indeed lose a lot of money, which would be a good reason to write directly to Europe.

The content of this letter is exactly what Chinese officials accused Tan Hunqua of doing in the early 1730s—secretly trying to manipulate the trade for his personal benefit. One of the reasons for Tan Hunqua writing letters to Europe was also to recover losses he had suffered. He was severely reprimanded and warned that if he wrote any more letters to Europe, he would do so at the risk of death. Similarly, Poankeequa also felt that it was worth the risk of writing this letter to try to recover some of his losses. He was well connected with Chinese officials, so perhaps he felt that he could manage any disturbance that might emerge from the letter. Whatever the case might have been, the EIC directors referred the case to the Select Committee in Canton.[65] Poankeequa was thus unsuccessful in securing a greater portion of the trade.

Plate 03.24 shows a tea contract Poankeequa made with the SOIC in 1767. He was paid an advance of 10 taels per picul in March for tea he would deliver in mid-October.

As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Monqua made a similar contract with the Swedes this same year (Plate 02.03). We only have this singular Swedish contract from Poankeequa, and no figures to show what he traded each year. Information below, however, will show that he now had control of the largest share of the Swedish cargos.

By 1768, Poankeequa was in good financial standing, largely owing to the Co-hong. We hear no more about his debts or financial difficulties. Of course, he still complained about losses such as in the letter above, but he was now quite wealthy. He had considerable influence with government officials, which was partially a result of the presents he had been handing out to them each year.

The Co-hong itself was now becoming less popular with officials as it had served its purposes. Poankeequa mentioned to the English this year that 'he has hopes of breaking the Conghong'.[66] This statement seems a bit strange considering that he and Swequa were responsible for establishing the organization, and that it helped to pull him out of debt. However, he undoubtedly knew that the society was becoming less favourable with officials who wanted to maintain a competitive environment.

In November 1769, Poankeequa appealed to the Mandarins for permission to go to TsinTsou (Quanzhou) to bury (or re-bury) his father. He was asked to wait until January, when the trading season had ended. We have no information about his trade in Fujian, but he was undoubtedly involved in that commerce to some extent.[67]

After the passing of his adversary Cai Hunqua in May 1770, the triple alliance began to fall apart. The trading environment was very different that year because there was now no one who could effectively oppose Poankeequa. The English mentioned that they paid Poankeequa 100,000 taels to end the Co-hong.[68] This payment has been the traditional explanation for the demise of that association. The source of this information comes primarily from the following entries in the EIC papers.

> The Council in a private letter to the Court of Directors inform them that PuanKhequa tired with the load of business and Expence, the consequence of his being Head of the Cong Hong, had communicated to them a Plan for dissolving this monopoly, representing the present as a most favorable opportunity as he was assured that presents properly placed at the three great Houses those of the Tsongtu, Foyeun and Hoppo woud without doubt put the finishing stroke to it, but declared inability to engage in so great an undertaking without the [sic] they could assure him the Company would support him by defraying part of the Charges, informed them the Companys proportion of these Charges should not exceed / 100.000 / tales. The Council to ease the trade from so heavy a burthen and in consequence of 59th paragraph of their Instructions, which they think gives them discretionary Powers resolve to promise him that the Company would support him by bearing that proportion of the charges he required.[69]

Previous scholars have cited this event without questioning the validity of their sources (see below). If we cross-reference this event with other data, we begin to see what Poankeequa was really up to. The first clue comes from the EIC director's response to this event which all previous studies of the merchants and the trade have failed to mention.

1771, Aug 9: The Court of Directors in their Instructions, find great fault with their Supra Cargoes for their Conduct relative to the Dissolution of the Conhong; accuse them of Imprudence, Want of thought, In attention to their Interest and as Lavishers of their Property and consider their Conduct in this affair as an abuse of their discretionary Power. The Supra Cargoes in their first minute in the Diary express their Hopes that the Court of Directors will reconsider the force and strength of the Paragraph and exculpate them from the severe charges brought against them and in a letter dated Nov. 20th set forth fully the Inducements that lead them to take this step, and point out the great advantages accruing from it which will very shortly reimbarse [*sic*] the Company for the Charge of dissolving so pernicious a monopoly, the Charges on the Exports during the Conhong were

on Raw Silk 5 Tls p pecul
Hyson 4
Singlo 1
Souchon 2
Congo 2
Hyson Skins 2
Bohea 1
Ten PCent on all imports.

The Tsong Tu published an edict for the dissolution of the Conhong, forth:

That formerly the trade was open to all Hong merchants appointed by government, the numberless bad practices arising from connections to foreigners and traitorous subjects of the empire occasioned the establishing of the Conhong, and they made answerable for all male–practices–that now on a Representation from Puan Khequa setting forth the agreements among themselves and great Disinclination from all parties continue this Conhong, He is resolved to dissolve this body and order ### the Trade shall be carried on as before the Establishment of the Conhong. Dated 35 year, 12 moon, 28 day of Keen Longs reign. [1771.02.12]

PuanKhequa entered into an obligation binding himself to pay to the company or their Agents 100,000 tales in case the old Conhong should be Reistablished, a New one formed or the Imports or Exports charged with Tax or Imposition whatever except the Emperors Duties.

N.B. This account of the dissolution of the Conhong is extracted from the original papers.[70]

As far as I know, the original entry in the EIC Diary referred to above (on 9 August) no longer exists. Another clue to the validity of this bribe comes from a French translation of the Chinese edict that ended the Co-hong. Copies of this document have survived in France, Denmark and Holland. This document reiterates that 'Poankeequa and his associates . . . proposed the establishment of a company' (Co-hong) in 1760.[71] Governor general Li Shiyao 李侍堯 mentioned in the edict that the emperor had been informed, in the 24th year of Qianlong (ca. 1759, or early 1760) of all the problems the local merchants were experiencing in the trade. The emperor responded by granting permission to initiate measures to correct the 'disorders'. Thereafter, the Co-hong was established. Li Shiyao was in fact the governor general who presided over its creation. He argued that the company (Co-hong) was now the source of 'a thousand inconveniences' and 'nothing but a name, unable to do what it was intended to do'.[72] It was

therefore abolished, and the trade was scheduled to return to the way it had been before the establishment of the Co-hong.[73]

The Court of Directors in London was rightfully very critical of the bribe given to Poankeequa. These secret arrangements between him and the English supercargos were contrary to normal procedures and very suspicious. I have already dealt with the improbability of the Co-hong being ended with a bribe, so I will not repeat that discussion here.[74]

As we will see below, the Co-hong was no longer effective. That is the primary reason it was broken up. Poankeequa knew this truth and that it was likely to be eliminated in the near future. He knew the English were anxious for its removal, and found a way to capitalize on that desire by collecting 100,000 taels from them. And he prepared the supercargos for this scheme two years in advance (when he suggested in 1768 that he might be able to break the Co-hong). According to the supposed agreement, Poankeequa was liable to repay the 100,000 taels to the EIC if a new Co-hong was established.

As far as the records reveal, none of the other companies paid a penny, which was also contrary to normal procedures. Everyone benefitted, but only the English paid. This is not the way the trade invariably worked. We will likely never know the *real* reasons behind this bribe or where the money went. But we can be certain that paying this large sum of cash to Poankeequa is not what made officials declare the Co-hong 'ineffective'. They gave it that label, and discontinued its operations, because it no longer served its original purpose.[75]

Historians have misread this event.[76] The 100,000 taels bribe is not an example of Poankeequa's ability to manipulate the Chinese officials. It is rather an example of Poankeequa's great influence over the English supercargos.[77] The response cited above by the Court of Directors was a sure sign that something was very strange about this transaction, but previous historians did not pick up on it. The supercargos in Canton did not have the authority to give him this money without permission from the directors, but they did so anyway. Why could they not wait a year for an answer from the Court? It was probably because Poankeequa knew the Co-hong was about to be abolished, and, in turn, he convinced the English supercargos that he had to have the money immediately. What if the Co-hong would have ended before the Court's answer arrived from London? Or what if the Court responded in the negative? In either case, Poankeequa would have lost his window of opportunity.

As I will show in the next chapter, a few days after Cai Hunqua's passing in May 1770, the merchant Tan Anqua told the Dutch that the Co-hong would not last much longer. Tan Anqua had chosen not to join that organization in 1760 but continued trading with foreigners as an inland tea agent. He knew well of Cai Hunqua's great influence over other members in the Co-hong, and that his passing would change everything. Tan Anqua had in fact previously traded in partnership with Cai Hunqua and the members of his triple alliance. The demise of the Co-hong, which Tan Anqua anticipated, had nothing to do with a supposed bribe of 100,000 taels given to Poankeequa. In fact, in May 1770, Tan Anqua would have had no knowledge of such a

plan, and yet he could still see the end of the Co-hong on the horizon. There is much more to this argument, which is discussed in volume one Chapter 3.

Before leaving this matter, one more key point needs to be clarified. The trade did not actually return to the way it functioned before the Co-hong was established. In the decades prior to 1760 there were usually upwards of twenty or more licensed Hong merchants operating in Canton. The number of licenses seemed to depend only on the number of men who were willing to pay for their issuance. The experience of the 1760s, however, showed officials that, as long as they kept around ten houses operating at a time (give or take a couple), the trade would remain competitive and not hinder growth. By licensing a smaller number of houses, officials gained better control. The 1760s also showed that Hong merchant bankruptcies were an inevitable consequence of a thriving trade. When houses failed, they were just replaced with others. As a result, their numbers always stayed around ten. In these ways, the environment before the Co-hong was quite different from the environment after its dissolution.[78]

Before I continue the chronological discussion of Poankeequa's trading activities, I would like to devote some space to briefly discuss his sources of capital and his junk trade to Southeast Asia. His capital sources help to explain why he survived when almost every other Hong merchant around him failed. The junk trade managed out of the Dafeng Hang illustrates other activities that helped to diversify his investments. These factors were at the foundation of his success in the 1770s and 1780s.

## CAPITAL SOURCES

Poankeequa had two sources of silver that gave him an edge over his competition, the Spanish and Swedish companies. By the 1750s, he already had the bulk of the Spanish silver imports under his control. In the 1760s, he tightened his control of the silver that the Swedes brought each year. The Swedish ships often stopped at Cadiz to acquire their silver, so we could rightfully say that both sources were 'Spanish silver'. These capital resources enabled him to survive in difficult years when even the best of his competitors failed. I begin with a brief account of his Spanish connections, followed by a discussion of his Swedish trade.

In July 1753, the English mentioned that Poankeequa was 'a merchant of a fair character partner with a man of great & very conversant in the silk business.'[79] This connection to the silk trade makes sense when we consider Poankeequa's involvement in the Manila trade. Unlike other foreigners at Canton, the bulk of the Spanish trade was not in tea but rather in silk (raw and manufactured). In 1759, the English recorded that 'Cetqua the Merchant who deals with the Spaniards sent up money to purchase 300 bales' of Nanking silk.[80] The Spanish trade seems to have been channelled exclusively through Poankeequa's Dafeng Hang, so this Cetqua could have been the 'partner' referred to above.

Although we do not have specific data, it is clear from other sources that the Pans continued to supply the Spanish ships with silks well into the nineteenth century. By examining a few of these entries, we get an idea of what Poankeequa might have been

handling each year. We can then also see more clearly how the Spanish trade complemented his overall operations and success.

On 14 October 1750 the English recorded that

> We hear there is a sloop arrived at Macao from Manilha, with some passengers on board, who have brought large sums of money with them to purchase wrought silks, with which they are to return in the month of April. We also understand that another ship will certainly follow, so that in all probability the Price of Raw Silk will rise very considerably.[81]

It does not say specifically that Poankeequa supplied the cargos for this Spanish ship, but we know from many other later examples that he took care of most of the trade with Manila. In June 1757, for example, a Spanish ship arrived at Macau from Manila. The Spaniards advanced about 200,000 Spanish dollars to Poankeequa, which he sent to his inland suppliers for raw silk and silk fabrics.[82]

In January 1763, the Dutch in Canton mentioned that Poankeequa 'has always traded with Manila via Macao'.[83] This entry is important because the trade between these two cities was disrupted from September 1762 to September 1764, when the English attacked and occupied Manila.[84] In September 1764, the Dutch reported the following.

> 1764, Sep 21: Learnt that several days ago a chaloup from Manila arrived in Macao, and a second is expected. Because their main exports consist of fine wares, especially silk fabrics and raw Nanking and Canton silk (of which latter the Chinese at Manila make fabrics) the Canton silk especially must have risen there at least 10 per cent since the 7th of this month.[85]

On 4 April 1765, Dutch officers in Macao reported that Poankeequa had arrived 'from Canton in order to dispatch the cargo of the Spanish sloop from Manila, which he is always in charge of'. By 11 April, everything was in order; the Spanish sloop was ready to embark on its return trip to Manila, and Poankeequa left Macao for Canton.[86] In January 1768, another Spanish ship arrived off Macao from Manila with 70 chests containing 110,000 Spanish dollars. In this case, the records do not say how the Spaniards planned to use the money, but we can assume that most of those funds went to Poankeequa to make purchases.[87] In December 1768, another Spanish ship arrived at Macao with 50,000 Spanish dollars.[88]

From the mid-1760s to the mid-1770s, there were at least two 'Spanish' vessels that sailed regularly between Manila and Macao. One ship was the *Nuestra Señora del Carmen* under command of Captain Pacheco. Pacheco made the trip every year and was closely connected to Poankeequa's cohorts. Captains Casten and Soares also commanded ships that sailed to Macao in these years.[89] The Spaniards Don Jorge san Clemente (or George san Clemente) and Don Juan Francisco Solano consigned cargos on their vessels.[90] Demetrio Nasarre was also involved in the trade with Clemente.[91] It was necessary to have Spaniards aboard the ships in order to trade at Macao. The crews of the two vessels, however, consisted of Chinese sailors.[92]

On 19 October 1769, Captain Casten arrived at Macao from Manila. His ship brought 60 to 70,000 Spanish dollars to invest in a return cargo. According to the

Dutch, most of this money would be used to purchase silk fabrics and porcelain. Pacheco was in Canton at the time purchasing a cargo for his ship. He had 140 to 150,000 Spanish dollars to invest in mostly raw silk and silk fabrics. The two ships left China on 25 December. On 8 April 1770, another Manila ship arrived under the command of Captain Dorado. Most of the money that these ships brought went to Poankeequa to purchase return cargos.[93]

On 30 November 1770, Captains Pacheco and Casten arrived at Macao again with several passengers. Each of their ships carried 175 chests of silver. The Dutch mentioned that there were 3,000 piastres (Spanish dollars) in each chest, which came to a total of 525,000 piastres. Part of the money belonged to the EIC and the private traders. The rest was to be invested in return cargos. The two captains left with their ships on 15 April 1771. The Dutch mentioned that they took with them 12,000 Spanish dollars, which they had planned to invest in more cargo, but they could not find enough of the items they had wanted (possibly owing to the silk quotas discussed in Chapter 9).[94]

On 25 April 1773, Captains Pacheco and Matthias Soares left Macao for Manila. Pacheco's ship was loaded with 80,000 piastres worth of silk of both Nanking and Canton varieties, plus Chinese cinnamon. Soares's ship carried 50,000 piastres worth of a similar cargo.[95] All of these incoming Manila ships would have been secured by Poankeequa and most of their cargos supplied by him.

By the late 1760s, Poankeequa's second and third sons (Youwei 有為 and Youxun 有勳) were in their twenties and old enough to send into the interior to buy the outbound cargos.[96] Poankeequa had agents in the interior who kept him continually informed of changes in the market. It is important to note that these connections to China's inland supplies, especially silk, had their origins in the trade with the Spanish, which his father had established and nurtured decades earlier. The important role of the Manila trade in the Pan family's overall operations has not been given its due recognition in previous studies. A couple of examples from the EIC records will suffice to show that his advantages in silk continued in later years.

> 1770, Dec 11: PuanKhequa was adjudged the most proper person [to obtain the silks we wanted] . . . He accepted of our commission and has wrote to Sou-Chew to his son who is established there to buy for us any quantity he can get not exceeding the limitation we have given him of 600 peculs. The price not to exceed tales 280 per pecul.[97]
>
> 1771, Jan 4: PuanKhequa rec'ed last night an answer from his son at Chinchew relative to the commission we gave him concerning raw silk. He says there was not above fifty bales in the place which were bought up by one person at 300 tales per pecul which could not be delivered on board under 315 tales. We are sorry to have been disappointed in our endeavors to send home some raw silk.[98]

In 1776, another Spanish ship, under command of Captain Monte Negro, arrived at Macao, and Poankeequa was named its security merchant.[99] In 1778, the English mentioned that some of the Spaniards in Canton had 'taken a factory for themselves as thinking that in the House of Puan Khequa they had neither so much freedom to trade nor so good accomodations [*sic*] as they wished'.[100] Up to this year, Poankeequa had

been providing the Spaniards with accommodations at Canton. From 1778 onwards they seemed to have had their own factory, but we know that they did not display the Spanish flag there until 1788.[101] However, the largest share of the Spanish trade continued to be handled by Poankeequa.

The silver from Manila, of course, came originally from Mexico. Many of the silk fabrics that were manufactured in Manila went to South America.[102] It is important to note these connections because we do not always have specific references stating that such and such a ship had a specific amount of silver on board or was exporting so many piculs of silk. We need to read between the lines to understand what was actually happening.

Even though the following references do not give specific figures, we can imagine Poankeequa receiving a large amount of silver from the Spaniards in exchange for silk. On 20 December 1782, for example, the English officers reported that 'Three Spanish ships from Manilha are now at Amoy; & with P. Khequa's assistance, are preparing to unload with their customary cargoes.'[103] On 14 August 1783, the Dutch mentioned that a Spanish ship arrived at Macao from Acapulco, via Manila.[104] In February 1786, the governor general in Canton ordered some Catholic priests to be repatriated on two Spanish ships that were docked at Whampoa. Poankeequa was the security merchant (fiador) for these ships, so he was responsible for their departure.[105] In October 1786, the Dutch mentioned that the French, Spaniards and others were purchasing large quantities of Nanking raw silk which pushed prices up.[106] Meanwhile the private English and Spanish ships also exported a lot of raw Canton silk in 1786.[107]

Before 1783, most of Poankeequa's Manila trade was handled through Macao. Beginning in 1783, some Spanish ships went to Macao, whereas others went directly to Whampoa.[108] In 1785, 4 Spanish ships arrived at Whampoa[109]; in 1786, 3 ships[110]; in 1787, 2 ships[111]; in 1788, 4 ships; and in 1790 and 1791, 1 ship each year.[112] Unfortunately, we do not have an accurate count of the Spanish arrivals at Macao in these years. Later entries reveal that Macao continued to be the preferred port for most of the Spanish trade. In 1790, for example, 1 Spanish ship arrived at Whampoa and 21 ships arrived at Macao[113]; in 1794, 2 Spanish ships arrived at Whampoa and 8 ships at Macao[114]; in 1795, 2 Spanish ships arrived at Whampoa and 16 ships at Macao[115]; and in 1796, 1 Spanish ship arrived at Whampoa and 12 ships at Macao.[116] Macao was clearly the favoured port for Spanish trade.

Poankeequa's successors continued to maintain control over the Spanish trade into the nineteenth century. Spanish ships continued to carry primarily silk and Nankings. On 11 October 1802, English officers recorded that, up till a few years back, the Spaniards had been the sole importers of cochineal into Canton. This dye was used mostly in colouring silk fabrics for export, which the Spaniards would have purchased. Because Poankeequa II had 'constant dealings with the Spaniards' he, in turn, had 'superior advantages in acquiring' knowledge about cochineal. This entry suggests that Poankeequa II continued to have control over the Manila trade, as his father had done before him.[117]

In a reference to the early nineteenth century, the American trader Waln also commented that 'The Spaniards have a Factory at Canton, where they support their

supercargoes; their shipm^ts^ to Europe consist principally of Silks, Nankins & other Chinese goods. They take no tea.'[118] The Spanish cargos continued to be comprised mostly of silk, which was supplied primarily by Poankeequa's successors. By retaining control over a dominant share of the cochineal imports, Poankeequa II also secured a dominant share of the silk exports that were coloured with that dye.

The Spanish trade between Manila and China has received very little attention in previous studies of the Pan family.[119] That trade has also not been well represented in the histories of Macao.[120] But, as we can see from the ship numbers above, the trade with Manila was very significant in the late eighteenth century. I list below a few more specific examples.

In the 1760s and 1770s, the junk (also called a 'Champan' or sampan) *Quim Contay* sailed between Manila and Macao each year. The vessel was commanded by Captain Tan Matay 陳協順 who was said to be a cousin to Poankeequa (Plate 03.16).[121] From the 1760s to at least 1796, Gregorio Chan, a Chinese Christian who lived in Manila, took care of much of this trade for Poankeequa and sons.[122] Gregorio travelled back and forth to Macao and Canton almost every year. In the 1790s, he was joined by Cheong Leoqua who was said to be a nephew to Poankeequa.[123] Cheong Leoqua lived in Manila and helped Gregorio Chan manage the trade (see below and Appendixes 3B and 3E).

In February 1785, the English supercargos heard that Poankeequa was supplying a great deal of raw silk to 'the Spaniards who are in want of silk and have money to advance for it'.[124] He welcomed the Spaniards when they arrived in early March.[125] Because of strong demand, Poankeequa kept his prices up. In March of the same year, the Dutch reported that there was a scarcity of silk in Canton. They thought that the two Manila ships in port at the time would have to layover a season owing to insufficient quantities of silk to complete their cargos.[126]

This discussion of Poankeequa's Manila trade highlights two important factors. First, the Manila trade was one of his main sources of silver, which set him apart from his competitors. He had relatives and associates in Manila who were Catholics; he was related to one of the captains and persons who took care of that trade in Macao; he had good connections to silk suppliers in the Nanjing and Canton areas; he had family members in Fujian taking care of the Manila-Fujian trade; and he could communicate with the Spaniards in their own language. While the volume and monetary amounts linked to the Spanish trade in many years were not large compared to that of the EIC, it was nonetheless a very steady business. Moreover the Manila ships were now arriving at Macao at all times of the year. They brought Poankeequa silver when he needed it most.[127]

Because of these advantages with the Spanish, no other merchants in Canton could compete with Poankeequa in that sector. Second, the Manila trade provided him with a very important reason to establish himself at Canton. By the 1730s, his father had already made the connections between Manila, Fujian, and the silk producing areas near Nanjing. The only part of the Spanish trade that the Pans did not control was based in Canton. After Poankeequa settled there in the 1730/40s, he firmed up his links to the silk producers in Guangdong Province. These connections gave him a monopoly over the Spanish trade.

The silk business gave the Pans a regular and constant source of silver from Mexico. This fact helps to explain the family's great success. The Spanish trade was undoubtedly one of the key factors behind Poankeequa's rapid rise in the 1750s. With his backward linkages to the silk supplies in Nanjing and Canton, he could offer the best products.

In the 1750s, Poankeequa gained control over a good part of the Swedish cargos as well.[128] He and Swequa were the major suppliers of the Swedish ships. When Swequa died in July 1761, his brother Tjobqua succeeded him (Chapter 1). Poankeequa gradually took over much of the Swedish trade and, by the mid-1760s, he had the major share. The Swedish ships usually stopped at Cadiz to exchange building materials for silver coin. They used that money to purchase return cargos in China in a triangular trade pattern.[129] In 1766, the Dutch mentioned that the Swedes purchased their fine teas from no other source than Poankeequa.[130]

Poankeequa became the largest provider of the Swedish cargos and he received in payment the largest share of their silver. This connection to the Swedish money was undoubtedly a benefit to Poankeequa when the Manila trade was disrupted in the early 1760s. By this time, Poankeequa was a major supplier of the French ships as well, which gave him access to large amounts of their silver. In some years, the French were very proud of their silver stock and made a grand display for all to see.[131]

> 1763, Sep 22: At first the French made a large display with their cash, by letting 100 chests of money come up [to Canton] with all their boats, which were manned very heavily by soldiers, and now no one will purchase their ginseng, sea coral, ebony wood, drapery, and other wares of this nature, but everyone is trying to get cash from them.[132]

I mention the French trade here because it was another key factor in Poankeequa's success. However, because the number of French ships to arrive each year was very unpredictable and because the French might have a lot of silver one year and none the next, it was not a steady source to be relied upon. The Spanish and Swedish ships, on the other hand, tended to depend heavily on silver imports to purchase cargos. They were fairly consistent from one year to the next. Poankeequa probably had a good idea of how many Spanish and Swedish ships were likely to arrive each year, and how much silver they would have on board.

After the Seven Years War (1756–1763), the EIC found it increasingly difficult to obtain enough silver to send to China. In the late 1770s, and several years thereafter, the EIC ships brought no silver, but rather fabrics and other merchandise.[133] This meant that Poankeequa's connections to companies that relied more on silver imports became even more important over time. It gave him the capital needed to finance trade and meet debt obligations.

With much of the Spanish and Swedish trade under his control, Poankeequa could be more selective in dealing with the English, Danes, Dutch, and others. The EIC divided its trade among five or more merchants, and Poankeequa was one of them. After the 1780s, the French trade declined; after 1794, the VOC sent no more ships to China. Because of the Napoleonic Wars, the Danish and Swedish ships ceased going to China after 1806. These changes made the English trade more important to the Pan

family. During Poankeequa's lifetime the Spanish and Swedish ships were the main sources of his capital and overall success.

As mentioned above, Poankeequa was always involved with the Canton junk trade to Southeast Asia. Much of that trade was done on a barter basis, with little silver involved. It was nonetheless a vital part of his business that we need to understand in order to appreciate the extent of his operations.

## THE DAFENG HANG AND POANKEEQUA'S JUNK TRADE

Appendix 3E shows the junks that operated out of the Dafeng Hang with their destinations and sponsors. Appendix 3B shows some of the people who were involved in the Southeast Asian and Manila trade. The junks made voyages to Cochin China, Batavia, Cambodia, and Passiak each year. A seventh junk, *Quim Contay* (mentioned above), was based in Manila and sailed to Macao each year. This junk also made voyages to ports in Southeast Asia (Appendix 3E). In the 1760s and 1770s, *Quim Contay* operated out of the firm Xieshun Gongsi 協順公司 in Manila (Plate 03.18). This firm was owned by Captain Tan Matay.

Gregorio Chan and Cheong Leoqua (mentioned above) were closely involved with the Manila trade. The Swedish traders Grill and Grubb also invested in the trade to the Philippines. Plate 03.15, for example, is a letter in Spanish from Gregorio Chan to Grill dated 22 June 1764. It gives a report of a voyage to the Philippine Islands. The 'D$^{n}$ Jorge' and 'S$^{or}$ Pan Ke qua' on the second page are references to Don Jorge san Clemente and Poankeequa, respectively.[134] Being a Catholic and fluent in Spanish, Gregorio Chan was a good person to be handling Poankeequa's Manila trade.[135]

Gregorio Chan kept a house in Macao where his wife lived.[136] He intermingled well with the Catholic community there. In 1792, for example, the Mandarins demanded money from him which they claimed he owed. Gregorio had helped the Dutch hire some Chinese sailors for the ship *Rozenburg*. The Chinese officials apparently found out about it and wanted their share. Gregorio fled to St Paul's Church where he held up for several days under the protection of the Macao Bishop.[137]

Plate 03.16 is an inventory of the cargo on *Quim Contay* dated in Manila 7 May 1765. It is signed by Captain Tan Matay 陳協順 in Chinese and Jorge san Clemente. Grubb, Grill and Poankeequa (Phwa Kequa) are mentioned on the first page. Plate 03.18 is a recap of *Quim Contay*'s voyage to the Philippines in 1765 showing the money that was invested. Captain Tan Matay, Poankeequa, Grubb, Grill and Clemente are all mentioned. These transactions were done through the firm Xieshun Gongsi.[138]

Plates 03.19, 03.21 and 03.22 are letters written to Grill, in Spanish, from Poankeequa. They discuss other investments on Tan Matay and Clemente's voyage to the Philippines on *Quim Contay* in May and June 1766. Plate 03.23 shows a list of the investments made by Grubb and Grill. Plate 03.25 has further discussion about Grill's investments in *Quim Contay* and with Captain Tan Matay. Jorge san Clemente was involved in all of these transactions. These examples illustrate the close relationship Poankeequa had with these men. They reveal also that Poankeequa was handling this trade. No other Hong merchants are mentioned.

One of Poankeequa's writers, named Seequa (different from his brother), managed the Manila trade from Canton. He arranged the purchase of Spanish imports at Macao and he transhipped the exports from Canton. Seequa continued to manage Poankeequa's Manila shipments until he was appointed a Hong merchant in 1782.[139]

Poankeequa was actively involved in the Dafeng Hang junks as well. Plate 03.10 is a bottomry contract the Swedes gave to Tan Quiqua (Chan Queyqua) to finance the junk *Samkonghing* (Sanguangxing 三廣興) on a voyage to Cochin China and Batavia in 1761. Poankeequa was a co-signer on the loan, which made him liable if Quiqua failed to repay the money. This transaction was conducted out of the Dafeng Hang. In fact, this is the only document I have found that actually used the Dafeng Hang stamp. The bottomry loan was for 1,300 Spanish dollars at 30 percent interest. As I have discussed elsewhere, this was not annual interest but rather interest that was applied to a voyage from about 8 to 13 months. The normal interest rate on a junk bottomry contract for a voyage from Canton to Batavia was 40 percent.[140] I have found no explanation as to why this contract was 30 percent. Perhaps it was done as a favour to Poankeequa for some other advantage he had shown the Swedes. The principal and interest became due when the junk arrived safely at Canton. The reverse side of this contract shows that the Swedes had borrowed this money from Antonio Baptista Stamma, an Armenian based in Macao.[141]

In January 1764, the Dutch in Canton shipped merchandise to Batavia aboard the junk *Samkonghing*. Plate 03.14 is the bill of lading for this shipment. The name of the transport company was the same as the junk *Samkonghing Gongsi* 三廣興公司. However, the chop has a different name Xiangxingtongsi 祥興同司. The cargo consisted of porcelain, rhubarb, Nanking linens, musk, and radix china. The captain on this voyage was Tsjon Sinqua (Zhang Zhenguan 張陣觀).

Plate 03.20 is another bill of lading for goods the Dutch shipped aboard the *Samkonghing* in March 1766. The captain this time was Whan Cancongh (Wen Jingguan 溫敬官). The cargo consisted of only 46 bundles of empty gunny sacks (25 sacks to a bundle) and one bundle with 18 sacks making a total of 1,168 sacks. The Dutch shipped pepper from Java to Canton in sacks, and regularly shipped the empty sacks back to Java after the pepper was delivered.[142]

Junks going to Batavia often stopped at Cochin China on their way out and/or on the return passage. The *Samkonghing* was a junk of around 250 tons.[143] Plate 03.01 is a detail of a painting of Canton in the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam from ca. 1771.[144] It shows *Samkonghing* anchored before the city. On 30 November 1772, the Swede Jacob Hahr reported that *Samkonghing* was lost in the passing year and that Tan Quiqua (Chan Queyqua) was now destitute owing to that misfortune. The Armenian Antonio Baptista Stamma was still investing in this junk up to the time it sank.[145]

Plate 03.02 is a detail of a painting of Canton in the British Library from ca. 1782. It shows the junk *Konghing* (廣興) anchored in front of the city. This junk may have been the replacement for the *Samkonghing*. The *Sam* (三) in front of the name in Plate 03.01 simply meant that it was the third *Konghing* (廣興).

Poankeequa invested in other junk voyages besides those operating out of the Dafeng Hang. In 1765, for example, he helped finance junk *Chantongchow*'s

(Shandongzhou 山東艌) voyage to Batavia and Cochin China (Appendix 3E). In 1767, he invested in the junk *Eckhing*'s voyage to Cochin China. On 1 November 1767, after *Eckhing* had returned, it caught fire while at anchor in the river in front of Canton and burnt. The Danes mentioned that Poankeequa was one of the losers from this unfortunate incident.[146] The loss of the *Eckhing* and *Samkonghing* are examples of other factors affecting Hong merchants' solvency.

Besides Poankeequa, other sponsors of the Dafeng Hang junks include Gau Semqua (Qiu Kun 邱崑) of the Yifeng Hang 義豐行 and Monqua (Chapter 2). The most prominent financier of the Canton junks was Ngan Hongsia (Yan Xiangshe 顏享舍). He was a relative of the Hong merchant Swetia in the Taihe Hang 泰和行. Ma Guohu 馬國護 was another investor. He was not a Hong merchant and seems to have been only involved in the junk trade (Appendix 3E).[147]

The last reference I have to the Dafeng Hang is from 1769. The Dutch shipped cargo to Batavia on the junk *Honka* (Huangzai 黃仔), under the command of Tsoa Tsoaqua (Cai Zouguan 蔡諏觀). The vessel was fitted out in the Dafeng Hang.[148] Although this shipment ends the references I have to Poankeequa's junk trade, it was not the end of his involvement in that commerce. Most of these references come from the Dutch and Swedish archives. In the 1770s, both of those nationals ceased recording information about junks.

I now return to Poankeequa's story after the Co-hong was dissolved.

## THE END OF THE CO-HONG

On 13 February 1771 the governor general (Tsontock) declared to the foreign community in Canton that the Co-hong was officially disbanded.[149] There was a lot of concern raised among the foreign community about how this change would affect their trade. The companies saw it as something positive, because they could use the increased competition to their advantage by pressuring merchants to their terms. Private foreign investors, however, were not so optimistic. They hoped that this change would not affect the repayment of the moneys owed to them by the Hong merchants.

Plate 03.25 is a letter dated 23 February 1771 written in Spanish by Poankeequa to the Jean Abraham Grill in Gothenburg. On the first page, he states that the Co-hong had ended and that the debts of the six small houses would be paid within three years. A Swedish letter written by Jacob Hahr in Canton to Grill, two days after the letter above, also states that the debts of the Hong merchants were to be settled within one to three years.[150] These letters are not explicit but they seem to suggest that the debts being discussed were those privately owed to the Swedish officers by the Hong merchants. As we have seen, the Swedes were much involved in loaning money to Chinese, and collecting high interest. Hahr advised Grill to keep this knowledge to himself so that the company's directors would not 'react badly' to the news.[151]

On 9 March 1771, Poankeequa informed the Dutch supercargoes that he was going to quit the trade and hand the management of his house over to his son. He cleared the transfer with the Mandarins, and on 15 April, wrote to the Dutch supercargoes (who were in Macao) notifying them that his son was now in charge of the business and that

he had retired from the day-to-day activities of trade. He would continue to keep a close eye on the business but would no longer be involved in negotiating.[152]

Poankeequa then apparently went to visit his family in Fujian. We know this because the Dutch mentioned on 28 September that he had 'finally returned from his trip'.[153] There is no mention of Poankeequa being in Canton from 15 April until his return, which is why several other names begin to show up in the records. After retirement, Poankeequa kept his home in Canton with his immediate family. He continued to deal with foreigners, sometimes negotiating contracts and advising wherever needed. But the actual handling, packing and shipping of all the goods was now being done by his son, secretaries (called 'writers'), and other members in his house.

In reality, Poankeequa did not leave the trade altogether. The Hoppos and Mandarins continued to rely on his experience and influence and called on him regularly to help with delicate issues. He also shows up fairly regularly in the foreign records, handling various matters. Perhaps we could say that he was semi-retired.

From 1771 and thereafter, Poankeequa's head writer, Howqua (also spelled Hanqua, Hauqua or Houqua), shows up regularly in the records as the person taking care of many correspondences with the Chinese officials.[154] In the Dutch records, his son is not mentioned by name, but anonymously as 'Poankeequa's successor'.[155] Shortly thereafter Poankeequa's nephew Kengsiangqua shows up as the person taking care of the Tongwen Hang. On 16 August 1771, for example, this man went to the Dutch factory to inquire into the amount of pepper and tin they had on hand.[156]

On 1 January 1772, another great feast was held in honour of the 81st birthday of the emperor's mother. As in the December 1761 celebration, the Dutch tell us that all of the important foreigners and Chinese met at a place called the 'Cochin Chinese Pagoda'. This building was probably the Temple of Longevity (Changshou si 長壽寺) which was situated just north of the factories.[157] The Dutch wrote that it was decorated with many ribbons. Poankeequa and the other principal merchants were again in attendance and all of the important guests (including foreigners) were carried to the event in palanquins, with the linguists arranging everything. Just like the birthday celebration ten years before, this one closed with a stage performance (comedy), and the guests were then carried back to their homes (in palanquins). Of course, the costs of the event were passed to the Chinese merchants.[158]

In July 1772, the VOC ship *Rijnsburg* sank near Sanchuan Island 三川島 on its way to China. The Dutch supercargoes were anxious to salvage what they could from the wreck. They asked Poankeequa to obtain permission from the Chinese authorities. On 4 March 1773, Poankeequa was informed by the governor general (Tsontock) that 40 percent of the salvaged goods would have to go to the emperor. The remaining 60 percent were for the Dutch to distribute as they saw fit.[159]

In order to replace the lost ship, the Dutch purchased the Portuguese ship *S. Simão* in Macao and renamed it the *Herstelder*. The purchasing of this ship caused Poankeequa considerable trouble with the Tsontock and Hoppo in Canton and the Hoppo in Macao. The latter man did not want to lose the duties from this ship, and the former men did not want to raise suspicions with the emperor or cause trouble with Macao. Poankeequa was caught between these officials in representing the Dutch. He

also arranged for a salvage (diving) team to be sent out to the sunken ship. He asked for orders to be sent to the Mandarin in that district to protect the wreck from being plundered by local fisherman. Poankeequa was tied up all of September taking care of these matters, while his son and others were running the business. In the end, the *Herstelder* was allowed to go upriver, and a couple of junks were sent out to the *Rijnsburg* to begin the salvage operation.[160]

In February 1773, the English supercargoes asked Poankeequa to deliver a petition to the viceroy (governor general). This document was from the Portuguese Governor Saldana in Macao requesting the governor general to intercede in the prosecution of an Englishman, Francis Scott, who had been accused of murdering a Chinese. According to the EIC supercargoes, Scott was innocent of all charges, but they feared he would be convicted anyway. The governor general, however, greatly objected to this irregular mode of communicating with him. He ordered Governor Saldana to go through the traditional channels via the county magistrate in charge of Macao.[161]

In August 1773, Poankeequa secluded himself from the public to mourn his mother's death (for the customary three-months). By October he was back again taking care of his affairs. On 9 November he sent word to the Dutch that the salvage team had recovered 3 chests from the *Rijnsburg* containing 314 bars of silver.[162]

We do not have figures for Poankeequa's EIC trade. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, from 1771 English officers began recording the shares of trade that each Hong merchant was allotted. The data are incomplete, with some years missing. Poankeequa was granted an equal or greater share than other merchants. In the early 1770s, he and Ingsia usually had a 1/4th share. We have no figures for 1777 to 1783. By 1784, Poankeequa's share had risen to 3/8ths, larger than any other merchant. We must remember, however, that merchants regularly took over shares of failed merchants in exchange for paying the debts left by those men. The larger shares gave them additional profits to make the payments. It is difficult to attach a dollar figure to these EIC distributions. Poankeequa's share would probably have been in the hundreds of thousands of taels in most years.

Poankeequa had little or no trade with the Dutch before 1773. The VOC ledgers (*grootboeken*) from 1734 to 1756 have not survived, so we have no figures for those years. Other Dutch records, however, show him doing little or nothing with the VOC. This was partially owing to the Dutch favouring his adversary, Cai Hunqua, and the two merchants that Hunqua was allied with. By 1773, the Dutch had lost much of their confidence in this alliance and turned to Poankeequa to supply a portion of their cargos.[163]

As the figures in Appendix 3D reveal, Poankeequa had significant shares of the VOC trade in 1773, totalling 106,576 taels. The next year was only about half that amount. His Dutch trade dropped off to almost nothing thereafter. In many years from 1775 to 1788, the Dutch did no trade with Poankeequa. In 1791 they traded a small amount with Poankeequa's son and successor, and a rather large amount in 1792 (184,674 taels). This outcome was not because the Dutch did not respect Poankeequa. In February 1775, for example, they referred to him as the most solid of all the Hong merchants.[164] The move away from Poankeequa was instead the result of the Dutch

forming another group of favoured merchants with whom they did most of their business (see Chapter 2).

Poankeequa's financial success made him a prominent target for the repayment of failed merchants' debts. In November 1774, he took over Cai Anqua's remaining debt with the EIC of 7,251 taels.[165] This amount was just pocket change for him, but many larger debts were handed to him as well, for which we have little or no data. From March to the end of July 1775, Poankeequa was in Amoy paying respects to his deceased mother.[166] On 8 August 1776, the English received a letter from Poankeequa stating that 'he had the misfortune of having his Woman's House burnt which had thrown all his family into great confusion'.[167]

By 1775, the Hong merchants were feeling the full effects of the fierce competition that had emerged after the abolition of the Co-hong and the failures that followed. In order to bring some stability back into the trade, Poankeequa and others tried to establish another Co-hong. He was now the wealthiest merchant in the port, which meant he also had the most to lose.

On 24 February 1775, the Dutch feared that, if a new Co-hong was established, within two or three years Poankeequa would become master of everything. Of course, the Dutch wanted to prevent that from happening. They mentioned that everyone was anxiously waiting for the governor general to return from Beijing to find out whether or not a new Co-hong would be allowed.[168] In the following year there was more talk of establishing a new Co-hong.

On 1 August 1776, the Danes recorded that a new Co-hong was about to be established, which the Chinese merchants had been trying to promote for the past two years. This new organization was to be made up of the nine houses that remained from the previous Co-hong. There were originally ten houses, but Tjobqua failed in 1772 (Chapter 1). A surcharge was to be applied to exports in order to pay the arrears of the Yifeng Hang which was on the verge of bankruptcy. The fund would also be used to pay for presents to superiors each year and other expenses.[169]

Here is what the English recorded.

> 1776, Aug 8: [EIC committee in Macao] By the compradore rec'd a letter from PuanKhequa . . .
>
> Relative to the contents of their letter about the Hong merchants having entered into a Conhong he could assure them it was not a fact: But as the Tzuntoc [governor general] apprehended a glut of goods would this year be imported by the Country ships, he had called the merchants together, & recommended to them to fix a price on each article of the imports, such a one as might be esteemed reasonable both by buyer, & seller which had by his recommendation been carried into execution, & therefore it was not his business but, the pleasure of the Tayeen, and observes if the Council do not trust to what he relates, they may concinced [conceived? convinced?] from all Hands of the truth of what he asserts on their arrival at Canton.
>
> He says this affair cannot be so well explained by letter but as soon as he sees the Council at Canton he shall be ready to give them all the satisfaction herein they can require.[170]

1776, Aug 14: [EIC committee in Macao] We took under consideration what mode would be most advicable to pursue to put a stop to the combination which thô not in every particular settled, the Hong merchants had made great progress in forming upon the plan we received information of at Macao, and which we communicated to PuanKhequa by letter dated the 12th July, & which was now currently reported to be supported under the patronage of the Tzuntoc, & Hoppo thô no publick edict had as yet been issued for carrying the association into execution.[171]

1776, Aug 20: [EIC committee in Canton] Having in a great measure made ourselves masters of the several regulations with which by the combination contrived by the Hong merchants, the trade was designed to be oppressed, it was judged most advisable to hear what PuanKhequa could have to say in his justification on the subject, and at the same time to declare to him our resolution should an association so destructive to the Hon'ble Company's trade at Canton take place.

He was therefore sent to and accordingly came to the Council.

When he was told with what surprize we received the intelligence of his having been the adviser and manager of a monopoly so contrary to his engagements, and which in every instance pointed out destruction to a free trade in opposition to the assurances he had constantly from time to time made us.

By way of excuse he laboured much to prove by many evasive, and fallacious arguments that this association could not be termed a Conhong nor by any means affect the interest of the Hon'ble Company but on the contrary must be a security to their property as by this means only the merchants could be secured from ruin.

We appealed to him whether an imposition of 10 PCt the merchants themselves had thought proper to lay / without publick sanction from government for so doing / on the importation of pepper, lead, tin, cotton, putchuck, & sandal wood, as well as additional 10 PCt on all exports, a sum sufficient to raise a fund to the amount of upwards of 500,000 tales, said to be reserved for the purchase of toys, & jewellery to be presented to the mandarines, & other purposes: also the prices that the merchants had at their discretion arbitrarily fixed on all exports as well as the above mentioned imports would not be an unsupportable grievance the weight whereof must ultimately fall on the Hon'ble Company's trade.

Tho' he confessed a deposit of 10 PCt on the imports, as well as 10 PCt on all exports was proposed yet he said if there was not a call for so large an amount (which in all probability there might not be) the residue would at the end of the Season be repaid to each individual who had made such deposit.

The reply made him to this assertion was if such a tax was by no means necessary why levy it? and if neither Conhong nor Monopoly was intended why had there been so much pains taken to oblige every Hong Merchant to enter into such firm Engagements respecting the Prices of the Imports, & the imposition of 10 PCt both inward, & outward. He still continuing to defend his conduct, and insisting these regulations by no means interfered with his engagements: We endeavored to convince him to the contrary by repeating to him his obligation wherein he binds himself, That the old Conhong should not be reestablished, or a New Conhong formed, or that the Imports, or Exports should be charged with any tax, or imposition whatever except the Emperor's legal duties; And moreover he was assured that he must by no means expect proctection [sic] of our Favour to his House should so destructive a Combination continue in force 'till he had fulfilled his Engagements.

> We then acquainted him we should this evening desire a meeting of the Hong merchants, & hoped he would attend on the occasion, which he promised to do & took his leave . . .
>
> In the evening the Hong merchants by appointment assembled when they were acquainted that their attendance was desired to repeat to them our firm, & steady detestation of a combination in whatever shape held out to us which we were convinced had at their instance been formed, or forming on the plan of an imposition of 10 PC$^{t}$ they had themselves thought proper to lay on the importation of pepper, lead, tin, cotton, putchuck, & sandal wood as well as an additional 10 PC$^{t}$ on all exports, and imports, sufficient to raise a fund to the amount of 500,000 taels / proposed as said to be reserved for the purchase of toys & jewellery to be presented to the mandarines, & other purposes and of a scheme they had carried into execution of arbitrarily at their own discretion fixing the prices on all exports as well as the abovementioned imports, resolutions diametrically in opposition to the publick Edict issued at the abolition of the late Conhong, & declaration of the Mandarines last Season that the Trade at Canton should be carried on as heretofore.
>
> PuanKhequa endeavoured by the same vague arguments he had made use of in the morning to distinguish between a Conhong and a company established under the intended regulations; to whose assertions reply was made that from the institution of the one or the other, and the consequences certain destruction must ensue to our Company by the Burthen ultimately falling on their trade, and after great pains had been taken to make the merchants comprehend the force of our arguments and no fresh matter being started by any of them. We concluded by declaring to them.
>
> That we could by no means transact Business under such an oppressive Monopoly: That we should therefore take the first Opportunity to lay our Grievances before the Tzuntoc, & Hoppo of whose protection, & patronage should we not be so happy to avail ourselves we then should determine what step to pursue but they might depend the abettors, & Contrivers of such a System would infallibly on all occasions experience our just resentment.[172]

For a short time, there does indeed seem to have been a preliminary Co-hong in place. On 11 September 1776, for example, the Dutch asked Ingsia about the price of tin. He mentioned that he, Monqua and Chowqua had much difficulty setting the price of tin within the Co-hong. Owing to protests and their fear of Poankeequa and others in that society, they could not yet feel free to receive the tin, or quote a price.[173]

It should be pointed out, however, that in the example above the governor general had recommended that they 'fix a price on each article of the imports, such a one as might be esteemed reasonable both by buyer, & seller'.[174] This is another example of officials being intensely focused on making sure that prices fluctuated according to the pressures of supply and demand. They were well aware that if the prices were set too high or too low on each item that there would likely be adverse effects on growth. Qing officials saw the wisdom in merchants wanting to fix prices in order to provide a bit more protection and to meet all of their debt obligations, but the values that they assigned to those goods needed to fall within—or at least close to—the highs and lows of the current market.

On 1 October, the Dutch learned that the Hong merchants had gone to the Hoppo the day before with gifts and money to present their plan for a new Co-hong. Poankeequa had not gone with them because Hoppo De Kui 德魁 had refused to receive him—owing to some grievances between them. On 1 October, however, Poankeequa went along. The merchants were united in their efforts to convince the governor general that a Co-hong was needed. The governor general received them, heard their proposal, and replied that he would discuss it with the Hoppo. He promised to give them a quick reply. The Dutch commented that nothing would likely happen unless many gifts and money exchanged hands.[175]

On 17 October, the English sent a protest to the Hoppo concerning the possible establishment of a Co-hong and the 10 percent tax that was simultaneously proposed. While they were waiting for the Hoppo's reply, Poankeequa avoided contact with the English officers.

> 1776, Oct 24: [EIC in Canton] PuanKhequa as usual when any thing is in agitation which may give him trouble, and possibly ashamed of his double dealing has for some days past denied himself to us under a pretence of his being very ill, tho' he received one of our captains with whom he was in treaty for the purchase of part of his investment, & several other individuals.[176]

On 25 October, the Hoppo met with each of the Hong merchants concerning the protest that the English had sent to him. He expressed his support for them, but announced that the Co-hong could not be allowed. They then made an alternative request. They wanted the small outside merchants to bear some of the cost of the presents that had to be given to the Mandarins each year.

> (T)he small merchants and shopkeepers are exempted from the heavy costs of paying for the presents to the Mandarins. They are busy because they can sell their wares for less, while we [Hong merchants] remain sitting with our goods.[177]

I have no information about how the Hoppo reacted to this suggestion. As is shown in later chapters, in 1779 and later years, the porcelain and silk dealers were indeed asked to bear some of the costs of presents to the Mandarins.

On 2 November, the Hoppo gave his reply to the EIC protest about the proposed taxes and the establishment of the Co-hong. He could not understand why the English were complaining. He mentioned that he had consulted with all of the Hong merchants, and that they knew nothing about a 10 percent tax. He added that, if any of the Hong merchants should try to collect such a tax, that he should be notified, and he would take care of it. That was the end of the matter.[178] The idea of establishing a new Co-hong continued to emerge in later years, but it never happened.

The new association was not allowed because it was not deemed to be good for trade. Even though Poankeequa was much wealthier and more powerful than he had been in 1771, he still could not push through something contrary to government interests. It did not matter how many gifts the merchants gave or how much money they paid in bribes, the reestablishment was not going to happen.

The Co-hong would bring more income protection to the Hong merchants through the control of prices. By this time, however, the government was not as concerned

with failures as it had been earlier. Of course, going into extensive debt was illegal and continued to be discouraged. Meanwhile the men who failed were subject to all the usual punishments. But, in practice, officials simply accepted failures as inevitable. Bankruptcies were unavoidable even though on paper they were illegal.

All that Hoppos needed to do in these cases was to make sure there were always a few healthy houses to absorb the debts of the failed men. The experience gained from the Co-hong in the 1760s showed that, if around ten firms were kept in operation, they could maintain a balance. With these ideas in mind, there was no need to introduce new measures to provide more protection for merchants. They were expendable.[179]

In June 1777, the Fouyeun (governor) ordered Poankeequa back to active duty. He was ordered to trade under his own name and not that of his nephew, as he had been doing since his semi-retirement in 1771.[180] It is interesting to note that the governor general Li Shiyao had just been reassigned to Yunnan Province 雲南省 a couple months earlier.[181] In order for Poankeequa to have retired in 1771, he would have had to give a large sum of money to government officials (such as 100,000 taels). Now that a new governor general was in office, who had not benefitted from previous payments from Poankeequa, his retirement was reversed. This is another coincidence that suggests that Poankeequa had used the 100,000 taels he received from the English in 1771 to effect his retirement from trade. He simply disguised the money as a 'bribe' so that the English would be willing to give it to him, and then gave the money to the top officials so that they would allow him to retire. This would account for why other foreigners were not asked to contribute. The Co-hong was about to end anyway so Poankeequa made use of this unique opportunity to devise a scheme whereby he could effectively have the English pay for his retirement under the guise of it being a payment to end the Co-hong. Such an act would be consistent with Poankeequa's double-dealing nature and also consistent with the way trade normally operated. Now that Li Shiyao was out of the picture, Poankeequa had to return to active duty.

In 1778, Poankeequa decided that he was not going to bear the costs of the 'presents' any longer. On 2 December of that year, a Chinese linguist reported to the Dutch that they could not ship their goods because of a dispute that had erupted among the Hong merchants. Poankeequa was asked to purchase some rarities from the private English merchant Dickenson. These 'presents' were to be given to the Hoppo and other Mandarins. Poankeequa refused to comply on the grounds that he thought all of the merchants should bear some of this expense. The Hoppo was angered at his refusal and stopped the trade until the matter was resolved.[182]

In October 1778, the EIC supercargos heard that another Co-hong was about to be established and sent a protest against the same to the governor and Hoppo.[183] Hoppo Tu Ming'a 圖明阿 gave the following reply.

> From his Excellency the Hoppo.
>
> The English Supracargoes have represented to me that the Merchants have associated themselves into a Conghong &ca.
>
> It is necessary to make a representation to the Emperor before permision can be had for any such agreement. I have given orders that some particular people

who have not behaved with honesty should be prohibited going to the European Factories.

Should any combination be formed by the Merchants I desire to be inform'd of it as it is not my intention that they should overrate their commodities, nor depreciate the value of the Goods imported by the Europeans, but I desire that these will also be cautious how they too easily give Credit to the reports propagated by evil minded people without any foundation.

Canton the 8th moon
In the 43d Year of the
Emperor King Long [Sep/Oct 1778][184]

Here again we see that the Co-hong could only be enacted with an order from the emperor. The Hoppo's response also shows clearly that the government was monitoring the prices of imports and exports to ensure that they were not arbitrarily raised or lowered by a combination of merchants. Officials were well aware that the best outcome for growth was to allow prices to fluctuate according to the pressures of supply and demand.

With all of the new information presented here and in the first volume about how the trade operated in Canton, I hope we can put to rest this idea that Poankeequa did away with the Co-hong with a bribe from the English. That makes no sense at all. The government maintained a consistent policy of how commerce was to be administered. The emperor was the only one who could make substantive changes in the foreign trade such as establishing or removing a regulatory body like the Co-hong. A bribe of 100,000 taels to local officials was simply not going to make that happen. Historical references that state things contrary to normal practices (such as this bribe) need to be cross-referenced to check their validity. Historians have been far too gullible in accepting as fact whatever they see written down on paper.[185] These examples also show clearly that we should no longer trust only in Morse's published *Chronicles* and the EIC records to tell the story of the Canton trade. There was much more to these exchanges than what was recorded in the British records.

On 30 July 1779, the Dutch reported that Poankeequa had returned to his homeland in order to rebury one of his wives, who had passed away fifteen years earlier.[186] This was undoubtedly a pleasant reprieve for him because the late 1770s were very troubling years for all of the Hong merchants. By 1780, two members of the three-merchant consortium, of which Poankeequa was so fearful of in the late 1750s, had failed (Chetqua and Ingsia). The third house (Cai Hunqua's) was in serious trouble as well and closed a few years later.[187] In time, Poankeequa would come to realize that, out of the ten firms of the Co-hong, his would be the only one to survive. Of course, he had to absorb many of the debts of those failed houses, for which we have few figures.

By the time he left for Fujian in 1779, Poankeequa was probably wondering how long he would be able to last.[188] He could at least take comfort in knowing that he still had the Swedish and Spanish trade tightly under his control, and he had very regular trade with the EIC. None of the other merchants posed any serious threat to his dominance. The English mentioned that

> 1780, Jan 15: Poan Khequa's debts to the English do not amount to more than eighty thousand Dollars. His abilities, and interest with the mandareens, make him the most useful man in the place, and with a little management, he is a merchant the most to be depended on.[189]

Debts between Chinese were much harder to collect than debts between Chinese and foreigners. As I have shown in the first volume, foreign companies had much more leverage in collecting the money owed to them by Chinese because the government did not want to discourage them from returning. In 1780, we have an example of Poankeequa using their greater protection for collecting foreign debts to his advantage.

> 1780, Apr 1: It will be necessary here to explain who Conqua is, as his name has not been mentioned either last year, or this, as a Hong Merchant. He was formerly of the Conghang and did a little business for a year or two, after that monopoly was put an end to; he has now for a long time done scarcely any with the Europeans; and makes little more use of his Hong Chop, than permitting shop keepers &ca. to ship off goods in his name; for doing which he is allowed PCentage.
>
> He now appears in this business from a very peculiar circumstance. In the year 1767 the Company did some business with him; and there remained a balance in their favor for pepper he had bought of tales ____. This he could not pay. PuankKhequa discharged the debt for him; and a bond was given for the amount. But as Khequa imagined he should have more trouble in recovering the money than an European would; he had the bond made out in the name of the late Mr. Robt. Gordon Surgeon to the factory, payable with an interest of Pr.Ct. ____. This Bond, now amounting with accumulated interest to _____ Khequa desired might be given in with the rest and the president desired Mr. Wm. Fitzhugh, who is a Holder of other bonds to put it down in his name.[190]

By transferring the debt to the deceased Englishman Gordon, Poankeequa could not only collect the debt from Conqua, but also earn interest on the outstanding balance. It is very unlikely that he could have collected this debt directly from Conqua. Without foreign involvement, Poankeequa would have had much less leverage to pressure officials or merchants for repayment.[191] The EIC could do this. If any problem occurred, Poankeequa could intervene and deliver a letter to the Hoppo and/or governor general to request payment be made. Of course, he would nominally be acting on the EIC's behalf, and not on his own. Thus, when we look at Hong merchants' debts and all of their foreign creditors we need to keep in mind that some of that money could actually be debts that were owed to other Hong merchants, but disguised as being 'foreign'.[192]

In August and September 1780, Poankeequa absented himself from trade owing to the death of his third son Youxun 有勳.[193] Poankeequa was now unrivalled in wealth, power and influence. The English saw this situation as a worse outcome than when the Co-hong existed.

> 1781, Dec 20: And it [the trade] is attended with so many disadvantageous circumstances as makes it infinitely worse than all former Cohongs and Associations: when the number of the merchants their Equality; their Jealousy & Competition; often made ineffectual the regulation of Prices; but at present the Superiority of PuanKhequa is so great, that the other merchants dare not deviate from the rules

> he lays down; & he may be said to have the absolute regulating of the European Trade.[194]

If the Co-hong had remained in effect, and not disbanded in early 1771, Poankeequa would have arrived at this position much earlier. This became clear after Cai Hunqua died in May 1770. This is why it was abolished and also why Poankeequa was not allowed to establish another Co-hong in 1776. Even with the market being opened more widely, he continued to dominate. However, as far as government was concerned, as long as prices remained somewhat competitive, this result was still better than giving Poankeequa a legal structure (the Co-hong) to formalize his control. With the trade remaining open for every licensed man to determine what was best, other merchants at least had a chance to gain a share of the market.

In June 1782, five new Hong merchants were appointed. Poankeequa's purser Howqua was appointed as well, but he declined. On 24 June 1782 the English recorded that 'Howqua Poan Khequa's purser is in great trouble, as the Tsongtoc [governor general] is determined to make him a salt merchant. He has absconded.'[195] He somehow worked things out, because on 4 August 1783 the Danes mentioned that Howqua (Poankeequa's former servant) had joined into partnership with Monqua.[196] Howqua became a Hong merchant in 1784.[197]

In 1782, Sinqua was asked to help the EIC dispose of a quantity of opium that had arrived on the ship *Nonsuch*. Probably out of fear of getting caught, Sinqua tried to get Poankeequa involved in this transaction. If Poankeequa would not help, then Sinqua at least wanted his sanction. Poankeequa declined to have any involvement with the deal. The English stated that he was wise to decline because 'his numerous enemies might lay hold of such a transaction to give him infinite trouble'.[198]

In the early 1780s, Poankeequa was often ill and absent from the trade for weeks at a time. He was now in his late 60s and early 70s. In 1783, Conseequa, 'a nephew of Puan Khequa's, and a very promising youth', begins to show up in the records.[199] Conseequa, however, traded on his own account, using other men's authority. He was eventually appointed a Hong merchant in 1797.[200]

In 1786, Poankeequa and other Hong merchants were asked to do what they could to encourage more rice imports—owing to dry weather and a severe shortage of grain. Poankeequa freighted the ship *Le Necker*, under Captain John Woolmore's command, to sail to Manila for a load of rice.[201] The country ship *Hastings* was also commissioned the same year to go to Manila for rice.[202] The Spanish ships from Manila also started carrying cargos of rice to China, probably at Poankeequa's request.[203]

In Autumn 1787, Poankeequa was indisposed for long periods. His son interceded on his behalf.[204] He emerged again in late December to finish up the trade for the season but he died a couple of weeks later.

> 1788, Jan 10: At three Oclock this morning died PuanKhequa in the 74th year of his age. After an illness which had confined hin to his bed for about ten days; he had been confined to his House during the greater part of this season by a complaint in his leg, which produced a discharge, and rather promoted than injured his health in other respects. But being advised to apply repellents, the humour fell upon his bowels and carried him off in spite of all the assistance that could be

> given by Mr. Duncan, who was sent for on the evening preceding his Death, and pronounced him irrecoverable.
>
> It is uncertain who will succeed him as head of the Co Hong but the business of his own house is to be conducted by his second son who has been his treasurer for some years past.
>
> Whether his Death will be attended with any inconvenience to the European trade, it is difficult to pronounce. He was certainly a man of great abilities, and could be extremely useful when so disposed, which seldom happened but when he was swayed by his own interest or apprehensions. It is very well known that he frequently caused embarrassments, that his consequence might appear his power to remove them, and was altogether of a nature so prone to intrigue, that should the son be able to keep up the credit and commercial consequence of the house, there is little reason to think his loss need be regretted.[205]

Poankeequa's fourth son, Youdu 潘有度, took over management of the Tongwen Hang. The wealth and influence of the house was so well-established that Youdu continued to dominate trade for another couple of decades. It would not be until the famous Houqua (of the Wu family) emerged in the early 1800s that anyone could challenge the great house of the Tongwen Hang. Monqua was appointed head of the Hong merchants in Poankeequa's place, but Youdu still had much influence in determining the direction of trade.

After his death, Poankeequa's son and successor continued to use the trade name Poankeequa (Pan Qiguan 潘啟官) and stamped his contracts with the personal chop *Weng* Pan Qiguan 翁潘啟官 (Plate 03.26).[206] Poankeequa's descendants continued his legacy. His fame, as one of the great merchants of the Thirteen Hongs, is still widely expressed today in newspapers and on the Internet.

## SUMMARY

If we were to sum up in a few words why Poankeequa succeeded when almost everyone else failed, what would we say? I can point to three factors that were central to his success. First and foremost were his insights on how to conduct business. He knew how to capture the Spanish and Swedish trade and to keep them under his control. He cut deals and maintained good relationships with both of those companies to the point that no one else could take the trade from him. His language skills and family connections in Manila were, of course, a big help in servicing the Spanish trade. Having both companies under his wing enabled him to survive in difficult years. As for the Swedish trade, there were plenty of other men who had business skills and who could have captured that trade from Poankeequa. Beaukeequa, Cai Hunqua and Tan Tinqua, for example were very aggressive players in the 1750s. They had extensive experience in the trade.

Poankeequa needed something else to move ahead of his competition. He was very skilled in politics and knew how to win the favour of officials. He and Swequa figured out how to persuade the government to accept the establishment of the Co-hong. He knew how to play both ends to his own advantage. No other merchants could compete with the connections and influence he had with government.

It should be pointed out, however, that Qing officials used Poankeequa as much as he used them. He was constantly called upon to bear the expense of endless gifts that his superiors demanded. In the 1770s and 1780s he was called upon to solve difficult problems that arose with foreigners. Meanwhile he was not allowed to move into full retirement in 1771, even though he told the Dutch he intended to do so. These two factors—exceptional business skills and political finesse—set him apart from others.

The third factor to his success was his exclusive access to Spanish silver. None of the other merchants could match his silver supplies from Manila and the Swedish trade. The Swedes acquired much of their silver from Cadiz, which also came from Mexico. And, of course, the annual Spanish galleon that arrived at Manila from Acapulco each year enabled the Spaniards to pay Poankeequa in cash for his silk and other goods. When other merchants were struggling for capital and running to foreigners for loans, he dipped into his Spanish and Swedish reserves.

Everyone who knew Poankeequa was aware that he would put his personal interests above everything else. He was of a much different character than other visionaries such as Tan Hunqua—who tried his best to open trade for the sake of everyone. He even put himself at significant risk for the greater cause.

As far as trade was concerned, would it have been better to operate with or without Poankeequa? It is hard to say. There were certainly a number of people in Canton who would have preferred that he had never existed. If he had not dominated the trade in the 1770s and 1780s, perhaps there would not have been so many failures. He was thought of by foreigners and Chinese alike as someone to fear. He was known to be a person who would do everything in his power to destroy his enemies. And the more he did so, the more enemies he gained.

Cai Hunqua had figured out how to deal with Poankeequa in the 1750s—by having nothing to do with him. But, to be fair to Poankeequa, we can point to many intrigues that Cai Hunqua initiated as well. Hunqua was also a man who did things secretly to the detriment of his close friends and allies. Moreover, there were debts that Poankeequa paid voluntarily in order to clear a merchant's balance or settle a patron's account, so not all of his actions were entirely self-centred.

Poankeequa was, in sum, a man who knew how to survive. He had the political and commercial skills necessary to carry out his dream, and he possessed the determination to do whatever was needed to reach that end. We hail the Pan family today as one of the very few houses that survived with wealth intact for more than a hundred years. The fortune eventually whittled away, but in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the family could rightfully boast of itself as being one of the richest enterprises in China.

It was not until Houqua emerged in the early 1800s, that anyone came close to competing with the Pans. After Cai Hunqua died in 1770, Poankeequa and his son Youdu, had no rivals. The Tongwen Hang dominated trade for at least four decades. To their credit, the Pans are still widely revered today as one of the great merchant families of the Thirteen Hongs.

I now turn to another success story—that of Tan Anqua. Although his experience and the path that he chose were very different from Poankeequa's, they both ended their lives with a thriving business in tack.

CHAPTER FOUR

# TAN ANQUA 陳安觀 1749–1790 AND THE INLAND TEA MEN

This chapter is about Tan Anqua and other inland tea men who operated outside of the Co-hong. Most of the information I have is about Tan Anqua, so he will be the main focus of the discussion. Other men are mentioned in passing. Taken together, the references to these merchants give us another side of the story that, up until now, has received almost no attention in the history books.

Tan Anqua was active in the trade at Canton from at least 1749 to 1790 (Appendix 4A). His Chinese name was Chen Anguan 陳安觀, but he was also known as Chen Wenfei 陳文斐.[1] As the spelling of his name would suggest, he was from Fujian. Most of the merchants from this province (such as Tan Suqua and Tan Hunqua in the first volume) used the Minnan pronunciation for their names ('Tan' for the character Chen 陳). He often went by the alias Young Hoyqua (Appendix 4C). The name of his business was the Jinyuan Hang 晉元行.

Tan Anqua's story is unique because, as far as we know, he did not have any other family members working with him. His record is the only one we have of a Chinese merchant going from a licensed Hong merchant, to an inland tea merchant, and then finally to an outside merchant. Before 1760, Tan Anqua was one of the Hong merchants licensed to trade with foreigners. During the period of the Co-hong (1760 to early 1771), he opted not to join that society but instead traded on his own as an inland tea agent. When the Co-hong was abolished in early 1771, he became an outside merchant (*hang wai shangren* 行外商人). As an inland and outside merchant, Anqua could contact foreigners directly to negotiate trade. He needed to channel his sales through one of the licensed Hong merchants, who stood security for the customs duties that were owed in exchange for a commission.

The first reference I have found to Tan Anqua is in the Dutch East India Company's (VOC) records of 1749.[2] The VOC examined some of his silk fabrics. In the early 1750s, Tan Anqua sold tea and did a considerable trade in tin. His knowledge of trade and his connections to inland markets were already well-established from the beginning, which suggests that he had been involved in the commerce for some time.

I have no information about Tan Anqua's activities before he appears in the records. He may have been working in one of the Hong merchant houses or with the junk trade to Southeast Asia. Considering that he died in 1790, he was probably in his twenties or thirties in 1750.

In December 1751, Tan Anqua offered a batch of Hysan tea to the Dutch. The next year he also traded in Bohea tea.[3] From this time forward he shows up regularly in the VOC records selling a variety of products just like the other licensed merchants. As

far as the records reveal, the volume of his trade was not large. In 1753, he joined into partnership with several prominent merchants. In the handling of the VOC trade that year, he and his partners Tan Suqua, Swetia, and Beaukeequa stood security for each other.[4] If one of them failed to fulfil their contract, for whatever reason, then the others were obliged to step in and complete the agreement. In 1753, Anqua also traded with the Swedish East India Company (SOIC, Appendix 4A).[5]

When the six top merchants in Canton attempted to tighten ranks in 1754, the smaller merchants like Tan Anqua were impacted.[6] Attay and Thequa were barred from trading tea with the large companies, and other smaller merchants were gradually pushed out. It became increasingly more difficult for small men to operate in the late 1750s.[7] Tan Anqua managed to survive these encroachments, probably because he had paired up with one of the large houses. By 1757, Tan Anqua's closest partner was Beaukeequa (Appendix 4A).

In their trade report for the year 1755, the Dutch mentioned that Tan Anqua was known by Europeans and Chinese alike as a 'virtuous and honourable merchant'.[8] That year, he had contracted with the French for a batch of Bohea tea of excellent quality. He demanded 13 taels per picul, with 6 taels paid in advance in silver coin. In September 1756, Tan Anqua made more transactions with Tan Suqua and another top man, Cai Hunqua. They purchased a quantity of betel nut from the Dutch.[9]

Like many of the other merchants, Tan Anqua was also involved in the illegal trade in gold. In July 1751, he sold 50 ingots of gold to the VOC. Delivery was to be made four months later.[10] As I have pointed out in volume one, merchants were usually eager to trade in gold owing to its connection to the capital market. Gold contracts often required 100 percent of the purchase price to be paid in advance, which means they realized their profits immediately and before the product was actually delivered.[11] In October 1756, Anqua made another gold contract with the Dutch for 50 ingots to be delivered the following February.[12] He probably had other gold sales as well for which we have no details.

In November 1756, Tan Anqua contracted Peco tea with the Dutch, and in the following year he sold them silk in partnership with Weaver Suckin (Chapter 10). His trade had now expanded to include most of the products that the large houses traded except, perhaps, porcelain, which he seems to have avoided. From the beginning, tea was his main focus.

In August 1758, Tan Anqua negotiated the Dutch trade in partnership with Cai Hunqua, Tan Suqua's son, Chetqua, and Swetia. This joint trade included another contract for gold. In 1757, he had some trade with the French, and a substantial amount of trade in partnership with Beaukeequa. It was unknown at the time, but this latter association would later cause him much trouble.[13]

By the late 1750s, Tan Anqua had gained the respect and trust of all the East India companies. In 1758, he landed a fairly large contract with the SOIC. He supplied the Swedes with a total of 780 chests and 4,600 canisters of tea, including Touzun, Ankay, Congo, Peco, and Souchon varieties.[14]

Plate 04.01 shows a contract dated 10 January 1758, which Tan Anqua made in his own name with the VOC, for one thousand piculs of Bohea. He agreed to accept

payment in money, cloves, and nutmeg. Plate 04.02 is another contract with the VOC, with the same date, stipulating the terms upon which Tan Anqua agreed to take the cloves and nutmeg (for details, see Appendix 9).

Tan Anqua continued to trade with his partner Beaukeequa as well. Plate 04.03 is a contract with the VOC dated 16 January 1758 in which Tan Anqua and Beaukeequa agreed to jointly supply 475 piculs of Bohea tea.[15] They agreed to take payment in money, cloves and nutmeg, and to go to the tea lands to purchase the tea that the Dutch had requested.

On 11 September 1758, Beaukeequa died insolvent. Being a close associate, Tan Anqua was held partially responsible for the repayment of some of his partner's debts. Tan Anqua delivered the goods he had contracted with the Dutch, but for some reason he had no new contracts with them in 1759. The Dutch contracted gold again that year, but Anqua was not part of that trade either.[16]

Up to this point, Tan Anqua had done no trade with the Danes. As far as the records reveal, he also did no trade with the English East India Company (EIC). With his Dutch trade now turning sour, he seems to have shifted to these other companies to make up for his losses. In 1759, he landed a contract with the Danish Asiatic Company (DAC) for 1,100 piculs of Bohea tea (Plate 04.04 and Appendix 4B). He also negotiated the sale of some tutenague to the EIC.

In the first half of 1760, the Co-hong was formed. Anqua was invited to become a member of the Co-hong, but he declined.[17]

> 1780, Feb 21: This man [Tan Anqua] is of a v__ fair character, and has often done business with the Comp. [EIC] He was formerly offered to be of the Conghong [Co-hong] but refused, __ not approving a plan of that kind.[18]

During the first years of the Co-hong's operation, Tan Anqua does not appear in any of the East India companies' records. The only references I have found to him from 1761 to 1764 are in some private Swedish records (Appendix 4A). These references show that he continued to offer tea to the Swedes, but it is unclear whether this trade was done covertly or through one of the newly licensed merchants.

By early 1764, Tan Anqua had found a way to continue his trade without having to join the Co-hong. In February and March of that year he went to various foreign officers in Canton and declared that he had been granted special privileges from the emperor's Board of Revenue (*neiwufu* 內務府) to sell tea to the Europeans.[19] In February, he sold Congo tea to the English, which was paid for when the first ships arrived. He also sold Souchon and Congo tea to the SOIC. The Co-hong was unable to stop Tan Anqua from trading, which suggests that his connections to the *neiwufu* were legitimate, but he had to pay the 3 taels per picul for the Co-hong's surcharges.[20]

In August 1764, the governor general and Hoppo received orders from the emperor stipulating that henceforth all inland tea dealers would be allowed to contact foreigners directly and contract up to 30 percent of the total exports in tea.[21] A declaration stating the same was distributed to foreigners in Canton on 21 August 1764. These transactions had to be channelled through one of the Hong merchant houses, which made them responsible for paying the export duties in the event that the inland agents

failed to pay. The negotiations and sales between inland tea men and foreigners could be conducted directly. The tea men or the foreign customers could choose themselves which house to sell through.[22]

Even though Tan Anqua now had permission to trade, he does not show up frequently in the foreign records. As noted above, he had been offering tea to the Swedes earlier and had made a contract with them in March 1763.[23] He also contracted an amount of Congo and Souchon tea with the SOIC in January and February 1764, which he delivered in November and December.[24] From this time forward, he shows up regularly in the Swedish records selling tea, with numerous entries and exchanges up to 1768.

Tan Anqua was not the only merchant who had tried to sell tea outside of the Co-hong in the early 1760s. Awue of the Yan family was previously a Hong merchant, but was not accepted into the Co-hong. In September 1763, he spread rumours that the governor general (Tsjonton) had given him permission to sell tea. Perhaps he was inspired by Tan Anqua's success. Awue, however, was effectively barred from the tea trade. Like Tan Anqua, Awue had tried to sell tea through inland tea men but, for whatever reasons, he was unsuccessful.[25]

Tacqua Amoy (Chang Maorong 長茂榮) was an outside merchant who sold tea in partnership with a couple of different Hong merchants before the establishment of the Co-hong. He shows up quite frequently in the Danish records from 1734 to 1766. He specialized in one type of green tea called Padri Zioun Zioun tea (*sengren queshe cha* 僧人雀舌茶). After the Co-hong was created, Tacqua Amoy shows up in the records again in 1760, 1765 and 1766, negotiating directly with the Danes for this special tea. It is unclear how he was able to do so. During the years that the Co-hong was in existence, Tacqua Amoy would have had to have traded under the name of one of the Hong merchants or have a connection to an inland tea man, but the records are silent about this.[26]

Tan Tinqua (Chen Zhenguan 陳鎮官 also known as Chen Yingjie 陳應節) was another former Hong merchant who had been barred from the tea trade after the Co-hong was established.[27] The Dutch mentioned that Poankeequa and Swequa were the ones behind the removal of Tan Tinqua from the trade.[28] He is the same man who purchased the Yee-ho Hang from Teunqua in 1759 (Chapter 2). He may have also been the same man who owned the French factory from 1750 to the 1770s.[29]

Originally, I had planned to write a separate chapter on Tan Tinqua, but I then found that there was too much confusion in the records with merchants of the same name. Because his experience was similar to Tan Anqua's and adds to our understanding of how these men operated, I will include a few paragraphs here about him and his partner, Wonsamye.

Tan Tinqua used the alias Jeangri (with various spellings), which helps to distinguish him from other Tinquas. Some sources say that he returned to Fujian after he was barred from the Co-hong. This may be true, but he continued to sell tea to foreigners in Canton as well.[30] He formed a partnership with the inland tea merchant Wonsamye.

The EIC and SOIC contracted with Tan Tinqua and Wonsamye in the off-season of 1760. The two men were allowed to fulfil those contracts after the Co-hong was

established. They packed and delivered the tea at the end of the year.[31] It was only fair to allow these contracts to be filled, as they had been made before the Co-hong was created. What the history books have not told us, however, is that foreigners continued to buy tea from Wonsamye after 1760 and before the emperor's edict in August 1764.

In February and March 1763, the Dutch examined several samples of Wonsamye's (spelled Uhnsamja) tea. They negotiated directly with him on the price, as they had done before the Co-hong was established. He made this transaction through the Hong merchant Chetqua. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Poankeequa had promised this tea from Wonsamye to the English. The Dutch got it instead because they dealt directly with Wonsamye.[32]

The next clear reference that I have to Tan Tinqua is in February 1770, when he sold some tea to the Dutch. This sale was channelled through Chetqua's house.[33] Because Tan Tinqua traded under other persons' names in the 1760s, he shows up infrequently in the records. The EIC bought one of Tan Tinqua's chops of tea in December 1770. This sale occurred shortly after Tan Tinqua's death, so it may have been carried out by his son.[34] On 14 January 1771, for example, the Dutch bought a chop of tea from Tan Tinqua's son, Jemqua, through one of the Hong merchants.[35]

The point to be made from these examples is that Tan Anqua was not the only person who was selling tea outside of the Co-hong at this time. There are numerous other examples. Ajou, Namqua, Ong Tetqua, Poqua, Lim Hauqua, and others were all selling tea to foreigners during the 1760s.[36] For some of these men, we have no idea who they were—except that they were not Hong merchants and they were not classed among the porcelain or silk dealers. It is possible that a few of them were employed in a Hong merchant house. From that position they could carry on a small volume of trade in tea on the side. Some of these men, however, seem to have had no clear links to Hong merchants. Like Tan Anqua, they were probably connected in some way to inland tea men. They operated independently in the shadows, negotiating contracts directly or indirectly with foreign customers. These were the unlicensed merchants who were allowed to sell tea to foreigners in order to provide competition to the Co-hong. The terms and prices that they agreed upon became the gauge that Chinese officials used to determine what the Co-hong should do each year.

With all of these non-Hong merchants selling tea in the 1760s, we can imagine that there was probably a lively trade going on for which we have no records. It makes no sense that these men would trade an amount of tea one year, and then show up three, four or five years later trading another parcel of tea. They had to be doing something to support themselves during the intervening years. If they were not working in one of the Hong merchant's houses, then they were likely selling tea for inland suppliers.

Many of the French and English records are missing from the 1760s so it is difficult to know exactly what Tan Anqua might have done with those companies. In February 1764, he told the Swedes that he had sold a batch of Congo and a batch of Souchon tea to the English, which was subject to the three taels per picul administrative costs of the Co-hong.[37] This transaction, however, does not show up in the EIC records. Perhaps he sold it under someone else's name or perhaps the records have not survived. Even though Tan Anqua was not a member of the Co-hong, he still had to pay the Co-hong's

fees, which meant the transactions were channelled through one of the licensed merchants. In 1765, Tan Anqua sold Souchon tea to the VOC under Tjobqua's (Chapter 1) authority.[38] In October 1768, he sold 250 chests of Souchon tea to the EIC, but it is unclear through which house this transaction was made.[39]

Besides supplying the EIC with tea in 1764, the Swedes mentioned that Tan Anqua also sold some Congo tea to the French that year.[40] In 1765, the Dutch mentioned that he was involved with the Portuguese trade in Macao. He had apparently purchased, on speculation, a batch of tea that had been sitting in Macao since 1762 owing to no interested buyers. Tan Anqua was now obviously willing to take considerable risks in order to gain a contract.[41] In August 1766, the Macao merchant Simão Vicente Rosa wrote to the Swedes and mentioned that Tan Anqua was someone with whom he was acquainted.[42] Tan Anqua probably had considerable dealings in Macao for which we have no details.[43]

In 1765, the Swedes recorded that Tan Anqua had sold a batch of Souchon tea to the French for the high price of 37 taels per picul. He demanded that the full amount be paid in silver. Usually, the only way to contract tea without having to take European goods, such as woollens, in exchange was to have superior products.[44] Tan Anqua periodically handled top quality Souchon and Congo tea, which was why he could command prices higher than everyone else in 1768.[45]

In 1767, the Swede Michael Grubb mentioned that, out of 9,000 to 10,000 piculs of Bohea Congo tea that the inland tea men brought to Canton, Tan Anqua and Ong Thequa had the best chops (batches). Tan Anqua was asking 18 to 19 taels per picul for his tea. After adding the 3 taels per picul for the Co-hong's duties, the total came to about 21 taels. The Swedes hoped to contract 1,000 to 2,000 piculs with him.[46]

Even though Tan Anqua operated outside of the Co-hong, placing orders with him still required providing money in advance. In February 1768, he contracted 500 chests of first grade Congo tea with the SOIC to be paid one half up front and the rest upon delivery. Another non-Hong merchant by the name of Lim Hauqua contracted 300 chests of Congo with the Swedes on the same terms.[47] This amount was a reasonable advance to demand and comparable to what the Co-hong might have asked of its own members.[48] In the same year, Tan Anqua also supplied the Swedes with 100 chests of Peco tea.[49]

Tan Anqua's transactions with the Swedes in the 1760s amounted to around 5,000 to 6,000 taels per year. With the average value of SOIC cargos being 150,000 to 250,000 taels per ship, his contribution was insignificant at best.[50] It is unfortunate that we have no figures to show his volume of trade with other companies, under other persons' names, private traders, and the Portuguese in Macao. All we can say is that he seems to have been involved at some level with all of them. The exception is the Danish company. Tan Anqua does not appear in the DAC records from 1760 to 1775, either through selling them merchandise or even talking to them about the possibilities of trade.[51]

On 1 May 1770, Cai Hunqua of the Yifeng Hang died. He had been much involved with the VOC.[52] In the weeks that followed, the Dutch, who were in Macao at the time, proposed to Tan Anqua that he join forces with Cai Hunqua's partner, Semqua,

to supply the Dutch cargos. Semqua could not speak Pidgin English, so the Dutch could not communicate directly with him. The Dutch had a low opinion of Semqua and did not want to continue trade with him unless he joined with someone they could trust.[53] It is unclear whether Tan Anqua could speak Pidgin English. In 1758, he told the Dutch that he 'understood no European script', but that might just mean he could not read a foreign text.[54] The Dutch had traded with Tan Anqua many years before the Co-hong had been established and trusted him.[55]

Tan Anqua was very appreciative of the Dutch for their kind words towards him. However, he said that he could have no association with the Yifeng Hang. With Cai Hunqua's passing, Tan Anqua anticipated that the Co-hong would not last long. He therefore chose to continue as he had worked previously—as an independent merchant.[56]

The ending of the Co-hong in February 1771 opened up numerous possibilities for Tan Anqua. One of the immediate effects was that he expanded his trade with the EIC. He did some trade with the English almost every year until his death in 1790. These transactions, however, were carried out as an outside merchant and not as a licensed Hong merchant. Outside merchants did not secure ships, so they tended to have smaller shares of a given cargo. With the ending of the Co-hong, outside merchants were once again able to trade in tea as had happened before it was established.

Despite the seemingly small volume of Tan Anqua's trade, he maintained good connections to inland tea producers. He was also known for supplying good quality Souchon tea.[57]

> 1780, Feb 21: Having now finished our contracts with the Hong Merchants we sent for Anqua, who generally makes a chop of very good Souchong . . . We contracted with him for his chop of Souchong Pe Une about 300 chests; which he agreed to deliver in the month of October, at such a price as we shall judge equitable when we have examined it.[58]

As we see from the references above and below, Tan Anqua's trade was rather sporadic and inconsistent. He traded with whoever offered the best contracts, and then he might not trade with those persons again the next year. He had good contacts with inland producers, who consistently offered him high grades of certain teas, which gave him an edge in the market. Being outside of the Co-hong, he was never able to obtain a large contract, but he also did not have to take foreign imports in exchange (the practice of 'truck'). Hong merchants, on the other hand, had no choice but to take foreign imports—which they could not always sell at a profit. Thus, their larger volumes did not necessarily mean greater profits.

On 5 January 1770, Tan Anqua extended credit to the French traders in the amount of 30,000 piasters at 18 percent annual interest. He was expecting to be repaid when the next ships arrived in the fall. On 5 October 1770, however, the French officers were still unable to settle the debt. Tan Anqua had no choice but to accept another promissory note. They capitalized the interest accumulated up to that date (which was calculated to be 12 percent of the principle) and renewed the loan in the amount of 34,200 piasters. On 5 October 1771, the interest was capitalized again and a new

note issued for 40,356 piasters. The total amount of 47,620 piasters (principle plus 18 percent interest) was to be repaid to Tan Anqua on 5 October 1772.[59]

It is unclear from the French records when Tan Anqua's account was finally settled. I found no further mention of it after October 1772. One of the reasons the French were unable to pay Tan Anqua was because they were carrying heavy debts from another Chinese merchant, Tjobqua (Chapter 1). Even though Tan Anqua was not connected to the repayment of Tjobqua's debts, he was nonetheless negatively affected by that merchant's bankruptcy, since he had to wait for his money.[60]

From 1769 to 1776, Tan Anqua does not appear in the SOIC records. Many of the French and SOIC documents are missing, so his absence could simply be a result of no surviving references. In 1777, he appears again in the Swedish records—supplying 756 chests of Congo tea.[61] There is a gap in sequence thereafter, with the next Swedish reference to him in 1784 (but with no details of trade).[62] The DAC account books are missing from 1773 to 1781, but Tan Anqua shows up again in a DAC trade journal from January 1777, selling a small amount of tea.[63]

The VOC records are fairly complete for the late eighteenth century. Tan Anqua appears in those records from 1765 to 1785. However, he only traded with the Dutch three of those years—1777, 1778 and 1785 (Appendix 4B). The volume in the latter two years amounted to less than 1 percent of the total VOC trade with China.[64] Unfortunately, no information is available about his trade with the Imperial Company, Macao, private traders, or the junk trade to Southeast Asia.

Tan Anqua died on the evening of 5 January 1790.[65] Nothing was mentioned about his business or successor. His name, however, continues to show up in the EIC records until 1794. An example from 1792 is shown below.

> 1792, Nov 26: Though we do not wish for any addition to the article of Souchon as our contract already exceeds the demand, we have been induced to purchase 2 chops of Ton Anqua [Tan Anqua] which he had been accustomed to sell us for many years viz. Quong-woe of 400 & Peck-wun of 300 Chests for the former of which we gave 45 & for the latter 43 Tales p Pecul& as they are of very good quality & bought at very reasonable Prices, we hope the Honble Court will not have cause to disapprove of our having done so.[66]

This entry and others like it are obviously referring to Tan Anqua's business, rather than to his person. We learn from entries below that he had a clerk by the name of Manhop (Guan Xiang 關祥) who continued to take care of the business after Tan Anqua's death.

> 1802, Dec 14: Under date the 20th August we noticed that the Hoppo had created two New Hong Merchants one the son of the deceased Exchin with whom we formerly dealt largely in the article of Chinaware. The other an outside Dealer of the name of Manhop who in former years sold tea to the Company under the name of Ton Anqua, having been either a clerk or domestic in that merchants house prior to his demise.[67]
>
> 1802, Dec 17: We omitted to apprize the Hon'ble Court by our former advices that in the month of August last the Hoppo created two New Hong Merchants, one of which is the son of the deceased Exchin Chinaware Merchant and the

> other Manhop a shop keeper who was formerly in the house of Ton Anqua, and who continued after the death to sell three or four chops of tea annually to the Company.[68]

By the time of Tan Anqua's death, seven out of the ten original houses in the Co-hong were bankrupt. When Manhop became a Hong merchant in 1802, only one of the original houses was still in business—Poankeequa's.[69] Tan Anqua's refusal to join that society seems to have been based on good advice. It seems very unlikely that his firm would have survived as long as it did if he had joined the Co-hong. Not only did his business support him to the end of his life, but it also gave his secretary, Manhop, a source of income for another twelve years. Tan Anqua's decision to continue as an inland tea man during the Co-hong and as an outside merchant thereafter had several advantages. These were not prestigious positions, and probably not occupations that could generate great wealth, but an outside merchant's chances for success in the long-run were greater than those of the licensed merchants.

After Manhop's Hong merchant appointment, we hear no more of Tan Anqua or his business. Manhop traded out of his own business called the Fulong Hang 福隆行.[70] Nothing more is known of the outcome of the Jinyuan Hang.

## SUMMARY

Tan Anqua entered the trade at Canton in the early 1750s as one of the legitimate licensed merchants. From the beginning, he had good knowledge of trade and strong connections to inland markets. He soon gained the confidence and respect of Chinese and foreign merchants alike. His level of experience and expertise suggest that he had already been involved in the trade for several years before his name appears in the foreign records.

Like most other merchants, Tan Anqua traded in gold and probably other contraband. This was an effective way to gain needed working capital quickly. He joined into partnerships with other prominent merchants, which enhanced his reputation and gained trust from his patrons. He was well on his way to becoming one of the top players in the trade.

Tan Anqua survived the tightening of the merchant ranks in the mid-1750s, but he refused to bow to the demands of the Co-hong in 1760. His voluntary removal from the trade, however, was short-lived. He continued to enter into small transactions with the Swedes, and probably with the Portuguese and other private traders for which we have no details. In 1764, he received special permission from the emperor to continue his tea business, but he had to channel his trade through one of the Co-hong members who became security for his trade and was responsible for paying his fees and customs' duties. For this service, they received a commission. Tan Anqua, Wonsamye, Tan Tinqua and numerous other men outside of the Co-hong negotiated directly with foreigners. The terms and prices to which they agreed became the gauge that officials used to determine what the Co-hong should do each year.

One of Tan Anqua's business advantages was his connection to high quality teas, which other merchants often found difficult to obtain. He could command high prices

on those teas because he had the best available. Specializing in high-end merchandize was a strategy that many merchants employed. It was an effective way to attract buyers. If one customer was not willing to pay the quoted price, there was usually another who would. High quality Chinese goods gave Europeans advantages in their home markets, so they would not want the competition getting those products. In this way, Tan Anqua did not need to depend on keeping the same customers year after year. He could sell to whoever offered the best price without the pressures from the companies to buy their imports. Tan Anqua was known by Chinese and foreigners alike as an honest and upright merchant, which contributed to his success.

As an inland tea man and later as an outside merchant, Tan Anqua was not burdened with the constant pressure to repay the debts of failed Hong merchants. Considering that only one of the Co-hong merchant houses of the 1760s survived into the nineteenth century, he was probably wise not to join that society. Tan Anqua's example shows that the Co-hong was not the strict monopoly so many previous histories have suggested it was. That organization had constant competition from inland tea men like Tan Anqua, Wonsamye and Tan Tinqua—all of whom helped administrators see what the *real* market prices were. They could then set the prices in the Co-hong each year according to that information. As I pointed out in the first volume, the Co-hong was established to gain greater control over foreign investments, to ensure that competition prevailed between the licensed merchants and to ensure that market prices ruled. Tan Anqua and men like him were key factors in making that happen.

In the next chapter, I turn to the Wu family. They became Hong merchants in the late eighteenth century, and help to show what might have happened to Tan Anqua had he returned to being a Hong merchant. The difficulties that the first two Wu men encountered help us to better appreciate Tan Anqua's decision to trade as an outside merchant through those years.

CHAPTER FIVE

# THE WU 伍 FAMILY 1772–1802

| Relation | Trade Name | Mandarin | Chinese |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cousin | Geowqua | Wu Qiaoguan | 伍喬官 |
| Cousin | Puiqua | Wu Peiguan | 伍沛官 |

## INTRODUCTION

The Wus are ranked among the most famous of the Hong merchant families in the Canton era (ca. 1700–1842). Their fame is largely owed to the famous Houqua (Wu Bingjian 伍秉鑑), who built a huge fortune in the early nineteenth century. Houqua was among the most successful merchants of his time. This chapter is about Houqua's two predecessors, Geowqua and Puiqua.[1]

According to the American William Hunter, who resided for many years in Canton, the Wu family was from the tea growing region in Fujian province.

> Houqua's family had long been tea planters in the Bohea Hills, and were so when they first came to Canton, soon after foreign trade was confined to that port (as he frequently observed to me), about the year 1750.[2]

The reference is a little misleading because the other ports in China were closed to foreign trade in 1757, not in 1750. If Hunter's story is correct and the family migrated to Canton at that time, then we might expect to find one of them trading in the 1760s. The only reference I have found to a Canton merchant with this last name in these years is Wu Heguan 伍和觀. He was the captain (*chuanzhu* 船主) of the Canton junk *Hingtay* (Hengtai 恒泰), which sailed to Southeast Asia each year. Heguan appears on a Chinese bottomry contract dated January/February 1765. The bottomry loan was given to him by the Swedish supercargos at 40 percent interest.[3] *Hingtay* sailed to Cochin China in 1765, where it was reported to have burned up.[4] Because the junk did not return to Canton, the loan was not repaid. Consequently, the document was not returned to Wu Heguan or his guarantor Hongsia (Yan Xiangshe 顏享舍), which explains why it survives today in the Swedish archives. Unfortunately, nothing more is known about Wu Heguan, or whether he had any connection to Geowqua or Puiqua's branches of the family (for an explanation of the names in the foreign records, see appendix 5F).

**GEOWQUA**

Geowqua (1734–1802) was the earliest of the Wu 伍 family members to appear in the records trading with foreigners in Canton.[5] His Chinese name was Wu Qiaoguan 伍喬官, but he was also known as Wu Guozhao 伍國釗. The first recognizable reference to him appears in 1772, when he offered some tea for sale to the Dutch. At this time, he was a purser (writer) in Ingsia's (Yan Yingshe 顏瑛舍) Taihe Hang 泰和行.[6]

Geowqua was 38 years old in 1772, which means he could have been active much earlier. Unfortunately, we know nothing about his early years. Besides working for Ingsia, Geowqua did some business on the side under Chowqua's (Chen Zuguan 陳祖官) license.[7] He sold small quantities of tea and other goods to the Dutch, English and Danish companies (Appendix 5A).

As we saw in the previous chapter, having good connections with inland suppliers was important in gaining contracts with foreigners. The Wu family's past experience in the tea country was an advantage to Geowqua. He seems to have specialized in the Singlo and Tunkay varieties. In 1777, he offered two batches of Singlo and one batch of Tunkay tea to the Dutch. A friend of his brought the batches to Canton from the tea lands.[8] In 1775, Geowqua offered Singlo and Tunkay tea to the English as well, but it was not of the high quality they wanted.[9] In 1781, the English East India Company (EIC) purchased 600 chests of Singlo and 600 chests of Tunkay tea from him.[10] In 1784 and 1788, Geowqua offered other batches of Singlo and Tunkay teas to the Dutch.[11]

As Appendixes 5C and 5D show, Geowqua sold other types of tea as well. However, Singlo and Tunkay were among his main stock from the beginning.[12] His friends in the tea lands were undoubtedly reserving this special tea for him. Owing to the missing Danish account books from 1773 to 1781, there are no figures for those years in Appendix 5C. However, Geowqua shows up in other Danish records in those years as a person carrying on some trade with them (Appendix 5A).

After Ingsia's house failed in late 1779, Geowqua became a writer in Chowqua's firm.[13] He continued to trade on the side under other merchants' licenses, which sometimes brought him into conflict with the local authorities. At the end of the 1781 season, for example, he had to bribe some customs officers to allow his tea to be loaded onto the English ships.

> 1781, Dec 31: Shipped Geowqua's tea, after much difficulty, a sum of money is to be paid for permission.[14]

By the end of 1781, there were only five houses remaining of the original ten licensed merchants from the 1760s. At least two of those five firms (Tsjonqua and Limsia) were deeply in debt. The Hoppo needed to expand the merchant ranks in order to better service the trade and to ensure competition among them. In June 1782, five new merchants were licensed to trade, which increased their number to ten.[15] Geowqua was one of the new appointees.[16]

It should be kept in mind that these were not voluntary assignments, but mandatory. Geowqua could have declined the offer to become a Hong merchant but that would probably have made him a target for other even less desirable positions (such as

a salt merchant). It could also result in the Hoppo turning against him and hindering or blocking his future prospects.

The English supercargoes had a favourable opinion of Geowqua.

> 1781, Mar 22: Geowqua / formerly Yngshaws [Ingsia] clerk / being very desireous of having some business with the Company and he being a man of extreme good character, we sent for him and agreed to contract with him for Twankay . . . Singlo [teas][17]
>
> 1782, Dec 29: Geowqua, was Yngshaw's purser, & has always been well respected by Europeans. It is supposed he has a capital & is in very good credit with his countrymen.[18]

After his appointment Geowqua traded under the firm Yuanshun Hang 源順行. He immediately gained a large amount of trade with the Danes, ranging from 30 to 65 percent of their total exports each year. In 1782, the Danes purchased a large amount of Nankins from him as well as Bohea tea.[19] His annual average with the Danish Asiatic Company (DAC) was about 158,000 taels (Appendix 5C). From 1784 to 1789, Geowqua handled about 20 to 35 percent of the total Dutch exports each year as well. The value of his annual trade with the Dutch came to about 250,000 taels (Appendix 5D).

The EIC granted Geowqua 2/16ths of the English trade in woollens in 1784, 1787, 1789, 1793 and 1796.[20] As stated below, from 1784 to 1787, he seems to have had a 2/16ths share of the EIC woollens. His allotment was reduced to 1/16th in 1788, but then raised to 2/16ths again in 1789. Having two shares made Geowqua eligible to supply at least 2,000 piculs of Bohea tea, not counting other tea.[21] A share of 2/16ths may not sound like very much, but it was actually quite significant.

By the early 1790s, these allotments were distributed according to the number of chests of Bohea and Congo tea rather than the number of piculs, which make them more difficult to translate into monetary amounts. A 1/16th share of woollens made a merchant eligible to supply 540 chests of Bohea and about 6,000 chests of Congo. In February 1793, the Bohea portion of the allotments was changed again to a 1/16th share being eligible to supply 600 chests of Bohea and a 2/16ths share was eligible for 1,000 chests of Bohea.[22]

In order to translate these figures into monetary amounts we would need to know the exact number of piculs that each merchant sold and the price they received for the tea. That information, however, is not always available, because the British did not always specify how many piculs were in each chest. We do know that Geowqua had a 2/16ths share of the woollens in 1793 and that he was given an advance on his tea contracts in February of that year amounting to 77,647.059 taels. These advances were usually about 70 to 75 percent of the total owed. This means that Geowqua's gross tea sales to the EIC this year would have been a little over 100,000 taels. He sold an additional 1,000 chests of Hyson tea to the EIC this year that was over and above his allotments.[23] Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that in the years when he had a 2/16ths share of the woollens, his gross tea sales to the EIC were probably from around 80,000 to 100,000 taels.

What this estimate shows is that the EIC was not Geowqua's most important trading partner. As we can see from the figures in Appendixes 5C and 5D, Geowqua's volume of trade in many years was much larger with the Dutch and Danes. From about 1784 to 1792, Geowqua's annual gross export trade with the Danes, Dutch and English was well over 500,000 taels. He also handled many of their imports. And he was sure to have been involved with at least some of the private traders, junk traders and Portuguese in Macao. He also handled a good share of the Imperial Company's trade in the 1780s, for which we have no figures.[24] His annual business in these years was likely well over 1 million taels.

Of course, gaining market shares also meant taking over the debts of failed houses. After Tsjonqua's Yifeng Hang failed in 1784, Geowqua was assigned one-fourth of the debt owed to the Dutch East India Company (VOC).[25] That explains why his Dutch trade saw such a huge increase that year (Appendix 5D). Greater volume did not necessarily mean more profits.

In 1784, we get a glimpse of Geowqua's silk trade. He and Chowqua joined together in planning their silk sales, and they formed a partnership with two of the prominent weavers, Tiqua and Lochop. The Dutch reported that Tiqua, Geowqua and Chowqua had formed an alliance. Weaver Tiqua refused to sell the Dutch any silk without the consent of the other two men. Weaver Lochop also sold his silks in 1784, and in other years, under the guarantee of Geowqua and Chowqua.[26] The latter two partners tended to keep their prices for European imports and tea exports about the same, which kept them from competing with each other.[27]

From 1785 to 1791 Geowqua secured Lochop's silk trade with the Dutch solely on his own account.[28] In 1786, the English stated that they were only interested in contracting silk fabrics with Poankeequa, Chowqua and Geowqua, which shows that the latter two partners ranked among the top suppliers of that product in Canton.[29] In 1794, the Danes listed the top four Canton merchants from whom raw silk could be purchased and Geowqua appeared second only to Mowqua.[30] Geowqua also had connections to the inland rhubarb suppliers, who brought their products to Canton each year.[31]

Geowqua's quick advancement into the trade did not go unnoticed by the authorities. In early March 1784, he was called into the city to give an account of his business to the head Mandarins. They asked to examine his account books, so that they could determine if he had paid all of the duties owed to the emperor.[32]

This request for validation is another example which shows that Chinese merchants did indeed keep account books, as we would expect. But, as I mentioned in the Preface, not one of them has survived. This request for verification also presents a good reason why merchants normally failed to keep those documents longer than needed. If officials later got their hands on the old account books, they might claim that a merchant owed more money to the government. Consequently, all of the Hong merchants seemed to have systematically destroyed their financial records on a regular schedule. If they were called upon to present financial records from a certain year, then they might create an account book on the spot that would not incriminate them. I show examples of this happening in Chapter 9.

On the morning of 6 February 1786, a fire broke out in Geowqua's warehouse on Henan Island.[33] The Dutch and English officers sent their fire engines (water pumps) to help, but the wind and the flames were too strong. The warehouse filled with Songlo and Tunkay tea burnt up. His loss in tea alone was estimated at 15,000 to 20,000 taels. Of course, his building was also lost.[34]

In 1786, we see the first reference to Geowqua's cousin, Puiqua, working in his house.[35] Puiqua was born in 1767, so he would have been 19 years old (see below). From this time forward, Puiqua shows up frequently in the records as Geowqua's partner in trade.

By the summer of 1786, Geowqua and Chowqua were much indebted to the inland merchants. Their unstable situation this year prevented them from landing a contract with the EIC.

> 1786, Jun 30: Geowqua & Chowqua came to Macao it is supposed in consequence of the death of Mr. Kintsius late chief of the Dutch with whom they have considerable dealings. Mr. Browne took this opportunity to ask them whether they were willing to extend their contracts to a larger quantity in consequence of the intelligence received p *Trial*, they both expressed their willingness, but declared their inability to engage with the Country [inland] Merchants till the arrears of their old debts were paid off. As they are at present very distrustful from former disappointments, but had no doubt of being able to make considerable additions to their several quantities in the course of the season.[36]

Geowqua was still in arrears to the inland (country) merchants in March 1787, which was partially owing to offsetting balances owed to him by the Dutch and Danish companies.[37] Because of a temporary lack of capital to meet his obligations, he was unable to contract larger quantities of tea with the EIC in 1787 and 1788.[38]

In 1787, Geowqua experienced a couple of encumbrances from Chinese officials. On 20 August 1787, the Danes were informed that the governor general had demanded that Geowqua and Chowqua pay 40,000 taels to help finance the Chinese troops in Taiwan.[39] On 23 October 1787, one of the linguists informed the Dutch that he was unable to procure a chop to ship off their goods to Whampoa—owing to a disagreement between Geowqua and the Hoppo. Apparently, the Danes had had a quantity of amber (barnsteen) on the ship that Geowqua had secured. Amber was a commodity that was highly sought after as a special present for the emperor.[40] The Hoppo was eager to get his hands on this commodity, and he requested that Geowqua purchase it for him.[41] Geowqua, of course, would have to offer the amber to the Hoppo as a gift, or sell at a huge discount, which accounts for his procrastination. Geowqua asked the Dutch to remain patient for a couple days until he could work out a better arrangement with the Hoppo.[42]

By 1788, Geowqua had amassed a substantial debt. The EIC gave him a contract this year, but reduced his share to 1/16th to minimize the risks.

> Geowqua attended the committee . . . This merchants present inability we have reason to think, proceeds in a great measure from the immense balance owing him by the Dutch, amounting as we are informed to near tales 180,000 an enormous sum to exact from a merchant of but a moderate capital, & which cannot fail to

> distress him very much. He agrees likewise to take 1/16 of the woollens expected the ensuing season, at the same price that was given this. He appeared rather dissatisfied that so small a share was allotted to him, and expressed a wish to have the same as heretofore. He was told that it was now too late to make any alteration in our arrangement, that in reducing his proportion we were actuated by his former complaints of the inconvenience he apprehended from so large a quantity, and thought the request of some other merchants to have their shares increased, afforded a good opportunity to oblige those who thought they had too much, by relieving them from a part. If therefore any favorable change had since taken place in the prospect of demand for this article, the advantage would be justly due to those, who, having either more foresight or less timidity, had all along expressed a willingness to take whatever share we chose to allot them.[43]

Geowqua was undoubtedly pleased to have landed this contract, but probably quite disappointed in the reduction. Nevertheless, the year seems to have gone well for him because, in 1789, the EIC increased his share to 2/16ths again.[44]

On 26 March 1789, Chowqua died and was succeeded by his son Locqua (Chen Junhua 陳鈞華).[45] Many of the foreign traders were in Macao at the time. In June, Geowqua and Locqua went downriver to assure the Dutch and others that there was no alarm and that Locqua's house would continue as before.[46] Locqua struggled along for a couple years but his financial situation continued to worsen, which raised concerns among the Dutch.

Plate 05.01 is a declaration, dated 12 September 1791, which states that Monqua (Chapter 2), Geowqua (Kiouqua) and Locqua would continue to stand security for each other in the delivery of their goods to the VOC until their debts with that company were paid in full. In 1792, Locqua seems to have suffered from a mental breakdown and was indisposed for a period of time. As stipulated in their declaration, Geowqua stepped in to keep Locqua's trade moving forward with the Dutch and EIC.[47]

On the evening of 28 December 1791, some officers from the VOC ship *Blitterswijk*, which Geowqua had secured, ran into trouble with the Chinese authorities. The captain, gunner and boatswain's mate had gone on an escapade in search of Chinese women. They were later discovered by the local Mandarins in the presence of women, with whom they were not supposed to become involved. The three men were arrested and sent to the French Folly Fort (*dongpaotai* 東炮台) east of Canton, where they were kept in chains.[48]

There were brothels that catered to foreigners at Whampoa and Canton, but it was forbidden for non-Chinese to go aboard the floating brothels known as the Canton Flower Boats. The few cases of foreigners attempting to enter them without a Chinese escort did not end happily. In this case, we do not know where these women the Dutchmen had encountered were located but they seem to have been somewhere along the riverfront.[49]

The Mandarins demanded 3,000 Spanish dollars from Geowqua for the Dutch officers' release. This demand was, of course, also a means of punishing Geowqua for not preventing this incident from happening. The next morning Geowqua notified the VOC officers of the incident. After much haggling, he managed to secure the Dutch officers' release for 700 Spanish dollars. The VOC chief charged each of the officers

for this great indignation to the company. The captain was fined $400 and the gunner and boatswain's mate were each charged $150. The amounts were deducted from their wages.[50]

At this time, Geowqua had a couple of writers (secretaries) working in his house that handled different parts of the trade. One of them was Tzy Jinqua.[51] Despite his financial problems, Geowqua was now one of the most prominent merchants in Canton. In September 1792, the English ranked the twelve licensed merchants in order of importance to themselves. Locqua ranked third, Geowqua fifth, and Geowqua's relative, Puiqua, tenth. There were four new Hong merchant appointments this year, one of which was Puiqua.[52] A Chinese document from 1792 listed Locqua fourth, Geowqua sixth, and Puiqua last, among ten Hong merchants.[53]

Geowqua was not in a financial condition that would warrant him loaning large sums of money to people. However, sometimes loans were required to maintain good relationships with customers. In 1792, for example, the Danes were short of funds to finish loading their ship. On 25 December, Geowqua gave them a loan of 21,800 taels at 6 percent annual interest. No Danish ship came to China in 1793, so he was repaid, with interest, on 25 September 1794.[54] Debt obligations such as these explain why Geowqua was sometimes short on capital.

In spring 1793, news arrived in Canton that Lord Macartney would soon visit China with the intention of proceeding to Beijing to address the emperor. The governor and Hoppo in Canton suggested sending Monqua and Geowqua along with Macartney to ensure the English went directly to Beijing and did not stop along the way to trade. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, in the end both men were exempted from going to Beijing.[55]

Later in 1793, an incident occurred in Macao that provides a rare glimpse into Geowqua's trade downriver. At this time, the French and British were at war. When a small French ship arrived in the delta, the British warship *Lion* gave chase. The English officers in Canton reported the following:

> 1793, Nov 4: We this day received accounts from Macao, which mentioned that a French Ship of about 300 Tons, which had been for some time expected, had been chased by the *Lion* off that place, & fled for protection under the Guns of the Bar Fort.
>
> 1793, Nov 6: We learn that the Portugueze have seized as a lawful Prize the French Ship, which run under the Guns of their Fort, for protection–as there is no certain Intelligence of hostilities having commenced between the two nations this proceeding appears rather premature, & not altogether justifiable–the Owner, Mons. Peron Resident on account of the French Company has applied to the Chinese Government to request their interference & permission to bring his ship to Whampoa.
>
> 1793, Nov 7: In consequence of the application of the Owner of the French Ship abovementioned the Quangt'cheoufou [magistrate of Guangzhou Prefecture 廣州府] this day set off for Macao attended with a numerous Retinue of some soldiers to enquire into the Business & command restitution which the Portugueze it is said on the other hand are determined to refuse.[56]

On 10 November the Hong merchant Ponqua reported to the Dutch supercargos in Canton that he and a companion of Geowqua's had been commissioned by the Hoppo to proceed to Macao. They were instructed to help the magistrate (Quongchoufou) recover the French ship from the Portuguese.[57] On 23 November the Dutch reported that Ponqua was still in Macao helping the Quongchoufou.[58]

Plate 05.02 is a Chinese document dated 23 November 1793 that is now in the French archives. It shows that this companion of Geowqua's was Cai Anguan 蔡安觀 (spelled Ounqua in French). The document is from the magistrate of Guangzhou Prefecture and the Guangzhou Coastal Defence commissioner. It states that Anguan was a partner in the Yuanshun Hang, and that he agreed to stand security for the duties and fees owed by the French ship should it conduct any trade in Macao.

On the same day, 23 November, the Dutch learned that Peron, captain of the French ship, had been arrested, put into chains and taken to the Mongha temple (Guangyin temple 觀音廟). The Mandarins who were visiting from Guangzhou were also staying at the temple. Peron then wrote letters to the other Europeans in Canton and Macao pleading for their help.[59]

On 26 November, Ponqua returned to Canton and reported to the Dutch that the matter with the French ship had been resolved. The vessel would load its cargo at Macao.[60] Three days later, the English recorded the following.

> 1793, Nov 29: The Quangtcheoufou returned to Canton from Macao, where he had been to settle the affair of the French Ship–it is said the Portugueze have consented to restore the property, & permit the Ship to do her Business in the port of Macao–It seems that the Portugueze being apprehensive that they were rather premature in seizing the Ship as a Prize in virtue of supposed existing hostilities–had put the matter on a different footing, & alledged that their unloading her was merely a consequence of the irregular Conduct of the French, who refused to shut their Hatches when required, & deliver a manifest of the cargo agreeable to the Custom of the Port–this declaration appeared satisfactory to the Chinese, who began to entertain Doubts of completely succeeding in what they had undertaken, & the Portugueze very readily consented to the Ships remaining in their Port as she will still be in their power, and may again be seized, should the acc$^{ts}$ of hostilities between the two nations be confirmed.[61]

On 4 December, the Dutch reported that the French ship was still sitting in Macao and that the Portuguese had written to Goa for a decision on the matter.[62] This incident is important for this study because it is the only reference we have to Geowqua's trade downriver. By matching the reference in the Dutch records of Geowqua's partner going to Macao, and the Chinese document in France showing that man to be Cai Anguan (or Anqua), we gain insights into this part of his operations. We can see that Geowqua and Anqua were very familiar with what was happening with the trade at Macao. Otherwise, the Hoppo would not have selected them. Further, Geowqua was probably dealing with the French all along, for which we now have no records.

While all of this was occurring in Macao, Geowqua had his trade stopped again in Canton. On 12 November 1793, the Dutch wanted to transfer some of his tea to the ship *Rozenburg*. The Hoppo, however, refused to issue a chop. On the previous day,

that official had informed Geowqua that Weaver Samqua was 40,000 Spanish dollars behind on his duties. For the past three years, Samqua had been shipping his silk under the guarantee of Geowqua (see Chapter 10). The Hoppo now insisted that Geowqua pay the arrears before he issued any more permission chops. The next day, Geowqua delivered 12,000 dollars to the Hoppo. This payment satisfied that officer enough to permit Geowqua's tea to be shipped to Whampoa.[63]

A series of misfortunes befell Geowqua one after another in the mid-1790s. In 1794, Locqua failed and his hong was closed. Geowqua's long relationship with that family made him a logical target for repayment of a portion of those debts.[64] As noted above, Geowqua had already signed a declaration with the Dutch, standing security for Locqua.

In October 1794, the Hoppo measured two of the EIC ships which Geowqua had secured, the *Taunton Castle* and the *Middlesex*. The Dutch mentioned that the captains of these two vessels, Edward Studd and John Rogers respectively, put a number of curiosities on display for the Hoppo to see when he came aboard. Several items caught his eye. The Hoppo picked out some clocks, mirrors, binoculars and some expensive locking belts ('rijke cijntuur of Gordel Slooten'), all of which were charged to Geowqua.[65] The items from the *Taunton Castle* amounted to $4,300 and from the *Middlesex*, $4,450, making a total of $8,750 Spanish dollars. Even though the EIC committee warned every captain when they arrived at Whampoa that these types of luxury items were forbidden, officers of British ships were notorious for selling these curiosities every year. They could easily make double their money on the items and the security merchants of each of those respective ships had to pay for them.[66]

In early 1795, Geowqua and Puiqua were two of the five merchants who were appointed to manage the debts of the failed merchant Gonqua (Shi Zhonghe 石中和).[67] This responsibility of course implicated them in the event that there were insufficient assets to pay the liabilities. The two men reported to the Dutch that Gonqua had 150,000 chests of tea in his warehouse, which they were eager to sell to pay the arrears.[68] In October 1795, Pinqua was declared bankrupt and died shortly thereafter. Geowqua was one of the five merchants appointed to manage Pinqua's arrears, which implicated him once again.[69]

As was often the case with Hong merchants, the health of their family business often went hand in hand with their personal health and well-being. Geowqua had been trading with Monqua for many years in handling the Dutch trade. Monqua's business was now in serious trouble, with little hope of a turn around. Monqua committed suicide in April 1796. The remaining merchants were asked to manage his debts, which again implicated Geowqua. It was around this time that Geowqua's sons begin to show up in the records. In May, Geowqua became very ill and went to his family house in the city to recover. He sent one of his sons to speak with the Dutch about the debts owed to them.[70]

By January 1798, Geowqua was in much distress owing to his creditors hounding him.

1798, Jan 26: Consultation

Geowqua & Puiqua (his Cousin) attended to settle the prices of contract teas . . . From the unusual circumstance of Geowqua & Puiqua attending in company & their dissected countenances it was easily to be discerned that some tale of distress was intended to be disclosed for which indeed we were not wholely unprepared, having heard for some days past that that [sic] Geowqua's Hong was almost constantly beset by the Parsees and Moormen [Muslims] with whom he is said to be deeply involved.

After a short silence Geowqua candidly informed us he had been of late so unsuccessful in his trade & his difficulties had so increased upon him that without our assistance he was afraid it would not much longer be in his power to support his credit; but that if we would afford him relief to enable him to quiet for the present one of his principal & most pressing creditors Samsoodeen, a Moorman, he was sure the other persons to whom he was indebted would give him time and wait till by delivering more of his contract teas to us, he should have credit in our books. We then enquired of him what would be sufficient to afford him present relief, when to our surprize he named the very inconsiderable sum of two or three thousand dollars, which he said would enable Samsoodeen to dispatch the *Jahagire* [*Shaw Jehangir*], of which he was Nockada & which was the principal impediment to an arrangement of his concerns.

The improbability that so trifling a sum could be materially beneficial to Geowqua struck the committee so forcibly that we consider'd it both useless & imprudent to involve the Hon'ble Company further in his Debts until we were better ascertained of the state of facts & could see on what security his present arrears were intended to rest. We therefore observed to Geowqua that he was already in debt to the Company between 50 & 60 thousand tales, and that we could on no account deem ourselves warranted in adding to those arrears, until some plan was suggested to us for their final liquidation, but that it was by no means our intention to desert him in his present embarrassments on the contrary we should allow him ample time to fulfil his contracts, when it would be in his power to appropriate a very considerable balance in any manner most conducive to his own advantage, & that while there was any probability of his delivering us more teas, we should reserve the tin allotted for his proportion amounting to nearly 20,000 tas. or that if it could be more serviceable to him we had no objections to its being immediately delivered to him on Puiquas security.

After one further request that we would so far aid him as not to receive the teas he was in treaty for from any other merchant, with which we readily complied, Geowqua withdrew.

When Geowqua was retired we expressed our serious alarms to Puiqua, and found him much agitated also on his own account. He assured us however that nothing need be apprehended for the Company, since whatever plan was adopted so much must depend on our concurrence & support. And that those could only be expected on condition that the interests of the Company were first attended to.[71]

Within a couple of weeks, Geowqua was declared bankrupt.[72] His cousin Puiqua took over his VOC debts and possession of the Dutch factory. According to the family genealogy, Geowqua died in 1802.[73] Nothing is known about how he spent the remaining years of his life.

**PUIQUA**

Wu Puiqua's (1767–1801) Chinese name was Wu Peiguan 伍沛官. He was also known as Wu Bingjun 伍秉鈞 and Wu Zhongcheng 伍忠誠.[74] As mentioned above, in 1786, when he was 19 years old, Puiqua began helping his cousin, Geowqua, in the Yuanshun hang 源順行.[75]

In his study of Houqua, John Wong has suggested that Puiqua had no business relationship with Geowqua.[76] As references above and below show, however, Puiqua did indeed work in Geowqua's firm—it is where he learned the trade. He was considered by some foreigners to be Geowqua's successor, which made him responsible for his cousin's debts.

While Puiqua was working in Geowqua's house, he conducted some trade on his own under his cousin's authority. Foreigners were often confused about his relationship to Geowqua. Sometimes they referred to him as a brother and at other times as a nephew or cousin.[77]

From 1786 to 1790, Puiqua carried on a small trade with the Danes. In 1789, he supplied them with over 20,000 taels worth of goods. His five-year annual average was about 11,000 taels (Appendixes 5B and 5E). This was a fair amount of trade for a young man in his early twenties to be handling on his own. As we can see from the entries in Appendix 5B, Puiqua seems to have traded exclusively with the Danes in these years. He also arranged trade with the Danes on Geowqua's behalf. I found no references to him supplying cargos to anyone else at this time or even communicating with others.

In 1787, a Hooqua appears in the EIC records selling tea.[78] This man is later revealed to be Houqua the brother of Puiqua (see below and Appendix 5F).[79] Hooqua sold a small amount of tea to the EIC each year. Owing to the problem of clearly identifying Houqua in the records (explained in Appendix 2G), and because John Wong has already told his story, I will not discuss him here.[80]

Puiqua was appointed a Hong merchant in 1792. Upon receiving his license, he opened his own firm called the Yihe Hang 怡和行 (Plate 02.04).

> 1792, Sep 21: Puiqua is Brother to Geowqua & is supposed to have some capital but hither to we know little of him, except occasionally purchasing a few chops of tea . . . Puiqua we believe might safely be trusted with a ship but exclusive of his not being very desirous of it, we are apprehensive.[81]

In another entry, the English described Puiqua as 'a young man desirous of the companys business & deserving of our countenance & encouragement'.[82] The Dutch provided additional information about the new men who were appointed this year.

> 1792, Mar 21: The Hoppo has made a large addition to the Hong merchants this year with the appointment of five new merchants, namely Jemqua (from Poankeequa's house), Mouqua (from Monqua's house), Puiqua (from Geowqua's house), Ponqua (from Locqua's house), and a stranger Tsjonqua.[83]

In this Dutch reference, the inclusion of Tsjonqua is a mistake. There were only four new appointments. The Dutch officers acknowledged that there were only four new men in other documents. Other Dutch references also show Puiqua as being part

of Geowqua's house.[84] These new men brought the total number of licensed merchants back to ten (excluding those who failed).[85]

Up until this time, Puiqua had only been trading in small amounts of tea. Now he began approaching each of the East India companies for a share of their business. The EIC agreed to give him part of Shy Kinqua's allotment, which amounted to 1/32 share of their imported woollens. Puiqua began by contracted 2,000 chests of Congo tea.[86] He also agreed to take 600 piculs of the EIC's imported tin.[87] In 1792, Puiqua contracted tea with the Danes and Dutch as well (Appendixes 5B and 5E). He was probably involved in some capacity with the other companies and private traders, for which we have no data.

Puiqua's gradual entrance into the companies' trade is typical of new merchants who had not yet established a reputation or credit rating. His colleagues, Yanqua (Ye Renguan 葉仁官), Mowqua (Lu Maoguan 盧茂官) and Ponqua (Ni Bangguan 倪榜官), were the other merchants appointed in 1792, and they advanced their trade at a similar rate. As far as we know, Yanqua and Mowqua did not trade with the VOC, but they both had some trade with the DAC as far back as 1783 and 1782, respectfully.[88]

Table 5.1 shows the EIC shares of the four 1792 appointees in comparison. The data are incomplete because the British officers did not record the shares that were granted every year. Mowqua was the first of the four to gain more EIC shares. It should be noted, however, that Ponqua contracted more trade with the DAC than Mowqua. Moreover, Ponqua also traded with the Dutch. Thus, the shares allotted to him by the EIC do not tell the whole story. The figures in Table 5.1 show a trend. All four

**Table 5.1 EIC Shares of Trade Granted to the Four New Hong Merchants of 1792**

| Year | Puiqua (Houqua) | Yanqua | Mowqua | Ponqua |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1792 | – | – | – | – |
| 1793 | 1/16 | 1/16 | 2/16 | – |
| 1794 | – | – | – | – |
| 1795 | – | – | – | – |
| 1796 | 2/16 | 2/16 | 2/16 | 1/16 |
| 1797 | – | – | – | – |
| 1798 | 3/17 | 2/17 | 2/17 | 1/17 |
| 1799 | – | – | – | – |
| 1800 | 3/18 | 3/18 | 3/18 | 1/18 |
| 1801 | 3/18 | 3/18 | 3/18 | 1/18 |
| 1803 | 3/18 | 3/18 | 3/18 | 1/18 |
| 1804 | 3/17 | – | 3/17 | 1/17 |
| 1805 | 3/17 | – | 3/17 | 1/17 |
| 1806 | – | – | – | – |
| 1807 | – | – | – | – |
| 1808 | 3/17 | – | 4/17 | 1/17 |

Sources: Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:198, 268, 348, 391, 419, 3:60; BL: IOR G/12/134 p. 35, G/12/145 pp. 212, 223, G/12/148 p. 153.

men advanced their EIC trade gradually. Puiqua's increased shares in 1798 were largely owing to his having taken over the repayment of some of Geowqua's debts. Yanqua was in poor health and retired in early 1804 and his shares were distributed to others.[89]

Puiqua's trade figures with the DAC help to reveal what it meant to rise to Hong merchant status. Before 1792, his volume of trade was not large—amounting to an annual average of about 11,000 taels or 3 percent of total DAC exports (Appendix 5E). After he became a Hong merchant, his annual average increased to over 62,000 taels or 22 percent of total exports. Even though the latter amount was still small compared to the volumes prominent merchants handled, it was nonetheless about six times greater than what he had done before.

On 14 December 1794 the British officers of one of the EIC ships got caught at a tollhouse trying to smuggle two blocks of white copper. Puiqua was the security merchant for this ship. He was penalized $3000 Spanish dollars for allowing this to happen.[90] In the meantime, the Hoppo had agreed to purchase some curiosities from the Prussian consul Daniel Beale to the amount of $37,310. Every year Beale imported a quantity of expensive clocks and other mechanical gadgets, and charged double price on the items. Despite their great cost, these items were highly sought after by Chinese officials as gifts for superiors and the emperor. On 16 December the Hoppo declared that Gnewqua was to pay for half of the cost of the gifts. The other half, $18,655, was to be divided equally between the other eight Hong merchants. Puiqua's share came to $2,332.[91] Within two days Puiqua had been relieved of over $5,300 in cash, which he could have in no way anticipated in advance. These are but a couple of the vexations that merchants had to endure for the 'privilege' of being a Hong merchant.

At the end of the 1794 season, the Hong merchant Gnewqua was having much difficulty keeping up with his payments. The Hoppo assigned Poankeequa II, Geowqua and Puiqua to manage his affairs and arrange for the repayment of debts. Poankeequa II told the Dutch that he was fearful that Gnewqua might fail and that the three of them would then be held responsible for paying all of his arrears.[92] Fortunately for Geowqua and Puiqua that failure did not happen until several years later.

By 1797, Puiqua had built up a good reputation with the British. 'Puiqua . . . is a young man of character, and attentive to business.'[93] This was his fifth year as a Hong merchant and he was now a creditor of the EIC. As the entry below shows, he had good credit among the Portuguese in Macao as well.

> 1797, Jul 8: Puiqua, Ponqua, Yanquas son, & Conseequa are arrived at Macao. Puan Khequa, Geowqua, Mowqua & Gnewqua excuse themselves for not immediately attending our summons, on account of . . . the necessity of waiting the arrival of the new Hoppo.
>
> . . .
>
> After concluding the above engagements Puiqua inform'd the committee that he was in treaty with Manoel Vicente de Barros an inhabitant of Macao, for a very large quantity of beetlenut which was also to be accompanied with a loan without interest of 15,000 dollars making the whole amount to about 80,000 dollars payable in four months in ready cash, or if he could obtain a promise from the committee in bills on Bengal at the rate of exchange published by that government.

> Could the above treaty be accommodated in any other mode than by a promise of bills on Bengal, the committee would have much satisfaction in affording any assistance in their power to a merchant who is not only entitled to favor from his general good conduct and particularly from the cheerfulness with which he attends on all occasions to our wishes, but has also so large a balance in his favor on our books, and has likewise suffered some disappointment as he certainly expected the *Nottingham* would have been an earlier arrival when he concluded his Nankeen contract with us; perceiving however that the Bengal government (on principles suggested by ourselves) has established a rate of exchange more favorable by 6 PCent to the remitter than what we drew at the former season, rather than accede to any proposals that did not specifically engage for the payment of the whole amount in specie we cannot for the present, nor until the success of the efforts of the Bengal Government for our assistance is better ascertain'd, make the sacrifice that a promise, such as is now required, would be liable to.
>
> At the same time however as the funds in question, are both considerable in amount & drawn from a foreign channel, & consequently all the objections that apply to sales of cargoes at Canton (the proceeds of which might come in aid of our investment on more favorable terms) do not equally apply here; the subject merits our attention. We therefore strongly recommend Puiqua to purchase the Beetlenut payable in four months in cash, and give him our assurance that previously to the expiration of the period we shall take the case into serious consideration, and that if any mode presents itself by which we can assist him in the discharge of his obligations, we shall very readily adopt it. With this he appear'd satisfied & retired informing us that he should immediately close the bargain.[94]

This transaction seems a bit strange on the surface. For example, why would Manoel Vicente de Barros offer to give Puiqua an additional four-months loan of $15,000, at no interest, over and above the $65,000 worth of betel nut he was about to credit him? Barros could have easily loaned out that money at 1 to 2 percent interest per month, which means he could have made an additional $600 to $1200. There is an explanation.

Barros owned two ships, the *Luconia* and *Diana*, both of which had returned this year from Cochin China with a fair amount of betel nut aboard. The *Luconia* was carrying 3,619 piculs of betel nut and the *Diana* 5,621 piculs, making a total of 9,240 piculs. The high and low price for betel nut in 1797 was $7.5 to $6.5 per picul.[95] At $7, the value of Barros's stock came to $64,680, which is approximately the amount that Puiqua had agreed to pay. If Barros had sold his betel nut for $6.5, he would have received only $60,060—or $4,620 less. By allowing Puiqua to pay for the product four months later and by offering him an additional incentive of a $15,000 loan without interest, Barros was able to obtain a price of $7 per picul. This higher price for the betel nuts, more than made up for the four months interest that Barros lost on the loan.

This deal was a win-win situation for all parties. Barros unloaded all of his betel nuts at a fair price. Although the EIC supercargos were not willing to pay in bills on Bengal, they were happy to accommodate Puiqua and pay Barros the $80,000 four months later ($65,000 for the beetle nuts and $15,000 for the loan). The company could then use that money interest free. Puiqua was happy to make a deal that did

not require any immediate payment. The agreement gave him $15,000 to use for four months interest free, and it secured a payment from the EIC on their debt to him.

The only catch to this deal was that Puiqua needed to hold onto the betel nuts until prices recovered in order to make a profit on the sale. In 1798 and 1799 the price of betel nut in Canton and Macao rose to as high as $8 per picul. Of course, the inland price would have been higher yet in order to cover transport costs. Puiqua should have been able to recover his initial investment and make a profit as well.

Small windfalls such as these must have been very uplifting. Puiqua's luck, however, did not continue.

> 1801, Jul 26: We learn from Canton that Puiqua the Hong Merchant died on the Thursday last the 23d instant at noon. From the very dangerous state of health under which he had lately struggled attended at intervals with the privation of his reason, his dissolution is an event for which his family have been for some time prepared, and was expected by all who know him. When the forms and fees of the Hoppo's office are gone through, his brother Hooqua who during a great part of the last season conducted the business, will be announced as the head of the firm, and from his regularity and talents there is no doubt of his maintaining the credit of the house.[96]

Puiqua was only 33 or 34 years old when he died. He had been active in the trade for fifteen years, six years with Geowqua and seven years on his own. The Yihe Hang's debts were not deemed large enough to warrant closing the business. Puiqua's brother Houqua continued the firm and took over the properties and the responsibility of repaying his arrears (including whatever was remaining of Geowqua's debts).

In their General Report for 1804, dated 12 January 1805, the Dutch mentioned that the 1798 debt left by the failed merchant Geowqua (Kiouqua), was passed to Puiqua. After Puiqua died, the debt was assumed by his brother Houqua. In 1802, Houqua settled the debt owed to the Dutch by delivering tea to the private Dutch ship *Hope*.[97] This entry in the Dutch report is more evidence that points to the connection between the three men. They were held responsible for each other owing to their family and commercial connections.

As John Wong has shown, Houqua fared much better than his brother and cousin. The Yihe Hang expanded steadily thereafter. It became one of the most successful and richest businesses of its time.[98]

## SUMMARY

Geowqua was a little known merchant who worked his way up the ranks from inland tea producer, to a purser in a large Canton firm and finally to becoming a Hong merchant himself. His connections to inland tea men, and later to the inland silk and rhubarb markets, gave him an edge in the trade. He formed partnerships with Ingsia and Chowqua's families, which gave them more control over supplies and prices.

Partnerships, however, also had a downside to them. If a partner failed, the other members became responsible for the debts. Meanwhile they also gained a share of the failed man's trade. The increase in volume, however, was often insufficient to cover the

added liabilities. Geowqua resorted to borrowing money from private traders to make ends meet until the firm finally failed and collapsed in 1798. Geowqua probably saw no other way out.

After becoming a Hong merchant in 1792, Puiqua quickly gained the trust of the foreign companies. By 1797, the English had much respect for him. They saw Puiqua as an up and coming merchant whom they could depend on. The debt payments, however, continued to drain away his profits. Puiqua died insolvent a couple of years later at the young age of 33 or 34.

Puiqua's brother Houqua took over the family firm and turned it into one of the most successful enterprises of its time. If it were not for Houqua, the legend of the Wu family would have ended with Puiqua. Because Geowqua and Puiqua both failed, it would have been a very different ending from that which we know today. However, it should also be noted that, if it had not been for Houqua's experience in working with his cousin and brother, Houqua would likely not have gained the knowledge and expertise to turn the business around.

In the next chapter, I turn to a discussion of the porcelain trade in Canton. Several of the Hong merchants discussed in this volume and in the first volume competed on a small scale with the porcelain dealers. Understanding the porcelain trade helps to illuminate different aspects of all of their stories.

Chapter Six

# THE PORCELAIN TRADE[1]

In 1720, the Canton merchants formed what has often been called the first Co-hong.[2] This organization did not last long and was disbanded before the start of the next season. However, the articles of their charter—to which all merchants agreed—are revealing. The following is the section that discusses the management of the porcelain dealers.

> Article 8: In relation to the China Ware, as it is a commodity that is fetched a great way, and sometimes one fashion desired, and sometimes another; though there is a profit to be got, and it is easily sold, yet it often remains upon the hands of the undertaker: so that whoever is not experienced in that trade, must infallibly be a loser. Wherefore we leave that part of the trade to those that understand it; permitting them to make the best advantage of it, on condition nevertheless, that they shall be obliged to pay 30 PCent, without examination whether they are gainers or losers by the bargain: whoever breaks this order shall be punished.[3]

As the quotation suggests, the trade in chinaware was very competitive. Only those who understood it were likely to survive in the long term. The gradual increase in demand in the first half of the eighteenth century led to shortages in some years. In December 1729, the English recorded that 'The Quantity of China Ware is only a flooring for each ship and has been so scarce that there is not a usefull piece left in Canton'.[4]

Porcelain dealers were classed among the small operators called 'outside merchants'. They were usually allowed to negotiate directly with foreigners regarding the sales of their products. Most chinaware men were not licensed Hong merchants and only traded in small quantities. They competed with Hong merchants, but on a very small scale. Hong merchants sometimes felt threatened by the competition from these small operators. In the example from 1720 above, we see the Hong merchants applying a 30 percent tax on porcelain exports. Other examples presented below show Hong merchants placing limitations on these outside merchants. The rivalry between these two groups led to the former group occasionally trying to curtail and/or control the latter group by whatever means possible.

Several things happened in the mid-eighteenth century that had significant effects on the porcelain trade. In 1755, the hundred or so outside merchants in Canton who were dealing with foreigners were separated into groups of five. A licensed Hong merchant was assigned to stand security for each group. If the outside men failed to pay their duties or went into debt, then the assigned Hong merchant became responsible. Prior to 1755, failures among the outside merchants were handled on a case-by-case basis.[5]

In 1760, the porcelain dealers were relocated in order to gain more control over them. In the early eighteenth century, most of these men had shops on Cheongla Street (Jianglan Jie 槳欄街).[6] It was a street that ran east-west and was located a couple of blocks north of Thirteen Hong Street (Shisan Hang Jie 十三行街). When the second Co-hong was formed in 1760, a new street was established in the foreign quarter—Jingyuan Street 靖遠街.[7] Foreigners called this new avenue Porcelain Street, China Street (with 'China' referring to chinaware), New Street or New China Street.[8]

From 1760 until the great fire of 1 November 1822, when all of the factories burnt to the ground, New Street was the place where one could find anything for sale. It was the equivalent of a modern shopping mall. Most of the outside merchants were moved to this new location, including porcelain dealers, silk weavers, embroiderers, painters and all the other specialists that one can think of.[9] After the 1822 fire, another street was added that came to be called New China Street. Chinese referred to this new street as Tongwen Street 同文街. It was named after the Pan family (Chapter 3), who gave up the land for its creation. The former street then took on the name Old China Street. Some of the porcelain dealers moved to Tongwen Street, while others rebuilt their shops in their former locations on Jingyuan Street.[10] There were gates and guards positioned at both ends of these streets in order to better monitor the activities of the porcelain dealers, as well as other outside merchants.

As we will see from the examples below, many porcelain dealers had showrooms on China Street. However, their warehouses, where they packed the product, might be in different locations. In 1777, for example, the Danes mentioned that a fire broke out in the house of porcelain dealer Suchin Tiauquon. His building was located west of the Danish factory and not near China Street.[11] Thus, one distinction we need to make concerning porcelain dealers is that, like Hong merchants, they might have more than one building where they kept their stock and carried on their businesses. Because fires were common in Canton, it made good sense not to keep all of one's stock in a single location.[12]

Porcelain was a nice compliment to tea. Not only was it necessary for drinking and serving tea, but it also provided additional weight to the ships, so they were properly ballasted. In both cases, however, porcelain had to produce a profit in order to justify the shipping and handling costs from China. If the product could not compete in price with the locally manufactured porcelain in Europe, then it was no longer a viable item of trade. All items put into the ships—even ballast—were expected to produce a profit. Otherwise they would be replaced with more cost-effective commodities.

Porcelain played another role in the loading of the ships—that of 'flooring' for an 'under layer' (*onder laag*) for tea. All of the East India companies operating in China placed their porcelain chests above the ballast.[13] These boxes needed to be strongly built in order to support five or six layers of tea above them. The height of the porcelain chests varied between companies. In the early years, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) used chests that were 21 inches tall.[14] By the early 1770s, the Dutch had reduced the height to 18 inches. This change was made so that there would be 147 inches left in the holds for storing the tea chests.[15]

The English and French companies shipped their porcelain in chests that were 11½ inches tall. In 1775, the Dutch began using two layers of chests—each 11½ inches high. This change reduced the remaining area for tea and other products to 142 inches.[16] Because there was only so much room in the holds of the ships, the taller the porcelain chests the less tea that could be loaded above them. If porcelain was more profitable than tea, then it was better to increase the former and decrease the latter. Thus, to some extent, porcelain competed with tea and with other products for space in the holds.

The bottoms of the hulls of most wooden ships at the time had leaks, and a certain amount of water was almost always present. It was the responsibility of the ship's crew to keep a constant eye on the level of water in the hold. During each watch, sailors manned the pumps in order to keep the water from rising above the ballast. Some ships were very leaky and had to be pumped constantly. The crew recorded the number of pumps they made each watch to keep track of whether the leaks were getting worse.[17]

The traditional items used for ballast in European ships sailing to and from China included zinc, tin, tutenague, alum, iron, flints, building materials, and other heavy commodities.[18] These products were not damaged by water and could be sold in Europe for a profit. Small stones from Macao, which were smoothened by the many years in the water, were scooped up from the bottom of the sea, shipped upriver to Whampoa, dried on shore, and then sprinkled over the top of the ballast to fill in the cracks. The stones needed to be neither too large nor too small, so that they provided a smooth floor for the porcelain chests. Ballast stones appear in the records under several different names including Macao stones, Macao ballast, shingle (or 'single') ballast, and pea ballast.[19]

There were, in fact, different sizes of stones. After the ballast material was loaded into the bottom of the hull then a typical English East India Company (EIC) ship might take in several sampan loads of shingle ballast (Macao stones). Pea ballast was then sprinkled over the top of the shingle ballast to fill in the smaller holes. This method would ensure a solid, flat floor for the porcelain chests. Pea ballast shows up in many of the EIC journals but other foreign records talk mostly about Macao stones or shingle ballast. Perhaps pea ballast was just another word that the English used for small shingle ballast. Unfortunately, these terms are not clearly defined in the records.[20]

One might ask why all of the foreigners wanted Macao stones (shingle ballast) rather than simply acquire some sand, earth or fine gravel near Whampoa? The latter could be used to fill up spaces and it could be levelled off very nicely to form a flat floor for the porcelain chests. There were two problems, however, that were associated with sand, earth and fine gravel. The small granules would dissolve in water which rendered the floor unstable. After sand became wet, it began to shift. When those fine grains dissolved into water, they would also get sucked up into the water pumps. In a very short time, the granules would damage the seals and interior walls of the pump cylinders—rendering them useless.[21]

Sand, earth or fine gravel could be used as ballast on the China bound ships, but it needed to be placed and sealed in chests or barrels.[22] The disadvantage of this plan was that there were still many gaps that needed filling. Thus, even with this method,

some Macao stones might still be needed to produce a solid, level floor for the porcelain chests.

Macao stones did not dissolve in water and were large enough that they did not get past the water pump filters. They were also small enough that they filled in the gaps. However, they needed to be cleaned to remove all the sand, and then dried on shore before loading them into the hulls. They formed a nice flat floor for the porcelain chests. As long as all of the empty spaces were filled in properly with stones, there was no fear of the ballast shifting or causing damage to the valuable cargo.

In terms of weight, the typical ballast of a VOC ship might consist of one half metal and one half Macao stones. The total ballast put into a ship of 800 to 900 tons weighed about 400,000 Dutch pounds.[23] The following is an account of the VOC ship *Oost Capelle's* ballast. The ship arrived in China with 370,520 Dutch pounds of ballast.[24] Some of this material was taken out of the ship and distributed to other VOC ships so that they all had sufficient weight.

1769, Aug 5: [units in Dutch pounds]
Received a letter from Capt. Papegaaij, wherein he gives the quantity of ballast that he has already removed.

| | |
|---|---|
| 26,000 | lbs. spelter, and we expect within 14 days, namely: |
| 100,000 | lbs. tin |
| 75,000 | lbs. European iron blocks |
| 17,000 | lbs ballast from Macao which was taken out of the ship *Geijnwensch* in Europe |
| 6,000 | lbs stone ballast from Batavia |
| 35,000 | lbs dried Macao ballast, in one sampan |
| 259,000 | lbs. [source: NAH: Canton 78, 1769.08.05] |

This account helps to show how ballast was recycled and moved around from one ship to another. Macao stones were never a commercial commodity that could be sold in Europe, but they were important for making a level floor. There must have been no commercial item that could serve the same purpose as Macao stones otherwise everyone would have switched to that commodity. Since additional Macao stones had to be purchased, it was best to recycle them and thereby cut down on shipping costs. This is why we see in the entry above the Macao ballast being transferred in Europe from the *Geijnwensch* to the *Oost Capelle*, before the latter ship set sail for China.

Christiaan Jörg has shown that porcelain made up from 3 to as much as 15 percent of the value of VOC export cargos each year. The ballast and costs incurred during the voyage, such as the provisioning of the crews, might amount to another 2 to 10 percent of the export cargos.[25] We often do not think of ballast as a commodity, but it was. These percentages varied between companies.

Porcelain made up a lesser percentage of the value of English East India Company's cargos. Appendix 6B shows the EIC exports (in taels) from 1760 to 1799. These figures were taken from Pritchard.[26] Throughout the forty-year period, tea made up on average 75 percent and raw silk 20 percent. Before 1792, porcelain and sago made up less than 2 percent of the total.

In their trade report for 1765, the Dutch listed the tea and porcelain cargos of 21 European ships in port in Canton during 1764. They obtained these figures from the Hoppo's book. Because the duties were paid according to the weight of the objects, exported porcelain was entered into the customs books according to so many piculs.[27] Those figures are reproduced in Appendix 6A. They help to show the relationship between the total weight of tea and that of porcelain. The figures do not include other exports such as silk, wood, metals, herbs, etc.—all of which were regularly exported. Except for ballast, the combined volume and weight of these supplemental commodities made up just a small fraction of the total cargos.

As the figures in Appendix 6A show, all European companies were flooring their ships with porcelain by 1764. This manner of loading the ships, with most of the cargo being tea, and the second heaviest item being porcelain, was true for almost all company ships from the early eighteenth century up to the early 1790s. This model, however, was not necessarily true for private ships trading in China or for the Spanish ships. Their export cargos could vary significantly from one ship to the next, based on the demands of their individual markets.[28] As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Spaniards often did not purchase tea. Silk was their main export, so those ships would have been loaded quite differently.

As we see from the figures in Appendix 6A, porcelain made up between 7 and 16 percent of the total weight of the cargos (tea and porcelain) in 1764. The EIC had the highest average, being 16 percent, and the Danes had the lowest average, at 7 percent. Part of the reason for the differences is related to the different size of the ships. In 1764, the EIC were the smallest of the companies' ships at about 500 to 700 tons. The Danes and Swedes were the largest, at upwards of 1200 tons, with the Dutch ships falling in the middle at around 800 to 900 tons.[29]

The amount of porcelain that large ships loaded might be about the same as the smaller ships, because they only needed enough for the flooring. Since large ships carried much more tea than smaller ships, porcelain took up a smaller percentage. Further, as the comparative figures reveal, the EIC ships tended to load more porcelain (in terms of weight) than some of the other larger company ships. This does not necessarily mean that there was more porcelain in those ships, because they could have simply ordered heavier pieces than other companies, or they could have ordered fewer larger pieces that took up space and a greater number of smaller items such as cups and saucers, which could be packed more tightly.

The overall average for porcelain in the 21 ships came to 12 percent. If we were to add in the weight of the other products mentioned above, these percentages would likely drop slightly. However, porcelain (with sago inside, see below) would still make up an average of about 10 percent of the total export weight. The average load of porcelain per ship was 958 piculs.

In terms of ratios, for every 8.8 piculs of tea loaded into the ships, there were about 1.2 piculs of porcelain. For ships of 500 to 700 tons, the ratio might be 8.2 to 8.5 piculs of tea to 1.8 or 1.5 piculs of porcelain. For ships of between 1000 and 1200 tons, the ratio might be 9.2 or 9.3 piculs of tea to 0.8 or 0.7 piculs of porcelain. A rough average ratio, therefore, might be 9 piculs of tea to 1 picul of porcelain. But, again,

these ratios are only a rough guide because there were always variations in the way ships were loaded. These ratios only apply to company ships and not private ships in the eighteenth century, before the 1790s.

Appendix 6D shows total piculs exported by 29 ships in 1784, including all products. All of these ships carried some chinaware. The cargos include that of the first American ship, *Empress of China*. Porcelain made up 24 percent of its cargo. Porcelain made up 6 percent of total exports this year. The average amount of porcelain loaded into each ship came to 475 piculs, which was about half of the average of 1764 (Appendix 6A). Total tea exported this year amounted to 168,339 piculs and total porcelain exported was 13,780 piculs. The ratio between tea and porcelain thus came out to be about 8:1. However, in the 1790s, some ships quit carrying chinaware, and the linkage between those two products gradually disappeared.

Even though porcelain was important for the proper ballasting and flooring of the ships, it was not essential. It was only used because it could produce a profit in its own right. After the demand for Chinese porcelain began to decline in Britain in the 1780s and 1790s, the EIC substituted other products that could be purchased in China and could produce a profit—such as alum, various types of wood, tin, tutenague, etc.[30]

Besides tea, the porcelain trade was also closely connected to other commodities such as sago, rice and straw. Throughout the eighteenth century, many foreigners operating in China, including Europeans and Americans, were filling their hollow porcelain (jars, pitchers, vases, tea and coffee pots, etc.) with Indonesian sago. Sago flour was very fine and dense, and it was good filler in these types of objects. It was also heavy and thus provided additional weight for ballast. Even during the time of Marco Polo, sago had been popular in Europe as a food thickener. The flour was also thought to have medicinal qualities that could cure scurvy. Therefore it was a common item included in many European ships' medicine cabinets. In fact, sago was often purchased and shipped to Europe by itself, in separate sacks or chests without any porcelain content. It served as a trade commodity in its own right.[31]

Some foreign captains and supercargos purchased sago in Southeast Asia, on their way to China, to ensure they would have enough to fill their hollow porcelain. Other foreigners purchased sago from Canton merchants who got it from the Chinese junks or Portuguese ships returning from Southeast Asia. In fact, sago was in such strong demand as a packing material that if a porcelain dealer could not find any he might very likely lose a sale. Many foreigners did not want to risk having their porcelain broken or lose profits by switching to a different packing material, so they often insisted on sago.[32]

Most of the companies trading in China, plus the Americans, listed sago and porcelain figures separately. The EIC, on the other hand, often included sago in the porcelain trade figures, thereby making it impossible to separate the two. This practice is another reason why it is so difficult to compare commodity prices between companies—especially with porcelain.[33]

Sago was used inside hollow porcelain but rice in the hull, rice hulls, chaff and straw were used to fill up the space inside the chests. For items that did not classify as hollow porcelain, a mix of rice, chaff and straw might be the only materials used

to pack them. Rice and rice hulls, of course, could also be sold for human or animal consumption. Straw could be used as bedding for animals and/or a packing material for other objects (so long as it did not get wet). And, of course, much of the porcelain was shipped in wooden chests which could also be sold or reused. Thus, when we think of the porcelain trade, we should remember that it was not simply the chinaware that produced revenue, but the packing materials as well.

The reasons for porcelain becoming less competitive in European markets had some connection to the Canton debt crisis of the late 1770s. Several large houses failed at this time, which presented the Chinese officials—especially the Hoppos—with the problem of how to pay the emperor's duties. They pressured the remaining Hong merchants to pay these arrears. As Jörg has pointed out, porcelain dealers were also implicated.[34]

In March 1779, the Mandarins suggested that the porcelain dealers be forced to pay the 20,000 taels duties remaining from the Hong merchant Coqua 陳科官 of the Guangshun Hang 廣順行.[35] Each of twenty dealers was asked to pay an amount in a ratio that corresponded to the amount of porcelain they routinely handled. If they refused to pay, the Hoppo would not permit them to have any further transactions with foreigners. The Dutch suspected that Poankeequa and his supporters were behind this request in order that they might be able to avoid paying the entire debt themselves.[36] We know there were more than twenty men selling porcelain and lacquerware at this time, so this request for payment seems to have been aimed only at the more prominent houses.

In August 1779, the Mandarins raised the duties on all imports and exports by 50 percent. The additional taxes collected were to be used to pay for the 30,000 taels worth of presents that the Hoppo and governor were obliged to send to the emperor every year.[37] In order to help the struggling Hong merchants bear the costs of the annual presents, in 1783 the senior Hong merchants convinced Hoppo Yi Ling'a 伊齡阿 to double the duties on all merchandise handled by the outside merchants. A fund was thereby set up to pay for the presents. The English suspected that another reason for the rise in duties was to help make up for the decline in the volume of trade, which had led to a consequential decline in the revenues collected for the emperor. Of course, porcelain prices had to rise again to cover the additional duties.[38]

There were also changes in the structure of the market that affected porcelain dealers. In the early 1780s, the Dutch and English were at war with each other. This led to a drop in the Dutch trade, with fewer ships arriving. In addition to this, other companies began cutting back on the number of ships sent to China. The Danish Asiatic Company (DAC) sent four ships in 1782 but, after 1788, only one was dispatched each year. The number of Swedish ships was also reduced to one per year; previously there had been two or more. In several years of the late 1780s and 1790s, no Danish or Swedish ships arrived. The French trade with China at this time was also very sporadic, with as few as one or as many as eight ships arriving each year, but then those arrivals ceased in 1793.[39] By 1795, the VOC was in serious financial trouble and sent no more ships to China.

In terms of the total number of vessels trading at Canton, according to Dermigny, there were 35 ships in 1780, 27 ships in 1781 and only 14 ships in 1782. This was a reduction, from 1780 to 1782, of over 50 percent in total tonnage.[40] In the years that followed, however, as one group of traders saw a decline, there were new ships arriving.

The Americans began arriving in China from 1784 onwards. The number of private ships from India began increasing as well. From 1785 onwards Spanish ships from Manila began regular voyages to Canton.[41] Further, after 1788, private convict ships from Australia stopped off in Canton to procure return cargos.[42] Many of the cargos they took in were actually under EIC charter. There was, likewise, an increase in the number of Portuguese ships trading in Macao; rising from about a dozen in previous decades to more than twenty in some years of the late eighteenth century.[43]

Most of these private ships, including the Portuguese and Spanish, were small—around 200 to 500 tons. It took two, three or four American ships to equal the carrying capacity of just one of the large companies' ships. It took quite a while for the numbers of American and other private ships to increase to the point that their combined carrying capacities made up for the sharp decline in the European companies' cargos.[44]

Canton junks had been carrying porcelain to Batavia as well, but those voyages ceased in the 1770s. This shift led to a great shortage in that port for many products, including porcelain. The Canton junks returned to Batavia again in the 1780s, but the voyages declined again later.[45]

As can be seen from these examples, the late 1770s to early 1790s were very volatile years for the Canton trade. In the long run, overall annual exports continued to grow but there were many up and down years. There could be upwards of 60 percent increases or decreases in the total volume from the year before. With some Europeans leaving the trade and Americans and other private traders stepping forward, there were rapid changes taking place in the demands placed on the market. Some of the newcomers wanted different types of porcelain than the companies had been normally ordering, while other newcomers did not want any porcelain whatsoever.

As the figures in Appendix 6C show, in 1798 more than 25,000 piculs of porcelain were exported. This amount was probably just a fraction of what had been exported each year in the 1770s and 1780s. We do not have figures for every year from 1801 to 1814, but for the years that figures are available, the porcelain shipments were just a fraction of what was exported in 1798. By 1814, only 5,139 piculs were exported. This was only 20 percent of the volume handled in 1798, which means the market had shrunk by 80 percent.

By the 1850s, Williams mentioned that, in addition to the Chinese porcelain sold in Asia, 'about 6000 piculs also annually go west of the Cape'. From at least the early 1790s to the 1810s, the porcelain trade in Canton was a shrinking market. At some point thereafter exports to Europe and the Americas seem to have stabilized at around 6,000 piculs per year. Of course, these changes in the demand side of the trade had a huge impact on all of the porcelain dealers. Williams gave the following explanation for the decline and the differences in the quality of porcelain that was being exported from China in his time.

> Chinaware or *porcelain*, 瓷器 *tsz' kí*. The largest part of this ware now exported is of the cheaper sorts. When the productions of the East were first carried round the Cape of Good Hope, the fine porcelain of China bore a high price. Those finest specimens are no longer made, even in China, and the processes of manufacturing the ware having been ascertained, Europeans began to make it, and soon rivaled the Chinese. All the very finest ware is still manufactured at Kingteh chin in the northeast of Kiángsí. Much of the common blue crockery is made at *Pá-kwoh*, a village near Shih-má between Amoy and Chángchaou fú, for native consumption; this kind is sent to all parts of the Archipelago, to India, Siam, and even finds its way to Central Asia. The pieces brought to Canton, except this blue stone ware, are white, and painted according to demand. The workmen sketch the design in India ink, and paint it over in water colors, mixed with strong glue. They are left in a reverberating furnace about half an hour, when they are taken out and cooled, and passed through cold water. These furnaces are made of fire brick of different sizes according to the pieces. That which is called Nanking porcelain, is ornamented with Chinese designs of heroes, and scenes in national war or plays, interspersed with quotations and flowers; it is usually much finer than the highly painted ware.[46]

Many authors have pointed to the decline in volume and quality of Chinese export porcelain in the nineteenth century. Jörg, Godden and others have given many reasons for the drop in demand in the late eighteenth century—some of which are cited above. There is no need to repeat those factors here, but I can refer readers to those other studies.[47] Because this downward trend affected all of the men discussed in this chapter, I will recount some other factors that contributed to the decline.

The effects of all these changes in Canton had a dramatic impact on the inland producers. Not only did the quantity and quality of export porcelain decline, but there were also many delays in the overland shipments. These delays were perhaps partially a result of more shops closing when the demand diminished and the reluctance of manufacturers to maintain or expand operations. On 1 October 1785, for example, the Dutch reported that the Canton merchants were all complaining bitterly that their porcelain had still not arrived from the interior.[48] In the previous year, there were also delays in the porcelain shipments that were attributed to the high cost of rice.[49] A famine swept through South China in 1786 and 1787, which resulted in a rise in the cost of foodstuffs. The cost of labour often rose in unison with the cost of rice.[50] When there was little rain, the water in the rivers declined, making passage impossible for the cargo sampans. These problems caused additional delays in porcelain shipments.[51]

The ongoing wars between Europeans continued to affect the number of ships arriving in China. According to Dermigny, there were 82 ships in 1787, 63 in 1788, 80 in 1789, 58 in 1790, 34 in 1791, and then around 50 ships each year up to 1799.[52] Fearful for their reputations and future careers, Hoppos did what they could to make up for lost revenues collected in slower years. On 28 March 1793, for example, the Dutch reported that the Hoppo was pressuring everyone for funds, including the hundred or so outside merchants. Meanwhile he had his eye on a couple of the older porcelain dealers to replace the Hong merchants who had failed.[53]

These impositions occurred at the same time that the tolls along the West River were rising. The Hoppos were pressuring everyone involved in trade, including the customs administrative networks. They had to somehow make up, as much as was possible, for the loss in revenues available for shipment to Beijing. The customs houses on the West River kept raising the tolls charged to foreigners when they passed by in their sampans on their way to and from Canton and Macao. We do not have specific information about how these customs officers were affected by the decline in the trade but their insistence on higher fees each year was undoubtedly in some way connected to the Hoppos' attempts to squeeze everyone under their control and thereby to make up for shortfalls in revenues.[54]

Other factors that affected the porcelain market in Canton were inflation, contraband and advances. However, the best data that I have with regard to those issues are in relation to the silk trade. I will therefore discuss those matters in Chapter 9. I briefly mention them here because it should be noted that these other factors, for which I have little or no data, were affecting the porcelain trade.

The combination of all of the factors discussed above resulted in rising porcelain prices, poorer quality merchandise being produced, and a corresponding decline in demand. Foreigners might decide to buy silk fabrics instead to avoid all of the problems connected with porcelain orders. These changes resulted in several porcelain dealers falling into debt and failing. Seven of the thirteen dealers discussed in the next chapter either failed or voluntarily quit their businesses. For some of these men, we have no idea what really happened to their firms—they simply disappear from the records—but all of the porcelain dealers were sure to have been affected in various ways by the changes taking place in their business environment.

Now that I have summarized the role that porcelain played in the cargos, covered some of the basic features of how the trade operated, and cited several factors that affected demand, I turn in the next chapter to a discussion of thirteen prominent porcelain dealers.

Chapter Seven

# THIRTEEN PROMINENT PORCELAIN DEALERS 1746–1806[1]

In the first volume of this study, I discussed several porcelain dealers who later became Hong merchants. Members of the Ye and Zhang families began their trade by specializing in porcelain. The first volume includes a brief history of the porcelain dealer named Tacqua Amoy who joined in partnership with a Hong merchant.[2] There were others like Pinqua, who was also a prominent porcelain dealer from the 1740s to 1770s and was appointed a Hong merchant in 1782. Ch'en and Cheong have given brief histories of his experience.[3] We now have several stories of porcelain dealers who were in partnership with Hong merchants or who became one. I am not including any of those men here.

In this chapter, and in the next chapter, I discuss porcelain dealers who remained in that profession, and never became a Hong merchant. I have divided them into two chapters based on the extent of the information available about them. Most of the details that have survived are linked to only thirteen men. They are discussed in this chapter. For the dozens of other porcelain dealers, we only have bits and pieces of information. It is a struggle to come up with even one or two sentences to describe many of them. I put all of those scattered references together in Chapter 8 and discuss them as a group.

All of these porcelain dealers discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 operated in the same environment, under the same control mechanisms and within the same limitations. Despite the brevity of some of their information, their experiences help to define the profession. Thus, rather than have two summaries at the end of each chapter, I discuss all of the dealers together at the end of Chapter 8.

As I mentioned in the previous chapter, porcelain dealers were not licensed operators but were classed among the men whom we refer to as outside merchants.[4] Table 7.1 shows the thirteen men discussed in this chapter.

I have assembled trade figures from the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Danish Asiatic Company (DAC) for all of these men. I also have schedules of trading activities for many of them. Those figures are reproduced in Appendixes 7A–7V.

There are no significant data available for any of the porcelain dealers operating before 1745, which is why all of the men in Table 7.1 post-date that year. Many of the records are missing from these early years. In later decades, foreigners in general seemed to have been more diligent in recording information about these small operators. The appendixes for Chapter 8 show the names of all of the porcelain dealers that I found in the records. I include the year they appear, the sources and, where available, their Chinese names.

**Table 7.1 Thirteen Prominent Porcelain Dealers 1746–1806 (Listed Alphabetically)**

| Name | Mandarin | Chinese | Years |
|---|---|---|---|
| A. Conjac | | | 1754–1784 |
| B. Echong | Yichang | 義昌 | 1768–1788 |
| C. Exchin | Yisheng | 鎰昇店 | 1764–1796 |
| D. Lisjoncon | Li Xianggong | 李相公 | 1752–1784 |
| E. Soychong | Juchang | 聚昌 | 1747–1787 |
| F. Soyqua | Xiuguan | 修官 | 1760–1792 |
| G. Suchin Kinqua | Suizhen Dian | 璲珍店 | 1752–1804 |
| H. Suchin Tiauquon | | | 1746–1787 |
| I. Synchong | Xinchang | 新昌 | 1765–1805 |
| J. Tonchong and Pontonchong | Yaochang and Tongchang | 傜昌 and 同昌 | 1750–1771 |
| K. Yeckhing | Yixing of the Juhe Hao | 益興 or 聚和號 | 1774–1806 |
| L. Youchong | | | 1780–1806 |

Sources: Plates 07.01–07.04, 07.06–07.13, and Appendixes 7A–7V.

We only have the business names of many of the porcelain dealers. Echong and Soychong, for example, were actually the Cantonese pronunciations for the names of their shops, Yichang 義昌 and Juchang 聚昌 respectively. They were known by these names, and not by their personal names. As is still the case today, Chinese porcelain shops often used the character *chang* 昌 (prosperous) in their name, which makes them easy to identify. For most of these men, we have no idea what their surname or personal names were. This makes it impossible to match them with names in genealogies or other Chinese sources. The only detailed information we have about these men comes from their customers' records.

I will discuss the men in the order that they are shown in Table 7.1.

## CONJAC 1754–1784

Conjac's Chinese name is unknown. He shows up in the foreign records as a porcelain dealer from 1754 to 1784. From 1770 to 1779, he traded small amounts of tea with the Dutch and Danes. After the Co-hong ended, outside merchants had more freedom to deal in other products. Porcelain, however, was Conjac's main line of business (Appendix 7A).

Conjac's trade with the Danes is hardly worth mentioning. He sold them 112 taels worth of goods in 1764 and 774 taels in 1766 (Appendix 7M). His name (spelled Qvonneach) shows up in the Danish records in 1759 offering porcelain for sale, but he did not seem to carry out any trade with them in that year (Appendix 7A).

Conjac's name (spelled Conjack or Quoneach) shows up several times in the Swedish records from 1754 to 1768 and in the English records (spelled Quoneach) in 1761 as a porcelain dealer, but specific details are not available (Appendix 7A). In

1768, he supplied a significant amount of porcelain to the Swedish East India Company (SOIC). In that year, Exchin and Lisjoncon were the main porcelain suppliers for the SOIC, with Conjac ranking about third.[5]

Conjac traded with the VOC every year from 1762 to 1784 (Appendix 7N, figures are missing for 1767). He began by supplying them with a few hundred to a couple of thousand taels worth of merchandise each year. From 1770 to 1779, his Dutch trade grew substantially; ranging from 10,000 taels to over 26,000 taels per year. Owing to war between the Dutch and English in the early 1780s, Conjac's trade with the VOC went into a steady decline from 7,835 taels in 1780 to 1,961 taels in 1784. Jörg mentions that he declared bankruptcy in 1783—in order to avoid being appointed a salt merchant. Somehow he managed to find the means to pay off his private debt to a Dutchman in 1786.[6]

**ECHONG 義昌 1768–1788**

Echong appears in the Dutch and Danish records from 1768 to 1788. References in Appendix 7B show that he was involved with the latter company from 1774 to 1780. The Danish ledgers are missing for these years, so we have no figures showing the amount of trade conducted. He also shows up in the American records in 1784 selling lacquerware (Appendix 7B).

As the figures in Appendix 7N reveal, Echong traded small quantities of porcelain with the Dutch in several years from 1768 to 1781 and again in 1788. His sales ranged from around 70 taels worth of merchandise to 2,000 taels. His omission from other companies' records suggests that he was one of the smaller porcelain dealers. Nonetheless, the trade seems to have supported him for twenty years. Nothing is known of his final outcome.

**EXCHIN 鷁昇 1764–1796**

Exchin's Chinese name was Yisheng 鷁昇, which was the name of his shop, Yisheng Dian 鷁昇店 (Plates 07.01 and 07.02). We know that his surname was Li 黎, because his sons Li Yanyu 黎顏欲 (Loqua) and Li Guangyuan 黎光遠 (Pacqua) succeeded him and later became Hong merchants. An entry in Plate 08.07 also shows him with the last name 'Ley', which is the Cantonese pronunciation for Li. The sons were also called Exchin but, in this study, the name only refers to the father. The stories of the sons have already been told by Ch'en. I have nothing significant to add, so I will not discuss them here.[7]

Exchin first appears in the SOIC records in 1763 and in the Danish and Dutch records in 1764. From these years to his death in 1796, he shows up regularly in many of the companies' trade books (Appendix 7C). Nothing is known about his years before 1763. He had the same last name as the infamous Hong merchant Beaukeequa who was from Quanzhou and died insolvent in Canton in 1758.[8] I have no information to suggest that Exchin and Beaukeequa were related.

Appendix 7P shows that Exchin's trade with the VOC averaged about 1,357 taels per year from 1764 to 1788. His total Dutch trade for the 20 years amounted to 27,131

taels. His family trade with the Danes was similar, averaging about 1,350 taels per year from 1782 to 1805. The Danish ledgers are missing from 1773 to 1781, so Appendix 7O shows no figures for those years. The total of the fourteen years that his family traded with the DAC amounted to 18,901 taels. He had no trade with the DAC from 1790 to his death in 1796. The figures from 1797 to 1805 were trade conducted with his sons.

Jörg has shown that Exchin was a primary supplier of porcelain to the Swedes.[9] He shows up quite a few times in the Swedish records from 1763 to 1772 (Appendix 7C). In 1768, he supplied a large quantity of porcelain to the SOIC. In that year, Exchin and Lisjoncon were the main suppliers to that company. The Swedes bought product from Conjac and other dealers as well.[10]

The Dutch and Danish references and figures in Appendixes 7O and 7P give no indication that Exchin might have been an ambitious man who was eager to expand his business. He had one fairly good year with the Dutch in 1785, when he supplied over 8,000 taels worth of product. His family had fairly good years with the Danes in 1782, 1797 and 1799 handling 3,000 to 4,000 taels or more worth of goods.

In 1782, the Hoppo offered to appoint Exchin a Hong merchant, but he managed to decline the offer and continued as a porcelain dealer.[11] Exchin had some trade with the Americans in 1784, but he does not seem to have done much more with them in other years (Appendix 7C). The Swedish, Dutch, Danish and American records suggest that he was a rather insignificant player who operated on the margins. His volume of trade with the Dutch and the Danes was just a fraction of what Lisjoncon and other porcelain dealers were doing with those companies.

It is difficult to explain Exchin's mediocre performance above, because he dramatically expanded his trade with the English East India Company (EIC). Exchin does not appear in the English records until 1772 (Appendix 7C), but then his business grew rapidly. By 1775, he had become the major supplier of porcelain to the British company. In fact, if all we had were the English records to tell his story, he would appear to be the most significant porcelain dealer in Canton. This is why is it so important to consult all the records, because then the picture becomes more complete.

> 1777, Oct 1: Exchin having for two years performed his engagements very punctually with regard to the China Ware we have resolved to continue to make our Contracts for this part of the Honble Companys Investment with him accordingly we sent for him and contracted for sufficient to supply 8 Ships at the following prices . . .[12]

Despite the government exactions and rise in duties of 1779 discussed in the previous chapter, Exchin's business seemed to have survived fairly well. While we do not have specific figures, the references reveal a substantial volume of trade.

> 1782, Oct 28: As Exchin has now near Twenty Ships China Ware on his hands, being the remainder of his last years Contract, with the whole of this, we agreed to make no further provisions of that article.[13]

As discussed in the previous chapter, in 1783 the Hoppo doubled the duties on merchandise handled by outside merchants. Exchin told the English officers that, because of these increases, he would have to raise his prices to cover the additional

costs.[14] The number of EIC ships sent to China increased from 5 ships in 1775 to 29 ships in 1786. The average tonnage of the EIC ships remained at about 750 to 800 tons during this period, so the amount of porcelain loaded into each ship remained about the same. This meant that the increase in their numbers resulted in a corresponding increase in Exchin's trade. After 1785, not all of the EIC ships carried porcelain (explained below).[15]

Exchin typically supplied anywhere from about 2,000 to 5,000 taels worth of porcelain and sago per ship.[16] At an estimated average of 3,500 taels, the twenty ships that he supplied in 1787 would represent gross sales of about 70,000 taels. With these figures we can estimate what Exchin's share of each ship's export cargo might have been. In 1787, the value of a typical EIC export cargo was about 200,000 taels (for ships of around 800 tons).[17] Exchin's share calculates to about 1.75 percent of the total.

If we combine those figures with Exchin's other sales, his annual gross income in 1786 and 1787 was probably in the neighbourhood of 90 to 100,000 taels. The number of EIC ships arriving in China declined after 1787 so that year and 1786 were likely peak years for him.[18] While this gross income was small when compared to what most Hong merchants handled each year, it was a huge amount for a porcelain dealer.

The EIC continued to buy porcelain from Exchin but, by the late 1780s, the increase in prices resulted in a decrease in profit margins for inland producers as well as for Canton dealers. In order to cut costs, the quality of some products seems to have been affected. The increase in cost, combined with a decrease in quality, meant that China porcelain could no longer compete with domestically produced ceramics in Britain.

At the end of the 1786 season, EIC directors instructed the committee in Canton to cease purchases of chinaware. However, at the beginning of the 1787 season, there was a reversal in this decision and orders were again given to Exchin.

> 1787, Sep 9: Having in consequence of our instructions of last season omitted the contract for China Ware as usual for the ensuing season we sent for Exchin & Synchong to inform us whether they had sufficient stock or could provide it in time for flooring ships which contrary to our expectations we found ordered.
>
> Exchin said he had sufficient on hand for 15 or 16 ships the same as the last year's contract, which he had made on speculation, & that he believed he could get enough for 5 ships more by December. We asked him if he could make those additional ships of other patterns, he said he should not have time to do it in the blue, but could furnish us with painted & gilt of any pattern we chose. We accordingly examined & approved of several patterns which he sent for inspection. He added that he was in expectation of a large assortment in the course of the season both stone & common china ware, such as is usually carried in private trade of which we should have the preference.
>
> Synchong said he had enough for one ship the same as last years contract, besides a large assortment both of stone & common china ware of which we might have the preference. We agreed therefore to take one ship's china ware for the present, & told him we should probably want more & would send for him again if necessary.[19]

What may not be evident from this change in policy are the dramatic effects it had on Exchin's trade. The EIC directors in Britain continued to be of different opinions about whether or not they wanted to order porcelain each year, which continued up to and including 1791. For the time being, Exchin's trade more or less continued. However, large orders were not made in advance as before, which meant more speculation was necessary on Exchin's part. He had to order the product on his own account, with the expectation that the EIC would again purchase the stock.

If Exchin did not speculate, when the EIC ships arrived in August or September there would not be enough time to order the products from Nanjing and expect them to be delivered by November. If the products did not arrive on time, Exchin's trade would have been reduced dramatically. In the past, he had been placing the EIC orders with inland suppliers in October or November, with expected delivery in August or September of the following year.[20] Unlike Lisjoncon, who went to the interior every year around April and accompanied the porcelain shipments to Canton (explained below), Exchin appears to have depended on others to handle this for him.[21] I have found no references to him actually making the trip himself—either to place the orders or to accompany the shipments.

Porcelain was the first item to go into the ships after the ballast was laid. No tea could be loaded until all the chinaware was in place. If the company could not find sufficient porcelain to floor the ships, it would have to buy other products instead. The EIC ships would not want to be delayed for the sake of receiving porcelain, because it would cost the company additional demurrage fees.[22] Other companies also did not want to delay the ships for the sake of taking in porcelain. It was thus very important that the products arrived on time.

In 1788, the directors in Britain remained undecided about the flooring of their ships, so the local EIC committee in Canton had to improvise.

> 1788, Sep 27: Finding on an estimate of the number of chests that will be required to contain the chinaware ordered by the list of investment, that it will not be nearly sufficient to floor the ships expected this season: we agreed as it appears to us to be the Hon'ble Courts intentions that every ship should have a complete flooring of that article, unless some other equally efficacious dunnaging can be substituted in its room, to purchase as much of Exchin's ready made china ware as will be sufficient for that purpose of patterns the nearest those ordered that can be selected for flooring some of the early ships which will thereby suffer less detention than if we waited for the new china ware, and be the sooner in readiness for the rest of their cargo.[23]

Exchin sold his stock—so his speculation in 1788 paid off. He was also fortunate in 1789 because the EIC committee again decided to take the porcelain he had on hand.

> 1789, Oct 3: As the Hon'ble Court have not as yet adopted any mode of dunnaging the ships in lieu of china ware, and finding the commanders unwilling to floor the ships on their own account, Exchin was desired to attend the committee, when he informed us, that our giving him reason to expect before we went to Macao, in case he provided an assortment of China ware agreeable to the orders pr *Earl Talbot* that we would purchase it, should it be wanted, he had in consequence

> ordered a considerable quantity, which was not yet arrived, but that he had Blue and White of last year's patterns / which came down after all the ships were floored / sufficient to floor 5 ships, and had likewise painted in the residence a large proportion of figured china ware of new patterns to make up for the deficiency of last season. He was then made acquainted with the alterations that were required to be made, that the teapots were to be flat instead of the shape formerly sent us out in tin, which we were at that time ordered never to deviate from and the milk pots to be only on one size, he said he did not think he could get the teapots in time to match the teacups and saucers, the two 20 inch dishes which are now ordered, but were last years only recommended to be added to the table sets provided it made but little difference in the price, being thought too dear were omitted, he thinks may easily be complied with, as there are single dishes of that size.[24]

Exchin could have actually sold more products in 1789, but he did not have sufficient stock on hand. As a result, the EIC turned to Synchong for the rest.[25]

Exchin was not so lucky the next year. He ordered a large lot again; according to the EIC's suggested patterns. However, this time the EIC used the decline in home demand to their advantage. They rejected Exchin's first offer and let him sit with his 3,000 chests of porcelain for a month. They later offered to purchase his entire stock, but only at a discount.

> 1790, Sep 1: Exchin has informed us that he had made 3000 chests on a supposition that it would be wanted and is much alarmed in consequence of our not having received any instructions respecting it.[26]
>
> 1790, Sep 30: Consultation. Exchin and Synchong severally attended the Committee, when we agreed to pack with them such Chinaware as we might require to floor the Ships in proportion to the Quantity each of them had made of the Patterns and Assortments we had pointed out to them at the close of last Season as most likely to be wanted: We represented to them in the strongest Terms the necessity there was for their making a very considerable abatement in the Prices if they expected the Honble Company should continue the Exportation of that Article, they assured us at the present reduced Prices they made but a small Profit, that the Duties were much higher than formerly as well as Labour & it was with great difficulty we could prevail upon them to admit of the following Reductions.

Figured Tea Sets from 3 Taels to 2.5 pr Set
Large and small Cups & Saucers to be reduced 4 Cash each

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Large breakfast ditto | ditto | 6 ditto |
| Single Coffee Cups ditto | ditto | 2 ditto |
| Ditto with Saucers | ditto | 4 ditto |
| Half Pint Basons | ditto | 4 ditto |
| Pint ditto | ditto | 5 ditto |
| Sets of Bowls | ditto | 1 Mace pr Set |

Blue and White Stone

| | |
|---|---|
| Cups and Saucers | 1 Candarine pr Pair |
| Single Coffee Cups | 5 Cash each |
| Ditto with Saucers | 1 Candarine pr Pair |

Table Sets with an Addition of 26 Pieces making 236 in a Set at the same Prices as before Tales 65 pr Set[27]

Of course, Exchin had no choice but to succumb to these pressures. Either he accepted reductions or he would likely be stuck with his inventory for years to come. These items had been ordered specifically for the British market. There was no demand for them in China or Asia. The only other alternative was to sell them to other Europeans but demand was small and shrinking there too. As we will learn below, other Europeans seem to have preferred their own designs to the British ones.

The porcelain business was now very much a buyer's market. Exchin's profit margins were squeezed to their limit. Of course, he would do his best to squeeze his suppliers and thereby not have to bear the full burden of the price reductions. The suppliers, in turn, kept fudging on the quality to make up for their lower income. Despite the EIC committee's efforts to rectify the situation, the company either had to accept the poorer quality or go without, because there was insufficient time to order new stock.

1791, Jan 31: [paragraphs are numbered]

22. Chinaware. We are concerned to find that this article is still so much complained of, we have represented in the strongest manner to the merchants, your Honors observations & instructions regarding it: both Exchin and Synchong declare that they reap but little advantage by the trade, that the quality & painting of their chinaware is as good as they can possibly afford to make at our prices, they alledge that the price at Nankeen, as well as duties carriage &ca have of late years considerably encreased and they find it impossible to make the manufacturers sensible of the improvements in the English ware. As we have been given to understand that for several years past, the importation of this article would be discontinued and some other mode found of flooring the ships, we did not venture to make any contract last season and have therefore been under the necessity of packing what had been made on speculation, paying attention to our orders respecting it as far as our situation would admit: we observe that ten or more patterns of each sort are desired to be sent but Exchin has only made four patterns and Synchong two of each.[28]

Exchin remained the main supplier of porcelain to the EIC until 1791. In that year, the British company ceased purchasing porcelain for its ships owing to the high duties on those items, poor sales in Europe and shrinking profit margins.[29]

1791, Nov 29: [paragraphs are numbered]

24. China Ware. As we are advised by the Hon'ble Court that they are furnished with a sufficient quantity of china ware adequate to three years sales, & that the orders respecting it this season proceeds more from an apprehension of distressing the manufacturers than a desire to have any sent by the returning ships we do not therefore intend to send more than what has been contracted for amounting to about 600 chests agreable to the models and assortment transmitted us by the *Earl of Talbot*, particulars of our contract with the prices were forwarded by one of the ships of last season.

25. Exchin & Synchong are the only merchants who have at present any dealings in that article, & as they have not any considerable quantity on hand particularly the latter, it will not be doing them any essential injury, by deferring

> our purchases, for one year & may be the means of making the manufacturers at Nankin sensible of the necessity of making a reduction in their prices and paying greater attention to the quality.[30]

The statement 'Exchin & Synchong are the only merchants who have at present any dealings in that article' needs some explanation. As this chapter and the next chapter show, there were many other men dealing in porcelain in Canton. Exchin and Synchong, however, were the only men selling porcelain to the British, which is what was meant in the statement above. The two men had little stock on hand so the British officers felt that it would do them no great injury if the company did not purchase any porcelain this year. At the same time, it was hoped that the decline in sales might pressure inland manufacturers to lower their prices and improve their quality. This was, of course, very optimistic thinking. In a shrinking market, it was more likely that the pressures to lower prices would result in manufacturers finding ways to cut back on costs such as producing items of lower quality. After all, that was why the quality had declined in the first place.

The British market was now saturated with Chinese porcelain. The small profits that could be realized no longer justified shipping it all the way from China. Chinese porcelain could no longer compete with the domestic product in Britain. As Ch'en has pointed out, the English continued to purchase porcelain from Exchin after 1791, but those goods were not carried to Europe. Instead, they were sent to the company's establishments at St. Helena and the Cape of Good Hope.[31] The volume Exchin supplied to the EIC after 1791 was a mere fraction of what he had managed previously.

Exchin needed to make a living, so we find that he continued to speculate and order items in advance in 1792, despite the depressed market. He knew there was a strong possibility that the company would not purchase his products but he obviously felt he simply could not continue without the trade.

> 1795, May 14: [paragraphs are numbered]
>
> 44. We have lately had an application from Exchin our late chinaware merchant, to afford him some relief from the loss, and inconvenience he has sustained by the discontinuance of that article in the Hon'ble Company's investment.
>
> 45. It appears by the Hon'ble Court's instructions on that head that the select committee, were directed to send home no more chinaware, than they had existing engagements for, and accordingly it was discontinued in the year 1792, there being then no existing contract.
>
> 46. The plea urged by Exchin, that although no contract was made at the close of the season 1791, the then president of the select committee had encouraged him to make a quantity under the presumption that it would be wanted; but as no chinaware was ordered that year, it has been upon his hands, ever since till this time that his losses, & misfortunes have compelled him to have recourse to the Hon'ble Company for relief.
>
> 47. The amount of his chinaware is about tales 60,000 which he is willing to let us have at an abatement of 15 PCent on the old prices, but as we did not think ourselves authorized to take the measure upon ourselves, we have desired him to pack up musters of his goods, which are sent in two chests p[er] *Albion* and a

> corresponding account in the packet by that ship, and his request as accordingly referred to the consideration of the Honble Court.
>
> 48. The prices contained in the account are the old prices, formerly established, and if the Hon'ble Court should think proper to assist him it may be returned, with such price affixed opposite to each article as they are willing to allow.
>
> 49. Exchin has offerred them at an abatement of 15 PCent and will be thankful if the Hon'ble Court will receive his stock on those terms, he will nevertheless be glad to accept whatever price they may think proper to allow him.[32]

The entry above is a good example of why Guangcai 廣彩 ware became so popular in Canton.[33] Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, many items were ordered from Jingdezhen without colour or designs painted on them. The pieces arrived in Canton in plain white and the colours and decorations were added after arrival. This practice not only gave customers more freedom to buy what they wanted on the spot, but it also lowered the risks to porcelain dealers. The polychrome Guangcai wares were painted in several colours which were much more attractive to Europeans than the traditional blue and whites from Jingdezhen.[34] Having the items painted locally gave the Canton dealers the freedom to better accommodate their customer's tastes.

In Exchin's example above, he seems to have already had the items painted with British designs, in expectation that they would again purchase the stock. This factor is probably why he could not sell them to other Europeans. If he had left them blank, he could have decorated the pieces to accommodate other customers' tastes.

One would expect Exchin to attempt to make up for his misfortune with the British by expanding his trade with other foreigners. This does not seem to have happened. He sold no porcelain to the DAC from 1790 to 1793. The DAC account book (*hovedboger*) is missing for 1794, but Exchin appears in the trade journal delivering a quantity of porcelain.[35] The total amount he sold to the Danes that year is unknown, which is why there is no entry in Appendix 7O. He had no trade with the DAC in 1795 or 1796.

In 1794, Exchin supplied the Dutch with 162 chests of porcelain, which was divided between the four VOC ships. He advanced them the products on credit, with the expectation of getting paid later. Appendix 7P shows no entry for this transaction, because it appears as a debt in the Dutch account books rather than a purchase.[36] The VOC ceased sending ships to China after 1794. Dutch officers remained in Canton and carried on a limited private trade, but without the big budget associated with the VOC. Exchin was not paid for the porcelain he delivered in 1794 until a few years later (see below).

Part of the reason that the Dutch did not pay Exchin sooner was because they were holding the debts of several Hong merchants. When they received payments on those accounts, then part of the money went to the porcelain dealers.[37] After Exchin's debt was paid off, the Dutch continued to buy porcelain from his sons (who were also called Exchin). The name Exchin continues to show up in the Dutch records up to 1814 (Appendix 7C).

As mentioned above, I found only one reference to Exchin in the American records in 1784. The Americans had transactions with Exchin's sons in later years, but they did not seem to have carried out much business with the father (Appendix 7C).

I have found no reference to his name in the French records. He had some trade with the Swedes in 1796, but there is no mention of him in those records as far back as 1772 (Appendix 7C). Many of the French and Swedish records have not survived, so his omission could be simply a lack of documentation. The Dutch and Danish records, on the other hand, are fairly complete, with some records surviving from every year. Many of the American records have survived as well. Unfortunately, we do not have records for most of the private ships from India but, from what we do know, it appears that Exchin did not make up for his loss of the EIC trade by increasing his trade with others.

What can we learn from these disparate data? I think they point to a man who had little interest in becoming a larger player. The English seemed to have chosen him, rather than the other way around. If they wanted to expand their trade with him, then fine; Exchin was happy to service the EIC ships, and did so with much satisfaction from his main customer. When the company no longer needed him, then so be it; Exchin speculated for a few years at his own expense, and then just reduced his operations when the EIC no longer wanted porcelain.

Exchin let his excess products sit in his warehouse collecting dust for three years in the early 1790s, which tells us several things about the trade in general—that the market had shrunk significantly by the time the EIC ceased buying porcelain; that the void was not filled by the new arrivals; and that there was obviously no market in China or Asia for the leftover stock. Otherwise, Exchin would have sold the porcelain locally or had it shipped on the Canton junks to Southeast Asia. This outcome is understandable considering that the products were designed specifically for the British market. Other Europeans had their own tastes and preferences and seemed to have had little interest in purchasing the so-called British designs.

Exchin did not have to concern himself about the shrinking market much longer, because he died the next year.

> 1796, Dec 29: Exchin is lately dead, but it will be acceptable news to his family should the company in the end determine on renewing this article of Chinese export.[38]

The EIC did not renew its porcelain contracts as it had done before. The company continued to purchase small quantities each year from Exchin's sons for shipment to St. Helena and the Cape of Good Hope. The company did allow captains of ships to purchase porcelain (with their own money) as flooring for tea chests. They had to ask permission to do so on a case by case basis, but many captains were allowed this freedom. These shipments, however, were considered as part of the private trade and were not listed with EIC cargos. Overall, the total amount of porcelain loaded into EIC ships after 1791 declined significantly. Many English ships returned to Europe with little or no porcelain aboard.

Ch'en has written the story of Exchin's sons, so I will only briefly mention them here. Loqua took over the Yisheng Dian after his father died.[39] Plates 07.01 and 07.02 are two Dutch receipts showing the final payments of the debts owed to Exchin. The Dutch had debts with two other porcelain dealers—Suchin Kinqua and

Yeckhing—which were also settled in 1799. The Dutch had agreed to pay 10 percent annual interest on the debt until it was paid.

The receipt in Plate 07.01 is dated 10 January 1799, and shows a payment of 1,207.54 taels. The receipt in Plate 07.02 is dated 18 October 1799 and it shows the final payment of 936.292 taels. This money would have been received by Exchin's son Loqua, but he signed and chopped them with the name Exchin (Yisheng 鎰昇 or Yisheng Dian 鎰昇店).[40] After the outstanding debt was paid, the Dutch resumed purchasing porcelain from Exchin's sons (Appendix 7C).[41]

Loqua was appointed a Hong merchant in 1802, and his trade grew substantially thereafter but his liabilities grew as well. By the time Loqua died in 1814, the family firm was not in good shape. A fight ensued between the brothers Cheequa and Pacqua over who would become the successor. Pacqua eventually took control of the firm, but fared no better than Loqua. Pacqua continued to borrow money to keep the firm afloat. By the early 1820s, Pacqua could no longer keep his creditors at bay. The business was declared bankrupt in 1825, liquidated, and the debts were distributed to the hong collective for repayment. In 1827/8, Pacqua was exiled to Ili (伊犁 Kulja, present city of Yining 伊寧) as punishment for his debts.[42]

If Pacqua's father, Exchin, had known what his sons' destinies were likely to be, one wonders if he would have taken a different course of action. Things were already looking bleak for the business back in 1787, when the EIC ceased placing porcelain orders in advance. Hindsight shows that it would probably have been a good time to get out of the business. The upside to continuing the trade was that, despite the accumulation of debts, the business kept going and supported the family for another 25 years. However, the costs were high. The family declined in wealth to a state of poverty and was disgraced when Pacqua was exiled to Ili.

Once the sons became Hong merchants, they lost the freedom to quit the trade at will. Exchin could have put the family on a different path, had he known what might have happened in the years ahead. He avoided being appointed a Hong merchant in 1782, which suggests he had a disdain for that position. Had he known that his sons were likely to be appointed as well, he could have perhaps found a way to move them into another occupation. But that was not the fate history had in store for them.

### LISJONCON 李相公 1752–1784

Lisjoncon was one of the prominent porcelain dealers of the late eighteenth century. His Chinese name was Li Xianggong 李相公 (Plate 07.06), but he was also known as Li Zhengmao 李正茂 (Plates 07.03 and 07.04). Unlike other porcelain dealers who were known only by their shop name, Lisjoncon used his personal name for all transactions. I found no references to his shop name.[43]

Lisjoncon first shows up trading with the Danes and Swedes in 1752. His specialty was porcelain but he sometimes traded small quantities of tea, pepper, fabrics and probably other products whenever the opportunity presented itself.[44] Because sago was often used to pack porcelain, he traded regularly in that commodity as well (Appendix 7D).

Lisjoncon seems to have done some business with all of the foreign companies at one time or another. As Appendix 7D shows, he had several transactions with the English in the 1750s and 1760s. As mentioned above, beginning in the early 1770s, the English contracted most of their porcelain with Exchin. Lisjoncon then all but disappears from those records. He sold porcelain to the DAC from 1752 to 1776. Because of the missing records, Appendix 7O only shows his trade figures with the DAC up to 1772.

Lisjoncon had numerous interactions with the Swedes from 1752 to the early 1770s. He sold porcelain to the VOC almost every year from 1757 to 1775 and again in 1784. In 1757, the Dutch considered him to be the main porcelain dealer in Canton.[45]

Plate 07.04 is a contract Lisjoncon made with the VOC dated 11 January 1758. It states that he was to supply the Dutch with 15,000 pairs of cups and saucers. They were to be painted according to the instructions and wooden samples provided. The total cost came to 915 taels, of which 600 taels was to be paid in advance, half in silver coin and half in spices. About 65 percent of this contract was paid up front. The remaining 35 percent was paid after delivery.

Plate 07.03 is a receipt dated 6 December 1760 showing money Lisjoncon received from the VOC for porcelain. The document has both his chop and the Hong merchant Chowqua's (Chen Zuguan 陳祖官) Yuanquan Hang (源泉行) chop. Chowqua stood security for Lisjoncon and was responsible for paying the duties in case the latter man failed to do so. If Lisjoncon's business should fail, Chowqua would be held responsible for all debts remaining. Chowqua received a small commission on Lisjoncon's sales for providing this security. On both Plates 07.03 and 07.04, Lisjoncon signed his name as Li Zhengmao. On Plate 07.06 he signed his name Li Xianggong, which corresponds to the Romanization Lisjoncon.

In order to obtain the best products in the desired quantities, it was important for porcelain dealers to go directly to the manufacturing areas near Jingdezhen. Lisjoncon took advantage of his mobility, which helps to explain why he was able to trade in fairly large quantities. On 6 April 1763, the Dutch mentioned that 'Lisjoncon left for Nanking'. By early September he was back in Canton again with a 'large amount of porcelain'.[46] By going directly to the interior he cut out the middlemen who normally placed orders for merchants in Canton and then arranged for the shipment of the goods. Of course, this service came at a higher cost to the Canton merchants, which was reflected in the higher prices.

Other entries below will show that Lisjoncon made the trip to Nanjing each year at about the beginning of April and then returned to Canton with the porcelain orders at the time the ships arrived in August and September. He spent about four months out of each year travelling. Plate 07.05 shows a merchant in a sedan chair with a string of workers marching behind carrying tubs of porcelain. The painting does not specify, but this may be a depiction of the men passing through the Meiling Pass north of Canton. This was the continental divide between Guangdong and Jiangxi Provinces, and the footpath through which all of the goods from the interior entered Canton. We can imagine Lisjoncon sitting in the chair accompanying his shipments each year.

Although porcelain dealers were rather small operators compared to Hong merchants, they nonetheless had dozens of people in their employ.

In order to finance his trade, Lisjoncon took out loans from his foreign patrons and did his best to get as much money in advance as possible. It is not always easy to tell the difference between a loan and an advance when examining the entries in the foreign archives. In January 1764, for example, Lisjoncon made a contract with the Swedes for 1,850 taels worth of porcelain. They paid him 80 percent in advance (1,500 taels).[47] This was quite a large amount to advance on a porcelain contract. If we look closer at the arrangement, however, we find that the Swedes were collecting 15 percent annual interest on their porcelain advances.[48] He made another contract with the Swedes in March 1765 for Spanish $2,000 (1,480 taels), with only 50 percent given in advance. The 80 percent advance above seems to have been a combination of an advance and a loan.[49]

In addition to advances, Lisjoncon borrowed money outright from several foreigners. In 1764, he received a one-month loan from the Swedes for 740 taels ($1,000) without interest.[50] This loan was perhaps interest free in return for favours he had done for them earlier. From 1766 to the early 1770s, Lisjoncon took out a number of long term loans from the Swedes of 1,000 to 2,000 taels at 20 percent annual interest.[51] From 1766 to 1768, he took out a couple short term loans of 2,000 to 3,000 taels at 1 to 2 percent interest per month.[52]

In 1763, the Swedes mentioned that Lisjoncon was also supplying porcelain to the French.[53] He borrowed money from them as well. From 1774 to 1776, he appears in the French account books as having taken out loans of 2,000 to 3,000 taels at 20 percent annual interest.[54] He is certain to have had other transactions with them, for which we have no data.

In January 1765, the Swedes managed to charge 24 percent annual interest on the advances they gave Lisjoncon as part of a porcelain contract.[55] In January 1768, they negotiated another contract with him at 12 percent interest on the advance. In that year, Lisjoncon and Exchin were the main suppliers to the SOIC. However, the Swedes bought porcelain from Conjac and other dealers as well.[56]

Many of the loans and advances that Lisjoncon received from the Swedes were done privately. The supercargos would contract with him for the company's porcelain without an advance and at the prices the company was willing to pay. The Swedish officers then offered Lisjoncon private loans, on the side, at high interest rates. The French and Swedish supercargos tended to loan money to merchants who had contracted with their respective companies.[57] This practice gave them additional leverage in collecting on the payments. We do not have specific figures, but the Danes seem to have been involved in these transactions as well.[58] The going rate for these private loans to Chinese merchants was normally about 20 percent annual interest or 1.5 to 2 percent per month. But the rate could be higher or lower, depending on the circumstances. These were about the same rates that Hong merchants paid.

The inconsistency of the interest rates linked to the Swedish loans may seem illogical on the surface, but there is an explanation. If there was a tight market and Lisjoncon had to sacrifice part of his profits in order to meet the prices that the company

was willing to pay, then he would insist on a private loan at low interest to make up for that lost income. If the market was such that he could supply the items at the company's prices and still make a good profit, then supercargos might insist on a higher interest rate for a private loan. Supercargos would not usually loan money to Chinese unless they could make at least 10 or 12 percent annual interest; more commonly they received an annual rate of 15 to 20 percent. Depending on the circumstances, Chinese merchants were sometimes successful in arranging a short term loan from foreigners for a month or two without interest, but this was usually done as a favour.

If a loan or advance was attached to a sale, as in the examples cited above, then the interest rates agreed upon often depended on the prices that the Chinese merchants had to meet to secure a contract with the companies. As Jörg has shown, the profit margins for porcelain dealers were typically not large. On specially ordered items, they could expect no more than about 15 percent gross profit (the difference between purchase and sale prices).[59] For common items ordered almost every year, the margins may have been even less.

As far as the Swedes and French are concerned, it is sometimes difficult to determine clearly from the records which loans were given privately and which came from the company's treasury. In the latter case, the company would receive income from interest. In the former case, the officers received the interest income on their private accounts. Some of the companies, such as the English and Dutch, forbade their officers from making these private loans, because it could negatively affect the company's trade. But if officers had a mind to be involved in this usury market, there were ways to do so via third parties.[60] Most of the loans and advances that appear in the EIC or VOC records were issued by those companies. If we examine a few of these we can see more clearly how Lisjoncon's trade was structured.

In September 1762, Lisjoncon contracted more than 10,800 taels ($14,608) worth of porcelain with the VOC. The products were said to be of 'very fine assortments and at a really good price'. As Jörg has pointed out, one of Lisjoncon's strategies was to keep his prices lower than everyone else.[61] The full amount of the contract was paid to him up front. The Dutch mentioned that 'this payment [up front] had been promised to him when we set the prices', which means Lisjoncon had already built the interest on this money into the sale. Thus, in order to arrive at the *actual* prices the Dutch paid, we would have to take the interest on this advance into consideration. He began packing and delivering the porcelain one month later and continued to deliver items over the following weeks.[62]

If a merchant agreed to a discount that was higher than the going rate, without being compensated for the lower prices in some way (such as an interest-free loan or advance), it was often a sign of desperation and financial difficulties. In the following year, we have such an example, which suggest Lisjoncon was hurting for cash.

> 1763, Feb 10: Purchased a batch of porcelain from Lisjoncon, at a good 20 per cent cheaper than we paid in the trading season, without there being a reason for the people to sell the porcelain (which cannot spoil, even if it is kept for ten years) one penny cheaper now, unless they are extremely hard up for money.[63]

Another means of raising quick capital was to trade in contraband, especially gold. Lisjoncon was involved in this trade, as were many of the Hong merchants.[64]

> 1763, Jan 9: In recent days, Lisjoncon brought us a batch of about 1,200 taels of gold of 85 touch, which he would not deliver for less than 126 taels. But the highest we can give, according to the limits set by Batavia, is a mere 110 taels.[65]

The Dutch did not purchase this gold from Lisjoncon, but the reference nonetheless shows that he was involved in contraband.

In 1763, Lisjoncon supplied the Dutch with over 14,400 taels worth of porcelain (Appendix 7P). He made a contract with them in February with an advance of 5,000 taels (ca. 35 percent of the total). On 1 April 1763 Lisjoncon approached the Dutch for an additional 'loan' of 3,000 taels. He was about to leave to head upcountry and apparently needed more money to place orders for the coming season. The Hong merchant, Chowqua, stood security for the loan. The amount borrowed would be deducted from money the Dutch owed Lisjoncon on his porcelain contract. In this sense, it was actually more like a second advance than an outright loan. Lisjoncon received a total of 8,000 taels in advance, which came to about 56 percent of his total trade with the Dutch that year.[66]

So far, the examples given cite only money transactions and provide an incomplete picture. In order to land contracts with foreign companies, porcelain dealers were often subject to the same pressures of 'truck' as the Hong merchants. This meant that they had to take partial payment for their porcelain in foreign imports. In October 1763, for example, 'Lisjoncon paid the Co-hong 15.5 taels for several hundred piculs of tin and 20.5 taels for several hundred piculs of pepper'. These products were undoubtedly exchanged for porcelain. Therefore, Lisjoncon had to sell them to local buyers before he could realize his *real* profit on that trade. The Dutch thought that he would make little profit on the tin, but the pepper was 'very reasonable'.[67]

As I pointed out in the first volume and in previous chapters, outside merchants could refuse to take foreign imports in exchange if they so desired. Hong merchants, on the other hand, secured ships which made them responsible for the majority of the trade of that ship. They had no choice but to accept imports as partial payment for exports. For porcelain dealers, it was entirely up to each individual as to whether or not he would accept foreign imports as payment. If other porcelain dealers accepted foreign imports, then the rest of them would be pressured to do so as well. Outside merchants, such as porcelain dealers did not secure ships so it all depended on the market and their financial needs. Some outside merchants were in a position where they could refuse foreign imports. Other outside merchants, such as Lisjoncon, found it necessary to accept those goods in order to land a contract.

In 1764, Lisjoncon contracted over 9,600 taels worth of porcelain with the VOC. In April, before leaving to go inland, he pleaded with the Dutch to loan him another 4,000 Spanish dollars (2,960 taels). This amount was 31 percent of the total contract. Lisjoncon again needed the money to secure the orders for the coming season. The Dutch decided that the discounted prices received from him more than made up for the interest that they would have earned on the loaned money. The loan (or advance) was

later deducted from the balance the Dutch owed him.[68] Lisjoncon obviously needed the money, but he did not want to risk losing the sale for the sake of securing those funds. Having a contract in hand would, of course, help him gain credits with inland suppliers.

In 1763 and 1764, Lisjoncon received loans from the Dutch interest free. He seems to have anticipated getting these loans in advance, which probably accounts for the reduced prices he gave them. This strategy, however, did not bring him long term security. From 1764 to 1768, his porcelain trade with the VOC declined, while his competitors grabbed his shares (see Appendixes 7N, 7P and 7Q). These examples show that, despite the Co-hong's so-called monopoly, there were no standard policies that had to be followed with regard to porcelain sales.

A good part of Lisjoncon's porcelain was much delayed in 1764 owing to the new governor general (Tsontock) commandeering his, Suchin Kinqua's (spelled Suchin Chinqua) and Pinqua's sampans. Those boats were re-commissioned to carry that official's luggage to Canton.[69] As we have seen from the examples above, Lisjoncon usually accompanied his shipments from the interior to Canton, so he would have known what happened to his sampans. The Dutch had waited over a month for Lisjoncon's porcelain to arrive in order to lay the flooring for the tea chests. This imposition was a great inconvenience to all of the foreigners who purchased porcelain from these merchants.

Lisjoncon was also involved in the junk trade to Southeast Asia. In December 1766, he took out a bottomry contract from the Swedish supercargoes to help finance the Canton junk *Ecktay*'s (Yitai 益泰, Plate 08.08) voyage to Batavia. Because this was a bottomry loan, which included marine insurance, the rate was 40 percent per voyage (one voyage per year).[70] The Captain of this junk was Lipsia (Yan Lishe 顏立舍).[71]

Plate 07.06 is a receipt from the SOIC dated 11 November 1766. The Swedes bought 4,266.993 taels worth of porcelain from Lisjoncon, which was to be delivered to the ship *Stockholm's Slott*. He was paid 2,960 taels (about 70 percent) up front. The remaining 1,305.993 taels were paid after delivery. The Swedes supplied their own chests for this porcelain, so 106.013 taels (143.260 piasters) were deducted from the remainder. The packaging made up about 2.5 percent of the cost of the porcelain. After the final payment was made, Lisjoncon signed his name (Li Xianggong 李相公)—showing that the sale had been completed.

Foreigners often supplied their own chests for the more valuable items. Common porcelain, however, was often packed into large Bohea tea chests (also called 'whole chests'), which were sealed and nailed shut. For many exports, the packaging was included in the prices. With porcelain, the packaging might not be included. Porcelain prices were adjusted accordingly. In a 1755 entry, the English listed the porcelain that they had purchased from several merchants in the amount of 3,435.876 taels. At the end of the list is an entry showing '120 Chests for the Chinaware at 0.420' taels and '1 Box for the Musters' at 0.1 tael. The total for the chests came to 50.5 taels. This amounts to 1.5 percent of the total sale.[72] It is important to know whether the chests were supplied by the buyer or seller, because the prices would have had to be adjusted accordingly.

In 1768, Lisjoncon purchased a couple of large mirrors from the Swedes.[73] Mirrors were a popular import throughout the eighteenth century, and could serve as a nice present to a superior.[74] Lisjoncon also landed a contract with the SOIC for 3,400 taels worth of porcelain.[75] In 1772, the Swedes described Lisjoncon as being *gamla* (old), which suggests he was in his advanced years.[76] In 1775, he shipped porcelain to Batavia on speculation.[77] As noted previously, the junk voyages from Canton to Batavia ceased in the 1770s, presumably owing to a lack of profits. This was a risky market. If the porcelain did not sell in Batavia, it would likely sit there in a warehouse.

In 1777 and 1779, Lisjoncon shows up in the Dutch records peddling tea (Appendix 7D).[78] His son approached the Dutch in September 1779 with a batch of Songlo tea, but they rejected it.[79] We often find porcelain dealers trading in small quantities of other products, when they had the chance, to supplement their incomes. They may have traded porcelain for those products.

In 1776, Lisjoncon took out two loans from the Frenchmen Robien and Vigny. One loan was for 1,125 piasters and the other for 1,700 piasters, making a total of 2,825 piasters (ca. 2,034 taels). Both loans were issued at 20 percent annual interest. In 1777, the interest was capitalized, which brought the total owed to 3,390 piasters. The next year, Lisjoncon paid the interest on the larger loan (the principle of which was now 2,040 piasters), but not the smaller loan (which was now 1,350 piasters).[80]

Jörg has pointed out that Lisjoncon went broke sometime around 1779, and he points to the government exactions as one of the main causes of his failure. His business appears to have all but ceased after that year.[81] He was still indebted to the Frenchmen for 3,660 piasters, which continues to show up in their records until at least January 1785 (Appendix 7D).[82] Either someone was paying the interest each year or, alternatively, interest was no longer being applied to the balance after his bankruptcy. It is unclear when the Frenchmen were finally paid.

The Dutch packed a few chests of porcelain with Lisjoncon in March and September 1784,[83] but then he disappears from the records and no mention of what later became of him is made.

### SOYCHONG 聚昌 1747–1787

Soychong's name was Juchang 聚昌, which was the name of his shop. He appears in the foreign records from 1747 to 1787. He traded fairly regularly with the DAC almost every year from 1747 to 1786 (Appendix7R). For many years his volume of trade with the Danes was not large; usually no more than a couple hundred taels to 1,500 taels per year. In 1761 he had no trade with the Danes. By 1764, his sales had increased to 3,688 taels and rose again to over 7,526 taels in 1765. From 1766 to 1769 he did 2,000 to over 3,000 taels worth of business with the DAC; that rose again to 6,807 in 1770 and 11,022 in 1772. Because the Danish ledgers (*hovedboger*) are missing from 1771 and 1773 to 1781, we do not have figures for those years. By the early 1780s, Soychong's trade with the DAC had declined to less than 800 taels per year. Of the 26 years for which we have figures, Soychong sold 65,273 taels worth of merchandise to the DAC—averaging 2,511 taels annually.

Soychong carried on some trade with the Dutch from at least 1758 to 1787—albeit it was not large and rather inconsistent (Appendix 7Q). Plate 07.07 is a receipt dated 3 January 1761 that shows Soychong receiving 1,176.903 taels from the VOC for porcelain he had delivered. This transaction was done through the Hong merchant Consentia Giqua (Ye Yiguan 葉義官) of the Guangyuan Hang 廣源行.[84] On 12 November 1761, the Dutch mentioned that Soychong and Consentia Giqua were packing porcelain with sago, which shows that both of them were shipping hollow porcelain.[85] Soychong's total trade with the VOC over 21 years came to 12,842 taels, averaging 612 taels per year.

Soychong shows up in a Portuguese letter dated 25 August 1766. He appears to have supplied some porcelain to the Macao merchant Simão Vincente Rosa.[86] Unfortunately, we have no further information about his Macao trade. As Appendix 7E shows, Soychong had some interaction with the Swedes and the British as well. Figures are not available for those companies, but his trade was not large. His total annual exports were perhaps in the neighbourhood of 4,000 to10,000 taels. Soychong disappears from the records after 1787.

**SOYQUA 修官 1760–1792**

Soyqua (Xiuguan 修官) was another porcelain dealer who traded under his personal name rather than a shop name. His family name is unknown. The earliest reference I have to him is from 1760, where he appears on a VOC receipt for porcelain he had delivered. The sale was rather small, about 39 taels.[87] The next reference to him does not appear until 1772. From that year to 1792, he appears almost annually in the Dutch and/or Danish records. I have found no mention of a porcelain dealer with a similar name in the British, French, Swedish, Portuguese, Chinese or American records, so I assume these earlier and later references are for the same person.

Except for the figures in Appendixes 7F, 7S and 7T, not much is known about Soyqua. Because the Danish trade figures from 1773 to 1781 are missing, those years have no entries in Appendix 7S. References in other journals clearly show that he was trading with the DAC almost every year from 1772 to 1792 (Appendix 7F). From 1782 to 1792, he traded a total of 24,228 taels worth of porcelain with the Danes, averaging 2,423 taels per year. From 1784 to 1792, his trade with that company saw a steady decline, ending with 244 taels in 1792. I have found no reason for this drop in trade other than competition from other dealers.

Soyqua's annual trade with the VOC was rather sporadic—ranging from a mere 27 taels to more than 8,500 taels (Appendix 7T). He had three years from 1786 to 1788 when he did quite a substantial trade with the Dutch that amounted to more than 6,500 taels per year. His trade dropped off thereafter. His 17 year total was 34,865 taels, which averages to 2,051 taels per year.

After 1792, Soyqua disappears from both the Dutch and Danish records with no mention of what happened to him.

**SUCHIN KINQUA 璲珍店 1752–1804**

Because there were several merchants with a name similar to Suchin Kinqua's, it is difficult to know with certainty when he actually began trading in Canton. The name of his shop was the Suizhen Dian 璲珍店 (Plate 07.08). At the end of the eighteenth century, we find him trading out of the Liangchang Ciqi Dian 良昌瓷器店 as well (Plates 07.09 and 07.10). His name shows up frequently as both Suchin Kinqua and Suchin Chinqua, which were often shortened to Suchin.[88]

The Danes traded with a porcelain dealer by the name of Suchin Tiauquon (discussed below), which they also shortened to Suchin. It is quite easy to cross-reference these entries and show that they do not refer to Suchin Kinqua. In 1766 and 1767, both men sold porcelain to the Swedes and their entries are listed as two separate individuals.[89] Both men show up in the DAC records in 1778 and 1781, and it is quite clear from the entries that they are separate persons (Appendixes 7G and 7H).[90]

Suchin Kinqua shows up for the first time, in recognizable form, in the Dutch records from 1760. Indeed, most of his trade seems to have been with the Dutch. He supplied the VOC with porcelain almost every year from 1760 to 1792 (Appendix 7Q). Even though that company ceased sending ships to China after 1794, the Dutch continued to trade through other Dutch enterprises.[91] They also freighted goods to Europe on Swedish, American, Prussian and other nation's ships.[92] The Dutch freighted goods to Batavia on Portuguese ships and Chinese junks as well. As a result, Suchin Kinqua continues to show up in the Dutch records until 1811. Several of the references after 1792 are connected to money that the VOC owed to him, rather than new trade (Appendix 7G).

Plate 07.08 is a receipt dated 3 January 1761, which shows money Suchin received from the VOC for porcelain he had delivered. Zhang Foutia 張富舍 of the Yuyuan Hang 裕源行 was the Hong merchant who stood security for this trade.[93] From 1760 to 1763, Suchin Kinqua sold a small amount of porcelain to the Dutch—ranging from 565 taels to about 3,600 taels—and sales increased dramatically thereafter. From 1764 to 1766, he contracted 12,000 to 19,000 taels worth of products each year (the VOC *grootboek* for 1767 is missing). This was a significant volume for a porcelain dealer. He continued to do a fairly substantial trade with the VOC up to 1792. His 29 years of business with the Dutch amounted to 252,996 taels, with an annual average of 8,724 taels (Appendix 7Q). The value of Dutch exports for those 29 years amounted to about 26.5 million taels, which means Suchin Kinqua's share was a mere 1 percent.[94]

As mentioned above, Suchin Kinqua's shipments from the interior were much delayed in 1764—owing to the new governor general conscripting his sampans. This was the first year that he did a substantial trade with the Dutch. It must have been very frustrating for him to make them wait patiently for their product. They were satisfied with Suchin Kinqua, but they did not want to give too much of their business to him. In 1766, the Dutch noted that Suchin Kinqua was short on money and credit. Nonetheless, he continued to land VOC contracts each year (Appendix 7G).[95]

Part of the reason for Suchin Kinqua's poor financial state had to do with an unfortunate accident. A boat carrying his orders from Nanjing to Canton in 1765 foundered,

and his shipment was destroyed. As Jörg has pointed out, Suchin Kinqua had to reorder everything anew at his own expense.[96]

Suchin Kinqua (spelled Suchin Chinqua) sold a small amount of porcelain to the Swedes in 1767.[97] Like everyone else, he also packed his hollow porcelain with sago. On 16 January 1768, for example, the Dutch mentioned that they had packed 25 chests of porcelain at Suchin Kinqua's house. Six of those chests were packed with sago.[98]

Suchin Kinqua does not seem to have done much business with the other companies. He also does not seem to have gone into the interior each year like Lisjoncon. In September 1776, for example, the Dutch were concerned about some of their porcelain that had not yet arrived. Suchin Kinqua sent his employee inland with the Dutch samples to make sure the products were made correctly.[99] The same thing happened in October 1777, and Suchin Kinqua again sent his assistant with the samples to the inland producers.[100]

In 1795, Suchin Kinqua delivered porcelain to the Dutch, but they had no money on hand to pay him. Plates 07.09 and 07.10 are receipts that show two payments made to him to settle this past debt. The first receipt is dated 10 January 1799 and is for a payment of 3,599.877 taels. The second receipt is dated 18 October 1799, and is the final payment on the debt (*finaale Afdoening*)—amounting to 2,791.221 taels. Suchin Kinqua signed and chopped both receipts with the name Liangchang Dian 良昌店.[101] The Dutch were paying 10 percent interest on this debt. As noted above, they owed money to Exchin and Yeckhing as well.

After the debt was paid, the Dutch resumed purchasing porcelain from Suchin Kinqua.[102] They soon began to build up more debts with him. In the meantime, Suchin Kinqua died on 13 December 1804.[103] On 31 December 1807, the Dutch still owed him 4,053.436 taels; a debt which they hoped to settle in the near future.[104]

The Hong merchant Kinqua was put in charge of managing Suchin Kinqua's estate. Three years later, however, the Dutch had still not settled the outstanding balance. On 31 April 1811 one last entry shows a payment to Kinqua of 5,557.160 taels. This money was to be credited to Suchin Kinqua's account; it apparently cleared the Dutch debt that had been outstanding since 1805.[105] The Dutch paid interest on the balance, which accounts for the larger settlement. Nothing more is known about Suchin Kinqua or the firm's outcome thereafter.

## SUCHIN TIAUQUON 1746–1787

Suchin Tiauquon was similar to Suchin Kinqua in that he seems to have depended primarily on one company—the DAC. I have found no recognizable references to him in the French, British, Dutch or American records. I only found two references to him in the Swedish records. A Portuguese letter that was sent to the Swedes in 1766 mentioned that he supplied porcelain to Macao the same year. In 1767, he sold the Swedes a small amount of porcelain.[106] He may have had other trade with the Portuguese and Swedes for which we have no data. The Danes were clearly his main customers.

Suchin Tiauquon was obviously dealing in lacquerware as well as porcelain, since he was sometimes called the 'lacquer man'. Porcelain seems to have been his main

export. He supplied the DAC with porcelain and sago almost every year from 1746 to 1787. He started out supplying the Danes with a mere 30 to 50 taels worth of product in 1746 and 1747. This trade increased to about 700 taels in 1748. Then he had a few up and down years from 1748 to 1754, supplying 500 to 1,700 taels worth of products each year. His Danish trade was fairly steady thereafter, ranging from about 2,000 to 7,000 taels each year through to 1787. In two of those years, 1771 and 1772, he seems to have done no trade with the Danes. This outcome may have been the result of increased competition after the Co-hong ended in February 1771, but it is unclear (Appendixes 7H and 7R).

On 1 January 1777 the Danes mentioned that a fire broke out in Suchin Tiauquon's factory and temporarily shut his business down. The Danes mentioned that this building was located west of their factory. The wind drove the fire towards the river, which saved the factories of Suchin Tiauquon's neighbours, Chowqua and Chonqua.[107] This shows that, in addition to having a showroom on China Street, he also had a location where his products were warehoused.

Because the DAC account books are missing from 1773 to 1781, we have no figures for that period. Almost all of the DAC trade journals have survived, and they confirm that Suchin Tiauquon continued to supply that company with porcelain. Of the 29 years for which we have figures, he supplied the Danes with 114,685 taels worth of merchandise, averaging 3,955 taels per year (Appendix 7R). In terms of total exports, this was a very small amount. The DAC exports for those 29 years were about 9.5 million taels, so Suchin Tiauquon's trade only represented 1.2 percent.[108]

Unfortunately, this is all the information we have about Suchin Tiauquon. After 1787, he disappears from the Danish records, with no mention of what became of him.

### SYNCHONG 新昌 1765–1820s

The name of Synchong's shop was the Xinchang Hao 新昌號. Synchong was the Cantonese pronunciation of the first two characters Xinchang 新昌. This name shows up in the records from 1765 to the 1820s. The year of Synchong's death is unknown, so we do not know whether he was actually running the business for 60 years or whether a successor took it over at some point and continued using the same name.

Not a lot of information is available about Synchong's early years. He shows up in the VOC records in 1765 supplying small amounts of porcelain (Appendix 7U). As Appendix 7I shows, there are no references to him in any of the other companies' records before 1776. In that year, he begins to show up in the DAC records. He only conducted trade with the VOC in a few years of those decades (Appendix 7U); he supplied just a few hundred taels worth of goods which could easily fit into a few chests.[109] His Danish trade was also small, but we do not have figures for him until 1783 (Appendix 7V). In that year he sold them 1,526 taels worth of porcelain. His twelve year average with the Danes was 795 taels per year.

Synchong and Exchin were very much involved with the EIC in the 1780s. The section above that focuses on Exchin has some information about Synchong, which I will not repeat here. It is quite interesting that both Synchong and Exchin were

considered for appointments to Hong merchants in September 1782. By December both of them had found a way to avoid accepting those appointments.

> 1782, Sep 3: It is the Hoppo's intention to complete the original number of 13, Exchin & Synchong were two men fixed on, they are at present in suspence.[110]
> 1782, Dec 29: Exchin & Synchong two China War[e] merchants were intended but found means to avoid it.[111]

The fact that Synchong had been considered for this appointment seems to have aroused the interest of the English enough to give him mention in their records, but a steady trade with the EIC did not begin until 1785 (Appendix 7I).

In 1784, the first American ship arrived in China. Samuel Shaw was in charge of establishing this new link to Eastern markets. He met Synchong and recorded the following about him.

> Syngchong, the principal porcelain merchant at Canton, told me one day, with much satisfaction, that his wife had brought him a third son,—and added, with an air expressive of gratitude, that Joss was very good to him. 'Joss loves me,' continued he, 'because I make him much chin-chin'.[112]

From the information that has survived, this suggestion of Synchong being a 'principal porcelain merchant' seems a bit of a stretch of reality. As far as the records reveal, up until this time, he had been just a small operator. He was an up and coming man who was expanding his business at about the same time so perhaps that is what influenced Shaw. By the mid-1780s, Synchong had landed a contract with the EIC. He began by supplying porcelain for one ship each year, along with some other miscellaneous sales.

> 1787, Sep 9: Synchong said he had enough for one ship the same as last years contract, besides a large assortment both of stone & common china ware of which we might have the preference. We agreed therefore to take one ship's china ware for the present, & told him we should probably want more & would send for him again if necessary.[113]

As noted above, Exchin was the major supplier of porcelain to the EIC at this time. While Synchong furnished porcelain for one ship in 1787, Exchin supplied porcelain for twenty ships. After the English curtailed their porcelain purchases in 1792, Synchong lost his trade with that company. He continued to trade privately with English officers. For example, he shows up selling porcelain in Captain Hamilton's private account books of 1796, 1806 and 1812 (Appendix 7I).[114]

Synchong shows up in the DAC records from 1776 onwards, but we only have figures for the years from 1783 to 1805 (Appendixes 7I and 7V). In several of those years he did no trade with the company. The volume of his Danish trade was never large—ranging from only a couple of hundred taels worth of merchandise per year to about 1,600 taels. Synchong's name pops up again in the Danish records in 1820 and 1822 as a porcelain dealer, but he seems to have done no trade with the company. The Danish company sent no ships to China from 1807 to 1819, which accounts for the gap in the references.

I have no figures for Synchong's trade with Americans. There are several references to him in later years. In 1802, Stephen Dexter from Providence wrote the following.

> Synchong, and Eching [Exchin] are the two principal China Ware Merchants & indeed the only ones, you can depend on to furnish you with any considerable quantity of China, & even with them, you ought to pay the greatest attention when packing the China, otherwise you will probably get some, not so good as your contract stipulates–The other China Ware Merchants, cannot in the least be depended on. If you have made a contract with any of them that proves to be favourable to them, they will comply with it: but if they can get ten dollars more for the China from another person, than what they have contracted to sell it to you, they will pay no regard to their contract with you, and you can obtain no redress.[115]

From this entry, we can infer that competition continued to be intense, and that Synchong and Exchin were still the dominant chinaware merchants. The reference also suggests that Synchong may have gained prominence over Exchin's house (Synchong is mentioned first). The following description of Synchong appears in the Benjamin Shreve papers of 1809, held at the Peabody Essex Museum:

> 1809: Old Synchong is head China Ware Merchant, is sometimes much dearer, often a little cheaper, generally better China & always best packed of any man in Canton, is a close fisted old miser, gets drunk every day, but performs his contracts & whatever you can bind him to, he will fulfill, I prefer dealing with Synchong to any other.
>
> Exhing . . . is next . . . has much business–some manners about him–does not pack so well, and China ware not generally so good, great breakage–has considerable business.
>
> . . .
>
> Sinchong is the great Porcelain Merchant, you purchase your principal ware of him. There are many others, inferior ones in the same line . . .
>
> . . .
>
> Syngchong was at the head of the China Ware Merchants. He sells dearer than some others.
>
> Exchin sold cheaper–not so much to be depended on as to punctually executing orders.[116]

In 1815, the American Bryan Tilden also had some dealings with Synchong and recorded the following about him:

> 1815: Seeing a rich inteligent China ware merchant named Synschong–on one day giving rice & food. from his ware house steps–to a numerous troupe of these beggars . . .
>
> . . . this same good old man–provides through his house and store coolies for all beggars stopping at his doors–which I always see are thronged whenever I visit him on business.
>
> Synschong's splendid china ware shop and long rooms are every day resorted to by foreigners, to make purchases & chat with him; but though very inquisitive about other countries, he china man like, cunningly evades all questions about his own.

> Most of his elegantly painted, costly jars, large bowls, and vases, etc, etc, are taken to various parts of India, and much of this beautiful ware is also every year smuggled home, by the Honbl Company ships to England.
>
> ### It is well for us barbarians that our ladies are not allowed to visit Canton– for they would spend all the ship's funds at some of the China ware and silk stores– Hinckley said this!
>
> I may here notice that the trade in china ware, is the only one exempted from the monopoly of the Company of Hong merchants.[117]

As noted above and below, Tilden's comment about the monopoly of the Hong merchants, where he says only chinaware was exempted, is not entirely correct. The statement nonetheless shows that it was very easy to buy porcelain directly from the dealers instead of going through a Hong merchant. What Tilden did not say is that the same was true with respect to silk and other goods. Foreigners could go directly to the silk weavers and order what they wanted, just as they could with chinaware.

In these references, we can see clearly that Synchong had now supplanted Exchin as the prominent porcelain dealer in Canton. From 1815 to 1819, several American references show him dealing in top-end products, including the best chinaware available (Appendix 7I). Waln mentioned that he was a man of number one standing and good character.[118] Nothing more is known of his fate.

### TONCHONG 傜昌 AND PONTONCHONG 同昌 1750–1771

There were two porcelain dealers who went by the name Tonchong. One of them only used the name Tonchong, while the other sometimes went by Pontonchong and at other times by Tonchong. The first Tonchong's Chinese name was Yaochang 傜昌, which does not correspond with his Romanized name. Pontonchong's Chinese name was Tongchang 同昌. His Romanized name, however, has an extra syllable Pon, for which we have no character. Because Pontonchong's name was sometimes shortened to Tonchong, it is impossible to distinguish him from the other Tonchong. I am therefore going to discuss both of them here as if they were one and the same.

A few entries in the Dutch records clearly distinguish Pontonchong from Tonchong. In 1760 Pontonchong sold the VOC 1,769 taels of porcelain. Plate 07.11 is a receipt he signed after the Dutch paid him for the items he had delivered. This transaction was done through the Hong merchants Cai Hunqua and Semqua of the Yifeng Hang 義豐行.[119] Pontonchong also had a small transaction with the VOC for 177 taels in 1764 (Appendix 8C).

The only reference I have that clearly distinguishes Tonchong from Pontonchong is a receipt in the VOC archive.[120] This document shows Tonchong receiving 49 taels from the VOC for porcelain he had delivered in 1758. It shows his shop name in Chinese, which was different from Pontonchong's. The transaction was done through the Hong merchant Consentia Giqua's Guangyuan Hang 廣源行.[121]

For all other entries to Tonchong, it is impossible to know exactly which man they are referring to. As Appendix 7M shows, a Tonchong sold a small amount of porcelain to the Danes from 1750 to 1766. He only traded with the DAC in six of those years and the amounts were not large—ranging from a mere 15 taels to 619 taels.

In 1752, a Tonchong sold porcelain to the Swedes in the amount of 127 taels.[122] In 1765, a Tonchon also appears in the Swedish records supplying porcelain to the Macao merchant Luis Coelho.[123] In 1771, a Tonchong sold 195 taels worth of porcelain to the VOC. A porcelain dealer by the name of Tonchong also appears in the EIC records in 1750 and 1755 (Appendix 7J).

Unfortunately, this is all we know about Tonchong and Pontonchong. Both names disappear from the records after 1771. What is important to clarify here is that there were two men trading under the same name at this time. Although their trade was not large, their examples add to our understanding of the degree to which these small operators were interacting with foreigners.

**YECKHING 益興 1774–1806**

Yeckhing's name was Yixing 益興.[124] The name of his shop was the Juhe Hao 聚和號 (Plates 07.12 and 07.13). He shows up in the foreign records selling porcelain to the Dutch and Danes from 1774 to 1806 (Appendix 7K).

Yeckhing had a fairly steady trade with the VOC from 1775 to 1792 (Appendix 7U). It grew from about 1,000 taels worth of merchandise in 1775 to over 17,000 taels in 1788. As Jörg has pointed out, the Dutch had a high regard for him.[125] His trade with the Dutch began to decline from 1789 to 1792. In the 17 years he traded with the VOC, Yeckhing supplied 91,357 taels worth of merchandise, averaging 5,374 taels per year. Yeckhing's name continues to show up in the Dutch records from 1793 to 1804, but these are references to a debt that the company owed to him (Appendixes 7K and7U).

Yeckhing traded with the DAC almost every year from 1774 to 1806 (Appendix 7V). We do not have figures for the years before 1782. The value of his trade each year from 1782 to 1796 ranged from 1,000 taels to more than 6,800 taels. From 1797 to 1806, however, his annual trade was about 500 to 1,000 taels each year. Over the 20 years he traded with the Danes, he supplied them with 53,485 taels worth of merchandise, averaging 2,674 taels per year (Appendixes 7K and 7V).

Like Exchin, who placed the EIC orders for the next year around October, Yeckhing usually placed his VOC orders in early November for delivery in the following September. In February 1786, for example, Yeckhing received word from the inland manufacturers that they were busy getting the VOC orders ready for the next season. The Dutch had given him the orders on 1 November. Yeckhing was informed that no one would make the fish dishes at the current prices.[126] The manufacturers insisted that it cost much more to make this product. Yeckhing advised the Dutch officers not to take delivery, as it would likely result in a big loss to the company. The Dutch decided to use the money to purchase silk textiles instead. On 14 November 1786, they placed another order for porcelain with Yeckhing for the next year, which he forwarded to inland manufacturers.[127]

When the Danes arrived in Canton on 17 September 1794, they learned that Yeckhing had died, and that his brother had succeeded him.[128] The brother continued trading under the same name. The Danes continued to trade almost every year with

his brother up to 1806 (Appendix 7V). The DAC sent no ships to China from 1807 to 1819. When they returned in 1820, they did not mention Yeckhing.

I only found a couple of references to Yecking in the Swedish records. In a document dated 26 September 1796, he is listed as one of the merchants who supplied porcelain to the SOIC.[129] In 1801, he supplied the Swedes with 2,474 taels worth of merchandise.[130] Many of the Swedish records are missing, so his omission could be simply due to the absence of documentation.

Plates 07.12 and 07.13 are receipts that show the Dutch settling their debt with Yeckhing. On 10 January 1799 they paid him 7,192.765 taels. On 21 December 1799, the Dutch received a payment on the debt owed to them by the Hong merchant Gnewqua II (Zheng Chongqian 鄭崇謙). This money was then used to pay Yeckhing 5,632.110 taels, which was the remainder owed to him.[131] As noted above, the Dutch were paying 10 percent interest on this debt. They paid off Exchin and Suchin Kinqua at the same time (see above).

Plate 07.13 shows that the Dutch were now using an exchange rate of 102 new Spanish reals of eight (the English called them Spanish dollars) to 74 taels.[132] In the past, the Dutch had used an exchange rate of 100 Spanish reals to 74 taels. The silver content of these new Spanish reals was apparently less than in previous years, so the exchange rate had to be adjusted accordingly. Porcelain dealers, like the Hong merchants, were attentive to the alloy content of the coins they received, so that they would not be cheated.

After the debt was paid, the Dutch resumed purchasing porcelain from Yeckhing's house.[133] His name continues to show up in the Dutch and Danish records until 1806 as a dealer in porcelain. Then the name disappears from the records.[134]

## YOUCHONG 1780–1806

Youchong shows up in the foreign records from 1780 to 1806 (Appendix 7L). As figures in Appendix 7T reveal, he sold small quantities of porcelain to the Dutch in the 1780s, but only in three years. In 1796, the Swedes listed Youchong as one of the dealers in Canton who supplied porcelain to the SOIC.[135] No information or figures have survived from that trade.

His Danish trade was more consistent and substantial. From 1796 to 1806, he supplied the DAC with 35,429 taels worth of merchandise (Appendix 7S). His annual average was 3,543 taels. After the Danes ceased trading at Canton in 1807, we would expect to find Youchong in other records such as those of the Americans. I have found no references to a porcelain dealer with this name. Nothing more is known of his fate.

This concludes the survey of the most prominent porcelain dealers. In order to avoid repetition, I will not summarize them here. There is still much more to report in the next chapter. Some of that information relates to the men in this chapter as well. After I discuss the smaller operators in Chapter 8, I will provide a final summary of what all these stories tell us about the porcelain trade.

CHAPTER EIGHT

# MISCELLANEOUS PORCELAIN DEALERS 1724–1844[1]

In this chapter I briefly discuss other porcelain dealers who were operating in Canton from 1724 to 1844, for whom we have only brief information. The English East India Company (EIC), General East India Company (GIC), Dutch East India Company (VOC), Swedish East India Company (SOIC), Danish Asiatic Company (DAC) and American records were especially helpful in pulling their stories together. In Appendixes 8A to 8E, I have recorded the names I found in those archives, the years they appear, and the trade they conducted with each company (where available). Most of these transactions amounted to just a few hundred taels each year.

Unless merchants handled any of the other products of the China trade, such as tea or silk, their business with an individual East India company might only amount to a few hundred taels each year. Robin (or Poor Robin, also spelled Robben, Labin, etc.) was one of the prominent porcelain dealers from the 1720s to the 1740s. He shows up in almost all of the companies' records. He also dealt in other products when the opportunity arose. In 1732 and 1733, he traded in partnership with Seyqua. Together, the two men sold over 60,000 taels worth of merchandise to the VOC. However, when only porcelain was involved, Robin's sales were just a few hundred to a few thousand taels with each company. The only way to increase his volume was to diversify into other products (Appendixes 8A to 8C).

From 1724 to 1732, Jago (or Jacco) traded porcelain with the GIC. His annual sales were not large, usually just a few hundred taels. In 1730, he also sold the Flemings some tea, which raised his sales that year to over 1,900 taels. In 1736, Jago also appears in the EIC records selling porcelain. (Appendixes 8A and 8B)

Tomsoy or Tomsoy Pocqua sold a small amount of porcelain to the GIC in 1725 and to the DAC in 1738. In 1727, he sold some tea and rhubarb to the GIC, which raised his sales to the Flemings that year to 7,430 taels (Appendixes 8B and 8D).

Canga (also spelled J. Congo) sold porcelain to the GIC in 1725 and 1727. One of his incentives to attract customers was to offer a 4 percent rebate for broken porcelain, rather than the traditional 2 percent. This tactic gave him an advantage over the competition. Moreover, it is another reason why it is difficult to make comparisons between porcelain prices. Unless we have all the variables, and all the information regarding secret agreements, we cannot arrive at the *real* prices that were paid (Appendix 8B).

As Appendixes 8A to 8D show, there were many other porcelain men. Some of them show up for several years in the records. Chunquay (also spelled Chonquoi, Cungqua, etc.) sold porcelain to the GIC and EIC in the 1720s and 1730s. He owned one of the factories in Canton, which he rented out to the GIC officers in 1730. Tom

**Table 8.1 Other Porcelain Dealers Who Were Operating around 1779**

| Name | Mandarin | Chinese | Years they appear in the records |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Pinqua | Yang Bingguan | 楊丙觀 | 1747–1795 |
| 2. Hopyek | Heyi | 合益 | 1760–1788 |
| 3. Winchong | Yongchang | 永昌 | 1761–1784 |
| 4. Houqua | Guangyi | 廣益 | 1758–1784 |
| 5. Kinqua (Shinqua) | | | 1766–1778 |
| 6. Foyec | | | 1778–1784 |
| 7. Meeho | | | 1779–1784 |
| 8. Pouchong | | | 1764–1802 |

Sources: Plates 06.01, 08.01–08.02, 08.06, and Appendixes 8C–8E.

(also called Mr. Tom, Honest Tom or Tom the Boutique man) and Guaqua sold porcelain to the GIC and EIC in those decades as well. While a list of other men—like Diauqua, Tay Huin, Offoo, Keowlo, Blekjacq, Jan Chinaware, Jeck, Augustin and numerous others—might only show up just once in the records and then disappear.

After the Americans began their voyages to China in 1784, we get much better information about these small operators. The Americans were particularly good at briefly describing each man with a comment or two about their character and trading patterns. I have reproduced the names of the porcelain dealers that I found in those records in Appendix 8E. There are likely to be many other names in records that were not consulted for this study.

As mentioned in Chapter 6, in 1779 twenty porcelain dealers were forced to pay the duties owed by the failed merchant Coqua.[2] Unfortunately, that source did not list their names. We can guess who they might have been. The names would have included all thirteen men discussed in Chapter 7 and listed in Table 7.1. In Table 8.1, I list an additional eight dealers who were operating in or around 1779. There are 21 shops in total. One of the 21 men was, for whatever reason, not included in the order to pay Coqua's duties.

There were other porcelain dealers besides these 21 men. As far as I can tell from the surviving records, the men listed in Tables 7.1 and 8.1 were the more prominent operators. Unfortunately, excepting Pinqua (who I am not going to discuss here because he later became a Hong merchant), I have only bits and pieces of information about them. Taken together, the data provide an idea of the scale of their operations.

A few documents linked to these men in the VOC archives are reproduced in the plate section. Plate 08.01 is a receipt from Hopyek (Heyi 合益, spelled Habjak). It shows him receiving 713 taels from the VOC for porcelain delivered in 1760. This document has the chop of Chowqua's Yuanquan Hang 源泉行 on it, which would have been the house that the sale was channeled through. The next reference to Hopyek is not until 25 years later. From 1785 to 1787, he supplied the VOC with more porcelain. We know this is the same shop because his Chinese name (Heyi 合益) appears again in the American records selling porcelain in 1786 (Appendixes 8C and 8E).[3]

Winchong appears in the EIC records in 1761 and the SOIC records in 1767 selling porcelain (Appendix 8A and Plate 08.06). He shows up again in the American records in 1784 with his Chinese name Yongchang 永昌 (which was Winchong in Cantonese, Appendix 8E).[4] Plate 06.01 is a painting showing a man packing porcelain into a barrel with the characters Yongchang Hao 永昌號. The *hao* 號 indicates that this was a shop. The common Chinese characters for a small retail establishment were *hao* 號, *dian* 店 and *ji* 記. These characters were often used interchangeably.

Plate 08.02 shows a receipt from the porcelain dealer named Houqua. This man seems to have been a separate person from the other Houquas discussed in earlier chapters. The receipt shows that he was paid 2,341.791 taels for porcelain he had delivered to the VOC in 1760. This transaction was also done through Chowqua's Yuanquan Hang. Houqua's business name was Guangyi 廣益 which does not correspond with his Romanized trade name. He obviously had another name as well. Houqua actually specialized in lacquerware, but also sold porcelain. In 1758, 1760, 1762, 1763, and 1765 he supplied porcelain and lacquerware to the VOC (Appendix 8C). A lacquerware man with this name shows up in the American records in 1784. He may have been the same person.[5] The painting in Plate 08.10 shows Guangyi porcelain being carried to market.

Kinqua is a different man from the Suchin Kinqua discussed in the previous chapter. He was also called Kinqua Shinqua. He sold porcelain to the VOC and DAC for several years from 1766 to 1778 (Appendixes 8C and 8D). Foyec and Meeho traded small amounts with the VOC in the years from 1778 to 1784 (Appendix 8C). Pouchong (also spelled Pouwchong, Powchon, etc.) shows up in both the Danish and Dutch records from 1764 to 1802 (Appendixes 8C and 8D).

Plate 08.03 is a receipt dated 3 January 1761 that shows a trader called Quonschong receiving 283.014 taels for porcelain he delivered to the VOC. The name of his shop was the Guangchang Dian 廣昌店. This transaction was channeled through Consentia Giqua's Guangyuan Hang 廣源行. Quonchong had some small transactions with the DAC in 1748, 1760 and 1764 (Appendixes 8C and 8D).

Plate 08.04 is a receipt dated 3 January 1761 that shows a merchant known as Quonsching receiving 216.061 taels from the VOC for porcelain delivered. The name of his shop was the Guangsheng Dian 廣盛店. This transaction was channeled through Chowqua's Yuanquan Hang.

Plate 08.05 is a receipt dated 3 January 1761. It shows one Neyschong receiving 571.717 taels from the VOC for porcelain delivered. The name of his shop was the Yichang Dian 裔昌店. This transaction was also channeled through the Guangyuan Hang.

Another shop that supplied porcelain was the Heli Hao 合利號. Plate 06.02 shows the inside of this shop. It was run by the two partners—Yan Linshe 顏琳舍 (Limsia) and Pinqua (Ni Pengguan 倪鵬官). The painting shows a Chinese merchant welcoming some foreigners into his shop. We can envision this man being either Limsia or Pinqua. Limsia was from the famous Yan family. The Yans had a Hong merchant license and ran a large trading operation in the eighteenth century. Limsia, however, operated more like an outside merchant—selling porcelain and other items to foreigners.[6]

Yam Shinqua was an innovative and ambitious porcelain dealer who appears in the American records. He placed an advertisement in the 12 May 1804 edition of the *Providence Gazette*. He was apparently trying to make his name known in order to attract American customers before they left for China. This was quite an innovative idea for the time.[7] His advertisement read as follows:

> Yam Shinqua, China-Ware Merchant, at Canton, Begs Leave respectfully to inform the American Merchants, Supercargoes, and Captains, that he procures to be Manufactured, in the best Manner, all sorts of China-Ware with arms, Cyphers, and other Decorations (if required) painted in a very superior Style, and on the most reasonable Terms. All orders carefully and promptly attended to.
> Canton (China) Jan. 8, 1804.[8]

It is unknown whether this tactic was successful. In the early years of the nineteenth century, Yam Shinqua was known for his cheap prices and for executing 'small orders pretty well'.[9] I have no references to him becoming a prominent player.

There are several other porcelain dealers who show up in the American records of the early nineteenth century. A few of the more popular men were Fouchong 阜昌, who in 1809 was said to be

> a pretty good man, & well spoken of by the Philadelphians, 2% is deducted from all Bills for China Ware and payment made @ 75 canderins pr Dollar[10]

By 1818, Fouchong was known as a man with 'a good name' and in 'No. 1 Standing'.[11] The Danes bought some porcelain from him in 1820 (Appendix 8D). He also appears in some private French records in 1826.[12]

The 2 percent rebate on chinaware was the normal amount that most porcelain dealers allowed for breakage during the voyage.[13] This was so commonly understood that foreigners often did not record the rebate in their records. Changing the exchange rate, however, from the normal 1 Spanish dollar to 0.72 taels, to 1 to 0.75 taels, led to savings of about 4 percent for the buyers. Fouchong could keep his prices the same as other dealers, but then privately agreed to a different exchange rate in order to land a contract. As we saw in the previous chapter (and Plate 07.13), Yeckhing's successors also used a different exchange rate with the Dutch in 1799. Americans were advised to be careful with discounts such as those Fouchong offered.

> 1809: The Ch[ina]. St[reet]. Merchants are generally Broking, with whom you contract for goods, they have them made, & you pay them, they pay the manufacturer, the prices are generally the same, & where a man abates much, he expects to make it up by cheating you.[14]

What was meant by 'Broking' is that the dealer was the go-between or middleman for the Hong merchants 'with whom you contract for goods' and the inland manufacturer. If the prices were cheaper than everyone else or if they offered a more advantageous exchange rate such as Fouchong did above, then the buyer could expect, in some way or another, to be cheated. This could happen in several different ways. The supplier might inadvertently insert poorer quality or defective items into the center of a bundle or bottom of a chest; or he might deliver items that looked similar, but were

in fact a cheaper variety and not exactly what had been ordered. The dealer could also skimp on the packing materials, making those items unsalable at the destination, and resulting in more damage during the voyage. Godden points to the example of one captain in Canton who found some of his chests of chinaware packed with musty sago that was 'full of cockroaches'.[15]

In order to avoid such outcomes, it was advisable to have 'nothing to do with a Hong Merchant of doubtful Character'. This advice was generally applied to porcelain dealers and other shopkeepers as well.[16] It was also pointed out that 'No contract is binding with a Chinaman, unless written by him in Chinese & ernest money given if he buys of you'.[17]

This statement needs some qualification. It was generally true that all itinerant traders who did not maintain a continual presence in China needed to give earnest money, which would then generate a contract and/or receipt. With foreigners who were steady customers, however, agreements could be made verbally, and without earnest money. Once trust was established, all kinds of small transactions could be done without any payments up front or without paperwork. The same still holds true today in the delta.[18]

For large transactions, such as those of the East India companies, earnest money was normally required because there was too much at risk. The example of Exchin, cited in the previous chapter, where he paid for everything himself after 1786 on speculation was an exception. His atypical behaviour reflects the desperate times in which he lived, rather than the normal practices in Canton.

By 1817, the American trader Waln recorded that all chinaware was now being purchased at an exchange rate of '75 tales per $100'.[19] It would not have taken long for Fouchong's competitors to determine how he was able to attract customers to his door, when his prices were the same as his competitors.

Cumchong 金昌 appears in the American records from the 1810s to 1840s (Appendix 8E). In 1818, Waln listed him as a man of good character but in 'No. 2 Standing'.[20] His name was also spelled Comshong or something similar. The Danes bought porcelain from him in 1820 and 1833 (Appendix 8D).[21]

Hupchong 合昌 appears in the American records of the 1820s (Appendix 8E). He does not appear in Waln's list of 'Outside Men' in 1818. He may have begun to trade a bit later.[22] In 1820, he shows up in the DAC records. He supplied a little over 1,000 taels of porcelain to the Danes that year (Appendix 8D).

Before I end this discussion of the porcelain dealers, there is still one other source that requires some discussion, the silk guild called the Jinlun Huiguan 錦綸會館.

## PORCELAIN DEALERS INVOLVED IN THE SILK TRADE 1748–1826

As I have noted above, many porcelain dealers handled other products. It is thus not strange to find that some of them mentioned here and in Chapter 7 donated money to the local silk guild called the Jinlun Huiguan. There are many stone steles inside this hall with the names of contributors carved into them. Table 8.2 shows eight porcelain dealer's names that are found on one or more of the steles.

**Table 8.2 Names of Porcelain Shops That Appear on Jinlun Huiguan (Silk Guild) Steles**

| Name | Mandarin | Chinese | Years they appear in foreign records | Date of the steles |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Pontonchang | Tongchang | 同昌號 | 1750–1771 | 1764 |
| 2. Heli | Heli | 合利號 | 1759 | 1764, 1826 |
| 3. Winchong | Yongchang | 永昌號 | 1767–1784 | 1765 |
| 4. Quonchong | Guangchang | 廣昌號 | 1748–1764 | 1765, 1778 |
| 5. Yick | Yiyi | 義益號 | 1786 | 1778 |
| 6. Echong | Yichang | 義昌號 | 1768–1788 | 1793 |
| 7. Hopyek | Heyi | 合益號 | 1760–1788 | 1826 |
| 8. Yeckhing | Juhe | 聚和號 | 1774–1806 | 1826 |

Sources: Appendixes 8C, 8D, and 8E, Plates 06.01, 06.02, 07.11, 08.01, and 08.03; MCM 1: Plates 09.07 and 09.16; and Guangzhou shi wenhua ju 廣州市文化局, *Guangzhou Jinlun Huiguan zhengti yiwei baohu gongcheng ji* 廣州錦綸會館整體移位保護工程記 (Beijing: Zhongguo jianzhu gongye chubanshe, 2007), 155, 158–60, 168–69.

Some of these men have already been discussed above or in volume one of this study. The names, however, are not without discrepancies. The Yan family, owners of the Heli Hao, went broke in the late 1770s. As we can see in Table 8.2 that name appears on a stele in 1826. Even though Hopyek disappears from the foreign records after 1788 and Yeckhing no longer appears after 1806, both of their names are found on the 1826 stele.

Of course, there is no way to be certain that the names in Table 8.2 all refer to the porcelain dealers discussed here. If the shops were operating at the time that their name appears on the stele then it is likely that they were the same person or shop. It is unlikely that there would have been two shops with the same name operating in the western suburbs at the same time. That would have led to constant confusion with everyone, including manufacturers, suppliers, other porcelain dealers, patrons and local officials.

Therefore, we can logically assume that most of the names in Table 8.2 are probably the same porcelain dealers mentioned above. They were perhaps diversifying their operations to include sales of silk. If the porcelain trade happened to decline for some reason, like it did in the 1780s and 1790s, they would have other sources of income. Unfortunately, none of these men left records to tell us what really happened. We are left to surmise and to rationalize their actions from the little bits and pieces of historical data that have survived.

## SUMMARY

In this section I summarize the stories of the men discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. Although many of their entries are brief and carry little detail, they nonetheless reveal some important features of the porcelain trade. Some porcelain dealers tended to cater to a singular group of foreigners. Conjac, Lisjoncon, and Suchin Kinqua sold porcelain

to the Dutch; Exchin catered to the English; and Suchin Tiauquon focussed on the Danes. These men might have arranged sales with other companies and private traders as well, but they depended primarily on one customer for the bulk of their business.

Porcelain dealers were just as much in need of foreign capital as were Hong merchants. They did what they could to secure advances and loans up front. They often had to pay high interest for loans and sometimes for advances. While 10 and 12 percent annual interest was common within the foreign community in Canton and Macao, Chinese merchants, including porcelain dealers, often paid 15 to 20 percent annual interest.

The rate of interest might vary with the amount of the advances. A small advance of 10 percent of a sale might carry no interest. An advance of 40 percent of a sale might carry 10 or 12 percent annual interest (or 1 percent per month). An advance of 80 percent of a sale might carry 15 to 18 percent annual interest (or 1.5 percent per month). Undefined loans usually went for 20 percent or more annual interest. Porcelain dealers could negotiate larger advances, but then they either had to pay a higher interest rate or offer better prices (like Lisjoncon did).

Other ways to attract customers was to give discounts or reductions. In the 1720s, Canga allowed the GIC a reduction of 4 percent for breakage when everyone else allowed 2 percent. In the early 1800s, Fouchong attracted customers by granting them a more favourable exchange rate of $1 to 0.75 taels, when the going rate was $1 to 0.72 taels. This policy led to a 4 percent saving to the buyers. Eventually, the other dealers seem to have caught onto this tactic and all of them began quoting a rate of $1 to 0.75 taels. In the 1760s and 1770s, Lisjoncon consistently kept his prices lower than others, but with the expectation that he would get larger advances or loans from the Dutch at low rates or no interest. He also gave customers the additional assurance of quality products and timely delivery by personally overseeing the final stages of production in Jingdezhen and accompanying his shipments each year to Canton.

Another way to get a lower price was for foreigners to supply their own chests. The companies did so from time to time. One example I gave shows the Swedes being reimbursed 2.5 percent of the cost of the porcelain because they had supplied the chests. Another example shows the EIC paying for its own chests which came to 1.5 percent of the sales. Sometimes sago was used to pack hollow porcelain and was included in the prices. Other times sago became an additional charge. In some cases, foreigners supplied the sago themselves.

Many things could affect the prices of porcelain. If smaller chests were desired, then this required many more handlers and added more expense to the transaction. Sago also came in a range of qualities, with a corresponding range of varying prices. Porcelain itself also had a range of qualities. European companies did not necessarily maintain the same standards. All of these variables make it difficult to compare porcelain prices among the companies and their Chinese merchants.

Trading in contraband such as gold was another way to produce quick capital. Although porcelain dealers do not seem to have been involved with this trade to the same extent as Hong merchants, we do find Lisjoncon trading in that metal in 1763.

He and other dealers may have been involved in this illegal trade in other years as well, for which we have no details.

Lisjoncon is one of the few porcelain dealers for whom we can show involvement in the Canton junk trade to Southeast Asia. He needed sago to pack hollow porcelain just like all of the other dealers. Because the junks carried that commodity to Canton, it made sense for Lisjoncon to be investing in those voyages. It was also a way to diversify his trade. He and other men like him were not entirely dependent on ceramics for their income.

Diversification seems to have been a popular strategy among many of the dealers. We sometimes find them trading in small quantities of tea, silk and other products when the opportunity arose. It is thus not surprising to find some of them donating money to the local silk guild. In fact, if they did not trade in other commodities, the extent to which their businesses could expand was quite limited. Even the largest of the porcelain contracts would not likely exceed 2 percent of a ship's export cargo. Supplying even 1 percent of the cargo could be quite substantial. It might add up to a few thousand taels. Many dealers sold small volumes to the companies that totalled no more than a few hundred taels worth of merchandise each year and was packed in only a couple of chests.

Exchin was perhaps the largest of the porcelain dealers examined in this study. At his height, his total annual exports might have reached 90,000 to 100,000 taels. This amount was exceptional for a porcelain merchant. Mid-level dealers such as Conjac and Lisjoncon might handle from 20,000 to 50,000 taels of merchandise each year. Small operators might trade just a few hundred taels to as much as 5,000 taels per year.

Some of the porcelain dealers, such as Exchin and Suchin Kinqua, sent agents into the interior around October or November to place the orders for the next season. These two men did not seem to have gone to the interior themselves. Their products then arrived in Canton in the following August or September. The smaller operators would have merely placed orders with agents in Canton who represented inland manufacturers.

Lisjoncon, on the other hand, placed his orders in the final months of the year, but then went inland himself around April. He stayed there examining all of the products in their final stages of production. That way he could be assured they were manufactured according to the samples. When the shipments were ready, he accompanied the goods to Canton, arriving in August or September. Exchin, Suchin Kinqua, Suchin Tiauquon, and others seem to have left the actual shipping of the products to their associates or agents.

The large porcelain dealers also owned their own chop boats. Each year, they sent these boats upriver to the Danshui Mountains to wait for the shipments being carried over the Meiling Pass. Sometimes these boats were conscripted by travelling officials who used them to carry their personal baggage and entourage to their next assigned posts. This diversion of assets was done at the boat owners' expense and could cause much delay in their products arriving at Canton. Moreover, when little rain fell, rivers ran shallow and that could also delay the shipments owing to insufficient water levels for the boats to sail.

Even though porcelain dealers operated in the shadows of the Hong merchants, they were affected by the latter men's successes and failures. In good years, Hong merchants might order extra products from them, which helped to increase their businesses. In bad years, when Hong merchants were hurting, porcelain dealers might be asked to pay a portion of the arrears of the failed hong houses.

When fewer ships arrived, there was not only a smaller pie for the porcelain dealers, but also a corresponding shrinkage of government revenues. Duties on porcelain were greatly increased to make up for the shortfall in funds available for transfer to Beijing. That move, in turn, pushed prices up, which led to declining demand.

After 1786, Exchin received no more advances from the EIC. He had to finance the trade all on his own. Meanwhile, he had no guarantee that the EIC would purchase any of the products. He was lucky up until 1791, because the English did indeed purchase his products each year. From 1792 onwards, the British company ceased buying his entire stock. The unsold products sat in his warehouse for three years. No other European company wanted the merchandise—probably because the designs were specifically aimed at the British market. Exchin had no choice but to plead with the EIC committee in 1795 to purchase the remaining stock at a 15 percent discount. Keeping in mind that 15 percent was also the gross profit on the items, Exchin was sure to have been a big loser in this transaction.

To further complicate matters, a famine occurred in South China in 1786 and 1787. It caused rice prices to rise and, in turn, made labour more expensive (for manufacturing and shipping). The result of all these factors was that, by the mid-to late 1780s, Chinese porcelain became increasingly less competitive with the domestic products of Europe. In order to compensate for declining sales, manufacturers in China began fudging on quality, which, in turn, further distanced European buyers who wanted superior products at reasonable prices that could compete with locally manufactured items.

Europeans continued to buy Chinese porcelain but they became much more selective. They had to pick out the styles, designs and pieces that could still produce a net profit. One by one the companies gradually pulled out of the chinaware market. The French sent only a few small ships after 1792, whereas previously there had been upwards of eight arriving at Whampoa each year. The VOC ceased its China voyages after 1794, whereas there had been upwards of four ships annually. The Dutch continued to commission other ships to China but the trade was irregular and the ships were often much smaller than those of the VOC.

In the early 1780s, the DAC was also sending three or four ships each year. In the 1790s and early 1800s, there were years when only one Danish ship arrived—or none at all. The DAC quit sending ships to China after 1806 and did not return again until 1820. The SOIC followed a similar path as the DAC; it ceased sending ships to China in 1805 and did not return. An occasional private Danish or Swedish ship arrived, but they were irregular voyages. Private vessels were usually much smaller than the company ships. As I have pointed out earlier, the EIC porcelain shipments also ended in the early 1790s. British captains were allowed to ship some porcelain on their private

accounts, on a case by case basis, but the overall volume was just a fraction of what it had been in the past.

In the companies' wake, more private ships came to China with different tastes and demands. The companies had been like modern department stories—in that they tended to trade in items that could be sold en masse to the general public. The blue and whites were especially popular. The companies did not typically deal in top quality, expensive items or in low-end items. Their signature designs were produced in large volumes, which took advantage of economies of scale in production.

However, with the arrival of more private ships in China, consumer tastes began to change. In 1784, the first American ship arrived. In 1788 private convict ships from Australia also began going to Canton to obtain return cargos for European markets. At the same time, the number of private Portuguese ships operating in Macao expanded to over 20. As I pointed out in Chapter 3, many more Spanish ships from Manila also began arriving in China in the 1780s and 1790s. The number of private English ships arriving from India expanded as well. By the late eighteenth century, all foreigners were making use of the new sea routes east of the Philippines that allowed them to arrive in China all times of the year.

These changes in the trading environment were representative of the changes occurring in the porcelain trade. Private traders would likely have made many more requests for top-end merchandise. Instead of all the old styles and patterns that the companies had ordered for decades, private traders might have in mind specific motifs that were more original. Overall, we could expect those individuals to have been much more focussed on local tastes and interests, rather than on the expectation of a mass public that had been the companies' domain.

It is unfortunate that we have so few records from the private Indians and Europeans trading in Canton. Because of this void, it is difficult to say precisely how the export porcelain market in China changed after the companies ceased buying that product. We simply do not know what products the private Europeans were buying. Considering the size of their ships and the fact that they were trading in much smaller volumes compared to the companies, some of them were likely catering more to their local communities.

If we look at the Americans trading in Canton, for example, we see a very different picture from the one the companies had featured in. The majority of their ships ranged from around 200 to 500 tons. American captains and supercargos often loaded their vessels with specific consumers and families in mind. Their local communities were their main target. In contrast, the large East India companies ordered porcelain for their entire fleets at the same time, with mass consumption in mind. By the time the companies ceased their involvement in the trade, locally produced porcelain from Europe and the United States was meeting much of the demand of their general public.

This concludes my study of the porcelain dealers. Even though many of their stories are brief, we have nonetheless gained a general picture of their trade from the fragments they left behind. I turn in the next chapter to the silk industry. The porcelain and silk trades were very different in nature but, as we will see, there were some revealing similarities as well.

CHAPTER NINE

# THE SILK TRADE[1]

> It is very commonly said in Manila that the city of Cantón has sixty thousand silk-looms, on which are made various fabrics of cloth and damask; and thus in one month enough is woven to lade many ships.[2]

We might rightfully ask why it is so important to understand the functioning of the silk trade. In Chapter 6 and Appendix 6C, I show the relationship between tea, porcelain, and silk exports. In terms of weight, silk made up less than 1.5 percent of the cargos. If all we considered was space silk took up in the hulls, it would hardly be worth mentioning but, in terms of value, silk made up a good 20 percent of the English East India Company's (EIC) exports (Appendix 6B).[3] Jörg has shown that raw and manufactured silk exports combined made up around 10 to 25 percent of the Dutch East India Company's (VOC) cargos.[4] Dermigny has shown that silk made up 15 to 30 percent of some of the French cargos.[5] As was shown in Chapter 3, silk made up the majority of the Spanish export cargos. It was clearly an important commodity of the Canton trade that has not been given its rightful place in the broader historical literature.

Almost all of the figures we have linked to total exports in Canton are in piculs (weight) rather than taels (value). If we look at the value figures that Pritchard assembled for EIC exports (Appendix 6B), we see clearly that silk was the second most important commodity. If we had the value of each item of annual exports from Canton, we would likely find that silk was the second most important commodity throughout the Canton era (ca. 1700 to 1842).[6]

Before I begin this discussion, I should point out the sources of our information on the silk trade and its workforce. There is an enormous amount of data about the silk trade in the EIC archives. Those records, however, contain almost nothing about individual silk workers. This is the case because the British ordered most of their silks from Hong merchants, rather than from weavers. The Hong merchants, in turn, handed the orders to their favoured weavers, painters and embroiderers. The large majority of EIC raw silk was also purchased from Hong merchants, but they also purchased smaller quantities from inland dealers and outside merchants. As far as we know, however, none of the Chinese merchants who show up in the EIC records for supplying the company with silk were weavers, painters or embroiderers.[7]

There were several advantages in arranging silk orders with Hong merchants rather than with silk workers. First, it was easier to pressure Hong merchants than individual craftsmen. Since the English had a lot of other trade with Hong merchants, they could use those transactions to negotiate better terms and prices in acquiring raw

silk and silk fabrics. For example, if raw silk prices were too high, they could negotiate the price down by giving a better deal on other commodities. A second consideration was that it was a very tedious task to order fabrics from the individual silk workers. By going solely through the Hong merchants, the company relieved officers from having to deal with those complicated matters.

The enormous amount of money spent on silk, and the large advances involved, might be more reasons to order silk through Hong merchants rather than silk workers. The amount of the advances and the interest to be paid on them could all be negotiated in conjunction with other trade, in order to get the best deals. This part made the silk trade very different from the porcelain trade. Advances and sales of the latter commodity were just a fraction of what was often spent on silk. All of these factors made it more advantageous for the EIC to make their silk purchases through the Hong merchants. This is why we have almost no information in those records about silk workers.

Other companies, like the VOC and Danish Asiatic Company (DAC) and many private traders such as the Americans, made the decision to order many items directly from weavers, painters and embroiderers. They could then be better assured of receiving exactly what they wanted. In some cases, foreigners even paid individual silk workers directly for their services and products. These exchanges were then recorded, and those entries make possible the writing of these chapters. The French and Swedes dealt directly with silk workers as well but, unfortunately, many of those documents have not survived.

During the years of the Co-hong (1760s), all silk purchases were channelled through the Hong merchant houses. This is why Appendixes 10A and 10B show no trade figures for weavers in those years. The foreign companies might have placed their orders directly with the weavers, but then they recorded the entries in their account books under the name of the Hong merchant who stood security. Consequently, we have no way of determining what portion of the silk trade came from each weaver. It was not until 1772 that the VOC began entering Weaver Suckin's trade separately (Appendix 10A). Because the Danish ledgers are missing from 1773 to 1781, the weavers' trade figures in Appendix 10B do not begin until 1782.

The silk workers guild known as the Jinlun Huiguan 錦綸會館 was responsible for regulating the industry. That organization was established in 1723.[8] The building was recently moved and renovated and is currently one of Canton's important historical sites. We have no records from the Jinlun Huiguan, but there are many stone steles imbedded on the inside walls of the building.[9] It was common practice for not only guilds but also temples to inscribe the names of donors on stone steles to commemorate each of their contributions.[10] The Jinlun Huiguan steles have the names of hundreds of contributors, covering the years from 1732 to 1924. All of the inscriptions and names were recently published.[11]

Plate 08.11 shows a couple warehouses along the river in Canton—one with the name Hehe 和合 above the entrance. The name Hehe (or Hehe Hao 和合號) appears on three of the Jinlun Huiguan steles, 1764, 1793 and 1826. Nothing is known about this shop, but it was obviously involved in the silk trade. As was pointed out in Chapter 8, some of the porcelain dealers were also members of the guild so it was not exclusively

closed to silk workers. We have no records to show how the Jinlun Huiguan was organized, but the examples presented in this study suggest that there were no limitations as to who could join the guild. There is also evidence to suggest that a merchant did not necessarily have to be a member of the guild to sell silk. Most of the Hong merchants, for example, were involved in the silk trade and very few—if any—of their shop or personal names appear on the steles.

There were two basic types of silk, the Nanking and Canton varieties. Canton silk was considered to be of lower quality and commanded lower prices. The following reference describes the basic differences between the two varieties.

> 1821: The best silk raised in China is called Nankin, and is raised in that province, it is very superior to the Canton silk & the price is considerably higher, if the Chineese [*sic*] wish to recommend a silk article they will tell you it is Nankin silk, but the difference is easily discovered, the Nankin always has a hairy appearance and a beautiful . . . surface perfectly clean of lumps, & has a gloss which Canton silk never has, they frequently mix the Canton silk with the Nankin . . . but [it is] inferior to the Nankin.[12]

When buying Nanking raw silk, one needed to inspect the inside of the bales very carefully to ensure that Canton or other inferior skeins had not been inserted. As the reference above suggests, Chinese merchants were very innovative in finding ways to pass Canton silk off as Nanking silk. Since raw silk was sold by weight in China, dealers often kept their bales in a damp place to increase their value. Another option was to bind the bales with heavier bands to increase the weight. Moist skeins were likely to become discoloured and/or damaged during the long voyage to Europe. They might also lose weight when the moisture evaporated. These risks could affect its potential saleability.[13]

Even though the quality of Canton silk was inferior, it had some advantages over the Nanking variety. First and foremost, it was cheaper. The Nanking variety had to be carried to Canton—which meant additional transport costs. Meanwhile Canton silk had an advantage in the processing; it lost 50 percent less in weight compared to Nanking silk. The Dutch estimated that one catty (of 16 taels weight) of Canton silk would lose one tael when processed—about 6 percent. One catty of Nanking silk, however, lost 2 taels when processed—about 12 percent. This difference gave the Canton variety a 6 percent weight advantage over the Nanking variety. Given the cheaper price owing to poorer quality, the lower transport costs, and its 50 percent less shrinkage, the Canton variety became an attractive export commodity.[14] The Dutch and Americans often purchased the Canton variety.[15] Muslims and other private traders from India likewise purchased large quantities of Canton silk. In September 1792, for example, the Dutch found that the stronger demand for the Canton variety had pushed up prices, while the Nanking silk prices had actually declined.[16]

Manufactured silks also varied in price according to their quality. As a general rule, the cost of most varieties and types increased over time. In order to keep prices from rising, foreigners often insisted that merchants quote the same prices as in previous years. Plate 09.01, for example, shows a comparison between silk prices in 1759 and 1763. In 1764, the Dutch were pleased when they were able to contract some silks

at 1759 prices. Other varieties were more expensive. On average, the Dutch saved 4 percent on silks in 1764 compared to 1763.[17]

These efforts to keep prices from rising were somewhat effective over the short term but, eventually, the triple forces of supply, demand, and inflation won out. One of the reasons the Dutch were able to contract 1759 prices in 1764, was because the former year had already seen prices inflate owing to strong demand and short supply.

Several entries in the EIC records help to clarify what the silk market was like in 1759.

1759, Mar 24: Consultation

Not being able to contract for Raw Silk upon the same Terms Sweetia [Yan Ruishe 顏瑞舍] offer'd Us we determin'd to send for him and engage with him if He would take anything under 200 Tales. We proposed to him on his coming to Us to give Him 198 tales p[er] Pecul. He long persisted in his first demand and repeated his apprehensions of losing even at that price. But at last consented to our Proposal and enter'd into Contract to deliver us three hundred and fifty Peculs of Raw Silk at 198 Tales p[er] Pecul we to pay Him immediately 140 Tales p[er] pecul and to make him a further payment of 45 Tales p[er] pecul on the arrival of the first ship. The Silk to be of the three six or twelve Moss sort equally good with the muster we gave him, to be free from Dampness and the Bandages to be of the same quality as the silk.

1759, Mar 25: Swetia desired to have his advance of Tales 49000._ _ _ for the Raw Silk we contracted for yesterday, in order to prepare it for sending as soon as possible into the Country We gave Mr. Lockwood the following Order.

. . .

Paid Swetia Ta$^{s}$. 49000._ _ _ as p[er] above Order.

1759, Apr 26: . . .

We received a Letter from Cainqua / the Person sent up into the Raw Silk Country / to the following Purport. That at the End of last year Silk fell to 170 tales Sisee Money. Cetqua the Merchant who deals with the Spaniards sent up Money to purchase 300 Bales which caused a rise of about 3 Tales p[er] pec$^{l}$ and since there have been about 1000 Bales bought at different Times for the Country Consumption There remains of the Silk made for the European Market 1000 Bales which may be bought at 173 Ta$^{s}$ / The Charges of bringing down Duties and Difference between Dollar Money and Sisee will make it come out at about 206 Ta$^{s}$. p Pecul / He also mentions the new Silk will be brought to Market for Sale in about 45 Days from this Day.

1759, Apr 28: Consultation

Inconsequence of the Letter we received from the Person We have in the Raw Silk Country, We came to a Resolution of contracting for 250 Peculs of Raw Silk more, if we can engage for it on the Terms we have already done. We therefore sent for Swetia and told Him we intended to contract for more Silk that if he would engage with us on the same Terms as before we should give Him the Preferance, as we had already contracted with Him. After a long Debate he offer'd to make 150 Peculs We told Him our Intentions were to agree for 250 Peculs and at one Word that was our Determination He long persisted in having a greater Advance than before but when we told Hime we were resolved, he consented rather than

any other Merchant should go to Market which he said would inevitably raise the Price, and then occasion a considerable Loss to both Parties.

We then contracted with Him for 250 Pecus of Raw Silk at 198 Tales p[er] Pecul to pay Him on Demand 140 Ta[s] p[er] Pecul, and to make Him a further advance of 45 Tales p[er] Pecul on the Arrival of the first English Ship. The Silk to be of the same Quality & C[a] as we contracted for the 24th of last Month, and to be delivered in 200 days.

1759, Apr 30: Swetia desired to be advanced Six Chests of Treasure on Account of the Contract made with Him for 250 Bales of Raw Silk the 28th Instant . . .

Paid Swetia as p[er] above Order . . . Ta[s] 17324.508

1759, Jul 15: We received a letter from Cainqua the Person we sent into the Raw Silk Country dated 21st of the 5th moon [June 15] to the following purport.

There is a considerable quantity of the Tao-Ham and but little of the Ched-le of this Years Silk, on the 15th of the 5th moon [June 9] several Chinchew merch[ts] offer'd money for this article upon which it rose to 191 & 192 Tales / Sisee Money / but there being no Purchasers at that Price it soon began to fall, when the said Merchants bought some Parcels at 178 & 179 p Pec[ul] / Sisee / by the same Weight as yours is bought. The Silk for the Europe Market is 2 or 3 tales p Pecul Dearer. The Chinchew, Nankin, and Japan Merchants have bought up their Quantity so that I think the Price will be some what lower in the latter end of the sixth Month. We have had a very little Rain which occasion'd a Scarcity of Leaves, so that of the 2[d] sort or Yee ham there will be little, but I think the price will be lower, much about what I last wrote you. The Prices of Silk for Canton to be manufactured varies, from 2[m] to 1[m] 3[c] or 4 Candarines [0.13–4 to 0.2 tales] p[er] Tale Weight according to its Goodness. This year the Silk, will be larger [higher in price?], Leaves being so scarce, they were obliged to feed the Worms with fine pounded Rice. About the middle of the fourth moon [ca. May 11–2] Yongshaw [Yan Yingshe 顏珖舍] / from Swetia's House [/] sent People to Shoang Leen and bought there 100 bales of old silk at the price I wrote you last, as there are no merchants buying new silk as yet I think if you have any money to send up, the sooner you do it the better. About the 15th of this moon [June 9] Swetias people arrived here with 13 or 14 chests of money.[18]

These entries tell us several things about the silk trade. Swetia contracted a total of 600 piculs of raw silk at 198 taels per picul. He received about 140 taels per picul in advance (ca. 70 percent), 49,000 taels on 26 March and 17,324.508 taels on 30 April. This came to 66,324.508 taels paid—immediately to be sent into the interior to secure the silk order. He would be paid an additional 45 taels per picul when the first EIC ships arrived.

Meanwhile, Swetia sent his brother Yongshaw (Ingsia) to the interior, presumably with the silver he had received on 26 March. It would have taken him four to six weeks to get there. In mid-May, Swetia bought up 100 bales of silk. Other members of Swetia's household arrived in the Nanjing area on 9 June with 13 or 14 more chests of silver. This money was probably from his second advance given to him on 30 April. These advances were given to Swetia interest free. Because he had to send the money immediately to the interior, he was unable to use it or loan it out to others to gain interest.

There was a delay of several weeks from the time Swetia received his advance to the time the money actually landed in Nanjing to secure the order. Swetia had already set his price with the English at 198 taels per picul, but he would not know exactly what he would be able to purchase the silk for until the money actually arrived in Nanjing. If the price of silk went up in the meantime, then he could be a big loser. If it went down, then he might benefit from this speculation. However, if the English found out that the price had dropped in the interior, then they would likely pressure Swetia for a discount. They had their own informant (Cainqua) in the interior, so they could find out what was happening in the market. All of the money that was given to Swetia in advance was presumably handed over to the silk manufacturers when his people arrived there.

As was mentioned in Chapter 3, this situation was what led to Poankeequa being a big loser on his silk order with the EIC in 1766. He made his contract in the off-season, as Swetia had done. However, by the time Poankeequa's money arrived in the interior, the price had risen—owing to many silk worms dying that year and a resultant short supply. Poankeequa complained to the EIC that he had lost a lot on the contract. This is exactly what Swetia was afraid of, and why he hesitated in contracting so much silk. In the end, however, he found it better to speculate on a larger amount than to hand part of the EIC silk order to someone else. The latter outcome would have added another competitor in the purchasing of the silk in Nanjing, which would likely push prices up.

The EIC ships *Winchelsea* and *Prince of Wales* arrived at Whampoa on 20 June.[19] Swetia was paid his remaining advance of 45 taels per picul (amounting to 27,000 taels) on 22 July. The records do not tell us what he did with this money. We know that on 1 November he had 500 bales of raw silk in his factory, which he had just received. This fact suggests that he probably sent the money to the silk manufacturers in the interior shortly after he received it. There were 70 days (10 weeks) between 22 July and 1 November—which would have been just enough time to send men with the silver to Nanjing and return with the silk.

However, to everyone's surprise, on 14 October an edict was received in Canton stating that the emperor had herewith banned the export of raw and wrought silks, owing to its scarcity in China.[20] The price had been rising for several years and foreign demand was seen as the cause of that rise.[21] All of this ended well for Swetia, because the governor general received permission to allow the export of silk that had already been contracted before the edict was issued.

Although 1759 is perhaps a rare exception, owing to the emperor forbidding its export, the other factors mentioned above were true for almost every year. The silk business could be very speculative because of the delay between the time the product was contracted and the four or more weeks it took to reach Nanjing to place the orders. In the meantime, silk prices could rise and merchants could be losers.

A couple other factors should be pointed out from the examples above. The Cetqua who is mentioned in the entries was the same person mentioned in Chapter 3 who was purchasing silk for the Spaniards. Because the Spaniards, and their supplier

Poankeequa, were big purchasers of silk, they gave considerable competition to others like Swetia.

Another factor that is revealed in the entries above is that prices in the interior were set according to payment in sycee silver (100 percent pure). Canton prices were set according to payment in Spanish silver coins (ca. 94 percent pure). The latter was worth about 6 percent less than sycee silver. There were also several customs houses between Nanjing and Canton. Duties had to be paid on the silk each time it passed a customs house and, of course, there were transport costs involved in carrying it to Canton.

In the entries above, the British calculated that silk worth 173 taels per pecul in Nanjing—after making the adjustment for sycee silver, transport costs and additional duties—would cost 206 taels in Canton. This was a 16 percent increase. In order for Swetia to make a profit on his silk contract with the EIC at 198 taels per picul, he would have had to purchase it for less than 166 taels per picul. With the market prices already up to more than 170 taels per picul in the Nanjing area, we can see why Swetia was so hesitant in contracting more. He probably hoped to place a large order with his suppliers and then pray that they would give him a discount for greater volume.

Owing to the emperor's edict, no raw or wrought silks were allowed to be exported in 1760 or 1761. These must have been very difficult years for the silk workers. The ban on exporting silk was withdrawn in 1762 and trade resumed. However, in order to prevent a shortage from happening again, quotas were placed on sales whereby each foreign ship could only export 80 piculs total of wrought and raw silks (explained below).[22]

In 1765, the weather in Nanjing was exceptionally cold and caused the deaths of many silk worms. The Dutch concluded that there would be about two-fifths less product than in previous years. More ships arrived in 1765 than in 1764, so demand remained strong.[23] The reduction in supply and the increase in demand pushed prices up. In that environment, foreigners either had to pay the higher prices or go without.

Some of the several factors that could affect the silk trade were inflation, contraband, quotas and advances. As I mentioned in Chapter 6, inflation, contraband and advances were also influences that affected the porcelain trade. Because the data I have collected is in relation to the silk trade, I have chosen to discuss those issues here, rather than in Chapter 6. It should be kept in mind, however, that some of the factors discussed here could also be applied to the porcelain trade.

## INFLATION

Because silk production was labour intensive, an increase in food prices directly affected the silk market. Inflation in the cost of foodstuffs was steady throughout the eighteenth century.[24] Inflation was not a well understood phenomenon in that early era. It was often thought of as something evil that needed to be suppressed. Foreigners complained constantly throughout the Canton era (ca. 1700–1842) of rising prices. Several examples are presented in the next chapter.[25] The pressures to keep prices low were, in turn, transferred downward to the wages of the silk workers.

There were many silk producing areas in Guangdong Province between Canton and Xiangshan 香山 (present-day city of Zhongshan 中山).[26] The manufacturing centre was in the city of Foshan, just west of Canton.[27] In order to continue offering competitive prices, Hong merchants tried very hard to keep silk workers' wages from rising. Of course, these methods would only work for so long. Eventually silk workers in the Canton area and Nanking threatened to go on strike.

> 1724, Oct 1: We hear that the Weavers at Fosan have stopt working of silks, in order to oblidge the merchants to raise the price of their labour, and we are in great pain till this matter is adjusted.[28]

> 1831: During the last moon, the silk weavers generally stopped working–much after the European manner, among the operatives there, and in the U[nited] States. This is their second turn out, within the past year, but such nonsence does not succeed in this over populated community, where thousands are always seeking work to keep from starving, at any rate of wages. Some of us here, are led to suppose that these ignorant silk workers, have been badly advised by secret agencies from abroad, where silk, cannot be so cheaply manufactured as in China.
>
> We Americans are their best customers from foreign countries, and much valuable time has been wasted, owing to such folly.
>
> Washing–who is an eminent silk merchant, says that now, two, or more applicants–offer for places vacated, for every one, who left off working, as is always the case after a "turn out."[29]

These two examples are separated by the passing of more than one hundred years, which suggest that strikes were not very common in the eighteenth or early nineteenth century. In another instance, around 30,000 tea porters went on strike in 1773.[30] As the second example above suggests, for every striking silk worker there were two persons waiting to take their place. In a market with such a large surplus of labour, workers had little leverage to negotiate higher wages. Of course, there were special skills involved in working silk, but new people could be trained. The silk workers' strike in 1831 was repeated in following years but it is unclear whether these later strikes were arranged by the same workers or by their replacements.[31]

Another factor that affected the silk trade was contraband.

## CONTRABAND

China's sumptuary laws reserved crimson and yellow fabrics for the emperor. Those colours were forbidden to import or export. The colour restrictions were enforced for all fabrics, not just silk. They were in effect from at least the beginning of the eighteenth century, if not earlier. Despite the regulations, those colours were traded regularly. In 1704, for example, the merchant Leanqua 連官 bribed a customs officer so he would not open a chest that had yellow or crimson fabrics inside. The officer allowed it to pass without inspection.[32]

Sometimes the expense and trouble involved in getting those forbidden fabrics past customs officers was more than what Chinese merchants cared to endure. In 1733, Beaukeequa refused to make yellow and crimson fabrics for the EIC because 'it would be a great deal of trouble to him to get them pass'd' customs. The British officers agreed

to omit the yellow fabrics, but asked Beaukeequa to order 'deep scarlett' instead of crimson colours, which was, apparently, more acceptable.[33]

As the following reference reveals, merchants who traded in illegal products needed to be careful not to keep written records of those transactions.

> 1741, Nov 18: A scrutiny has been makeing for some days past into the Hoppo's accounts for 6 years by order of the Foyen who has placed a mandareen at every Hoppo house to observe what passes and be a check on the other officers. The merchants and linguists have been obliged to send up many of their books to be examin'd.
>
> 1741, Nov 19: The merchants who deal with the Europeans are revising their old accounts, and making new books, that their contract for gold & for crimson & yellow silks (which are all prohibited to be exported) should not be discover'd.[34]

If merchants were caught with documents that showed they had been trading in contraband, it could create many difficulties for them. It was therefore a general practice to destroy all financial records. If merchants were asked to produce details about their trade, as in the example above, then they made up fictitious accounts that would not incriminate them. The fact that private financial records could be used against merchants during the Canton era (ca. 1700–1842) is probably why none of them have survived in China.

As I pointed out in the first volume, some Chinese merchants were quite bold in these illegal exchanges. They even wrote out particulars in Chinese.[35] As long as payments were made to the proper persons it was rather easy to transport illegal goods past customs officers.

Hoppos continued to introduce initiatives to stop this illegal trafficking. Smuggling, however, was so common that there was usually a way around the restrictions. It was only during years of crackdowns that we find customs officers unwilling to allow forbidden articles to pass. In fact, collecting connivance fees was so common that customs officers often considered it to be their special privilege.[36]

In 1759, the tollhouse keepers between Canton and Whampoa had become so accustomed to allowing illegal silks to pass that they joined together and made a bold attempt to add a surcharge of 100 Spanish dollars to every foreign ship for the 'privilege of smuggling silk'. They tried to charge this fee regardless of whether the ships were loading illegal silks. The English and Danish supercargoes reported the connivance to the governor general. Since their ships were not carrying illegal silks, they resented having to pay this fee. Their complaints led to the tollhouse officers being arrested. Those officers who managed to flee downriver were later caught near Macao.[37]

These arrests were made a month before the emperor's edict forbidding the export of silk was made public in Canton. The customs officers may have heard that there was about to be a change in policy and tried to formalize their connivance fees on illegal silk before the edict arrived. If the foreigners had not complained about this new charge, the customs houses could have continued receiving this connivance money despite the new law.[38]

Another incident occurred on 20 November 1766, when one of Weaver Suckin's shipments of silk to the Dutch ships at Whampoa was detained at a tollhouse because the Mandarins had found 'forbidden colours' aboard. Normally they could bribe the customs officers to enter the yellow fabrics as displaying the colour of Canton tea instead. The new Hoppo, De Kui 德魁, however, was watching for connivances and would not permit silks to be entered as the colour of tea. As a consequence, the Dutch had to think of another way to get the goods past the customs officers.[39]

Changing the colours in customs records was an easy way to get around the ban on yellow and crimson fabrics. The methods that Chinese merchants used to get these items past customs officers might change from one year to the next. It all depended on who was in charge at the time and how strict they were about recording the exports. If Chinese merchants refused to ship forbidden colours, they might lose the entire silk contract. There was considerable pressure on them to find means of exporting these colours.[40]

In December 1767 the Mandarins intercepted a shipment of red and yellow silks on their way from Foshan to Canton. The Hong merchants Ingsia and Poankeequa had contracted these fabrics with the Danes. The products were eventually released but only after significant bribes had been paid to the customs officers. Chetqua also had his silk exports held up this year because of renewed crackdowns on smuggling.[41]

A well-established practice of bribing prevailed in Canton, with set fees for every article. Mandarins only accepted bribes if they were fairly certain the goods could be successfully transported to Whampoa without the Hoppo's knowledge. In 1834, the connivance fee to allow more raw silk to pass through than the quotas allowed was 4 Spanish dollars per picul. The connivance fee for forbidden manufactured silks (crimson and yellow) to pass was 2 Spanish dollars per chest. Sometimes, however, toll officers insisted on picking out some of the silks from the shipment as their 'reward' instead of accepting a monetary payment.[42]

Remunerations in kind created accounting problems for foreign supercargoes. Therefore we do not see many references to this practice in the foreign records. The amount of goods that left Canton had to match the total amount that arrived at Whampoa. The extraction of products *en route*, as in the example above, upset that balance. This factor is probably why connivance fees eventually became fixed monetary amounts charged per unit, rather than payments in kind. A monetary charge could be entered easily into companies' books as a 'Mandarin's fee', which, as far as foreigners were concerned, was a legitimate expense.[43]

If there were greater risks on detection in one year compared to another, as there were in 1759, then toll officers would either refuse to allow the illegal goods to pass or would only do so in exchange for a greatly inflated remuneration (bribe). The latter scenario could inflate costs enormously and reduce profits significantly. If that happened, then illegal silks might be warehoused in Canton until a more favourable time for shipment. If the companies knew in advance that there would be difficulties one year, they might exclude those colours from their orders.[44]

Among other factors that greatly affected the export of silk were the quotas placed on each ship.

## QUOTAS

As mentioned above, quotas were placed on the export of silk in the early 1760s. This was done to prevent shortages of that commodity in the future and to avoid a situation where stronger demand pushed prices up. The quotas helped to keep demand from outgrowing supply.

Quotas were placed on both raw and manufactured varieties.[45] Foreigners were allowed to export only 80 piculs of silk per ship—30 piculs of Nanking silk and 50 piculs of Canton silk. This amounts to 37.5 and 62.5 percent, respectively. By the 1780s, the quota had been raised to 100 piculs per ship (50 piculs of each variety). The size of the ships was not taken into account.[46]

Some confusion exists in the sources concerning the silk quotas. I list below some references that mention their amounts. The entries do not all agree with each other. I will discuss a few of these discrepancies, so that we can come to some conclusion about the level of the quotas and how they were enforced.

An 1830 reference states that the silk quota was 80 piculs per ship.[47] As cited above, we know that 80 piculs was the quota in the late eighteenth century. On face value, these references suggest that there was no change in the quotas from the 1760s to 1830. Other references, however, do not agree with this assumption.

Without giving a year or a source, Morse mentions that the silk quota was 140 piculs per ship.[48] In another entry below, he states that the quota was 88 piculs per ship.[49]

> 1822, Oct 1: The Custom House regulations only permit the export to the amount of 88 peculs in each Ship; it would appear that in reliance upon former usage they had purchased these Silks . . . In former years whatever quantity was purchased beyond the licensed amount of 88 Peculs for each Vessel, was enabled to be sent on board by the assumption of the name of a Country Ship in the river not trafficking in this article by an increased expence of 20 Dollars per Pecul as an additional duty or fee, but the relative disproportion of American and Country Ships now in China renders it impossible for them to adhere to their former system, whence arises the inconvenience under which they now suffer . . . reverting to our records on the subject we perceive that a total prohibition to the export of Raw and Wrought Silks took place in 1760, which appears to have been partially repealed within a few years, as in 1768 it is stated that the Merchants are fearful of engaging for a larger quantity that 1,500 peculs as only 88 peculs are allowed for each Ship.[50]

I have not run into a reference stating a quota of 140 piculs per ship so it is unclear where that has come from. The 1822 reference of 88 piculs per ship, however, seems to be a misreading of the documents. The original EIC entry from 1768 reads as follows.

> 1768, Mar 15: Si Hunqua, Chetqua, and Yngshaw . . . they still insist on 270 Tales p[er] Pecul, and do not care to engage but for 1000 to 1500 Peculs as we found by the discourse that they were fearful of engaging for more, on account of some difficulty they had in passing the quantity last year at the Hoppo-house as only 80 Pecul is allowed for each ship.[51]

It is possible that Morse misread the '80' for '88', or that it was simply a typographical error. The 1768 reference agrees with other sources in the Dutch archives that also show silk quotas to be 80 piculs per ship at that time.[52] Manufactured silk was weighed and included in the quotas. In 1763, the Dutch and Swedes complained about the quotas and diligently sought to find a way around them (see examples below). At this time, both of those companies had much larger ships than the EIC.

The Dutch argued that, because of shrinkage in the processing of manufactured silk, it should not be treated the same as raw silk. Ten piculs of Nanking raw silk, for example, only produced 8 to 9 piculs of fabrics (because of the 12 percent shrinkage mentioned above). The Dutch also pointed out that the three large VOC ships in 1763 loaded more tea and porcelain than the seven EIC ships in port. Owing to the quota restrictions, however, the three Dutch ships were only allowed 240 piculs of silk, whereas the seven smaller ships of the EIC could load 560 piculs. The Dutch suggested that a much fairer policy would be to tie the quotas to tea exports, which would make them more consistent with ship size. For example, for every 1,000 piculs of tea loaded onto a ship, 20 to 25 piculs of silk should be allowed.[53]

The Dutch were unsuccessful in changing the quotas because they were set by the emperor. Officials in Guangzhou had no authority to alter them. Moreover, tying the export of silk to tea purchases would have greatly disadvantaged the Spaniards who did not export the latter commodity. Whether or not connivance fees were paid at a later day to allow an additional 20 piculs per ship is unclear. It may have been a means used by the Hoppos to make up for a decline in revenues when fewer ships arrived. We know that foreigners were allowed to export 100 piculs per ship in the 1780s, which seems to have continued in later years but there is also significant evidence suggesting that the amounts exceeding 80 piculs per ship may have been the result of transferring unused quotas from some ships to other vessels that wanted more silk (see below).

This confusion with respect to the level of the quotas is the result of practice not always following policy. While the total quotas per ship were more or less maintained, the exact proportion of Canton and Nanking varieties was not always followed. Before 1810, for example, the EIC only exported Nanking raw silk, while many private ships

**Table 9.1 Total Silk Exports from Canton in 1810 (from British Records) (All Figures in Chinese Piculs)**

| Ships | Nanking raw silk | Canton raw silk | Wrought silks | Silk thread | Total | Ships | Piculs per ship |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EIC | 715 | | 33.5 | 16.0 | 764.5 | 15 | 51 |
| Country | 358 | 196 | 316.0 | | 870.0 | 21 | 41 |
| Foreign | 100 | 266 | 1,161.0 | 110.5 | 1,637.5 | 12 | 136 |
| Totals | 1,173 | 462 | 1,619.0 | 126.5 | 3,272.0 | 48 | 68 |
| Piculs per ship | 24.44 | 9.63 | 33.73 | 2.64 | | | |

Source: BL: IOR G/12/173, pp. 122–29. Some of these figures can also be found in Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:348, 3:55, 131, 138, 176, 181, 190, 4:4.

**Table 9.2 Total Silk Exports from Canton in 1810 (from Dutch Records) (All Figures in Chinese Piculs)**

| Ships | Nanking raw silk | Canton raw silk | Wrought silks | Silk thread | Total | Ships | Piculs per ship |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EIC | 692.5 | | 54.5 | 17 | 764 | 15 | 51 |
| Country | 36.0 | 699 | 184.0 | | 919 | 20 | 46 |
| Foreign | 166.0 | 585 | 1,344.0 | 295 | 2,390 | 15 | 159 |
| Totals | 894.5 | 1284 | 1,582.5 | 312 | 4,073 | 50 | 81 |
| Piculs per ship | 17.89 | 25.68 | 31.65 | 6.24 | | | |

Source: NAH: Canton 268 'Generaale Vervoer uit Canton 1810'.

exported the cheaper Canton variety.[54] These latter ships (including 'country' ships from India and America) also exported some Nanking silk, but not necessarily in the proportions mentioned above. Tables 9.1 and 9.2 provide examples from 1810.

The silk export figures in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 are for the same year. They were acquired by the British and Dutch from the same source (the Hoppo's book, via the linguists). The figures differ slightly because they were collected at different times. Table 9.1 shows exports for 48 ships, whereas Table 9.2 shows exports for 50 ships.

From these two tables, we can see how the Hoppos manipulated the figures so that they did not go over the quotas. If the Hoppo reported the figures as shown in Table 9.1, he would be under quota. The average silk per ship was only 68 piculs. If we assume that 80 piculs per ship was also the quota in 1810, then the Hoppo was 12 piculs per ship short of the maximum allowed. In order to maximize the duties he collected, he needed to adjust the figures so that they reached 80 piculs per ship.

The figures in Table 9.2 show an average of 81 piculs of silk being exported per ship. This scenario was almost right on target. The Hoppo just needed to subtract 73 piculs from the total, and push those exports into the next year's report. His exports would then show exactly 80 piculs per ship.

Tables 9.1 and 9.2 only show total figures for wrought silk and silk thread so we cannot calculate the percentage of Nanking and Canton varieties. We can see that in both tables the foreign ships (which include American and Spanish) exported far more silk than the quotas allowed. The Hoppo covered this overage by applying the unused quotas from other ships. The figures collected by the British and Dutch are recorded in this manner for almost every year, which means we cannot glean the exact proportions of Nanking silk to Canton silk. It was, in fact, in the Hoppos' interests to omit those details. If they could arbitrarily increase one variety to a higher level, then it would be easier to reach the total quota per ship in each year.

In some years, companies were actually allowed to combine the quotas from several ships and put them all onto one ship. The only requirement was that all of the vessels had to be in port in China that year. Qing policy dictated that Canton and Nanking varieties could not be substituted one for the other (which applied to both wrought and raw silk).[55] The fact that the EIC exported only Nanking silk before 1810

shows that Hoppos did not take the restrictions of 50 piculs Canton silk and 30 piculs of Nanking silk too seriously.

Besides inflation, contraband and quotas, there was one other important factor that affected the silk trade—advances.

## ADVANCES

The silk trade required huge payments of 60, 80 or even 100 percent in advance. Local merchants often insisted that the advances had to be mostly paid, if not entirely paid, in silver coin. Inland silk producers would often refuse to deliver their products to Canton unless they received silver. As mentioned above, the prices in the interior were based on payment in sycee silver. This made the silk trade less in sync with tea and porcelain and more in line with gold and opium. The latter two commodities also required huge silver investments.

The companies were not always willing to tie up their silver stock in silk purchases. With tea and porcelain, they could usually negotiate a larger part of their purchases to be paid for with imported goods such as spices, tin and European fabrics. Because the trade required large amounts of silver capital, we often find Hong merchants placing orders for raw silk, rather than weavers. This was the case because the former had better access to silver reserves.

It took time to prepare all of the items according to the samples that were given. Weaving the right kind and size of fabrics, painting the designs, and sewing the borders and embroidery work onto them required a lot of planning and preparation. In order to perform well and ensure that there were sufficient fabrics ready for export by autumn, it was best to begin work on the fabrics in the off-season (February to June).

In the 1780s and 1790s, both the EIC and VOC were short on capital. They often did not have enough money to pay advances upfront as in previous decades. Prior to 1784, for example, the VOC offered a 20 percent advance when they negotiated the silk contract in February or March. This enabled the weavers to go to work immediately to prepare for the next season (August to January). Another 60 percent advance was given when the first ship arrived with more silver in August or September. Under this arrangement, the weavers could assure their creditors that they would indeed have sufficient funds in the upcoming season to pay their debts. The remaining 20 percent was paid on delivery.

In 1784, the VOC renegotiated their arrangement with the weavers. The company had just gone through a war with the English and was strapped for cash. The Dutch still wanted to contract in the off-season for their fabrics, but they had no money for an advance. They still provided the standard 60 percent when the first ship arrived, but then paid the remaining 40 percent when the goods were delivered.

This new arrangement put much pressure on the weavers. If they wanted to trade with the Dutch, then they had to proceed without the 20 percent up front. The weavers had to finance the preparation of the products in the off-season themselves. The 20 percent they had previously received in February or March would now be given to them in November or December after delivery. Not only did this situation deprive

them of cash up front, but they also lost the interest on that money for those eight or nine months.

The Dutch benefitted from this situation because instead of giving that 20 percent at no interest in February, they could loan that money out (when they had it) and earn interest for those eight or nine months. Of course, the original reason for introducing this new policy was because the Dutch had no money in 1784 but, after this system was introduced, it stayed in force even in years when the Dutch had the resources to pay the 20 percent up front.

What this change in policy actually did was to effectively lower the net price of the fabrics. The Dutch could now use the 20 percent advance themselves or loan it out to others at 1.5 percent interest per month. We can see more clearly from the figures in Appendix 10A what this actually meant. In the late 1780s and early 1790s, the Dutch contracted well over 50,000 taels worth of fabrics in most years. A 20 percent advance on those fabrics would be 10,000 taels. If we multiply that amount by 1.5 percent interest for eight months we find that the Dutch saved 1,200 taels on their fabrics with this new policy. In some years they contracted upwards of 100,000 taels. This meant a saving of 2,400 taels or more. Before 1784 that interest money had gone to the weavers.

We will see examples in the next chapter of silk prices rising for the Dutch in 1784. Part of the reason for that rise was the weavers trying to compensate for the loss of the 20 percent advance and the interest on that money. The Dutch complained a lot about the rise in prices in 1784. They tried to keep them at previous levels. The price increase, however, was partially the result of their change in policy.

This example is another reason why it is so difficult to compare commodity prices between companies over time. On face value, it might look like the prices in 1784 were much higher than in 1783 but, in reality, the difference between the lower and higher prices was simply an adjustment that was made to compensate for not receiving the customary 20 percent advance in the off-season. As far as silk workers were concerned, we only have the Dutch records to document what was actually happening. If we had full transparency of what other companies and foreigners did in Canton in their silk trade, we could explain more clearly how the weavers were being affected by changes in the market.

Now that I have laid down some of the basic characteristics of the silk trade and the roles played by inflation, contraband, quotas and advances, I turn in the next chapter to a discussion of silk weavers, painters and embroiderers.

CHAPTER TEN

# SILK WEAVERS, EMBROIDERERS, AND PAINTERS

The study of silk weavers, embroiderers and painters in eighteenth century Canton reveals a side of the commerce that has previously received little coverage in the history books. Numerous studies have been published on the many steps involved in manufacturing silk. Many figures have been assembled by scholars on the amounts of raw and wrought silk exported from China by the English East India Company (EIC).[1] A few studies have been carried out on Chinese silk fabrics that have been deposited in American museums.[2] A few studies have also been conducted on the Sino-Dutch and other European imported silk.[3]

While all of these publications help to expand our understanding of the production, volume and different types of silk fabrics that were produced in China, they reveal very little about the Chinese in Canton who ordered and prepared the products for export. The Dutch and Danish archives and, to a lesser extent, the Swedish and French archives, contain much information about Chinese silk workers. The data are far from complete but at least provide a glimpse into this previously little known world of the people involved in the silk industry.

There is quite a lot of information about several of the Canton weavers in records from the latter half of the eighteenth century. I will first discuss these men, and then move on to a brief discussion of the embroiderers and painters. I begin with Weaver Suckin.

## WEAVERS SUCKIN AND SIOUQUA 1757–1784[4]

Weaver Suckin traded out of a couple of different houses, including the Shenghe Dian 生和店 and Yuelai Hao 悦來號.[5] The former shop seems to have been his main business. He shows up for the first time in the Dutch East India Company's (VOC) annual trade report for 1757, which was left for the supercargoes of the next season. Weaver Suckin was noted as being the foremost dealer in manufactured silk.[6]

In 1757, Suckin sold fabrics to the VOC in partnership with the Hong merchant Tan Anqua (Chapter 4), but no figures have survived.[7] That year, the Dutch also bought silks from Weaver Lamqua.[8] In 1758, the Dutch bought many silk fabrics, but they were all ordered from Weaver Chancri. This man was the main supplier of silks to the French.[9]

There was intense competition in the silk trade. From Suckin's very first appearance in the Dutch records, he seems to have been fighting for a share of the market. Weavers who consistently offered the best quality fabrics had distinct advantages over

the competition. The French were known for purchasing the best fabrics available and were willing to pay higher prices than other companies.[10] In January 1758, the Dutch purchased some Pekings from a dealer named Tenhi, from whom the French bought fabrics as well.[11] There is no mention of weavers or other silk workers in the foreign records of 1760 and 1761 because of the ban on exporting silk in those years (see Chapter 9). People could still make fabrics for the domestic market, but not for export. In 1762, the ban was lifted but quotas were put into place, which limited the amount that could be exported.

In 1763, the Dutch mentioned that the weaver who supplied the French (probably Chancri or Tenhi) only did business through the Hong merchant Ingsia (Yan Yingshe 顏瑛舍).[12] These references to the Dutch buying items from the weavers who supplied the French are examples that show Europeans trying to obtain the best products in Canton, so that they could be competitive in their home markets.

Plate 06.02 shows a couple of foreigners entering a Chinese shop by the name of Heli Hao 合利號. This shop was run by Ingsia's brother, Limsia (Yan Linshe 顏琳舍). The Heli Hao was involved in the silk trade as well. It was a member of the silk guild Jinlun Huiguan 錦綸會館 mentioned in previous chapters. The Heli Hao was not exclusively a silk shop, but also sold porcelain and tea amongst other products.[13] Like the porcelain dealers who traded in other goods, silk dealers might also sell small quantities of other items whenever the opportunity presented itself.

As we saw in Chapter 5, Hong merchants sometimes formed exclusive partnerships with weavers whereby the latter men agreed to reserve all of their products for the former men. In the first volume and in previous chapters of this volume, I have shown how Hong merchants often had special connections to suppliers. Sometimes, these partnerships between merchants and producers were based on extended family relationships. I have pointed out a few cases where inland tea growers reserved their products specifically for one merchant in Canton. In Chapter 3 I have also pointed out the linkages between the Pan and Chen families and their extended family members in Manila.

Partnerships helped merchants gain advantages over their competition. It is thus not strange to see that the weaver mentioned above reserved all of his products for Ingsia. These commercial arrangements were similar to business practices today whereby companies such as Coca Cola or Pepsi agree to supply all of a university's needs—at a special price—with the agreement that the entire campus must only offer their products. Another example is a computer retailer who agrees to distribute one specific brand—at a special price—and then the manufacturer guarantees that the retailer will have an exclusive license to handle those items in his area. Mini-monopolies such as these create special relationships between suppliers and retailers whereby they both gain a niche in the market. Over time, consumers become accustomed to those specific products, which nurtures brand loyalty.

The many studies that have been done of the various East India companies have shown that they were actively promoting their brands in Europe with their respective companies' logos on their products. Chinese weavers also had their special products and skills for which they became well known. For reasons discussed in the first volume

and in the Preface of this volume, Chinese did not expand their branding to the consumer level in Europe. In the 1730s, Tan Hunqua and his partner Chinqua would have undoubtedly tried to make such linkages had the Qing government not blocked them from doing so. These governmental restrictions resulted in most products from China being rebranded with East India companies' logos on the packages—making the Chinese suppliers virtually unknown to European consumers. Today, the only way we can trace who the Chinese suppliers of fabrics and other artefacts in museums were is to look for small insignias in Chinese on the back or bottom of those items. If the Chinese merchants and weavers would have had the freedom to make direct linkages to Europe, they would have likely sold those items under their own logos and names. But that was not the destiny that was in store for them.

The Dutch continued to trade with Tan Anqua in 1758, but no longer under a joint account with Suckin. We have no references to Suckin for the years from 1758 to 1763. When Suckin reappears in the records in 1764, he was making many of the silks for Cai Hunqua and Ingsia.[14] These two men were in partnership with Tan Chetqua and supplied most of the VOC cargos. They also contracted individually with the EIC. Tan Chetqua, however, ordered his silks from a weaver who was a member of his family.

Suckin wove the Dutch fabrics, but the Dutch hired other men to paint and embroider designs on them. Like the weavers, silk painters and embroiderers spoke directly with their foreign customers when orders were placed, but the sales were conducted through the hong houses. Weavers were mainly concerned with bulk fabric and raw silk orders. Those fabrics usually had no more than one or two colours on each piece, in basic designs. Some of those fabrics were delivered to painters and embroiderers after they were woven. Those artisans added additional colours, logos, borders, names, coats of arms, and whatever other images customers wanted on the fabrics.

Suckin was a major dealer in raw silk as well as manufactured silk. The Dutch ordered both the Nanking and Canton varieties each year, but Suckin appears to have specialized in the local variety. In fact, the Dutch mentioned that he actually lived in Foshan, where many of the local fabrics were manufactured. He went back and forth to Canton regularly to carry on his trade.[15]

In January 1766, the Dutch tried to peg prices to the levels prevailing in 1763, which Suckin complained would dig deeply into his profits.[16] Silk prices continued to rise throughout the 1760s (see Plates 10.1 and 10.2). In 1770, the Dutch officers told Suckin they would not tolerate another increase and they would not give him any more than they had paid in 1769.[17] In February 1771, however, Suckin again complained that he could not supply silk for the same price as he had in the previous year, owing to another price rise.[18]

The rise in prices was partially the result of silk manufacturing being a labour intensive industry. As food prices increased, so did the cost of making silk fabrics. Silk worms and their food source, mulberry leaves, were also much affected by cold weather, diseases, droughts and floods. Silk prices in Canton were therefore much affected by all of these factors. Whenever the manufacturing costs rose and/or supplies declined when demand remained strong it was inevitable that prices would rise.

In February 1767, we begin to see signs of Suckin having cash flow problems. Up until this year, he had been receiving the standard 20 percent advance on silk contracts in the off-season from the VOC (at the time the order was placed in February or March), and the remaining 60 percent when the ships arrived in August or September. He now demanded a 30 percent advance at the time the contract was made.[19] The Dutch refused, and continued to pay him the customary 80 percent advance (20 and 60 percent, respectively).[20]

In 1768, Suckin took out a loan from the Swedes for 300 Spanish dollars at the going rate of 20 percent annual interest.[21] In some years capital was so scarce that some Chinese paid as much as 40 or 50 percent interest on loans. Thus, there were good reasons for Suckin wanting the Dutch to pay him more in advance. He could then avoid having to borrow this expensive money.[22]

The contracts Suckin made with the Dutch stipulated not only the price and quantity of merchandise, but also the exact date of delivery. It was common to state that the product had to be delivered aboard the ships at Whampoa within 100, 120 or more days from the date of the contract. The delivery date was then also noted on the document, so that there was no mistaking which day they had agreed upon. If delivery was not made on time, Suckin would be charged 3 percent demurrage on the value of the undelivered fabrics. Chinese and foreigners used different calendars (lunar and solar, respectively), so it was important to make the dates very clear in the contracts to avoid misunderstandings.[23]

In August 1767, another entry appears showing Suckin demanding more money. This time it was connected to the prices of the products that had been agreed upon. Suckin wanted the Dutch to pay 8 percent more for the 1,000 pieces of silk fabrics they had ordered, because the silk he received from his supplier was of an exceptional quality. In November, the two Hong merchants through whom Suckin supplied the VOC made an effort to help him avoid incurring a loss. The men demanded an addition 900 taels for the silk textiles that Suckin supplied. If the Dutch refused to pay, then Suckin would suffer a loss and the supercargoes would likely not get their fabrics on time. By the end of December, when the goods were finally delivered, the Dutch compromised. They gave Suckin 4 percent more than the price they had earlier agreed upon.[24]

Suckin had a reputation for handling the best silks, which is probably why his supplier gave him a superior quality. If Suckin had not been fussy about quality, his supplier would probably have tried to deliver a poorer product and save the better silk for another weaver. In another example from February 1768, the English received much poorer silk than they ordered and demanded their Chinese merchant give them a discount of 10 taels per picul.[25]

As I pointed out in Chapter 3, Poankeequa had suffered a significant loss on raw silk in 1766. He had agreed on one price with the EIC, but was then charged a higher price than expected by the inland suppliers because of a reduced supply. He tried to recover that loss by asking for preferential treatment on contracts in the future. In the case above, Suckin was lucky to recover some of his loss. According to their contracts, the Dutch did not have to pay Suckin the additional money he was asking for.

The quality of raw silk that was delivered to weavers by inland suppliers and the quality of wrought silks that they received from spinners in Foshan and Canton did not always match with the quality of goods contracted with foreigners. The wrought silks were ordered according to samples that customers supplied. In the end, however, retailers had to accept whatever products the manufacturers could offer. Merchants and weavers had to pay their suppliers according to the quality of the products actually delivered, irrespective of their agreements with foreigners. In these regards, the pricing and marketing structures (as well as the usury rates) in Canton were slanted in favour of foreign buyers rather than Chinese sellers.

On 1 May 1770, the head of the three merchant consortium, Cai Hunqua, died and there was a temporary halt in his trade. By early August, the Dutch were very anxious to contract their silks with Suckin before a new head was appointed to Hunqua's house. The implication was that they feared they would not be able to get the same prices as in the previous year once everyone became aware of the actual financial situation of that firm.[26]

Because silk orders were carried out through the Hong merchants in the 1760s, it is not possible to show how much product Suckin actually delivered in those years. In March 1772, Suckin insisted that the Dutch deal with him directly—not only in placing their orders but also in their advances, deliveries, and payments. He now had the freedom to conduct trade in his own name and on his own account. Suckin specifically stated that he would no longer deal through the Hong merchant consortium as he had done in the 1760s. His unwavering determination in this matter suggests that he had not been pleased with the previous restrictions on his business.[27]

Suckin's apprehension requires some explanation. Although we only have the VOC records to analyze, they nonetheless contain an interesting phenomenon that helps to explain Suckin's situation. As mentioned above, during the era of the Co-hong, the Dutch entered weavers' accounts under Hong merchants' names. The business that was done with painters, embroiderers and even porcelain dealers, on the other hand, was entered separately under each of those men's names.

We know from the VOC *dagregisters*, trade journals, resolutions and reports that the Dutch contacted weavers, painters, embroiderers and porcelain dealers directly, before, after and during the administration of the Co-hong. The Dutch delivered samples to all of these men, placed all of the orders in person, and received all of their items directly from each individual. However, only the weavers' accounts were entered under Hong merchants' names during the Co-hong years.[28]

I would not want to read too much into this phenomenon, because it is only one company's example, but it is important to note that during the Co-hong years, for some reason, weavers were kept under much closer control by the Hong merchants than were painters, embroiderers and porcelain dealers. Given the fact that Dutch officers entered those figures into their records indiscriminately, despite the financial status or standings of those persons; and that we have no figures for weavers, even though they had gross sales that far surpassed many of those other smaller operators, the evidence on balance suggests that Co-hong policies may have been behind this phenomenon (see examples in Appendixes 7N, 7P, 7Q, 7U, and 10C compared to 10A). This outcome raises the

question of whether weavers were forbidden to have direct financial exchanges with foreigners. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient evidence to provide a conclusive answer.[29]

The collapse of the Co-hong was not necessarily a good outcome for Suckin. Even though he had to give a percentage of his profits to a hong house, he received some protection in return. The Co-hong had regulated the prices for silk and the required advances, which provided security and stability to trade. When that society ended, the merchants were left to themselves to negotiate the contracts. As a result, fierce competition broke out as merchants scrambled to hold their existing customers and gain market shares from others. This cut-throat environment gave foreigners more leverage in negotiating better terms.

In March 1773, the Dutch wanted to make some alterations in their silk order. Suckin replied that, unless the Dutch were willing to pay more money in advance when the ships arrived, no alterations were possible.[30] In August 1773, the Dutch demanded that Suckin give them better prices. They insisted on paying only 50 percent of the contract in advance rather than the previous 80 percent. Because the Hong merchants no longer took a cut on the profits, Suckin was able to accommodate the Dutch in price, but he would not give in to the reduced advance. He needed that money to send to his suppliers. Suckin had some leverage because other weavers depended on advances as well. He was therefore able to continue demanding the customary 80 percent advance and the Dutch finally relented.[31]

In 1775 and 1776, the Dutch tried again to restructure how the trade was conducted. They suggested that, instead of giving the customary 80 percent advance in the off-season for a contract on raw silk, they would pay Suckin 100 percent of the amount at the time the ships arrived in August or September. Here again, his need for capital enabled Suckin to continue to insist on the customary 80 percent advance (20 percent in February or March and 60 percent when the ships arrived).[32]

Suckin sold silks to the Danish Asiatic Company (DAC) from 1775 to 1781, but no figures have survived. In 1776, another weaver by the name of Samqua begins to appear in the DAC records as a competitor in trade. Samqua and Suckin supplied the DAC with the silks they wanted until 1781, when both men disappear from the records. Table 10.1 shows the prices given to the Danes of Nanking raw silk in 1777, 1781 and 1794.

The list of silk grades and prices in Table 10.1 requires some explanation. Top quality Nanking silk was forbidden to export and was reserved exclusively for the emperor. The application of this policy, however, varied somewhat. Top grades might include all of the silk produced in a specific area (where all were considered to be top quality) or, alternatively, it might include only the best products in certain areas, with lower grades allowed for export.[33]

Because of these restrictions, there were differences between the Chinese and foreign grading systems. The '1st Organzin silk' in Table 10.1 was actually second grade silk in the Chinese grading scale. Foreigners were not quoted prices for first grade silk, because that product went to Beijing. Not surprisingly, top grade silks earmarked

**Table 10.1 Prices of Nanking Raw Silk for 1777, 1781, and 1794 (Taels per Picul)**

| **Suckin's raw silk prices in 1777** | | **Samqua's raw silk prices in 1781** | | **Chowqua's (Tan Ziuqua) and Geowqua's (Kiauqua) raw silk prices in 1781** | | **Samqua's raw silk prices in 1794** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Organzin silk | 348 | 1st Organzin silk | 360 | 1st Organzin silk | 345 | 1st Organzin silk | 410 |
| 2nd Organzin silk | 328 | 2nd Organzin silk | 350 | 2nd Organzin silk | 325 | | |
| 3rd Organzin silk | 313 | 3rd Organzin silk | 340 | 3rd Organzin silk | 315 | | |
| 1st Tram silk | 326 | 1st Tram silk | 350 | 1st Tram silk | 334 | 1st Tram silk | 400 |
| 2nd Tram silk | 311 | 2nd Tram silk | 340 | 2nd Tram silk | 324 | | |
| 3rd Tram silk | 301 | 3rd Tram silk | 330 | 3rd Tram silk | 314 | | |

Source: RAC: Ask 1178, 1777.12.09, p. 123v, Ask 1185, 1781.10.27, p. 56r, 1781.10.29, p. 57v, Ask 1208, 1794.10.04, p. 32r, and 1794.12.02, p. 52r.

for Beijing were very difficult to acquire by anyone except those persons who were licensed.[34]

The grading and pricing of silk, however, was not as straightforward as the examples in Table 10.1 suggest. During most of the eighteenth century, there were no common silk standards that all foreigners adhered to. As a result, there was much confusion about which products fell into which categories. Moreover, foreign records often do not mention the grades, but simply describe 'raw silk' purchased. Because of these ambiguities, we have no way of accurately comparing silk prices between companies over time.

The figures in Table 10.1 from the DAC records represent a rare exception. In other years, the Danes simply recorded one price for all raw silk they had purchased, with no mention of quality. The high and low prices for raw silk in Canton that Li assembled for the years 1702 to 1799 are another example. For 1775, Li shows prices ranging from 275 to 277.5 taels per picul and 275 taels per picul in 1783.[35] These prices are much lower than the prices shown in Table 10.1. The different ranges of prices are the result of the companies maintaining different silk standards. Therefore, it is impossible for us to draw meaningful comparisons from price data.

Moreover, foreigners did not apply the same exchange rates to convert Spanish dollars into Chinese taels. They also used different weights to weigh their goods (including raw silk and silver). Even when we have a range of prices for different grades, those numbers need to be checked to see if they correspond to their equivalent weights in silver. Further, even if we have all of that information, we still need to check to see that the companies were using the same rating system for raw silk. Only then can we be sure that the second grade in one source is the same as the second grade in another. Table 10.1 reveals that there were actually two levels of first, second and third grades.[36]

Despite the confusion in the figures, it is clear that first grade Canton silk was much less expensive than first grade Nanking silk. In the early 1770s, the Dutch contracted regularly with Suckin each year for 40 to 80 piculs of raw Canton silk at 190 to 195 taels to the picul. In comparison, Nanking raw silk went for 280 taels per picul. The prices for raw Canton silk were again higher in 1778, so Suckin had to renegotiate his terms again with the Dutch. He raised his price to 200 taels per picul, and the Dutch could not get him to go lower. In 1779, the price of silk rose again. The weavers were now demanding 290 taels per picul for Nanking raw silk. The huge increase in price this year was attributed to a 15 percent hike in customs duties. This additional surcharge was initiated to help pay for the expensive gifts that were given to the Mandarins each year.[37]

In 1778, there were rumours circulating in Canton that Hoppo Tu Ming'a 圖明阿 was planning to issue a declaration requiring all goods to be once again handled through the large merchant houses. Thereby he could crack down on smuggling (and probably provide some aid to the struggling Hong merchants). As a precautionary measure, Suckin sent all of the silks that he had obtained for the VOC to the house of Tsjonqua (Cai Xiangguan 蔡相官). Tsjonqua was a Hong merchant, and his father-in-law was a Mandarin in another district. This procedure gave Suckin some protection in the event the new policy was put into effect.[38] As far as we know, it was not enforced.

As merchants filled the vacuum left behind by the Hong merchants who failed in the late 1770s, stiff competition broke out, which had a significant impact on the weaving industry. We have already seen how the Dutch tried to benefit from the increased competition by attempting to renegotiate the terms of their contracts with Suckin. This intense environment made it increasingly difficult for Suckin to realize a profit.

Jörg mentions that Suckin went bankrupt in 1778, but he continued to conduct some business for a couple more years.[39] In 1780, he lost much of his Dutch trade to Tiqua, who offered more competitive terms and prices. Suckin contracted a fair amount of textiles with the VOC that year, but it was less than one third of what he had done in the previous year. Stiff competition had effectively pushed him out of the market.[40]

Unknown to Suckin at the time, even without Tiqua's competition he would have lost most of his VOC trade in the early 1780s owing to war. In 1781, only one Dutch ship showed up when there had previously been four; in 1782, no VOC ships made it to China; and in 1783 the Dutch commissioned two 'Prussian' ships to China. The VOC trade did not return to its previous volume until 1784. Even if Suckin had managed to maintain his share of the Dutch trade in 1780, he would have lost much of that business in the two or three years that followed.

Suckin is mentioned in the Dutch records of 1783 in reference to the Hong merchant Pinqua (Yang Bingguan 楊丙觀). According to the report, Pinqua was left with a quantity of silk textiles from Suckin, who had ceased operations two years before. The Dutch mentioned that Pinqua had finally disposed of the goods in a transaction with the Danes.[41] I have no evidence of Suckin carrying on any trade after 1781.

In 1783, one of Suckin's nephews, Kyt Siouqua (also spelled Sjouqua or Sjonqua) shows up in the Dutch records dealing in silk. Like his uncle, he insisted on the

**Table 10.2 Average Silk Fabric Prices from Four Weavers in 1784**

| Weavers | Conqua | Kytsjouqua (Siouqua) | Lochop | Tiqua |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Average price of silk fabrics (in taels) | 13.817 | 13.474 | 13.720 | 13.495 |

Source: Calculated from the figures in Plate 10.01. Items without four prices were omitted.

customary advances (presumably, referring to the 80 percent advance mentioned above). The Dutch, however, were able to convince him to accept a 60 percent advance when the ships arrived, with the remaining 40 percent due when the product was delivered. The Hong merchant Chowqua (Chen Zuguan 陳祖官) stood security for the duties that Kyt Siouqua owed (and probably for the 60 percent advance as well in the event he failed to deliver).[42]

Siouqua had worked very closely with his uncle in the business. He could speak Portuguese, which means he probably handled Suckin's trade in Macao. Like his uncle, the Dutch found Siouqua to be well stocked in all the silk varieties, so he apparently continued to handle only the best merchandise, as his uncle had done.

Siouqua did some business with the VOC in 1784. The overall prices of silk went up about 5 percent from January to September (discussed below). While the other weavers raised their prices in accordance, Siouqua kept his prices lower. This tactic stimulated sales (see Plate 10.01).

Table 10.2 shows the average prices of the four top weavers. The prices are within 0.35 taels (about 50 cents) of each other. This outcome is another reflection of the intense local competition. If a weaver had just a slight rise in price, he could lose a customer. Siouqua's lowest price strategy helped him regain a small contract with the Dutch in 1784, but he lost that trade thereafter. He shows up briefly in the Dutch records the next year, but then disappears.[43] Nothing more is known about Suckin or Siouqua.

### WEAVER TIQUA 1770s–1780s

Weaver Tiqua shows up in the Dutch records of 1780, but he was active in the trade long before then. The Dutch mentioned that he had been a regular supplier to the EIC as well as to private British traders.[44]

Tiqua was most likely active throughout the 1770s and perhaps earlier, but no details have survived. From the extensive lists of fabrics that Tiqua supplied to the Dutch in 1780 and thereafter, we can see that he was indeed very well-established by that time. According to the document in Plate 10.01, Tiqua was listed as one of the top four weavers in Canton.[45]

In 1780, the Dutch found Tiqua's prices to be, on the whole, 3 percent lower than Suckin's. Tiqua demanded the customary 80 percent in advance for silk textiles, but he did not insist on an advance for raw Canton silk. He contracted 25 piculs of that product with the VOC in February, to be paid upon delivery in October. These advantages won him a large share of the VOC trade in that year (Appendix 10A).[46]

Considering the incentives Tiqua offered, one might ask why the Dutch had not gone to him earlier. Perhaps they realized that Suckin was no longer competitive in his terms and prices, or perhaps it had just been more convenient trading with Suckin in the past because he knew the types of fabrics the Dutch typically wanted. The answer is unclear. Despite the war between the Dutch and British in the early 1780s, Tiqua still managed to do some trade with the Dutch (Appendix 10A).

On 22 September 1783, the Dutch asked to meet with the four top weavers in Canton to discuss the rise in silk prices. The Dutch talked with three of them but were unable to meet with Tiqua. He had not yet returned from Nanking. By 18 October, Tiqua was still absent, so his companion informed the Dutch that the prices for silk textiles would be 5 percent higher than last year. By 23 October, Tiqua had returned to Canton and the Dutch decided to contract with him rather than with the other three weavers (see Appendix 10A).[47]

These entries give us insights into Tiqua's business strategies. Other weavers usually sent their agents inland to place orders, and then stayed in Canton to deal with the foreigners. As we saw in earlier chapters, most of the porcelain dealers seemed to have operated like this as well. Tiqua went to inland suppliers himself, which was similar to what the porcelain dealer Lisjoncon had done. This move cut out the middleman, and helps to answer the question of how he could undercut Suckin's prices. Obviously, Tiqua could not handle everything in Canton and Nanking, at the same time, so his assistant filled in when he was gone.

The VOC trade returned to normal in 1784, with four ships arriving in China. As noted above, the Dutch wanted to reduce the amount of the silk advance from 80 percent to 60 percent. The contracts would be made at the customary time in February or March, but the Dutch would not supply the 20 percent up front as before. Like Suckin, Tiqua was also unwilling to go along with this new arrangement. He finished his contracts with the VOC in 1784. The Dutch then turned to other weavers who were more accommodating.

Weaver Conqua came forward to take up a good share of the Dutch trade. As mentioned, Kyt Siouqua recaptured a small share of the Dutch trade in 1784. Tiqua had no more business with the Dutch for the next few years, but he shows up again in the Dutch records in December 1789. He delivered two chests of linens for the VOC ships *Meerwijk* and *Christopher Columbus*. There is no mention of this purchase in the account books. It was either carried out under someone else's name or perhaps as reimbursement for amounts Tiqua owed the Dutch from previous contracts.[48]

## WEAVER CONQUA 1780–1793

In Appendix 10D, I point out that it is not always easy to identify Conqua in the foreign records owing to one of the Hong merchants having a similar name. The latter man died in 1781, which is the same year that Weaver Conqua begins to appear in the DAC records. On 15 October, he contracted several hundred pieces of silk fabrics for delivery in eighty days. This sale does not appear in Appendix 10B, because the Danish account book (*hovedboger*) is missing for 1781.[49]

Weaver Conqua was from Macao, where his mother lived.[50] In 1784, the Dutch mentioned that, for the past three or four years, Conqua had done a considerable trade with the Portuguese and other private traders.[51] This means he would have entered the business around 1780, which was around the time that Weaver Suckin was to exit the trade.

Conqua had obviously lived in Macao for some time because he communicated with the Dutch in Portuguese.[52] That connection would suggest that we might find him listed in the Portuguese records. As discussed in Appendix 10D, however, I have found no references to him in the Macao archives.

As mentioned above, Conqua agreed to the new terms the Dutch had introduced in 1784—that they would no longer pay 20 percent of the silk orders in the off-season. Conqua agreed to accept 60 percent advance when the ships arrived and then the remainder upon delivery. If he had not agreed to this, the Dutch probably would have turned to someone else.[53]

As Plate 10.01 and Appendix 10A show, Conqua competed with weavers Kyt Siouqua, Tiqua and Lochop for a share of the Dutch trade. Conqua and Lochop supplied the VOC with similar amounts each year. As Appendix 10B reveals, Conqua also competed with Weaver Samqua and the silk dealer Assing for a share of the Danish trade from 1782 to 1787. Both of the latter two men managed to contract more trade with the DAC almost every year than Conqua. By 1785 Conqua lost most of his Danish trade to Assing. The Danes made a small contract with Conqua again in 1787, but he disappears from those records thereafter.

Weaver Conqua's Dutch trade was more active. From 1784 to 1792 he averaged over 42,000 taels per year with the VOC. His peak year with the Dutch was 1789 when he contracted more than 69,000 taels worth of fabrics. In comparison, his peak year with the Danes in 1782 was less than 11,000 taels. If we add Conqua's trade with the Portuguese, other private merchants, and companies, we can imagine his gross sales exceeding well over 100,000 taels in some years.

Owing to several Hong merchants having failed in the early 1790s, six new appointments were made in September 1792—which raised the number to twelve.[54] The Hong merchants were pressed this year to contribute 300,000 taels to help support the military campaign against the Gurkhas.[55] Moreover, to make up for slow years and meet Beijing's revenue expectations this year, Hoppo Sheng Zhu 盛住 added a new surcharge on exported silk of 17.5 taels per picul.[56]

All of these matters, of course, affected Weaver Conqua, in a negative way. He was now very pressed for cash. The Dutch complained that the products he had delivered had many mistakes in their colours. It was probably the result of his scrambling to fill whatever orders he could with whatever capital he had on hand.[57] Conqua was much pressed to pay the new surcharge on his silk exports.

By 13 December 1792, Conqua had still not been able to pay the duties, so the Hoppo arrested him.[58] A payment into the Hoppo's treasury was about the only effective way to gain his freedom. Meanwhile, the Dutch mentioned that they had contracted all their silk fabrics with Conqua's successor. Unfortunately, they did not mention that man's name, but he was apparently taking care of business in Conqua's absence.[59] On

28 February 1793, the Hong merchant Geowqua (Kiouqua, Chapter 5) reported to the Dutch that Conqua had obtained his release. He had paid 4,100 Spanish dollars and provided an additional $5,900 as security (with no explanation of what was meant by 'security').[60] On 2 March 1793, the Dutch talked with Conqua about his silk contracts. He said that, unless the Dutch were willing to increase the prices to cover the costs of the new impositions, he could not fulfil his agreement. They came to a compromise, but Conqua failed to follow through on the deal.[61]

On 29 September 1793, the Dutch complained that, owing to Conqua's continual absence, they would ship the fabrics from Ponqua's weavers instead. The next day, the Dutch reported that Conqua had absconded, because he was unable to pay the remainder of the Hoppo's duties. Moreover, he had private debts with some of the Dutch officers as well. In response to these events, the Dutch gave their furniture damask order to Ponqua's weavers.[62]

On 1 October 1793 the new Hoppo Su Leng'e 蘇棱額 arrived in Canton.[63] In order to generate more funds, he introduced yet another surcharge on Nanking raw silk of 6 Spanish dollars (ca. 4.3 taels) per picul. This time the tax was applied to the gross weight of the silk after it was packed, which meant that the chests had to absorb the new duties as well.[64] On 15 October, Poankeequa reported to the Dutch that the previous Hoppo (Sheng Zhu) had arrived in Beijing with more than a million taels worth of silver in his possession. He was arrested and put into chains on suspicion of embezzling imperial funds. An investigation was launched into his affairs in Canton.[65]

The accused Hoppo was the same man who in April 1793 had held a big birthday party for himself. The eight Hong merchants were required to attend. They gave him a birthday 'present' of 10,000 taels in silver, and they were charged 5,000 to 6,000 taels for the cost of the party plus 2,000 taels to pay the servants. The Hong merchant Shy Kinqua was asked to give an additional 'present' of 5,000 taels.[66]

These accusations against the Hoppo make one wonder to what extent Weaver Conqua and other merchants in Canton may have been victims of his exploits. However, regardless of whether he was ultimately guilty or innocent, it was unlikely that anything would be done to correct any wrongs that might have been inflicted on individuals like Conqua. On 27 November 1793 the Dutch mentioned that the house of Conqua had failed, and Ponqua had taken over his fabric order with the VOC. Conqua's family in Macao would have been undoubtedly pressed to pay the remaining duties that were owed.[67]

### WEAVER SAMQUA 源盛號 1770s TO 1790s

The name of Weaver Samqua's shop was the Yuansheng Hao 源盛號.[68] In an undated Swedish document from around 1769, a 'Broderaren Samqua' (embroiderer Samqua) appears accepting silk orders.[69] Later references show a Weaver Samqua also arranging embroidery work. These two men might be one and the same.[70] The next entry I have to Weaver Samqua is from 1776, when he appears in the DAC records.[71]

Most of the information we have about Samqua comes from the Danish and Dutch archives. As mentioned, no figures survive of the DAC trade from 1773 to 1781, but

Samqua shows up in the trade journals (*negotieprotocoler*) each year from 1776.[72] When the account books begin again in 1782, Samqua is included in the annual sales almost every year up to 1796 (Appendix 10B).

Samqua competed with Suckin for a share of the Danish trade from 1776 to 1781.[73] After Suckin went bankrupt, Samqua competed with Conqua and Assing for a share of that trade. He had a good year in 1782 with over 33,000 taels in sales to the DAC. We know that he was selling to other foreigners as well, so his overall volume was much larger.

Weaver Samqua did no trade with the Danes in 1785 and 1786 but then contracted over 20,000 taels in 1787 (Appendix 10B). The large increase in 1787 over what he had managed in 1783 and 1784, is partially owing to him also selling Congo tea that year. As the figures in Appendix 10B show, his Danish trade declined each year thereafter. He disappears from those records after 1796.

In 1793, the Dutch characterized Weaver Samqua as a supplier to the Danish company and 'a very capable and trusted man'.[74] Samqua had a small amount of trade with the Dutch in the early 1790s, for which we have no figures. These transactions were recorded under petty cash disbursements or through the Hong merchant Geowqua (Kiouqua). Therefore, they do not show up under Samqua's name in the VOC account books.[75] However, we do know that in 1791 he supplied nine chests of fabrics worth a little over 4,500 taels to the VOC ship *Alblasserdam*.[76]

In 1792, Samqua was also affected when the Hoppo applied a new 17.5 taels per picul surcharge on export silk.[77] As mentioned above, Hoppo Sheng Zhu was much pressed to raise 300,000 taels for Beijing. Samqua had been carrying out a lot of trade through Geowqua (Kiouqua) for the past three years (Chapter 5). The Hoppo claimed that Samqua owed $40,000 in unpaid duties. On 12 November, the Hoppo refused to allow him to ship off any more products until he paid the outstanding debt.[78]

Unlike Weaver Conqua, who could not pay the new duties, Samqua managed to scrape together enough money to satisfy the Hoppo. On 16 December, he was allowed to send his fabrics to the DAC ship *Cron Printsen*.[79] In April 1793, however, the Dutch mentioned that Samqua and Conqua were hard pressed owing to the new impositions. Both of them insisted on selling at higher prices.[80]

Samqua somehow survived the 1792 impositions. In October 1793, he packed and shipped off 29 chests of silk to a VOC ship.[81] It was the last transaction Samqua had with the Dutch. On 26 November 1793, he complained that he would likely lose a lot on his contracts in the year because of the new impositions on export silk. The entry is not explicit, but it may be referring to the $6 per picul surcharge that the new Hoppo had placed on silk about this time (mentioned above).[82]

In January 1794, the Dutch talked with Samqua about ordering more fabrics. He informed them that the only way he could deliver more products was if they agreed to a substantial rise in prices. The Dutch decided that, with the higher prices, there would not be enough profit to make it worthwhile and cancelled their fabric orders.[83]

In 1794, Samqua gave the Danes a quote for raw silk (Table 10.1). Even though his prices were higher than others, the Danes found his product to be more to their liking.[84] They contracted a small amount with him.[85] Keeping the prices up seems to

have become one of his business strategies. That method, however, would only work if he offered superior products for sale.

In an American letter from Providence, Rhode Island, dated 24 December 1794, Samqua was described as follows.

> The Silk Merchants in Canton most known in this country & whose credit are best established are Ponqua & Samqua, to whom you will give a preference in your dealing in this article.[86]

In 1797, another American from Boston mentioned that Samqua was older than the silk dealer Eshing.[87] Samqua had additional American trade this year as well.[88] Despite all of the problems surrounding the silk industry in the early 1790s, Samqua managed to retain his reputation. The American trade seems to have helped carry him through the difficult years.

## SILK DEALER ASSING 1782–1799

The silk dealer named Assing is a bit of a mystery. He appears briefly on an American receipt from 1784. It shows him receiving 492 Spanish dollars for a delivery of silks. He signed the receipt Longhe 隆和. The Americans wrote his name as 'Assing Silk Merch.'[89] Longhe was the name of the Hong merchant Pinqua's firm so he apparently sold those fabrics through his house. Besides this brief entry, all other information we have about Assing comes from the DAC archives.[90]

Assing appears in the DAC records from 1782 to 1790 and again in 1799 (Appendix 10B).[91] I call him a silk dealer here because he specialized in silk. Unlike the other men discussed in this chapter, I have found no reference to him actually being called a weaver by contemporaries. The American receipt mentioned above refers to him as a silk merchant as do all of the Danish entries.

All we know about Assing's business comes from the figures in Appendix 10B. They show that he traded mostly in silk, but occasionally in small amounts of tea. His volume of trade with the DAC was never large. His peak year was 1785—with sales of a little more than 15,000 taels. He traded some tea that year, which helped to push up his volume. In years when he sold only silk to the Danes, his trade did not exceed 8,100 taels. Given the fact that Assing does not show up in the Dutch or other American records consulted for this study, he seems to have been a rather small operator.

For some reason, Assing had no trade with the DAC from 1791 to 1798. The Danes purchased silk from him again in 1799. He seems to be the same person because the Danes referred to him just as they had in former years.[92] Assing then disappears from the records.

## WEAVER LOCHOP 1784–1794

We know as much about Weaver Lochop as we do about Assing. The only information I have about him comes from the Dutch records. He first appears in 1784 in competition with Kyt Siouqua, Tiqua, Conqua, Samqua and Assing. Like Samqua, Lochop did much of his trade through the house of Geowqua (Chapter 5).

When Weaver Lochop first appears in the Dutch records in 1784, he was trading in a full range of silks and offering competitive prices. He had obviously been in business long before this date, for which we have no data. Plate 10.01 and Table 10.02 show Lochop's prices in comparison with Conqua, Kyt Siouqua and Tiqua.[93] Lochop's average price was a little higher than Kyt Siouqua and Tiqua, but a bit lower than Conqua.

Lochop landed a contract with the Dutch in 1784, but those figures do not show up in the VOC account books (*grootboeken*).[94] Consequently, there are no figures for him in those years listed in Appendix 10A. It is unclear why this was the case, especially since the other three weavers, Kyt Siouqua, Tiqua and Conqua do appear in those books. The Dutch resolutions and *dagregisters* clearly show that Lochop was supplying silks to them. Those figures must have been recorded under another man's name, such as Geowqua's,[95] or perhaps they were done under petty cash disbursements, as cited in Samqua's example above.[96]

From 1785 to 1791, Lochop has his own entries in the VOC account books and then we have figures for his trade (Appendix 10A). Many of those transactions were done under guarantee of the Hong merchants Chowqua and Geowqua and on the same terms as in 1784 (60 percent advance when the first ship arrived). After Chowqua died in early 1789, Geowqua alone stood security for Lochop.[97]

Lochop lost his contract with the VOC in 1792. The reason was that some of the fabrics he supplied the Dutch in 1790 were found to be inferior and not according to the samples provided to him. The Dutch were pleased with Conqua's fabrics, so they handed him Lochop's share of the trade in 1792 (Appendix 10A).[98] Unfortunately, this is all we know about Weaver Lochop. He had no trade with the Danes and I found no references to him in the American archives.

## SILK PAINTERS AND EMBROIDERERS

Most of the information we have about the silk painters and embroiderers in Canton comes from the Dutch records. There are a few scattered references in the French, Swedish and Danish archives as well. The Dutch contracted their silks with the weavers mentioned above, but then went directly to the silk painters to tell them exactly what designs they wanted on those fabrics.

Unlike most other companies, the Dutch paid their silk painters and embroiderers directly, which means we have figures for them. However, unlike the figures for weavers, which show the value of the fabrics they delivered each year (Appendixes 10A and 10B), the figures for painters and embroiderers are for labour (Appendix 10C). Included in labour figures, however, were the cost of paint (for the painters) and thread (for the embroiderers). They gave estimates on painting and embroidering based on those materials being included. The references are often very brief and scattered. But I will piece them together here to see what they can tell us about the painters and embroiderers.

Weavers had their favoured painters and embroiderers whom they tended to subcontract to each year. These men and their helpers might paint and embroider for other

weavers as well. Anthony was by far the most popular painter from the late 1750s to the 1780s. In 1757, the Dutch called him 'Anthony Thunqua, or Christian name Anthony, the first [number one] painter of silk fabrics in these regions'.[99] In 1757, he painted silks for Weaver Lamqua. As we will see from examples below, Anthony painted for other weavers at the same time. I have more information about him than for the other silk workers.

The French sometimes went directly to the silk painters to order their fabrics. Few records have survived of those transactions, but we do have one. Plate 10.02 is a contract from Painter Anthony (Antoine Peintre) dated 4 February 1757, showing the different colours, types and sizes of fabrics that he painted for the French. As mentioned above, the Dutch recorded that the French had ordered their silks through Weavers Chancri and Tenhi at this time.[100] According to Plate 10.02, the French seem to have taken the fabrics from those weavers, and then delivered them to Anthony to paint. The Dutch later decided to make similar arrangements with Anthony.

Anthony's Chinese name was Guo Yagui 郭亞貴. The total amount of his contract with the French in 1757 was 1,351.460 taels, which covered his labour costs. At an exchange rate of 0.74 taels to the piaster, this total came to 1,826 piastres (which the English called Spanish dollars). At the time of the contract, the French gave Anthony an advance of 1,185.75 piastres (about 65 percent of the total). The balance (640.25 piastres) was paid to him after delivery. According to the contract, he was to deliver the items in the eighth lunar month (September or early October 1757).

Many documents in the VOC archives linked to Canton weavers are very detailed like Plate 10.02. These data give us insights into how the painters and embroiderers operated. They usually received money in advance for commissioned fabrics, but not always. In December 1765, for example, Anthony painted 200 pieces of fabrics for the VOC. He delivered them on 3 and 4 January 1766, and was paid in full on 6 January.[101] Most of the entries in the VOC account books show the painters and weavers receiving a down payment up front. The amount given could vary wildly—from 20 to 60 percent of their contracts. The remainder was usually paid a few days after delivery.[102]

Painters and embroiderers worked very closely with weavers, and the orders were often placed at the same time. In November 1767, for example, the Dutch received a batch of fabrics from Weaver Suckin. Part of the batch had been painted by Anthony in gold and silver colours. The embroiderers Ajouw and Pinqua (also spelled Binqua) sewed designs on another part of the same batch.[103]

The documents for 1768 are more explicit. If we examine them closely, we can see the financial structures behind the weavers, painters and embroiderers. In 30 January 1768, the Dutch contracted more fabrics with Weaver Suckin. A portion of those fabrics were painted by Anthony, and another portion embroidered by Ajouw and Pinqua. All of these fabrics were to be delivered by 8 October—or 250 days from the date of the contract. He would be charged 3 percent demurrage on the products that were not delivered by 8 October.[104]

Suckin received an advance of 20 percent of his contract in January; 60 percent was advanced to him after the first ship arrived on 22 July, and the remaining 20 percent was paid after delivery.[105] Suckin was ill and laid up at home in early July so the Dutch

were not able to talk with him until the 12th. On that day, Anthony was given some of the fabrics to paint.[106]

Anthony was commissioned to paint 650 pieces at a total cost of 3,516 taels. On 23 July, he received an advance of 740 taels for that work. He was paid another advance in September, which was probably after he had delivered some of the pieces. The Dutch received another 100 pieces from him over the next couple of months. He delivered the last batch on 11 December and was paid the remaining balance of 1,296 taels on 17 December.[107]

The embroiderers Ajouw and Pinqua operated similarly to Anthony. They were each commissioned on 2 May 1768 to embroider fabrics for the VOC. Ajouw's contract was for 1,501 taels to embroider 29 pieces. Pinqua's contract was for 1,014 taels to embroider 21 pieces. Ajouw and Pinqua each received an advance of 370 taels on the day they were commissioned (2 May). Pinqua received another advance on 12 July of 148 taels 'for the good delivery of the embroidered silk fabrics'. Ajouw and Pinqua delivered the rest of the fabrics to the Dutch on 5 November. They were paid their remaining balances on 11 November.[108]

Some of the popular designs that Anthony painted for the Dutch were flowers and vines in gold and silver. Ajouw and Pinqua also sewed various coloured flowers and vines onto fabrics, and they put borders around the edges of pieces. In some years they just embroidered one or two dozen pieces for the Dutch. They would have been very detailed and extensive designs.[109]

From 1768 to 1780, the most pieces Pinqua ever embroidered for the Dutch in one year were 60. In 1769, he and Ajouw embroidered about two dozen pieces each for the VOC.[110] They had no embroidery work for the Dutch in 1770 but the two men had contracts for about a dozen pieces each in 1771 and again in 1772.[111] Thus, their Dutch trade was not large.

Ajouw also sold other products to the Dutch such as linen, tea and rhubarb. In 1769 he supplied the VOC with 10,000 pieces of Nanking linen, a certain quantity of Peco tea and about 94 piculs of rhubarb.[112] From 1770 to 1772, Ajouw traded with the Dutch in partnership with Limsia (Yan Linshe 顏琳舍, also called Loncsia and other spellings) as well. Limsia was the younger brother of the Hong merchant Ingsia. In 1771, the two men are listed together in the VOC account books even in the embroidery entries. However, in 1772, the tea sales are listed under both of their names as partners, and the embroidery entries are listed only under Ajouw's name. Ajouw may have been the only one doing embroidery work.[113]

In 1771, Ajouw and Limsia sold the Dutch 21,000 pieces of Nanking linen—20,000 red-colour pieces and 1,000 yellow-colour pieces. Because these colours were forbidden to trade, they may have had to bribe the customs officers to allow them to pass. The two men also supplied the VOC with a quantity of Songlo, Tunkay and Souchon tea. Their total sales to the VOC this year amounted to 18,660 taels.[114]

In January 1772, Ajouw and Limsia sold the Dutch 15,454 taels worth of Congo and Souchon tea. In November of that year, Ajouw sold 500 pieces of blue and 500 pieces of red Nanking linen on his own account. He also sold 30 pieces of furniture

damasks. From this time onwards, Ajouw seems to have traded on his own without Limsia.[115]

In some years, the Dutch hired only one embroiderer (Appendix 10C). Only Pinqua had Dutch orders from 1773 to 1778, with no mention of Ajouw. The Dutch had more orders with Ajouw in several years from 1780 and then Pinqua had no more orders after 1780. The unpredictable nature of their businesses, whereby they had no idea whether a company would want their services from one year to the next, meant that painters and embroiderers needed a broad customer base to stay in business. That is why we find them working for a wide range of customers—several companies, Hong merchants and weavers at the same time. That is also why we see Ajouw expanding his operations into selling other products as well so that he did not depend solely on embroidery work.

Painting designs on silks was less expensive than embroidering designs, which explains why we see Anthony being employed more regularly by the Dutch than Ajouw and Pinqua. From 1757 to 1787, Anthony painted 100 to upwards of 600 pieces of fabrics for the VOC each year. However, he did not have any business with them in a few of those years (Appendix 10C).

Besides silk, Anthony was also involved in painting wallpaper. From 1778 to 1788, the VOC ordered painted wallpaper from Anthony and another *boutiquier* and painter named Seequa.[116] I have found no references to this latter man painting silk, but he and Anthony painted quite a lot of wallpaper for the VOC in those years.[117] In 1786, for example, the Dutch placed an order with Anthony and Seequa for painted wallpaper amounting to 1,000 taels.[118] In 1787, the Dutch placed separate orders for wallpaper with each of these two painters.[119] The relationship between these two men is unclear. They often appear in some of the same entries, but I have found no clear references that show them to be partners.[120]

The Danes ordered painted wallpaper from Seequa in 1782, 1783, 1786 and 1787, but I found no further information about him in those records. The DAC traded with another Seequa for tea and Nankings at this time and it is not always clear which entries refer to the painter Seequa.[121]

Anthony's labour figures, shown in Appendix 10C, are the total amounts that the VOC paid to him each year. In the years when he contracted wallpaper orders, part of the labour would have been for producing that product and the other part for painting silk. If we look at his wage figures, we see that Anthony began receiving wallpaper orders for the VOC at a time when his silk orders were in decline. There is no way to be sure, but the figures do suggest that he might have been trying to make up for his reduced income in silk by offering to paint wallpaper.

Curiously, at the same time that the wallpaper painter Seequa was contracting with the Dutch, we also find them purchasing musk from a 'boutiquier Seequa'. The VOC ledgers (*grootboeken*) show that there is only one man listed as Seequa selling both wallpaper and musk.[122] Was he a painter selling musk on the side or was he a musk dealer who painted wallpaper on the side? Whatever the case may have been, Seequa is another example of artisans diversifying their businesses so that they did not depend on just one source of income.

**SUMMARY**

From the analysis above, several patterns emerge that give us insight into how the silk trade was structured. Before and after the Co-hong, Suckin could arrange his sales directly with foreigners, but he had to go through that society when it was in operation. Foreigners, however, were allowed to go directly to the weavers to stipulate what colours and designs they wanted on their fabrics. The example of Suckin suggests that foreign buyers may have been required by the Co-hong to contract their silks with Hong merchants.

Weavers handled common textiles in one or two colours with basic designs. They traded in raw and manufactured silk in both the Nanking and Canton varieties. Suckin and his nephew Siouqua captured the high-end of the market, supplying foreigners with the best raw silk and silk fabrics available for purchase.

Like Hong merchants, weavers were also heavily dependent on foreign capital to finance their trade. Silk dealers large and small demanded 80 percent advances on all orders. Some men, like Suckin, tried to insist on even larger advances, so they would not have to invest their own money or take out high-interest loans. The fact that all weavers examined in this study seemed to have insisted on this policy, and that foreigners were continually pressured to give larger advances on silk orders, points to an extreme shortage of local capital in Canton's financial sector. The going interest rate for foreign money was normally 20 percent per annum.

Even though Suckin seemed to prefer trading directly with foreigners, rather than through the Co-hong, he did not do so well in the competitive environment that emerged after that society ended. Because of the quotas placed on silk exports, weavers could not off-set greater liabilities with increased trade. Export quotas were tied to the number of ships in port, not to volume, which meant that weavers could only expand if the number of silk-buying arrivals increased. This factor made their trade very different to that of tea and porcelain.

As we have seen, the Hoppos did what they could to get around the individual ship quotas by distributing them as needed. The evidence suggests that, during the second half of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, Hoppos tended to only regulate the total quota for each separate year. The number of ships multiplied by the quota per ship gave them a target figure. There were years when the Hoppos tried to enforce the quota per ship—and even the distributions between Nanking and Canton varieties. The application of how quotas were enforced seemed to vary from one Hoppo to the next.

Like most of the merchants in Canton, the weavers, painters and embroiderers depended on binding agreements (written and oral). Contracts gave them the assurance that, after ordering and preparing the fabrics and raw silk, they would indeed be paid for the items and their labours. If weavers did not deliver the product on time, they might have to pay penalties or demurrage fees.

Contracts stipulated specific qualities, but weavers often had little control over the products arriving from suppliers. If they received better quality than expected, they had to pay higher prices. This additional expense was very difficult to pass on to foreign

customers once their agreements had been made. If weavers received poorer quality from suppliers, foreign buyers would pressure them to offer a discount greater than that inland suppliers had given to them. In both cases, the weavers' profit margins were squeezed.

Whether weavers dealt with foreigners directly or through the Hong merchants they had to deal with the problem of receiving different products than previously ordered. It was a great disadvantage to the weavers, and was undoubtedly one of the factors that contributed to Weaver Suckin's bankruptcy in 1781. Because he was based in Foshan, Suckin was able to maintain more quality control over locally produced silk. This factor may explain why he tended to favour Canton silk over Nanking silk. He and most other Canton weavers had much less control over what they received from inland producers.

Weaver Tiqua tried to gain more control over his shipments by going to the interior himself to place the orders and later accompany the items to Canton. This tactic would undoubtedly have been an advantage in acquiring the best products and prices, but going inland each year also meant leaving customers alone in Canton where the competition could woo and influence them. Other weavers did not go personally into the interior. Instead, they sent members of their households there or, alternatively, they depended on inland agents to send the products based on samples.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Nanking raw silk had additional risks involved. Weavers sold that commodity to foreigners, so they were subjected to those risks as well. During the four-or five-week delay from the time weavers received the silk advances from their foreign customers and the time that the money actually arrived in the interior, the prime cost of the silk might rise. The prices that silk dealers finally paid for the raw silk depended entirely on how much product was available at the time and how big the demand was. If prices rose in the interim then the weavers might lose on their contracts. If prices declined in the interim then foreigners might pressure the weavers to give them a better price, or forfeit future trade with them. It was crucial for all persons dealing in Nanking silk to have the most current information about what was happening in that industry. Considering the additional risks that were involved in selling Nanking raw silk, it probably made good sense for Weaver Suckin to specialize in the Canton variety.

Painters and embroiderers were dependent on weavers. If the weavers sold nothing, then the painters and embroiderers, in turn, had no work. When the prices of silk rose owing to inflationary pressures or because new export duties had been introduced, then everyone suffered. Higher prices usually translated into shrinking demand. Weavers were prone to favouring a specific foreign customer. Once they had learned what their customer wanted and had proven themselves trustworthy, the companies tended to stay with them.

When new duties were applied to export silks from the late 1770s to the early 1790s, the prices rose sharply. As silk became more expensive, maintaining competitive prices became increasingly important to the companies. The Dutch, for example, pressured their weavers to forego the 20 percent advance traditionally given in the off-season. And, rather than depend on just one weaver as they had done in the 1760s and

1770s, the VOC later branched out to other weavers. From 1784 to 1791, the Dutch ordered their silks from two weavers each year. From 1782 to 1790, the Danes also bought their silks from two or three weavers annually. Changes within the silk industry itself were largely responsible for this pattern of operations.

This ends my discussion of the silk trade. Even though silk was only a fraction of the tea trade, it was nonetheless an important part of the commerce. The variety of goods is what really made the China trade attractive in general. Indeed, silk was a much sought after commodity by all persons arriving in Canton. Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure the positive influences that these products had on the overall success of the trade, but silk would certainly rank high on the list of vital factors.

Conclusion

# UNWRITTEN REALITIES OF TRADE

What do these disparate stories tell us about the Canton trade that we did not already know? One important revelation that emerges from these chapters is the Qing's concept of financial insolvency. The idea had nothing to do with balancing assets against liabilities or credit against debit. It rather had everything to do with balancing financial resources and the demands of creditors. As long as merchants kept creditors at arm's length, they were considered solvent by the Chinese government. Meanwhile, maintaining close government connections was an essential factor in keeping the trade sector solvent in the long term.

This concept is perhaps no different from private enterprise today. If a business is privately owned, its financial standing is typically not made public on a daily basis. The only way outsiders can know the true financial standing comes from accessing quarterly or year-end tax statements and checking a company's credit rating. As far as the Hong merchants were concerned, the former figures were recorded in the Hoppo's book. Those numbers revealed the gross sales revenues of each Hong merchant, irrespective of their liabilities. In other words, each man's gross revenue was public knowledge, but not his debts or profits and losses.

Determining a Hong merchant's credit rating was less challenging. If he had many creditors hounding him and no one seemed willing to advance any additional credits, then he was in a poor financial state. If he could keep his creditors happy, despite a large debt load, and if people were still willing to advance credits, then he continued to maintain a high rating. This is also not all that much different from the condition of private enterprise today. The true status of a private company is not revealed until it fails and enters a bankruptcy courtroom.

In eighteenth-century Canton, as long as an owner could manage his creditors he was considered solvent by the Qing government, irrespective of his level of profits or losses. Monqua and Tjobqua inherited the debts of their predecessors and thus began their businesses in the early 1760s in the red. Both men relied on foreign loans to keep creditors happy. Because these loans were illegal, they were not reported. The aggregate debts were consequently invisible. Tjobqua survived for eleven years, but then failed in 1772. Monqua was more skilled at balancing his resources and his obligations. He managed to survive 35 years until his death in 1796.

As far as we can tell from the surviving evidence, Monqua and Tjobqua seemed to have operated in the red for nearly the entire time they were open for business. Yet both of them were granted licenses to trade. Monqua was even appointed head merchant while carrying a huge debt load. However, when we consider the Qing government's

concept of solvency, it all makes more sense. Because Monqua was so skilled at keeping creditors at bay, he was actually a good example for others to imitate. Of course, when Monqua and Tjobqua eventually failed they were condemned for the volume of debts they had accumulated. But their *real* fault was their inability to keep their creditors satisfied with respect to eventual repayment.

There are many other similar examples. Poankeequa and Swequa were both carrying heavy debt loads when they were accepted into the Co-hong in 1760. Indeed, Poankeequa was even appointed president. Houqua took over the debts of his brother, Puiqua, and was granted a license to trade so that he could satisfy the creditors. The list goes on and on. Several men that I discussed in the first volume were also given licenses, even though they were carrying huge debts. They include Coqua (Chen Keguan 陳科官), Tsjonqua (Cai Xiangguan 蔡相官), Limsia (Yan Linshe 顏琳舍), Locqua (Chen Junhua 陳鈞華) and Tiauqua (Ye Chaoguan 葉朝官). Out of all of those houses, Poankeequa and Houqua were the only ones who survived in the long term.

I have pointed out the three key reasons for Poankeequa's unparalleled success. None of his contemporaries could match his combination of business savvy, political finesse and silver reserves. Those factors carried him to heights that exceeded all men who preceded him. Many merchants possessed some of these qualities but, as far as we know, he was the only one in the eighteenth century who demonstrated them all. After Cai Hunqua died in 1770, no one came close to competing with Poankeequa.

But allowing Poankeequa a free hand to dominate the trade was, in truth, not in the Qing government's best interests. He was a good politician and, by the 1770s, he was also very wealthy. These qualities made him both an asset and a threat. By abolishing the Co-hong in early 1771, officials removed one of the formal structures through which Poankeequa could have controlled events more thoroughly. He claimed credit for ending the Co-hong, but the evidence suggests that other factors were behind its demise. We must remember that Poankeequa was the man who pushed for the Co-hong's creation in 1760. Indeed, it pulled him out of debt. He was also the one who spearheaded the push for the creation of another Co-hong in the mid-1770s.

Historians tell us that the removal of the Co-hong was closely linked to a 100,000 taels bribe that Poankeequa had already received from the EIC. However, this explanation makes no sense. It was not genuinely in the government's interests to continue the Co-hong after 1771—or to create another one at a later date. This was because a closed and uncompetitive trade run by Poankeequa threatened growth. With the circumstances changed, it was more reasonable for Qing officials to return commerce to the way it had operated before 1760. Indeed, the governor general himself proclaimed that the reason the Co-hong was abolished was because it was now 'nothing but a name, unable to do what it was intended to do'.[1]

While some merchants began their ventures in debt, others were actually in a rather good standing when they received their licenses. Geowqua and his cousin Puiqua seem to have both been rather prosperous when they became Hong merchants. But with the assumption of failed merchants' debts, and various governmental exactions, their overall balances quickly shifted from credit to debit. The loans that Geowqua

took out carried him up until early 1798. By then, he could no longer keep his creditors at bay and he was declared bankrupt.

Some of Geowqua's debts were handed to Puiqua. Subsequently, he had other debts and impositions placed on him. When Puiqua died in 1801, he was declared insolvent. His debts, however, were not deemed irrecoverable, and Houqua was allowed to succeed him. Geowqua and Puiqua were both experienced men who had previously been successful in trading under other men's authority. However, after they were granted their own licenses, their trading circumstances and business environments changed drastically. They were now responsible for paying the cost of expensive presents to the Mandarins every year, for meeting government exactions, and for settling debts left behind by failed houses. After they became Hong merchants, the overall volume of goods handled increased dramatically, but the enhanced trade did not mean increased profits.

Tan Anqua is the rare exception in these accounts. He went from Hong merchant, to inland tea agent, and finally to outside merchant. As far as we know, he made all of these moves voluntarily. His disdain for the controlled trade of the Co-hong pushed him to become an inland tea agent. Although the Co-hong tried to keep him from trading with foreigners, in 1764 the emperor granted him the freedom to contract with them directly. In fact, he had already been trading with them before this date. After the Co-hong ended, he became an outside merchant. His trade probably never rose to the volume that he handled in the 1750s as a Hong merchant but, to his credit, his business survived long after his death in 1790. Tan Anqua's clerk, Manhop, continued the trade for another twelve years before being appointed a Hong merchant in 1802. This outcome suggests that the firm remained in good financial standing.

Thus, in addition to Poankeequa, we should include Tan Anqua in the list of men who succeeded in their businesses for a long period of time. While Poankeequa had the skills to manipulate the Hong merchant system to his advantage, Tan Anqua had the sense to know that his best course of action was conducting trade outside the system. Both men succeeded, but in very different ways—and with very different outcomes. Tan Anqua all but disappeared from history, whereas Poankeequa began a legacy that has continued for 250 years to the present day.

The porcelain and silk dealers also operated outside the Hong merchant system, but they were nonetheless impacted by it. In 1776, the Hong merchants suggested that these outside men share in the costs of giving expensive gifts to the Mandarins each year. During the debt crisis of the late 1770s, officials acted in the Hong merchants' favour and increased the duties on the various goods that these outside merchants handled. Some duties were reported to have increased as much as 50 percent in 1779. The duties on raw silk went up by 15 percent. In addition, the Mandarins forced twenty of the prominent porcelain dealers to pay the 20,000 taels that the failed merchant Coqua owed on taxes. The silk duties were increased again in 1792—and then again in 1793.

These tax increases were partially the result of Hong merchant failures and partially a result of the Hoppos trying to make up for a decline in trade in certain years. Owing to war among the Europeans, the 1780s and 1790s had several up and down

years. In down years, the Hoppos made concerted efforts to generate more funds from whatever sources were available. The 1793 rise in silk duties was applied to the gross weights after packing, so that merchants had to pay duties on even the chests. This reveals the pressures on the Hoppos to generate enough revenues every year, and it reveals the extremes to which they were willing to go to reach that end.

All of these changes had adverse effects on the trade in both porcelain and silk. The former commodity was actually experiencing a shrinking market in the 1790s and early 1800s. The rise in prices exacerbated that decline. Meanwhile, the silk trade was limited by the export quotas applied to each ship.

As a result of all these changes, we find the 1780s and 1790s to be very unpredictable decades for the porcelain and silk dealers. Several men went broke in those years. Other men survived, but they had to deal effectively with all the changes occurring in the market. The demand side was also undergoing a transformation—from a reliance on the large East India companies to the greater involvement of small private traders. The items that the latter men wanted to trade were often quite different from what the companies had previously ordered.

When the silk weavers' trade declined, it had corresponding effects on the businesses of the silk painters and embroiderers. The latter men maintained a broad customer base and some of them, such as Ajouw, expanded their operations by selling linen, tea and rhubarb. The silk painter Anthony also painted wallpaper and the wallpaper merchant Seequa diversified his business by selling musk. These additional sources of income gave the men some protection on those occasions when one of the weavers, like Suckin or Conqua, went broke.

The quality of locally produced silks in Europe was rapidly improving. Therefore, if prices rose too high in China, European consumers could easily switch to their local brands. Porcelain dealers also maintained a broad customer base, but there was little they could do about the shrinkage of aggregate exports. To cope with the decline, manufacturers began cutting back on quality. At the same time, European consumers were switching to locally produced ceramics, owing to the high cost and lower quality of chinaware from Asia. In such a market it was inevitable that some Chinese porcelain dealers would be pushed out.

Even though it is difficult to measure the influences that commodities had on the overall trade, there is little doubt that silks and porcelain added significantly to the attraction of engaging in the China trade. The millions of silk and porcelain artefacts from the trade that are now in museums throughout the world are testimony to this happening. Tea always remained the number one export in northern European markets, but more ships were undoubtedly attracted to China's shores because they could also obtain these other complementary commodities. We could add export art, herbs, medicine, metals, furniture, carvings and numerous other items to the list as well. It was the combination of all these items that really made the Thirteen Hong shopping mall special. There was no place like it anywhere in the world.

What can we conclude from this study of the *Merchants of Canton and Macao*? Unlike what we have learned from previous histories, the Qing government did indeed have a trade policy. However, it was perhaps not something written down for all of us

to read. Yet, the actions and practices of officials clearly show a sustained pattern when dealing with merchants and foreign commerce.

The first volume of this study showed how local merchants and the Chinese government dealt with the problem of how to increase output to meet the growing overseas demand in the 1740s and 1750s. Partnerships were formed to gain better control of foreign monetary advances that could, in turn, be forwarded to inland producers to stimulate output. The Co-hong kept these partnerships from controlling the market, but that depended on there being rival factions within the organization in order that competition was maintained. When one of the largest competitors, Cai Hunqua, died, the Co-hong became unbalanced; it lost its purpose; and it was consequently abolished.

The Co-hong, however, was a very important learning experience. Officials found that, if they kept around ten houses in operation, they could maintain a balance between healthy and failing houses. By keeping around ten houses in operation, they were able to gain greater control over trade. At the same time, they could still foster active competition between them. The Co-hong also showed that, regardless of government actions, Hong merchant failures seemed to be inevitable. From the end of the Co-hong up until the Nanking Treaty of 1842, individual merchants were essentially treated as expendable appendages.

The accumulation of long term debts was illegal and discouraged but, because there were always more merchants available to replace the failed men, nothing was done to change the system. Many of the men discussed on the preceding pages went bankrupt in the end. On the positive side, however, the trade supported quite a few of them and their families for decades, or even lifetimes before their enterprises went out of business. As for the Canton trade in general, we all know that it eventually collapsed. The government fixed things here and there to keep the trade active, but it was not looking at the issue within the larger picture of international competition and commerce. The rise in duties on porcelain in the late eighteenth century, for example, contributed to that market shrinking faster than was necessary.

As I pointed out in both the first volume and this volume, some trade policies tended to favour foreigners in order that they would not be discouraged from returning to China. Interest rates inside China were higher than outside, which encouraged foreign loans and investments but disadvantaged Chinese merchants. Chinese merchants consistently had to pay higher interest rates on private loans than foreigners, and this reality was true even in Canton and Macao. Nothing was more detrimental and unfair to local merchants than being forced to pay higher interest rates just because they were Chinese. Because loans were illegal and foreign investments were considered good for growth, the Qing government did nothing to equalize the rates.

Foreign companies (but not necessarily foreign individuals) had protection from the Chinese government for the repayment of Chinese debts—even though they were illegal. On the other hand, Chinese merchants had no similar backing from the government for debts owed to them by other Chinese or by foreigners. Some of the Hong merchant's operations could rival those of the East India companies, but the two business sectors were not treated the same by the Qing government. Fred Grant's recent study on the 'Canton Guaranty System' illuminates some of these inequalities more

clearly. Moreover, I have already discussed some of these issues in the first volume, but it is perhaps requisite to repeat them here. That way we can understand the pressures faced by the merchants covered in this volume.

Chinese merchants were not allowed to negotiate directly with foreign governments or corporate directors abroad, which prevented them from making forward linkages to markets. In fact, the threat of something happening to them or their families kept them from even considering sending their merchandise in their own vessels directly to India, Europe or the Americas. For most of the eighteenth century, licensed merchants were free to deal with foreigners in Canton as they pleased, so long as they did that business in China. This unwritten limitation gave Qing officials control over how trade was conducted.

In contrast, foreigners had direct access to the government in Canton, and they could undermine Chinese merchants by appealing to local officials. The Qing government insisted that all foreigners coming to trade should be treated fairly and equally, but it did not insist on those same rights being granted to Chinese merchants in foreign countries. In fact, in practice Chinese merchants were forbidden from travelling abroad.

The pressures on Hoppos to meet (or surpass) the revenues of previous years were behind some of the increased duties in the late eighteenth century and the consequential price increases for Chinese exports. As I pointed out in *The Canton Trade*, there was no administrative body to oversee the trade. Therefore the adjustments needed to keep the porcelain, silk and other industries competitive with changes in the international markets could not be easily made. Eventually, China even lost its monopoly on tea.

But what new information does this study present about the merchants themselves? If a Hong merchant wanted to be successful like Poankeequa, what skills and resources would he have needed to possess? A degree of business acumen was essential for any man to prosper and survive. Most of the men in this study had some level of business expertise. In fact, because the trade was so competitive, the more adept the man, then the more potential he had to succeed for longer periods of time.

But all merchants needed capital resources. Without credit, trade was much hindered. Merchants with regular access to silver supplies could avoid the necessity of borrowing expensive money from foreign lenders. Poankeequa, for example, had access to Spanish silver that no other merchants could touch. This advantage came from his childhood experiences in Manila, his language skills gained there and his close family and business connections in that port. Merchants who had business savvy and steady capital sources had a good chance of surviving for decades. But something else was still required to expand trade and maintain wealth—and those key elements were political connections and prudent finesse.

Poankeequa was a rare creature. Very few people in Canton could boast such a fine mixture of personal qualities. In contrast, Tan Anqua probably understood, either consciously or unconsciously, that he did not have all the qualities needed to survive in the long term under the Hong merchant system. He therefore took another route, which proved successful. We also see porcelain and silk dealers surviving for many decades outside of the port system. For some men like Exchin, the trade supported them for their entire lives. But they faced intense competition as well. Outside men could be

brought to ruin very quickly if new taxes were levied or new impositions forced upon them by government decree. Their trade was also impacted by local economic conditions and by changes that took place in the distant international market.

Running a private business, regardless of the country or the century in question, usually involves some level of risk. The fact that many of the firms examined in this study survived for decades shows that there was some degree of stability for merchants in the immediate term. The hundred or so outside merchants who participated in the trade voluntarily and who were active in Canton throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth century are testimony to there being a potential to make a profit. They clearly saw the trade as an opportunity to better their lives. However, in order to retain their wealth for one hundred years or more, a family really needed the skills of Poankeequa and sons. The better the merchant was connected to government, the more potential he had to keep his fortune intact. And this reality was probably true for all men, regardless of the size of their businesses. Having solid political connections was the best way to prevent new taxes from being levied and new governmental impositions from being introduced. Because no administrative body oversaw trade or could stand up for the rights of Chinese merchants, maintaining close government connections was essential.

However, in the long term the odds were stacked against maintaining wealth. Poankeequa's and Houqua's family fortunes survived into the late eighteenth century, but were gradually whittled away. By the late twentieth century there was nothing left in Canton to represent the great success they had in trade. Even their stories have to be reconstructed from foreign archives because there are no detailed documents remaining in China about their activities. This outcome is true with all of the men discussed in these two volumes, regardless of whether they were large or small operators or whether they succeeded or failed. Thus, along with the lack of long term security for wealth, we could add that there was also no long term security for their heritages.

One of the strange phenomenon of history is that the great influence that China had, and contribution that China made, in the rise of global commerce and the development of international trading networks can only be explained and understood by consulting non-Chinese sources. It was China's foreign customers who preserved the legacy of all of the men discussed in these two volumes and also of Canton's role in the rise of early modern trade. This was the result of short term concerns such as protecting imperial revenues collected from trade being of utmost importance and continually dominating government policies.

This page ends my study of the *Merchants of Canton and Macao*, but it is not the end of their stories. Many important topics remain to be explored. 1) the types of goods that were handled; 2) how goods were made and manufactured; 3) backward linkages to sources and forward linkages to markets; 4) distribution networks; 5) relationships between commodities such as porcelain and sago; 6) consumer trends and habits; 7) social influences; 8) types of packages used; and finally, 9) economies of scale. All these factors can shed a brighter light on the businesses of the Chinese merchants. In sum, there is still much work to be done. I hope other scholars will expand their research horizons and fill in the areas that this study has left open for discovery.

# INTRODUCTION TO APPENDIXES

As mentioned in the introduction, the appendixes are numbered to correspond with the chapters to which they belong. Appendixes that begin with number 1, for example, contain data for Chapter 1, and so on. The only exception to this rule is Appendix 9, which does not correspond to any chapter. Chapter 9 had no corresponding data to include in an appendix, so, rather than jump from Appendix 8 to 10 I put the contract data in Appendix 9 (explained below). All references that appear in the appendixes are in their shortened versions and/or their abbreviated forms. The full citations are listed in the bibliography and on the abbreviations page.

Appendixes 1A to 5F contain data that correspond to Chapters 1 to 5. In each of these chapters I discuss one merchant and/or family. The appendixes for these chapters are divided into three basic types: (1) schedule of activities; (2) trade figures; and (3) nomenclature sections.

(1) Schedule of Activities. Appendixes 1A and 1B list, in chronological order, all source materials for the merchants discussed in Chapter 1. The data include biographical information, such as trade names, births, deaths, relatives, associates and businesses. I have marked all sources that contain a signature, the name of the business, and/or a chop in Chinese. These sources are noted with a bracketed superscript $^{(s)}$ such as VOC 4381$^{(s)}$ which indicates a signature; $^{(b)}$ for a business name; $^{(s/b)}$ for a signature or business name; or $^{(c)}$ for a chop. A source that is followed by all three $^{(s/b/c)}$ indicates a signature, business name and chop in Chinese. Entries such as IC 5921$^{bis}$ have a superscript without parenthesis, which is part of the archive number. With this information, researchers should be able to find every document that has a Chinese signature or chop, in the event that an identity needs further investigation.

(2) Trade Figures. Appendixes such as 1C to 1E show trade, rent, and loan figures with the Danish, Dutch and Swedish East India Companies (DAC, VOC and SOIC, respectively). These companies list each merchant's trade separately, making it possible to see their total trade each year. The only SOIC figures that have survived are for 1752. The other companies' archives have merchants' figures for many years. The English, French, and Portuguese records do not have figures for each of the Chinese merchants.

Some American records have trade figures for each merchant. However, those numbers are few and the ones that are available are recorded in such an inconsistent manner that it is very difficult to assemble meaningful figures for this study. In almost all of the tables in the appendixes, there are gaps in the data and/or only partial information available. Thus, figures in these tables are important for what they tell us, but

do not give the whole story of each man's or each family's business activities. Unless specifically noted, all monetary figures are in Chinese taels.

Figures in the Danish companies' records are by far the easiest to work with and to reproduce because they are complete in content for each year and consistent in the way that the data were recorded. All accounts with the Chinese were listed under their names for each ship or, in later years, for each year. Data in other companies' records are more problematic. Cargo data in the Dutch companies' records usually include various expenses that were incurred in Canton or during the voyage, loans that were given or taken out, and other exchanges that were not necessarily trade related. The most complete Dutch data for exports are not listed in Chinese taels but rather in other currencies, such as piastres or florins. Because exchange rates varied over time, coins varied in their alloy content, and different weights were used in different periods to measure silver, I have chosen to use only figures that are given in Chinese taels in the original documents. There may be a few exceptions where figures were converted from reals or piastres to taels in order to complete a run of data. If that happened, then it is noted. All other figures were listed in Chinese taels in the original.

The Dutch trade figures are given as percentages of 'total receipts', rather than as percentages of the cargos of each ship, which requires some explanation. The Dutch did not ship all of their exports on VOC bottoms. Some goods were purchased in Canton from the Chinese merchants and then shipped to Batavia on Portuguese ships from Macao or Chinese junks from Canton. This means that we do not get the whole picture if all we look at are the figures for each VOC ship.

The Dutch trade figures include expenses, loans, and rents that were paid to merchants, which are not always possible to identify. We know that all export merchandise was purchased from the Chinese merchants, because no other persons were allowed to sell goods in Canton. Thus, by adding all of their receipts each year, we can arrive at a sum of their total transactions. These figures include cargo that was shipped on non-Dutch vessels as well. This method presents a much truer picture of the merchants' trade than if I had taken the amounts they supplied to each ship.

Only one year (1752) has survived of the Chinese merchants' accounts with the Swedish company. 'Total receipts' was also used for this one voyage for the same reasons as mentioned above (Appendix 1C). Unfortunately, detailed data of the Chinese merchants' accounts with other companies and traders are not available.

The appendixes also include data about loans and rents that were paid to Chinese merchants. The loan data was extracted from the Jean Abraham Grill papers in the Nordic Museum Archive in Stockholm. These data require some explanation. Some appendixes, such as 1D, 2E, and 2F, show foreign loans given to Chinese. The entries in Grill's account books, however, are inconsistent, with some items recorded several times and not necessarily on the correct dates. Sometimes the figures include only Grill's part of the transactions and other times the figures include money from associates which was then given to Chinese. A figure might include only the principal or the interest on a loan in one entry, but then include the principal and interest in another entry, without mentioning why. For some of these transactions, it is very difficult to figure out if all or part of the loans were settled on time, if only interest was paid on the

loans and principle carried over, or if interest and principle remained unpaid. It is not always clear what is supposed to be debit or credit in the Grill records, as the entries sometime appear in a left column, sometimes in a right column, and sometimes in no column. Rather than trying to figure all this out, I simply reproduced all the figures in Grill's papers, under the date they are listed, and tried to put the numbers in the most logical column (left or right, credit or debit). Because of these inconsistencies and ambiguities, the loan data should be used only as a general guide, rather than as specific transactions that took place on a particular day. Rent data in Appendix 1E are also incomplete. They were included because they help to show another aspect of Chinese businesses, so we can see more clearly the complexity of their operations.

(3) Nomenclature Sections. The schedules and trade figures are followed by nomenclature sections. Appendixes 1F, 2G, and 3F, for example, discuss problems connected to establishing merchants' identities in those respective chapters (1, 2 and 3). Each chapter from 1 to 5 has a corresponding nomenclature appendix. I discuss inconsistencies and ambiguities in the historical literature (primary and secondary), and the rationale and methodology employed to overcome these problems.

Appendixes 6A to 6D reproduce overall export figures from 1760 to 1814. The purpose of this data is mainly to show the relationship between tea, porcelain and silk. Some of these figures were copied from secondary sources, such as Pritchard's studies, while other figures were taken from primary sources. I included these data in order to show how silk and porcelain fit into the overall volume of exports in Canton, which has not been clearly established in previous studies.

Appendixes 7A to 8E are a mixture of schedules and trade figures for the porcelain dealers discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. I have tried to include all data and names of porcelain dealers that I have found in the records. I include references to each entry, so that if any questions arise in the future about these men, researchers will be able to find the corresponding documents.

Appendix 9 provides a breakdown of 34 trade contracts that are reproduced in the plate section. These documents are written in Chinese, Swedish, Danish, Dutch and French. An English summary is provided to make them more useful to researchers (as I did in the first volume Appendix 2). The Plate section also includes documents written in Spanish and English. However, they are not contracts—so none of those records appear in Appendix 9. Between the first volume (Appendix 2, 64 contracts) and this volume (Appendix 9, 34 contracts), there is a total of 98 contracts explained in detail.

There still remains perhaps another fifty or so contracts in the Danish, Dutch and American archives that I have not included in either of these two volumes or in *The Canton Trade*. There may also be more Chinese contracts in the French and/or British archives. I have selected the more important ones with extensive details to include in this study. The remaining ones mostly repeat content and terms that are the same or similar to what is shown in these 98 contracts—or they deal with persons whom I have not included in this study. A few of the remaining contracts are very brief in content and not worth the trouble to translate. Many of them also have signatures and/or chops in Chinese.

Appendixes 10A to 10C are trade figures for silk workers discussed in Chapter 10. Appendix 10D reviews some of the nomenclature problems connected to those men. I also list the names of other silk workers that I found mentioned in the records but that were not included in this analysis. Either the information about them was too brief to justify mentioning them, or they are from the early nineteenth century and fall outside of the scope of this study.

**APPENDIX 1A: Swequa's Schedule**

Aliases: Cai Ruiguan 蔡瑞官; Cai Guohui 蔡國輝
Trade Names: *Swequa, Suiqua, Ziuqvoa, Zouqvoa, SuiKoa, Lam Siuqua, Lan Sinqua, Zauquoa, Svikva, Ziuqvoa, Zuqua, Siuqua, Tsoi Sweequa, S. Sweequa, Tsoi Suequa, Suiqva, Lan Suyqua, Suyqua, Long Svicqva, Suiqva, Zey Swiqua, Svicqva, Swiqva, Lon Siuqva, Long Svicqva, Sway Sweequa, Suah Sweequa, Swaa Sweequa, Swiqua, Sviqua, Chai Suequa, Tsoi Suequa, Suequa, Tsoi Suequa, Zay Swiqua, Lange Suyqua, Suyqua, Chai Suequa, Tsoi Suequa, Tswaa Suyqua, T'Swaa Suyqua, Tswaa Suya, Tswaa Suicqua, Lang Suiqua, Lang Souqua, Lono Suyqua, Long Suqua, Long Souqua, Suah Swequa, Long Swequa, Tzwaa Suiqua, Tzwaa Suiqua, Twaa Suyqua, Lono Suyqua, Long Suyqua, Cheo Swiqua, Lange Suyqua, Suyqua de Lange*

| Biographical data | Date | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| Death | 15 July 1761 | R/10/5, 1761.07.15, p. 4; CMD 1763, 13 July, p. 72 |

| Brothers | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sequa | Cai Xiguan | 蔡璽官 | Plates 01.02(s/b/c) |
| Tjobqua | Cai Yuguan | 蔡玉官 | Plate 01.07(s/b/c) |

| Business | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Jufeng Hang | 聚豐行 | Plate 01.01(c) |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1741 | | | EIC | P, H | G/12/50 |
| 1741 | | | SOIC | H | JFB: Irvine |
| 1742 | | | CFI | | C.1.10 pp. 16–18 |
| 1743 | | | CFI | Nk | C.1.10 |
| 1748 | | | SOIC | | UUB: L185, p. 27 |
| 1750 | | | EIC | B, H | G/12/53–54 |
| 1751 | | | DAC | B, P, HS | Ask 1129 |
| 1751 | | | EIC | ld, w, B | G/12/56 |
| 1751 | | | VOC | G, spw, B | Can 15, 16 |
| 1752 | | Jufeng | DAC | see Appendix 1C | Ask 1130(c), 1131, 2205, 2206; Plate 01.01 |
| 1752 | | | SOIC | see Appendix 1C | GL: A406 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1752 | | | VOC | B, P, lw, G | Can 7, 14, 15, 17; GM 12: 216–17, 221 |
| 1753 | | | DAC | see Appendix 1C | Ask 1132, 2207, 2208 |
| 1753 | | | EIC | H, Pc | G/12/57 |
| 1753 | | Jufeng | SOIC | tea | GL: A 406[(b)]; GUB: H22.1 *Hoppet* Brevkopiebok |
| 1753 | | | VOC | Tn | Can 17 |
| 1754 | | | CFI | | Morse v. 5: 11–12, 41–42; R/10/3–4 |
| 1754 | | Jufeng | CHD | | Lau doc. No. 1367 |
| 1754 | | | DAC | see Appendix 1C | Ask 1134, 2209a |
| 1754 | | | EIC | | Morse v. 5: 11–12, 41–42; R/10/3–4 |
| 1754 | | | SOIC | B, Tn | GUB: H22.4A *Prins Carl* Dagbok |
| 1754 | | | VOC | FR, B | Can 19, 20 |
| 1755 | | | DAC | | Ask 1135 |
| 1755 | | | EIC | | Morse v. 5: 41–42; R/10/4 |
| 1755 | | | SOIC | B, HS, Bg, Sc | GUB: H22.4A *Prins Carl* Dagbok |
| 1755 | | | VOC | B | Can 20 |
| 1756 | Sequa | Jufeng | CFI | B, Ty, z | C.1.10 p. 109r; Plates 01.02[(s/b/c)], 01.03[(s/b/c)] |
| 1756 | | | EIC | B | R/10/4 |
| 1756 | | | VOC | see Appendix 1C | Can 22 |
| 1757 | | | CFI | | C.1.10 p. 125 |
| 1757 | Sequa | Jufeng | VOC | zr, R, Rx, Sl, z, P, H, Rg, C, Nl, Sc | VOC 4381[(sbc)]; JFB: B 1758 fNe |
| 1758 | | | SOIC | Sc, C, Bg | NM: F17 pp. T1_03926–31 |
| 1758 | Sequa | Dutch factory | VOC | Bg, Sl, B, C, Sc, Ty, Kz | Can 24; JFB: B 1758 fNe |
| 1759 | | Jufeng | CHD | | QGY, doc. Nos. 280, 327; XS, pp. 181–85; MQSQ doc. No. 214 |
| 1759 | | | EIC | FR, B, Sl | Morse v. 5: 74; R/10/4 |
| 1759 | | Jufeng | VOC | | VOC 4384[(sbc)] |
| 1760 | | | DAC | | Ask 1143, 1145 |
| 1760 | | | EIC | | R/10/4 |
| 1760 | | Jufeng | VOC | tea | Plate 01.06[(sbc)] |
| 1761 | | | DAC | | R/10/5, 1761.07.15, p. 4 |
| 1761 | | | SOIC | | GUB: Ströms H21.1. Nr 1152 |
| 1761 | | | VOC | | Can 71, 74; VOC 4388 |

**APPENDIX 1B: Tjobqua's Schedule**

Aliases: Cai Yuguan 蔡玉官; Cai Tinggang 蔡莛(廷)岡
Trade Names: *Jeauqva, Jouqva, Jauqua, Jiauqua, Jeauqva, Jaucqva, Joqua, Jiouqua, Tsjobqua, Tjobqua, Tiobqua, Lon Ziuqui's brother, Yokqua, Zey Jauqua, Jaqua, Yokoa, Zey Jocqua, Jsiokoa, Juokoa, Zey Jouqua*

| Biographical data | Date | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| Death | 1776 | C.1.13, letter dated 1781.01.06, pp. 139–40 |

| Business | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Jufeng Hang | 聚豐行 | Plate 01.07(s/b/c) |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1761 | Swequa | | SOIC | | GUB: Ströms H21.1 Nr 1152 |
| 1762 | | | DAC | ZZ | Ask 2220–22 |
| 1762 | Swequa | | VOC | see Appendix 1C | Can 25, 71; VOC 4394 |
| 1763 | | | DAC | B | Ask 1150 |
| 1763 | Swequa | | VOC | see Appendix 1C | Can 26, 72; VOC 4394 |
| 1764 | | | DAC | B | Ask 1153a |
| 1764 | | | EIC | Sl, H, B | R/10/5 |
| 1764 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_00745–, T1_01941 |
| 1764 | | | VOC | see Appendix 1C | Can 27, 73; VOC 4396 |
| 1765 | | | CFI | B | Can 74 |
| 1765 | | | DAC | HS, H, Ty | Ask 1154–55, 2229–30 |
| 1765 | | | EIC | Sc, C | R/10/5; Can 74 |
| 1765 | | Jufeng | SOIC | | Plate 01.09(s/b/c) |
| 1765 | | | VOC | see Appendix 1C | Can 28, 74 |
| 1766 | | | CFI | B, Sc | Can 75 |
| 1766 | | Jufeng | SOIC | tea | Plate 01.07(s/b/c); Can 75 |
| 1766 | | | VOC | Pc, B | Can 29, 75 |
| 1767 | | | CFI | | Can 76 |
| 1767 | | Jufeng | SOIC | By, tx, B | Plate 01.09(s/b/c) |
| 1767 | | | VOC | B | Can 76 |
| 1768 | | | CFI | | C.1.11 p. 69– |
| 1768 | | | EIC | B, Sk, ct, et, HS, Ty, ld | Morse v. 5: 141; R/10/5–6 |
| 1768 | | | SOIC | By | NM: F17 pp. T1_05352–53 |
| 1768 | Emanuel is clerk | | VOC | Pc | Can 31, 77 |
| 1769 | | | EIC | B, Sl | R/10/5–6 |
| 1769 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_01336– |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1769 | | | VOC | see Appendix 1C | Can 32, 78; VOC 4405 |
| 1769 | | | VOC | Pc | Can 78 |
| 1770 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 p. T1_02035 |
| 1771 | | | CFI | | C.1.11 p. 97v |
| 1771 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_02012–17 |
| 1772 | | | CFI | | C.1.16 p. 79; ADY: E 3056 Lettres de Robien |
| 1772 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_02012–, T1_02067–68 |
| 1772 | bankrupt | | VOC | | Can 35 |
| 1773 | | | CFI | | C.1.12 pp. 105–6; ADY: E 3056 Lettres de Robien |
| 1773 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 p. T1_02057 |
| 1774 | | | CFI | | C.1.16 pp. 78–79 |
| 1774 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_02052, T1_02056 |
| 1775 | | | CFI | | C.1.16 pp. 78–79 |
| 1775 | | | DAC | | Ask 1173 |
| 1776 | Tjobqua died | | CFI | | C.1.16 pp. 78–79 |
| 1776 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 p. T1_02626 |
| 1777 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_02635–36 |
| 1779 | | | CFI | | Dermigny 899; ADY: E 3056 Lettres de Robien |
| 1779 | | | EIC | | Dermigny 898; G/12/66 |
| 1781 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_01007–, T1_01143–46 |
| 1784 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_02404– |
| 1785 | | | CFI | | C.1.15 pp. 69–70 and C.1.16 p. 86v |
| 1785 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_02412–14 |
| 1787 | | | CFI | | C.1.16 pp. 78, 86–87 |

**APPENDIX 1C: Swequa's Trade with the DAC, VOC and SOIC 1752–1769 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

Swequa and Family Trade with the DAC 1752–1754

| DAC | Ships | Ship name | Return cargos | Trade | Products traded | Trade name |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1752 | 1 | *Princesse Lowise* | 141,056 | 3,553 | B | Swequa |
| 1752 | 1 | *Cron Prin af Dan* | 144,167 | 3,434 | B | Swequa |

| DAC | Ships | Ship name | Return cargos | Trade | Products traded | Trade name |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1753 | 1 | *D Sophia Magdalena* | 154,753 | 8,671 | rat, B, Bg | Swequa |
| 1753 | 1 | *D Juliana Maria* | 154,232 | 8,476 | B, Nk, Bg | Swequa |
| 1754 | 1 | *Princesse Lowise* | 162,263 | 9,874 | B | Swequa |
| Total | 5 | Years = 3 | 756,471 | 34,007 | 4.50% | |
| average per ship | | | 151,294 | 6,801 | | |
| average per year | | | 252,157 | 11,336 | | |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Ask 2205–9a.

Swequa and Family Trade with the VOC 1757–1769

| VOC | Ships | Ship name | Total receipts | Trade | Products traded | Trade name |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1757 | 1 | | 208,140 | 50,832 | Sl, B, C, Sc | Swequa & Sequa |
| | | | | 6,806 | B, C | Swequa |
| 1762 | 3 | | 680,600 | 12,327 | Sl, Sc | Tjobqua |
| 1763 | 3 | | 971,709 | 22,977 | Sc, B | Tjobqua |
| 1764 | 4 | | 985,019 | 1,741 | Sc, B, C | Tjobqua |
| 1765 | 4 | | 976,121 | 16,896 | Pc, Sc | Tjobqua |
| 1769 | 4 | | 756,602 | 2,350 | R | Tjobqua |
| Total | 19 | Years = 6 | 4,578,191 | 113,930 | 2.49% | |
| average per year | | | 763,032 | 18,988 | | |

Source: *Grootboeken* NAH: VOC 4381, 4394, 4396–97, 4405.

Swequa and Family Trade with the SOIC 1752

| SOIC | Ships | Ship name | Return cargos | Trade | Products traded | Trade name |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1752 | 1 | *Hoppet* | 151,030 | 9,156 | Sc, B | Swequa |
| Total | 1 | | 151,030 | 9,156 | 6.06% | |

Source: GL: Öijareds säteris arkiv A406.

## APPENDIX 1D: Tjobqua's (Zey Jauqua) Loans with the Swedes 1764–1772 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)

Tjobqua's Loans from Swedish Supercargoes to Finance His Foreign Trade

| Date | Loan signer | Annual rate | Debit | Credit | Balance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1765.01.28? | J. Chambers | 0.20 | 740.000 | | 888.000 |
| 1766.01.28 | H. Hahr | 0.17 | 1,184.000 | | 1,385.280 |
| 1766.01.28 | J. Chambers | 0.20 | | 740.000 | 148.000 |
| 1766.01.28? | J. Chambers | 0.20 | 740.000 | | 888.000 |

| Date | Loan signer | Annual rate | Debit | Credit | Balance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1766.12.01 | H. Hahr | 0.17 | | 201.280 | 1,184.000 |
| 1766.12.01 | H. Hahr | 0.17 | 1,184.000 | | 1,385.280 |
| 1766.12.31? | Printz | 0.20 | 740.000 | | 888.000 |
| 1766.12.31? | J. Chambers | 0.20 | 740.000 | | 888.000 |
| 1767.01.21 | Grill? | 0.20 | 3,700.000 | | 4,440.000 |
| 1767.01.28 | J. Chambers | 0.20 | | 888.000 | |
| 1767.05.11? | Hahr & Grill? | 0.20 | 3,330.000 | | 3,996.000 |
| 1767.12.01 | H. Hahr | 0.17 | | 1,385.280 | |
| 1767.12.07 | Grill & Grub? | 0.20 | 740.000 | | 888.000 |
| 1767.12.12? | Hahr & Grill? | 0.20 | 6,660.000 | | 7,992.000 |
| 1767.12.12? | Hahr & Grill? | 0.12 | 481.000 | | 538.720 |
| 1767.12.31 | H. Hahr | 0.20 | 1,467.095 | | 1,760.514 |
| 1767.12.31 | J. Chambers | 0.20 | | 888.000 | |
| 1767.12.31 | Printz | 0.20 | | 888.000 | |
| 1768.00.00? | H. Hahr | 0.20 | | 1,760.514 | |
| 1768.05.11 | Hahr & Grill? | 0.20 | | 666.000 | 3,330.000 |
| 1768.12.08 | Hahr & Grill | 0.20 | 2,220.000 | | 2,664.000 |
| 1768.12.12 | Hahr & Grill? | 0.20 | | 1,332.000 | 6,660.000 |
| 1768.12.12 | Hahr & Grill? | 0.12 | | 57.720 | 481.000 |
| 1768.12.19 | Hahr & Grill | 0.20 | 3,700.000 | | 4,440.000 |
| 1768.12.19 | J. Chambers | n/a | 740.000 | | |
| 1769.12.08 | J. Grill | 0.20 | 1,480.000 | | 1,776.000 |
| 1769.12.08 | Hahr & Grill | 0.20 | | 2,664.000 | |
| 1769.12.08 | Hahr & Grill | 0.20 | 2,664.000 | | 3,196.800 |
| 1769.12.08 | J. Hahr | 0.20 | 2,664.000 | | 3,196.800 |
| 1769.12.31 | J. Grill | 0.20 | 1,776.000 | | 2,131.200 |
| 1770.10.22 | J. Hahr | 0.20 | 1,776.000 | | 2,131.200 |
| 1770.12.08 | J. Grill | 0.20 | 2,590.000 | | 3,108.000 |
| 1771.01.07 | J. Grill | 0.20 | 2,590.000 | | 3,108.000 |
| 1771.12.01 | J. Grill | 0.20 | | 3,108.000 | |
| 1772.11.30 | J. Hahr | 0.20 | 20,000.000 | | 20,000.000 |

Tjobqua's Loans from Swedish Supercargoes to Finance His Junk Trade 1764–1770

| Date | Junk Name | Rate | Debit | Credit | Destination |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1764.01.00 | Diverse Junks | 0.17 | 1,184.000 | (loan with no insurance incl.) | |
| 1768.02.07 | *Ecktay* | 0.40 | 370.000 | | Cochin China |
| 1768.02.07 | *Wansun* | 0.40 | 370.000 | | Batavia |
| 1768.12.06 | *Ecktay* | 0.40 | 148.000 | 207.200 | |
| 1768.12.19 | *Ecktay* | | | 518.000 | |
| 1768.12.20 | *Wansun* | 0.40 | 370.000 | | |
| 1770.10.22 | *Wansun* | | | 170.200 | Cochin China |

Tjobqua's Bottomry Loans Given to the SOIC in 1765 and 1770

| Date | Ship Name | Rate | Debit | Credit | Destination |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1765.01.10 | *Stockholms Slott* | n/a | | 360.000 | Gothenburg |
| 1770.12.16 | *Finland* | | | 37.000 | |

KEY: 0.12 = 12%, 0.17 = 17%, 0.20 = 20% (all annual rates), 0.40 = 40% (rate per voyage of 8–13 months); Junks: *Ecktay* 益泰, *Wansun* 源順
Source: NM: F17.

**APPENDIX 1E: Factory Rents Paid to Swequa and Tjobqua 1753–1763**

| Year | Co. | Owner | Chinese Taels | Spanish dollars | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1753 | VOC | Swequa | 1,000 | | Can 17, 19, 210, 212; Jörg 58 |
| 1754 | VOC | Swequa | | 1,800? | Can 19, 215; GUB H22.4A |
| 1755 | VOC | Swequa | | | Can 24, 215 |
| 1756 | VOC | Swequa | | | Can 24 |
| 1757 | VOC | Swequa | | | Can 24; Jörg 59 |
| 1758 | VOC | Swequa | 1,480 | 2,000 | VOC 6364, 4556; Can 24; JFB B 1758 fNe |
| 1759 | EIC | Swequa | 1,300 | 1,806 | Morse v. 5: 73–74; R/10/4 p. 107 |
| 1760 | VOC | Swequa | 1,332 | 1,800 | NAH: VOC 4384, doc. No. 36, p. 473 |
| 1761 | VOC | Swequa | 1,332 | 1,800 | VOC 4388, 4394, 4556; Bonke 109 |
| 1762 | VOC | Tjobqua | 1,332 | 1,800 | VOC 4391, 4394, 4556; Can 25, 71 |
| 1763 | VOC | Tjobqua/ Sweetia | 1,332 | 1,800 | VOC 4394, 4556; Can 71 |

**APPENDIX 1F: Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 1**

Cai Swequa's name does not show up in recognizable form until the early 1750s. He is listed with his aliases Long Swequa, Lam Seyqua, Lang Suiqua, Seyqua alias Lang, or with his last name attached (Si, Zey, Choi, etc.). As shown above in Appendix 1A, the family name Cai was Romanized many different ways (see also MCM 1: Appendix 7B).

There is a name that appears in the EIC records from 1732 that looks suspiciously like Cai Swequa.

> 1732, Sep 26: Lookt over Laew Seuqua's Heyson tea contracted for ye 19th instant, found severall of ye tubbs were old, tea, & yt which was new but very indifferent, so refused to take any of him. (BL: IOR G/12/33, 1732.09.26, p. 101)

I have omitted this reference, because the next recognizable entry to him does not appear until nine years later. In the early 1740s, several entries appear in the records that are likely referring to Cai Swequa. In 1741, a 'Swequa' appears in the EIC records

selling porcelain and tea (BL: IOR G/12/50, 1741.10.15, p. 26 and 1741.11.05, p. 36). In the same year a 'Suiqua' appears several times in the Charles Irvine (a supercargo for the SOIC) papers selling tea (JFB: Charles Irvine Papers, 'Letter Books & Account Books'). In 1742 and 1743, a merchant by the name Seikoua or SuiKoa appears in the French records (ANOM: C.1.10, pp. 16–18). In 1748, the Swedes recorded on a map the location of the merchant Svikva's factory (MCM 1: 02.02). Most of the French and Swedish records are missing from the 1740s, so it is not possible to follow him each year.

I have attributed the references above from the 1740s to Cai Swequa. He was one of the major suppliers to the French company at this time, so we would expect him to show up in those records. His name appears later in the Swedish records spelled similarly, with his alias Long or his last name attached. In 1753, the Swedes showed this man to be attached to the Jufeng Hang 聚豐行 (GL: Öijareds säteris arkiv A 406). In 1756, he shows up in a couple of French contracts as Tsaïa SouiKöa (Cai Ruiguan 蔡瑞官) of the Jufeng Hang 聚豐行 (Plates 01.02 and 01.03). These documents show him trading in partnership with his brother Sequa (Xiguan 璽官).

The Dutch and Danish records are a bit more problematic. In the late 1730s and 1740s, there are many references to men with names like Sinqua, Zinqua, Siouqua, Sauwqua, Souwqua, Suiqua, etc. The letters 'n' and 'u' are often difficult to distinguish, which means Sinqua could also be Siuqua or Suiqua. In 1743, for example, there is a man who appears in the VOC records trading in tea, gold, pepper and other products by the name of Lam Suiqua. He traded in partnership with Consentia Giqua this year and looks like a good candidate for Swequa but sometimes his name appears as Sinqua with no Lam or Lange attached (NAH: Canton 2 and 69). In 1749, a Ziuqvoa or Siuqua shows up in the DAC records trading tea, but his name is sometimes spelled Zuqua (RAC: Ask 1117 and 2202). Some of these names are probably referring to Cai Suiqua. Because the spellings vary so much in these records I have decided to omit all of those references from the 1730s and 1740s. It is not until his name appears in the early 1750s, in the Dutch and Danish records, with his alias Long attached that we can follow him. After that happens we can make positive identification.

White and Cheong connected Swequa and his Jufeng Hang to Cai Hunqua and the Yifeng Hang 義豐行 as if they were one and the same persons and firms. Part of the confusion comes from the authors assigning the name Cai Guohui 蔡國輝 to Cai Hunqua. This name, however, was another one of Cai Swequa's aliases. Swequa seems to have had some relationship with the Yifeng Hang, but he was not part of that firm, and was not its owner or manager. We know from several Chinese documents that Cai Guohui was the owner of the Jufeng Hang, which we can now show clearly was Swequa's firm and not Hunqua's (Lau doc. No. 1367–68; QGY doc. Nos. 280 and 327; XS pp. 181–85; MQSQ doc. No. 214; White, 'The Hong Merchants of Canton', 55–56; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 40, 84, 98, 120n1, 254, 257, 259, 292nn43–44. For the story of the Yifeng Hang, see MCM 1: Chapter 7).

A Chinese document dated 10 June 1754 that was issued by the Macao Magistrate helps to clarify Swequa's identity. In this document Cai Guohui of the Jufeng Hang is shown trading with the French in Canton (Lau doc. no. 1367). We know that this was

Swequa and not Hunqua because the former man was the person who traded out of the Jufeng Hang and dealt with the French.

There is yet one other problem connected to Swequa that needs clarification. He died about the same time (1761) as Teunqua, the father of Cai Monqua (another branch of the Cai clan). This has resulted in these two men getting mixed up. (The various Teunquas are very difficult to follow in Cheong's book. For a few examples, see Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 40, 82, 98).

Swequa's two brothers Sequa and Tjobqua have their problems as well. There were a couple of merchants who went by a name similar to Sequa. Cai Sequa's name is spelled various ways, and sometimes with two e's, as Seequa. In this study, I have standardized it with one 'e'.

Swequa's other brother was known by the Dutch as Tjobqua. He shows up in other records with various spellings including Yokqua, Joqua, Jauqua, etc. There were other men who went by similar names, which sometimes makes it confusing. A Jouqua or Yoqua appears in the Danish records from 1752 to 1763 and in the Swedish records in 1755. This man only traded in porcelain. I have not found a clear connection between this porcelain merchant and Swequa, so I eliminated those entries. However, the Jauqua that appears in the Swedish records in the 1760s and who traded in tea was clearly the brother of Swequa (because he signed his name in Chinese, see Plates 01.07, 01.08 and 01.09). Ch'en and Cheong used the spelling Yokqua to refer to this brother, because that is the appellation that often appears in the EIC records. Because the latter author mistakenly connected him with the Yifeng Hang (Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 84), and because there were other merchants with a name similar to Yokqua which Ch'en and Cheong were unaware of, I have chosen to use the Dutch spelling. There were no other merchants with a name like Tjobqua.

## APPENDIX 2A: TEUNQUA'S SCHEDULE

Aliases: Cai Yongjie 蔡永接; Cai Chunxing 蔡純興
Trade names: *Teunqua*, *Teeongqua*, *Thee ongqua*, *Tionqua*, *The ongqua*, *Thee Onqua*, *Thionqua*, *Tounqua*, *Tehanqua*, *Theonqua*
Cai Sur Names: *Chai*, *Chiu*, *Choi*, *Chia*, *Cheo*, *Cha*, *Chua*, *Chwan*, *Chy*, *Chuy*, *Che*, *Sai*, *Schy*, *Si*, *Se*, *Sia*, *Chi*, *Sia*, *Say*, *Sey*, *Soy*, *Suah*, *Sy*, *Tsja*, *Tsa*, *Tsia*, *Tja*, *Tjay*, *Tay*, *Ti*, *Te*, *Thaay*, *Thay*, *Tsaay*, *Tsay*, *Tjaay*, *Tshaa*, *Tzwaa*, *T'Swaa*, *Tsey*, *Tsoi*, *Tsoy*, *Tsy*, *Tzy*, *Tzi*, *Tshae*, *Zey*, *Zay*.

| Biographical data | Date | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| Death | 21 November 1760 | VOC 4386, *dagregister*, 1760.11.21, p. 119 |

| Sons | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| Seequa, Sujee | | | G/12/110, 1796.04.10–14, pp. 238–41 |
| Monqua | Cai Wenguan | 蔡文觀 | R/10/05, 1761.07.21, p. 10 |

| Business | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Fengyuan Hang | 逢源行 | QGY doc. Nos. 280, p. 1428 |

| Year | Trade Name & Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1734 | Teunqua | | EIC | G, tu | G/12/37 |
| 1735 | Teonqua, Teunqua | | EIC | Tu | G/12/38–39 |
| 1736 | Teunqua & Gowqua | | EIC | P, H | Morse v. 1: 255; G/12/40–41 |
| 1738 | Teunqua | | EIC | B, tx, P, Nk, P | G/12/44–45 |
| 1739 | Teunqua or Chesha | | EIC | P, Sl | G/12/46 |
| 1740 | Teunqua | | EIC | B, Sl, zt, ld, P, H | G/12/48 |
| 1741 | Teunqua | | EIC | P, Sl, H | G/12/49–50; R/10/3 |
| 1742 | Teunqua | | EIC | zt, Sl, H | G/12/51 |
| 1750 | Teunqua | | EIC | zt, B, zr, P, C | G/12/53–54 |
| 1751 | Teunqua, Tonqua | | EIC | Nk, zt, zr | G/12/55–56 |
| 1751 | Teeongqua, Thee ongqua | | VOC | ob, Af, ctw, B, Pc, Sl, G, ct | Can 7, 15–16 |
| 1752 | Teunqua | | EIC | Sl | Morse v. 5 |
| 1752 | Tionqua | | SOIC | B, SR | GL: A406 |
| 1752 | Tee/The ongqua, Thee Onqua | | VOC | B, G | Can 7, 15, 17; GM 12: 216–17, 221 |
| 1753 | Teunqua | | EIC | sw, B | G/12/57 |
| 1753 | Tionqua & Zayhunqua | Fengyuan | SOIC | Tea | GL: A 406[(b)] |
| 1753 | Thee onqua | | VOC | Tn | Can 17 |
| 1754 | Thionqua | | CFI | | C.1.10 |
| 1754 | Teunqua, Tounqua | | EIC | | Morse v. 5; R/10/3 |
| 1754 | Thee Onqua | | VOC | | Can 19, 20 |
| 1755 | Teunqua | | EIC | zt, B, ld, Nk, C, Sl | R/10/4 |
| 1755 | Thee onqua | | VOC | | Can 20; VOC 4380 |
| 1756 | Teunqua | | EIC | B, P, Sl, Sc | R/10/4 |
| 1756 | The Onqua | | VOC | | Can 22; VOC 4380 |
| 1759 | Cai Chunxing | Fengyuan | CHD | | QGY doc. Nos. 280, 327 |
| 1759 | Teunqua, Tehanqua | | EIC | B, FR | Morse v. 5: 74; R/10/4 |
| 1759 | The onqua | | SOIC | B | VOC 4384 p. 537v |
| 1760 | Teunqua | | EIC | B, Sl, Ty | Morse v. 5: 91; R/10/4 |
| 1760 | The Onqua, Theonqua, The-on-qua | | VOC | B | Can 74, VOC 4384, 4386 |
| 1761 | Teunqua | | EIC | | R/10/5 |

| Year | Trade Name & Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1765 | Theonqua | | VOC | original member of the Co-hong but now deceased | Can 74 |

**APPENDIX 2B: Monqua's Schedule**

Aliases: Cai Wenguan 蔡文觀; Cai Shiwen 蔡世文
Trade names: *Monkoa, Munqua, Mongkoa, Manqua, Mamqua, Mong Koua*

| Biographical data | Date | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| Death | 10 April 1796 | G/12/110, 1796.04.10–14, pp. 238–41 |

| Brothers | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| Seequa, Sujee | | | G/12/110, 1796.04.10–14, pp. 238–41 |

| Business | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fung-iuen, Fung-Yuen | Fengyuan Hang | 逢源行 | Plate 02.01(sbc) |
| Wangwho | Wanhe Hang | 萬和行 | Plate 02.04(sbc) |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1761 | | | EIC | ct, B, Nk, su, HS | R/10/5; G/12/20 |
| 1762 | | | EIC | | R/10/5 |
| 1762 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 25; VOC 4394 |
| 1763 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_05286–87 |
| 1763 | | | VOC | | Can 26, 72 |
| 1764 | | | CFI | B | CMD 1764, p. 252 |
| 1764 | | | DAC | see Appendix 2C | Ask 1152, 2227–28 |
| 1764 | Cai Hunqua, Conqua | | EIC | C, Sk, HS, B, ct, ld, oli | R/10/5 |
| 1764 | | | SOIC | By | NM: F17 pp. T1_00706–, T1_00753 |
| 1764 | | | VOC | B | Can 73 |
| 1765 | | | DAC | see Appendix 2C | Ask 1155, 2229–30 |
| 1765 | | | EIC | B, Ty, Sl, C, rc, sa, ag, Sk | R/10/5 |
| 1765 | | | SOIC | By, op | NM: F17 pp. T1_00774–, T1_02313, T1_02325 |
| 1765 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 28, 74; VOC 4397 |
| 1766 | | Fengyuan | DAC | see Appendix 2C | Ask 1156a(sbc), 1156b, 2231 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1766 | | | SOIC | By, R, H | NM: F17 pp. T1_01831, T1_06346, T1_06350 |
| 1766 | | | VOC | B | Can 75 |
| 1767 | | Fengyuan | DAC | see Appendix 2C | Ask 1157–60(sbc), 1161, 2232–33 |
| 1767 | | Fengyuan | SOIC | By, B | NM: F17 pp. T1_01214, T1_01230; Plate 02.03(sbc) |
| 1767 | | | VOC | An, B | Can 30, 76 |
| 1768 | | Fengyuan | DAC | see Appendix 2C | Ask 1162(sbc) |
| 1768 | | | EIC | B, Sl, ld, Sk, ct, oli | Morse v. 5; R/10/5–6 |
| 1768 | | | SOIC | By | NM: F17 p. T1_01947–50 |
| 1768 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 31, 77; VOC 4402 |
| 1769 | | | DAC | see Appendix 2C | Ask 2235 |
| 1769 | | | EIC | B | R/10/5–6 |
| 1769 | | | SOIC | By | NM: F17 pp. T1_01985–89, T1_07288 |
| 1770 | | | DAC | see Appendix 2C | Ask 2236–37 |
| 1770 | | | EIC | Ty, Sl, B, zr | R/10/7 |
| 1770 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 p. T1_06648 |
| 1770 | | | VOC | Sl | Can 79 |
| 1771 | | | EIC | w | R/10/7 |
| 1771 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 34, 233; VOC 4408 |
| 1772 | | | DAC | see Appendix 2C | Ask 2238–39 |
| 1772 | | | EIC | B, Sl, Ty, w, H, HS, su | Morse v. 5; R/10/7, 9 |
| 1772 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_02012– |
| 1772 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 35, 81, 234; VOC 4410 |
| 1773 | | | DAC | B, C, Pc | Ask 1170 |
| 1773 | | | EIC | B, HS, Ty, Sl, H | Morse v. 5; R/10/9 |
| 1773 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 36, 82, 235; VOC 4411 |
| 1774 | | | CFI | tea | C.1.12–13 |
| 1774 | | | DAC | B, ld, rat, C | Ask 1172 |
| 1774 | Chowqua | | EIC | w, ct, pp, sw | Morse v. 5; R/10/7, 9 |
| 1774 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 37, 83; VOC 4412 |
| 1775 | | | DAC | B, C, Ty, pj | Ask 1173 |
| 1775 | | | EIC | B, zr, H, C, su | Morse v. 2; G/12/58; R/10/7, 9 |
| 1775 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 38, 84; VOC 4413, 4556 |
| 1776 | | | DAC | Ty, ld, sa, B | Ask 1175 |
| 1776 | | | EIC | w, ld, Sl, Ty, B, gt, pp, C, H, Sk, su, Nk | Morse v. 2; G/12/59 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1776 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 39, 85, 238; VOC 4414 |
| 1777 | | | CHD | | Lo-Shu Fu 280; YHGZ 25: 491 |
| 1777 | | Funy yuen | DAC | K, C, ld, SR, B, Ty | Ask 1177 |
| 1777 | | | EIC | zr, tx, Ty, Sl, B, H, tx, Sc, C, su, Nk, cp, Q | Morse v. 2; G/12/60–62 |
| 1777 | | | SOIC | B | GUB: H22.15 p. 20 |
| 1777 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 40, 86, 240; VOC 4415 |
| 1778 | | | CHD | | QGY doc. No. 479 |
| 1778 | | Fung-iuen | DAC | C, ld, K, HS | Ask 1179 |
| 1778 | | | EIC | B, Ty, Sl, w, su, Nk, sa, H, Sc | Morse v. 2; G/12/64–65 |
| 1778 | | Fengyuan | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 41$^{(sb)}$, 87, 89, 241; VOC 4418, 4556 |
| 1779 | | | CFI | | Dermigny 899 |
| 1779 | | Fung-Yuen | DAC | tin, SR, HS, C, ld, ZZ, pp | Ask 1180 |
| 1779 | | | EIC | C, H, Sk, ld, tx, Ty, Sl, su, Nk, B | Morse v. 2; Dermigny 898; G/12/66, 68 |
| 1779 | | | SOIC | | G/12/66 |
| 1779 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 42, 88, 242; VOC 4419 |
| 1780 | | | CHD | | QGY doc. No. 501 |
| 1780 | | | DAC | C, tu, H, ZZ | Ask 1183–84 |
| 1780 | | | EIC | C, Sl, Ty, B, tx, ld, ct, sw | Morse v. 2; Inglis 11; G/12/68, 70–71 |
| 1780 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 43, 88, 89, 243; VOC 4421 |
| 1781 | | | DAC | Ty, K, R, ld | Ask 1185 |
| 1781 | | | EIC | tx, sw, Ty, ld, Sl, B, H, C, Sk | Morse v. 2; G/12/71–74 |
| 1781 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 44, 244; VOC 4423 |
| 1782 | | | CHD | | QGY doc. No. 518 |
| 1782 | | | DAC | see Appendix 2C | Ask 2240 |
| 1782 | | | EIC | H, B, Sl, ld, su, Nk, Sc, C | Morse v. 2; G/12/75–76 |
| 1782 | | | VOC | zt, pm, HS, Sc, H, C, Sl | Can 44; VOC 4430 |
| 1783 | | | CFI | | Constant 228–32, 408n |
| 1783 | Hauqua | | DAC | | Ask 1191, p. 41v |
| 1783 | | | EIC | B, Sl, Ty, tx, ld, Sc, C, su, Nk | Morse v. 2; Inglis 13; G/12/77–78 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1783 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 44, 45, 245; VOC 4430 |
| 1784 | | | CHD | | QGY doc. No. 522 |
| 1784 | | | DAC | see Appendix 2C | Ask 2242 |
| 1784 | | | EIC | B, Sl, tx, ld | Morse v. 2; G/12/79–80 |
| 1784 | | | USA | | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets; Smith (see index) |
| 1784 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 46, 90, 246; VOC 4426 |
| 1785 | | | CFI | | C.1.15 |
| 1785 | | | DAC | see Appendix 2C | Ask 2243 |
| 1785 | | | EIC | tx, Sc, C, Ty, H, Sl | Morse v. 2; G/12/79, 81–83 |
| 1785 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 47, 85, 91, 247, 295; VOC 4431 |
| 1786 | | | DAC | see Appendix 2C | Ask 1200, 2244 |
| 1786 | | | EIC | Sc, C, K, Ty, Sl | Morse v. 2; Pope 74–75; G/12/82, 84–85 |
| 1786 | | Wanhe | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 48, 92, 248; VOC 4432, 4433[(bc)] |
| 1787 | | | CFI | | C.1.16 p. 32; Cordier (1922) 3: 18 |
| 1787 | | | EIC | zr, C, Sk, H, Ty, Sl, B, tx, ld | Morse v. 2; G/12/84–88 |
| 1787 | writer Houqua | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 49, 92, 93, 249, 366; VOC 4436 |
| 1788 | | | CFI | Sl | G/12/88 |
| 1788 | | | CHD | | QGY doc. No. 575 |
| 1788 | | | EIC | Ty, B, CK, Sc, C, Sk, H | Morse v. 2; G/12/20, 87–89, 94 |
| 1788 | | | USA | tea | RIHS: Brown Mss 312 |
| 1788 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 50, 93, 250, 366; VOC 4440 |
| 1789 | | | EIC | Sl, H, Ty, C, ld, Sc | Morse v. 2; G/12/96–97 |
| 1789 | | | USA | | Shaw 302 |
| 1789 | | Wanhe | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 51[(b)], 251, 94, 95, 366; VOC 4444 |
| 1790 | | | EIC | C, Sl, Sc, tx, pp, B, ct, CK | Morse v. 2; G/12/96–99 |
| 1790 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 52, 367; VOC 4445 |
| 1791 | | | CHD | | Lo-Shu Fu 318 |
| 1791 | | | EIC | CK, Sc, Sl, HS, tx, tin, ld, C, zr, Ty, B | Morse v. 2; G/12/98–102 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1791 | Poankequa, Kiouqua, Locqua | Wanhe | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 53[(b)], 252; VOC 4446[(b)]; GHL: Ms 1985 |
| 1792 | | | CHD | | Lau doc. No. 1216; Xing doc. No. 58; QGY doc. No. 599; Lo-Shu Fu 323; QDGZ pp. 64–66 |
| 1792 | Mowqua | | EIC | R, B, zr, C, Ty, Sl | Morse v. 2 |
| 1792 | | | VOC | see Appendix 2D | Can 54, 253; VOC 4576 |
| 1793 | | | CHD | | QGY doc. Nos. 515, 600–601, 603; MQSQ doc. No. 337 |
| 1793 | | | EIC | zr, B, C, w, tin, pp, ld, Sl, Nk | Morse v. 2; G/12/103–5, 107 |
| 1793 | | | VOC | C, R | Can 55, 254 |
| 1794 | | | CHD | | QGY doc. Nos. 613–14 |
| 1794 | | | EIC | B, zr, C, Sl, Ty, H, w, ld | Morse v. 2; G/12/106–9 |
| 1794 | | | USA | FR | RIHS: Logbook ship *George Washington* |
| 1794 | | | VOC | C, K, Sc, R, cvo, ng, pp, tin, B, H, cv | Can 56, 255–57, 326; Ch'en 301 |
| 1795 | | Wanhe | CHD | | Lau doc. No.382 |
| 1795 | | | EIC | zr, C, Sc, w, Sl, tin, B, CK, Ty | Morse v. 2; G/12/108–11 |
| 1795 | | Wanhe | VOC | C, K, B, K, Sc, R | Can 57; OIC 196, 238Q[(sbc)]; Aanw 298 |
| 1796 | son and brother | died on Apr 10, at 2 am | EIC | C, Sc, CK, Ty, B, ld, HS, Sl, H | Morse v. 2; G/12/110–17 |
| 1796 | | | USA | | Bishop 178 |
| 1796 | brother is writer | Wangwho | VOC | died of opium overdose on 9 April 1796 | OIC 197; Can 96, 260, 326 |
| 1797 | nephew | | EIC | C, CK, Sc, HS, B, tx, Ty | G/12/116–18, 120 |
| 1797 | writers | | VOC | C | Can 261, 330; OIC 198 |
| 1798 | | | EIC | Ty, CK, w, pp, tin, ld, Sl | G/12/119–22 |
| 1798 | | | VOC | Db | Can 60, 262, 331 |
| 1799 | | | EIC | tx, tin, ld, C, CK | G/12/123, 126 |
| 1799 | | | VOC | Db | Can 61, 333; RAB 140 |
| 1800 | | | EIC | | G/12/128 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1800 | | | VOC | Db | Can 264 |
| 1802 | | | VOC | | Can 342 |
| 1803 | | | VOC | | Can 345 |

**APPENDIX 2C: Monqua's Trade with the DAC 1764–1786 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Ships | Ship name | Return cargos | Trade | Products traded |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1764 | 1 | *Pr Fred af Dan* | 263,800 | 486 | Bg |
| 1765 | 1 | *D Juliana Maria* | 157,101 | 26,236 | B, C, Sl |
| 1766 | 1 | *Fred'borg Slott* | 203,820 | 22,596 | B, C, tx |
| 1767 | 1 | *D Sophia Magd* | 174,171 | 18,255 | B, Sl, C |
| | 1 | *Pr Fred af Dan* | 240,875 | 21,776 | B, C, tx |
| 1768 | 1 | *Fred'borg Slott* | 212,082 | 8,183 | B, C, tx |
| 1769 | 1 | *D Sophia Magd* | 166,374 | 3,913 | B |
| 1770 | 1 | *Fred'borg Slott* | 168,627 | 11,645 | B |
| | 1 | *Kong af Dan* | 181,621 | 7,676 | B |
| 1772 | 1 | *Kong af Dan* | 166,886 | 10,866 | C, Sl, B |
| | 1 | *Fred'borg Slott* | 153,585 | 5,626 | B |
| 1782 | 4 | *M,D,K af D, ChA* | 918,095 | 32,703 | K, B, H |
| 1784 | 3 | *Dk & JM & Dis* | 516,624 | 17,588 | C, K, HS |
| 1785 | 3 | *CP & Mars & CA* | 647,740 | 8,629 | K, H |
| 1786 | 2 | *Dk & S Mag* | 460,474 | 196,179 | K |
| Total | 23 | Years = 12 | 4,631,874 | 392,358 | 8.47% |
| average per year | | | 385,989 | 32,697 | |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Ask 2228–29, 2231–44.

**APPENDIX 2D: Monqua's Trade with the VOC 1762–1792 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Ships | Total receipts | Monqua's trade | Joint trade Monqua & Chowqua | % | Products traded |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1762 | 3 | 680,600 | 7,227 | | 0.011 | H, C |
| 1765 | 4 | 976,121 | 2,397 | | 0.002 | H |
| 1768 | 4 | 702,999 | 13,327 | | 0.019 | B |
| 1771 | 4 | 825,947 | 7,087 | | 0.009 | Sc, B, C |
| 1771 | | | | 27,856 | 0.034 | (not included in Chowqua's chapter in Vol. 1) B |
| 1772 | 4 | 944,765 | 21,064 | | 0.022 | tin, pp, Sc, Bg, B, Sl |

| Year | Ships | Total receipts | Monqua's trade | Joint trade Monqua & Chowqua | % | Products traded |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1773 | 4 | 670,531 | 29,261 | | 0.044 | B, C, Sc, z, zr |
| 1774 | 4 | 603,020 | 23,714 | | 0.039 | Sl, B, C |
| 1775 | 5 | 693,437 | 17,753 | | 0.026 | Sc, z, ci, Rx, Rg, spw, C, H, pp, ng, pm, ld, cv, Nl, sta, B |
| 1775 | | | | 102,693 | 0.148 | B, C |
| 1776 | 4 | 676,401 | | 154,900 | 0.229 | Sc, tin, pm, ld, tin, C, H, Nl, Pc, B |
| 1777 | 4 | 796,175 | | 174,234 | 0.219 | Nl, Ty, Pc, HS, Sl, B, C |
| 1778 | 4 | 765,224 | | 209,031 | 0.273 | Ty, Nl, Sl, B, C, sat |
| 1779 | 4 | 799,117 | 138,741 | | 0.174 | C, B, Sl, Ty, Sc, H, HS, J, tin, la, pm, sw, ng, pp, cv, Nl |
| 1780 | 4 | 732,092 | 158,075 | | 0.216 | C, Sc, Sl, B, H, HS, pm, la, ld, cv, pp, tin |
| 1781 | 1 | 197,427 | 32,929 | | 0.167 | Sc, spr, B, C |
| 1783 | 2 | 477,324 | 66,033 | | 0.138 | pm, pp, C, Sc, H, HS, Sl, la, cvo, jc, tin, cv |
| 1784 | 4 | 928,577 | 181,707 | | 0.196 | jc, pp, z, sta, K, Sc, H, HS, Sl, zr, la, jc, tin, B, C, spr |
| 1785 | 4 | 992,376 | 199,321 | | 0.201 | B, C, Sc, Ty, Sl, cv, z, K, H, pm, la, ld, cv, cvo, pp, tin, zr, HS, zt, spr |
| 1786 | 5 | 1,266,617 | 295,163 | | 0.233 | B, z, C, Sl, Ty, HS, tin, pm, la, ng, cv, z, spr, pp, ld, sw, Sc, Pc, K, zr, ms, Rx, Rg |
| 1787 | 5 | 1,621,824 | 305,188 | | 0.188 | zr, B, pp, jc, la, pm, si, Rx, Rg, K, Sc, Sl, C, HS, Nl, spr |
| 1788 | 4 | 1,904,661 | 382,840 | | 0.201 | B, zr, R, tin, pp, Rx, Rg, C, K, Sc, H, HS, Pc, Ty, Sl, Nl, spr |
| 1789 | 5 | 2,201,455 | 322,073 | | 0.146 | zr, spr, B, tin, pp, spr, C, Rx, Rg, K, Sc, H, Nl, HS, Ty |
| 1790 | 3 | 552,910 | 89,278 | | 0.161 | B, spr, zr, Rx, Rg, Rl, Nl |
| 1791 | 2 | 623,795 | 152,669 | | 0.245 | Sc, K, C, zr, Sl, Rl, J, Rx, S, Rg |

| Year | Ships | Total receipts | Monqua's trade | Joint trade Monqua & Chowqua | % | Products traded |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1792 | 4 | 1,071,153 | 253,583 | | 0.237 | B, C, H, Sc, HS, K, Ty |
| Subt | 91 | 21,704,549 | 2,699,432 | 668,715 | 0.124 | |
| 1/2 Joint | | | 334,358 | | | |
| Total | | | 3,033,789 | | 0.140 | |

Source: *Grootboeken* in NAH: VOC 4394, 4397, 4402, 4408, 4410–15, 4418–19, 4421, 4423, 4426, 4430–32, 4436, 4440, 4444–46, 4576.

**APPENDIX 2E: Monqua's Loans from Swedes Used to Finance His Junk Trade to Southeast Asia 1764–1769 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Date | Junk Name | t/f | Destination | Rate | Lt column | Rt column | Interest |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1764.01.27 | *Eckhing* | t | Cochin China | 0.40 | 400 | | |
| 1764.01.27 | *Hangzaychow* | t | Siam | 0.40 | 600 | | |
| 1764.01.27 | *Samjeck* | t | Cochin China | 0.40 | 700 | | |
| 1764.02.17 | *Winghing* | t | Conghau | 0.40 | 1,000 | | |
| 1764.09.27 | *Samjeck* | | | 0.40 | 700 | 980 | 280 |
| 1765.01.16 | *Samkonghing* | t | Cochin China | 0.40 | 740 | | |
| 1765.01.31 | *Eckhing* | | | | 560 | | |
| 1765.01.31 | *Hangzaychow* | | | | 600 | | |
| 1765.01.31 | *Samkonghing* | | Cochin China | | 740 | | |
| 1765.01.31 | *Winghing* | | | 0.40 | 1,400 | | |
| 1765.03.19 | *Eckhing* | | Cochin China | | 500 | 400 | |
| 1765.03.19 | *Eckhing* | | Passiack | | 500 | | |
| 1765.03.19 | *Ecksun* | | Cambodia | | 500 | | |
| 1765.03.19 | *Winghing* | | | | | 1,000 | |
| 1765.12.09 | *Eckhing* | | | 0.40 | 500 | 700 | 200 |
| 1765.12.09 | *Ecksun* | | | 0.40 | 500 | 700 | 200 |
| 1765.12.09 | *Samkonghing* | | | 0.40 | 740 | 1,036 | 296 |
| 1765.12.31 | *Hangzaychow* | | | | | 840 | |
| 1766.02.07 | *Ecksun* | t | Cambodia | 0.40 | 720 | | |
| 1766.02.07 | *Hangzaychow* | | | 0.40 | 280 | | |
| 1766.02.07 | *Santay* | t | Passiak | 0.40 | 370 | | |
| 1766.11.23 | *Santay* | | | | | 518 | |
| 1767.01.29 | *Ecksun* | | Cochin China | | | 1,400 | (for 1766) |
| 1767.01.29 | *Ecksun* | t | Passiak | | 1,110 | | |
| 1767.01.29 | *Gihing* | t | Cambodia | | 740 | | |
| 1767.08.08 | *Ecksun* | | Passiack | 0.40 | 1,110 | | |

| Date | Junk Name | t/f | Destination | Rate | Lt column | Rt column | Interest |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1767.08.08 | *Gihing* | | Cambodia | 0.40 | 740 | | |
| 1767.12.14 | *Gihing, Ecksun* | | paid on account | | | 1,739 | |
| 1767.12.30 | *Gihing, Ecksun* | | paid on account | | | 851 | |
| 1768.00.00(?) | *Chongtatt* | | | 0.40 | 740 | 1,036 | |
| 1768.00.00(?) | *Fongschyn* | | | 0.40 | 370 | 518 | |
| 1768.02.11 | *Chongtatt* | t | Passiack, Cochin China | | 740 | | (for 1768) |
| 1768.03.12 | *Fongschyn* | t | Passiack | | 370 | | (for 1768) |
| 1768.03.17 | *Ecksun* | t | Passiack | | 370 | | (for 1768) |
| 1768.03.17 | *Samkonghing* | t | Batavia | | 444 | | (for 1768) |
| 1768.12.06 | 2 Junks | | | 0.40 | 444 | 622 | 178 |
| 1768.12.13 | *Chongtatt* | | | | | 1,036 | |
| 1768.12.13 | *Fongschyn* | | | | | 518 | |
| 1768.12.20 | *Samkonghing* | | | | 444 | | (for 1769?) |
| 1769.01.10 | bottomry loan | | co-signer: Hongsia | | | 647 | |
| 1769.01.10 | *Samkonghing* | | co-signer: Hongsia | 0.40 | 481 | 673 | 192 |
| 1769.01.10 | *Samkonghing* | | co-signer: Hongsia | 0.16 | | 673 | 27 |

Key: t = to, f = from, 0.16 = 16% interest (annual rate), 0.40 = 40% interest (rate per voyage lasting 8 to 13 months). Junks: *Chongtatt* 鐘達, *Eckhing?*, *Ecksun* 益順, *Ecktay* 益泰, *Fongschyn* 豐順, *Gihing?*, *Hangzaychow* 坑仔艘, *Hingtai* 恒泰, *Samjeck* 三益, *Samkonghing* 三廣興, *Santay* 新泰, *Winghing?*
Source: NM: F17.

**APPENDIX 2F: Monqua's Loans from Swedes Used to Finance His Foreign Trade at Canton 1766–1769 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Date | loan signer | rate | Debit | Credit | Balance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1766.01.10 | Grill? | 0.20 | 280.000 | | 336.000 |
| 1767.04.19? | Hahr & Grill? | 0.20 | 1,280.000 | | 1,536.000 |
| 1767.05.11? | Hahr & Grill? | 0.20 | 280.000 | | 336.000 |
| 1767.12.12? | Hahr & Grill? | 0.20 | 1,760.000 | | 2,112.000 |
| 1768.04.19 | Hahr & Grill? | 0.20 | | 56.000 | 2,056.000 |
| 1768.05.09 | Hahr & Grill? | 0.20 | | 1,480.000 | 576.000 |
| 1768.05.11 | Hahr & Grill? | 0.20 | | 56.000 | 520.000 |

| Date | loan signer | rate | Debit | Credit | Balance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1768.12.12 | Hahr & Grill? | 0.20 | | 352.000 | 168.000 |
| 1768.12.17 | Hahr & Grill | 0.20 | 1,480.000 | | 1,776.000 |
| 1769.12.17 | Hahr & Grill | 0.20 | | 1,776.000 | – |
| 1769.12.17 | Hahr & Grill | 0.20 | 1,776.000 | | 2,131.200 |

Key: 0.20 = 20% interest
Source: NM: F17.

**APPENDIX 2G: Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 2**

The early years of this Cai lineage's involvement in trade are difficult to trace. Cheong mentions that Monqua's family connection to the trade 'goes back to the 1720s when his grandfather entered it' (Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 90, 264–65). Unfortunately, he provides no reference for this information. Ch'en found that Monqua's father 'Teunqua was already in business in the 1739–40 season', but the reference he gives is from 1740–41. Ch'en also mentions that 'Teunqua's father, Tehanqua, had been the owner of one of the "factories", the Yee-ho hong (I-ho hang) in late K'ang-hsi and early Yung-cheng period' (Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 307). The sources he cites, however, are from 1759 and mention only that the family owned the Yee-ho hong, and nothing about Tehanqua being active in trade 'in late K'ang-hsi and early Yung-cheng period' (Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 432n199). The family genealogy confirms that Tehanqua's great grandfather had migrated to Macao during the early Qing Dynasty, but we do not know what business he was in (*Cai shi qian Yue jiapu* 蔡氏遷粵家譜, 1907).

Teunqua is rather easy to track through the EIC records, because the spelling of his name is fairly consistent. The first recognizable entry to him is in 1734. He shows up fairly regularly to 1742 (Appendix 2A). A Teinqua also shows up in the EIC records, at this time, but those are likely references to Tan Tinqua rather than Teunqua. There is a gap in the English records from 1743 to 1749 (inclusive) when no references appear for Teunqua, but then he reappears regularly from 1750 to his death in 1760.

Teunqua shows up in the VOC records as Thee Ongqua or Theonqua. There is also a Tionqua in the Dutch records in the 1750s, but he was a porcelain dealer. Teunqua appears in the SOIC records as 'Tionqua', selling tea. We know this is correct because in 1752/3, the name of Teunqua's (Tionqua) business is given as the Fengyuan Hang 逢源行 (GL: Öijareds säteris arkiv, A406).

It is impossible to distinguish Teunqua in the DAC records. From the late 1730s to 1760, there are a few references to a porcelain dealer named Tionqua or Tiunqua. Because this man seems to only handle porcelain and because the Danes also spelled Tonqua and Tinqua similarly, there is no way to know whether he is Monqua's father (RAC: Ask 2191–92 and 2199, see entries under Tiunqua). In 1743, a Teonkoua shows up in the French records trading with another man by the name of Manila (ANOM: C.1.10, 1743.08.18, p. 41r). Other merchants' names were spelled similarly, so this man's identity is uncertain. I have omitted all of these early references from the Danish and French records, owing to their ambiguous nature.

Cheong suggests that Teunqua and his father traded under the Yihe Hang but changed the name to Fengyuan Hang after they sold the former to Tan Tinqua. Cheong supplies no reference, so I was unable to check it, but this is most likely coming from the EIC reference in 1759 that says Teunqua's father owned the factory called Yee-ho hong. If this is correct, then the Yihe Hang is simply the name of the factory which was rented to the English in the late 1750s. So far, no evidence has emerged to show that it was the name of Teunqua's trading house (Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 171). Both Cheong and Ch'en appear to be taking the 1759 reference to the Yee-ho hong and transposing it back in time, without any references to support doing so.

Ch'en states that Monqua had two brothers (Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 309 and 433nn210–11). As we know from the family genealogy, he had one brother. However, sometimes men adopted sons and sometimes foreigners mistook cousins for brothers. Monqua is fairly easy to track through the records. In the early 1760s, however, there was a Canton linguist, who went by the name 'Monqua alias Jan Baptist'. He was often just called Monqua. Linguist Monqua and merchant Monqua show up regularly in the Dutch records. In my dissertation, I had confused these two men, because they appear in Dutch records as though they might have been the same person (Van Dyke, 'Port Canton', 316). After further investigation, I realized the mistake (see CMD 1762 and 1763 for examples).

For some reason, clear references to Monqua's older brother Seequa do not appear in the records until the 1790s. He seems to have had minimal contact with foreigners before then. He may have been handling the trade with inland merchants and/or perhaps the junk trade to Southeast Asia. In 1795 and 1796, Monqua's brother and successor shows up in the Dutch records as Sujec, Swjee, or Sujie. Sometimes the Dutch just called him 'Monqua's brother' without giving a name.

There were several other men who had names like Seequa. In some cases it is easy to distinguish them, and in other cases it is not. Cai Swequa's brother was called Seequa, Sequa or something similar. He appears in the foreign records in the 1750s, but is usually easily identified owing to his connections to Swequa (Chapter 1). In the late 1750s and early 1760s, Poankeequa traded with his brother Sequa. This man is rather easy to identify owing to his connection to his brother (Chapter 3).

In 1782, a Seequa was made a Hong merchant, and he was said to have previously worked in Poankeequa's house managing his Manila trade. This man's name and firm are unknown (Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 277–78). Cheong has confused this man with Monqua's brother (Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 98). We know this was not the case because the Seequa who became a Hong merchant died in 1784 and then the business was closed (Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 278). The EIC records show the following entry on 1 May 1784: 'Received advice from Canton that Seequa one of the Hong Merchants died on the 26th ultimo after a short illness' (BL: IOR G/12/79, 1784.05.01, p. 36).

There was also a Tan Sequa who was Tan Suqua's grandson and a Cai Sequa who was Cai Hunqua's son. These men show up in the records in the 1770s, so care needs to be taken not to confuse them with Monqua's brother (see references to these men in MCM 1: Index). There is also a Sequa who shows up in the Danish records in the late 1780s selling Nankings. I have omitted Monqua's brother Seequa from the discussion

of the family trade owing to few references to him and the difficulty in distinguishing him from other Seequa's.

One other name still needs clarification, that is Howqua (with various spellings). Monqua had a writer named Houqua. In 1783, Monqua also had a partner named Howqua (or Hauqua). As mentioned in Chapter 2, from at least 1774 to 1787 Monqua had a writer who shows up in the records under various spellings. Sometimes this man appears in the records representing Monqua and at other times he shows up selling tea on his own account. This writer appears off and on in the Dutch records from 1774 onwards selling tea. His name is spelled various ways, including Huyqua, Houqua, Heyqua, Hyqua, and Hayqua. The Dutch identified this man as Monqua's writer (NAH: VOC 4412, *Grootboek* for 1774, entry entitled 'Heyqua'; Canton 39, doc. No. 29, 1776.11.16 'Hoyqua Schrijver van Monqua', Canton 85, 1776.01.24–25 'Hoyqua', and Canton 93, 1787.09.28 'Monqua door zijn Schrijver Houqua zeggen'). Besides working in Monqua's house, he also sold tea under Monqua's authority. By following the entries in the Dutch ledgers, we can see that these names all refer to the same man.

As Ch'en has shown, there was a man by the name of Howqua who at this time traded under Monqua's authority. Ch'en identified him as Lin Shimao 林時懋. He shows up in the EIC records selling tea in 1769 and then almost every year from 1772 and after. In 1778, the EIC records show a Howqua representing Poankeequa, and in 1781 he is referred to as Poankeequa's clerk. Cheong shows this man to be Poankeequa's purser as well, but then confuses him with the Howqua who appears later and was a member of the Wu family. In 1782, Howqua was asked to be a Hong merchant but refused. In May of that year the Danes listed him as one of the new appointees. By June, he had refused the post, and he absconded when the Hoppo said he would appoint him to be a salt merchant instead. He seems to have served only a few months as a salt merchant. In August 1783, the Danes mentioned that a 'Hauqua', who had previously been working in Poankeequa's house, joined in partnership with Monqua. This may have been a way for him to get out of becoming a salt merchant. By 1784, Howqua had changed his mind and agreed to become a Hong merchant. He went broke in 1788 (Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 279–83; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 98; BL: IOR G/12/64, p. 126 and G/12/72, 1781.02.05, p. 8, 1781.03.25, p. 54, 1781.09.08, p. 105, G/12/76, 1782.06.24, p. 33; RAC: Ask 1190, May 1782, p. 31r and Ask 1191, 1783.08.04, p. 41v).

Here are some other references that have caused more confusion—BL: IOR R/10/5, 1769.01.23, p. 114 (Howqua), R/10/9, 1772.01.26, p. 5 (Howqua); NAH: VOC 4412, *Grootboek* for 1774, entry entitled 'Heyqua'; Canton 39, doc. No. 29, 1776.11.16 ('Hoyqua Schrijver van Monqua'), Canton 85, 1776.01.24–25 ('Hoyqua'), and Canton 93, 1787.09.28 ('Monqua door zijn Schrijver Houqua zeggen'). We know that the Hoyqua or Houqua who was attached to Monqua was his writer but was he also the Howqua who shows up in the EIC records? This man often contacted the Dutch to trade, and he could have done the same with the English. If the Houqua who was Monqua's writer and trading on the side and the Houqua who was Poankeequa's purser were the same person, then why would the Danes, in 1783, mention that Hauqua had joined Monqua's house, when he had already been working in that firm? Further, if he was a Hong merchant in 1787 and trading under his own license, then why would the

Dutch list him as Monqua's writer in that year? These contradictions suggest that we are talking about more than one man.

If there were two Howquas, then, as Ch'en has shown, the one who worked in Poankeequa's house (and later in Monqua's house) and then became a Hong merchant in 1784 was Lin Shimao. The other Howqua is unknown. We know this other person could not have been the famous Wu Bingjian because that man was born in 1769 and would not have been old enough to trade in the 1770s. See Zhang Wenqin 章文欽, 'Shisan Hang xingshang shouling Wu Bingjian he Wu Chongyao' 十三行行商首領伍秉鑒和伍崇曜, in *Guangzhou Shisan Hang cangsang* 廣州十三行滄桑 [The Thirteen Hongs in Guangzhou], ed., Zhang Wenqin 章文欽 et al. (Guangzhou: Guangdong ditu chubanshe, 2001), 206.

As Wong has suggested, the Hooqua who appears in the EIC records from 1787 onwards is later shown to be connected to Puiqua (Wu Bingjian's brother, see Chapter 5). It is plausible that this man was Wu Bingjian. In 1787, he would have been 18 years old, which was old enough to carry on some trade (John D. Wong, 'Global Positioning: Houqua and His China Trade Partners in the Nineteenth Century', PhD diss., History Department, Harvard University, 2012, Chapter 2). Following this man in the records, however, is very problematic because of the different spellings that were used and the various people who had similar names.

In 1787, the EIC supercargos recorded three similar names all on the same page: Hooqua, Howqua and Houqua. All three men supplied tea, with no clarification of who was who or whether they were all the same. If they were all the same, then why spell them differently? (BL: IOR G/12/87, 1787.02.14–15, p. 144. See also pp.147 and 171–73, which mentions Howqua, and p. 177 which shows Hooqua). It seems likely that these three names refer to at least two different persons.

The name Howqua (and maybe Houqua) seem to indicate the same person as the Hong merchant Lin Shimao. If this is true, then under whose authority was Hooqua trading? Was he Monqua's writer? Or was he Wu Bingjian? If the latter is the case, then he was probably trading out of his cousin Geowqua's firm, which was where his brother Puiqua had been working since 1786. After Puiqua got his hong license in 1792, we do indeed find a Hooqua trading with Puiqua (BL: IOR G/12/105, 1793.01.26, p. 105 and G/12/136, 1801.12.03, p. 105).

If this were not enough confusion, there were still other men with similar names. The writer in Consentia Giqua's Guangyuan Hang was Huiqua. He shows up in the French, Dutch, Danish and Swedish records in the 1760s and 1770s under various spellings, including Huiqua, Huyqua, Haikoa, Haykoa, Heykoa and Hoyqua. (MCM 1: Chapter 11 and Appendixes 11E and 11H; ANOM: C.1.12, pp. 105–6 and C.1.16, pp. 80, 86–87). In the 1760s, the Dutch also purchased porcelain and lacquerware from a Houqua who traded under the business name Guangyi 廣益 (Chapter 8, Plate 08.02, Appendix 8C and NAH: Canton 25, doc. No. 11, 1762.10.29). A lacquerware man by the name of Howqua shows up in the American records in 1784 (Appendix 8E and UPL: Ms. Coll. 499, p. 21r). This porcelain dealer could also be one of the Howqua's that shows up in other records. Some porcelain dealers did indeed sell tea from time to

time (Chapters 7 and 8). The Swedish records also show a man by the name of Hauqua or Zey Hauqua, who was Cai Hunqua's son Anqua (MCM 1: 344–45).

Because of all these ambiguities, I have not discussed Howqua in detail in Chapter 2 or Chapter 5. These examples show the problems that are created when limiting the study to the English records. If all one uses are the EIC records, then it seems as though there were only two men with a name like this when, in fact, there were several. And it is not just these decades that have these problems. In the early 1730s, there are 19 different merchants mentioned in the EIC records, 19 in the Flemish records, 15 in the Dutch records, 14 in the Danish records, and 15 in the Swedish records. When we combine all of these names, there appears to be 56 different people. If all we use is just one of the company's records, then we do not see all the other people involved in trade. Every decade of the eighteenth century has this problem.

As far as Howqua in Chapter 2, I have omitted the ambiguous entries, and only used the ones that I could match with Monqua.

## APPENDIX 3A: Poankeequa's Schedule

Aliases: Pan Qiguan 潘啟官; Pan Zhencheng 潘振承; Pan Wenyan 潘文巖
Trade Names: *Poankeequa, Keequa, PonKeiqva, Punkyqva, Panquayqua, Panquyqua, Pun/Pon/Pand Qveiqva, Poankequa, Puankhequa, Khiqua, Paunkeyqua, Ponqveiqua, Panqueiqua, Panqueyqua, Pankeiqua, Kequa, Puan Khiqua, Pon Keiqva, Paun Khiqua, Poan Keyqua,Phua que qua, Punkeyqua, Pkeyqua, Ponckequa, Puankhequa, Poanquequa, Poanqueque, Ponkaiqua, Poenquaqua, Poenquequa, Panquekois, Pwankhequa, Pwankequa, P. Khiqua, Kheyqua, Khiqua, Kheequa*

| Biographical data | Date | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| Birth | 23 July 1714 | *Pan shi zupu* 潘氏族譜 (1994), p. 63 |
| Death | 10 January 1788 | *Pan shi zupu* 潘氏族譜 (1994), p. 63 |

| Relatives | Trade Name | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brother | Sequa | Pan Seguan | 潘瑟官 | *Pan shi zupu* 潘氏族譜 (1994); Plate 03.04 |
| 4th son | Poankeequa II | Pan Youdu | 潘有度 | *Pan shi zupu* 潘氏族譜 (1994) |
| Cousin | Capt. Tan Matay | Chen Xiexun | 陳協順 | Plate 03.16[(s)] |
| Nephew | Cheong Leoqua | | | GHL: Ms 1985, VOC *dagregister*, 1790.12.31, p. 11 |

| Business | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tatfong | Dafeng Hang | 達豐行 | Plate 03.03[(sbc)] |
| Tongwun, Tung Ven | Tongwen Hang | 同文行 | Plate 03.11[(sbc)] |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products Traded | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1748 | | | SOIC | | UUB: L185 p. 27 |
| 1750 | | | EIC | zt, B, zr, Ty, Nk, Sl | G/12/53–4 |
| 1751 | | | DAC | psy, lu, pq, zt, B | Ask 1129 |
| 1751 | | | EIC | B | G/12/56 |
| 1751 | | | SOIC | pp, sw, zt, Tn, B | GUB: H22.4A Rådplägningsbok |
| 1751 | | | VOC | G | Can 15 |
| 1752 | | Dafeng Hang | DAC | B | Ask 1130(c), 1131(c), 2205, 2206 |
| 1752 | | | SOIC | B, z, Sc | GL: A406 |
| 1753 | | | DAC | B | Ask 1132, 2207, 2208 |
| 1753 | | | EIC | zr, sw, zt, Ty | Morse v. 1: 291; G/12/57 |
| 1753 | | Tatfong/ Dafeng | SOIC | B | GL: A406(b); GUB: H22.1 *Hoppet* Brevkopiebok |
| 1753 | | | VOC | Tn | Can 17 |
| 1754 | | | DAC | tea | Ask 1134 |
| 1754 | | | EIC | H | Morse v. 5; R/10/3 |
| 1754 | | | SOIC | B, tu, pp | GUB: H22.4A *Prins Carl* Dagbok |
| 1754 | | | VOC | Tn, B, Sl | Can 19, 20 |
| 1755 | Pan Seguan | Dafeng Hang | DAC | Bx, B, pq, sat, z, C, zt, ld, psy | Ask 1135(sbc), 2209b |
| 1755 | | | EIC | zt, ld, B, Sl, H, Sc, Ty | Morse v. 5; R/10/4 |
| 1755 | | | SOIC | C, B, Pc, Sc, zr | GUB: H22.4A *Prins Carl* Dagbok |
| 1755 | | | VOC | B, Sl | Can 20 |
| 1756 | | | CFI | | BMN: Ms 1172C16.2.004 |
| 1756 | | | DAC | | Ask 1136 |
| 1756 | | | EIC | H | R/10/4 |
| 1756 | | | VOC | tin, ld, B | Can 22 |
| 1757 | | | CFI | | C.1.10 p. 120r |
| 1757 | Pan Seguan | Dafeng Hang | DAC | C, HS, ZZ, B, H, pq, z, zt, pq, psy, lu, Sl | Ask 1137(sbc), 2210 |
| 1757 | | | EIC | Nk, zt, zr | Morse v. 5; R/10/4 |
| 1757 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 p. T1_00358 |
| 1757 | | | VOC | | JFB: B 1758 fNe |
| 1758 | | | DAC | B, C, Tn | Ask 1138(c), 2211–2213 |
| 1758 | | | EIC | B, tx, ld, Ty | Morse v. 5; R/10/4 |
| 1758 | | | SOIC | C, Sc | NM: F17 p. T1_00522 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products Traded | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1758 | | | VOC | H, HS | Can 24; VOC 4382; JFB: B 1758 fNe |
| 1759 | | Dafeng Hang | DAC | Pc, B | Ask 1139–1142, 1144(sbc), 2214, 2215 |
| 1759 | | | EIC | FR, B, Sl, H | Morse v. 5; R/10/4 |
| 1759 | | | SOIC | | VOC 4384 p. 533r |
| 1760 | | | CFI | | Dermigny 834; Cheong 121 n. 20; SHD: IP299 liasse 31 |
| 1760 | Pan Zhencheng | Tongwen, Dafeng Hang | CHD | | Viraphol 133; YHGZ 25: 496; QDGZ p. 54 |
| 1760 | | | DAC | B | Ask 1143, 1145, 2216, 2217 |
| 1760 | | | EIC | rw, Sl, Ty, B, HS | Morse v. 5: 86, 91; R/10/4 |
| 1760 | | | SOIC | tea | VOC 4384 |
| 1760 | | | VOC | tea | VOC 4384 |
| 1761 | Consentia Giqua | Dafeng Hang | DAC | B, Ty, HS, Bg, H, PZZ, Pc, tu, P | Ask 1146(sbc), 2218 |
| 1761 | | | EIC | ct, pp, sw, tx, ld, B, tu, Sc, C, Ty, H | Morse v. 5: 104; R/10/5; G/12/20 |
| 1761 | | Dafeng Hang | SOIC | B, C, R | GUB: H22.4A *Riksens Ständer* Dagbok; Plate 03.10(sbc) |
| 1762 | | Dafeng, Tongwen | DAC | C, HS, Pc, PZZ, B, BY | Ask 1148a(sbc), Ask 1149(sbc), 2220–2222 |
| 1762 | | | EIC | | R/10/5 |
| 1762 | | | SOIC | B, AnC | NM: F17 p. T1_01669– |
| 1762 | | | VOC | B, C, Sc | Can 25, 71 |
| 1763 | | | DAC | B | Ask 1147, 2223–6 |
| 1763 | | | EIC | w | R/10/6 |
| 1763 | | | SOIC | he purchased two clocks | NM: F17 pp. T1_01679–91, T1_01725– |
| 1763 | | | VOC | B | Can 26, 72 |
| 1764 | | Tongwen | DAC | Pc, B, C, H, Ty, z, sat | Ask 1152(sbc), 2227–2228 |
| 1764 | | | EIC | zr, pp, H, Sk, ld, w, ct, tin, tx | Morse v. 5: 113; R/10/5–6 |
| 1764 | Siqua | eldest son died, married to Sonping's daughter | SOIC | tx, H, Sc, B, tg, By | NM: F17 pp. T1_00704, T1_00718–22, T1_00745–, T1_01618 |
| 1764 | | | VOC | | Can 27, 73, 278 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products Traded | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1765 | Pan Zhencheng | | CHD | | MQSQ doc. No. 241 |
| 1765 | brother Sequa died | | DAC | | Ask 1154 |
| 1765 | | | EIC | Sl, Ty, H, Sk, tin, w, Sc, C | Morse v. 5: 125–26; R/10/5; G/12/20 |
| 1765 | Emoy Sequa | | SOIC | By, crl, tea | NM: F17 pp. T1_00774–89, T1_06350, T1_07313–22; GUB: H22.4A Rådplägningsbok |
| 1765 | | | VOC | B | Can 28, 74 |
| 1766 | Pan Zhencheng | | CHD | | XS pp. 432–33; MQSQ doc. No. 243 |
| 1766 | | | DAC | C, HS | Ask 2231 |
| 1766 | | | SOIC | tea, prl | NM: F17 p. T1_06346 |
| 1766 | | | VOC | B | Can 75 |
| 1767 | | chef da Conghang | CFI | B | C.1.11 pp. 49– |
| 1767 | | Dafeng/ Tongwen | DAC | B, C, zt | Ask 1157–1160(sbc), 2232–2233 |
| 1767 | | Tongwen Hang | SOIC | B | GUB: Ströms H21.1 Nr 1151(sbc), 1157; NM: F17 pp. T1_00926– |
| 1767 | | | VOC | | Can 76 |
| 1768 | | chef da Conghan | CFI | Nk, P, B | C.1.11 pp. 68–, 71–, 73 |
| 1768 | | | DAC | B, C | Ask 2234 |
| 1768 | | | EIC | zr, w, Sl, B, zt, Ty, HS, ld, rw, ct, C, H | Morse v. 5; R/10/5–6 |
| 1768 | | | SOIC | P, An | NM: F17 pp. T1_00179–92 |
| 1768 | | | VOC | B, C, H, Sc | Can 31, 77; VOC 4402 |
| 1769 | | chef da conhang | CFI | | C.1.11 pp. 76– |
| 1769 | | | DAC | B, C, ZZ, PcZZ | Ask 1165, 2235 |
| 1769 | | | EIC | Ty, Sl, B, zr | Hickey 1: 223; R/10/5–6 |
| 1769 | | | SOIC | B | NM: F17 pp. T1_01336– |
| 1769 | | | VOC | B | Can 32, 78 |
| 1770 | Pan Zhencheng | Tongwen Hang | CHD | | Viraphol 133; YHGZ 25: 496 |
| 1770 | | | DAC | B, ZZ, Ty, Bg, PcZZ | Ask 2236–2237 |
| 1770 | | | EIC | zr, B, Ty, Sl | Morse v. 5; R/10/7 |
| 1770 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 p. T1_01960 |
| 1770 | | | VOC | | Can 79 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products Traded | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1771 | | | CFI | | C.1.11 pp. 99–, 117, 120v, 124v–; C.1.12 pp. 11, 13v, 21, 23v; Cordier (1922) 3: 27 |
| 1771 | | | EIC | w, Ty, Sl, HS, H, B, pp, ld.ct | Morse v. 1, 5; Inglis 7; R/10/7 |
| 1771 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_02024–, T1_05227–8(sc) |
| 1771 | | | VOC | B | Can 34, 80, 233; VOC 4408, 4556 |
| 1772 | | | CFI | | ADY: E 3056 Lettres de Robien; C.1.11 p. 149 |
| 1772 | Pan Tongwen | | CHD | | XS pp. 438–39; MQSQ doc. No. 253 |
| 1772 | | | DAC | B, H | Ask 2238, 2239 |
| 1772 | | | EIC | zr, HS, Ty, Sl, Sc, H, B | Morse v. 5; R/10/9 |
| 1772 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_02012– |
| 1772 | Tan Tsjooqua, Monqua | | VOC | C, tin, pp, Sc, H, B, R, zr, Ty, Sl | Can 35, 81, 234; VOC 4410 |
| 1773 | | | CFI | | C.1.12 pp. 59, 104, 139, 140v, 142v, 143v, 166v; ADY: E 3056 Lettres de Robien |
| 1773 | | | DAC | B, C | Ask 1170 |
| 1773 | | | EIC | B, HS, Ty, Sl, H, zr | Morse v. 5; R/10/7, 9 |
| 1773 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_02058 |
| 1773 | | | VOC | B, C, Sl, zr, tin, Sc, H | Can 36, 82, 235; VOC 4411 |
| 1774 | | | CFI | tea | C.1.12 p. 105r |
| 1774 | | | DAC | B, ld, rat, PcZZ | Ask 1172 |
| 1774 | | | EIC | zr, w, B, C, H, ct, pp, sw, Sc | Morse v. 5; R/10/7, 9 |
| 1774 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_00272–7 |
| 1774 | | | VOC | Sl, B, H, C, HS | Can 37, 83; VOC 4412 |
| 1775 | | | DAC | B, C, H, Pc | Ask 1173 |
| 1775 | | | EIC | B, zr, tea, C, H | Morse v. 2; G/12/58; R/10/7, 9 |
| 1775 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 p. T1_00285 |
| 1775 | | | VOC | Sc | Can 38, 84; VOC 4556 |
| 1776 | | | DAC | ld | Ask 1175 |
| 1776 | Con Equa | | EIC | w, ld, zr, B, Sl, Sk, Nk, gt | Morse v. 2; G/12/20, 59 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products Traded | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1776 | | | SOIC | B, C, AnC | GUB: H22.15 |
| 1776 | | | VOC | B | Can 85, 238 |
| 1777 | | | DAC | zt, B, C | Ask 1177 |
| 1777 | | | EIC | zr, Sk, tx, B, ld, Ty | Morse v. 2; G/12/61–2 |
| 1777 | | | SOIC | B, C, AnC | GUB: H22.15 |
| 1777 | | | VOC | | Can 86 |
| 1778 | | | DAC | ld, R, Nk | Ask 1179 |
| 1778 | | | EIC | B, Ty, Sl, H, zr, w, C | Morse v. 2; G/12/64–5 |
| 1778 | | | VOC | tin, B | Can 41, 87, 89, 241 |
| 1779 | | | CFI | | Dermigny 899; Constant 407–8 |
| 1779 | | Tung-Ven | DAC | tin, ld, zr | Ask 1180 |
| 1779 | | Tong Wun Hong | EIC | Ty, Sl, zr, tx, pp, Sk | Morse v. 2; Dermigny 898; G/12/66, 68, 70 |
| 1779 | | | VOC | | VOC 4419; Can 88 |
| 1780 | Pan Wenyan | Tongwen Hang | CHD | | QGY doc. No. 501; QDGZ p. 61 |
| 1780 | | Tung-Ven | DAC | K, ld, tin | Ask 1183–4 |
| 1780 | | Tongwun hong | EIC | C, Sl, zr, Ty, zr, B, tx, ld, H | Morse v. 2; Inglis 12; G/12/68–71 |
| 1780 | | | VOC | pm, B | Can 43, 89; VOC 4421 |
| 1781 | Pan Wenyan | | CHD | SOIC | QGY doc. No. 502; XS pp. 444–45; MQSQ doc. No. 263 |
| 1781 | | | DAC | FR | Ask 1185 |
| 1781 | | | EIC | B, tx, ld, Ty, Sl, H, C, zr | Morse v. 2; G/12/72–74 |
| 1781 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_01143–46 |
| 1782 | | | CFI | | AEAD: 8MD Asie 17 p. 401 |
| 1782 | Pan Wenyan | | CHD | | QGY doc. Nos. 514, 518 |
| 1782 | Hauqua, his clerk | | DAC | B, K, C, zr, H | Ask 1190, 2240 |
| 1782 | Seequa | | EIC | B, Sl, C, Ty, zr, ld | Morse v. 2; G/12/75–76; Inglis 13; G/12/76 |
| 1782 | | | SOIC | | Ask 1186 p. 44 |
| 1783 | | | CFI | | Constant 196, 226–28, 408 n.(a) |
| 1783 | Hauqua, his clerk, went to work with Monqua | | DAC | B, C | Ask 1191, 2241 |
| 1783 | Seequa and Puan Khequa's son | | EIC | B, zr, Sk, Sl, tx, ld, H, C, Ty | Morse v. 2; Inglis 13; G/12/77–78 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products Traded | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1783 | | | SOIC | | Constant 226–28 |
| 1783 | | | VOC | | Can 245 |
| 1784 | Pan Wenyan | | CHD | | Xing doc. No. 48; MQSQ doc. No. 270; QSL 3: 20–21 |
| 1784 | | | DAC | C | Ask 2242 |
| 1784 | Seequa | | EIC | Sl, Ty, tx, Sc, H, Sk, R, cp, ms, zr | Morse v. 2; G/12/18, 20, 79–80 |
| 1784 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_02404–11 |
| 1784 | | | USA | | Smith (see index); Shaw 179 |
| 1784 | | | VOC | | Can 90 |
| 1785 | | | CFI | | C.1.15 p. 99r |
| 1785 | Pan Wenyan | | CHD | | QGY doc. Nos. 524, 526–7 |
| 1785 | | | DAC | B, K, H, C | Ask 2243 |
| 1785 | | | EIC | B, tx, ld, Ty, Sl, H, C, zr, pp, Sc, Sk | Morse v. 2; G/12/79, 81–3 |
| 1786 | | | DAC | C, HS, H | Ask 1200, 2244 |
| 1786 | | | EIC | zr, B, Sl, C, Sc, H, Sk, K | Morse v. 2; G/12/82, 84–5 |
| 1786 | | | VOC | Pm | Can 48, 92, 248; VOC 4432 |
| 1787 | | | CFI | | C.1.16 pp. 31, 38v, 57r–v, 71, 97v; Cordier (1922) 3: 15, 17–8, 20, 44–5; AEAD: 8MD Asie 19 p. 49v |
| 1787 | Pan Wenyan | | CHD | | QGY doc. No. 569 |
| 1787 | | | DAC | K, H | Ask 2245 |
| 1787 | | died 10 Jan 1788 | EIC | H, Ty, B, zr, C, Sk, Sc, tx, ld | Morse v. 2: 138; G/12/84–8 |
| 1788 | Pan Wenyan | Tongwen Hang | CHD | | QGY doc. Nos. 571, 575; QDGZ p. 65 |
| 1788 | | | DAC | K, C, H | Ask 2246 |
| 1788 | | | EIC | Sl, C, zr, B, CK, Sc, Nk, Sk | Morse v. 2; G/12/20, 87–9, 94; OR: 2: 321 |

**APPENDIX 3B: Schedule of Pan and Chen Trading Activities in the Dafeng Hang 達豐行 1753–1796**

Chen Guiguan's trade names: *Tan Quiqua, Chan Queyqua, Queyqua, Quiqua, Chanqueyqua*

| Year | Co. | Merchants' Names | Chinese | Name in Mandarin | Chinese | Products Traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1753 | SOIC | Poankeequa | | (Tatfong) Dafeng Hang | 達豐行 | tea | GL: A 406(b) |
| 1754 | Chinese | Chen Zheng | 陳正 | Dafeng Hang | 達豐行 | | Lau 1415 |
| 1754 | Chinese | Chen Zheng | 陳正 | Dafeng Hang | 達豐行 | under 本港行 after 1760 | Lau 1415; Viraphol 134; YHGZ 25: 496 |
| 1755 | DAC | Poankeequa | 潘啟官 | Dafeng Hang | 達豐行 | Bx, B, sat, z, C, zt, ld | Ask 1135(sbc), 2209b |
| 1755 | DAC | Poankeequa & Pan Seguan | 潘啟官, 潘瑟官 | Dafeng Hang | 達豐行 | zt, B, lu, pq, sat, psy | Ask 1135(sbc) |
| 1757 | DAC | Poankeequa & Pan Seguan | 潘啟官, 潘瑟官 | Dafeng Hang | 達豐行 | zt, pq, psy, lu, HS, Sl, B, C, ZZ, z, H | Ask 1137(sbc), 2210 |
| 1759 | Chinese | Chen Zheng | 陳正 | Dafeng Hang | 達豐行 | | QG 1428–9, 1445, 1451, 1861 |
| 1759 | DAC | Poankeequa | 潘啟官 | Dafeng Hang | 達豐行 | Pc, B | Ask 1139–1142, 1144(sbc), 2214, 2215 |
| 1761 | DAC | Poankeequa | 潘啟官 | Dafeng Hang | 達豐行 | B, Ty, HS, Bg, H, PZZ, Pc, tu, P | Ask 1146(sbc), 2218 |
| 1761 | SOIC | Pan Qiqua and Chen Guiguan | 潘啟官, 陳貴觀 | Dafeng Hang, Junk Samkonghing | 達豐行, 三廣興 | | NM: F17 pp. T1_05641–3(sbc) |
| 1762 | DAC | Poankeequa | 潘啟官 | Dafeng Hang | 達豐行 | C, Hs, Pc, PZZ, B, Bty | Ask 1148a(sbc) |
| 1764 | SOIC | Gregorio Chang | Manila trade with Pan Qiguan | | | | NM: F17 pp. T1_00731–, T1_01363 |
| 1764 | SOIC | Tan Matay, Tanmatay | captain of Qium Contay | | trades with Pan Qiguan & D. Jorge San Clemente | | NM: F17 p. T1_00733 |
| 1765 | SOIC | Chen Guiguan | | | | | NM: F17 pp. T1_03014–20 |

| Year | Co. | Merchants' Names | Chinese | Name in Mandarin | Chinese | Products Traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1765 | SOIC | Gregorio Chan | went with the junk to Manila | | | | NM: F17 pp. T1_00791–3 |
| 1765 | SOIC | Tanmatay, Tan Matay | Capt. of Quim Contay | trades with Don Jorge San Clemente of Xieshun Gongsi 協順公司 | | | NM: F17 p. T1_00789, Plate 03.18(b) |
| 1766 | SOIC | Chen Guiguan | | | | | NM: F17 p. T1_00889– |
| 1766 | SOIC | Gregorio Chan | | T1_01363–64 has two letters from G. Chan | | | NM: F17 p. T1_01364 |
| 1767 | SOIC | Chen Guiguan | | trades under Poankeequa I | | | NM: F17 p. T1_06601 |
| 1768 | SOIC | Chen Guiguan | 陳貴觀 | Dafeng (Thatfong) | 達豐行 | | NM: F17 p. T1_05146(sb) |
| 1769 | VOC | Captain Cai Zouguan | 蔡諏觀 | Dafeng Hang | 達豐行 | Junk Huangzai 黃仔 to Batavia | Can 277, No. 30 |
| 1769 | SOIC | Chen Guiguan | | Chen Guiguan | | | NM: F17 pp. T1_01972– |
| 1772 | SOIC | Chen Guiguan | | | | | NM: F17 pp. T1_02038– |
| 1772 | SOIC | Tan Matay | captain of Manila junk and relative of Pan Qiquan's | | | | NM: F17 pp. T1_05333–9 |
| 1772 | VOC | Gregory, Gregorio Chan | | | | C, Nl | Can 35, 81; VOC 4410 |
| 1790 | VOC | Cheong Leoqua, Gregorie Chan | Cheong Leoqua is Poankeequa I's nephew (his brother's son) | | | Sc, C | GHL: Ms 1985 |
| 1791 | VOC | Gregorie Chan & Cheong Leoqua | Gregorie Chan, an old capable Chinese Christian of good character | | | Sc, C, K, Nl | Can 53; VOC 4446; GHL: Ms 1985 |
| 1792 | VOC | Cheong Leoqua | | | | C, Sc, K | Can 54; VOC 4576 |
| 1792 | VOC | Gregorie Chan & Cheong Leoqua | at Macao | Dutch try to engage 30 Chinese sailors from Gregorie Chan | | | Can 54 |
| 1795 | Dutch | Gregorio Chang | | | | | OIC 196 |
| 1796 | Dutch | Gregory Chang | | | | | Can 58 |

**APPENDIX 3C: Poankeequa's Trade with the DAC 1752–1788 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | No. | Ship name | Return cargos | Pan trade | Products traded |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1752 | 1 | *Princesse Lowise* | 141,056 | 13,967 | B |
| | 1 | *Cron Prin af Dan* | 144,167 | 18,632 | B |
| 1753 | 1 | *D Sophia Magd* | 154,753 | 7,275 | B |
| | 1 | *D Juliana Maria* | 154,232 | 7,214 | B |
| 1755 | 1 | *D Juliana Maria* | 180,987 | 27,245 | Bx, B, sat, z, C |
| 1757 | 1 | *Princesse Lowise* | 137,506 | 25,370 | C, HS, ZZ, B, ZZ, H, z |
| 1758 | 1 | *D Juliana Maria* | 124,729 | 13,407 | B, C |
| 1759 | 1 | *Kong af Dan* | 139,581 | 1,485 | Pc |
| | 1 | *Cron Pr af Dan* | 108,114 | 819 | Pc |
| | 1 | *Princesse Lowise* | 141,743 | 9,128 | B |
| 1761 | 1 | *Kong af Dan* | 135,120 | 31,985 | B, Ty, HS, Bg, H, PZZ, Pc, tu |
| 1762 | 1 | *Pr Fred af Dan* | 235,800 | 32,844 | B, C |
| | 1 | *D Sophia Magd* | 171,654 | 47,158 | C, HS, Pc, PZZ |
| 1763 | 1 | *Princesse Lowise* | 151,835 | 17,531 | B |
| | 1 | *D Juliana Maria* | 146,541 | 8,202 | B |
| 1764 | 1 | *Pr Fred af Dan* | 263,800 | 90,633 | Pc, B, C, H, Ty, z, sat |
| 1766 | 1 | *Fred'borg Slott* | 203,820 | 2,511 | C, HS |
| 1767 | 1 | *D Sophia Magd* | 174,171 | 12,914 | B, C |
| | 1 | *Pr Fred af Dan* | 240,875 | 27,043 | B, C |
| 1768 | 1 | *Fred'borg Slott* | 212,082 | 30,349 | B, C |
| 1769 | 1 | *D Sophia Magd* | 166,374 | 22,210 | B, C, ZZ, PcZZ |
| 1770 | 1 | *Fred'borg Slott* | 168,627 | 32,233 | B, ZZ, Ty, Bg, PcZZ |
| | 1 | *Kong af Dan* | 181,621 | 17,953 | B, PcZZ, ZZ |
| 1772 | 1 | *Kong af Dan* | 166,886 | 21,684 | B, H |
| | 1 | *Fred'borg Slott* | 153,585 | 24,536 | B |
| The DAC account books are missing for 1773 to 1781 | | | | | |
| 1782 | 4 | *M,D,K af D, ChA* | 918,095 | 200,256 | B, K, C, rz, H |
| 1783 | 2 | *S Mag & Cron Pr* | 467,604 | 40,592 | B, C |
| 1784 | 3 | *Dk & JM & Dis* | 516,624 | 36,990 | C |
| 1785 | 3 | *CP & Mars & CA* | 647,740 | 89,316 | B, K, H, C |
| 1786 | 2 | *Dk & S Mag* | 460,474 | 51,865 | C, HS, H |
| 1787 | 2 | *D Jul M & Cron P* | 544,740 | 51,002 | K, H |
| 1788 | 2 | *P Ch A & Mars* | 540,269 | 73,145 | K, C, H |
| Total | 43 | Years = 23 | 8,295,205 | 1,087,494 | 13.11% |
| average per year | | | 360,661 | 47,282 | |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Ask 2205–15, 2018, 2220–23, 2225–26, 2228, 2231–46.

**APPENDIX 3D: Poankeequa and Sons' Trade with the VOC 1773–1792 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Ships | Total receipts | Pan Trade | Products Traded | Trade Name |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1773 | 4 | 670,531 | 106,576 | g, B | Poankeequa I |
| 1774 | 4 | 603,020 | 63,626 | S, hs, B, C | Poankeequa I |
| 1779 | 4 | 799,117 | 778 | ? | Poankeequa I |
| 1780 | 4 | 732,092 | 1,562 | ? | Poankeequa I |
| 1786 | 5 | 1,266,617 | 1,594 | ? | Poankeequa I |
| 1791 | 2 | 623,795 | 12,611 | sc, kp | Poankeequa II |
| 1792 | 4 | 1,071,153 | 184,674 | sc, tk, kp, H, hs, B, C | Poankeequa II |
| Total | 16 | 1,694,948 | 371,421 | 22% | |

Source: *Grootboeken* NAH: VOC 4411–12, 4419, 4421, 4432, 4446, 4576.

**APPENDIX 3E: Destinations and Sponsors of Dafeng Hang 達豐行 Junks and Junk *Quim Contay* from Manila**

| No | Junk Name | 1761 | 1762 | 1763 | 1764 | 1765 | 1766 | 1767 | 1768 | 1769 | 1770 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | *Samkonghing*[6] | CC, Ba, PQ | CC, GS | CC, MG | Ba, MG, NH | CC, Ba, ZM, NH | Ba, NH | CC, NH, PQ | Ba,[1] NH, ZM | | LO, NH |
| 2 | *Quongli* | | | | | | GS | GS | Ps | | |
| 3 | *Quongjeck* | | | | | | Ca | Ca, Cg | Cg | Cg[3] | Cg[3] |
| 4 | *Tengfuychou* | | | | | | | | Ps[2] | | |
| 5 | *Chantongchow* | | | | | PQ | | | Ps | | |
| 6 | *Honka* | | | | | | | | | Ba | |
| | *Quim Contay* (from Manila) | | | | Ma, PQ[5] | Ps, NH, JS | Ps, Ma, NH | Ps,[4] NH | Ma, NH | | |

Sources: Plates 03.10, 03.14, 03.20, NM: F17; CMD 1763, 3 September, p. 113; CMD 1764, 10 January, p. 7, 14 August, p. 170, 18 August, p. 173, 22 August, p. 177; NAH: Canton 77, 1768.09.16–19, 1768.10.06, Canton 78, 1769.06.06, 1769.07.05, 1769.07.14, Canton 278, report dated 1763.12.24, p. 8, VOC 4556 'Macaos Vaarders'; MCM 1: Plate 04.01; Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Plate 12.

Key: Ba = Batavia, Ca = Cambodia, CC = Cochin China, Cg = Caucong, GC = Gregorio Chan, GS = Gau Semqua (Qiu Kun 邱崑), JS = Juan Francisco Solano, LO = Layover, Ma = Manila, MG = Ma Guohu 馬國護, NH = Ngan Hongsia (Yan Xiangshe 顏享舍), Ps = Passiak, PQ = Poankeequa (Pan Qiguan 潘啟官), ZM = Zey Monqua (Cai Wenguan 蔡文官). Junks: *Samkonghing* 三廣興, *Quongli* 廣利, *Quongjeck* 廣億, *Tengfuychou* 釘灰鮹, *Chantongchow* 山東鮹, *Honka* 黃仔, *Quim Contay*?

Notes

1. In 1768, it was rumoured that *Samkonghing* was captured by Malaysian pirates. It was later discovered that it had wintered near Hainan Island due to storm.
2. In 1768, *Tengfuychou* was reported to have come from Hainan.
3. These Junks are suspected to have visited these ports.
4. In January 1767, *Quim Contay* was reported to be from Ningbo.

5. Other persons listed as freighting goods on the junk this year include GC and JS.
6. On 30 November 1772, a Swede reported that *Samkonghing* was lost in the passing year. NM: F17 p. T1_02040.

**APPENDIX 3F: Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 3**

It is impossible to identify Poankeequa in the records that have survived from the 1730s and 1740s. I have found no name with a first syllable similar to Pan, Pun or Poan attached to a 'Keequa'. The shortened version of Poankeequa was Keequa.

Cheong mentions that 'Khequa became known as Phuankhequa', which is plausible, but we have no way to trace it (Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 81). Several merchants went by this name. It was spelled in various ways, including Keequa, Khequa, Quiqua, Kiqua, Khiqua, etc. Some of these references could possibly be referring to Poankeequa. However, it is impossible to sort out who was who. In some cases we can follow the paper trails and connect them to full names like Mandarin Quiqua or Old Quiqua and Young Quiqua. I have found no references in the foreign records before 1748 that can be positively connected to Poankeequa. He was probably concentrating more on his Spanish trade at Manila and junk trade to Southeast Asia in these early years, which may be why we do not have clear references to him in the foreign records.

Cheong has confused Poankeequa with others: 'Phuankhequa I and Chowqua I were apprentice and son respectively, of Mandarin Quiqua in the late 1730s' (Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 122n35). I have shown in the first volume that the Keequa who was working with Mandarin Quiqua was not Poankeequa (MCM 1: Chapter 10 and Appendix 10H). Poankeequa was born in 1714, so it is plausible that he was already trading in Canton by the mid-1730s and early 1740s. However, we have no clear references to confirm this.

One other clarification should be made here. Every study that has been done on the merchants and the trade has assumed that Poankeequa's firm was always the Tongwen Hang 同文行. This study shows that prior to 1760, Poankeequa conducted his trade out of the Dafeng Hang 達豐行. It is not until 1760 that we have the first reference to the Tongwen Hang.

**APPENDIX 4A: Tan Anqua's Schedule**

Aliases: Chen Anguan 陳安觀; Chen Wenfei 陳文斐

| Biographical data | Date | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| Death | 5 January 1790 | BL: IOR G/12/96, 1790.01.06, p. 128 |

| Business | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Jinyuan Hang | 晉元行 | Plate 04.01(sbc) |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products trade | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1749 | | | VOC | pp | VOC 8721 |
| 1750 | | | VOC | | VOC 8721 |
| 1751 | | | VOC | G, H | Can 15 |
| 1752 | | | VOC | tin, tea, Ak, ld, B | Can 7, 17 |
| 1753 | | Jinyuan | SOIC | | GL: A 406[(b)] |
| 1753 | Tan Suqua, Swetia, Beaukeequa | | VOC | Tn | Can 17 |
| 1754 | | | VOC | Tn, Ak | Can 19, 20 |
| 1755 | | | VOC | | Can 20 |
| 1756 | | | VOC | B, tin, ld, ps, Ak, G, Pc | Can 22 |
| 1757 | | | CFI | | C.1.10 p. 120v |
| 1757 | Beaukeequa, Hou Suckin | Jinyuan | VOC | Sc, B, z, C, ld | VOC 4381[(sbc)]; JFB: B 1758 fNe |
| 1758 | | | SOIC | Sc, Pc, C | NM: F17 pp. T1_03926–31 |
| 1758 | Beaukeequa | | VOC | see Appendix 4B | Can 24; VOC 4382; JFB: B 1758 fNe |
| 1759 | (same as Chen Wenfei) | Jinyuan | CHD | | QGY doc. Nos. 280, 327 |
| 1759 | Awue | Jinyuan | DAC | see Appendix 4B | Ask 1139–42, 1144[(bc)], 2214–15 |
| 1759 | | | EIC | tu | R/10/4 |
| 1760 | | | CFI | | Dermigny 834; Cheong 121n20; Constant 318; SHD: 1P 299 liasse 31 |
| 1760 | | | VOC | B | VOC 4386 |
| 1763 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 p. T1_05135 |
| 1764 | | | SOIC | C | NM: F17 pp. T1_00718– |
| 1764 | | | CFI | C | NM: F17 pp. T1_00873–74, T1_06299 |
| 1764 | | | EIC | Sc, C | NM: F17 pp. T1_00718–20, T1_00786, T1_01772, T1_06299, T1_06707, T1_07311–12 |
| 1765 | | | SOIC | C | NM: F17 pp. T1_00782, T1_00785–86, T1_00873– |
| 1765 | Tjobqua | | VOC | Macao tin, Sc, C, B | Can 28, 74 |
| 1765 | | | Port | tea | Can 74 |
| 1766 | | | SOIC | tea | NM: F17 pp. T1_00888–, T1_01803, T1_01831 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products trade | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1767 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_00944–, T1_01832–; GUB: Ströms H21.1 Nr 1152 |
| 1768 | | | EIC | Sc | R/10/5 |
| 1768 | | | SOIC | By, C | NM: F17 pp. T1_05396–97 |
| 1769 | | | VOC | C | Can 78 |
| 1770 | | | VOC | | Can 79 |
| 1770 | | | CFI | | C.1.12 p. 14r |
| 1772 | | | CFI | | C.1.11 pp. 90–92 and C.1.12 pp. 14r–v, 24 |
| 1772 | | | EIC | Sc | R/10/9 |
| 1774 | | | EIC | zr | R/10/9 |
| 1775 | | | EIC | H, C | G/12/58 |
| 1776 | | | DAC | K, C | Ask 1175 |
| 1776 | | | EIC | Sc, Sk | G/12/59 |
| 1777 | | | EIC | Sc, C | G/12/61–62 |
| 1777 | | | SOIC | C | GUB: H22.15 p. 20 |
| 1777 | | | VOC | see Appendix 4B | Can 40; VOC 4415 |
| 1778 | | | EIC | C | G/12/64 |
| 1778 | | | VOC | Sc | Can 41, 87; VOC 4418 |
| 1780 | | | EIC | Sc | G/12/70 |
| 1781 | | | EIC | Sc, C, H | G/12/72–74 |
| 1783 | | | EIC | Sc | G/12/77–78 |
| 1784 | | | EIC | Sc, C, H | G/12/79–80 |
| 1784 | | | SOIC | | NM: F17 pp. T1_02404– |
| 1785 | | | EIC | Sc, C, H | G/12/79, 81–83 |
| 1785 | | | VOC | see Appendix 4B | Can 47; VOC 4431 |
| 1786 | | | EIC | Sc | G/12/82, 84–85 |
| 1787 | | | EIC | Sc | G/12/85–88 |
| 1788 | | | EIC | C, Sc | G/12/20, 88–89, 94 |
| 1789 | | | EIC | Sc, C, CK | G/12/94, 96–97 |
| 1790 | (died on 5 Jan 1790) | | EIC | C, Sc, CK | G/12/96–99 |
| 1791 | | | EIC | CK, Sc, Pc | G/12/98–102 |
| 1792 | | | EIC | Sc | G/12/102–4 |
| 1793 | | | EIC | Sc | G/12/104–5, 107 |
| 1794 | | | EIC | Sc | G/12/106–9 |

**APPENDIX 4B: Tan Anqua's Trade with the VOC and DAC 1757–1785 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

Tan Anqua's Trade with the VOC 1757–1785 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)

| Year | Ships | Total receipts | Joint trade | Individual | Products traded | Trade names |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1757 | 1 | 208,140 | 34,523 | | zt | Tan Anqua & Weaver Suckin |
| | | | | 33,685 | Sc, B | Tan Anqua |
| 1758 | 3 | 364,592 | 4,289 | | B | Beau Queyqua & Tan Anqua |
| | | | | 26,945 | G, sw, B, tin, C | Tan Anqua |
| 1777 | 4 | 796,175 | | 3,538 | Sc | Tan Anqua |
| 1778 | 4 | 765,224 | | 6,095 | Sc | Tan Anqua |
| 1785 | 4 | 992,376 | | 8,086 | C | Tan Anqua |
| Total | 16 | 3,126,507 | 38,812 | 78,349 | 117,161 | 3.75% |
| average per year | | 625,301 | 7,762 | 15,670 | 23,432 | |

Source: *Grootboeken* in NAH: VOC 4381–82, 4415, 4418, 4431.

Tan Anqua's Trade with the DAC 1759 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)

| Year | hips | Name | Return cargo | Individual | Products traded | Trade names |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1759 | 1 | *Princesse Lowise* | 141,743 | 19,618 | B | Tan Anqua |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Ask 2215.

**APPENDIX 4C: Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 4**

There were several merchants in Canton who went by the name Anqua, but Tan Anqua was the only one who used the alias Hoyqua or Young Hoyqua. He was also the only Anqua who regularly attached the surname Tan 陳 to his name, which makes him fairly easy to identify. There were a couple of merchants with the first name Anqua, but none of these others had the last name Tan (Chen 陳). When Tan Anqua is simply referred to as Anqua, it is still fairly easy to identify him by following the money trails (purchases, deliveries, payments, etc.).

Other Anqua's included Cai Anqua, second son of the famous Cai Hunqua. This man appears in the records from about 1765 to his death in late 1774 or early 1775 (MCM 1: 131 and 344). This Cai Anqua is rather easy to keep separate from Tan Anqua by looking at his associations. The former man traded out of the Yifeng Hang with his father, several brothers and owner Semqua. He often appears in the records as 'Sy Anqua' (with various spellings for 'Sy').

In 1785, another Cai Anguan 蔡安觀 appears in the French archives (Plate 05.02) working in the house of Geowqua (Chapter 5). The French called him Ounqua. There is also a man who shows up in the EIC records named 'Amqua' in the early 1770s selling

tea, silk and other wares (for a couple examples, see BL: IOR R/10/9, 1772.01.26, p. 4 and 1775.01.03, p. 100). It is unclear who he was, but it is possible these are references to Tan Anqua. In 1783, for example, Tan Anqua is referred to as Ton Amqua (BL: IOR G/12/78, 1783.12.15–16, p. 78–79), but the earlier references to Amqua are unclear. I have omitted the ambiguous entries.

## APPENDIX 5A: Geowqua's Schedule

Aliases: Wu Qiaoguan 伍喬官; Wu Guozhao 伍國釗
Trade Names: *Kinqua*, *Kiouqua*, *Quouqua*, *Qiouqua*, *Keequa*, *Kiauqua*, *Qiauqua*, *Quiauqua*, *Kequa*, *Queouqua*, *Kiuqua*, *Geowqua*, *Gewqua*, *Geoqua*, *Geouqua*

| Biographical data | Date | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| Born | 1734 | *Wu shi zupu* 伍氏族譜 |
| Death | 1802 | *Wu shi zupu* 伍氏族譜 |

| Cousins | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| Puiqua | Wu Bingjun | 伍秉鈞 | *Wu shi zupu* 伍氏族譜 |
| Houqua | Wu Bingjian | 伍秉鑑 | *Wu shi zupu* 伍氏族譜 |

| Business | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Yuanshun Hang | 源順行 | Plate 05.01[(sbc)] |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1772 | writer in Ingsia's house | | VOC | C | Can 35 |
| 1775 | | | EIC | Nk | G/12/58 |
| 1775 | | | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 38; VOC 4413 |
| 1776 | | | EIC | Sl | G/12/59 |
| 1776 | writer in Ingsia's house | | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 39, 85 |
| 1777 | | | DAC | PZZ | Ask 1177 |
| 1777 | writer in Ingsia's house | | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 40; VOC 4415 |
| 1778 | | | DAC | C | Ask 1179 |
| 1778 | | | EIC | gt, Sl, Ty | G/12/64–65 |
| 1778 | writer in Ingsia's house | | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 41; VOC 4418 |
| 1779 | | | DAC | Nk, HS, H, Ty | Ask 1180 |
| 1779 | | | EIC | S | G/12/66 |
| 1780 | | | DAC | R, ld, Pc, C, ZZ, H, K, HS, Nk | Ask 1183–14 |
| 1780 | | | VOC | Sc | Can 43; VOC 4421 |
| 1781 | | | DAC | zt, P, tu | Ask 1185 |
| 1781 | 'formerly Yngshaws clerk' | | EIC | Ty, Sl | G/12/72–74 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1782 | Lunsia | Chowqua's writer | DAC | see Appendix 5C | Ask 1190, 2240 |
| 1782 | | | EIC | | Morse v. 2; Inglis 13; G/12/76 |
| 1783 | | | CFI | | Constant 226–32 |
| 1783 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5C | Ask 2241 |
| 1783 | | | EIC | Ty, Sl, B, pp, tx, ld, H, Sk, Sc | Morse v. 2; G/12/77–78 |
| 1783 | | | SOIC | | Constant 226–32 |
| 1783 | | | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 45, 245; VOC 4430 |
| 1784 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5C | Ask 2242 |
| 1784 | | | EIC | B, Sl, tx, H, C, Ty | Morse v. 2; G/12/79–80 |
| 1784 | | | USA | | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets; Smith, see Index |
| 1784 | | | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 46, 90, 246; VOC 4426 |
| 1785 | | | CFI | | C.1.15 p. 93 |
| 1785 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5C | Ask 2243 |
| 1785 | | | EIC | Ty, H, Sc, C, Sl, Sk | Morse v. 2; G/12/79, 81–83 |
| 1785 | | | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 47, 247, 295; VOC 4431 |
| 1786 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5C | Ask 1200, 2244 |
| 1786 | | | EIC | Sl, Ty, K, C, Sk, HC | Morse v. 2; G/12/82, 84–85 |
| 1786 | | | Imp | cotton | G/12/82 |
| 1786 | | Yuanshun | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 48; VOC 4432, 4433(bc) |
| 1787 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5C | Ask 2245 |
| 1787 | | | EIC | B, Ty, Sl, K, C, tx, H | Morse v. 2; G/12/84–88 |
| 1787 | it says he was Ingsia's writer in 1775 | | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 49, 93, 249, 366; VOC 4436 |
| 1788 | | | CHD | | QGY doc. No. 575 |
| 1788 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5C | Ask 2246 |
| 1788 | | | EIC | Ty, Sl, B, C, K, Sk, H, HS | Morse v. 2; G/12/20, 87–89, 94 |
| 1788 | | | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 50, 93, 250, 366; VOC 4440 |
| 1789 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5C | Ask 2247 |
| 1789 | | | EIC | Ty, Sl, C, Sc, ld, CK, H | Morse v. 2; G/12/94, 96–97 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1789 | | Yuanshun | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 51, 95, 251, 366; VOC 4444 |
| 1790 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5C | Ask 2248 |
| 1790 | | | EIC | tx, pp, C, B, CK, ld, tin, Sc, Pc, HS | Morse v. 2; G/12/96–99 |
| 1790 | | | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 52, 367; VOC 4445 |
| 1791 | | | EIC | CK, H, HS, R, Ty, Sl, Sc, B, C, tx, tin, ld | Morse v. 2; G/12/98–102 |
| 1791 | his writer is Tzy Jinqua | Yuanshun Hang | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 53, 252; VOC 4446[(b)]; GHL: Ms 1985 |
| 1792 | | | CHD | | Xing 58; QGY doc. No. 599; QDGZ p. 66 |
| 1792 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5C | Ask 2249 |
| 1792 | | | EIC | B, C, cp, R, Ty, H, zr, Pc, sw | Morse v. 2; G/12/103–4 |
| 1792 | | | VOC | see Appendix 5D | Can 54, 62, 253; VOC 4576 |
| 1793 | | | EIC | zr, B, w, tin, ld, C, H | Morse v. 2; G/12/103–5, 107 |
| 1793 | | | VOC | C, Pc, Sc | Can 55, 254; VOC 4447 |
| 1794 | | | CHD | | QGY doc. No. 614 |
| 1794 | | | DAC | C, H, B, Rx, ga, zr, tu | Ask 1208 |
| 1794 | | | EIC | B, C, Sc, Sl, w, ld | Morse v. 2; G/12/107–9 |
| 1794 | | | VOC | C, Sc, K, Nl, la, pp, tin, B, HS, H | Can 56, 62, 256–57, 326; OIC 194; Ch'en 301 |
| 1795 | | | EIC | Sc, C, H, tin, Sl, HS | Morse v. 2; G/12/108–11 |
| 1795 | | Yuanshun | VOC | K, B, C, Sc, H, Nl | Can 57; OIC 196, 238Q[(sbc)] |
| 1796 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5C | Ask 1209, 2250 |
| 1796 | | | EIC | w, ct, tin, C, Ty, Sl, H, Sk, B, Sc, CK, ld | Morse v. 2; G/12/110–15, 117 |
| 1796 | sent his son to speak to the Dutch | | VOC | | Can 58, 96, 260, 326; OIC 197 |
| 1797 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5C | Ask 2251; G/12/116 |
| 1797 | | | EIC | B, tx, Ty, C, Sc, CK, tin | Morse v. 2; G/12/116–20 |
| 1797 | | | VOC | | Can 261, 330; OIC 198 |
| 1798 | | | EIC | C, w, tin, ld | Morse v. 2; G/12/119–21 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1798 | | | VOC | | Can 60, 97, 262, 269, 331; RAB 142 |
| 1799 | | | EIC | | G/12/126 |
| 1799 | | | VOC | | Can 61, 263, 306; RAB 140 |
| 1800 | | | EIC | | G/12/128 |
| 1800 | | | VOC | | Can 62, 264, 333 |
| 1801 | | | VOC | | Can 265; RAB 140 |
| 1802 | | | VOC | | Can 64, 266, 343 |
| 1806 | | | VOC | | Can 99 |

**APPENDIX 5B: Puiqua's Schedule**

Aliases: Wu Peiguan 伍沛官; Wu Bingjun 吳秉鈞; Wu Zhongcheng 伍忠誠
Trade Names: *Poyqua, Poiqua, Puqua, Puiqua, Poeyqua, Piuqua, Pjuqua, Poeiqua*

| Biographical data | Date | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| Born | 1767 | *Wu shi zupu* 伍氏族譜 |
| Death | 1801 | *Wu shi zupu* 伍氏族譜 |

| Relatives | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| Houqua (brother) | Wu Bingjian | 伍秉鑑 | *Wu shi zupu* 伍氏族譜 |
| Geowqua (cousin) | Wu Qiaoguan | 伍喬官 | *Wu shi zupu* 伍氏族譜 |

| Business | Mandarin | Chinese | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Yihe Hang | 怡和行 | Plate 05.03(b) |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1786 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5E | Ask 1200, 2244 |
| 1787 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5E | Ask 2245 |
| 1788 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5E | Ask 2246 |
| 1789 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5E | Ask 2247 |
| 1790 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5E | Ask 2248 |
| 1791 | | | VOC | | GHL: Ms 1985 |
| 1792 | | | CHD | | Xing doc. No. 58; QGY doc. No. 599; QDGZ p. 66 |
| 1792 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5E | Ask 1207, 2249 |
| 1792 | | | EIC | C, tx | Morse v. 2; G/12/103–4 |
| 1792 | | | VOC | Pc, H | Can 54, 62, 253; VOC 4576 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1793 | Hooqua | | EIC | B, w, C, CK, Sl | Morse v. 2; G/12/103–5, 107 |
| 1793 | | | VOC | | Can 55, 254 |
| 1794 | | | DAC | ps, B | Ask 1208 |
| 1794 | | | EIC | C, Sc, H, HS, Pc, B, w, ld | Morse v. 2; G/12/107–9 |
| 1794 | | | VOC | Sc, C, Nl, tin, pp, K, B, Pc, HS, H, cv | Can 56, 62, 256–57; OIC 194; Ch'en 301 |
| 1795 | | | EIC | C, H, HS, w, B, Sc | Morse v. 2; G/12/108–11 |
| 1795 | | Yihe Hang | VOC | C, K, Sc, B, Pc, Nl | Can 57; OIC 196, 238Q(sbc) |
| 1796 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5E | Ask 2250 |
| 1796 | | | EIC | w, ct, tin, C, Sc, B, Ty, CK, H, Pc, ld | Morse v. 2; G/12/110–15 and 117 |
| 1796 | | | SOIC | | GUB: H22.12 |
| 1796 | | | VOC | | Can 58, 96, 260, 326; OIC 197 |
| 1797 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5E | Ask 2251 |
| 1797 | | | EIC | B, CK, tx, ct, Ty, Sc, H, HS, C, tin | Morse v. 2: 298; G/12/116–20 |
| 1797 | | | SOIC | | GUB: H22.12 |
| 1797 | | | VOC | | Can 261, 330; OIC 198 |
| 1798 | | | EIC | B, H, Ty, C, H, HS, Sc, Ty, Pc, CK, Nk, Sl, w, tin, ld, sw | Morse v. 2: 317; G/12/119–23 |
| 1798 | | | SOIC | | GUB: H22.12 |
| 1798 | | | VOC | | Can 60, 97, 262, 269, 331 |
| 1799 | | Yihe Hang | CHD | | QGY doc. No. 671; Xu 2: 53–56 |
| 1799 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5E | Ask 2252, 2253 |
| 1799 | | | EIC | Ty, C, HS, H, tx, tin, ld, Nk, B, Sc, CK | Morse v. 2; G/12/123–6 |
| 1799 | | | VOC | pp, tin, cv, Ak | Can 61, 263, 306, 333; RAB 140 |
| 1800 | 伍怡和 | Wu Yihe | CHD | | QDGZ p. 71 |
| 1800 | | | DAC | see Appendix 5E | Ask 2254 |
| 1800 | Houqua | | EIC | w, B, C, ld, tin, H, Sc, CK, Nk, Ty, HS, ld, ct, tin, sw, pp | Morse v. 2: 348; G/12/128–32 |
| 1800 | | | SOIC | | GUB: H22.12, 15 |

| Year | Partners | Hong | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1800 | | Yihe Hang | VOC | FR, C, K, Sc, Pc, Ty | Can 62, 264, 333, 389; RAB 140(sbc) |
| 1801 | | | CHD | | QGY doc. No. 681 |
| 1801 | died on 23 July 1801, at noon | | EIC | B, Nk, C, HS, Ty, Nk, Sl, Sc, CK, tin, ld, w, sw, H, ct, Pc | Morse v. 2; G/12/133–37 |
| 1801 | | | SOIC | | GUB: H22.12 |
| 1801 | | | USA | | JCB: Brown B664 |
| 1801 | died on 23 July 1801 | | VOC | | Can 63, 98, 265, 339, 389; RAB 140 |
| 1802 | | | VOC | J, Sc, C | Can 266, 269, 342, 343; RAB 142 |

**APPENDIX 5C: Geowqua's Trade with the DAC 1782–1797 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Ships | Ship Names | Return Cargos | Geowqua | Products Traded |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1782 | 4 | *M, D, K af D, ChA* | 918,095 | 303,024 | Tu, B, K, C, H, Nk, ZZ, K, Sl, z, R |
| 1783 | 2 | *S Mag & Cron Pr* | 467,604 | 302,066 | K, B, ZZ, H, C, Nk, Hs, B, R, ZZ, C |
| 1784 | 3 | *Dk & JM & Dis* | 516,624 | 201,541 | K, C |
| 1785 | 3 | *CP & Mars & CA* | 647,740 | 188,698 | B, K, Nk, C, K, Hs, ZZ, PZZ, Pc, PcZZ, R, H, Ty, T, S, Ut |
| 1786 | 2 | *Dk & S Mag* | 460,474 | 167,411 | PZZ, S, PcZZ, K, B, C, Hs, ZZ, Gy, Pc |
| 1787 | 2 | *D Jul M & Cron P* | 544,740 | 190,545 | B, tu, K, C, ZZ, Hs, H, Pc, PZZ, R, Sl, Ty |
| 1788 | 2 | *P Ch A & Mars* | 540,269 | 151,981 | tu, K, B, C, Pc, ZZ, PZZ, T |
| 1789 | 1 | *Kong af Dan* | 289,778 | 88,784 | B, tu, K, C, PZZ, HS, Pc |
| 1790 | 1 | *Juliana Maria* | 233,936 | 38,788 | K, C, Pc, H, ZZ, PZZ |
| 1792 | 1 | *Cron Printzen* | 247,448 | 80,566 | tu, K, sa, C, rz, ZZ, Pc, PZZ |
| 1796 | 2 | *K af D, Pr Ch A* | 493,710 | 137,479 | tu, B, K, C, H, HS |
| 1797 | 1 | *Cron Pr Maria* | 166,033 | 46,428 | tu, B, C, H |
| 12 | 24 | | 5,526,450 | 1,897,311 | 34% |
| average per year | | | 460,537 | 158,109 | |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Ask 2240–51.

**APPENDIX 5D: Geowqua's Trade with the VOC 1775–1792 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Ships | Total Receipts | Geowqua | Products Traded |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1775 | 5 | 693,437 | 2,710 | Sc, Pc, HS |
| 1777 | 4 | 796,175 | 18,875 | C, Sc, H, Sl, Ty |
| 1778 | 4 | 765,224 | 15,335 | Ty, Sl |
| 1783 | 2 | 477,324 | 28,575 | z, C, Sc, HS, H, pm, la |
| 1784 | 4 | 928,577 | 208,719 | R, C, K, Sc, HS, Sl, Pc, zt, pp, la, sta, z, Nl, B, Al, Rx, Rg, Ty, S |
| 1785 | 4 | 992,376 | 273,595 | B, C, Sc, Sl, cv, R, K, Pc, H, pm, la, ld, cv, cvo, pp, tin, pw, sta, Db, z, zr |
| 1786 | 5 | 1,266,617 | 385,261 | B, Db, tin, la, pm, cv, ng, Nl, sta, R, pp, ld, sw, C, Sc, Pc, H, HS, K, cn, T, ms |
| 1787 | 5 | 1,621,824 | 504,746 | B, zr, pp, jc, pm, si, la, Nl, z, zr, C, K, Sc, Pc, H, HS, Sl, Ty, Db |
| 1788 | 4 | 1,904,661 | 588,161 | B, pw, zr, R, tin, pp, sta, Nl, C, K, Pc, H, HS, Sl, Ty, Sc, Db |
| 1789 | 5 | 2,201,455 | 625,046 | zr, Nl, R, B, tin, pp, sta, C, K, Pc, Sc, H, HS, S, J, Sl, Db, Ty |
| 1790 | 3 | 552,910 | 206,868 | B, Nl, zr, R, Db, Sc, sta |
| 1791 | 2 | 623,795 | 138,142 | Db, Sc, K, C, H, Pc, sta |
| 1792 | 4 | 1,071,153 | 260,281 | R, sta, C, Ty, Sl, HS, C, H, Sc, Pc, K, B |
| 13 | 51 | 13,895,528 | 3,256,314 | 23% |
| average per yr | | 1,068,887 | 250,486 | |

Source: *Grootboeken* in NAH: VOC 4413, 4415, 4418, 4426, 4430–32, 4436, 4440, 4444–46, 4576.

**APPENDIX 5E: Puiqua's Trade with the DAC and VOC 1786–1800 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

Puiqua's Trade with the DAC 1786–1790 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)

| Year | Ships | Ship Names | Return Cargos | Wu Trade | Products Traded |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1786 | 2 | *Dk & S Mag* | 460,474 | 11,267 | Ty, C |
| 1787 | 2 | *D Jul M & Cron P* | 544,740 | 11,011 | S, C |
| 1788 | 2 | *P Ch A & Mars* | 540,269 | 8,212 | Pc, Hs, K, T |
| 1789 | 1 | *Kong af Dan* | 289,778 | 20,784 | C, S |
| 1790 | 1 | *Juliana Maria* | 233,936 | 3,659 | S, Pc |
| Total | 8 | Years = 5 | 2,069,197 | 54,933 | 3% |
| average per year | | | 413,839 | 10,987 | |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Ask 2244–54.

Puiqua's Trade with the DAC 1792–1800 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)

| Year | Ships | Ship Names | Return Cargos | Wu Trade | Products Traded |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1792 | 1 | *Cron Printzen* | 247,448 | 27,903 | ps, Pc, Ty, S |
| 1796 | 2 | *K af D, Pr Ch A* | 493,710 | 72,271 | B, C, T, K, S, Pc |
| 1797 | 1 | *Cron Pr Maria* | 166,033 | 37,025 | C, K, H, Pc, PZZ, R |
| 1799 | 1 | *Cron Printzen* | 200,029 | 71,191 | tu, K, Pc, B, PZZ, ZZ, HS, T, Sl |
| | 1 | *Kong af Dan* | 211,658 | 65,652 | ps, B, tu, K, C, S, T |
| 1800 | 1 | *Danmark* | 125,121 | 38,334 | K, S, H, C, PZZ, Pc |
| Total | 7 | Years = 5 | 1,443,998 | 312,376 | 22% |
| average per year | | | 288,800 | 62,475 | |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Ask 2244–54.

Puiqua's Trade with the VOC in 1792 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)

| Year | Ships | Return Cargos | Wu Trade | Products Traded | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1792 | 4 | 1,071,153 | 44,143 | Pc, H | 0.04 |

Source: *Grootboek* in NAH: VOC 4576.

**APPENDIX 5F: Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 5**

As mentioned in Chapter 5, I have found no references to a member of this branch of the Wu family prior to Geowqua in 1772. In the Cantonese pronunciation, the name for Wu would be spelled something like Ong or Ng. There is a merchant by the name of Ong Tequa (spelled various ways) who appears in the Swedish records from 1752 to 1769 trading in tea and other products. I found no connection between this man and Geowqua. Because Geowqua's family was from Fujian, they might have used the Minnan pronunciation for their name.

Without the Chinese characters, or some other circumstantial information, it is impossible to connect any of the names in the foreign archives from the 1750s or 1760s to the Wu 伍 family. Wu Heguan, who is mentioned in Chapter 5, is the only reference I have found from these years to a man with this last name. The Chinese records that were searched for this study also did not yield any references to Wu merchants active in Guangzhou from the 1750s to the 1780s.

Geowqua's name was spelled several different ways. The Danes usually referred to him as Kiauqua, but sometimes spelled it Queouqua or in a similar way. The Dutch usually called him Kiouqua, but also spelled his name Quouqua or Qiouqua. The English and Americans used Geowqua, but he rarely appears in the latter sources. I have only found a couple of references to him—as Kiouqua, in the French records from 1783 and 1785. I found no references to him in the Swedish records. However, a French source states that he had traded with the Swedes in 1783. Geowqua appears in the Chinese records as Wu Guozhao 伍國釗 in 1788, 1792 and 1794 (see Appendix 5A for references).

Puiqua is fairly easy to track through the records because his name was spelled differently from others. A man by the name of Poyqua, Poiqua or Puqua shows up trading small amounts of tea in the DAC records in 1775 and in the EIC records of 1775 and 1779 (RAC: Ask 1173; BL: IOR R/10/9, G/12/58 and 66). It is unclear who this man was, but we can be certain that he was not Wu Puiqua, because in 1775 he would have been only seven years old. There are a couple possibilities for the identity of this man. Tan Coqua of the Guangshun Hang had a brother named Poqua (with various spellings) who was helping in the trade before that house went broke and was closed in 1779; Tan Conqua of the Yuanlai Hang also had a brother by the name of Poqua (with various spellings) who was helping in the trade before that house went broke and was closed in 1781 (for references to these men, see 'Tan Poqua' in the Index of MCM 1).

The first clear reference I have to Wu Puiqua is from the DAC records of 1786. In that year, he sold some tea to the Danes and was described as 'Geowqua's brother'. In 1791, he also shows up in the Dutch records as 'Geowqua's brother'. In 1792, Puiqua was appointed a Hong merchant, and then he shows up frequently in all records. The English also described him as 'Brother to Geowqua', and the Dutch mentioned that he was formerly working in the house of Geowqua. I have therefore begun Puiqua's story in 1786. From this year to his death in 1801, he is fairly easy to identify in the records, because no one else, at this time, had a name like his. Puiqua's brother and successor Houqua was sometimes also referred to as 'Puiqua', which accounts for this name continuing to show up in the records into the 1830s.

**APPENDIX 6A: Total Tea and Porcelain Exports in 1764 (All Figures in Chinese Piculs)**

| Ships | Co. | No. | Bohea Tea | Green Tea | Porcelain | Total | Percent Porcelain | Co. ave. per ship |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *A-schat* | VOC | 1 | 8,529 | 550 | 949 | 10,028 | 0.09 | |
| *Ruijteveld* | VOC | 2 | 9,627 | 587 | 762 | 10,976 | 0.07 | |
| *Huis Om* | VOC | 3 | 9,132 | 577 | 1,012 | 10,722 | 0.09 | |
| *Lands Welvaren* | VOC | 4 | 7,782 | 439 | 616 | 8,838 | 0.07 | 0.08 |
| *Le Berrier* | CFI | 5 | 4,823 | 1,152 | 1,028 | 7,002 | 0.15 | |
| *Le Penthievre* | CFI | 6 | 5,207 | 962 | 524 | 6,692 | 0.08 | |
| *Le Elephant* | CFI | 7 | 2,699 | 637 | 356 | 3,693 | 0.10 | 0.11 |
| *Pocock* | EIC | 8 | 5,397 | 231 | 1,025 | 6,654 | 0.15 | |
| *Latham* | EIC | 9 | 3,884 | 1,456 | 1,243 | 6,582 | 0.19 | |
| *British King* | EIC | 10 | 6,135 | 186 | 1,248 | 7,568 | 0.16 | |
| *Lord Clive* | EIC | 11 | 4,046 | 2,289 | 1,368 | 7,703 | 0.18 | |
| *Norfolk* | EIC | 12 | 6,259 | 131 | 1,220 | 7,610 | 0.16 | |
| *Pitt* | EIC | 13 | 4,664 | 2,427 | 892 | 7,983 | 0.11 | |
| *E. of Northumberl'd* | EIC | 14 | 4,042 | 1,538 | 1,276 | 6,856 | 0.19 | |
| *Worchester* | EIC | 15 | 4,119 | 2,250 | 1,047 | 7,417 | 0.14 | |

| Ships | Co. | No. | Bohea Tea | Green Tea | Porcelain | Total | Percent Porcelain | Co. ave. per ship |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Lord Holland* | EIC | 16 | 3,795 | 1,580 | 1,162 | 6,537 | 0.18 | |
| *Earl of Lincoln* | EIC | 17 | 3,774 | 2,146 | 710 | 6,631 | 0.11 | |
| *Princess Augusta* | EIC | 18 | 4,219 | 1,245 | 953 | 6,417 | 0.15 | 0.16 |
| *Prins Fredrick* | DAC | 19 | 13,159 | 662 | 952 | 14,773 | 0.06 | |
| *Cron Prins* | DAC | 20 | 6,248 | 388 | 593 | 7,229 | 0.08 | 0.07 |
| *Stockhom Slott* | SOIC | 21 | 11,509 | 300 | 1,181 | 12,990 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| Total | | | 129,051 | 21,732 | 20,116 | 170,899 | 0.12 | |
| average per ship | | | 6,145 | 1,035 | 958 | 8,138 | | |

Source: VOC 4397 (16–7), General Report for 1765, dated 1766.01.04, pp. 2–3.

**APPENDIX 6B: Total EIC Exports 1760–1799 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Total EIC exports | Tea | % of Total | Chinaware & Sago | % of Total | Raw Silk Exports | % of Total | Nankeen Exports | % of Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1760 | 707,000 | 653,000 | 0.924 | 12,000 | 0.017 | | | | |
| 1761 | 761,644 | 700,124 | 0.919 | 13,500 | 0.018 | | | 1,020 | 0.001 |
| 1762 | 782,226 | 720,291 | 0.921 | 9,000 | 0.012 | | | | |
| 1763 | 949,149 | 862,442 | 0.909 | 16,500 | 0.017 | 78,748 | 0.083 | | |
| 1764 | 1,184,213 | 1,095,354 | 0.925 | 21,000 | 0.018 | | | | |
| 1765 | 1,637,997 | 1,334,978 | 0.815 | 22,500 | 0.014 | 200,674 | 0.123 | 6,120 | 0.004 |
| 1766 | 1,587,266 | 1,370,818 | 0.864 | 18,000 | 0.011 | 132,500 | 0.083 | | |
| 1767 | 1,340,169 | 608,640 | 0.454 | 12,000 | 0.009 | 673,400 | 0.502 | | |
| 1768 | 1,828,169 | 1,077,178 | 0.589 | 18,000 | 0.010 | 666,136 | 0.364 | 7,600 | 0.004 |
| 1769 | 1,612,892 | 1,507,656 | 0.935 | 25,500 | 0.016 | | | 11,400 | 0.007 |
| 1770 | 1,413,816 | 1,323,849 | 0.936 | 18,500 | 0.013 | | | | |
| 1771 | 2,133,498 | 1,570,538 | 0.736 | 30,000 | 0.014 | 436,000 | 0.204 | | |
| 1772 | 1,658,928 | 1,174,125 | 0.708 | 19,500 | 0.012 | 385,520 | 0.232 | 4,750 | 0.003 |
| 1773 | 1,245,642 | 522,890 | 0.420 | 17,780 | 0.014 | 617,345 | 0.496 | | |
| 1774 | 625,257 | 225,036 | 0.360 | 7,429 | 0.012 | 352,343 | 0.564 | | |
| 1775 | 1,045,433 | 498,644 | 0.477 | 21,675 | 0.021 | 479,184 | 0.458 | 3,916 | 0.004 |
| 1776 | 1,218,198 | 689,894 | 0.566 | 29,368 | 0.024 | 430,535 | 0.353 | 9,766 | 0.008 |
| 1777 | 1,486,677 | 904,739 | 0.609 | 39,522 | 0.027 | 477,258 | 0.321 | 3,610 | 0.002 |
| 1778 | 1,259,973 | 712,314 | 0.565 | 20,957 | 0.017 | 464,675 | 0.369 | 8,000 | 0.006 |
| 1779 | 1,051,278 | 524,604 | 0.499 | 15,368 | 0.015 | 425,227 | 0.404 | 7,800 | 0.007 |
| 1780 | 2,026,042 | 1,125,983 | 0.556 | 39,903 | 0.020 | 772,456 | 0.381 | 8,000 | 0.004 |
| 1781 | 1,596,554 | 1,144,633 | 0.717 | 43,345 | 0.027 | 324,311 | 0.203 | 8,000 | 0.005 |
| 1782 | 796,371 | 401,640 | 0.504 | 9,498 | 0.012 | 327,404 | 0.411 | 8,800 | 0.011 |
| 1783 | 1,919,819 | 498,024 | 0.259 | 51,212 | 0.027 | 260,293 | 0.136 | 8,506 | 0.004 |
| 1784 | 1,825,061 | 1,480,014 | 0.811 | 41,886 | 0.023 | 200,355 | 0.110 | 9,360 | 0.005 |
| 1785 | 2,942,069 | 2,564,701 | 0.872 | 83,397 | 0.028 | 169,077 | 0.057 | 10,440 | 0.004 |

| Year | Total EIC exports | Tea | % of Total | Chinaware & Sago | % of Total | Raw Silk Exports | % of Total | Nankeen Exports | % of Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1786 | 4,962,148 | 3,841,000 | 0.774 | 95,661 | 0.019 | 849,914 | 0.171 | 20,000 | 0.004 |
| 1787 | 5,262,177 | 4,315,879 | 0.820 | 117,594 | 0.022 | 656,462 | 0.125 | 20,000 | 0.004 |
| 1788 | 4,578,849 | 3,804,698 | 0.831 | 86,577 | 0.019 | 503,526 | 0.110 | 22,425 | 0.005 |
| 1789 | 4,440,451 | 3,770,049 | 0.849 | 95,567 | 0.022 | 418,958 | 0.094 | 24,800 | 0.006 |
| 1790 | 4,669,811 | 4,103,828 | 0.879 | 43,219 | 0.009 | 355,273 | 0.076 | 24,800 | 0.005 |
| 1791 | 3,353,536 | 3,010,926 | 0.898 | 21,935 | 0.007 | 169,171 | 0.050 | 24,800 | 0.007 |
| 1792 | 3,540,825 | 3,046,047 | 0.860 | | | 340,120 | 0.096 | 35,800 | 0.010 |
| 1793 | 3,846,382 | 3,480,986 | 0.905 | | | 194,268 | 0.051 | 39,800 | 0.010 |
| 1794 | 4,714,906 | 4,235,256 | 0.898 | | | 293,471 | 0.062 | 47,700 | 0.010 |
| 1795 | 3,521,171 | 3,126,198 | 0.888 | | | 188,318 | 0.053 | 40,000 | 0.011 |
| 1796 | 6,293,757 | 5,890,729 | 0.936 | | | 149,686 | 0.024 | 68,260 | 0.011 |
| 1797 | 5,556,801 | 5,188,050 | 0.934 | | | 108,736 | 0.020 | 87,190 | 0.016 |
| 1798 | 2,965,479 | 2,590,029 | 0.873 | | | 131,730 | 0.044 | 82,840 | 0.028 |
| 1799 | 4,091,892 | 2,545,624 | 0.622 | | | 235,227 | 0.057 | 121,602 | 0.030 |
| ave/ yr | 2,460,838 | | 0.745 | | 0.017 | | 0.203 | | 0.008 |

Source: Earl H. Pritchard, *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations 1750–1800* (1936; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 395–96.

**APPENDIX 6C: Total Tea, Porcelain and Silk Exports from Canton in 1798, 1801 and 1804–1814 (All Figures in Chinese Piculs)**

| Year | Black tea | Green tea | Porcelain | Raw silk | Silk piece goods | Total tea, porcelain & silk | Percent porcelain | Percent silk |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1798 | 188,069 | 49,628 | 25,890 | 2,033 | 1,213 | 266,832 | 0.097 | 0.012 |
| 1801 | 283,026 | 66,449 | 6,175 | 1,283 | 1,027 | 357,960 | 0.017 | 0.006 |
| 1804 | 316,860 | 92,289 | 16,088 | 696 | 571 | 426,504 | 0.038 | 0.003 |
| 1805 | 253,682 | 99,799 | 12,988 | 675 | 998 | 368,141 | 0.035 | 0.005 |
| 1806 | 250,047 | 107,459 | 9,763 | 1,549 | 638 | 369,456 | 0.026 | 0.006 |
| 1807 | 169,056 | 79,240 | 17,410 | 1,876 | 666 | 268,248 | 0.065 | 0.009 |
| 1808 | 167,146 | 60,254 | 21,864 | 2,586 | 685 | 252,534 | 0.087 | 0.013 |
| 1809 | 211,128 | 77,263 | 16,578 | 1,717 | 1,938 | 308,624 | 0.054 | 0.012 |
| 1810 | 163,527 | 76,402 | 12,295 | 2,490 | 1,583 | 256,297 | 0.048 | 0.016 |
| 1811 | 229,553 | 67,032 | 16,583 | 2,185 | 1,773 | 317,126 | 0.052 | 0.012 |
| 1812 | 131,005 | 57,735 | 9,106 | 2,155 | 257 | 200,258 | 0.045 | 0.012 |
| 1813 | 183,367 | 54,226 | 9,267 | 2,103 | 558 | 249,521 | 0.037 | 0.011 |
| 1814 | 202,505 | 62,752 | 5,139 | 3,502 | 265 | 274,163 | 0.019 | 0.014 |
| Total | 2,748,970 | 950,528 | 179,145 | 24,848 | 12,170 | 292,756 | 0.050 | 0.010 |

Source: NAH: Canton 262 'Lijst der Vervoer door 58 Scheepen van Canton in China in den Jaare 1798/9', RAB 140 'Lijst der Vervoerde Goederen uit Canton in China geduurende den Handel Tijd van 1801 op 1802', Canton 268 'Generaalen Vervoer van Canton' 1804–1814.

**APPENDIX 6D: Total Exports from Canton in 1784 (All Figures in Chinese Piculs)**

| Company | Ships | Bohea Tea | Green Tea | Porcelain | Other products | Total piculs | Percent Porcelain |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EIC | 9 | 42,089 | 17,968 | 4,465 | 3,253 | 67,775 | 0.07 |
| Country | 7 | 2,107 | 2,244 | 2,422 | 24,225 | 30,998 | 0.08 |
| Danish | 4 | 19,100 | 4,590 | 1,479 | 1,081 | 26,250 | 0.06 |
| French | 4 | 32,193 | 5,013 | 2,064 | 1,725 | 40,995 | 0.05 |
| Dutch | 4 | 36,291 | 3,720 | 2,388 | 740 | 43,139 | 0.06 |
| American | 1 | 2,462 | 562 | 962 | 51 | 4,037 | 0.24 |
| Total | 29 | 134,242 | 34,097 | 13,780 | 31,075 | 213,194 | 0.06 |
| average per ship | | 4,629 | 1,176 | 475 | 1,072 | 7,352 | |

Source: BL: IOR G/12/80, pp. 122–23.

**APPENDIX 7A: Conjac's Schedule**

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1754 | Conjack | SOIC | P | GUB: H22.4A *Prins Carl* Dagbok |
| 1759 | Qvonneak | DAC | P | Ask 1139–42, 1144 |
| 1761 | Quoneach | EIC | P | R/10/5 |
| 1762 | Conjac | VOC | P | VOC 4395; Can 71 |
| 1763 | Conjac | VOC | P | VOC 4394 |
| 1764 | Qvonneak, Quonneach | DAC | P | Ask 2227–28 |
| 1764 | Conjac | VOC | P | VOC 4396 |
| 1765 | Qounjeak, Coneak, Quonjeck | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_06332, T1_06350; GUB: H22.4A Rådplägningsbok |
| 1765 | Conjac | VOC | P | VOC 4397 |
| 1766 | Qvonneak, Quonneach | DAC | P | Ask 2231 |
| 1766 | Quonjeck | SOIC | P | NM: F17 p. T1_06346 |
| 1766 | Conjac | VOC | P | Can 29; VOC 4399 |
| 1767 | Qvonjeack | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_04893–99 |
| 1767 | Conjac | VOC | P | Can 30, 76 |
| 1768 | Quonjeck, Quonneack | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_04440–57, T1_04474–502 |
| 1768 | Conjac | VOC | P | Can 31, 77–78; VOC 4402 |
| 1769 | Conjac | VOC | P | VOC 4405; Can 78–79 |
| 1770 | Conjac | VOC | P, sa | Can 33, 79; VOC 4406 |
| 1771 | Conjac, Conjacq | VOC | P | Can 34, 80; VOC 4408 |
| 1772 | Conjac | VOC | P | VOC 4410; Can 81, 234 |
| 1773 | Conjac | VOC | P | Can 36, 82, 235; VOC 4411 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1774 | Conjac | VOC | P | Can 37, 83; VOC 4412 |
| 1775 | Conjac | VOC | P, H | Can 38, 84; VOC 4413 |
| 1776 | Conjac | VOC | P | Can 39; VOC 4414 |
| 1777 | Conjack, Conjac | VOC | P, H | Can 40, 86; VOC 4415 |
| 1778 | Conjac | VOC | P, H | Can 41, 87; VOC 4418 |
| 1779 | Conjac | VOC | P | Can 42, 88; VOC 4419 |
| 1780 | Conjac | VOC | P | Can 43, 89; VOC 4421 |
| 1781 | Conjac | VOC | P | Can 44; VOC 4423 |
| 1783 | Conjac | VOC | P | Can 45, 245; VOC 4430 |
| 1784 | Conjac | VOC | P, pw | Can 46, 90, 246; VOC 4426 |

## APPENDIX 7B: Echong's 義昌 Schedule

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1768 | Echong | VOC | P | Can 31, 77; VOC 4402 |
| 1769 | Echong | VOC | P | VOC 4405; Can 78 |
| 1770 | Echong | VOC | P | Can 79; VOC 4406 |
| 1771 | Echong | VOC | P | VOC 4408; Can 80 |
| 1773 | Echong | VOC | P | VOC 4411; Can 82 |
| 1774 | Echong, Exchong, Ichong | DAC | P | Ask 1172 |
| 1774 | Echong, Exhong | VOC | P | Can 37, 83; VOC 4412 |
| 1775 | Exchong | DAC | P | Ask 1173 |
| 1775 | Ichong | DAC | P | Ask 1173 |
| 1776 | Exchong | DAC | P | Ask 1175 |
| 1776 | Ychong, Ichang, Ychang, Echong | DAC | P | Ask 1175 |
| 1776 | Echong | VOC | P | Can 39, 85; VOC 4414 |
| 1777 | Echong | DAC | P | Ask 1177 |
| 1778 | Echong | DAC | P | Ask 1179 |
| 1778 | Echong | VOC | | VOC 4418 |
| 1779 | Echong | DAC | P | Ask 1180 |
| 1779 | Exchong | DAC | P | Ask 1181 |
| 1780 | Ecklong | DAC | P | Ask 1183–84 |
| 1780 | Echong | VOC | P | Can 43; VOC 4421 |
| 1781 | Echong | VOC | P | Can 44; VOC 4423 |
| 1784 | Echong | USA | lw | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets[(s)]; Smith (see index); Mudge 55 |
| 1788 | Echon | VOC | P | VOC 4440 |

**APPENDIX 7C: Exchin's 鵾昇 Schedule**

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1763 | Exchin | SOIC | P | NM: F17 p. T1_05135 |
| 1764 | Exshin | DAC | P | Ask 2227–28 |
| 1764 | Exchin | VOC | P | VOC 4396 |
| 1765 | Exhin | VOC | P | VOC 4397 |
| 1766 | Exchin | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_06430–31 |
| 1766 | Exhin | VOC | P | Can 29; VOC 4399 |
| 1767 | Exchin | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_04893–99, T1_04931, T1_06424–25 |
| 1767 | Exhin | VOC | P | Can 30, 76 |
| 1768 | Exchin, Eckchin | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_00075–77, T1_00152, T1_00183, T1_04440–57 |
| 1768 | Exhin | VOC | P | Can 31, 77; VOC 4402 |
| 1769 | Exchin | SOIC | P | NM: F17 p. T1_05202 |
| 1769 | Exhin | VOC | P | VOC 4405; Can 78 |
| 1770 | Exchin | SOIC | P | NM: F17 p. T1_00250 |
| 1770 | Exhin | VOC | P | VOC 4406; Can 79 |
| 1771 | Exhin | VOC | P | VOC 4408 |
| 1772 | Exshing, Exchin, Exshin | EIC | P | R/10/9 |
| 1772 | Exchin | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_05384–87 |
| 1774 | Exchin | DAC | P | Ask 1172 |
| 1774 | Exchin | EIC | P | R/10/9 |
| 1774 | Exhin | VOC | P | Can 37; VOC 4412 |
| 1775 | Exchin | EIC | P | G/12/58 |
| 1775 | Exhin | VOC | P | Can 38; VOC 4413 |
| 1776 | Exchin, Exching | DAC | P | Ask 1175 |
| 1776 | Exchin | EIC | P | G/12/59 |
| 1776 | Exhin | VOC | P | Can 39, 85; VOC 4414 |
| 1777 | Exching, Exchin | DAC | P | Ask 1177 |
| 1777 | Exchin | EIC | P, sa | G/12/60, 62 |
| 1777 | Exhin | VOC | P | VOC 4415 |
| 1778 | Exchin | EIC | P, sa | G/12/64–65 |
| 1778 | Exhin | VOC | P | Can 87; VOC 4418 |
| 1779 | Exchin | DAC | P | Ask 1180 |
| 1779 | Exchin | EIC | P, sa | G/12/66 |
| 1779 | Exhin | VOC | P | VOC 4419; Can 88 |
| 1780 | Exchin | DAC | P | Ask 1183–84 |
| 1780 | Exchin | EIC | P, sa | G/12/70–71 |
| 1780 | Exhin | VOC | P | Can 43; VOC 4421 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1781 | Exchin | EIC | P, sa | G/12/72–74 |
| 1781 | Exhin | VOC | P | Can 44; VOC 4423 |
| 1782 | Exching | DAC | P | Ask 2240 |
| 1782 | Exchin | EIC | P | Inglis 13; G/12/75–76 |
| 1783 | Exching | DAC | P | Ask 2241 |
| 1783 | Exchin | EIC | P, sa | G/12/77–78 |
| 1784 | Exchin | EIC | P, sa | G/12/79–80 |
| 1784 | Exhin | USA | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets(s); Smith (see index) |
| 1784 | Exhin | VOC | P | Can 46, 90, 246; VOC 4426 |
| 1785 | Exchin | EIC | P, sa | G/12/79, 81, 83 |
| 1785 | Exhin, Exhing | VOC | P | Can 47, 91; VOC 4431 |
| 1786 | Exchin | EIC | P | G/12/82–85 |
| 1786 | Exhin | USA | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets(s); Smith (see index) |
| 1786 | Exhin | VOC | P | Can 48; VOC 4432 |
| 1787 | Exching | DAC | P | Ask 2245 |
| 1787 | Exchin | EIC | P | G/12/86–87 |
| 1787 | Exhin | VOC | P | VOC 4436 |
| 1788 | Exching | DAC | P | Ask 2246 |
| 1788 | Exchin | EIC | P | G/12/87–89, 94 |
| 1788 | Exhin | VOC | P | VOC 4440 |
| 1789 | Exching | DAC | P | Ask 2247 |
| 1789 | Exchin | EIC | P | G/12/94–97 |
| 1790 | Exchin | EIC | P, tea | G/12/96–99 |
| 1791 | Exchin | EIC | P | G/12/98–102 |
| 1792 | Exchin | EIC | P | G/12/102 |
| 1793 | Exhin | VOC | | Can 254 |
| 1794 | Exching | DAC | P | Ask 1208 |
| 1794 | Exchin | EIC | P, sa | G/12/107 |
| 1794 | Exhing | VOC | | Can 56 |
| 1795 | Exhin | Dutch | Db | OIC 196 |
| 1795 | Exchin | EIC | P | G/12/110 |
| 1796 | Exhin | Dutch | | OIC 197 |
| 1796 | Exchin | EIC | P, sa | G/12/115–16 |
| 1796 | Exchin | SOIC | P | GUB: Ströms H21.1 Nr 1171 |
| 1797 | Exching | DAC | P | Ask 2251 |
| 1797 | Exhin | Dutch | Db | Can 330; OIC 198 |
| 1797 | Exchin | EIC | P | G/12/117 |
| 1798 | Exhing, Exin | Dutch | Db | Can 97, 331 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1798 | Exchin | EIC | P | G/12/120–21 |
| 1799 | Exching | DAC | P | Ask 2252–53 |
| 1799 | Exhin, Ekhin | Dutch | P | Can 61, 333; RAB 140 |
| 1800 | Exching | DAC | P | Ask 2254 |
| 1800 | Exhin | Dutch | Db | Can 263, 333 |
| 1800 | Exchin | EIC | P | G/12/128, 130 |
| 1800 | Exchin | SOIC | | GUB: H22.12 and 15 |
| 1801 | Exching | DAC | P | Ask 2255 |
| 1801 | Exhin | Dutch | Db | Can 339 |
| 1801 | Exchin | EIC | P | G/12/133, 135 |
| 1801 | Exchin | SOIC | | GUB: H22.12 |
| 1801 | Exhin | USA | P | RIHS: Mss 336 Carter-Danforth Papers |
| 1802 | Exching | DAC | P | Ask 2256–57 |
| 1802 | Exhin | Dutch | P | Can 342–43 |
| 1803 | Exching | DAC | P | Ask 2258–59 |
| 1803 | Exhin | Dutch | P | Can 345–46 |
| 1804 | Exhing, Exhin | Dutch | P | Can 65, 269, 347–48 |
| 1804 | Exhin | USA | P | MHS: Lamb Papers |
| 1805 | Exching | DAC | P | Ask 2261–63 |
| 1809 | Exhin | USA | P | PEM: MH20 Shreve Papers, box 10, folder 4, ship *Minerva* Account Book 1809, p. 42; Mudge 56 |
| 1814 | Exching, Exhing | Dutch | | Can 268 |

**APPENDIX 7D: Lisjoncon's 李相公 Schedule**

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1752 | Lie Samqua | DAC | P | Ask 1131, 2205–6 |
| 1752 | Lizun kung | SOIC | P | GL: A406 |
| 1754 | Lisingkoung | SOIC | P, pp | GUB: H22.4A *Prins Carl* Dagbok |
| 1755 | Lus Sanqvon, Lyssanqvon, Lyssan Qvong Lussan Qvon, | DAC | P | Ask 1135, 2209b |
| 1755 | Lysungkung, Lisonkung, Lisongkung, Lisingkoung | SOIC | P | NM: F17 p. T1_03912; GUB: H22.4A *Prins Carl* Dagbok |
| 1756 | LieSamqva | DAC | P | Ask 1136 |
| 1756 | Lysoncoon, Lusoncoon | EIC | P | R/10/4 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1757 | Lus Sanqvon, Lyssan Qvong Lyssanqvon, Lyssan Qvon | DAC | P | Ask 1137, 2210 |
| 1757 | Li Sjon Kon, Lissokoen, Lisjonkon | VOC | P | VOC 4381$^{(sc)}$; JFB: B 1758 fNe |
| 1758 | Lisamqva Samqva, Sanqva, Lie Samqua | DAC | P | Ask 1138, 2211–13 |
| 1758 | Lisoncon, Lischonqua | VOC | P, Pc, Sc | VOC 4382; JFB: B 1758 fNe |
| 1759 | Lysanqvon, Lysan Qvong, Liesamqvon, Liesamguon, | DAC | P, sa | Ask 1139–92, 1144, 2214–15 |
| 1760 | Lyssanqvon, Lyssan Qvong, Samqva, Lie Samqua, Lus Sanqvon | DAC | P | Ask 1143, 1145, 2216–17 |
| 1760 | Lisjoncon | SOIC | P | VOC 4386 |
| 1760 | Lisjoncon, Lischonquon | VOC | P | VOC 4384, 4386–87(sc) |
| 1761 | Lisonkung | SOIC | P | GUB: H22.4A *Riksens Ständer* Dagbok |
| 1761 | Luchoncong | VOC | P | VOC 4388 |
| 1762 | Lysankong | SOIC | P | NM: F17 p. T1_01676 |
| 1762 | Lisjoncon | VOC | P | Can 25, 71; VOC 4394 |
| 1763 | Lysankong | CFI | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_01691–94 |
| 1763 | Lus Sanqvon, Lyssanqvon, Lyssan Qvong Lysanqvon | DAC | P | Ask 1151, 2223–26 |
| 1763 | Lysankong, Lizankong | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_01691– |
| 1763 | Lisjoncon, Lysankong | VOC | P, G, pp, tin | Can 26, 72; VOC 4394; NM: F17 pp. T1_01691–94 |
| 1764 | Lus Sanqvon, Lyssanqvon, Lyssan Qvong Lysamquon | DAC | P | Ask 1152, 2227–28 |
| 1764 | Lewsooncoon, Lewsoncoon, Leusooncoon | EIC | P | R/10/5 |
| 1764 | Lysankong | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_00707– |
| 1765 | Lus Sanqvon, Lyssanqvon, Lyssan Qvong | DAC | P | Ask 2229–30 |
| 1765 | Lewsoncoon | EIC | P | R/10/5 |
| 1765 | Lozunkung, Lysankong, Lisongkong | SOIC | P | NM: F17 p. T1_00784; GUB: H22.4A Rådplägningsbok |
| 1766 | Lus Sanqvon, Lyssanqvon, Lyssan Qvong | DAC | P | Ask 2231 |
| 1766 | Lysankong, Lyskonskan | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_00888, T1_06346 |
| 1767 | Lus Sanqvon, Lyssanqvon, Lyssan Qvong | DAC | P | Ask 2232–33 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1767 | Lysan Kong, Lysankong | SOIC | P, By | NM: F17 pp. T1_00148, T1_00952–55, T1_06591 |
| 1767 | Lisjoncon | VOC | P | Can 30, 76 |
| 1768 | Lysankong, Lisanchong, Lysonkung, Lyxonkung | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_00183, T1_06614–15; GUB: Ströms H21.1 Nr 1152 |
| 1768 | Lisjoncon, Luchoncon, Suchoncon | VOC | P | Can 31, 77; VOC 4402 |
| 1769 | Lysanchong | SOIC | loan | NM: F17 pp. T1_05378–81 |
| 1769 | Lisjoncon, Suchoncon | VOC | P | VOC 4405; Can 78 |
| 1770 | Lus Sanqvon, Lyssanqvon, Lyssan Qvong | DAC | P | Ask 2236–37 |
| 1770 | Lysan Kong, Lysan Chong, Lysanchong, Lysankong, Lychonkan, Lisonkong | SOIC | P, By | NM: F17 pp. T1_00249–51, T1_06644 |
| 1770 | Lisjoncon, Luchoncon | VOC | P | VOC 4406; Can 79 |
| 1771 | Lisjoncon, Luchoncon | VOC | P | Can 34, 80; VOC 4408 |
| 1772 | Lysamqvon Lus Sanqvon, Lyssanqvon, Lyssan Qvong | DAC | P | Ask 1168, 2238–39 |
| 1772 | Lisonkong | SOIC | S | NM: F17 p. T1_001894 |
| 1772 | Lisjoncon, Luchoncon | VOC | P | Can 35, 81, 234; VOC 4410 |
| 1773 | Lisjoncon, Luchon Con | VOC | P, sat | VOC 4411; Can 82, 235 |
| 1774 | Lucioncon | CFI | loan | C.1.16 p. 81v |
| 1774 | Lisjoncon, Luchonkon, Suchonkon | VOC | P | Can 37, 83; VOC 4412 |
| 1776 | Lucioncon | CFI | loan | C.1.16 p. 81v, 87v |
| 1776 | Lysianquon, Lusanquon | DAC | P | Ask 1175 |
| 1777 | Lisjoncon | VOC | Sl | Can 40, 86 |
| 1779 | Luchoncon's son | VOC | C | Can 88 |
| 1784 | Lesjoncon | VOC | P | VOC 4426; Can 90 |
| 1785 | Lucioncon | CFI | loan | C.1.15 p. 69–70 |

**APPENDIX 7E: Soychong's 聚昌 Schedule**

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1747 | Soychong, Sayching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P, sa | Ask 2199 |
| 1749 | Soy Chong, Soychong, Sayching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P, sa | Ask 1127, 2202 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1750 | Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P | Ask 1128, 2203–4 |
| 1751 | Soy Chong | DAC | P | Ask 1129 |
| 1752 | Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P | Ask 2205–6 |
| 1752 | Soychong | SOIC | P | GL: A406 |
| 1753 | Sou/Soy Chong, Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P, sa | Ask 1132, 2207–8 |
| 1754 | Soy Chong, Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P, sa | Ask 1134, 2209a |
| 1755 | Sou Siong, Soy Chong | DAC | P | Ask 1135, 2209b |
| 1755 | Soychon | SOIC | P | GUB: H22.4A *Prins Carl* Dagbok |
| 1756 | Soy Chong | DAC | P | Ask 1136 |
| 1757 | Soy Chong, Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P | Ask 1137, 2210 |
| 1758 | Soy Chong, Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P | Ask 1138, 2211–13 |
| 1758 | Soychongh, Soyschong, Soysching | VOC | P | VOC 4382; JFB: B 1758 fNe |
| 1759 | Soychong, Soychon, Soy Chong, Saycching, SoyChong | DAC | P, sa | Ask 1139–42, 1144, 2214–15 |
| 1760 | Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P, sa | Ask 1143, 1145, 2216–17 |
| 1760 | Soyschong | VOC | P | VOC 4386–7[(b)] |
| 1761 | Soychong | EIC | P | R/10/5 |
| 1762 | Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P | Ask 2220–22 |
| 1762 | Soyschon | VOC | P | VOC 4395 |
| 1764 | Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P | Ask 2227–28 |
| 1764 | Soychong | EIC | P | R/10/5 |
| 1764 | Soychong | VOC | P | VOC 4396 |
| 1765 | Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P | Ask 2229–30 |
| 1765 | Soychon, Soychong | SOIC | P | NM: F17 p. T1_06332; GUB: H22.4A Rådplägningsbok |
| 1765 | Soychon | VOC | P | VOC 4397 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1766 | Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P | Ask 2231 |
| 1766 | Soy chong, Soychong | Port. | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_00851–52, T1_01330– |
| 1766 | Soy chong, Soychong | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_00851–52, T1_01330– |
| 1766 | Soychong | VOC | P | VOC 4399 |
| 1767 | Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P | Ask 2232–33 |
| 1768 | Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P | Ask 2234 |
| 1769 | Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P | Ask 2235 |
| 1769 | Soychong | VOC | P | VOC 4405 |
| 1770 | Soychong, Saycching, Soychon, SoyChong | DAC | P | Ask 2236–37 |
| 1770 | Soychong, Soychon | VOC | P | VOC 4406; Can 79 |
| 1771 | Soychong, Soychon | VOC | P | VOC 4408; Can 80 |
| 1772 | Soychon, Soychong, Saycching, SoyChong | DAC | P | Ask 1168, 2238, 2239 |
| 1772 | Soychong | EIC | | R/10/9 |
| 1772 | Soychong | VOC | P | Can 35, 81, 234; VOC 4410 |
| 1773 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 1170 |
| 1773 | Soychong | VOC | P | Can 36, 235; VOC 4411 |
| 1774 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 1172 |
| 1774 | Soychong | VOC | P | VOC 4412 |
| 1775 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 1173 |
| 1775 | Soychong | VOC | P | Can 38, 84; VOC 4413 |
| 1776 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 1175 |
| 1776 | Soychong | VOC | P | Can 85; VOC 4414 |
| 1777 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 1177 |
| 1777 | Soychong, Soychon | VOC | P | VOC 4415; Can 86 |
| 1778 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 1179 |
| 1778 | Soychong | VOC | | VOC 4418 |
| 1779 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 1180 |
| 1780 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 1183–84 |
| 1781 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 1185 |
| 1781 | Soychong | VOC | P | Can 44; VOC 4423 |
| 1782 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 2240 |
| 1783 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 2241 |
| 1783 | Soychin | VOC | | VOC 4430 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1784 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 2242 |
| 1784 | Soychong | VOC | P | VOC 4426; Can 90 |
| 1785 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 2243 |
| 1786 | Soychong | DAC | P | Ask 1200, 2244 |
| 1786 | Soychong | VOC | P | VOC 4432; Can 92 |
| 1787 | Soychong | VOC | P | Can 93; VOC 4436 |

**APPENDIX 7F: Soyqua's 修官 Schedule**

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1760 | Soyqua | VOC | P | VOC 4386–87[(s)] |
| 1772 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 1169, 2238–39 |
| 1772 | Soyqua | VOC | P | VOC 4410 |
| 1773 | Soyqua | DAC | P, sa | Ask 1170 |
| 1773 | Soyqua | VOC | P | VOC 4411 |
| 1775 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 1173 |
| 1775 | Soyqua | VOC | P | VOC 4413; Can 84 |
| 1776 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 1175 |
| 1777 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 1177 |
| 1777 | Soyqua | VOC | P | VOC 4415 |
| 1778 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 1179 |
| 1778 | Soyqua | VOC | P | Can 87; VOC 4418 |
| 1779 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 1180 |
| 1779 | Soyqua | VOC | P | Can 88; VOC 4419 |
| 1780 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 1183–84 |
| 1780 | Soyqua, Sooyqua | VOC | P | Can 43, 89; VOC 4421 |
| 1781 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 1185 |
| 1781 | Soyqua | VOC | P | Can 44; VOC 4423 |
| 1782 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 2240 |
| 1783 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 2241 |
| 1783 | Soyqua | VOC | | VOC 4430 |
| 1784 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 2242 |
| 1784 | Soyqua | VOC | P | VOC 4426; Can 90 |
| 1785 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 2243 |
| 1785 | Soyqua | VOC | P | Can 47, 91, 247; VOC 4431 |
| 1786 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 1200, 2244 |
| 1786 | Soyqua | VOC | P | Can 48, 92, 248; VOC 4432 |
| 1787 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 2245 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1787 | Soyqua | VOC | P | Can 49, 249; VOC 4436 |
| 1788 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 2246 |
| 1788 | Soyqua, Soeyqua | VOC | Db, P | VOC 4440; Can 250, 366 |
| 1789 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 2247 |
| 1789 | Soyqua | VOC | P | VOC 4444; Can 95 |
| 1790 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 2248 |
| 1791 | Sooyqua, Soyqua | VOC | P | Can 53, 252; VOC 4446 |
| 1792 | Soyqua | DAC | P | Ask 2249 |
| 1792 | Soyqua | VOC | P | VOC 4576; Can 253 |

**APPENDIX 7G: Suchin Kinqua's 璲珍店 Schedule**

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1752 | Suchin Kinqua | SOIC | P | GL: A406 |
| 1760 | Suchin | VOC | P | VOC 4386, 4387[(b)] |
| 1762 | Suchin | VOC | P | VOC 4395; Can 71 |
| 1763 | Suchin | VOC | P | VOC 4394; Can 72 |
| 1764 | Suchin Kinqua, Suchin Chinqua, Suchin | VOC | P | Can 27; VOC 4396 |
| 1765 | Suchin Chinqua | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_06313, T1_06332 |
| 1765 | Suchin Chinqua/Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 28, 74; VOC 4397–98 |
| 1766 | Suchin Chinqua | SOIC | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_00881, T1_06346 |
| 1766 | Suchin Chinqua/Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 29, 75; VOC 4399 |
| 1767 | Suchin Chinqua | SOIC | P | NM: F17 p. T1_06357 |
| 1767 | Suchin Chinqua | VOC | P | Can 30, 76 |
| 1768 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 31, 77; VOC 4402 |
| 1769 | Suchin Chinqua | SOIC | P | NM: F17 p. T1_00236 |
| 1769 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 32, 78; VOC 4405 |
| 1770 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 79; VOC 4406 |
| 1771 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 34, 80; VOC 4408 |
| 1772 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 35, 81, 234; VOC 4410 |
| 1773 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 36, 82, 235; VOC 4411 |
| 1774 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 37, 83; VOC 4412 |
| 1775 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 38, 84; VOC 4413 |
| 1776 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 39, 85; VOC 4414 |
| 1777 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | VOC 4415; Can 86 |
| 1778 | Suchinchinqua, Suchin Kinqua | DAC | P | Ask 1179 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1778 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 87; VOC 4418 |
| 1779 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 42, 88; VOC 4419 |
| 1780 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 43; VOC 4421 |
| 1781 | Suchinkinqua | DAC | P | Ask 1185 |
| 1781 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 44; VOC 4423 |
| 1783 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 45; VOC 4430 |
| 1784 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 46, 90, 246; VOC 4426 |
| 1785 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 47, 247; VOC 4431 |
| 1786 | Suchin Kinqua, Suchin | VOC | P | Can 48, 92, 248; VOC 4432 |
| 1787 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 49, 249; VOC 4436 |
| 1788 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P, Db | VOC 4440; Can 94, 250, 366 |
| 1789 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 51, 95, 251; VOC 4444 |
| 1791 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | Can 53, 252; VOC 4446; GHL: Ms 1985 |
| 1792 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | P | VOC 4576; Can 253 |
| 1793 | Suchin Kinqua | VOC | | Can 254 |
| 1794 | Suchen Kinqua | VOC | | Can 56, 257 |
| 1795 | Suchin Kinqua | Dutch | P, Db | Can 57; OIC 196, 238Q; Aanw 298 |
| 1796 | Suchin Kinqua | Dutch | | OIC 197 |
| 1797 | Suchin Kinqua | Dutch | Db | Can 330; OIC 198 |
| 1798 | Suchin Kinqua | Dutch | Db | Can 97, 331 |
| 1799 | Suchin Kinqua, Suchin | Dutch | P | Can 61, 333; RAB 140 |
| 1800 | Suchin Kinqua | Dutch | P | Can 263, 333 |
| 1801 | Suchin Kinqua | Dutch | P | Can 339; RAB 140 |
| 1802 | Suchin Kinqua, Suchin | Dutch | P | Can 63–64, 342–43; RAB 140 |
| 1803 | Suchin Kinqua | Dutch | P | Can 345–46 |
| 1804 | Suchin Kinqua | Dutch | P | Can 65, 98, 269, 347–48 |
| 1805 | Suchin Kinqua | Dutch | P | Can 66–67, 350–51 |
| 1806 | Suchin Kinqua | Dutch | P | Can 352–53 |
| 1807 | Suchin Kinqua | Dutch | P | Can 272, 355–56 |
| 1811 | Suchin Kinqua | Dutch | | Can 378 |

## APPENDIX 7H: Suchin Tiauquon's Schedule

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1746 | Suchin Suckin, Zuchin, Zukin, Souchin | DAC | P | Ask 2197–98 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1747 | Suckin Suchin, Zuchin, Zukin, Souchin | DAC | P | Ask 2199 |
| 1748 | Suchin, Zucrin Suckin, Zuchin, Zukin, Souchin | DAC | P | Ask 1126, 2200–2201 |
| 1749 | Tiauqvon Tiouqvon Laqueer Mand | DAC | P | Ask 2202 |
| 1750 | Sukin, Suckin, Sukinn Suchin, Zuchin, Zukin, Souchin | DAC | P | Ask 1128, 2203–4 |
| 1751 | Tiauquon | DAC | P | Ask 1129 |
| 1752 | Suckin, Suchin, Zuchin, Zukin, Souchin | DAC | P | Ask 2205–6 |
| 1753 | Tiauqvon Tiouqvon Laqueer Mand | DAC | P | Ask 1132, 2207–8 |
| 1754 | Suchin Suckin, Zuchin, Zukin, Souchin | DAC | P,sa | Ask 1134, 2209a |
| 1755 | Suchin Tiauqvon, Tiauqvon Tiouqvon Laqueer Mand | DAC | P | Ask 1135, 2209b |
| 1756 | Suchin Tiauqvon (same man as Tiauqvon in previous yrs.) | DAC | P | Ask 1136 |
| 1757 | Tiauqvon Tiouqvon Laqueer Mand | DAC | P | Ask 1137, 2210 |
| 1758 | Suckin Tiauqvon, S. Tiauqvon, Tiauqvon, Tiouqvon Laqueer Mand | DAC | P, lw | Ask 1138, 2211–13 |
| 1759 | Suchin/Suckin Tiauqvon/ Tiouqvon, | DAC | P, sa | Ask 1139–42, 1144, 2214–15 |
| 1760 | Suchin & Tiauquon, Mr Suchin Tiauquaon Tiauquon | DAC | P, sa | Ask 1143, 1145, 2216–17 |
| 1761 | Suchin & Tiauquon, Mr. Suchin Tiauquaon Suckin Tiauquon | DAC | P | Ask 1146, 2218 |
| 1762 | Suchin & Tiauquon, Mr. Suchin Tiauquaon | DAC | P, sa | Ask 2220–22 |
| 1763 | Suchin & Tiauquon, Mr. Suchin Tiauquaon | DAC | P, sa | Ask 2223–26 |
| 1764 | Suchin & Tiauquon Suchin Tiauquaon | DAC | P | Ask 1153a, 2227–28 |
| 1765 | Suchin & Tiauquon, Mr. Suchin Tiauquaon | DAC | P | Ask 2229–30 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1766 | Suchin & Tiauquon, Mr. Suchin Tiauquaon | DAC | P | Ask 2231 |
| 1766 | Suchin Tiauquon/Tianquon | Port | P | NM: F17 pp. T1_00851–52, T1_06346 |
| 1767 | Suchin & Tiauquon, Mr. Suchin Tiauquaon | DAC | P | Ask 2232–33 |
| 1767 | Suchin Tiauquon | SOIC | P | NM: F17 p. T1_06357 |
| 1768 | Suchin & Tiauquon, Mr. Suchin Tiauquaon | DAC | P | Ask 2234 |
| 1769 | Suchin & Tiauquon, Mr. Suchin Tiauquaon | DAC | P | Ask 2235 |
| 1770 | Suchin & Tiauquon, Mr. Suchin Tiauquaon Suchin Tiouquon | DAC | P | Ask 1166, 2236–37 |
| 1773 | Suchin Tiauquon | DAC | P | Ask 1170 |
| 1776 | Suchin Tiaukuon, Souchin Tiauquon | DAC | P | Ask 1175 |
| 1777 | Suchin Tiauquon, Suchintiauquin | DAC | P | Ask 1177 |
| 1778 | Suchin Tiauquon | DAC | P | Ask 1178 |
| 1779 | Suchintiauquon | DAC | P | Ask 1180 |
| 1780 | Souchintiauquon | DAC | P | Ask 1183–84 |
| 1781 | Suchintiaquon, Suchintianchon, Suchintiauquon | DAC | P | Ask 1185 |
| 1782 | Suchin Tiauquon, Suchin | DAC | P | Ask 2240 |
| 1783 | Suchin Tiauquon, Suchin | DAC | P | Ask 2241 |
| 1784 | Suchin Tiauquon, Suchin | DAC | P | Ask 2242 |
| 1785 | Suchin Tiauquon, Suchin | DAC | P | Ask 2243 |
| 1786 | Suchin Tiauquon, Suchin | DAC | P | Ask 1200, 2244 |
| 1787 | Suchin Tiauquon, Suchin | DAC | P | Ask 2245 |

**APPENDIX 7I: Synchong's 新昌 Schedule**

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1765 | Senchong | VOC | P | VOC 4397 |
| 1766 | Senchong | VOC | P | VOC 4399 |
| 1773 | Senchong | VOC | P | VOC 4411; Can 82 |
| 1775 | Singchong, Sinchong | VOC | P | VOC 4413; Can 84 |
| 1776 | Sunchung | DAC | P | Ask 1175 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1776 | Singchong | VOC | P | Can 39. 85; VOC 4414 |
| 1778 | Sinchong | VOC | | VOC 4418 |
| 1780 | Synchong | DAC | P | Ask 1183–84 |
| 1781 | Synchong | DAC | P | Ask 1185 |
| 1782 | Synchong, Sinchong, Singchong, Syn Chong | EIC | P | Inglis 13; G/12/75–76 |
| 1783 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 2241 |
| 1784 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 2242 |
| 1784 | Synchong | VOC | P | VOC 4426; Can 90 |
| 1784 | Synchong | USA | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets(s); Smith (see index) |
| 1785 | Synchong | EIC | P | G/12/79 and 81–83 |
| 1785 | Synchong | French | | Constant 332 |
| 1785 | Synchong | VOC | P | VOC 4431 |
| 1786 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 1200, 2244 |
| 1786 | Synchong | EIC | P | G/12/82, 85 |
| 1786 | Syngchong, Singchong | VOC | P | VOC 4432; Can 92 |
| 1786 | Synchong | USA | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets(s); Smith, see Index |
| 1787 | Synchong | EIC | P | G/12/86–87 |
| 1787 | Syngchong, Synchong | VOC | P | Can 93; VOC 4436 |
| 1788 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 2246 |
| 1788 | Syngchong | VOC | P | VOC 4440; Can 250 |
| 1789 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 2247 |
| 1789 | Synchong | EIC | P | G/12/96–97 |
| 1789 | Syngchong, Syngsong | VOC | P | VOC 4444; Can 95 |
| 1790 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 2248 |
| 1790 | Synchong | EIC | P | G/12/96–99 |
| 1792 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 2249 |
| 1794 | Synchong | DAC | P | Ask 1208 |
| 1796 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 2250 |
| 1796 | Synchong | EIC | P | CL: HMN 5 |
| 1796 | Syngchong | SOIC | P | GUB: Ströms H21.1 Nr 1171 p. 3 |
| 1796 | Synchong, Singshong | USA | P | Mudge 56 |
| 1797 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 2251 |
| 1800 | Sunschong, Sunchong | SOIC | | GUB: H22.12 and 15 |
| 1801 | Sunschong, Sunchong | SOIC | | GUB: H22.12 |
| 1802 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 2256–57 |
| 1804 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 2260 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1804 | Synchong | USA | P | RIHS: Mss 336 Carter-Danforth Papers |
| 1805 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 2261–63 |
| 1806 | Synchong | EIC | P | CL: HMN 35 |
| 1806 | Synchong | USA | P | RIHS: Mss 336 Carter-Danforth Papers |
| 1809 | Synchong, old | USA | P | PEM: MH20 Shreve Papers, box 10, folder 4, Ship *Minerva* Account Book 1809, p. 42; Mudge 56 |
| 1812 | Syngcheong | EIC | P | CL: HMN 77 |
| 1815 | Synchong | USA | P | PEM: MH20 Shreve Papers[(s/b)]; Crossman DA 30 |
| 1817 | Synchong | USA | P | HSP: 687 Waln Papers 1 |
| 1819 | Synchong | USA | P | HSP: 687 Waln Papers 2 |
| 1820 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 2267 |
| 1822 | Syngchong, Synchang | DAC | P | Ask 2268 |

**APPENDIX 7J: Tonchong 傪昌 and Pontonchong's 同昌 Schedule**

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1750 | Tongchong Tonchong, Ton Chong, Tonchon | DAC | P | Ask 1128, 2203–4 |
| 1750 | Tonchong | EIC | P | G/12/53 |
| 1752 | Tonchong | SOIC | P | GL: A406 |
| 1754 | Tonchong, Tonchon Ton Chong | DAC | P, sa | Ask 1134, 2209a |
| 1755 | Tonchong | EIC | P | R/10/4 |
| 1756 | Ton Chong | DAC | P | Ask 1136 |
| 1758 | Tonchong Ton Chong, Tonchon | DAC | P | Ask 1138, 2211–13 |
| 1758 | Tonchon | VOC | P | VOC 4386–87[(b)] |
| 1759 | Tonchon, Tonchong, Donchong Ton Chong, Duon Chong | DAC | P | Ask 1139–42, 1144, 2214–15 |
| 1760 | Pontonchon | VOC | P | VOC 4386, 4387[(b)] |
| 1761 | Tonchong Ton Chong, Tonchon | DAC | P | Ask 1146, 2218 |
| 1764 | Pontonschong | VOC | P | VOC 4396 |
| 1765 | Tonchong, Tonchon | SOIC | P | NM: F17 p. T1_06332 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1766 | Tonchong, Ton Chong, Tonchon | DAC | P | Ask 2231 |
| 1771 | Tonchong, Tonchon | VOC | P | VOC 4408; Can 80 |

## APPENDIX 7K: Yeckhing's 益興 Schedule

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1774 | Yecking | DAC | P | Ask 1172 |
| 1775 | Yeckhing | VOC | P | Can 38, 84; VOC 4413 |
| 1775 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 1173 |
| 1776 | Yeckhing, Ejeckhing | VOC | P | Can 39, 85; VOC 4414 |
| 1776 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 1175 |
| 1777 | Yeckhing | VOC | P | VOC 4415; Can 86 |
| 1777 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 1177 |
| 1778 | Yeckhing | VOC | | VOC 4418 |
| 1778 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 1179 |
| 1779 | Yeckhing, Jekhing | VOC | P | VOC 4419; Can 88 |
| 1779 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 1180 |
| 1780 | Yekhing, Yeckhing | VOC | P | Can 43; VOC 4421 |
| 1780 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 1183–84 |
| 1781 | Yeckhing | VOC | P | VOC 4423 |
| 1781 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 1185 |
| 1782 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2240 |
| 1783 | Yeckhing | VOC | | VOC 4430 |
| 1783 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2241 |
| 1784 | Jekhing, Yekhing | VOC | P | VOC 4426; Can 90 |
| 1784 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2242 |
| 1785 | Yekhing, Jekhing | VOC | P | Can 47, 247; VOC 4431 |
| 1785 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2243 |
| 1786 | Yeckhing, Jeckhing | VOC | P | Can 48, 92, 248; VOC 4432 |
| 1786 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 1200, 2244 |
| 1787 | Yeckhing, Jeckhing, Yeching | VOC | P | Can 49, 93, 249; VOC 4436 |
| 1787 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2245 |
| 1788 | Jeckhing, Yeckhing | VOC | Db, P | VOC 4440; Can 250, 366 |
| 1788 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2246 |
| 1788 | Yeckhing | USA | | RIHS: Mss 776 Ward Papers[(s)] |
| 1789 | Yekhing, Jeckhing | VOC | P | Can 51; VOC 4444 |
| 1789 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2247 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1790 | Jeckhing | VOC | P | VOC 4445 |
| 1790 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2248 |
| 1791 | Yeckhing | VOC | P | VOC 4446; Can 252; GHL: Ms 1985 |
| 1792 | Yeckhing | VOC | P | VOC 4576; Can 253 |
| 1792 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2249 |
| 1793 | Yeckhing | VOC | | Can 254 |
| 1794 | Yeckhing | VOC | | Can 56 |
| 1794 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 1208 |
| 1795 | Yeckhing, Jeckhing | Dutch | Db, P | OIC 196, 238Q |
| 1796 | Jeckhing, Yeckhing | Dutch | Db | OIC 197; RAB 140 |
| 1796 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2250 |
| 1796 | Yeckhing | SOIC | P | GUB: Ströms H21.1 Nr 1171 |
| 1797 | Yeckhing | Dutch | Db | Can 330; OIC 198 |
| 1797 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2251 |
| 1798 | Yeckhing. Jeckhing | VOC | Db | Can 97, 331 |
| 1799 | Yeckhing | Dutch | Db | Can 61, 333; RAB 140 |
| 1799 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2252–53 |
| 1800 | Yeckhing, Jeckhing | Dutch | P | Can 263, 333 |
| 1800 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2254 |
| 1801 | Yeckhing, Jeckhing | Dutch | P | Can 339; RAB 140 |
| 1801 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2255 |
| 1801 | Yeckhing | SOIC | | GUB: H22.12 |
| 1802 | Jeckhing, Yeckhing | Dutch | P | Can 63–64, 342–43; RAB 140 |
| 1802 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2256–57 |
| 1803 | Yeckhing | Dutch | P | Can 345–46 |
| 1803 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2258–59 |
| 1804 | Yeckhing, Jeckhing | Dutch | P | Can 65, 269. 347–48 |
| 1804 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2260 |
| 1805 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2261–63 |
| 1806 | Yeckhing | DAC | P | Ask 2264 |

## APPENDIX 7L: Youchong's Schedule

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1780 | Youchong | DAC | P | Ask 1183–84 |
| 1784 | Youchong, Jungchong | VOC | P | Can 90; VOC 4426 |
| 1786 | Jouchong, Youchong | VOC | P | VOC 4432; Can 92 |

| Year | Trade names | Co. | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1787 | Youchongh, Jouchong, Younchon | VOC | P | Can 49; VOC 4436 |
| 1794 | Youchong | DAC | P | Ask 1208 |
| 1796 | Youchong | DAC | P | Ask 2250 |
| 1796 | Youchong | SOIC | P | GUB: Ströms H21.1 Nr 1171 |
| 1797 | Youchong | DAC | P | Ask 2251 |
| 1799 | Youchong | DAC | P | Ask 2252–53 |
| 1800 | Youchong | DAC | P | Ask 2254 |
| 1801 | Youchong | DAC | P | Ask 2255 |
| 1802 | Youchong | DAC | P | Ask 2256–57 |
| 1803 | Youchong | DAC | P | Ask 2258–59 |
| 1804 | Youchong | DAC | P | Ask 2260 |
| 1805 | Youchong | DAC | P | Ask 2261–63 |
| 1806 | Youchong | DAC | P | Ask 2264 |

**APPENDIX 7M: Conjac and Tonchong's (同昌 or 僮昌) Trade with the DAC 1750–1766 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Conjac (Qvonneak) | Products | Tonchong | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1750 | | | 15 | P |
| 1754 | | | 619 | P, sa |
| 1758 | | | 113 | P |
| 1759 | | | 75 | P |
| 1761 | | | 197 | P |
| 1764 | 112 | P | | |
| 1766 | 774 | P | 87 | P |
| Total | 886 | | 1,106 | |
| Years | 2 | | 6 | |
| average | 443 | | 184 | |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Ask 2203, 2209a, 2211–13, 2218, 2227, 2234.

**APPENDIX 7N: Conjac and Echong's 義昌 Trade with the VOC 1762–1788 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Conjac | Products | Echong | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1762 | 1,156 | P | | |
| 1763 | 1,133 | P | | |
| 1764 | 443 | P | | |

| Year | Conjac | Products | Echong | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1765 | 267 | P | | |
| 1766 | 2,597 | P | | |
| 1768 | 2,688 | P | 2,017 | P |
| 1769 | 2,040 | P | 1,485 | P |
| 1770 | 15,766 | P, sa | 808 | P |
| 1771 | 20,790 | P | 71 | P |
| 1772 | 20,230 | P | | |
| 1773 | 26,092 | P | 551 | P |
| 1774 | 17,722 | P | 880 | P |
| 1775 | 12,750 | P, H | | |
| 1776 | 10,289 | P | 292 | P |
| 1777 | 14,401 | P, H | | |
| 1778 | 17,865 | P, H | 326 | P |
| 1779 | 12,190 | P | | |
| 1780 | 7,835 | P | 425 | P |
| 1781 | 4,569 | P | 149 | P |
| 1783 | 3,714 | P | | |
| 1784 | 1,961 | P | | |
| 1788 | | | 80 | P |
| Total | 196,499 | | 7,084 | |
| Years | 21 | | 11 | |
| average | 9,357 | | 644 | |

Sources: *Grootboeken* in NAH: VOC 4394, 4396–97, 4399, 4402, 4405–6, 4408, 4410–15, 4418–19, 4421, 4423, 4426, 4430, 4440.

**APPENDIX 7O: Lisjoncon 李相公 and Exchin's 鷁昇 Trade with the DAC 1752–1805 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Lisjoncon | Products | Exchin | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1752 | 211 | P | | |
| 1754 | 1,258 | P | | |
| 1755 | 579 | P | | |
| 1757 | 1,085 | P | | |
| 1758 | 1,602 | P | | |
| 1759 | 3,227 | P | | |
| 1760 | 358 | P | | |
| 1763 | 388 | P | | |
| 1764 | 3,292 | P | 57 | P |
| 1765 | 535 | P | | |
| 1766 | 975 | P | | |

| Year | Lisjoncon | Products | Exchin | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1767 | 1,383 | P | | |
| 1770 | 2,394 | P | | |
| 1772 | 182 | P | | |
| 1782 | | | 3,480 | P |
| 1783 | | | 536 | P |
| 1787 | | | 268 | P |
| 1788 | | | 1,889 | P |
| 1789 | | | 520 | P |
| 1797 | | | 4,589 | P |
| 1799 | | | 3,507 | P |
| 1800 | | | 1,015 | P |
| 1801 | | | 1,213 | P |
| 1802 | | | 247 | P |
| 1803 | | | 980 | P |
| 1804 | | | 389 | P |
| 1805 | | | 211 | P |
| Total | 17,470 | | 18,901 | |
| Years | 14 | | 14 | |
| average | 1,248 | | 1,350 | |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Ask 2205–6, 2209a–b, 2210–17, 2225, 2227–29, 2231–33, 2237, 2239–41, 2245–47, 2251–56, 2258–60.

**APPENDIX 7P: Lisjoncon 李相公 and Exchin's 鵾昇 Trade with the VOC 1757–1788 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Lisjoncon | Products | Exchin | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1757 | 1,618 | P | | |
| 1758 | 2,031 | Pc, Sc, P | | |
| 1760 | 9,614 | P | | |
| 1762 | 10,810 | P | | |
| 1763 | 14,424 | P | | |
| 1764 | 9,640 | P | 28 | P |
| 1765 | 7,894 | P | 390 | P |
| 1766 | 2,363 | P | 595 | P |
| 1768 | 3,618 | P | 1,853 | P |
| 1769 | 6,195 | P | 1,205 | P |
| 1770 | 5,923 | P | 308 | P |
| 1771 | 3,820 | P | 454 | P |
| 1772 | 6,486 | P | | |
| 1773 | 2,829 | sat, P | | |

| Year | Lisjoncon | Products | Exchin | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1774 | 6,119 | P | 1,166 | P |
| 1775 | 3,315 | P | 171 | P |
| 1776 | | | 1,103 | P |
| 1777 | | | 1,312 | P |
| 1778 | | | 881 | P |
| 1779 | | | 713 | P |
| 1780 | | | 1,618 | P |
| 1781 | | | 482 | P |
| 1784 | 1,748 | P | 2,930 | P |
| 1785 | | | 8,276 | P |
| 1786 | | | 1,989 | P |
| 1787 | | | 1,302 | P |
| 1788 | | | 354 | P |
| Total | 98,446 | | 27,131 | |
| Years | 17 | | 20 | |
| average | 5,791 | | 1,357 | |

Source: *Grootboeken* in NAH: VOC 4381–82, 4386, 4394, 4396–97, 4399, 4402, 4405–6, 4408, 4410–15, 4418–19, 4421, 4423, 4426, 4431–32, 4436, 4440.

**APPENDIX 7Q: Soychong 聚昌 and Suchin Kinqua's 璲珍店 trade with the VOC 1758–1792 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Soychong | Products | Suchin Kinqua | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1758 | 135 | P | | |
| 1760 | 1,177 | P | 1,428 | P |
| 1762 | 1,028 | P | 3,619 | P |
| 1763 | | | 565 | P |
| 1764 | 117 | P | 12,188 | P |
| 1765 | 36 | P | 17,014 | P |
| 1766 | 309 | P | 19,096 | P |
| 1768 | | | 7,359 | P |
| 1769 | 80 | P | 6,891 | P |
| 1770 | 348 | P | 8,663 | P |
| 1771 | 1,679 | P | 5,914 | P |
| 1772 | 1,237 | P | 3,692 | P |
| 1773 | 2,122 | P | 11,305 | P |
| 1774 | 61 | P | 7,308 | P |
| 1775 | 1,145 | P | 9,145 | P |
| 1776 | 106 | P | 8,357 | P |
| 1777 | 335 | P | 6,321 | P |

| Year | Soychong | Products | Suchin Kinqua | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1778 | 146 | P | 10,255 | P |
| 1779 | | | 9,871 | P |
| 1780 | | | 6,737 | P |
| 1781 | 638 | P | 4,887 | P |
| 1783 | 103 | P | 1,466 | P |
| 1784 | 92 | P | 7,406 | P |
| 1785 | | | 8,845 | P |
| 1786 | 1,269 | P | 9,562 | P |
| 1787 | 680 | P | 7,726 | P |
| 1788 | | | 16,523 | P |
| 1789 | | | 14,375 | P |
| 1791 | | | 8,618 | P |
| 1792 | | | 17,862 | P |
| Total | 12,842 | | 252,996 | |
| Years | 21 | | 29 | |
| average | 612 | | 8,724 | |

Source: *Grootboeken* in NAH: VOC 4382, 4386, 4394, 4396–97, 4399, 4402, 4405–6, 4408, 4410–15, 4418–19, 4421, 4423, 4426, 4430–32, 4436, 4440, 4444, 4446, 4576.

**APPENDIX 7R: Soychong 聚昌 and Suchin Tiauquon's Trade with the DAC 1746–1787 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Soychong | Products | Suchin Tiauquon | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1746 | | | 32 | P |
| 1747 | 1,014 | P, sa | 49 | P |
| 1748 | | | 692 | P |
| 1749 | 1,402 | P | 1,729 | P |
| 1750 | 268 | P | 1,156 | P |
| 1752 | 1,041 | P | 482 | P |
| 1753 | 1,581 | P, sa | 3,365 | P |
| 1754 | 1,312 | P, sa | 443 | P, sa |
| 1755 | 482 | P | 2,217 | P |
| 1757 | 1,485 | P | 2,530 | P |
| 1758 | 1,345 | P | 3,751 | P, lw |
| 1759 | 2,056 | P | 8,277 | P, mp, PZZ, ZZ |
| 1760 | 2,255 | P, sa | 8,080 | P, sa |
| 1761 | | | 6,707 | P |
| 1762 | 3,820 | P | 9,581 | P, sa |
| 1763 | 1,886 | P | 12,671 | P |
| 1764 | 3,688 | P | 4,153 | P |

| Year | Soychong | Products | Suchin Tiauquon | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1765 | 7,526 | P | 12,366 | P |
| 1766 | 3,442 | P | 1,725 | P |
| 1767 | 2,405 | P | 7,733 | P |
| 1768 | 3,028 | P | 3,507 | P |
| 1769 | 2,713 | P | 1,635 | P |
| 1770 | 6,807 | P | 3,298 | P |
| 1772 | 11,022 | P | | |
| 1782 | 2,354 | P | 1,744 | P |
| 1783 | 674 | P | 3,107 | P |
| 1784 | 598 | P | 5,355 | P |
| 1785 | 351 | P | 6,653 | P |
| 1786 | 720 | P | 1,389 | P |
| 1787 | | | 258 | P |
| Total | 65,274 | | 114,685 | |
| Years | 26 | | 29 | |
| average | 2,511 | | 3,955 | |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Ask 2198–2218, 2220–45.

**APPENDIX 7S: Soyqua 修官 and Youchong's Trade with the DAC 1782–1806 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Soyqua | Products | Youchong | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1782 | 7,102 | P | | |
| 1783 | 2,301 | P | | |
| 1784 | 4,696 | P | | |
| 1785 | 3,016 | P | | |
| 1786 | 2,707 | P | | |
| 1787 | 1,537 | P | | |
| 1788 | 1,203 | P | | |
| 1789 | 762 | P | | |
| 1790 | 659 | P | | |
| 1792 | 244 | P | | |
| 1796 | | | 2,266 | P |
| 1797 | | | 1,009 | P |
| 1799 | | | 5,687 | P |
| 1800 | | | 2,111 | P |
| 1801 | | | 4,209 | P |
| 1802 | | | 4,831 | P |
| 1803 | | | 3,312 | P |
| 1804 | | | 4,593 | P |

| Year | Soyqua | Products | Youchong | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1805 | | | 4,075 | P |
| 1806 | | | 3,336 | P |
| Total | 24,228 | | 35,429 | |
| Years | 10 | | 10 | |
| average | 2,423 | | 3,543 | |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Ask 2240–61, 2264.

**APPENDIX 7T: Soyqua 修官 and Youchong's Trade with the VOC 1760–1792 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Soyqua | Products | Youchong | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1760 | 39 | P | | |
| 1772 | 130 | P | | |
| 1773 | 49 | P | | |
| 1775 | 180 | P | | |
| 1777 | 27 | P | | |
| 1778 | 904 | P | | |
| 1779 | 684 | P | | |
| 1780 | 1,384 | P | | |
| 1781 | 1,041 | P | | |
| 1783 | 387 | P | | |
| 1784 | 1,379 | P | 168 | P |
| 1785 | 2,138 | P | | |
| 1786 | 6,867 | P | 108 | P |
| 1787 | 6,701 | P | 644 | P |
| 1788 | 8,569 | P | | |
| 1789 | 1,782 | P | | |
| 1792 | 2,603 | P | | |
| Total | 34,865 | | 921 | |
| Years | 17 | | 3 | |
| average | 2,051 | | 307 | |

Source: *Grootboeken* in NAH: VOC 4386, 4410–11, 4413, 4415, 4418–19, 4421, 4423, 4426, 4430–32, 4436, 4440, 4444, 4576.

**APPENDIX 7U: Synchong 新昌 and Yeckhing's 益興 Trade with the VOC 1765–1792 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Synchong | Products | Yeckhing | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1765 | 68 | P | | |
| 1766 | 965 | P | | |

| Year | Synchong | Products | Yeckhing | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1773 | 218 | P | | |
| 1775 | 221 | P | 1,046 | P |
| 1776 | 377 | P | 1,671 | P |
| 1777 | | | 1,737 | P |
| 1778 | 416 | P | 1,756 | P |
| 1779 | | | 875 | P |
| 1780 | | | 3,247 | P |
| 1781 | | | 1,344 | P |
| 1783 | | | 35 | P |
| 1784 | 1,624 | P | 3,092 | P |
| 1785 | 203 | P | 4,583 | P |
| 1786 | 1,059 | P | 9,764 | P |
| 1787 | 1,880 | P | 13,219 | P |
| 1788 | 1,247 | P | 17,356 | P |
| 1789 | 844 | P | 12,766 | P |
| 1790 | | | 7,030 | P |
| 1791 | | | 3,054 | P |
| 1792 | | | 8,783 | P |
| Total | 9,123 | | 91,357 | |
| Years | 12 | | 17 | |
| average | 760 | | 5,374 | |

Source: *Grootboeken* in NAH: VOC 4397, 4399, 4411, 4413–15, 4418–19, 4421, 4423, 4426, 4430–32, 4436, 4440, 4444–46, 4576.

**APPENDIX 7V: Synchong 新昌 and Yeckhing's 益興 Trade with the DAC 1782–1806 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Synchong | Products | Yeckhing | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1782 | | | 5,404 | P |
| 1783 | 1,526 | P | 2,856 | P |
| 1784 | 1,582 | P | 6,810 | P |
| 1785 | | | 6,406 | P |
| 1786 | 173 | P | 4,495 | P |
| 1787 | | | 5,786 | P |
| 1788 | 1,097 | P | 4,363 | P |
| 1789 | 222 | P | 2,103 | P |
| 1790 | 435 | P | 1,386 | P |
| 1792 | 1,380 | P | 2,180 | P |
| 1796 | 1,395 | P | 3,410 | P |
| 1797 | 277 | P | 884 | P |

| Year | Synchong | Products | Yeckhing | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1799 | | | 1,081 | P |
| 1800 | | | 570 | P |
| 1801 | | | 1,780 | P |
| 1802 | 503 | P | 461 | P |
| 1803 | | | 1,357 | P |
| 1804 | 556 | P | 672 | P |
| 1805 | 389 | P | 916 | P |
| 1806 | | | 562 | P |
| Total | 9,534 | | 53,485 | |
| Years | 12 | | 20 | |
| average | 795 | | 2,674 | |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Ask 2240–60, 2264.

## APPENDIX 8A: Miscellaneous Porcelain Dealers in EIC Records 1702–1775

| Year | Trade name | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1702 | Diauqua | P | G/12/16 |
| 1721 | Chuqua | P | G/12/22 |
| 1721 | Linqua | P | G/12/22 |
| 1721 | Yewnqua, Yeunqua | P | G/12/22 |
| 1722 | Cheuqua | P | G/12/23 |
| 1722 | Chouqua | P | G/12/23 |
| 1722 | Imqua | P | G/12/23 |
| 1722 | Offoo | P | G/12/23 |
| 1722 | Tinqua | P | G/12/23 |
| 1727 | Gauqua | P | G/12/26 |
| 1728 | Chequa | P | G/12/27 |
| 1728 | Gawqua | P | G/12/27 |
| 1728 | Keowlo | P | G/12/27 |
| 1728 | Lockcoon | P, sa | G/12/27 |
| 1728 | Poor Robin | P | G/12/27 |
| 1729 | Cungqua | P | G/12/28 |
| 1729 | Leonqua | P | G/12/28 |
| 1731 | Tonqua | P | G/12/31 |
| 1732 | Poor Robin | P | G/12/33 |
| 1732 | Tinqua Tom | P | G/12/33 |
| 1734 | Chiqua | P | G/12/36 |
| 1734 | Guaqua | P | G/12/37 |
| 1734 | Joiqua | P | G/12/37 |
| 1734 | Joiqua and Tuqua | P, sa | G/12/37 |

| Year | Trade name | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1734 | Yeanqua | P | G/12/37 |
| 1734 | Yeanqua and Guaqua | P | G/12/37 |
| 1735 | Chaqua | P, sa | G/12/39 |
| 1735 | Poor Robin | P | G/12/38 |
| 1735 | Sinqua | P | G/12/38 |
| 1735 | Ton Tiqua | P, sa | G/12/38 |
| 1736 | Hequa | P | G/12/40 |
| 1736 | Jago | P | G/12/40 |
| 1736 | John Baptist | P | G/12/40 |
| 1736 | Robin, Poor Robin | P | M1; G/12/40–41 |
| 1736 | Sinqua | P | M1; G/12/41 |
| 1736 | Tequa | P | M1; G/12/41 |
| 1736 | Tom Boteekman | P | G/12/40 |
| 1736 | Tuqua | P, sa | M1; G/12/41 |
| 1737 | Huquoi | P | G/12/42 |
| 1737 | Khatqua, Katquoi | P | G/12/42 |
| 1737 | Poor Robin, Poor Robin Hunqua | P | Cheong 40, 72n90; G/12/42–43 |
| 1737 | Tycho | P | G/12/42 |
| 1737 | Young Chanqua, Chanquoi | P, sa | G/12/42 |
| 1738 | Akow | P | G/12/45 |
| 1738 | Assamco | P | G/12/45 |
| 1738 | Assea | P | G/12/45 |
| 1738 | Jacqua | P | G/12/45 |
| 1738 | Juqua | P | G/12/44 |
| 1738 | Powqua Twansoy | P | G/12/45 |
| 1738 | Robin, Poor Robin | P | G/12/44–45 |
| 1738 | Taqua | P | G/12/44 |
| 1738 | Tunqua | P | G/12/44 |
| 1739 | Chesia | P | G/12/46 |
| 1739 | Gonkquoi, Gouqua, Goukqua | P | G/12/46 |
| 1739 | Jounquai | P | G/12/46 |
| 1739 | Khiqua | P | G/12/46 |
| 1739 | Robin, Poor Robin | P, sa | G/12/46 |
| 1739 | Ton Tinqua/Tienqua | P | G/12/46–47 |
| 1740 | Cinqua | P | G/12/48 |
| 1740 | Ketqua | P | G/12/48 |
| 1740 | Robin | P | G/12/48 |
| 1740 | Tetqua | P | G/12/48 |
| 1741 | Attoy | P | G/12/50 |

| Year | Trade name | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1741 | Ghemqua | P | G/12/50 |
| 1741 | Honest Tom | P | G/12/49 |
| 1741 | Katqua | P | G/12/50 |
| 1741 | Kiqua | P | G/12/49 |
| 1741 | Nunqua | P | G/12/49 |
| 1741 | Robin | P, sa | G/12/49–50 |
| 1741 | Souqua | P | G/12/49 |
| 1741 | Tonqua | P | G/12/49 |
| 1741 | Winqua | P, sa | G/12/50 |
| 1742 | Cinqua | P | G/12/51 |
| 1742 | Hekee | P | G/12/51 |
| 1742 | Robin Conqua, Robin | P, sa | G/12/51 |
| 1750 | Apang | P | G/12/53 |
| 1750 | Fuqua | P | G/12/53 |
| 1751 | Apang | P | G/12/56 |
| 1751 | Cinqua | P | G/12/56 |
| 1753 | Hockqua | P | G/12/57 |
| 1755 | Beau Hing | P | R/10/4 |
| 1755 | Cinqua | P | R/10/4 |
| 1755 | Inqua | P | R/10/4 |
| 1755 | Loqua | P | R/10/4 |
| 1759 | Cinqua | P | R/10/4 |
| 1759 | Hequa, Heequa | P | R/10/4 |
| 1759 | Inqua | P | R/10/4 |
| 1759 | Tiqua | P | R/10/4 |
| 1761 | Quoneach | P | R/10/5 |
| 1761 | Sinqua | P | R/10/5 |
| 1761 | Suchin | P | R/10/5 |
| 1761 | Wingchong (永昌) | P | R/10/5 |
| 1761 | Yinqua | P | R/10/5 |
| 1764 | Sinqua | P | R/10/5 |
| 1764 | Tatqua | P | R/10/5 |
| 1765 | Sinqua | P | R/10/5 |
| 1765 | Tatqua | P | R/10/5 |
| 1768 | Sinqua | P | R/10/5 |
| 1772 | Sinqua | P | R/10/9 |
| 1774 | Sinqua | P, sa | R/10/9 |
| 1775 | Sinqua | P | G/12/58 |

Note: This list only includes porcelain dealers who are not included in other appendixes.

**APPENDIX 8B: Miscellaneous Porcelain Dealers in GIC Records 1724–1732 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Trade names | Trade | Products traded | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1724 | Chunquay, Chonquoi | 163 | P | IC 5684, 5740; PMA 479 |
| 1724 | Conjou, Congjou | 462 | P | IC 5684, 5740; PMA 479 |
| 1724 | Jago, Jacco | 672 | P | IC 5684, 5740; PMA 479 |
| 1725 | Anthony, Antonio | 74 | P | IC 5690, 5692 |
| 1725 | Blekjacq | 17 | P | IC 5690, 5692 |
| 1725 | Canga, J. Congo | 297 | P (gave a 4% rebate) | IC 5690, 5692 |
| 1725 | Jago, Jacco | 548 | P (gave a 2% rebate) | IC 5690, 5692 |
| 1725 | Ouqua | 16 | P | IC 5690, 5692 |
| 1725 | Robben | 537 | P (gave a 2% rebate) | IC 5690, 5692 |
| 1725 | Tomsoy | 93 | P | IC 5690, 5692 |
| 1727 | Canga, J. Congo | 556 | P | IC 5699, 5700 |
| 1727 | Liqua | 153 | P | IC 5699, 5700 |
| 1727 | Robben | 1,980 | P, sa | IC 5699, 5700 |
| 1727 | Tauquay, Teyqua, Tayqua, Tyqua | 1,398 | P | IC 5699, 5700 |
| 1727 | Tom, Mr. Tom | 19 | P | IC 5699, 5700 |
| 1727 | Tomsoy | 7,430 | P, C, R, An, B, sa | IC 5699, 5700 |
| 1730 | Chunquay, Chonquoi | 394 | P, B, FR | IC 5710 |
| 1730 | Jago, Jacco | 1,903 | P, B, Pc, zt, Bg, Sl | IC 5710 |
| 1730 | Robben | 990 | P | IC 5710 |
| 1730 | Tauquay, Teyqua | 479 | P | IC 5710 |
| 1732 | Anthony, Antonio | 16 | P | IC 5707 |
| 1732 | Chiqua | 11,747 | P | IC 5707 |
| 1732 | Guaqua | 537 | P | IC 5707 |
| 1732 | Jago, Jacco | 260 | P | IC 5707 |
| 1732 | Robben | 2,823 | Bg, P | IC 5707 |

Note: This list only includes porcelain dealers who are not included in other appendixes.

**APPENDIX 8C: Miscellaneous Porcelain Dealers in VOC Records 1730–1791 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Trade names | Trade | Products |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1730 | Onqua | 657 | P |
| 1730 | Zeyqua | 12 | P |
| 1730 | Augustin | 786 | P |
| 1730 | Goe Tyqua | 16 | P |

| Year | Trade names | Trade | Products |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1730 | Tyqua | 4 | P |
| 1730 | Tiuqua | 176 | P |
| 1730 | Tonqua | 357 | Rx, P |
| 1730 | Jan Chinawaar | 6 | P |
| 1730 | Labin, Labyn (Robin) | 1,272 | P |
| 1731 | Labin, Labyn (Robin) | 15,921 | P, H, B, C |
| 1730 | Quinqua | 28 | P |
| 1731 | Tyqua | 289 | P |
| 1731 | Kiga | 224 | P |
| 1732 | Labin (Robin) & Seyqua | 38,462 | P, C |
| 1733 | Labin (Robin) & Seyqua | 23,586 | P, Pc, H, Cht |
| 1733 | Lacqua | 532 | P |
| The *grootboeken* are missing from 1734 to 1756 | | | |
| 1757 | Manuel Corree | 33 | P |
| 1757 | Konqua | 121 | P |
| 1757 | Jouwqua | 85 | P |
| 1758 | Houqua (廣益) | 1,887 | P |
| 1758 | Janqua, Jauqua | 701 | P |
| 1758 | Tonchon (傛昌) | 49 | P |
| 1760 | Hapjak (合益) | 713 | P |
| 1760 | Houqua (廣益) | 2,342 | P |
| 1760 | Janqua, Jauqua | 713 | P |
| 1760 | Neyschong (裔昌店) | 572 | P |
| 1760 | Pontonchon (同昌) | 1,769 | P |
| 1760 | Quonsching (廣盛店) | 216 | P |
| 1760 | Quonschong (廣昌店) | 283 | P |
| 1762 | Houqua (廣益) | 788 | lw |
| 1762 | Chonqua | 585 | lw |
| 1763 | Houqua (廣益) | 748 | lw |
| 1763 | Janqua, Jauqua | 402 | P |
| 1763 | Chonqua | 567 | lw |
| 1763 | Sinqua | 565 | P |
| 1763 | Affu | 672 | P |
| 1764 | Pontonchon (同昌) | 177 | P |
| 1764 | Sinqua | 877 | P |
| 1764 | Konqua | 28 | P |
| 1764 | Taxion, Taxon | 309 | P |
| 1764 | Hapwoo | 75 | P |
| 1764 | Tongfong | 253 | P |
| 1765 | Houqua (廣益) | 567 | lw |

| Year | Trade names | Trade | Products |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1765 | Chonqua | 522 | lw |
| 1765 | Sinqua | 40 | P |
| 1765 | Taxion, Taxon | 668 | P |
| 1765 | Boohing | 120 | P |
| 1765 | Tonhang | 190 | P |
| 1766 | Sinqua | 4,076 | P |
| 1766 | Taxion, Taxon | 960 | P |
| 1768 | Sinqua | 651 | P |
| 1769 | Pouwchong | 77 | P |
| 1769 | Kinqua | 124 | P |
| 1770 | Kinqua | 307 | P |
| 1771 | Kinqua | 751 | P |
| 1772 | Pouwchong | 1,058 | P |
| 1772 | Kinqua | 971 | P |
| 1773 | Kinqua | 1,487 | P |
| 1775 | Eyeck, Ejec | 92 | P |
| 1777 | Samjack | 75 | P |
| 1778 | Kinqua | 68 | P |
| 1778 | Foyec | 247 | P |
| 1779 | Foyec | 75 | P |
| 1779 | Meeho | 216 | P |
| 1780 | Foyec | 98 | P |
| 1784 | Foyec | 38 | P |
| 1784 | Meeho | 32 | P |
| 1785 | Hopyek (合益) | 751 | P |
| 1786 | Hopyek (合益) | 1,878 | P |
| 1787 | Hopyek (合益) | 961 | P |
| 1787 | Chinqua | 81 | P |
| 1788 | Hopyek (合益) | 103 | P |
| 1791 | Toyqua | 1,687 | P |

Source: *Grootboeken* in NAH: VOC 4375–78, 4381–82, 4386, 4394, 4396–97, 4399, 4402, 4405–6, 4408, 4410–11, 4413, 4415, 4418–19, 4421, 4426, 4431–32, 4436, 4440, 4446
Note: This list only includes porcelain dealers who are not included in other appendixes.

**APPENDIX 8D: Miscellaneous Porcelain Dealers in DAC Records 1734–1833 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Trade names | Trade | Products |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1734 | Hotqua | 84 | P |
| 1734 | Pocqua | 109 | P |

| Year | Trade names | Trade | Products |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1736 | Amoy Sinqua | 1,271 | P |
| 1738 | Tamsoy Pocqua | 206 | P |
| 1738 | Tay Huin | 57 | P |
| 1739 | Amoy Jak | 74 | P |
| 1739 | Amoy Sinqua | 243 | P |
| 1739 | Gouqua Sinko | 176 | P |
| 1739 | Jamqua | 317 | P |
| 1744 | Amoy Sinqua | 1,297 | P, sa |
| 1746 | Hoyqua | 264 | P |
| 1746 | Pocqua | 137 | P |
| 1747 | Jak, Jeck | 59 | P |
| 1747 | Ponqua | 139 | P |
| 1747 | Toheng | 52 | P |
| 1747 | Tonqua | 163 | P |
| 1747 | Tungchin | 295 | P |
| 1748 | Abath | 51 | P |
| 1748 | Hoyqua | 259 | P |
| 1748 | Keyqua | 308 | P |
| 1748 | Quonchong, Quonchon (廣昌店) | 19 | P |
| 1748 | Waqua | 542 | P |
| 1750 | Hoyqua | 61 | P |
| 1750 | Keyqua | 291 | P |
| 1750 | Longchin | 577 | P |
| 1750 | Waqua | 116 | P |
| 1752 | Jauqua, Jeauqva, Jouqua | 399 | P |
| 1752 | Kimcqva | 107 | P |
| 1752 | Kinqua Shinqua | 89 | P |
| 1752 | Waqua | 115 | P |
| 1754 | Bouheng, Boehing, Bohing | 62 | P |
| 1754 | Bouqua | 24 | P |
| 1754 | Jak, Jeck | 165 | P |
| 1754 | Pocqua | 27 | P |
| 1754 | Waqua | 520 | P |
| 1755 | Jauqua, Jeauqva, Jouqua | 572 | P |
| 1759 | Bouheng, Boehing, Bohing | 347 | P |
| 1759 | Duon Chong | 330 | P |
| 1759 | Jauqua, Jeauqva, Jouqua | 403 | P |
| 1760 | Mauqua | 37 | P |
| 1760 | Quonchong, Quonchon (廣昌店) | 11 | P |
| 1762 | Quinqua | 39 | P |

| Year | Trade names | Trade | Products |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1763 | Jauqua, Jeauqva, Jouqua | 251 | P |
| 1763 | Waqua | 1,022 | P |
| 1764 | Bouheng, Boehing, Bohing | 559 | P |
| 1764 | Powchon | 77 | P |
| 1764 | Quinqua | 214 | P |
| 1764 | Quonchong, Quonchon (廣昌店) | 59 | P |
| 1764 | Quonqua | 229 | P |
| 1764 | Suchin Kinqua | 260 | P |
| 1764 | Waqua | 218 | P |
| 1765 | Bouheng, Boehing, Bohing | 133 | P |
| 1765 | Kinqua Shinqua | 99 | P |
| 1765 | Waqua | 234 | P |
| 1766 | Bouheng, Boehing, Bohing | 39 | P |
| 1766 | Kinqua Shinqua | 560 | P |
| 1767 | Bouheng, Boehing, Bohing | 84 | P |
| 1767 | Kinqua Shinqua | 204 | P |
| 1767 | Zumau, Zin Mouw | 553 | P |
| 1768 | Kinqua Shinqua | 149 | P |
| 1769 | Jonqua | 433 | P |
| 1769 | Kinqua Shinqua | 91 | P |
| 1770 | Kinqua Shinqua | 137 | P |
| 1770 | Swe Eg | 182 | P |
| 1772 | Kinqua Shinqua | 82 | P |
| 1772 | Seequa | 843 | P |
| The *Kasse-hovedboger* are missing from 1773 to 1781 | | | |
| 1783 | Suchin | 1,725 | P |
| 1784 | James | 253 | P |
| 1784 | Suchin | 1,883 | P |
| 1784 | Suchin Xinqua | 118 | P |
| 1786 | James | 412 | P |
| 1796 | Andreas | 905 | P |
| 1802 | Pouchong | 372 | P |
| 1802 | Bochong | 984 | P |
| No DAC ships in China from 1807 to 1819 | | | |
| 1820 | Cumchong (金昌) | 1,625 | P |
| 1820 | Fouchong (阜昌) | 1,540 | P |
| 1820 | Hupchong (合昌) | 1,103 | P |
| 1833 | Cumchong (金昌) | 170 | P |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Lintrup 5893 No. 1, Ask 2190, 2192–94, 2197–2201, 2203–6, 2209a–b, 2212–17, 2220, 2223–39, 2241–42, 2244, 2250, 2256–57, 2267, 2271
Note: This list only includes porcelain dealers who are not included in other appendixes.

**APPENDIX 8E: Miscellaneous Porcelain Dealers in USA Records 1784–1844**

| Year | Trade names | Products | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1784 | Chew | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets[(s)]; Smith (see index) |
| 1784 | Howqua (廣益) | lw | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets[(s)]; Smith (see index) |
| 1784 | Layhoun (麗源) | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets[(s)]; Smith (see index) |
| 1784 | Souchin Anyong (璲興亞元) | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets[(s)]; Smith (see index) |
| 1784 | Winchong (永昌) | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets[(s)]; Smith (see index) |
| 1786 | Chinqua (成官) | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets[(s)]; Smith (see index) |
| 1786 | Hopyeck (合益) | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets[(s)]; Smith (see index); Mudge 55 |
| 1786 | Manchin (萬勝號) | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets[(s)]; Smith (see index) |
| 1786 | Souchin Choqua (璲興店) | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets[(s)]; Smith (see index) |
| 1786 | Souchin Choqua (璲興店) | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets[(s)]; Smith (see index); Mudge 55 |
| 1786 | Soyhing (聚興店) | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets[(s)]; Smith (see index) |
| 1786 | Yick (義益店) | P | UPL: Ms Coll. 499 Molineux's Reciets[(s)]; Smith (see index) |
| 1797 | Fouchong (阜昌) | P | JCB: B1131 Brown Papers[(b)] |
| 1801 | Efing | P | RIHS: Mss 336 Carter-Danforth Papers |
| 1801 | Sonyeck | P | RIHS: Mss 336 Carter-Danforth Papers |
| 1804 | Yamshingqua, Yam Shinqua | P | RIHS: Mss 336 Carter-Danforth Papers; Mudge 56–58; *Providence Gazette* (12 May 1804) |
| 1809 | Fouchong (阜昌) | P | PEM: MH20 Shreve Papers, box 10, folder 4, Ship *Minerva* Account Book 1809, p. 42; Mudge 56 |
| 1809 | S(G)onyeck | P | PEM: MH20 Shreve Papers; Mudge 56 |
| 1809 | Yamshinqua | P | PEM: MH20 Shreve Papers |
| 1815 | Cumchong (金昌) | P | PEM: MH20 Shreve Papers[(s/b)] |
| 1815 | Fouchong (阜昌) | P | PEM: MH20 Shreve Papers[(s/b)] |
| 1817 | Fouchong (阜昌) | P | HSP: 687 Waln Papers 1 |
| 1817 | Manchong | P | HSP: 687 Waln Papers 1 |
| 1819 | Cumchong (金昌) | P | MHS: Ship *Sultan* Account Book; HSP: 687 Waln Papers 2, 4 |
| 1819 | Fouchong (阜昌) | P | HSP: 687 Waln Papers 2, 4 |

| Year | Trade names | Products | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1820 | Hupchong (合昌) | P | PEM: Shreve.MH20(s/b); Crossman DA 33 |
| 1822 | Hupchong (合昌) | P | PEM: MH20 Shreve Papers(s/b) |
| 1824 | Cumchong (金昌) | P | RIHS: B158 Carrington Papers |
| 1830 | Cumchong (金昌) | P | HSP: 1691 Rulon Papers 9(s) |
| 1844 | Cumchong (金昌) | P | Tiffany 68–72 |
| 1844 | Yeckhing (益興) | P | Tiffany 124–26 |

Note: This list only includes porcelain dealers who are not included in other appendixes.

**APPENDIX 9: Contents of 34 Contracts**

As mentioned in the Introduction, Appendix 9 is different from other appendixes in that it has nothing to do with Chapter 9. That chapter is the only one for which I have no accompanying data. Rather than jump from Appendix 8 to Appendix 10 in my numbering sequence, I decided to put details about the 34 contracts in the plate section in Appendix 9.

I have included this information for the benefit of anyone who might have an interest in these documents. Chinese commercial contracts are very difficult to come by in China. All of the documents included here are from foreign archives. Because they were written in several different languages (Dutch, French, Danish, Swedish and Chinese), I thought it important to provide a summary of each one here, in English, as I did in the first volume. I merely provide this information in order to make these records more accessible to the reader.

In Chapter 2 and Appendix 2 of the first volume I examined 64 contracts that were included in that book. In this volume, I include another 34 contracts in the plate section. These documents have already been discussed in each of the respective chapters. I also refer the reader to Chapter 2 of volume one, where I discuss the contents of the contracts.

The 64 contracts in the first volume and the 34 in this volume give a total of 98 commercial contracts. There are many more of these documents in the European and American archives. I have included the most important ones for the merchants discussed in this study. I have not made an accurate count of the remaining contracts. I am sure that there are more than 50 but probably less than 100 remaining. Most of them are in the Dutch, Danish and American archives. Many of these records have Chinese signatures and/or chops on them, but few of them have details written out in Chinese. I have examined all of these records and found no details or particulars that were different from those this study contains. These 98 documents are therefore a good representation of how and why merchants and foreign companies used contracts in eighteenth century Canton—all of which is explained in Chapter 2 of volume one.

Plates: 01.01, 01.02, 01.03, 01.04, 01.05, 01.06, 01.07, 01.08, 01.09, 02.01, 02.02, 02.03, 03.03, 03.04, 03.05, 03.06, 03.07, 03.08, 03.09, 03.10, 03.11, 03.12 (a), 03.12

(b), 03.13, 03.17 (a), 03.17 (b), 03.17 (c), 03.24, 04.01, 04.02, 04.03, 04.04, 07.04, 10.02

***(1) Plate 01.01 (RAC: Ask 1131, p. 154r)***

Date: 1752.09.29 Languages: Danish and Chinese chop
Sellers: Swequa Buyers: DAC supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | ca. 400 | 16.7 | ca. 6,680 | |

Payment: full amount paid on delivery
Instructions: to be packed in 150 whole chests, with circa 275 catties net tea per chest, and tare weight of each chest to be 48 to 52 catties
Delivery: all chests to be delivered to the ship within 55 days
Conditions: FOB, free of all costs
Signatures: buyers and seller's chop

***(2) Plate 01.02 (BMN: Ms1172C16.2.008)***

Date: 1756.04.06 Languages: French and Chinese
Sellers: Swequa and brother Sequa Buyers: French supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea | 250 | 13.0 | 3,250 | 1,625 |
| Tunkay tea | 100 | 20.5 | 2,050 | 1,400 |
| Total | 350 | | 5,300 | taels 3,025 |

Payment: 3,025 taels now and remainder paid after delivery
Instructions: none on the contract, but there would need to be instructions given at some point before the packing of the tea began
Delivery: Bohea tea to be delivered in September and Tunkay tea delivered in November.
Conditions: FOB, free of all risks and costs
Signatures: buyer and sellers with chops
Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the French text: Qianlong 21st year, 3rd month, 2nd day, Bohea tea of the first picking (Tou chun Wuyi cha 頭春武夷茶) to be delivered within the 8th lunar month, and Tunkay tea (Tunxi cha 屯溪茶) to be delivered within the 10th lunar month

***(3) Plate 01.03 (BMN: Ms1172C16.2.007)***

Date: 1756.03.17 Languages: French and Chinese
Sellers: Swequa and brother Sequa Buyers: French supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea | 1,000 | 13.0 | 13,000 | 6,500 |
| Superior Green tea | 300 | 18.5 | 5,550 | 4,200 |
| Tunkay tea | 150 | 20.5 | 3,075 | 2,100 |
| Nanking raw silk | 60 | 185.0 | 11,100 | 7,400 |
| Total | | | 32,725 | taels 20,200 |

Payment: 20,200 taels now and remainder paid after delivery
Instructions: none on the contract, but there would need to be instructions given at some point before the packing of the tea

Delivery: Bohea tea to be delivered in September; Superior Green and Tunkay teas and Nanking raw silk delivered in November.
Conditions: FOB, free of all risks and costs
Signatures: buyer and sellers with chops
Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the French text: Qianlong 21st year, 2nd month, 17th day, Bohea tea of the first picking (Tou chun Wuyi cha 頭春武夷茶) to be delivered within the 8th lunar month, and Superior Green (called Songpi Cha 松皮茶, which would be Song Skin tea) and Tunkay teas (Tunxi cha 屯溪茶), and raw silk (Hu si 湖絲), to be delivered within the 10th lunar month.

***(4) Plate 01.04 (NAH: VOC 4381, p. 158)***

Date: 1758.01.08 Languages: Dutch and Chinese
Sellers: Swequa and brother Sequa Buyers: Dutch supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade/ picking | 500 | 11.5 | 5,750 | 5,025.347 |

Payment: paid in advance 4,250 taels in money and 775.347 taels in cloves weighing 353 lbs. and nutmeg weighing 253 lbs., making a total of 5,025.347 taels, and the remaining 724.653 taels to be paid after the tea is received onboard the VOC ship and found to be in good order and quality, etc.
Instructions: the said persons to go to the Bohea tea lands, at the customary time, 14 days after the New Year or 31 days from today, to purchase for the VOC, new Bohea tea of the 1st grade/ picking, pure and unadulterated (not mixed with any other tea), tea to be well conditioned, and in canisters that have been dried in the sun according to custom, and then [after arrival in Canton] packed in good chests without grit/gravel
Delivery: deliver to the VOC ship by the coming Tsjon Tsjouw Tshiet, or known by Europeans as the Autumn Equinox of 22 September
Units: 1 picul = 122.5 Dutch lbs.
Currency: Piaster or Spanish mat
Exchange rate: 1 Piaster = 0.74 taels
Conditions: FOB, free of all risks, costs of packing, lead, chests, and tolls, etc.
Signatures: sellers with chop
Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the Dutch text: Qianlong 222d year, 11th month, 30th day (which is 1758.01.09, a day after the Dutch date)

***(5) Plate 01.05 (NAH: VOC 4381, p. 298)***

Date: 1758.01.08 Languages: Dutch and Chinese
Sellers: Swequa and brother Sequa Buyers: Dutch supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade/ picking | 500 | 11.5 | 5,750 | 5,025.347 |

Payment: paid in advance 4,250 taels in money and 775.347 taels in cloves weighing 353 lbs and nutmeg weighing 253 lbs., making a total of 5,025.347 taels, and the remaining 724.653 taels to be paid after the tea is received onboard the VOC ship and found to be in good order and quality, etc.
Instructions: the said persons to go to the Bohea tea lands, at the customary time, 14 days after the New Year or 31 days from today, to purchase for the VOC, new Bohea tea of the 1st grade/

picking, pure and unadulterated (not mixed with any other tea), tea to be well conditioned, and in canisters that have been dried in the sun according to custom, and then [after arrival in Canton] packed in good chests without grit/gravel

Delivery: deliver to the VOC ship by the coming Tsjon Tsjouw Tshiet, or known by Europeans as the Autumn Equinox of 22 September

Units: 1 picul = 122.5 Dutch lbs.

Currency: Piaster or Spanish mat

Exchange rate: 1 Piaster = 0.74 taels

Conditions: FOB, free of all risks, costs of packing, lead, chests, and tolls, etc.

Signatures: sellers with chop

Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the Dutch text: Qianlong 21st year, 11th month, 30th day (which is 1758.01.09, a day after the Dutch date)

***(6) Plate 01.06 (NAH: VOC 4384, doc. No. 36, p. 473)***

Date: 1760.08.01 Languages: Dutch and Chinese

Owner: Swequa (alias Long Souqua) Tenants: Dutch supercargos

Rent: 1,800 new Spanish reals, or 1,332 taels, for one year, beginning from today

Currency: new Spanish reals

Exchange rate: 1 real = 0.74 taels

Signatures: owner with chop

Additional information mentioned in the Dutch text that is not in the Chinese text: the building is owned by Swequa, who lives in the rear part, and the building lies in the factory street and is the same building that has been rented out by the Dutch supercargos from Batavia for many years and by the Dutch company in 1758 (it does not say in the contract, but the English rented this building in 1759).

Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the Dutch text: Qianlong 25th year, 6th month, 22nd day (which is 1760.08.02, a day after the Dutch date); the agreement is for the four sections of the building adjacent to the water and that face Henan [Island] including upper and lower flowers; the space is large enough to house the people from about three ships; it is the responsibility of the tenants to pay for any repairs that are needed

***(7) Plate 01.07 (NM: F17 pp. T1_04986–87)***

Date: 1766.01.26 Languages: Swedish and Chinese

Sellers: Tjobqua (Jauqva) Buyers: Swedish supercargos

| **Exports** | **Piculs** | **Taels per picul** | **Taels** | **Advance paid upfront** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | 1,000 | 15 | 15,000 | 10,000 |
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | 500 | 15 | 5,000 | 5,000 |
| Total | 1,500 | | 20,000 | 15,000 |

Payment: 10 taels per picul paid in advance and the remaining 5 taels per picul paid after delivery

Instructions: new Bohea tea of the 1st grade, not mixed with any other tea, good smell and colour, without damage from water or black leaves, and without grit/gravel; packing to begin middle of October and to be completed by middle of November; chests to have a tare weight of 70 to 71 Swedish lbs. and gross weight of 452 to 456 Swedish lbs.

Delivery: begin middle of October and completed by middle of November

Units: 1 picul = 142 Swedish lbs. (skålpund)

Currency: only taels are mentioned in the contract, but the Swedes would have paid in silver coin and they generally used an exchange rate of 1 piastre to 0.74 taels.

Conditions: 2 taels per picul demurrage will be charged to the seller if the tea is not delivered within the specified time

Signatures: buyers and seller with chops

Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the Swedish text: Qianlong 30th year, 12th month, 16th day (which is 1760.01.26, same as the Swedish date); delivery must begin within 285 days from this date or seller pays demurrage of 2 taels per picul; tare weight of each chest to be about 50 catties; about 270 catties net of tea in each chest

***(8) Plate 01.08 (NM: F17 pp. T1_04988–90)***

Date: 1767.03.10 Languages: Swedish and Chinese

Sellers: Tjobqua (Jauqva) Buyers: Swedish supercargos

| **Exports** | **Piculs** | **Taels per picul** | **Taels** | **Advance paid upfront** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | 2,000 | 15.5 | 31,000 | 20,000 |
| Ankay Congo tea of 1st grade | 150 | 15.5 | 2,325 | 1,500 |
| Total | 2,150 | | 33,325 | 21,500 |

Payment: 10 taels per picul paid in advance and the remaining 5.5 taels per picul paid after delivery

Instructions: new Bohea tea of 1st grade, not mixed with any other tea, good smell and colour, without damage from water or black and damaged leaves, and without grit/gravel; packing to begin the middle of October and completed by middle of November; chests to have a tare weight of 70 to 71 Swedish lbs. and gross weight of 452 to 456 Swedish lbs.

Delivery: begin middle of October and completed by middle of November

Units: 1 picul = 142 Swedish lbs. (skålpund)

Currency: only taels are mentioned in the contract, but the Swedes would have paid in silver coin and they generally used an exchange rate of 1 piastre to 0.72 taels.

Conditions: 2 taels per picul demurrage will be charged to the seller if the tea is not delivered within the specified time

Signatures: buyers and seller with chops

Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the Swedish text: Qianlong 32nd year, 2nd month, 10th day (which is 1767.03.09, a day before the Swedish date); if delivery is not made within the ninth or tenth lunar month then seller pays demurrage of 2 taels per picul.

***(9) Plate 01.09 (NM: F17 p. T1_04215)***

Date: issued on 1762/3, paid on 1768.02.05 Languages: Swedish and Chinese

Issuers: Tjobqua (Jauqua) Receivers: Swedish supercargos

| **Ship** | **Bottomry loan in pesos** | **interest** | **total** | **duration of loan** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| n/a | 360 | n/a | 360 | ca. 5–6 years |

Payment: total amount to be repaid the next year that a Swedish supercargo should arrive. According to the Chinese text, however, payment was not made until 1768.02.05.

Interest: the Swedish text states that interest is inclusive, but does not explain. The Chinese text mentions that Tjobqua received the 360 pesos on 1768.02.05 and no mention of interest so there was apparently none applied.

Signatures: receiver and issuer with chops

Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the Swedish text: Qianlong 32nd year, 12th month, 17th day (which is 1768.02.05). Text states that the loan was issued in Qianlong 27th year, which would be 1762 or early 1763. The Swedish date at the top is unclear. It is either 1763.01.10 or 1765.01.10.

***(10) Plate 02.01 (RAC: Ask 1156b, 1766.03.25)***

Date: 1766.03.25 Languages: Danish and Chinese
Sellers: Monqua (Manqua) Buyers: Danish supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade Tauson | 1,080–1,100 | 17.5 | 18,900–19,250 | |

Payment: 10 taels per picul paid when the first Danish ships arrives and the remainder paid after delivery
Instructions: to be packed in 400 whole chests, with circa 270 to 275 catties net tea per chest, and tare weight of each chest to be 48 to 50 catties
Delivery: to ship at Whampoa or Bocca Tigris according to supercargos instructions
Currency: (silver coin) of 94 touch
Conditions: FOB, free of all tolls and costs
Signatures: buyers and seller's chop
Additional terms in the Chinese text that are not in the Danish text: Qianlong 31st year, 2nd month, 15th day (which is 1766.03.25, same as the Danish date).

***(11) Plate 02.02 (RAC: Ask 1156a, 1766.07.30, pp. 83r–v)***

Date: 1766.07.30 Languages: Danish and Chinese signature
Sellers: Monqua (Manqua) Buyers: Danish supercargos

| Silk Exports | Pieces | Taels per piece | Taels | Length (covids) | Width (covids) | Weight (Taels) | Threads |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| painted illustinger | 70 | 16.0 | 1,120 | 45 | 2 | 36 | 6 |
| painted gaies | 50 | 9.4 | 470 | 45 | 2 | | |
| Total | 120 | | 1,590 | Advance paid upfront | | | 1,200 |

Payment: 1,200 taels now and balance paid after delivery
Delivery: middle of November
Signatures: seller with chop

***(12) Plate 02.03 (GUB: Skeppspredicanten C.C. Strömspapper. H 21:1, nr 1153)***

Date: 1767.03.10 Languages: Swedish and Chinese
Sellers: Monqua Buyers: Swedish supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | 800 | 15.5 | 15,000 | 10,000 |

Payment: 10 taels per picul paid now and the remaining 5.5 taels per picul paid after delivery
Instructions: new Bohea tea of the 1st grade, not mixed with any other tea, good smell and colour, without damage from water or black and damages leaves, and without grit/gravel; chests to have a tare weight of 70 to 71 Swedish lbs. and gross weight of 452 to 456 Swedish lbs.
Delivery: begin middle of October and completed by middle of November
Units: 1 picul = 142 Swedish lbs. (skålpund)
Currency: Piastres
Exchange rate: 1 Piastre = 0.74 taels
Conditions: 2 taels per picul demurrage will be charged to the seller if the tea is not delivered within the specified time

Signatures: seller with chops

Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the Swedish text: Qianlong 32nd year, 2nd month, 10th day (which is 1767.03.09, which is a day before the Swedish date); delivery must begin around the ninth lunar month or seller pays demurrage of 2 taels per picul; tea to be packed in whole chests; damage by fire or water at Monqua's risk

***(13) Plate 03.03 (RAC: Ask 1135, pp. 100v–101r)***

Date: 1755.08.19 Languages: Danish and Chinese signature

Sellers: Poankeequa and brother Sequa Buyers: DAC supercargos

| **Silk exports** | **Pieces** | **Taels per piece** | **Taels** | **Length (covids)** | **Width (covids)** | **Weight (Taels)** | **Threads** | **Other specifications** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| poesies damast | 200 | 10.2 | 2,040 | 45 | 2 | 44 | 8 | of specified colours |
| pordosoy | 200 | 11.4 | 2,280 | 62 | 1.6 | 55 | 10 | of specified colours |
| illustring | 100 | 9.2 | 920 | 45 | 2 | 38 | 8 | of specified colours |
| furniture damast | 100 | 10.6 | 1,060 | 38 | 2 | 44 | 10 | of specified colours |
| effene Pekings | 200 | 6.1 | 1,220 | 45 | 2 | 28 | 4 | of specified colours |
| satin | 100 | 10.4 | 1,040 | 45 | 2 | 44 | 8 | of specified colours |
| striped illustinger | 35 | 15.0 | 525 | 62 | 1.4 | 45 | 8 | of specified colours |
| striped illustinger | 20 | 12.0 | 240 | 45 | 2 | 35–36 | 8 | of specified colours |
| Total | 120 | | 9,325 | Advance paid upfront | | | | ca. 6,527.5 |

Payment: 7/10ths of the contract paid now, and the balance paid after delivery

Delivery: 105 to 110 days from this date

Currency: Spanish pillar dollars or pieces of eight of 94 touch

Conditions: FOB, free of all risks and costs

Signatures: sellers with chop

***(14) Plate 03.04 (RAC: Ask 1135 pp. 119v–120r)***

Date: 1755.09.24 Languages: Danish and Chinese signature

Sellers: Poankeequa and brother Sequa Buyers: DAC supercargos

| **Exports** | **Piculs** | **Taels per picul** | **Taels** | **Advance paid upfront** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | ca. 280 | 17 | ca. 4,760 | |

Payment: paid after delivery

Instructions: new Bohea tea, pure and unadulterated (not mixed with any other tea), packed in 100 whole chests, on the same terms as shown in folio 119, which are as follows: each chest to have circa 275 to 280 catties net tea, and tare weight of each chest to be 48 to 50 catties

Delivery: three weeks from this date

Currency: silver (coin) of 14 lods 12 grains Danish fineness (pure silver being 16 lods and each lod containing 18 grains), which is equivalent to 94 touch Chinese fineness.

Conditions: FOB, free of all risks and costs, and further responsibilities as defined on folio 119, which are as follows: seller bears all risks and costs of warehousing the packed tea chests for

the one to three days and nights while they are in Canton waiting to be shipped, regardless of whether they are located in the seller's or buyer's factory

Signatures: buyers and sellers with chop

Note: The Danish silver standard of 14 lods 12 grains (or 14 lods × 18 grains = 252 grains + 12 grains = 264 grains) actually calculates to about 92 percent pure silver (or 92 touch). According to the Danish units, pure silver contained 288 grains (16 lods × 18 grains = 288 grains), which means 264/288 = 0.9167. In Chinese units 94 touch was technically 94 percent pure silver. But in practice, 92 or 93 percent silver or gold usually passed for 94 percent. For an explanation of the Danish and Chinese units, see P. Kelly, *The Universal Cambist and Commercial Instructor*, Vol. 1 (London: privately printed, 1835), 66–68, 74–80.

***(15) Plate 03.05 (RAC: Ask 1135, pp. 139v–140r)***

Date: 1755.10.21 Languages: Danish and Chinese signature

Sellers: Poankeequa and brother Sequa Buyers: DAC supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | ca. 810 | 15.7 | ca. 12,717 | |

Payment: paid after delivery

Instructions: new Bohea tea, pure and unadulterated (not mixed with any other tea), packed in 300 whole chests, on the same terms as shown in folio 139, which are as follows: each chest to have circa 270 catties net tea, and tare weight of each chest to be 47 catties

Delivery: delivery must begin by 20 November

Currency: silver (coin) of 14 lods 12 grains Danish fineness (pure silver being 16 lods and each lod containing 18 grains), which is equivalent to 94 touch Chinese fineness.

Conditions: FOB, free of all risks and costs, and further responsibilities as defined on folio 139, which are as follows: seller bears all risks and costs of warehousing the packed tea chests for the one to three days and nights while they are in Canton waiting to be shipped, regardless of whether they are located in the seller's or buyer's factory

Signatures: buyers and sellers with chop

Note: The Danish silver standard of 14 lods 12 grains (or 14 lods × 18 grains = 252 grains + 12 grains = 264 grains) actually calculates to about 92 percent pure silver (or 92 touch). According to the Danish units, pure silver contained 288 grains (16 lods × 18 grains = 288 grains), which means 264/288 = 0.9167. In Chinese units 94 touch was technically 94 percent pure silver. But in practice, 92 or 93 percent silver or gold usually passed for 94 percent. For an explanation of the Danish and Chinese units, see P. Kelly, *The Universal Cambist and Commercial Instructor*, Vol. 1 (London: privately printed, 1835), 66–68, 74–80.

***(16) Plate 03.06 (RAC: Ask 1137, p. 93r)***

Date: 1757.09.30 Languages: Danish and Chinese signature

Sellers: Poankeequa, Swetia (Swissia), Chetqua (Schecqua) and Consentia Giqua

Buyers: DAC supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | 550 | 12.5 | 6,875 | |

Payment: paid after delivery

Instructions: new Bohea tea, pure and unadulterated (not mixed with any other tea), packed in 200 whole chests (which means there would be 275 net catties of tea in each chest).

Delivery: one month from this date

Currency: silver (coin) of 94 touch
Signatures: buyers and seller with chop

***(17) Plate 03.07 (RAC: Ask 1148a, pp. 134r–v)***

Date: 1762.07.02 Languages: Danish and Chinese signature
Sellers: Poankeequa, Swetia (Swissia), Chetqua (Schecqua) and Consentia Giqua
Buyers: DAC supercargos

| **Exports** | **Piculs** | **Taels per picul** | **Taels** | **Advance paid upfront** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade Tauson mixed with Congo of 2nd grade | 7,450 | 17.5 | 130,375 | 104,300 |

Note: According to the terms of the contract made on 30 June. I copy here those terms.
Payment: paid 104,300 taels now (14 taels per picul), and the remainder paid after delivery
Instructions: the 7,150 piculs to be packed in 2,600 whole chests; 2,000 of these chests are to be packed with 2/3 Bohea tea of 1st grade and 1/3 Congo tea of 2nd grade. The remaining 600 chests are to be packed with only Bohea tea of 1st grade. Tare weights of whole chests are 48 to 50 catties, which means there will be 275 catties net tea in each one. The remaining 300 piculs are to be packed in 200 smaller chests of various sizes. Chests and lead lining inside of them are to be provided by the seller.
Delivery: to begin 116 days from this date (25 October). From the first packing day, the tea is to be packed every day, or every other day, thereafter, so that the contract is fulfilled within 25 days.
Currency: silver (coin) of 94 touch
Signatures: buyers and seller with chop

***(18) Plate 03.08 (RAC: Ask 1144, pp. 77v–78r)***

Date: 1759.09.24 Languages: Danish and Chinese signature
Seller: Poankeequa Buyers: DAC supercargos

| **Exports** | **Piculs** | **Taels per picul** | **Taels** | **Advance paid upfront** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | 560 | 17 | 9,520 | |

Payment: paid after delivery
Instructions: packed in 200 whole chests, with 280 catties net tea in each chest.
Delivery: 70 days from this date
Conditions: FOB, free of all risks and costs, including damage by fire or water
Signatures: buyers and seller with chop

***(19) Plate 03.09 (BMN: Ms1172C16.2.004)***

Date: 1756.01.16 Languages: French and Chinese
Sellers: French supercargos Buyers: Poankeequa and brother Sequa

| **Imports** | **Piculs** | **Taels per picul** | **Taels** | **Advance paid upfront** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ginseng | 6.95 | 143.5 | 997.325 | |

Payment: 1,390 piastres (997.325 taels) paid after delivery
Currency: Piastres
Exchange rate: 1 Piastre = 0.7175 taels
Signatures: buyers with chop

***(20) Plate 03.10 (NM: F17 pp. T1_05641–43)***

Date: 1761.01.30/1761.02.01 Languages: Swedish and Chinese
Issuers: Swedish supercargos Receiver: Chan Queyqua of the Dafeng Hang

| Junk | Bottomry loan in piastres | Interest | Total | Duration of loan |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Samkonghing* 三廣興 | 1,300 | 30% | 1,690 | ca. 9 months |

Payment: principle plus interest to be repaid on the day the junk returns to Guangzhou. The characters jiu yue 九月 (ninth lunar month, which would be around October) were inserted. The document does not specify whether this was the expected or actual month of return.

Interest: 30 percent on a voyage to Cochin China or Java. According to notes on the back of the document, the loan appears to have been repaid on time, because there was no additional interest applied. If it was repaid in October, then this would be a loan of 9 months, and would calculate to about 37 percent annual interest (interest of 360/9 = 40, 40 × 12 = 480, 480/1300 = 0.369).

Additional information: the Swedish notes on the back suggest that the money come from Antonio Baptista Stamma. He was a Macao based Armenian merchant, who was also active in Canton as well. The other notes in Swedish show the names of Grill and Grubb, with figures showing funds from these men in the years 1763, 1765, and 1768.

Signatures: receiver with chops, and Poankeequa as witness

***(21) Plate 03.11 (RAC: Ask 1149, pp. 62r–63r)***

Date: 1762.09.14 Languages: Danish and Chinese signatures
Sellers: Poankeequa, Swetia (Suesia), Chetqua (Schequa) and Consentia Giqua
Buyers: DAC supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade Tauson mixed with Congo | 4,900–5,000 | 18 | ca. 90,000 | 71,204.351 |

Payment: the text says an advance of 14 to 15 taels per picul; the actual amount advanced was 71,204.351 taels, which is 14.24 taels per picul for 5,000 piculs or 14.53 taels per picul for 4,900 piculs. The remaining will be paid after delivery, and when the total amount of the tea delivered is known.

Instructions: Bohea tea of first grade Tauson, to be mixed with Congo tea as specified, and packed in 1,800 whole chests, with 275 to 280 catties net tea in each chest; Chests and lead lining inside of them are to be provided by the seller, and have a tare weight of 48 to 50 catties each. The tea chests are to be proportioned as follows: Poankeequa 500 chests, Swetia 500 chests, Chetqua 400 chests, Consentia Giqua 400 chests. Swetia to provide an additional 140 chests of the same type of tea, and same price, in variously sized chests as is needed for the ship *Dronning Sophia Magdalena* (the exact amount of the additional tea to be determined later).

Delivery: to begin 48 to 50 days from this date, which is around November 1; packing to be carried out every day, or every other day, so that the contract is fulfilled by the time the ship leaves in 95 days.

Currency: silver (coin) of 94 touch

Conditions: FOB, free of all risks and costs, including damage by fire or water; sellers agree to fulfill the contract, and stand security for each other, one for all and all for one, in case something should happen such as death.

Signatures: buyers and sellers with chops

***(22) Plate 03.12 (a) (RAC: Ask 1152, pp. 65v–66r)***

Date: 1764.08.16 Languages: Danish and Chinese
Seller: Poankeequa Buyers: DAC supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade Tauson mixed with Ankay Congo of 1st grade | 2,750 | 19 | 52,250 | 44,000 |

Payment: paid 44,000 taels now (16 taels per picul) and the remainder paid after delivery
Instructions: Bohea tea of first grade Tauson, to be packed in 1,000 whole chests, and each chest to be mixed with 2 baskets of first grade Ankay Congo tea; every chest to contain 275 to 280 catties net tea; and chests to have a tare weight of 48 to 50 catties.
Delivery: to begin 70 days from this date (25 October). From the first packing day, the tea is to be packed every day, or every other day, thereafter, so that the contract is fulfilled within 25 days.
Signatures: seller with chop

***(23) Plate 03.12 (b) (RAC: Ask 1152, pp. 65v–66r)***

Date: 1764.08.16 Languages: Danish and Chinese
Seller: Chetqua (Schecqua) Buyers: DAC supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade Tauson mixed with Ankay Congo of 1st grade | 1,787.5 | 19 | 33,962.5 | 28,600 |

Payment: paid 44,000 taels now (16 taels per picul) and the remainder paid after delivery
Instructions: Bohea tea of first grade Tauson, to be packed in 650 whole chests, and each chest to be mixed with 2 baskets of first grade Ankay Congo tea; every chest to contain 275 to 280 catties net tea; and chests to have a tare weight of 48 to 50 catties.
Delivery: to begin 70 days from this date (25 October). From the first packing day, the tea is to be packed every day, or every other day, thereafter, so that the contract is fulfilled within 25 days.
Signatures: seller with chop
Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the Danish text: Qianlong 29th year, 7th month, 22nd day, which is 1764.08.19 (three days after the Danish date).

***(24) Plate 03.13 (RAC: Ask 1152, pp. 77v–79r)***

Date: 1764.08.24 Languages: Danish and Chinese signature
Seller: Poankeequa Buyers: DAC supercargos

| Silk exports | Pieces | Taels per piece | Taels | Length (covids) | Width (covids) | Weight (Taels) | Threads | Other specifications |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| peau de soie | 150 | 13.8 | 2,070 | 62 | 1.6 | 55–56 | 10 | of specified colours |
| illustring | 150 | 11.0 | 1,650 | 45 | 2 | 38 | 8 | of specified colours |
| poesie damast | 100 | 13.3 | 1,330 | 45 | 2 | 44 | 8 | of specified colours |

| Silk exports | Pieces | Taels per piece | Taels | Length (covids) | Width (covids) | Weight (Taels) | Threads | Other specifications |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| furniture damast | 200 | 13.3 | 2,660 | 38 | 2 | 44 | 8 | of specified colours |
| effene pekings | 300 | 8.0 | 2,400 | 45 | 2 | 30 | 8 | of specified colours |
| satin | 30 | 13.2 | 396 | 45 | 2 | 44 | 8 | of specified colours |
| flowered pelangs | 200 | 2.2 | 440 | 23 | | | | of specified colours |
| effene pelangs | 200 | 2.2 | 440 | 23 | | | | of specified colours |
| handker-chiefs | 20 | 7.7 | 154 | | | | | |
| Total | 1,350 | | 11,540 | Advance paid upfront | | | | n/a |

Payment: n/a
Delivery: 110 days from this date
Conditions: FOB, free of all risks and costs
Signatures: seller with chop

***(25) Plate 03.17 (a) (top left) (RAC: Ask 1131, pp. 120v)***

Date: 1752.08.21 Languages: Danish and Chinese chop
Sellers: Poankeequa (Pon Qveiqva) Buyers: DAC supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | 1,100 | 16 | 17,600 | 10,000 |

Payment: 10,000 taels cash now and remainder to be paid with DAC cloth imports at a price of 0.8 taels per ell
Instructions: to be packed in 400 whole chests, with circa 275 catties net tea per chest, and tare weight of each chest to be 48 to 52 catties
Delivery: must begin within 80 days and completed within 120 days from this date
Conditions: FOB, free of all risks and costs
Signatures: buyers and seller's chop

***(26) Plate 03.17 (b) (bottom left and top right) (RAC: Ask 1131, pp. 120v–21r)***

Date: 1752.08.21 Languages: Danish and Chinese chop
Sellers: Fat Hunqua Buyers: DAC supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | 1,100 | 15.9 | 17,490 | 10,000 |

Payment: 10,000 taels cash now and remainder to be paid with DAC cloth imports at a price of 0.8 taels per ell
Instructions: to be packed in 400 whole chests, with circa 275 catties net tea per chest, and tare weight of each chest to be 48 to 52 catties
Delivery: must begin within 60 days and completed within 100 days from this date
Conditions: FOB, free of all risks and costs
Signatures: buyers and seller's chop

***(27) Plate 03.17 (c) (centre right) (RAC: Ask 1131, p. 121r)***

Date: 1752.08.21 Languages: Danish and Chinese chop
Seller: Awue Buyers: DAC supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | 280 | 16 | 4,480 | 1,000 |

Payment: 1,000 taels cash now and remainder paid after delivery
Instructions: to be packed in as many variously sized chests as the captains require
Delivery: within 50 days from this date
Conditions: FOB, free of all risks and costs
Signatures: buyers and seller's chop

***(28) Plate 03.24 (GUB: Skeppspredicanten C.C. Ströms papper. H 21:1, nr 1151)***

Date: 1767.03.10 Languages: Swedish and Chinese
Sellers: Poankeequa Buyers: Swedish supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | 4,550 | 15.5 | 70,525 | |
| Ankay Congo of 1st grade | 500 | 15.5 | 7,750 | |
| Total | 5,050 | | 78,275 | 50,500 |

Payment: 10 taels per picul paid in advance and the remaining 5.5 taels per picul paid after delivery
Instructions: new Bohea tea of the 1st grade, not mixed with any other tea, good smell and colour, without damage from water or black and damages leaves, and free of grit/gravel; chests to have a tare weight of 70 to 71 Swedish lbs. and gross weight of 452 to 456 Swedish lbs.
Delivery: begin middle of October and completed by end of November
Units: 1 picul = 142 Swedish lbs. (skålpund)
Currency: Piastres
Exchange rate: 1 Piastre = 0.74 taels
Conditions: 2 taels per picul demurrage will be charged to the seller if the tea is not delivered within the specified time
Signatures: seller with chop
Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the Swedish text: delivery must be made in the ninth to tenth lunar months; received an advance of 5,050

***(29) Plate 04.01 (NAH: VOC 4381, pp. 161–62)***

Date: 1758.01.10 Languages: Dutch and Chinese
Seller: Tan Anqua Buyers: VOC supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade/ picking | 1,000 | 11.5 | 11,500 | 10,175.347 |

Payment: paid in advance 8,500 taels in money and 1,675.347 taels in cloves weighing 710 lbs. and nutmeg weighing 617 lbs., making a total of 10,175.347 taels, and the remaining 1,324.653 taels to be paid after the tea is received onboard the VOC ship and found to be in good order and quality, etc.
Instructions: the said persons to go to the Bohea tea lands, at the customary time, 14 days after the New Year or 29 days from today, to purchase for the VOC, new Bohea tea of the 1st grade/

picking, pure and unadulterated (not mixed with any other tea), tea to be well conditioned, and in canisters that have been dried in the sun according to custom, and then [after arrival in Canton] packed in good chests without grit/gravel

Delivery: deliver to the VOC ship by the coming Tsjon Tsjouw Tshiet, or known by Europeans as the Autumn Equinox of 22 September

Units: 1 picul = 122.5 Dutch lbs.

Currency: Piaster or Spanish mat

Exchange rate: 1 Piaster = 0.74 taels

Conditions: FOB, free of all risks, costs of packing, lead, chests, and tolls, etc.

Signatures: seller with chop

Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the Dutch text: Qianlong 222d year, 12th month, 1st day (which is 1758.01.10, same as the Dutch date); 503.03 catties of nutmeg at a price of 1.3125 taels per catty comes to 661.07 taels, and 579.09 catties of cloves at a price of 1.75 taels per catty comes to 1,014.276 taels (these numbers for both nutmeg and cloves do not calculate exactly but that is what the text says). The total for nutmeg and cloves comes to 1,675.346 taels. Received 8,500 taels in money. The total amount received in advance (in money and spices) comes to 10,175.346 taels. The remaining 1,324.654 taels are to be paid after the tea is delivered to the ship (the weights shown in Chinese in catties correspond with the Dutch pounds above, at 1 picul equal to 122.5 pounds)

***(30) Plate 04.02 (NAH: VOC 4381, pp. 297–98)***

Date: 1758.01.10 Languages: Dutch and Chinese

Seller: Tan Anqua Buyers: VOC supercargos

| **Exports** | **Piculs** | **Taels per picul** | **Taels** | **Advance paid upfront** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade/ picking | 1,000 | 11.5 | 11,500 | 10,175.347 |

Payment: paid in advance 8,500 taels in money and 1,675.347 taels in cloves weighing 710 lbs. and 4,030.534 taels of nutmeg weighing 617 lbs., making a total of 10,175.347 taels, and the remaining 1,324.653 taels to be paid after the tea is received onboard the VOC ship and found to be in good order and quality, etc.

Instructions: the said persons to go to the Bohea tea lands, at the customary time, 14 days after the New Year or 29 days from today, to purchase for the VOC, new Bohea tea of the 1st grade/ picking, pure and unadulterated (not mixed with any other tea), tea to be well conditioned, and in canisters that have been dried in the sun according to custom, and then [after arrival in Canton] packed in good chests without grit/gravel

Delivery: deliver to the VOC ship by the coming Tsjon Tsjouw Tshiet, or known by Europeans as the Autumn Equinox of 22 September

Units: 1 picul = 122.5 Dutch lbs.

Currency: Piaster or Spanish mat

Exchange rate: 1 Piaster = 0.74 taels

Conditions: FOB, free of all risks, costs of packing, lead, chests, and tolls, etc.

Signatures: seller with chop

Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the Dutch text: Qianlong 222d year, 12th month, 1st day (which is 1758.01.10, same as the Dutch date); 503.03 catties of nutmeg at a price of 1.3125 taels per catty comes to 661.07 taels, and 579.09 catties of cloves at a price of 1.75 taels per catty comes to 1,014.276 taels (these numbers for both nutmeg and cloves do not calculate exactly but that is what the text says). The total for nutmeg and cloves comes to 1,675.346 taels. Received 8,500 taels in money. The total amount received in advance (in money and spices) comes to 10,175.346 taels. The remaining 1,324.654 taels are to be paid

after the tea is delivered to the ship (the weights shown in Chinese in catties correspond with the Dutch pounds above, at 1 picul equal to 122.5 pounds)

***(31) Plate 04.03 (NAH: VOC 4381, pp. 300–301)***

Date: (1758).01.19 Languages: Dutch and Chinese signatures
Seller: Beaukeequa and Tan Anqua Buyers: VOC supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade/ picking | 475 | 11.5 | 5,462.5 | 4,030.534 |

Payment: paid in advance 3,562.5 taels in money and 468.034 taels in cloves weighing 237 lbs. and nutmeg weighing 119.5 lbs, making a total of 4,030.534 taels; the remaining 1,431.966 taels to be paid after the tea is received onboard the VOC ship and found to be in good order and quality, etc.
Instructions: the said persons to go to the Bohea tea lands, at the customary time, 14 days after the New Year or 3 weeks from today, to purchase for the VOC, new Bohea tea of the 1st grade/ picking, pure and unadulterated (not mixed with any other tea), tea to be well conditioned, and in canisters that have been dried in the sun according to custom, and then [after arrival in Canton] packed in good chests without grit/gravel
Delivery: deliver to the VOC ship by the coming Tsjon Tsjouw Tshiet, or known by Europeans as the Autumn Equinox of 22 September
Units: 1 picul = 122.5 Dutch lbs.
Currency: Piaster or Spanish mat
Exchange rate: 1 Piaster = 0.74 taels
Conditions: FOB, free of all risks, costs of packing, lead, chests, and tolls, etc.
Signatures: sellers with chops

***(32) Plate 04.04 (RAC: Ask 1144, pp. 86r–v)***

Date: 1759.09.29 Languages: Danish and Chinese signature
Seller: Tan Anqua Buyers: DAC supercargos

| Exports | Piculs | Taels per picul | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea tea of 1st grade | 1,100 | 17 | 18,700 | |

Payment: paid after delivery
Instructions: Bohea tea of first grade, to be packed in 400 whole chests, and every chest to contain 275 to 280 catties net tea.
Delivery: to begin ____ days from this date (the number of days was left blank).
Conditions: FOB, free of all risks and costs, including damage by fire or water, up until the tea is safely stowed in the ship.
Signatures: buyers and seller with chops

***(33) Plate 07.04 (NAH: VOC 4387, pp. 301–2)***

Date: 1758.01.11 Languages: Dutch and Chinese
Seller: Lisjoncon Buyers: VOC supercargos

| Porcelain exports | Pairs/Sets | Taels per pair/ set | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dutch tea or coffee items according to 2 samples | 10,000 pairs (5,000 from each sample) | 0.055 | 550 | |

| Porcelain exports | Pairs/Sets | Taels per pair/ set | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dutch double coffee items according to 31 samples | 5,000 pairs | 0.045 | 225 | |
| Bowls according to 2 samples, of 7 × 7.5 inches | 1,000 sets of 3 (500 from each sample) | 0.140 | 140 | |
| Total | | | 915 | 600 |

Payment: paid in advance 301.070 taels in money, 298.930 taels in cloves weighing 120 lbs. and nutmeg weighing 119 lbs, making a total of 600 taels; the remaining 315 taels to be paid after the porcelain is received onboard the VOC ship and found to be in good order and quality, etc.

Instructions: the wooden samples are to be returned with the ordered items

Delivery: 180 days from this date, without delay

Conditions: FOB, free of all costs, except that, according to custom, the chests in which the porcelain is to be packed are to be supplied by the buyers

Signatures: seller with chops

Additional information in the Chinese text that is not in the Dutch text: Qianlong 22nd year, 12th month, 2nd day (1758.01.11, same date as the Dutch), porcelain to be delivered without delay in the 8th lunar month of the 23rd year (ca. September 1758).

***(34) Plate 10.02 (BMN: Ms1172C16.2.003)***

Date: 1757.02.04 Languages: French and Chinese

Seller: Painter Anthony (Antoine Peintre) Buyers: French supercargos

| Silk exports | Taels | Advance paid upfront |
|---|---|---|
| silk fabrics to be painted as specified | 1,351.460 | 850.760 |

Payment: pay 850.760 taels now, and balance paid after delivery

Delivery: 8th lunar month (ca. September 1757)

Currency: Piaster

Exchange rate: 1 Piaster = 0.74 taels

Signatures: seller

Additional information: the Chinese text shows detailed descriptions of each type of fabric, with lengths, widths, number of pieces and prices.

## APPENDIX 10A: Silk Weavers' Trade with the VOC 1772–1792 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)

| Year | Ships | Weaver Suckin & nephew Kyt Siouqua | Products | Weaver Tiqua | Products | Weaver Conqua | Products | Weaver Lochop | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1772 | 4 | 50,809 | zt, zr | | | | | | |
| 1773 | 4 | 60,272 | Nl, zt, z | | | | | | |
| 1774 | 4 | 50,831 | zt, zr, z, Nl | | | | | | |

| Year | Ships | Weaver Suckin & nephew Kyt Siouqua | Products | Weaver Tiqua | Products | Weaver Conqua | Products | Weaver Lochop | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1775 | 5 | 60,161 | zr, zt, Nl | | | | | | |
| 1776 | 4 | 70,640 | zt, zr, Nl | | | | | | |
| 1777 | 4 | 61,153 | zr, zt, z | | | | | | |
| 1778 | 4 | 83,589 | zt, zr | | | | | | |
| 1779 | 4 | 74,320 | zr, zt, z | | | | | | |
| 1780 | 4 | 20,452 | zt, z | 45,022 | z | | | | |
| 1781 | 1 | | | 17,833 | z | | | | |
| 1783 | 2 | | | 37,115 | z | | | | |
| 1784 | 4 | 6,603 | z | 13,185 | z | 29,217 | ln, zr, z | n/a | z |
| 1785 | 4 | | | | | 19,360 | z, ln | 18,791 | z |
| 1786 | 5 | | | | | 27,749 | z, ln | 20,993 | z, ln |
| 1787 | 5 | | | | | 35,172 | z, ln | 32,901 | z, ln |
| 1788 | 4 | | | | | 53,219 | z, ln | 49,130 | z, ln |
| 1789 | 5 | | | | | 69,369 | z, ln | 61,692 | z, ln |
| 1790 | 3 | | | | | 53,354 | z, ln | 41,884 | z, ln |
| 1791 | 2 | | | | | 39,304 | z, ln | 27,252 | z |
| 1792 | 4 | | | | | 54,546 | z, ln | | |
| Total | 76 | 538,830 | | 113,155 | | 381,291 | | 252,643 | |

Source: *Grootboeken* in NAH: VOC 4410–15, 4418–19, 4421, 4423, 4426, 4430, 4432, 4436, 4440, 4444–46, 4576.

**APPENDIX 10B: Silk Dealers and Weavers' Trade with the DAC 1782–1799 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Ships | Silk Dealer Assing | Products | Weaver Samqua | Products | Weaver Conqua | Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1782 | 4 | 8,078 | z | 33,549 | z | 10,860 | z |
| 1783 | 2 | 3,755 | z | 2,643 | z | 3,440 | z |
| 1784 | 3 | 7,925 | z | 6,433 | z | 5,500 | z |
| 1785 | 3 | 15,269 | C, K, z | | | 179 | S |
| 1786 | 2 | 1,581 | z, C | | | | |
| 1787 | 2 | 6,998 | z | 20,431 | C, z, ZZ | 249 | C, gg |
| 1788 | 2 | 8,816 | z, K | 14,020 | C, z | | |
| 1789 | 1 | 2,116 | z, sat | 11,438 | z | | |
| 1790 | 1 | 2,472 | z | 8,925 | z, C | | |
| 1792 | 1 | | | 4,240 | z | | |
| 1794 | 1 | | | n/a | | | |
| 1796 | 2 | | | 4,806 | Nk, H, z, pq | | |
| 1799 | 1 | 4,243 | z | | | | |
| Total | 25 | 61,254 | | 106,485 | | 20,228 | |

Source: *Kasse-Hovedboger* RAC: Ask 2250, 2252–53 and *Negotieprotocoler* Ask 1208.

**APPENDIX 10C: Silk Embroiderers and Painters' Trade with the VOC 1757–1788 (All Figures in Chinese Taels)**

| Year | Ships | Silk Painter Antony for labor | Embroiderer Ajouw for labor | Embroiderer Pinqua for labor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1757 | 1 | 2,855 | | |
| 1765 | 4 | 851 | | |
| 1766 | 4 | 777 | | |
| 1768 | 4 | 3,516 | 1,501 | 1,014 |
| 1769 | 4 | 1,532 | 4,436 | 1,211 |
| 1770 | 5 | 1,558 | | |
| 1771 | 4 | 2,779 | 7,692 | 582 |
| 1772 | 4 | 3,830 | 1,888 | 582 |
| 1773 | 4 | 6,763 | | 803 |
| 1774 | 4 | 3,757 | | 2,466 |
| 1775 | 5 | 3,559 | | 1,457 |
| 1776 | 4 | 2,291 | | 2,469 |
| 1777 | 4 | 1,610 | | 822 |
| 1778 | 4 | 1,026 | | 422 |
| 1779 | 4 | 434 | | |
| 1780 | 4 | 822 | 662 | 1,813 |
| 1783 | 2 | 733 | 376 | |
| 1784 | 4 | | 636 | |
| 1786 | 5 | 973 | 1,459 | |
| 1787 | 5 | 1,299 | 3,019 | |
| 1788 | 4 | | 705 | |
| Total | 83 | 40,963 | 22,375 | 13,640 |

Source: *Grootboeken* in NAH: VOC 4381, 4397, 4399, 4402, 4405–6, 4408, 4410–15, 4418–19, 4421, 4426, 4430, 4432, 4436, 4440.

**APPENDIX 10D: Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 10**

Weavers in Canton were known by several names. They might be called a weaver one time, a fabriqueer another time, and a winkelier (shopkeeper), boutiquière, or silk man at other times. Sometimes they were simply recorded with their Romanized first name, such as Suckin, Tiqua or Conqua. In many cases, the paper trails help us to determine that all of these entries are referring to the same person. In other cases, we can also identify them through their associations (partners) and/or by the products they sold. I have omitted the ambiguous entries. I give below an account of the nomenclature problems of each weaver.

### *Weaver Suckin*

There were at least two other persons in Canton who went by the name Suckin (or something similar), which can be confusing. Two prominent porcelain dealers were also called 'Suchin' (Appendixes 7G and 7H). One of the SOIC house servants in Canton in the 1760s was called 'Loyin Suchin' or simply 'Suchin' (NM: F17 p. T1_01667 and T1_01686). The Swedes sometimes loaned Loyin Suchin money, which makes him appear as though he might be a merchant (see examples in NM: F17 p. T1_06628 and T1_06636).

Because we know Weaver Suckin was connected to the Shenghe Dian 生和店 and Yuelai Hao 悦來號, we might expect to find one of these names on the Jinlun Huiguan (silk guild) steles. I have found no name like 生和 but there is a Chen Yuelai 陳悦來 carved into the 1778 and 1793 steles. I have found no connections with that man and Weaver Suckin (The names on the Jinlun Huiguan steles are reproduced in Guangzhou shi Wenhua Ju 廣州市文化局, *Guangzhou Jinlun huiguan zhengti yiwei baohu gongcheng ji* 廣州錦綸會館整體移位保護工程記. Beijing: Zhongguo jianzhu gongye chubanshe, 2007).

### *Weaver Tiqua*

There are several Tiqua's who appear in the foreign records in the eighteenth century. Only one of them was a weaver, but the entries in the records are not always clear. Other Tiquas sold silk as well, but it was not their main occupation.

Tacqua Amoy, who was in operation from at least 1731 to 1766, was also known as Tiqua, Tyqua, Twyqua, Tequa and by other spellings similar to Tiqua. He shows up in the Dutch, Danish, English and Swedish records. Fortunately, this man sold other products as well, and he often appears with the name Amoy attached to his name, both of which help to separate him from Weaver Tiqua. Tacqua Amoy's story is told in Chapter 11 of the first volume of this study.

In the 1730s, the officers of the English East India Company (EIC) sometimes called the Hong merchant Texia, Tiqua as well (MCM vol. 1, Chapter 9). There are a couple of other Tiquas (with various spellings) that appear in the English records in the first four decades of the eighteenth century. Fortunately, all of those references are several decades before Weaver Tiqua emerges.

Even though the Dutch mentioned in 1780 that Weaver Tiqua was supplying the EIC with many of their silks, I have found no reference to him in those records (NAH: Canton 43, doc. No. 2, 1780.02.02). The English usually ordered their silks through Hong merchants and these men then contracted with the weavers, so the latter men's names rarely appear in the EIC records.

The last reference I have found to Tiqua is in the Dutch records of 1789, and then he disappears. I have found nothing in the American records that comes close to his name.

### *Weaver Conqua*

There were several Chinese merchants with a name like Conqua. The Portuguese records in Macao show a name like this from the 1750s to 1770s. We know that Weaver Conqua was from Macao and that his mother lived there. There are references in the Portuguese records from about 1754 to 1764 to a Chinese merchant by the name of Conqua or Chonqua. His Chinese name was Wu Huanguan 吳環官. There are other references to names like Conqua, but with no Chinese names recorded (Carl T. Smith's unpublished papers entitled '18th Century Chinese Merchants' and '19th Century Chinese Merchants'). Unfortunately, I have found no clear evidence to show that the Conquas in the Portuguese records were the same men as those in Canton. Moreover, one of the Hong merchants was called Conqua and he would likely have done business in Macao as well. We know that this man was from the Chen lineage, so he was different from Wu Huanguan. Moreover, it is unclear whether all the Conquas in the Portuguese records were the same man. As I point out in Chapter 10, Weaver Conqua seems to have entered in trade with the Portuguese sometime around 1780, which does not fit with the references that appear earlier.

There are many references in the various East India companies' archives to the Hong merchant Conqua. He died in 1781, but his name still appears several years thereafter in reference to the debts that he left behind. Like other Hong merchants, this Conqua also dealt in silk, which means care needs to be taken not to confuse him with Weaver Conqua (MCM vol. 1, pp. 118–20 and Appendixes 6C and 6D).

It is not until 1781 that we have clear references to Weaver Conqua in the Danish records. He shows up in those records up to 1785, and in the Dutch records up to 1793. His name then disappears.

### *Weaver Samqua*

There were several merchants with a name close to Samqua in the late eighteenth century. Gau Semqua (also spelled Samqua) was a Hong merchant and active up until 1774 (MCM 1: Chapter 7). The porcelain dealer Lisjoncon, who is discussed in Chapter 7, also went by the name Lie Samqua, or just Samqua. The Hong merchant Shy Kinqua had a brother by the name of Samqua (BL: IOR G/12/82, 1786.03.04, p. 14).

Because we know the Chinese name for Samqua's business, Yuansheng Hao 源盛號, we might expect to find it mentioned on one of the steles in the Jinlun Huiguan. The steles dated 1765, 1778 and 1826 show an Ou Yuansheng 區源盛; the 1826 stele has a *yuanshengyunji* 源盛雲記 and a *yuanshengyunjin* 源盛雲進; the 1840 stele shows *huangyuanshengjinjinji* 黃源盛進津記; and the 1851 stele shows *changyuanshengguiji* 昌源盛桂記 and *changyuanshengyuanji* 昌源盛垣記. All of these names contain the two characters yuansheng 源盛. Unfortunately, I have no way of determining whether any of these names are connected to Weaver Samqua. (Guangzhou shi wenhua ju, *Guangzhou Jinlun Huiguan zhengti yiwei baohu gongcheng ji*, 2007)

### *Silk Dealer Assing*

Aside from a brief mention of Assing in the American records, he seems only to appear in the Danish records. The Dutch had a comprador with a name similar to Assing, but I found no silk merchant with a name like that in those or other records.

### *Weaver Lochop*

Weaver Lochop only appears in the Dutch records. In the early 1790s, there was a Hong merchant by the name of Locqua (MCM 1: Chapter 10 and Appendix 10D). His name is the closest to Lochop, but the different spellings and products they handled, make it rather easy to distinguish between them.

### *Other Silk Dealers and Workers*

There were, of course, numerous other silk dealers and workers active in Canton in the eighteenth century for whom we have little or no information. These other men sometimes appear in the records just once or twice, and then disappear, without any further details. I include the names of other silk men here, with the year of when they appear in the records in parenthesis. Most of these men were weavers, but the entries are not always explicit. I picked out the men who seem to have been mostly focused on silk.

Some of the men below have numerous references to them, such as Namqua, but owing to confusion with other merchants with similar names it is difficult to sort out their stories. Some men that appear in the American records might be listed as 'silk merchants' but in fact were Hong merchants. I only list below men who seem to have been focused mostly on silk.

There are many references in the American records to some of these silk men, such as Eshing and Washing, but almost all of these entries just show a dollar amount or an item purchased from them with no description. If there is a description, it is often just a few words or a sentence. The brevity of the entries does not allow for any type of examination of their businesses or activities. I list their names here for the sake of future research, in case new documents should emerge someday.

American records: Eshing (1784–1821), Cooshing (1817–1828), Keetching (1817–1821), Namshing (1801–1822), Yingshing (1821–1822), Hipshing (1815–1825), Washing (1795–1844), Thonshing (1819), Thinshing (1821–1824, possibly the same as Thonshing?), Hinchong (1828), King Woo (1828), Kinglun (1801–1821), Loonshong (1809–1819), Imhing (1831), Kinqua (1801–1835)

Danish records: Tinqvoa (1740), Linqua (1779–1783), Seequa (1780–1790)

Dutch records: Houjouw (1750), Lamqua (1757), Namqua (1760s), Tetqua (1806), Lumshing (1828)

English records: Cetqua (1759), Shunqua (1775–1776), Focklong (1802)

Swedish records: Namqua (1760s)

# NOTES

## Preface

1. Frederic D. Grant Jr., *The Chinese Cornerstone of Modern Banking: The Canton Guaranty System and the Origins of Bank Deposit Insurance 1780–1933* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).
2. John D. Wong, 'Global Positioning: Houqua and His China Trade Partners in the Nineteenth Century' (PhD diss., History Department, Harvard University, 2012).
3. Wang Shuo 王碩, '*Wu Bingjian* and His Friends: The Relations Network of a Chinese Merchant in the Early 19th Century' (PhD diss., East Asian History, University of Freiburg, forthcoming). http://www.eah.geschichte.uni-freiburg.de/staff/wang-shuo [accessed 20 October 2014].
4. Li Yun 李雲, 'Guangzhou Shisan Hang yangshang Ye Tingxun jiazu yu Yi Bingshou' 廣州十三行洋商葉廷勳家族與伊秉綬 (PhD diss., Central China Normal University, 2013).
5. Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*. Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) (hereafter referred to as MCM 1), Chapter 11 and Plates 11.18–20.
6. Jessica Hanser, 'Mr. Smith Goes to China: British Private Traders and the Interlinking of the British Empire with China, 1757–1792' (PhD diss., Department of History, Yale University, May 2012); Susan E. Schopp, 'The French in the Pearl River Delta: A Topical Case Study of Sino-European Exchanges in the Canton Trade, 1698–1840' (PhD diss., Department of History, University of Macau, 2015); and Lisa Hellman, 'Everyday Life in Canton: The Case of the Swedish East India Company 1730–1830' (PhD diss., Department of History, Stockholm University, 2015).
7. Paul A. Van Dyke and Maria Kar-wing Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822: Reading History in Art* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015).
8. Sun Yat-sen University Library has the following digital collections which I made extensive use of: *Zhongguo fangzhi ku* 中國方志庫, *Ming Qing shilu* 明清實錄, and *Zhongguo leishu ku* 中國類書庫.
9. MCM 1:xvii.
10. See, for example, my review of Gang Zhao, *The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684–1757* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013); *Journal of Asian History* 48, no. 1 (2014): 124–27. Zhao's study is based almost exclusively on Chinese records and shows the great disparity between what officials in Beijing thought was happening in the trade and what was actually happening in Canton.
11. See the bibliography for a list of the Chinese sources in the British National Archives.
12. Liang Tingnan 梁廷楠, *Yue haiguan zhi* 粵海關志 [Gazetteer of Guangdong Maritime Customs] (1839; reprint, Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2001), 496.
13. Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident: Le Commerce à Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and Album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 2:521–24.
14. For examples, see Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990); and Ch'en Kuo-tung

Anthony 陳國棟. *Qingdai qianqi de yue haiguan yu shisan hang* 清代前期的粵海關與十三行 (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2014). This latter book is not new, but rather a collection of previously published articles and Ch'en's MA thesis from 1979. Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, 'Qingdai qianqi de Yue haiguan' 清代前期的粵海關 [Maritime customs of early Qing dynasty 1683–1842] (MA thesis, Department of History, National Taiwan University, 1979). Ch'en did not cross-reference the data he found in the British or Chinese records with other sources, and he did not update the discussions with new research that has been done, so even his recent 2014 book is now much out-of-date.

15. If lawyers investigated their clients'cases—as some historians have done in researching the China trade—believing everything they read, there would be no justice in the courtroom. Likewise, if journalists investigated their stories as some historians have done, by believing whatever is written in government and corporate records, connivances and scandals would never be revealed.
16. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, Chapter 2. See also Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, '1760–1833 nianjian Zhongguo chaye chukou de xiguan zuofa' 1760–1833 年間中國茶葉出口的習慣做法, in Ch'en, Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *Dongya haiyu yiqian nian* 東亞海域一千年 [One thousand years of maritime East Asia] (Taipei: Yuanliu chuban gongsi, 2005), Chapter 10.
17. MCM 1: Plate 10.09 is a painting of the inside of the Hong merchant Chowqua's tea warehouse. It shows a Danish officer and one of Chowqua's writers both recording the chests of tea and their weights in their respective account books. Many written references attest to the accuracy of this scene, and that Chinese merchants did indeed keep detailed records.
18. For references to the Hoppo's books, see the indexes in Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007); and MCM 1.
19. Ch'en attempted to estimate Hong merchant profits and came to the conclusion that 'Hong merchants' trade was basically profitable'. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 103. Regardless of all the figures he assembled and all the estimates he presented, in the end we are still left with the historical fact that the overwhelming majority of Hong merchants failed. The problem with Ch'en's analysis is that there are too many variables missing from his equation. This outcome is perhaps the result of Ch'en treating the EIC as if it were the most important part of every Hong merchant's business. Because of this prejudice, the British viewpoint tends to dominate his discussion. Ch'en failed to take into full consideration all of the other aspects of a Hong merchant's operation, such as the other East India companies, the private traders, the Macao and Manila trade, the junk trade to Southeast Asia, and the many different products they were handling (besides tea, woolens and cotton, which he does discuss), etc. We cannot explain Hong merchants' failures by simply looking at one of their main customers or by analyzing the trade of a couple key commodities they handled. That approach is similar to trying to calculate the profits of a large department store by only looking at the purchases of people from one district and the sales of a couple key products. In the end, all we have are a bunch of figures that tell us nothing. In order to calculate a meaningful figure for 'profits', we must look at all of the customers in the department store, all of the purchases that the store made, all of the sales that the store generated, all of the operational and overhead costs involved, and all of the depreciation factors on fixed assets, etc., and then we can come up with a reliable estimate. Anything short of that is meaningless. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, Chapter 2 'The Profitability of Trade'; Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, 'Lun Qingdai zhongye: Guangdong hangshang jingguan bushan de yuanyin' 論清代中葉：廣東行商經管不善的原因, in Ch'en, *Dongya haiyu yiqian nian*, 365–94.
20. Ch'en, *Dongya haiyu yiqian nian* (2005). Even though Ch'en has not done any original research on the Canton trade for many years, he continues to uphold his incomplete and

inconclusive findings which are now much out-of-date. See also Gang Zhao, *The Qing Opening to the Ocean* (2013).

21. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 10–12.
22. Liang, *Yue haiguan zhi*, 496.
23. There are many examples in the first volume of this study of Hong merchants and foreigners being involved in the junk trade to Southeast Asia. MCM 1: several chapters, but especially Chapter 9. For an explanation of the importance of sago imports in the foreign export trade, see Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Packing for Success: Sago in Eighteenth Century Chinese Trade', in *Kuayue haiyang de jiaohuan* 跨越海洋的交換 [The transoceanic exchange] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2013), 167–92.
24. Ch'en states that 'Although the second kung-hang did not last long, the exclusion of merchants other than members of the wai-yang-hang in trading with the Europeans did persist.' Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 11. This division that he sees between these two administrative bodies comes from looking at policies to the exclusion of practices. In another place Ch'en states that 'During the time of the second kung-hang (1760–1771), only merchants of the wai-yang-hang were allowed to trade with foreigners. Merchants of the peng-kang-hang were not. After the dissolution of that association, some members of the peng-kang-hang came to take a part in the foreign trade.' Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 186. As I have shown extensively in the first volume, there was never a clear division between these two groups. There was always interaction between the junk traders and the trade with foreigners in Canton. Ch'en was unaware of these activities because those details are not contained in the British or Chinese sources. MCM 1: see especially Chapter 9, section discussing Hongsia.
25. The Macao Historical Archives, University of Hong Kong Library and Sun Yat-sen University Library in Guangzhou all have copies of the G/12/1–291 records from the British Library.
26. One just needs to look at the index to the *Chronicles of Macau* to realize how little information about the Canton and Macao merchants is contained in the Macao records. Very few of the merchants discussed in this study (volumes one and two) are mentioned in the index. The persons that are mentioned in these six volumes are simply quotes from Chinese documents cited in this study or they are quotes from my books and articles. There is almost nothing in this compilation about the majority of Chinese merchants who were operating in Macao in the eighteenth century. There is also almost nothing about the Portuguese who were going to Canton every year to purchase cargos. If all we had to consult were the Macao records, there would be nothing write here. Wu Zhiliang 吳志良, Tang Kaijian 湯開建, Jin Guoping 金國平, eds., *Aomen biannianshi* 澳門編年史 [Chronicles of Macau], 6 vols. (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2009).
27. Because funding was always limited and insufficient to order the entire collection, I made sure that the Dutch documents available in Macao were different from those that were ordered in Guangzhou. Between the two cities, there are about 130,000 pages of Dutch China-trade documents available for researchers to use. As of October 2014, we are only missing about 5,000 pages.
28. Most of the Swedish East India Companies' records are available online and can be downloaded free of charge, at these two websites: http://www.ub.gu.se/samlingar/handskrift/ostindie/ and http://ostindiska.nordiskamuseet.se/. The former website is also searchable. When I was working in the Danish and Belgian archives, they allowed digital cameras so I was able to photograph many of the Ostend Company records.
29. Dilip Kumar Basu, 'Asian Merchants and Western Trade: A Comparative Study of Calcutta and Canton 1800–1840' (PhD diss., Department of History, University of California, Berkeley, 1975); Ann Bolbach White, 'The Hong Merchants of Canton' (PhD diss., Department of History, University of Pennsylvania, 1967); and Ch'en, *Insolvency*.

30. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 180.
31. Liang Jiabin 梁嘉彬, *Guangdong Shisan Hang kao* 廣東十三行考 [Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton] (1937; reprint, Taipei: 1960; reprint, Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999); Ch'en, *Insolvency*; and Weng Eang Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997).
32. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1762 (Macao: Macao Cultural Affairs Bureau, 2006); Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1763 (Macao: Macao Cultural Affairs Bureau, 2008); and Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1764 (Macao: Macao Cultural Affairs Bureau, 2009) (hereafter these published *dagregisters* are referred to as CMD 1762, 1763 or 1764).
33. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Weaver Suckin and the Canton Silk Trade 1750–1781', *Review of Culture*, International Edition no. 29 (2009): 105–19.
34. CMD 1762, 1763 and 1764. These translated *dagregisters* are still in print and can be ordered from the Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Macao S.A.R. Government at this address: http://www3.icm.gov.mo/gate/gb/www.icm.gov.mo/deippub/publicationE.asp [accessed 23 December 2014]. See also http://www.gcs.gov.mo/showNews.php?DataUcn=30741&PageLang=E [accessed 23 December 2014]
35. MCM 1:xvi.
36. Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2:521–24; and Rhys Richards, 'United States Trade with China, 1784–1814', *The American Neptune* 54: Special Supplement (1994).
37. Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2:521–24.
38. Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2:521–24.
39. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) R/10/4, 1757.12.02, pp. 47–49; and MCM 1:53–56.
40. Since I wrote the first volume, I have found another couple of ships that had to layover an entire season in China owing to insufficient merchandise being available in Canton. The French ship *Comtesse de Pontchartrain* arrived at Whampoa in December 1717 and remained there until January 1719. BL: IOR L/MAR/B/0656A, 1718.08.05. The EIC ship *Essex* laid over an entire year from 1719 to 1720. BL: IOR L/MAR/B/667B, 1720.07.24.

## Introduction

1. For the number of ships in China in the 1720s, 1730s and 1740s, see Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident: Le Commerce à Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 2:521–24.
2. I have listed the ships that had to layover in China in Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) (hereafter referred to as MCM 1), 53. I also mention a couple other ships in the Preface of this volume. In short, the number of ships that had to layover for a year in China owing to insufficient merchandise to load them was as follows: 1718 one French ship, 1719 one English ship, 1741 one Swedish ship, 1747 one Swedish ship, 1749 one Swedish ship, 1752 one Swedish ship, 1754 one Prussian and one Swedish ship, 1759 one Swedish ship, and 1761 one Swedish ship. In addition to these layovers, the departures of quite a few other ships were delayed for a month or more in the 1740s and 1750s owing to insufficient cargo to load them. There were likely many other ships that were delayed owing to insufficient cargo, for which I have no data. After the Co-hong was created in 1760, the departures of all ships became much more regular.

3. With regard to the Qing trade policies, Ch'en states that 'Perhaps appropriately we can say that there was no foreign-trade policy at all'. Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 252. Ch'en did not analyse Qing practices—only policies so he is unaware that the government did indeed have a consistent practice with respect to the foreign trade.
4. Ng Chin-Keong, 'The Case of Ch'en I'lao: Maritime Trade and Overseas Chinese in Ch'ing Policies, 1717–1754', in *Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, C. 1400–1750*, ed. Roderich Ptak and Ditmar Rothermund (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991), 373–400.
5. Ng, 'The Case of Ch'en I'lao', 390.
6. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) R/10/4, 1757.12.02, pp. 47–49.
7. Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2:828–29; and Sven T. Kjellberg, *Svenska Ostindiska Compagnierna 1731–1813* (Malmö: Allhems Förlag, 1974), 96–97 (see caption under painting of Poan Key-qua). In 2007, the Gothenburg City Museum changed its website and acknowledged that the rumour of Poankeequa visiting Sweden in the mid-eighteenth century may be inaccurate. 'Uppgifterna om att mandarinen varit bosatt eller ens vistats i Göteborg har senare forskning kunnat avvisa som oriktiga (2007, 1 Intendent LarsOlof Lööf)'. http://62.88.129.39/carlotta/web/object/32946 [accessed 15 November 2014]
8. Frederic D. Grant Jr., *The Chinese Cornerstone of Modern Banking: The Canton Guaranty System and the Origins of Bank Deposit Insurance 1780–1933* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).
9. Caroline Frank, 'A Cantonese Merchant Sails to Federal America: National Discourses of Maritime Practice' (unpublished paper presented at the international conference entitled 'Material and Textual Studies in a Cross-Cultural Background: A Chinese Historical Perspective and Beyond', held at Sun Yat-sen University, 6–7 December 2014).
10. John D. Wong, 'Global Positioning: Houqua and His China Trade Partners in the Nineteenth Century' (PhD diss., History Department, Harvard University, 2012).
11. BL: IOR R/10/4, letters from Fort Marlborough dated 1763.08.27, pp. 4–5 and 1763.07.22, pp. 10–11.
12. Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke. *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters 1764* (Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2009) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1764), 12 September, pp. 199–200.
13. BL: IOR R/10/8, doc. No. 10, letter to the EIC committee in Canton from Robert Hay at Fort Marlborough, dated 1777.07.17, p. 19.
14. BL: IOR R/10/8, doc. No. 51, letter to the Governor and Council of Fort Marlborough from the EIC committee in Canton, dated 1777.12.14, p. 78.
15. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): VOC 4445, letter dated 1790.12.11, paragraph 39.
16. NAH: VOC 4425, report dated 1784.02.01, paragraph 30.
17. James Fichter, *So Great a Proffit: How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American Capitalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 284.
18. See, for example, MCM 1:75.
19. MCM 1:133–34.
20. MCM 1:81–82.
21. Historical Society of Pennsylvania (HSP): 1878 Sword Family Papers, Box1, letter to Miss Mary Parry, dated in Canton 27 January 1836, typescript, p. 2.
22. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 252.
23. BL: IOR G/12/31, 1732.01.03, p. 215.
24. Ch'en, for example, states that 'as failure did occur to the Hong merchants so often, it can only be attributed to their bad management'. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 42. See also pp. 43, 106, 251, and 308. This statement reveals how little Ch'en understands the system in which the Hong merchants operated. Such generalizations do the Hong merchants an injustice given the fact that Ch'en only had information about a small fraction of their business activities.

This is one of the problems of academicians writing about things in which they have had no experience. They are unable to see the holes in their analysis.

25. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966).

## Chapter 1

1. The following Chinese document mentions that Swequa was from Fujian. National Archives, London (NAL): FO 233/189, doc. No. 49, p. 15. The following Dutch reference mentions that his home was in 'Tschin Tchou' (Quanzhou). National Archives, The Hague (NAH): Canton 76, 1767.06.25.
2. Cheong suggests that the 'Chequa' who appears in the English records in 1728 might be a reference to Swequa. I have found no clear connection between these two men so I have not used this reference. Weng Eang Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 86 and 120n1.
3. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/50, 1741.10.15, p. 26; and University of Minnesota, James Ford Bell Library (JFB): Charles Irvine Papers, Letter Books and Account Books.
4. Aix-en-Provence, Archives Nationales d'Outre-mer (ANOM): C.1.10, 1742.07.23, p. 17v and 1743.08.13, p. 39v.
5. Kungliga Vetenskaps-akademiens Bibliotek, Stockholm (Library of the Royal Academy of Sciences, KVB), 'Dagbok under resan från Giötheborg til Canton 1748–1749', map entitled 'Cantons Förstad'. This Swedish map is reproduced in Paul A. Van Dyke and Maria Karwing Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822: Reading History in Art* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015), Figure F27; and Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) (hereafter referred to as MCM 1), Plates 02.01 and 02.02.
6. The present-day location of Swequa's factory would be a little south of the farmer's market Dongchuan Xinjieshi 東川新街市 on Heping Dong Lu 和平東路. According to the Swedish map, in the eighteenth century, tailors were congregated in this area. The north-south street where Swequa's factory was located was east of the present-day Xinglong Bei Lu 興隆北路.
7. NAH: VOC 4381, *Rapport*, doc. No. 24, pp. 220r–v.
8. Chinese merchants tended to favour one company over another in order to gain access to the silver that company brought to China. MCM 1:19–21.
9. For the number of French ships in China each year, see Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident: Le Commerce à Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 2:521–22. For a more current list, see Susan E. Schopp, 'The French in the Pearl River Delta: A Topical Case Study of Sino-European Exchanges in the Canton Trade, 1698–1840' (PhD diss., Department of History, University of Macau, 2015).
10. Many of the Hong merchants were involved in smuggling gold out of China. For a discussion of the advantages of partaking in that trade, see MCM 1:18–19 and other pages shown in the index of that book.
11. NAH: Canton 7, letter dated 1752.11.07 and Canton 17, doc. dated 1752.06.27.
12. NAH: VOC 4381, *Rapport*, doc. No. 24, 1758.01.19, pp. 220r–v and doc. No. 29, dated 1758.01.19, pp. 281–82. Wan Tang Ju is called a 'Hannist' in this source, which suggests he was a Hong merchant. I have no references to a merchant with a name like this.
13. NAH: Canton 19, letter dated 1754.07.08, which includes the trade report for 1753. The Chemqua who is mentioned in the Dutch records as one of the owners of their factory

may have been the same person as Chimqua, who shows up in the English records. This latter man died some time before 1755. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 5:25.

14. NAH: Canton 20, trade report for 1754 in letter dated 1755.06.24.
15. NAH: Canton 20, trade report for 1754 in letter dated 1755.06.24.
16. NAH: Canton 20, trade report for 1754 in letter dated 1755.06.24; and ANOM: C.1.15 pp. 69–70.
17. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5:9.
18. BL: IOR R/10/3, 1754.07.16, p. 203.
19. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5:9–11.
20. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5:9–11.
21. BL: IOR R/10/3, 1754.07.29, p. 207.
22. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5:9–11.
23. BL: IOR R/10/3, 1754.08.07–10, pp. 216–17.
24. BL: IOR R/10/3, 1754.08.15, p. 219.
25. BL: IOR R/10/3, 1754.08.15–28, pp. 219–13.
26. The Frenchman who was apprehended was eventually released in 1755 owing to a general pardon from the emperor that gave all prisoners their freedom this year. The references to this affair are far too many to cite here. Most of the discussion can be found on these pages. BL: IOR R/10/3, pp. 223–349.
27. BL: IOR R/10/3, 1755.07.17, pp. 334–35.
28. MCM 1: Chapter 3.
29. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.09.24, Consultations for 1755, pp. 6–7.
30. Before the 1750s, ships arrived and left China in concert with the monsoons. Beginning in the late 1750s, they began arriving all times of the year. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'New Sea Routes to Canton in the 18th Century and the Decline of China's Control over Trade', in *Studies of Maritime History* 海洋史研究, ed. Li Qingxin 李慶新, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2010), 57–108. However, before 1715, there were a number of French ships that arrived in the off-season because they sailed via Cape Horn rather than Cape Hope. See Schopp, 'The French in the Pearl River Delta'.
31. BL: IOR R/10/4, letter dated 1756.01.17, p. 20.
32. Van Dyke, 'New Sea Routes to Canton', 57–108.
33. NAH: Canton 22, Resolution dated 1756.07.02.
34. Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2:521–24.
35. NAH: VOC 4381, *dagregister*, 1757.12.18, pp. 191v–192r.
36. MCM 1:189.
37. Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2:521–24.
38. NAH: VOC 4556, entry under 'Factory' and Canton 24, Resolution dated 1759.08.06; and JFB: B 1758 fNe, *dagregister*, 1758.09.27.
39. The main Dutch factory was building No. 16, in Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822*, Plate P4. It was the second building from the creek on the east end of the quay.
40. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5:73–74. See also NAH: Canton 25, Resolution No. 1, dated 1762.09.17.
41. MCM 1:221–22.
42. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.01.27, p. 10.
43. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.05.06, p. 51.
44. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.04.06, p. 33, 1759.04.15, p. 41.
45. Van Dyke, 'New Sea Routes to Canton', pp. 57–108.

46. MCM 1: Chapter 3; and NAH: Canton 74, 1765.07.21. A French translation of the edict to end the Co-hong, dated the 35th year of Qianlong, 12th month, 28th day (1771.02.12), can be seen in ANOM: C.1.11, p. 99.
47. NAL: FO 233/189, doc. No. 9, pp. 245–48.
48. NAH: VOC 4384, doc. dated 1760.08.15 and the 1760 trade report dated 1761.01.11. See pp. 519–603.
49. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1762 (Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2006) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1762), 19 September, p. 18. This reference mentions that Tjobqua's predecessor (Swequa) had been living in the back of the Dutch factory for two years, which means he would have moved in sometime around 1760.
50. 'De Svendske hav med 2d insuffisante kiöbmændd at bestelte nemlig Ponqueiqua [Poankeequa] og Long Ziugqua [Long Swequa] samme hav imodtaget de Svendske penger og ikke leværet Den alle i Compagnies Cassa'. Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1143, 1761.01.12, p. 139r; and NAH: VOC 4384, 1760 trade report dated 1761.01.11, see pp. 594–98.
51. NAH: VOC 4384, trade report for 1760, pp. 523–39; and Gothenburg Universitetsbibliotek (GUB): H 22.1 Ström, Nr 1152 Promemoria med råd om teinköp. This latter document shows the Swedes continuing with Swequa's brother Tjobqua (spelled Joqua), after Swequa died. The Jean Abraham Grill papers in the Nordic Museum Archive are filled with references to Poankeequa and Tjobqua (Jauqua) supplying the Swedes with cargos for their ships in the 1760s. Nordic Museum archive, Godegårdsarkivet. Ostindiska Handling F17: 1–7 (hereafter referred to as NM: F17).
52. Morse, *Chronicles,* 5:100.
53. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1761.07.15, p. 4 and 1761.07.21, p. 9; NAH: Canton 25, doc. No. 1, dated 1762.09.17.
54. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters,* 1763 (Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1763), 13 July, p. 72; and NAH: Canton 74, 1765.07.21.
55. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1761.07.15, p. 4 and 1761.07.21, p. 9; RAC: Ask 1143; NAH: Canton 25, doc. No. 1, dated 1762.09.17. Ch'en does not show Tjobqua (Yokqua) being in financial difficulties until 1770, but that is because he only used the British and Chinese records. Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843,* 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 259.
56. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1761.07.21, p. 9.
57. NAH: VOC 4384, trade report for 1760, dated 1761.01.11, pp. 519–20.
58. For Chowqua, Consentia Giqua, Fat Hunqua and Foutia's stories, see MCM 1.
59. MCM 1: Chapter 3.
60. NAH: Canton 76, 1767.06.25 and 1767.07.02.
61. CMD 1762, 17 September, p. 11 and 19 September, pp. 18–19; and Christiaan J. A. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 58–60.
62. CMD 1762, 17 September, p. 11 and 19 September, pp. 18–19. For Swetia's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 9.
63. CMD 1762, 17 September, p. 11 and 19 September, pp. 18–19.
64. CMD 1762, 17 September, p. 11 and 19 September, pp. 18–19. In 1772, the Dutch asked Tjobqua to vacate the apartment in the back of their factory. However, references below show that he was still living in that apartment up to his bankruptcy in 1772. The Dutch took over that part of the building in 1772 which increased their rent an additional $400 (see below). NAH: Canton 81, 1772.03.03; and Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 60.
65. CMD 1763, 11 January, p. 10.

66. On 6 August 1763, the Dutch heard from the French that they were expecting four ships to arrive. The Dutch dismissed this rumor as 'nothing but bragging'. On 10 August, the Swedish supercargos reported that 'two French ships will come for sure'. CMD 1763, 6 August, p. 83 and 10 August, p. 86.
67. Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2:521–24.
68. CMD 1763, 13 July, p. 72.
69. Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1764 (Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2009) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1764), 18 March, p. 30.
70. NM: F17, p. T1_00748.
71. MCM 1: Chapter 3.
72. CMD 1763, 24 August, p. 105, 25 August, p. 107 and 11 September, p. 120.
73. CMD 1763, 3 September, p. 113.
74. The French supercargos began buying up tea on 12 August, but the first French ships did not arrive at Macao until 3 September. The 100 chests of silver arrived in Canton on 22 September. CMD 1763, 12 August, p. 91, 23 August, p. 104, 3 September, pp. 113–14, 22 September, p. 126.
75. CMD 1763, 12 November, pp. 150–51.
76. CMD 1764, 1–7 March, p. 26.
77. CMD 1764, 10 March, pp. 26–27.
78. CMD 1764, 30 April–5 May, pp. 67–68.
79. MCM 1:189.
80. NAH: Canton 28, Resolution No. 16, dated 1765.12.06 and Canton 74, 1765.12.02. There are other examples of merchants using Tjobqua's authority.
81. For a layout of the factories in 1748 map, see Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822*, Figure F27.
82. Foreigners at this time called their water pumps 'fire engines'. The Chinese, however, called them water carts 水車. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Fires and the Risks of Trade in Canton 1730s–1840s', in *Canton and Nagasaki Compared 1730–1830: Dutch Chinese, Japanese Relations*, ed. Evert Groenendijk, Cynthia Viallé, and Leonard Blussé, *Intercontinenta* no. 26 (Leiden: Institute for the History of European Expansion, 2009), 171–202.
83. CMD 1764, 11 November, p. 251; and RAC: Ask 1153a, 1764.11.11.
84. NAH: Canton 76, 1767.07.02.
85. The refusal to issue permission chops appears to have been just for 'new' requests. The French, for example, were renovating their factory during the spring of 1767 and seem to have been able to get the carpenters and labourers they needed before this dispute emerged. They continued to work on their factory up until at least mid-June 1767, when the last supercargo Vigny left for Macao. Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822*, Chapter 1.
86. NAH: Canton 76, 1767.07.02.
87. MCM 1: Chapter 2.
88. For examples and an explanation of how bottomry loans worked, see Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), 151–56; and MCM 1: Chapter 2.
89. 'Tjobqua overhandigde een pacquet Brieven voor particuliere aan hem toegezonde van Aymuy, welke aldaar door 3 Jonken van Batavia komende waren aangebragt.' NAH: Canton 77, 1768.09.10.
90. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Packing for Success: Sago in Eighteenth Century Chinese Trade', in *Kuayue haiyang de jiaohuan* 跨越海洋的交換 [The transoceanic exchange] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2013), 167–92.
91. NAH: Canton 75, 1766.03.03, 1766.10.25, 1766.12.10.

92. CMD 1763, 8 February, p. 20.
93. CMD 1763, 18 August, p. 96.
94. CMD 1763, 2 April, p. 36.
95. The Dutch mentioned on 30 June that Le Fevre and his assistant were leaving for Macao. NAH: Canton 76, 1767.06.25 and 1767.06.30. On 20 November 1771, the English in Canton mentioned that Le Fevre was an 'agent here to the missionaries at Pekin'. BL: IOR R/10/7, p. 68. Thus, he seems to have found a way to remain in China.
96. NM: F17, pp. T1_00147–9, T1_00183, T1_00952–4.
97. NM: F17, p. T1_00148.
98. CMD 1762, 7 December, p. 71.
99. CMD 1763, 3 March, p. 24 and 18 August, p. 97.
100. CMD 1763, 10 March, pp. 27–28.
101. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 259–60; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 292nn43–44. I found no mention to Tjobqua (Yokqua) in the EIC records after 1770.
102. NM: F17, p. T1_02045.
103. ANOM: C.1.16, pp. 78r–79r, entry dated 1772.01.16 and several other entries on these pages discuss Tjobqua's (Yokoa) debt from 1772 to 1777. See also pp. 87–88.
104. MCM 1:17–18 and 193.
105. Montigny-le-Bretonneux, Archives Départementales de Yvelines (ADY): E 3056 Lettres de Robien, de Canton et de Bretagne (1767–80). See letters dated 1773.01.07, 1773.01.20, 1777.09.03, 1779.03.28, and signed by supercargo De Robien; and ANOM: C.1.16, pp. 79–86. It is unclear from the entries in these documents whether 20 percent interest was being applied to the entire outstanding balance, or just a portion of it.
106. 'Alles omtrent het inhuuren van gemelde gedeelte der factory met Inksia afgehandeld en gereguleerd zijnde, maand men dezelve aan om Tjobqua te doen verhuijsen, om provisional klarigheid te maken, en het ruuwste werk staande ons verblijf op Macao, verrigt te konnen worden; Inksia beloofd zulks ten uijtvoer te brengen'. NAH: Canton 81, 1772.03.10.
107. 'Worden het met Inksia eens, het agterste gedeelte van deeze factory, thans door Tjobqua bewoond, te huuren voor Sp. 400:_ dan voor de geheele factory Sps 2200.' NAH: Canton 81, 1772.03.03.
108. 'Tjobqua provisionel een vak van 't agter end van de factory ingeruijmd hebbende, is in possisie genoomen.' NAH: Canton 81, 1772.09.20.
109. NAH: Canton 35, Resolution No. 2, 1772.01.04.
110. NM: F17, p. T1_02045.
111. NM: F17, pp. T1_02038–49.
112. NM: F17, pp. T1_02038–49.
113. RAC: Ask 1173, 1775.08.02, p. 57v.
114. ANOM: C.1.13, letter dated 1781.01.06, pp. 139–40. This letter is reproduced in Cordier, except that he did not keep the original spellings of the Chinese names. Henri Cordier, 'Les Marchands Hanistes de Canton', *T'oung Pao* 3 (1902): 295–97.
115. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:44–49 and 53–57.
116. NM: F17, letter dated 1784.01.08 to Jean Abraham Grill from Olaf Lindahl in Canton, pp. T1_02404–6.
117. Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2:897–901. Dermigny extracted his figures from ANOM: C.1.15, pp. 69–70.
118. Carrying this large debt was one of the reasons why the French were having so many cash flow problems in the 1780s. They moved out of their factory that they had occupied for more than thirty years and rented more economical quarters a few doors to the west. For a discussion of the French in the 1780s and 1790s, see Schopp, 'The French in the Pearl River Delta'; and Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822*, Chapters 4 and 6.

119. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 40, 84, 98, 254, 257, 259, 292nn43–44.
120. MCM 1:157.
121. NM: F17, p. T1_02045.

## Chapter 2

1. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) R/10/4, 1759.11.03, p. 133.
2. 'Lai Guangdong yingsheng, sui ju Aomen' 來廣東營生，遂居澳門 [Come to Guangdong to make a living, and reside in Macao], *Caishi qian Yue jiapu* 蔡氏遷粵家譜 (1907). Thanks to Professor Li Qingxin 李慶新 of the Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences for showing me Monqua's family genealogy.
3. *Caishi qian Yue jiapu*.
4. *Qing gong Yue Gang Ao shangmao dang'an quanji* 清宮港澳商貿檔案全集, Zhongguo di yi lishi dang'an guan 中國第一歷史檔案館 and Zhongguo guji zhengli yanjiuhui bian 中國古籍整理研究會, ed., 10 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo shudian, 2002) (hereafter referred to as QGY), doc. No. 280, 1757.02.08, pp. 1428–29 and doc. No. 327, 1759.10.09, pp. 1861–62; and *Caishi qian Yue jiapu*.
5. Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) (hereafter referred to as MCM 1), Chapters 5–6.
6. As discussed in Appendix 2G, it is not always easy to identify Teunqua in the other European records owing to names that were spelled similarly. However, I was able to trace many of the prominent Chinese merchants and major suppliers of the other European companies (non-EIC) through the records from the 1730s to the 1750s and Teunqua was clearly not among them. He always appears as a small operator.
7. BL: IOR G/12/37, 1734.09.22–23, pp. 67–68; and MCM 1:18–19.
8. BL: IOR G/12/37, 1734.10.16, p. 82.
9. Gothenburg Landsarkivet (Provincial Archive), Öijaredssäterisarkiv: A406 (hereafter referred to as GL: A406); and J. E. Schooneveld-Oosterling, ed., *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, 1750–1755, Vol. 12 (The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2007), 216–22.
10. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): Canton 19, letter dated 1754.07.08 which includes the trade report for 1753; and Schooneveld-Oosterling, ed., *Generale Missiven*, 12:216–22.
11. NAH: Canton 20, doc. dated 1755.06.24, Canton 22, doc. dated 1756.07.02, Canton 210, *Rapport*, 1753.06.25, VOC 4380, doc. dated 1754.11.17, pp. 63–64, and doc. from 1756, p. 57.
12. The Danes ranked the nine top merchants as follows. First six were: Bow Qveiqva (Beaukeequa), Svesia (Swetia), Siuqva (Suqua), Sey Hunqva (Cai Hunqua), PonKeiqva (Poankeequa) and Long Sviqva (Swequa). Last three were: Tounqva (Teunqua), Consientia Giqva (Consentia Giqua) and Avue (Awue). Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1135, 1755.08.14, p. 90r. Of course, this ranking was just the Danes' opinion, and merely shows which persons they thought to be most important to their trade.
13. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.08.07, pp. 18–19, 1755.08.07–9, p. 34, 1755.08.13, p. 36.
14. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.10.10, p. 55.
15. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.09.25, p. 51.
16. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.10.11, p. 55.
17. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.11.01, p. 67.
18. BL: IOR R/10/4, letter dated 1755.11.22, pp. 71–72.
19. BL: IOR R/10/4, letter dated 1756.01.17, pp. 20–21.
20. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1756.04.28, p. 39.

21. BL: IOR R/10/3, 1754.08.07, p. 216 and R/10/4, 1755.08.07, pp. 18–19, 1755.08.09, p. 32, 1755.08.07–9, p. 34, 1755.08.13, p. 36, 1756.11.27, p. 63; Weng Eang Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 83 and 170–71; and Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 307 and 432n199.
22. The family genealogy mentions that both sons were Imperial examination students (*guozijian li gongsheng* 國子監例貢生). It does not state when the exams were taken, but it must have been before Monqua succeeded his father in 1761. *Caishi qian Yue jiapu*.
23. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 83, 170–71; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 307 and 432n199.
24. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.11.03, p. 133. The 1759 title deed for the Yee-ho Hong was returned to Teunqua so it does not exist in the British archives. But several other title or mortgage deeds have survived from 1765, 1795, 1816, and 1821–43 and are now held in the British National Archives, London (NAL): FO 931/74, 77, 79 and 84.
25. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.05.17, p. 53; and MCM 1:162.
26. QGY: doc. No. 280, 1757.02.08, pp. 1428–29 and doc. No. 327, 1759.10.09, pp. 1861–62.
27. Each of the eleven men was asked to pay an entrance fee so they could raise 74,000 taels to cover administration costs. The top men in the Co-hong paid 10 to 12,000 taels each. The amount each man paid was based on their volume of trade each year (and perhaps their perceived financial status at the time). MCM 1: Chapter 3 and pp. 446–47n29.
28. 'deeze Nacht was den Hangist Theonqua overleeden' NAH: VOC 4386, *dagregister*, 1760.11.21, p. 119.
29. NAH: VOC 4386, *dagregister*, 1760.11.21, p. 119.
30. NAH: VOC 4386, *dagregister*, 1760.12.21, p. 145.
31. On page 537v of the trade report, the Dutch mentioned that Teunqua was a person who never had credit: 'The-on-qua, een Suppliant die by geen mensch ooit Crediet gehad heeft'. In both the trade report and the *dagregister*, the Dutch mentioned that Teunqua (spelled The-on-qua) died on 21 November 1760. NAH: VOC 4384, trade report dated 1761.01.11, pp. 537–41, VOC 4386, *dagregister*, 1760.11.21, pp. 119–20, 1760.12.21, p. 145.
32. MCM 1: Chapter 3 and Appendix 3D. Consentia Giqua and Chowqua were admitted into the Co-hong as well, and were both in rather questionable financial situations. MCM 1:54–58, 172–74, and 188–90.
33. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1761.07.21, pp. 10–11. In 1765, the Dutch also mentioned that Teunqua (spelled Theonqua) was among the merchants who had died since the establishment of the Co-hong in 1760. They mentioned that the repayment of his debts became the responsibility of the successor. NAH: Canton 74, 1765.04.26.
34. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 170–71; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 307; and *Cai shi qian yue jia pu*.
35. For example, Monqua supplied 500 piculs of Bohea tea to the Swedes in 1767. Nordic Museum Archive, Godegårdsarkivet. Ostindiska Handling F17: 1–7 (hereafter referred to as NM: F17): 1767.02.10, p. T1_00147.
36. Another junk that Monqua sponsored was the *Samjeck* (Sanyi 三益)—a painting of which can be seen in MCM 1: Plates 04.11 and 04.12.
37. For more discussion about how junk bottomry bonds worked, see Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), Chapter 8 and MCM 1: Chapter 4.
38. 'Af Monqua lärer jag om att paar dagar få ett Certificat att han ey fädt någon styfwer af de Swenska till sin faders begrafning; jag har bedt honom att likwäl se först noga öfwer Räkningaren, detta skall jag skicka till MKB [MKB is the abbreviation for 'min kära Bror' (my dear brother), see p. T1_01692]; ifall han skulle wilja betala Hr. monni det för gamla små saker, menn nämn till widare ey dårom i fatt att Monqua wara mis tagen, om han

har fådt dem skatt han betala dem äter, men hwarom icke låter han genom George Smith skrifwa Certificatet'. NM: F17 p. T1_00711. Thanks to Lisa Hellman for helping me decipher this text.

39. In 1772, for example, Ingsia reburied his father 21 years after he had died [the reference says 16 years after he died, but this is a mistake]. His father was reburied along with his mother who had died two years before. The new gravesite cost 10,000 taels. The funeral procession consisted of 1,000 palanquins with 15,000 people in attendance. MCM 1:157. Monqua did not have the means to have such a large funeral. But he was apparently trying to make it as elaborate as he could, in order to please his deceased father, by collecting donations from those who had known him.
40. MCM 1:18–19.
41. NM: F17 p. T1_02325. The receipt showing Monqua's opium purchases is reproduced in Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Plate 23. Monqua is identified clearly in the Swedish records in 1764 as 'Tionqua's son' so we know it is not referring to someone else. NM: F17 p. T1_00706. Monqua appears many times in the Swedish records with his last name 'Zey' (Cai) attached.
42. NM: F17 p. T1_0238–39; and Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 122–24.
43. NM: F17 p. T1_0238–39; and Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 122–24.
44. MCM 1:98.
45. 'een gast die alles wat hy is en ooit warden zal aan d' engelsen te danken heeft'. NAH: Canton 74, 1765.07.11.
46. RAC: Ask 1154, 1765.05.21 and Ask 1170, 1773.12.27, p. 128.
47. MCM 1:42 and Plate 05.12.
48. MCM 1: Chapter 2.
49. As stipulated in the contract (Plate 02.03), 454 Swedish lbs. per chest divided by 142 Swedish lbs. per picul equals 3.2 piculs or 320 catties.
50. No figures are given for the damage to the junk. The references only mention that investors suffered 'considerable loss'. RAC: Ask 1158, 1767.11.01, Ask 1159, 1767.11.01, Ask 1160, 1767.11.01; NAH: Canton 76, 1767.11.01; and Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690–1845' (PhD diss., Department of History, University of Southern California, 2002), Appendixes O, P and Q.
51. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 145–50.
52. RAC: Ask 1157, 1767.12.10, Ask 1158, 1767.12.10, Ask 1159, 1767.12.10, Ask 1160, 1767.12.10; NAH: Canton 76, 1767.12.11; and MCM 1:119. See also Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Fires and the Risks of Trade in Canton 1730s–1840s', in *Canton and Nagasaki Compared 1730–1830: Dutch Chinese, Japanese Relations*, ed. Evert Groenendijk, Cynthia Viallé, and Leonard Blussé, *Intercontinenta* no. 26 (Leiden: Institute for the History of European Expansion, 2009), 171–202.
53. RAC: Ask 1157, 1767.12.10, Ask 1158, 1767.12.10, Ask 1159, 1767.12.10, Ask 1160, 1767.12.10; NAH: Canton 76, 1767.12.11; and MCM 1:119.
54. RAC: Ask 1157, 1767.12.13.
55. Fu Lo-Shu, ed., *A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644–1820)* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966), 1777.01.04, pp. 276–77, 1777.05.12, pp. 280–81. For Tiauqua's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 11.
56. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 2:6, 5:152, 159, 168, 179, 189 and Appendix; BL: IOR R/10/7, 1771.03.08, p. 74, R/10/9, 1772.09.03, p. 53.
57. BL: IOR R/10/8, doc. No. 90, letter dated 1778.03.05, pp. 138–39.

58. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*. 5 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926. Reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 2:6, 5:152, 159, 168, 179, 189 and Appendix; BL: IOR R/10/7, 1771.03.08, p. 74, R/10/9, 1772.09.03, p. 53
59. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:97 and Appendix.
60. BL: IOR R/10/9, 1774.12.08, pp. 88–89.
61. We only have figures for Monqua's EIC shares of trade from 1771 to 1776, 1784, and 1793. In 1793 he was allotted two shares. In all other years, he was allotted one share. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:6, 97, 198, 5:152, 159, 168, 179, 189.
62. Fu, *A Documentary Chronicle*, 1777.01.04, pp. 276–77, 1777.05.12, pp. 280–81.
63. BL: IOR R/10/9, 1773.02.08, pp. 197–98.
64. NAH: Canton 84, 1775.01.13, pp. 16–17; RAC: Ask 1173, 1775.06.02, pp. 55v–56r, 1775.07.15, pp. 56v–57r, 1775.08.02, p. 57v, 1775.08.08, p. 58r; and BL: IOR G/12/58, 1775.07.07, pp. 34–35.
65. For the operation of the Dutch trade in the 1760s by their three merchants, see MCM 1: Chapter 3.
66. NAH: Canton 86, 1777.02.08; and MCM 1:174.
67. Fu, *A Documentary Chronicle*, 1777.01.04, pp. 276–77 and 1777.05.12, p. 280; Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:33–34; and NAH: Canton 41, doc. No. 16, 1778.09.16, Canton 46, Resolution No. 1, 1784, Canton 89, 1780.10.18. Cheong mentions that a rivalry now broke out between Poankeequa and Monqua with the former trying to remove the latter from the trade, and 'Munqua's attempt to stab Phuankhequa'. Unfortunately, Cheong did not provide a reference. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 172; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 308; and NAH: Canton 35, Resolution Nos. 12 and 13, 1772.08.08 and 1772.08.09.
68. The four merchants—Ingsia, Chowqua, Monqua and Tsjonqua—were said to owe the English 16,000–17,000 taels, the Frenchman Sebire 8,000 taels and Moulin 7,000–8,000 taels. Monqua was probably responsible for at least one-fourth of the total debt outstanding. NAH: Canton 41, doc. No. 1, 1778.03.30.
69. BL: IOR G/12/64, 1778.09.27, p. 26.
70. MCM 1: Plates 07.07, 10.07 and 10.12.
71. NAH: Canton 47, doc. No. 1, 1785.02.20.
72. BL: IOR G/12/66, 1779.10.14, p. 24; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:45. Cheong mentions that Chowqua was now senile. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 88.
73. On 15 January 1780, the EIC officers mentioned that 'Munqua owes a good deal, but is not supposed to be in any immediate distress'. BL: IOR G/12/66, 1780.01.15, p. 193; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:45–46, 54–55.
74. BL: IOR G/12/66, 1779.08.20, pp. 57–58.
75. Liang Jiabin 梁嘉彬, *Guangdong Shisan Hang kao* 廣東十三行考 [Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Guangdong] (1937; reprint, Taipei: 1960; reprint, Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999), 220–22.
76. The 22 August 1786 declaration is reproduced in MCM 1: Plate 10.12. Cheong suggests that the name change could have taken place as a result of Coqua, Ingsia and Kewshaw's failures in 1778 and 1779, and Monqua's consequential absorbing a portion of their debts. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 171–72.
77. Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident: Le Commerce à Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 2:521–54. Morse's figures differ slightly with Dermigny's. But they both show a huge drop in the number of EIC ships in China in 1782. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 'East India Company's Ships at Canton, 1775–1804'. My new list of ships is not yet complete, but it is clear from the data that I have completed so far that for the years from 1781 to 1783 Dermigny's numbers of EIC ships are very close to reality.

78. MCM 1:134.
79. BL: IOR G/12/71, letter dated 1781.01.22.
80. BL: IOR G/12/71, letter dated 1781.01.22 and the EIC committee's response, pp. 86–88.
81. NAH: VOC 4425, 1782.06.30, pp. 5–6 and 1782.07.27, pp. 7–8.
82. BL: IOR G/12/77, 1783.01.17, p. 9.
83. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 172; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 308; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:90. In 1784, the Dutch also reported that Monqua was over 10,000 taels in debt. NAH: Canton 46, doc. No. 1, 1784. For the EIC ships that Monqua secured each year from 1775 to 1796, see Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: Appendix. Because Monqua's situation was considered by the EIC officers to be 'too precarious' in 1783, they did not offer a parcel of pepper to him. BL: IOR G/12/77, 1783.03.06, pp. 31–32, G/12/88, 1788.04.04, p. 196.
84. On 27 September 1783, the English also recorded that 'Munqua too much embarrassed to be of any consequence, so that the whole trade was in a manner confined to Puan Khequa, Chowqua, and Shy Kinqua'. BL: IOR G/12/77, 1783.09.27, p. 79. But Monqua still secured two EIC ships in 1783. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: Appendix.
85. 'Monqua, som aar paa meget svage födder, er indgaaet i Compagnie med Hauqua, forhen fuldmægtig hos Ponkeiqua. Det Hang bliver altsaa igien nogenledes sickert at handle med, siden Hauqua efter siigende skal have Formue'. RAC: Ask 1191, 1783.08.04, p. 41v. In May 1782, the Danes confirmed that a 'Hauqua' was indeed working in Poankeequa's house. RAC: Ask 1190, 1782 May, p. 31r.
86. The EIC records also confirm Howqua having joined with Monqua. BL: IOR G/12/77, 1783.10.25, p. 130, 1783.10.26, pp. 132–33.
87. BL: IOR G/12/79, 1784.10.02, p. 63; Louis Dermigny, ed., *Les Mémoires de Charles de Constant sur le Commerce à la Chine*, par Charles de Constant (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 316–17; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 280–81.
88. NAH: Canton 46, doc. No. 4, 1784.11.19.
89. NAH: Canton 92, 1786.09.05–07, pp. 25–26.
90. NAH: Canton 92, 1787.01.15, pp. 121–22.
91. Ch'en mentions that the amount requested from the Hong merchants in 1787 for the military campaign in Taiwan was 300,000 taels. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 93. The Danes mentioned that the merchants had to pay 40,000 taels (each?) and the Dutch were told that the total requested from the 'gepriveligeerde Hanggisten' (privileged Hong merchants) was 400,000 taels. RAC: Ask 1202, 1787.08.20, p. 54v; and NAH: Canton 93, 1787.08.20, p. 10.
92. RAC: Ask 1202, 1787.08.13–21, p. 54v. Sycee silver was 100 percent pure (100 touch), whereas Spanish dollars had an alloy content of around 94 percent silver (94 touch) and 6 percent other metal. The merchants had to therefore pay 6 percent more in Spanish dollars to purchase sycee silver. Sycee silver ingots could only be purchased with silver or gold, which is why they needed the foreign coins.
93. BL: IOR G/12/86, 1787.08.22, p. 35. The EIC entry is as follows:

> Consultation
>
> Took into consideration a letter signed by Puankhequa & the rest of the Hong Merchants acquainting us that they had a demand made upon them by the Mandareens to procure a sum of new Dollars for the use of the Troops employed in the Service at Formosa, for which they were to received Sizee in Exchange, & requesting we would order Twenty Chests to be delivered to them for that purpose & placed to their several Accts. in such proportions as we might judge proper–accordingly resolved to comply with their request, & put the sum to their Several Accounts in the following proportions.

| | Chests | Tales |
|---|---|---|
| P. Khequa | 3 | 8492.403 |
| Chowqua | 3 | 8492.403 |
| Munqua | 3 | 8492.403 |
| Shy Kinqua | 3 | 8492.403 |
| Geowqua | 2 | 5661.602 |
| Eequa | 2 | 5661.602 |
| Pinqua | 2 | 5661.602 |
| Howqua | 2 | 5661.602 |
| | 20 | 56,616.020 |

94. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:148–49; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 93 and 280; and QGY: doc. No. 575, 1787.12.20, p. 2999.
95. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 308.
96. Fu, *A Documentary Chronicle*, 1791.05.31, pp. 317–18; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 290–91.
97. NAH: Canton 55, doc. No. 2, 1793.03.25, VOC 4446, journal of daily expenses, 1791.12.24, p. 45 and 'Bevinding van alle Zodanige Thee' dated 1792.10.04; and VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.04.10, p. 6.
98. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 290–307; QGY: doc. No. 600, pp. 3133–34, doc. No. 613, 1793.05.03, pp. 3187–88, doc. No. 748, 1809.01.22, pp. 3971–74; and NAH: Canton 96, 1795.11.05, pp. 41–42, 1795.11.09, p. 42, 1795.11.24, pp. 47–50, 1796.03.16, p. 69.
99. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 72–82.
100. NAH: VOC 4447, letter addressed 'Aan Zijn Hoog Edelheijd Den Heere Gouverneur Generaal', dated 1792.11.28, paragraph No. 47 and VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1792.03.21, p. 23.
101. Locqua's house was much weakened after Ponqua was appointed a Hong merchant in 1792. Locqua failed shortly thereafter. MCM 1:178.
102. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:220–22; and NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.04.28, pp. 9–10 and 1793.07.13, p. 17. At this time, the Hoppo had a linguist in his employ who could read French and English so the foreigners could send a request in either of those languages and did not have to translate it into Chinese as was previously the case. 'Den Hoppo heeft reets deezen middag gezonden om Een Translaat van het Sjap in 't Frans, wijl een Chinees in zijn dienst heeft, die 't Frans & Engels in 't Chinees kan overzetten'. NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1792.10.06, p. 74.
103. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 308–9; QGY: doc. No. 599, 1792.05.23, pp. 3126–30; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 172–73.
104. BL: IOR G/12/108, 1794.10.27, pp. 80–81.
105. BL: IOR G/12/108, 1794.12.17, pp. 117–18.
106. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 172; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 308–9; BL: IOR G/12/133, 1796.10.13, pp. 141–42; and NAH: Canton 96, 1796.04.10–13, pp. 87–88, 1796.04.17, p. 90, 1796.04.20, p. 92.
107. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:273; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 309; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 90 and 172; and BL: IOR G/12/110, 1796.04.10, pp. 238–39.
108. Frank Lequin, *Isaac Titsingh in China (1794–1796)* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Canaletto / Repro-Holland, 2005), 49.
109. BL: IOR G/12/110, 1796.04.10–14, pp. 238–41.
110. The list of Monqua's debts is reproduced in Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Plate 3. Compare this list with the one in the EIC records, BL: IOR G/12/118, 1797.09.11, pp. 125–26.
111. NAH: Canton 61, Resolution dated 17 October 1799.
112. BL: IOR G/12/118, 1797.09.12, p. 131.

113. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:298, 301.
114. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 308.
115. For Tan Suqua, Texia, and Cai Hunqua's stories, see MCM 1.
116. For more thorough coverage of Seequa's interim, see Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:273 and 284; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 308–11.
117. For the story of Mandarin Quiqua and Chowqua, see MCM 1: Chapter 10.

## Chapter 3

1. *Pan shi zupu* 潘氏族譜 (1994), 63.
2. *Pan shi zupu*, 33, 44, 54, 63–65.
3. *Pan shi zupu*, 66; and Pan Gang'er 潘剛兒, Huang Qichen 黃啟臣, and Ch'en Kuo-tung 陳國棟, *Guangzhou Shisan Hang zhi yi Pan Tongwen (Fu) Hang* 廣州十三行之一潘同文 (孚) 行 [One of the Thirteen Hongs in Canton: Tung-Wan / Tung-Fu Hong Puankhequa I–III] (Guangzhou: Huanan ligong daxue chubanshe, 2006), 3.
4. Kungliga Vetenskapsakademiens Bibliotek, Stockholm (Library of the Royal Academy of Sciences, KVB), 'Dagbok under resan från Giötheborg til Canton 1748–1749', map entitled 'Cantons Förstad'. This Swedish map is reproduced in Paul A. Van Dyke and Maria Karwing Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822: Reading History in Art* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015), Figure F27. On the west end, Denglong Xiang 燈籠巷 turned into Old Bean Street 舊荳街 somewhere around Xinglong Jie 興隆街 or Changle Jie 長樂街. Rev. D. Vrooman, *Map of the City and the Entire Suburbs of Canton*, 1860. London Missionary Society Collection MAP LMS 636; and a 1907 map by Mr. F. Schnock, entitled *Canton with Suburbs and Honam*. Denglong Xiang is now called Heping Dong Lu 和平東路. The Dafeng Hang 達豐行 was located on the south side of Heping Dong Lu about where the Dongchuan New Market is located (Dongchuan Xin Jie Shi 東川新街市). The present-day Xinglong Bei Lu 興隆北路 and Guyi Jie 故衣街 are in approximately the same location as they were in the eighteenth century.
5. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/54, 1750.09.11–15, pp. 8–11. The EIC Diaries and Consultations (D&C) for 1745, 1746, 1748 and 1749 are missing. The D&C that have survived for 1743, 1744 and 1747 are very brief and only a fraction of what they are for other years. These records are contained in BL: IOR R/10/3. The incompleteness of the documents that have survived means that Poankeequa could very well have been trading with the EIC earlier, but no clear references have survived.
6. BL: IOR G/12/54, 1750.10.29, p. 30.
7. BL: IOR G/12/53, 1750.11.27, p. 84 and G/12/54, 1750.11.27, p. 39.
8. Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1129, 1751.09.05, p. 95; Gothenburg Universitetsbibliotek (University Library, GUB): SOIC H22.4A Rådplägningsbok för skeppet Götha Leijon; National Archives, The Hague (NAH): Canton 15, Resolutions dated 1751.07.09, 1751.08.03, and 1751.08.13; Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 1:291; Liang Jiabin 梁嘉彬, *Guangdong Shisan Hang kao* 廣東十三行考 [Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton] (1937; reprint, Taipei: 1960; reprint, Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999), 103, 139–40n39.
9. Aix-en-Provence, Archives Nationales d'Outre-mer (ANOM): C.1.10, section for 1754, pp. 90r and 92r. These pages also refer to trade in 1753.
10. René Estienne, ed., *Les Compagnies des Indes* (Paris: Gallimard, 2013), 174.
11. Pan, et al, *Guangzhou Shisan Hang zhi yi Pan Tongwen (Fu) Hang*, 33; and Zhu Wanzhang 朱萬章, 'Pan shi jiazu yu Lingnan ketie' 潘氏家族與嶺南刻帖 [The Pan family and the

Lingnan inscription], in *Guangzhou Shisan Hang cangsang* 廣州十三行滄桑 [The Thirteen Hongs in Guangzhou], eds. Zhang Wenqin 章文欽, et al. (Guangzhou: Guangdong ditu chubanshe, 2001), 132.

12. Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) (hereafter referred to as MCM 1), Plate 03.07.
13. NAH: Canton 15, Resolutions dated 1751.07.09, 1751.08.03 and 1751.08.13.
14. RAC: Ask 1152, 1764.08.24, pp. 78–79.
15. RAC: Ask 1157, 1767.12.21, p. 129 and Ask 1160, 1767.12.23, pp. 89–90.
16. BL: IOR R/10/03, p. 367.
17. The stories of Beaukeequa, Swequa, Chetqua, Cai Hunqua and Swetia are included in MCM 1.
18. BL: IOR R/10/03, p. 367; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 5:41–42.
19. Pan shi zupu 潘氏族譜, 64.
20. 'den Koopman Bouquyqua als den Coopman Panquyqua op swacke voeten stonden en het by deeze Conjuuctuure zeer gevaarlijk zouden zijn, met dezelve te negotieeren'. NAH: Canton 24, Resolution dated 1758.08.15.
21. MCM 1: Appendix 8C, pp. 352–53.
22. Ch'en is confused about this period, including the effects of Beaukeequa's insolvency, the alliance that was formed between the three large firms, the formation of the Co-hong, its operation during the 1760s and closure in 1771, the relationship between various Hong merchant families, how consortiums operated, and even the administrative structures of trade. But this confusion is understandable. Ch'en based his research on the British and Chinese records, which are incomplete in these years. There are only a few Chinese records that have survived that discuss these matters, and they are very brief in content. The EIC records from this period have huge gaps in them. The Diaries and Consultations (D&C) are missing for 1756, and only a few pages survive for 1758. The later year is when Beaukeequa died and when the trade was in turmoil, most of which is not covered in the 18 pages that have survived. There are some Chinese records that discuss these matters, but they are more concerned with settling Beaukeequa's arrears, and do not mention all the other problems that were happening at the time such as ships having to layover owing to insufficient cargos, the role of advances, the credit market, etc. The D&C pick up again from 1759 to 1761, but the content is much less detailed than what we find in D&C from earlier and later decades. There is no mention in those records of who the officers were in the Co-hong, the contributions they were asked to give, the granting of 30 percent of the trade to inland tea men, or many other matters concerning the formation, operation and ending of that organization. There are only 16 pages of D&C for 1762, 9 pages for 1766, and 15 pages and a couple of short letters for 1769. Because of these gaps, many things concerning the Co-hong and its operation are not mentioned in the surviving EIC records. Many of the EIC records from 1770 to 1774 are also missing or incomplete. It is impossible to understand what is going on in the trade by simply using the British and Chinese sources as Ch'en and others have done. The Dutch, Danish and Swedish records are the most detailed documents we have for the years covering the establishment of the Co-hong to its end in 1771. There are important French records for these years as well. Moreover, some of the important EIC records have been missed by Ch'en and other scholars. One example is the Court of Directors' criticism of the supercargos in Canton for giving Poankeequa 100,000 taels. All of these matters are very poorly represented in Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990) and Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *Qingdai qianqi de yue haiguan yu shisan hang* 清代前期的粵海關與十三行 (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2014).

23. MCM 1: Chapter 3.
24. Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*. 1764. Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2009) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1764), 19 April, pp. 59–61, and 30 April–5 May, pp. 66–67.
25. MCM 1: Chapter 3.
26. The problems and connections between advances, inland supplies, layovers, growth, and officials' careers are discussed in MCM 1: Chapter 3.
27. BL: IOR G/12/195 doc. No. 8. This document is undated. But it is obviously referring to the situation shortly after Beaukeequa's death in 1758.
28. As I pointed out in Chapter 3 of volume 1 there are numerous references accrediting both Swequa and Poankeequa as being the creators of the Co-hong. MCM 1: Chapter 3, especially note 27.
29. NAH: VOC 4384, Trade Report for 1760, pp. 519–20. In MCM 1, page 57, I wrote that Swequa's son Monqua took over the family business. This is an error. It should Swequa's brother Tjobqua.
30. Sarasin Viraphol, *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652–1853* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 133; Liang Tingnan 梁廷楠, *Yue haiguan zhi* 粵海關志 [Gazetteer of Guangdong Maritime Customs] (1839; reprint, Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2001) (hereafter referred to as YHGZ) 25:497; and Li Guorong 李國榮 and Lin Weisen 林偉森, eds. *Qingdai Guangzhou Shisan Hang jilue* 清代廣州十三行紀略 [Chronicle of the Hong merchants in Canton during the Qing dynasty] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2006) (hereafter referred to as QDGZ), p. 54.
31. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1761.07.21, p. 9.
32. For coverage of the English occupation of the Philippines and some of the problems it created for the trade at Macao and Canton, see CMD 1764; Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1762 (Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2006) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1762); and Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*. 1763 (Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1763).
33. CMD 1764, 19 April, pp. 59–61.
34. CMD 1764, 28 April, p. 65. The Dutch supercargoes heard about the proceedings of this meeting from Chetqua. The text in CMD 1764 is in italics to indicate that this was a direct quotation of what Poankeequa said.
35. CMD 1764, 19 April–5 May, pp. 59–68. See also Christian Koninckx, *The First and Second Charters of the Swedish East India Company (1731–1766)* (Kortrijk, Belgium: Van Gemmert Publishing Co., 1980), 339.
36. RAC: Ask 1146, 1761.12.23, p. 91v.
37. On 1 January 1772, the 81st birthday party was held for the emperor's mother, so she would have been about 71 years old in late December 1761. NAH: Canton 81, 1772.01.01. The European ships anchored at Whampoa fired a 9-gun cannon salute on 30 December 1771 in honour of the emperor's mother's birthday. BL: IOR L/MAR/B/473D, 1771.12.30.
38. The 'Siams Pagoda' was probably the Xianluo Gongguan 暹羅貢館. It was located several blocks northwest of the factories on a street that was west of, and ran parallel to, Yangxiang Road 楊巷路. Vrooman, *Map of the City and the Entire Suburbs of Canton*, 1860.Today this location would be just a little east of the Xiguan Management Office 西關大廈管理處.
39. RAC: Ask 1146, 1761.12.23, p. 91v.
40. MCM 1: Chapter 3.
41. In 1761, for example, the EIC mentioned that 'Chetqua I believe an honest Man, and was he alone might be made a valuable Merchant'. What was meant by this is that Chetqua was a member of the triple alliance and he refused to do anything without consulting the other

members. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1761.07.21, p. 10. See also BL: IOR R/10/5, 1767.03.13–14, pp. 11–12. There are many other references to these three merchants refusing to do anything without the consent of the other two. There were exceptions, of course, when one member of the alliance agreed to terms that the other two refused. But in general, they usually consulted with each other before making contracts. MCM 1: Chapter 3.

42. MCM 1: Plate 03.07.
43. BL: IOR R/10/6, 1763.06.08, pp. 10–11.
44. CMD 1764, 23 March, p. 39.
45. CMD 1764, 11 April, p. 55.
46. MCM 1:60. There are many examples in the first volume, and in other chapters of this present volume of different ways merchants wooed and accommodated their customers—despite the Co-hong's control over trade.
47. Ch'en has incorrectly stated that Ingsia (Yngshaw) was the leader of the alliance in the 1760s. 'Yngshaw was, in fact, the leader of this group after 1763'. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 273. He cites this EIC reference dated 4 March 1772 as evidence. 'He is leader of one party here, as PuanKhequa is of the other, and it is their jealousy and hatred of each other, which has been our great security against paying unreasonable prices for our goods'. BL: IOR R/10/7, letter dated 1772.03.04, p. 107 and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 274. Yngshaw (Ingsia) is actually not mentioned in this reference, but we know from another entry that the 'he' was indeed referring to him. BL: IOR R/10/9, 1772.02.17, p. 31. Ch'en has taken this reference out of context, and applied it to the 1760s. Ingsia became the leader of the alliance only after Cai Hunqua died in 1770. Many references in the Dutch records, which Ch'en did not consult, clearly show Cai Hunqua leading the group during the 1760s. See also Christiaan J. A. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 69–71. For Cai Hunqua's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 7.
48. MCM 1: Chapter 7.
49. CMD 1763, 8 March, p. 26. For more about Wonsamye, see MCM 1: index.
50. CMD 1764, 7 April, pp. 51–53.
51. Tan Quiqua is also mentioned in a Swedish and Chinese document from 1768 as the manager of the Dafeng Hang. Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), Plate 12.
52. *Pan shi zupu*, 66; and CMD 1764, 13–16 June, p. 89 and 18 June , p. 92; BL: IOR R/10/06, section for 1764, pp. 25–30. 'Punkequa hav för 2ne dagar sedan förlorat sin åldsta son som war gifft med Sonpings doter.' Nordic Museum archive, Godegårdsarkivet. Ostindiska Handling F17: 1–7 (hereafter referred to as NM: F17), letter to Michael Grubb dated 18 June 1764, p. 30 (T1_00748).
53. NAH: Canton 74, 1765.07.04.
54. Henri Cordier, 'Les Marchands Hanistes de Canton', *T'oung Pao* 3 (1902): 306.
55. NAH: Canton 74, 1765.03.31. I found no reference in Grill's papers to the death of Poankeequa's brother in 1765.
56. BL: IOR R/10/6, letter dated 1765.12.05, p. 135; Morse, *Chronicles*, 5:125–26; Weng Eang Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 188n130; and NAH: Canton 78, 1769.06.04
57. RAC: Ask 1154, 1765.07.13, pp. 53r–v.
58. 'Verders verneemt men dat PoanKeequa den 28 passo na Eymuy vertrocken is, en 't ten minsten 2/md zal aanloopen voor dat hij zal kunnen geretourneerd weezen. De voornaame reeden, hij deeze rijs heeft ondernoomen is, dat zijn Broeder, die aldaar zijn zaeken derigeerd; overleeden is, door welkers sterf geval hij veel verliest en is genoodsaakt schikking desweegen te maken'. NAH: Canton 78, 1769.06.04.

59. 'Poankeyqua har gått til Amoy och wänter tilbaken medio Aug: Dess Bror i Amoy är död, som giordt honom stora tianster i Thè och annan handel'. NM: F17, letter from Jacob Hahr dated 1769.06.21, pp. T1_01968–71.
60. *Pan shi zupu*, 58 and 64.
61. MCM 1:98.
62. NM: F17, letter addressed to Poankeyqua from Grill dated 1771.12.04, pp. T1_05340–3.
63. BL: IOR E/1/49 Miscellaneous Letters Received 1767, letter from Pan quey qua dated 1767.02.10. It was read before the Court on 20 January (1768?). BL: IOR B/82 Court Minutes.
64. The original Spanish letter is in BL: IOR E/1/49 Miscellaneous Letters Received 1767.
65. BL: IOR B/82 Court Minutes.
66. BL: IOR R/10/6, 1768.12.14, p. 38.
67. NAH: Canton 78, 1769.06.04, Canton 79, 1770.01.03 and 1770.01.28.
68. Ch'en, *Insolvency,* 222; and BL: IOR R/10/7, 1770.11.20, p. 31.
69. BL: IOR G/12/20, 'References to the Diaries from 1755', 1771.02.09, p. 33 and 1771.08.09, pp. 33–34.
70. BL: IOR G/12/20, 'References to the Diaries from 1755', 1771.02.09, p. 33 and 1771.08.09, pp. 33–34.
71. 'Sur ces entrefaites Pen-Tchi-Tchin, (c'est-à-dire, Pan Ke Koa, en Patois) et ses associés me proposèrent d'établir une compagnie exclusives à tous autres marchands'. ANOM: C.1.11, 1771.02.12, p. 99r; RAC: Ask 206a; and NAH: VOC 4407, 'Avis Pour la destruction du Cong Hang', 35th year, 12th month, 28th day of Emperor Kien Long (1771.02.12).
72. 'de là mille inconvéniens facheux, qui s'en sont suivis, en sorte que cette compagnie n'en a que le nom, sans pouvoir faire ce qui lui a été imposé'. ANOM: C.1.11, 1771.02.12, p. 99v; RAC: Ask 206a; and NAH: VOC 4407, 'Avis Pour la destruction du Cong Hang'. Thanks to Susan Schopp for helping me decipher this text.
73. ANOM: C.1.11, 1771.02.12, pp. 99r–v; RAC: Ask 206a; and NAH: VOC 4407, 'Avis Pour la destruction du Cong Hang'.
74. MCM 1: Chapter 3.
75. For further discussion, see MCM 1: Chapter 3.
76. Ch'en states that 'the dissolution of the second kung-hang in 1771 was chiefly a work of Puan Khequa, who was on account of that well trusted by the English supercargoes'. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 274. This point of view comes from Ch'en depending so heavily on the EIC records, which do not tell the whole story. See also Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 221–22; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 164–65. Grant has also repeated these ideas about the bribe to Poankeequa in Frederic D. Grant Jr., *The Chinese Cornerstone of Modern Banking: The Canton Guaranty System and the Origins of Bank Deposit Insurance 1780–1933* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 89–90.
77. For further discussion, see MCM 1: Chapter 3.
78. MCM 1: Chapter 3. For the number of Hong merchants licensed every year from 1760 to 1842, see Ch'en, *Insolvency*, Table 1.1.
79. BL: IOR G/12/57, 1753.07.17, pp. 4–5.
80. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.04.26, p. 43.
81. BL: IOR G/12/54, 1750.10.14, p. 28.
82. BL: IOR R/10/04, document dated 1757.09.14 which is included in another document dated 1757.10.23, p. 40.
83. CMD 1763, 21 January, p. 12; and Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Manila, Macao and Canton: The Ties that Bind', *Review of Culture*, International Edition no. 18 (April 2006): 125–34.
84. The British occupation of Manila displaced many Chinese who had encouraged the English and were afraid of Spanish reprisals for their disloyalty. When the English returned the islands to Spanish rule, they agreed to move 1,500 Chinese to the island of Yolo and 6,000

Chinese to Bencolen in Sumatra. As far as we know, however, Poankeequa's relatives in Manila were not among them. Gregorio Chan being a Catholic was sure to have been a benefit in maintaining good relations with Spanish merchants. For Dutch reports of the progress of the English attack and occupation of Manila and withdrawal in 1764, see entries in CMD 1762–1764, especially entry dated 1764.09.12.

85. CMD 1764, Sep 21, p. 207.
86. NAH: Canton 74, 1765.04.04 and 1765.04.11.
87. NAH: Canton 77, 1768.01.22.
88. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1768.12.14, p. 97.
89. NAH: Canton 75, (1766) 2 June, 30 October and 8 November, Canton 78, (1769) 20 January, 22 May, 4 October, Canton 77, 1768.01.23; BL: IOR R/10/9, 1772.04.26–28, p. 17; and Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson. *The Philippine Islands 1493–1898*, 55 vols. (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1903–1909), 49:144–45.
90. For a couple examples of Clemente and Solano going to Macao with these vessels, see NM: F17, letters to Juan Solano and Jorge de San Clemente dated 1763–64, pp. T1_00727–40. Clemente died in 1773. NM: F17, letter to Jean Abr. Grill from Jacob Hahr dated 1773.12.12, pp. T1_02062–64.
91. NM: F17, letter to Juan Abrah. Grill from Manuel Galban y Ventura dated 1764.08.11, pp. T1_01594–97.
92. 'Van Macao bekent men tijding dat aldaar een Schip van de Manilha gevoerd door Capt. Pacheco, g'arriveerd is, met 70 man Chineesen, by zig hebbende 70 kisten met geld bedragende Sps. 110,000:–geborgen is uijt een Jonk op die kust gebleeven, van daar na Aymuy gedestineerd'. NAH: Canton 77, 1768.01.23.
93. NAH: Canton 78, 1769.10.19 and 22 and Canton 79, 1770.04.08.
94. NAH: Canton 79, 1770.11.30 and Canton 80, 1771.04.15.
95. NAH: Canton 82, 1773.04.25.
96. Pan shi zupu, 66–67.
97. BL: IOR R/10/07, p. 49.
98. BL: IOR R/10/07, p. 63.
99. NAH: Canton 85, 1776.08.08.
100. BL: IOR R/10/8, doc. No. 63, letter to Court of Directors, dated 1779.01.21, p. 116.
101. Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822*, 36.
102. NAH: Canton 89, 1780.04.28.
103. BL: IOR G/12/73, letter dated 1782.12.20, p. 92.
104. NAH: VOC 4425, *dagregister*, 1783.08.14, p. 20.
105. NAH: Canton 92, 1786.02.17, p. 7.
106. NAH: Canton 48, Resolution No. 7, dated 1786.10.28.
107. NAH: Canton 48, Resolution No. 9, dated 1786.12.23.
108. The Spanish ship *Santa Florintina* anchored at Whampoa in 1783. BL: IOR G/12/78, p. 139. In 1785, the Royal Philippine Company was granted exclusive rights to the China trade. William Schurz, 'The Royal Philippine Company', *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 3:4 (Nov 1920): 491–508. Some of those ships went to Whampoa rather than Macao. NAH: Canton 159, doc. no. 61, 'Lijst van den Aanbreng tot Canton', pp. 219–23 and Canton 248, 'Lijst der Scheepen in Anno 1786', pp. 145–49.
109. NAH: VOC 4429 'Lijst der Scheepen'; BL: IOR G/12/83 pp. 31–32.
110. NAH: VOC 4433, Hoge Regering van Batavia (HRB) 76 & 77 Ship List for 1786, Canton 248 pp. 145–49; BL: IOR G/12/85 pp. 41–44.
111. BL: IOR G/12/87 pp. 26–29.
112. NAH: Canton 250, pp. 125–28 and Canton 252, ship list for 1791; Brown University, John Carter Brown Library (JCB): Brown B.737 F.1 List of Ships; BL: IOR G/12/99, pp. 81–83

and G/12/95, pp. 37–39; and Paul G. Fidlon and F.J. Ryan, eds., *The Journal of Arthur Bowes Smyth: Surgeon, Lady Penrhyn 1787–1789* (Sydney: Australian Documents Library, 1979), 80–82.

113. Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822*, 58.
114. NAH: Canton 256, HRB 93 & 94 Ship List for 1794; and BL: IOR G/12/109, pp. 47–49, L/MAR/B/267G(A), 400M, 138E, 150L, 182B, 215H, 330B, 331C, 341B, 366K, and MS.21106 *Lion* 1793,
115. NAH: Canton 258 Ship List for 1795, HRB 102, 103 & OIC 196 Ship List for 1795/6; BL: IOR G/12/115, pp. 6–7, L/MAR/B/141M and 513A.
116. NAH: Canton 260 pp. 61–63, OIC 196, 197, HRB 102, 103 & 104 Ship List for 1796; and BL: IOR G/12/117, pp. 14–15. By the 1780s, many Spanish ships were making multiple voyages to Macao each year. The numbers I provide here include some ships that arrived at Macao two or three times in the same year.
117. BL: IOR G/12/139, 1802.10.11, pp. 212–13.
118. Historical Society of Pennsylvania (HSP): Waln Papers Vol. 5, p. 20.
119. Pan, et al,*Guangzhou Shisan Hang zhi yi Pan Tongwen (Fu) Hang*; and Zhu, 'Pan shi jiazu yu Lingnan ketie'.
120. Very few of the Spanish ships that visited Macao in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century show up in the Macao records or studies of the trade. See for example Zhang Tingmao 張廷茂, *Ming Qing shiqi Aomen haishang maoyi shi* 明清時期澳門海上貿易史 [History of Macao's maritime trade during the Ming-Qing period) (Macao : Aoya zhoukan chuban youxian gongsi, 2004); Benjamim Videira S. J. Pires, *A Vida Marítima de Macau no Século XVIII* (Macao: Cultural Institute, 1993); A. M. Martins do Vale, *Os Portugueses em Macau (1750–1800)* (Lisbon: Institvto Portvgvês do Oriente, 1997); and Ângela Guimarães, *Uma Relação Especial Macau e as Relações Luso-Chinesas 1780–1844* (Lisbon: EdiçãoCies, 1996).
121. 'que a Cap. Tan Matay es primo de Snor Panqueyqua' (Captain Tan Matay, a cousin of Mr. Poankeequa). NM: F17, letter to Jorge San Clemente in Manila dated 1765.04.10, p. T1_00789. See also Plate 03.22 and NM: F17, letter addressed to Poankeyqua dated 1772, pp. T1_05344–5.
122. 'Gregorie Chan, een oud bekend Chineese Christen van goed caractijer' (Gregorie Chan, an old Chinese Christian acquaintance of good character). Universiteit Bibliotek, Ghent (GHL): Ms 1985, VOC *dagregister*, 1790.12.28, p. 10.
123. 'Ontfingen weder eenige monsters Souchong en Congo van Cheong Leoqua (boven gem. Broeders zoon van Pankequa)' (Received again some samples of Souchong and Congo [tea] from Cheong Leoqua the above mentioned son of Pankequa's brother). 'Gregorie . . . zijn confrater Cheong Leoqua Neef van Pankhequa' (Gregorie . . . his partner Cheong Leoqua, nephew of Poankeequa). GHL: Ms 1985, VOC *dagregister*, 1790.12.31, p. 11 and 1791.01.17, p. 25. These references to Pankequa seem to refer to Poankeequa I, but it is unclear. Poankeequa died in 1788 so they could also be referring to his son and successor Pan Youdu.
124. BL: IOR G/12/79, 1785.02.22, p. 5.
125. NAH: Canton 92, 1786.03.06, pp. 9–10.
126. NAH: Canton 47, Resolution No. 2 dated 1785.03.23.
127. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'New Sea Routes to Canton in the 18th Century and the Decline of China's Control over Trade', in *Studies of Maritime History* 海洋史研究, ed. Li Qingxin 李慶新, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2010), 57–108.
128. See entries in NM: F17 and CMD 1762–64 for Poankeequa's Swedish trade.
129. Koninckx, *The First and Second Charters of the Swedish East India Company*, see Cadiz in the index.
130. NAH: Canton 75, 1766.12.08.

131. NAH: Canton 28, Resolution No. 2, dated 1765.07.18, and Canton 74, 1765.03.07–13 and numerous other entries.
132. CMD 1763, Sep 22, p. 126.
133. Earl H. Pritchard, *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations 1750–1800* (1936; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1970), Appendixes 1–9.
134. There are long discussions in Grill's letter book about these voyages to the Philippines. NM: F17 Utgåendebrev, Brevkopiebok 1764–1765, pp. T1_00727–40.
135. NM: F17, Letter to S. D. Jean Grill from Gregorio Chan dated 1766.06.09, p. T1_01364. See also Van Dyke, 'Manila, Macao and Canton: The Ties that Bind', 125–34.
136. NAH: OIC 195, *dagregister*, 1795.01.04, pp. 126–27.
137. NAH: OIC 195, *dagregister*, 1794.12.22, pp. 116–17.
138. See also Grill letter book NM: F17 Utgåendebrev, Brevkopiebok 1764–1765, pp. T1_00788–91.
139. Seequa died on 26 April 1784 so he was a Hong merchant for only two years. BL: IOR G/12/76, 1782.09.03, p. 77 and G/12/79, 1784.05.01, p. 36. A few examples of Spanish ships at Whampoa are the *Santa Florintina* in 1783, and the *Florintina* and *S. Philippe* in 1786. In 1785, the Royal Philippine Company was granted exclusive rights to the China trade, and many of those ships went to Whampoa. NAH: Canton 159, doc. No. 61, 'Lijst van den Aanbreng tot Canton', pp. 219–23 and Canton 248, 'Lijst der Scheepen in Anno 1786', pp. 145–49; and BL: IOR G/12/78, p. 139.
140. MCM 1:44–48 and Chapter 4; and Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 145–50.
141. The Dutch called him 'Den Armenier Anthony Baptist Stamme'. NAH: 4386, *dagregister*, 1760.09.11, p. 66. He may have been the same person as the 'Armeniaan Jan Baptist Stamme'. NAH: 4384, Report dated 1761.01.11, p. 539v.
142. NAH: Canton 278, report dated 1763.12.24, p. 8, doc. dated 1764.01.15 and Canton 279, doc. No. 30, dated 1766.03.01.
143. CMD 1763, 3 September, p. 113; CMD 1764, 10 January, p. 7; and MCM 1: Chapter 4.
144. This painting can be dated fairly accurately to autumn 1771. Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822*, see Figure F2 and Plate P4.
145. 'Samkonghing förlorades förledit År, Chan Queyqua är utfattig'. NM: F17, p. T1_02040 (p. 2r of the letter), letter to J. A. Grill in Gothenburg from Jacob Hahr in Canton dated 1772.11.30.
146. RAC: Ask 1158, 1767.11.01, Ask 1159, 1767.11.01; and NAH: Canton 76, 1767.11.01.
147. See also MCM 1: Chapters 4 and 9.
148. NAH: Canton 277, doc. No. 30, pp. 151–54. This document is reproduced in MCM 1: Plate 04.01.
149. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5:153; and NAH: Canton 80, entry dated 1771.02.13.
150. 'Conghanget är uphäfwit, dock lär blifwa författningar, hwarwid Poankeyqua ey kommer att förlora. Hans fordran är betalt med reverser på 1 à 3 År att betalas af de andra Conghangister.' NM: F17, letter from Jacob Hahr to Jean Abraham Grill, dated 1771.02.25, pp. T1_02022–23.
151. 'Detta behagar Bror behålla hos Sielf, på dett Direction ey må taga denna berättelse illa.' NM: F17, letter from Jacob Hahr to Jean Abraham Grill, dated 1771.02.25, pp. T1_02022–23. Thanks to Lisa Hellman for helping me understand this text.
152. 'Poankequa geeft te kennen de negotie te quiteeren en zijn huijs aan zijn zoon over te laaten, het welk in 't weezentlijke geen verandering zal veroorsaaken, alsoo hij altoos de directie zal hebben, en het oog op de zaak zal blijven behouden, willende alleen de Negotie abandonneeren om volgens zijn voorgeeven van de Mandarijns ontslaagen te weezen, dat altoos een groote Lastpost voor hem geweest, naedemaal hij voor het geringste dat er voorviel altoos ten antwoord moest staan, en aan de Mandarijns oplossinge van zaaken geeven' NAH:

VOC 4407, *dagregister*, 1771.03.09, p. 42. 'Ontfangen een Brief, van PoanKequa waar in hij kennis geeft, de affaires van zijn huijs aan zijn zoon heeft overgedaan, en afstand van de Negotie gedaan te hebben' NAH: VOC 4407, *dagregister*, 1771.04.15, p. 47; 'De Neef van Poankequa Kengsiangqua de zaaken derigeert komt in de Factory' NAH: VOC 4407, *dagregister*, 1771.08.16, p. 61. 'Met Poankequa zijn succeseur Tan Tjouqua & Monqua appart ten opzigte de prijs van het eene en andere gesprookende hebbende, willen zij omtrent de prijs niet declareeren, zig vergenoegende met de portie die men hun zal geeven, zodanig de prijsen gestelt werden te accepteeren' NAH: VOC 4407, *dagregister*, 1771.08.29, p.80. 'Poankequa dan wel zijn successeur, geeft te kennen om verdre moeijelijkheijd met onse cooplieden te voor komen' NAH: VOC 4407, *dagregister*, 1771.09.03, p. 88. There are copies of all these entries in the *dagregister* in NAH: Canton 80. See also NAH: Canton 34, Resolution No. 6, August 1771.

153. 'Poankequa is eijndelijk van Zijn reijs te rug gekomen'. NAH: Canton 80, 1771.09.28.
154. Ch'en identified this Howqua as Lin Shimao 林時懋. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 279–80.
155. For a couple examples, see NAH: Canton 80, 1771.08.09 and 1771.09.03.
156. NAH: Canton 80, entries dated 1771.03.09, 1771.04.15, 1771.08.29, and 1771.09.03. See also Canton 34, Resolution No. 6, August 1771, under point number 3 it says 'Nae verloop van eenige dagen quam Kingsiangqua die de zaaken in het huijs van Poankequa derigeert'. Kingsiangqua is spelled Kengsiangqua in other records. This Romanization and pronunciation would be similar to Conseequa, who was Poankeequa's nephew and later became a Hong merchant. Conseequa, however, would have been too young in 1771 to be taking care of business.
157. William Hunter, *Bits of Old China* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co., 1885), 63. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the term 'pagoda' was used for both temples and pagodas. Hunter explained that the foundation of the Temple of Longevity was originally a Cochin Chinese temple, which is why they called it by that name. Thanks to Tana Li for pointing this reference out to me.
158. NAH: Canton 81, 1772.01.01.
159. NAH: Canton 82, 1773.03.04, 24 March, and 29 July.
160. NAH: Canton 81, 1772.09.17, 19 September and 21 November.
161. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5:182–85.
162. NAH: Canton 82, 1773.08.28, 21–22 October, and 9 November.
163. For Cai Hunqua's story and the alliance he had with the other two firms, see MCM 1: Chapters 3, 5, 7 and 9.
164. NAH: Canton 84, 1775.02.16.
165. BL: IOR R/10/9, 1774.10.19, p. 60 and 1774.11.09, p. 68. It is unclear from these references whether he accepted this debt voluntarily or whether the governor general asked him to pay it.
166. BL: IOR G/12/58, 1775.07.04, p. 26 and 1775.07.28, p. 38.
167. BL: IOR G/12/59, 1776.08.08, p. 50.
168. 'zullende men afwagten wat de terug komst der Tsjontocq van Peking aangaande een weeder oprechting der Konhang zal uijt werken'. NAH: Canton 38, Resolution No. 3, 1775.02.24.
169. RAC: Ask 1176, 1776.08.01, pp. 47–50, and Ask 234, letter dated 1776.01.29.
170. BL: IOR G/12/59, 1776.08.08, p. 50.
171. BL: IOR G/12/59, 1776.08.14, p. 51.
172. BL: IOR G/12/59, 1776.08.20, pp. 54–58.
173. NAH: Canton 85, 1776.09.11.
174. BL: IOR G/12/59, 1776.08.08, p. 50.
175. NAH: Canton 85, 1776.10.01.
176. BL: IOR G/12/59, 1776.10.24, p. 143.

177. 'Van het sjap of request welke de Engelsen hebben ingeleeverd, verneemd men niets anders, als dat den Hoppo de kooplieden heeft by elkander laten koomen, en hen daar over onderhouden heeft; zij lieden hebben daar en tegen een request ingeleeverd, als dat die Kohang of Societijt buiten de Europeaanen was; haar lieden alleen betrof, en dat zijl. [zijlieden] de kleijne kooplieden of winkeliers daar buiten hielden, wijl die op geen Sware onkosten zittende, en geen presenten aan de Mandarynen behoeven de te betaalen, hunne Waaren dierhalven voor minder konden verkoopen, dus die hunl: [hunlieden] drukkten, wijl zijl: [zijlieden] met de goederen bleeven zitten' NAH: VOC 4414, *dagregister*, 1776.10.25, p. 69.
178. BL: IOR G/12/59, 1776.11.02, pp. 156–57.
179. For further discussion about these factors, see MCM 1: Chapter 3.
180. 'The Fouyuen, on his being appointed to superintend the European trade, sent to Puan Khequa and insisted on his carrying on business in his own name, and not / as for some time / in that of his nephew, also ordered him to attend in the city in the same manner as the other merchants whenever called upon by the mandarins'. BL: IOR G/12/62, 1777.06.03, pp. 11–12.
181. BL: IOR G/12/60, letter No. 52, dated 1777.11.13.
182. NAH: Canton 87, 1778.12.02.
183. BL: IOR R/10/8, doc. No. 17, letter to the Fouyuen and Hoppo, dated 1778.10.02, p. 38.
184. BL: IOR R/10/8, doc. No. 25, p. 46.
185. If historians were hired as detectives to investigate crimes few criminals would be brought to justice because so many of them simply believe whatever is written down.
186. 'Poankeequa / welke na zijn oland is, om een van zijn Vrouwen welke voor 15 Jaaren overleeden is ter aarde te bestellen / wederom te rug komt'. NAH: Canton 88, 1779.07.30.
187. For the story of these other three houses, see MCM 1: Chapters 5, 7 and 9.
188. Jessica Hanser and Fred Grant have recently done new research on the Hong merchant debt crisis in the late 1770s. Frederic D. Grant, Jr., *The Chinese Cornerstone of Modern Banking: The Canton Guaranty System and the Origins of Bank Deposit Insurance 1780–1933* (Leiden: Brill, 2014); and Jessica Hanser, 'Mr. Smith Goes to China: British Private Traders and the Interlinking of the British Empire with China, 1757–1792' (PhD diss., Department of History, Yale University, May 2012). These and other new studies being done on the trade are making Ch'en's work of the insolvency of the merchants much out-of-date. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 1990.
189. BL: IOR G/12/65, 1780.01.15, p. 193.
190. BL: IOR G/12/68, 1780.04.01, pp. 118–19.
191. For Conqua's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 6.
192. BL: IOR G/12/202, 1816.03.11, pp. 23–25, G/12/206, 1817.03.06, p. 19; John D. Wong, 'Global Positioning: Houqua and His China Trade Partners in the Nineteenth Century' (PhD diss., History Department, Harvard University, 2012), 104, 107–9; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 169–70.
193. BL: IOR G/12/68, 1780.09.08, p. 183. Youxun died on 5 August. *Pan shi zupu*, 67.
194. BL: IOR G/12/73, 1781.12.20, p. 71.
195. BL: IOR G/12/76, 1782.06.24, p. 33.
196. The Danes spelled his name Hauqua. 'Monqua, so maar paa meget svage födder, er indgaaet i Compagnie med Hauqua, forhen fuldmægtig hos Ponkeiqua'. RAC: Ask 1191, 1783.08.04, p. 41v; Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:82; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 280–81.
197. BL: IOR G/12/79, 1784.10.02, p. 63; Louis Dermigny, ed., *Les Mémoires de Charles de Constant sur le Commerce à la Chine*, par Charles de Constant (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 316–17; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 280–81.
198. BL: IOR G/12/76, 1782.08.01–31, pp. 64–76.
199. BL: IOR G/12/77, 1783.10.31, p. 142.

200. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 330–31.
201. BL: IOR G/12/82, 1786.11.14, p. 136.
202. BL: IOR G/12/82, 1786.09.30, p. 66.
203. There are many references to Spanish rice ships arriving in the late 1780s and 1790s. For a couple examples, see BL: IOR G/12/86, 1787.05.06, pp. 8–9, 1787.08.26, p. 42.
204. BL: IOR G/12/86, 1787.09.19, p. 101 and 1787.10.06, p. 158.
205. BL: IOR G/12/88, 1788.01.10, p. 80.
206. *Weng* 翁 is a reference to seniority or reverence.

## Chapter 4

1. *Qing gong Yue Gang Ao shangmao dang'an quanji* 清宮港澳商貿檔案全集, ed. Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'an guan 中國第一歷史檔案館 and Zhongguo guji zhengli yanjiuhui 中國古籍整理研究會, 10 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo shudian, 2002) (hereafter referred to as QGY), doc. No. 280, dated 1757.02.08, pp. 1428–29, and doc No. 327, dated 1759.10.09, p. 1862.
2. 'Jong Hoequa'. National Archive, The Hague (NAH): VOC 8721, 1749.10.07, p. 186.
3. NAH: Canton 15, doc. dated 1751.09.05.
4. NAH: Canton 17, doc. dated 1753.07.27 and Canton 19, Resolutions dated 28–29 June and 8 July 1754; and Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) (hereafter referred to as MCM 1), 53 and 91.
5. Landsarkivet, Gothenburg (GL): Öijaredssäterisarkiv A 406. Seriesignum F III (hereafter referred to as GL: A406).
6. NAH: VOC 4380, 'Originaeele Missive weegens den Handel te Canton in China van Anno 1755', pp. 32–36, Canton 20, doc. dated 1755.07.02 and 1755.07.04, and Canton 22, trade report for 1755 which was copied into the doc. dated 1756.06.30. For the events leading up to the establishment of the Co-hong, see MCM 1: Chapter 3 'Growing Pains, Partnerships, and the Co-hong'.
7. NAH: Canton 20, Resolution dated 1755.06.24, report for 1754. For Attay's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 13.
8. 'Jong Hoeyqua [alias Tan Anqua] by de Europeese soo wel als by de Chineese natien voor een seer braafeerlijk coopman bekend zijnde'. NAH: VOC 4380, document dated 1765.07.30, fol. 57.
9. NAH: Canton 22, doc. dated 1756.09.07.
10. NAH: Canton 15, doc. dated 1751.07.13
11. MCM 1: Chapter 1, 'The Trading Environment'.
12. NAH: Canton 22, doc. dated 1756.10.04.
13. NAH: Canton 22, doc. dated 1756.09.07 and 1756.10.04, entitled 'Alle Present Dempto . . .', and doc. dated 1756.11.08, Canton 24, doc. dated 1758.08.15–16 and 1758.08.28; and Aix-en-Provence, Archives Nationales d'Outre-mer (ANOM): C.1.10, section for 1757, p. 120v.
14. Nordic Museum archive, Godegårdsarkivet. Ostindiska Handling F17: 1–7 (hereafter referred to as NM: F17), pp. T1_03926–31.
15. A copy of the contract in Plate 04.03 is reproduced in MCM 1: Plate 08.09 and p. 239.
16. NAH: Canton 24, see all documents in this file concerning trade, especially the ones dated 1758.09.11 and 1759.01.25; and MCM 1: Chapter 8, Plate 08.09 and pp. 239 and 468n34. Grant states that 'The 1758 determination by the Nanhai and Panyu magistrates that only the Taihe hong merchant Sweetia would be liable for the deceased's debts, and for only half of that sum'. Frederic D. Grant Jr. *The Chinese Cornerstone of Modern Banking: The Canton Guaranty System and the Origins of Bank Deposit Insurance 1780–1933* (Leiden: Brill, 2014),

88n147. Grant does not explain what he means by 'only half of that sum', or what debts he is talking about (English? Dutch?), or where this information came from. In an email dated 1 April 2015 I asked Grant about this entry. He cites Cheong, p. 149, as the source. Weng Eang Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 149. Cheong's statements concerning Sweetia taking over Beaukeequa's debt are also vague and without supportive references. I have therefore disregarded these statements.

17. British Library (BL): India Officer Records (IOR) G/12/70, 1780.02.21, p. 26; and Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 374n27. On 2 August 1760, the Dutch also recorded that Tan Anqua had refused to join the Co-hong and returned to his home. NAH: VOC 4386, 1760.08.02, p. 22. The French merchant Michel mentioned that Tan Anqua had voluntarily retired from the commerce ('Ankoa s'est retiré volontairement du commerce'). Lorient, Service Historique de la Défense (SHD): 1P 299 'Correspondance diverse et documents relatifs à la ville de Lorient', Liasse 31: 'Lettres de fonctionnaires de la Compagnie en Chine et dans l'Inde, 1754–1762', letter No. 412 signed by Michel, dated 1760.12.31. See also MCM 1:56.
18. BL: IOR G/12/70, 1780.02.21, p. 26.
19. 'eller också skicka något upp att köpa Thèer uppe i landet; såsom af Anquas folck eller någon annan; de äro så stridiga acti Conghong att det säges att Sontocq, låtit dem weta att han årnar skrika en Chapp till Keysaren, att utur Keysarens Räntekammare få tage uth pg., och att för Keysarens Räk. sälja Theerne till Europeerne; om så händer blifwer dår en artig handel af; enfin sakerne äro i desse dagar så willrådrige, att ey allenast jag men de flåste Europeer äro helt willrådige' (Anqua's people were in conflict with the Co-hong for several years but the Viceroy let them know in the strongest language that he had permission from the emperor to sell tea to the Europeans on the emperor's Board of Revenue, but the Europeans are hesitant). NM: F17, p. T1_00723. This extract is from Jean Abraham Grill's letter copybook in the Nordic Museum Archive. The letter is addressed to Michael Grubb and dated 19 March 1764. Thanks to Lisa Hellman for helping me decipher this text.
20. NM: F17, letter to Michael Grubb dated 1764.02.25, pp. T1_00718–20 and letter to Michael Grubb dated 1764.03.19, pp. T1_00722–26.
21. Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), 20.
22. Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1762 (Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2006) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1762), 21August, p. 176
23. NM: F17, pp. T1_05077 and T1_05102.
24. NM: F17, pp.T1_00704, T1_00745, T1_00755, T1_05087–91, T1_05099–5100, T1_05135, T1_06500, T1_06510, T1_06517, T1_06675, T1_06685, T1_06697, T1_06706–8, T1_07258, T1_07264 and T1_07364.
25. For Awue's story, see MCM 1:57 and 153–55; and Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1763 (Macau: Macau Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1763), 129–31.
26. For Tacqua Amoy's story, see MCM 1:186–87 and Appendix 11J. For an example of him selling Padri Zioun Zioun tea directly to the Danes in the 1760s, see Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1154, 1765.12.27, p. 135r.
27. One of Tan Tinqua's (Chen Zhenguan 陳鎮官) contracts from 1744/5 written in English and Chinese is reproduced in Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Plate 18. He made that contract when he was a Hong merchant with his partner Tzy Yamqua (Cai Yanguan 蔡炎官), which was for the sale of silk and gold to the SOIC.

28. NAH: VOC 4384, trade report for 1760, pp. 524r–v. The English also suspected that Poankeequa and Swequa, as well as Swetia, were behind Tan Tinqua being banned from the Co-hong. 'It is greatly to be apprehended that Ton Tinqua's disgrace has proceeded from a false representation of some of the merchants (Sweequa, Khiqua, Swetia) who were seen by the Tsongton the evening before'. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1760.08.10, p. 46.
29. Archives Nationales d'Outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence (ANOM): C.1.12, pp. 100–117v and 133v; Susan E. Schopp, 'The French as Architectural Trendsetters in Canton, 1767–1820', *Review of Culture*, International Edition, No. 45 (2014), 79–87; and Paul A. Van Dyke and Maria Kar-wing Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822: Reading History in Art* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015), 16.
30. 'We have since heard Ton Tinqua is detained in the Nam-hoy-hiens court, where he is to remain until he has paid Tales 2400 due to the emperor for duties, that his Hong chop is then to be taken from him, and he with his family are to transport themselves to his country, the province of Fokien'. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1760.08.10, p. 46.
31. MCM 1:56–58, 155; BL: IOR R/10/4, 1760.05.04, p. 26, 1760.09.19, p. 82, 1760.09.24–25, p. 83; NAH: VOC 4384, trade report for 1760, p. 523r and VOC 4386, *dagregister*, 1760.08.12, pp. 32–33; Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 5:91; and Weng Eang Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 83.
32. MCM 1:56–58, 447n34; CMD 1763, Uhn-Sam-Ja (the Dutch spelling for Wonsamye) appears on many pages, see index for references. Specifics about the negotiations and contract with Uhn-Sam-Ja can be found in NAH: Canton 26, doc. No. 2, dated 1763.02.11, doc. No. 4, dated 1763.03.10, doc. No. 5, dated 1763.03.15, doc. No. 49, dated 1763.11.30 and the 1763 trade report in Canton 278, dated 1763.12.24, pp. 14–15.
33. NAH: Canton 79, 1770.02.28.
34. MCM 1:57 and 448n41. On 11 December 1770, the English mentioned that they had bought a chop of tea from 'the late Tinqua', which was done in order to settle his account. He must have died sometime shortly before then. We know this is not Chetqua's brother Tinqua (Chen Dengguan 陳瞪觀), because that man died in 1775. MCM 1:99. The only other Tan Tinqua operating in Canton at this time was Chen Zhenguan 陳鎮官. BL: IOR R/10/7, 1770.12.11, p. 51. Ch'en has confused Chen Dengguan with Chen Zhenguan stating that the later 'sold teas to the Company in 1772 as an outside trader'. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 374n27.
35. On 14 January 1771, the Dutch also mentioned that Tan Tinqua was deceased ('wijlen'). 'Laaten de Congo Thee van Lamsia gekogt in de factory komen, koopen van Jemqua zoon van wijlen Tan Tinqua 80/4 kassen Thee Congo tot Th. 18'. NAH: Canton 80, 1771.01.14.
36. For some brief references to Ajou, Wayqua and other non-Hong merchants selling tea in the 1760s, see MCM 1.
37. NM: F17, pp. T1_00718–20, T1_00786, T1_01772, T1_06299, T1_06707, T1_07311–12.
38. NAH: Canton 28, Resolution No. 16, dated 1765.12.06 and Canton 74, 1765.12.02.
39. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1768.10.28, p. 67.
40. NM: F17, pp.T1_00873–74 and T1_06299.
41. NAH: Canton 74, entry dated 1765.07.14.
42. NM: F17, pp. T1_00811–12, letter from Simão Vicente Roza dated 1766.08.11.
43. I have checked many of the Portuguese records in Macao and found no recognizable references to a man named Tan Anqua. As Carl Smith has shown, Chinese merchants with names such as Aqua, Achoa, Engua, etc. appear in the Portuguese records in the 1760s. Without the Chinese characters, however, there is no way to know if those names have any connection to Tan Anqua. There is a merchant mentioned in the Portuguese records

in the 1760s by the name of Oqua, which is close to the pronunciation Anqua. But his Chinese name was Cai Fuguan 蔡福官. Carl T. Smith, '18th Century Chinese Merchants', unpublished paper. There is also no mention of him in the *Chronicles of Macau*. Wu Zhiliang 吳志良, Tang Kaijian 湯開建, Jin Guoping 金國平, eds. *Aomen bian nian shi* 澳門編年史 [Chronicles of Macau], 6 vols. (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2009.12).

44. NM: F17, p. T1_00874.
45. NM: F17, pp. T1_00191–92.
46. Gothenburg Universitetsbibliotek (GUB): H 22.1 Ström, Nr 1152 Promemoria med råd om teinköp, pp. 4–5. This document is undated, but discusses the prices in 1766 and future trade in 1768 so it would have to be 1767 or early 1768.
47. NM: F17, pp. T1_00152, T1_00183 and T1_00191–92. Lim Hauqua was possibly Lin Shimao 林時懋. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 279–80. In 1768–69, the English purchased 100 chests of Hyson tea from an outside merchant by the name of 'Howqua'. BL: IOR R/10/5, p. 114. They made another purchase of him in 1771–72. BL: IOR R/10/9, p. 5. This man is probably the same as Lim Hauqua in the Swedish records. NM: F17, p. T1_00183.
48. MCM 1: Plate 03.09 and p. 232.
49. NM: F17, pp. T1_00191–92.
50. GUB: Svenska ostindiska kompaniets arkiv H22.13, Skeppet Factura 1768–1786.
51. I have found no entry to Tan Anqua in the DAC *negotieprotocoler* from 1760 to 1775. RAC: Ask 1143–74.
52. For Cai Hunqua's story, see MCM 1: Chapters 3 and 7.
53. For Semqua's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 7, and especially p. 124.
54. 'Tan Anqua mee zijde: Ik verstaan geen Europeeisch Schrift'. University of Minnesota, James Ford Bell Library (JFB): B 1758 fNe, 1758.09.30. This source contains the Dutch *dagregister* and other VOC records from 1758.
55. 'Tan Anqua . . . doordien zeedert lange Jaaren voor dat de Kohang [Co-hong] ingeregt is geweest, het ons bekend is, en zelfs ondervonden hebben hij de Comp. althoos wel bediend heeft, en op zijn woord en behandeling althoos met reeden veel vertrouwen heeft gemeriteerd, zo dat ingevalle, volgens ons gevoelen'. NAH: Canton 79, 1770.05.10.
56. 'De Comperadoor komt van Canton te rug, rapport doende met Tan Anqua gesprooken te hebben, die hem gedeclareerd had, geen Associatie met het Huijs van Hunqua te konnen aangaan; dat afschoon de zaeken in een goede order waren, egter den overleedenen met Semqua reekening heeft gehad met Chineese zaeken, en hij zig niet daarin willende steeken, dat hij verders ons zouden spreeken bij de te rug komst, ondertusschen zeer verpligt zijnde voor d' affectie die wij voor hem hebben, en daarvan zo hij sustineerd voordeel zal konnen trecken, wanneer de Kohang kwam te breeken, dat zo hij meend in 't kort wel mogt gebeuren; op wat grond hij zulks præsumeerd blijft als nog een Raadsel'. NAH: Canton 79, 1770.05.16.
57. An entry in the English records dated 28 November 1788 shows the following. 'The Hong Merchants were Puan Khequa, Yanqua, Ton Anqua, Munqua, Conseequa, Geowqua, Chowqua, Tingshaw, Pooqua, Shy Kinqua, Mowqua, Pinqua, Gonqua, Eequa'. BL: IOR G/12/20, doc. dated 1788.11.28, no page numbers. This entry is misleading because Tan Anqua was not an official Hong merchant at this time, nor was Yanqua, Conseequa, Tingshaw, Pooqua, Mowqua, Eequa, or Gonqua. All of these latter men became Hong merchants later. There are also several Hong merchants' names missing who were active in 1788. For a list of the licensed Hong merchants each year, see Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 13–18.
58. BL: IOR G/12/70, Consultation dated 1780.02.21, p. 26; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 374n27.
59. Aix-en-Provence, Archives Nationales d'Outre-mer (ANOM): C.1.11, 1771.01.19, pp. 90–92 and C.1.12, 1772.09.05, pp. 14r–v and 24r–v. These latter documents have two sets

of page numbers on them. I have given the numbers that are stamped on the top of every other page.

60. Montigny-le-Bretonneux: Archives departementales de Yvelines (ADY): E 3056 Lettres de Robien, de Canton et de Bretagne (1767–1780). See letters dated 1773.01.07 and 1773.01.20 signed by supercargo De Robien; and ANOM: C.1.16, pp. 79–86.
61. GUB: Svenska ostindiska kompaniets arkiv H22.15, page entitled 'Resp. Sv. O.I. Comp. Capital i Canton'.
62. NM: F17, p. T1_02406.
63. RAC: Ask 1175, 1777.01.28, p. 133.
64. NAH: VOC 4418 and 4431, see entries in the *grootboeken*.
65. 'Were informed that Ton Anqua, a Merchant with whom we have for several years past had considerable Dealings died yesterday Evening'. BL: IOR G/12/96, 1790.01.06, p. 128. See also Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 374n27.
66. BL: IOR G/12/103, 1792.11.26, p. 144, paragraph No. 23 and also G/12/107, 1793.11.16, p. 12 and 1793.11.22, p. 16.
67. BL: IOR G/12/142, 1802.12.14, p. 149.
68. BL: IOR G/12/142, 1802.12.17, p. 155, paragraph No. 6. See also Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 348.
69. Hong merchant appointments were not voluntary, and required large payments for the 'privilege' of trade. According to the Dutch, Manhop paid the Hoppo 50,000 Spanish dollars for his appointment, so Tan Anqua's business had apparently been very good to him. NAH: Raad der Aziatische Besettingen en Etablissementen (RAB) 140, doc. dated 1802.09.01, p. 30.
70. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 20 and 348–49.

## Chapter 5

1. John Wong has recently written Houqua's story so I will not deal with him here. John D. Wong, 'Global Positioning: Houqua and his China Trade Partners in the Nineteenth Century' (PhD diss., History Department, Harvard University, 2012).
2. William Hunter, *The 'Fan Kwae' at Canton before Treaty Days 1825–1844* (London: 1882; reprint, London, 1885; London, 1911; Shanghai: Mercury Press, 1938; Taipei: 1966; reprint, under the title *An American in Canton (1825–44)*. Hong Kong: Derwent Communications, Ltd., 1994), 57. Thanks to John Wong for pointing this reference out to me.
3. Nordic Museum archive, Godegårdsarkivet. Ostindiska Handling F17: 1–7 (hereafter referred to as NM: F17), pp. T1_05632–3. This bottomry contract is reproduced in Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), Plate 10. The interest was calculated per voyage with the expectation that it would be completed within one year.
4. 'juncker Hingtay som brander upp i Cochin China'. NM: F17, entry dated 1766.01.10, p. T1_06542.
5. Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) (hereafter referred to as MCM 1), 325.
6. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): Canton 35, doc. No. 7, 1772.03.18 and Canton 39, doc. No. 29 dated 1776.11.16, doc. No. 31 dated 1776.12.08. Geowqua shows up in the Danish records in 1775 as 'Ingsia hoved mand Kinqua' (Ingsia's headman Kinqua). In later years the Danes spelled his name 'Kiauqua'. Ask 1173, 1775.07.15, p. 56v; and Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 216 and 311. For Ingia's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 9. The Taihe Hang was located in building No. 5 in Van Dyke and Mok's study of the factories. Paul

A. Van Dyke and Maria Kar-wing Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822: Reading History in Art* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015). Its location was discovered after that book was written.

7. For Chowqua's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 10.
8. NAH: Canton 40, doc. No. 17, 1777.11.29. For the items that the Dutch purchased from Geowqua (Kiouqua) this year, see VOC 4415, *grootboek*, p. 29.
9. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR): G/12/66, 1775.11.30, pp. 107–8.
10. BL: IOR G/12/72, 1781.03.22, pp. 52–53.
11. NAH: Canton 49, doc. No. 48, 1788.02.23.
12. NAH: Canton 90, 1784.02.09.
13. MCM 1:175.
14. BL: IOR G/12/73, 1781.12.31, pp. 125–26.
15. The Danes in Macao were given the names of the five new appointees in May 1782. Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1190, May 1782, p. 31r. But the appointments seemed to have been completed in June. BL: IOR G/12/76, 1782.06.24, p. 33; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, p. 14.
16. BL: IOR G/12/76, 1782.06.24, p. 33 and 1782.12.29, pp. 194–95.
17. BL: IOR G/12/72, 1781.03.22, pp. 52–53.
18. BL: IOR G/12/76, 1782.12.29, p. 194.
19. RAC: Ask 1186, 1782.09.17–22, pp. 44r–6v.
20. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 2:97, 198, 268; BL: IOR G/12/86, 1787.09.20, p. 108, G/12/89, 1788.04.08, pp. 12–13 and G/12/94, 1789.03.24, pp. 125–26.
21. BL: IOR R/10/9, 1774.12.08, pp. 88–89.
22. BL: IOR G/12/103, 1793.02.08–9, pp. 235–43; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:198.
23. BL: IOR G/12/103, 1793.02.08–9, pp. 240–43; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:198.
24. BL: IOR G/12/82, 1786.09.05, pp. 6–7.
25. MCM 1:134 and Plates 07.07 and 10.12.
26. MCM 1:175; NAH: Canton 46, doc. No. 1, 1784.03.15 and doc. Nos. 11 and 13, 1784.03.18. Can 52, VOC 4445
27. BL: IOR G/12/77, 1783.08.27, p. 60, 1783.09.27, p. 80 and 1783.12.06, p. 164.
28. NAH: Canton 47, doc. No. 11, 1785.03.19, Canton 28, doc. No. 15, 1786.02.10, doc. No. 16, 1786.09.05, and doc. No. 21, 1786.10.10, Canton 49, doc. No. 4, 1787.02.09, doc. No. 9, 1787.10.04, Canton 50, doc. No. 3, 1788.03.04 and doc. No. 19, 1788.09.18, Canton 51, doc. No. 49, 1789.02.01, Canton 52, doc. No. 12, 1790.01.26, Canton 53, doc. No. 26, 1791.01.08.
29. BL: IOR G/12/82, 1786.02.28, p. 5.
30. RAC: Ask 1208, entry dated 1794.10.18.
31. NAH: Canton 47, doc. No. 3, 1785.09.28 and Canton 48, doc. No. 9, 1786.12.23.
32. NAH: Canton 90, entry dated 1784.03.09.
33. For a summary of 100 fires in and around Canton, see Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Fires and the Risks of Trade in Canton 1730s–1840s', in *Canton and Nagasaki Compared 1730–1830: Dutch Chinese, Japanese Relations*, ed. Evert Groenendijk, Cynthia Viallé, and Leonard Blussé, *Intercontinenta* no. 26 (Leiden: Institute for the History of European Expansion, 2009), 171–202.
34. The Dutch estimated his loss in tea at 15,000 taels. NAH: Canton 92, 1786.02.06, pp. 3–4. The Danes estimated his loss in tea at 20,000 taels. RAC: Ask 1200, 1786.02.10, p. 25v.
35. The English supercargoes referred to Geowqua and Puiqua as brothers or cousins. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 311–12. In 1786, the Danish supercargoes called them brothers. RAC: Ask

1200, 1786.12.24, pp. 85–86. Ch'en has suggested that Geowqua was Puiqua's uncle. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 312. John Wong suggests they were second cousins. Wong, 'Global Positioning'.

36. BL: IOR G/12/82, 1786.06.30, p. 27. The Dutch chief Pieter Kintsius' is buried in the Old Protestant Cemetery in Macao. He died on 25 June 1786 at the age of 55. Lindsay Ride and May Ride, *An East India Company Cemetery: Protestant Burials in Macao* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996), 267.
37. BL: IOR G/12/84, 1787.03.23, p. 175.
38. BL: IOR G/12/86, 1787.04.08, pp. 5–6 and G/12/89, 1788.04.08, pp. 12–13.
39. RAC: Ask 1202, 1787.08.20–1, p. 54v.
40. In 1755, the Hoppo listed amber among the curiosities that foreigners brought and that were reserved for the emperor's use. BL: IOR R/10/3, p. 363, translation of a Chinese document dated 7th day, 4th moon, and 20th year of Emperor Qianlong (1755.05.17).
41. In 1863, Williams mentioned that amber 'was formerly much prized for ornaments and incense, and in China is still largely in demand for court beads. Transparent pieces of a lively yellowish-brown colour are the best, and if insects are imbedded in it, the value is greatly increased . . . The price varies from $8 to $14 per catty, and higher, according to the quality and size of the pieces, the finest being carved into beads'. S. Wells Williams, *The Chinese Commercial Guide, Containing Treaties, Tariffs, Regulations, Tables, etc., Useful in the Trade to China & Eastern Asia; with an Appendix of Sailing Directions for Those Seas and Coasts* (Canton: Chinese Repository, 1856, 5th ed., Hong Kong: A. Shortrede & Co., 1863; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 79.
42. NAH: Canton 93, 1787.10.23. Out of the two DAC ships in China this year, only one of them has a surviving trade journal (*negotieprotocoler*). I found no mention of this incident between Geowqua and the Hoppo in that journal. RAC: Ask 1202. The amber could have been brought by one of the DAC officer's on their private account, which would then not appear in the DAC records. The Dutch learned of this matter from the linguist, who had to explain why he could not get a chop to deliver Geowqua's goods to Whampoa.
43. BL: IOR G/12/89, 1788.04.08, pp. 12–13.
44. BL: IOR G/12/94, 1789.03.24, pp. 125–26.
45. BL: IOR G/12/96, 1789.03.28, p. 3 and 1789.12.12, p. 105.
46. NAH: Canton 95, entry dated 1789.06.06; and MCM 1:177–78.
47. BL: IOR G/12/103, 1792.10.31, p. 121 and 1792.11.11, p. 126; and MCM 1:177–78.
48. NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1791.12.29, p. 1; and Christiaan J. A. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 65.
49. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Floating Brothels and the Canton Flower Boats 1750–1930', *Review of Culture*, International Edition no. 37 (January 2011): 112–42.
50. NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1791.12.29, p. 1; and Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 65.
51. NAH: Canton 53, doc. No. 18, 1791.11.10, this reference mentions that he had more than one writer. See also Ghent University Library (GHL): Ms 1985, *dagregister*, 1791.12.04, p. 121.
52. BL: IOR G/12/103, 1792.03.31, p. 12, 1792.09.21, p. 38.
53. Xing Yongfu 邢永福, et al., eds. *Qing Gong Guangzhou Shisan Hang dang'an jingxuan* 清宮廣州十三行檔案精選 [A selection of Qing imperial documents of the Guangzhou Shisan Hang] (Guangzhou: Guangdong jingji chubanshe, 2002) (hereafter referred to as Xing), doc. No. 58, p. 158.
54. RAC: Ask 1207, 1792.12.25, p. 143 and Ask 1208, 1794.09.25, p. 29r.
55. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:220–22; and NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.04.28, pp. 9–10 and 1793.07.13, p. 17.
56. BL: IOR G/12/105, 1793.11.04–07, pp. 73–74.

57. 'Kwam Ponqua my berigten dat den Hoppo hem had gecommitteerd, om nevens een Compagnon van Kiouqua den Quongchoufou naar Macao te moeten verzellen te eijnde de Portugeesen het genomen frans scheepje de doen restitueeren.' NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.11.10, p. 71.
58. NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.11.23, p. 77.
59. NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.11.05, p. 69 and 1793.11.25, p. 78.
60. NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.11.26, p. 79.
61. BL: IOR G/12/105, 1793.11.29, p. 105.
62. NAH: OIC 195, *dagregister*, 1793.12.04, pp. 2–3. There are many Portuguese translations of Chinese documents that have survived concerning this matter of Peron in Macao. Jin Guoping 金國平 and Wu Zhiliang 吳志良, comps., *Correspondência Oficial Trocada Entre As Autoridades de Cantão e Os Procuradores do Senado. Fundo das Chapas Sínicas em Português (1749–1847)*, 8 vols. (Macao: Macao Foundation, 2000), 2: doc. nos. 41–68, pp. 70–110. See also Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822*, 59–60.
63. NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1792.11.12–13, pp. 106–7.
64. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 295.
65. NAH: OIC 195, *dagregister,* 1794.12.16, p. 106.
66. NAH: OIC 195, *dagregister,* 1794.12.16, p. 106.
67. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 301.
68. NAH: Canton 57, report dated 1795.10.30, p. 52.
69. NAH: Canton 57, doc. dated 1795.11.27, pp. 70–71, Canton 96, entries dated 1795 October 15, 29, 30, November 5, 7, and 9, and 1796 January 30.
70. NAH: Canton 96, entries dated 1796 April 17, 20, and May 12, pp. 88–100.
71. BL: IOR G/12/119, 1796.01.26, pp. 96–98.
72. MCM 1:194–95.
73. Thanks to John Wong for information about Geowqua's death.
74. Thanks to John Wong for information about Puiqua's dates and names.
75. RAC: Ask 1173, 1775.07.15, p. 56v.
76. Wong, 'Global Positioning', Chapter 2.
77. NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1793.01.06, p. 147 ('neef').
78. BL: IOR G/12/87, 1787.02.14–15, p. 144.
79. BL: IOR G/12/105, 1793.01.26, p. 105 and G/12/136, 1801.12.03, p. 105.
80. Wong, 'Global Positioning', Chapter 2.
81. BL: IOR G/12/103, 1792.09.21, p. 39.
82. BL: IOR G/12/103, 1792.10.01, p. 75.
83. 'Onder de Hangisten is geduurende dit jaar door den Hoppo een groote promitie gedaan en vijf nieuw cooplieden aangesteld te weten Jemqua (uit Poankequa's Huis) Mouqua (uit Monqua's Huys) Poeyqua (uit Kiouqua's Huis) Ponqua (uit Locqua's Huis) en Tsjonqua een vreemdeling'. NAH: VOC 4447, letter addressed 'Aan Zijn Hoog Edelheijd Den Heere Gouverneur Generaal', dated 1792.11.28, paragraph No. 47. An entry in the 1792 *dagregister* also shows one of the new appointees to be out of Kiouqua's house. 'Verneem dat de Hoppo te Canton vier nieuwe Hangisten heeft benoemd, waar van een is genoomen uijt het huijs van Pankequa, een uijt dat van Monqua, & een uijt dat van Kiouqua.' VOC 4447, dagregister, 1792.03.21, p. 23.
84. See, for examples, NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1792.03.21, pp. 23–24 and Canton 253, General Report for 1792, par. 36, p. 19.
85. The Danes recorded the new appointments as follows: 'I dag ankom Hoppo hertil fra Canton i Hans folge ere de gamle Hong Kiöbmænd og 4re Nye Hang Kiöbmænd, nemlige Mauqua, Yimqua, Poyqua og Ongqua'. RAC: Ask 1207, 1792.04.06, p. 77. These names refer to Mowqua, Yanqua, Puiqua and Ponqua, respectively. Earlier in March, while the English

officers were in Macao, they 'Received advice from Canton that the Hoppo had appointed three New Hong Merchants–Yanqua late clerk to Puankhequa, Mowqua and Puiqua'. BL: IOR G/12/103, 1792.03.31, p. 12. Ponqua was added later. The ten merchants are listed in a Chinese documented dated 1792.04.23. MCM 1: Plate 11.17.

86. BL: IOR G/12/103, 1792.09.16, p. 32.
87. BL: IOR G/12/103, 1792.10.01, p. 75.
88. For Yanqua's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 11; and Li Yun 李雲. 'Guangzhou Shisan Hang yangshang Ye Tingxun jiazu yu Yi Bingshou' 廣州十三行洋商葉廷勳家族與伊秉綬 (PhD diss., Central China Normal University, 2013). Ponqua's figures with the Danes and Dutch show a similar advancement into their trade, with about the same small volume as Puiqua. For Ponqua's story, see Ch'en, *Insolvency*, pp. 322–27. For Mowqua's story, see Huang Qichen 黃啟臣 and Pang Xinping 龐新平, *Ming-Qing Guangdong shangren* 明清廣東商人 [Guangdong merchants in the Ming and Qing dynasty] (Guangzhou: Guangdong jingji chubanshe, 2001), pp. 287–300.
89. MCM 1:196.
90. NAH: OIC 195, *dagregister,* 1794.12.14, p. 102. If the EIC committee had learned about these officers smuggling copper they would likely have been reprimanded, but there is no mention of this event in the diaries, consultations or ship journals.
91. NAH: OIC 195, *dagregister,* 1794.12.16, p. 105.
92. NAH: OIC 195, *dagregister,* 1794.12.19, p. 110–11.
93. BL: IOR G/12/118, 1797, p. 13.
94. BL: IOR G/12/118, 1797.07.08, pp. 44–49.
95. NAH: Canton 261, 'Lijst der te Macao Gearriveerde Scheepen Ao 1797', p. 91, 'Kaart van den Generaale Aanbring te Macao in den Jaare 1797', 'Lijst van den Generaale Aanbring te Macao in den Jaare 1798', 'Lijst der Generaalen Aanbreng te Canton in China Ao 1797 à 1801'.
96. BL: IOR G/12/134, pp. 108–9.
97. NAH: Canton 269, General Report for 1804, dated 1805.01.12, par. 23.
98. Wong, 'Global Positioning'.

## Chapter 6

1. A brief summary of things discussed in this chapter was published in 2013 in Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Porcelain Dealers in Eighteenth Century Canton', in *Chinese Export Fine Art* 清代外銷藝術精品, ed. Guangdong Museum (Guangzhou: Lingnan meishu chubanshe, 2013), 20–29.
2. Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843,* 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 7.
3. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/8, 1720, p. 1377.
4. BL: IOR G/12/28, 1729.12.07, p. 56. The lack of porcelain in 1729 could be owing to the Dutch East India Company (VOC) trading directly in Canton this year. This was the first year that the VOC sent its own ships to China.
5. Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) (hereafter referred to as MCM 1), 11 and 54.
6. Jianglan Jie 槳欄街 is now called Jianglan Lu 槳欄路 and is still in the same location. In the eighteenth century, it was a very short street, not as long as it is today. The porcelain shops were located at the far eastern end of this street.
7. Chinese referred to this new street by other names as well, including New Street 新街 and Jingyuan Street (靖遠街 or 靜遠街). Paul A. Van Dyke and Maria Kar-wing Mok, *Images of*

*the Canton Factories 1760–1822: Reading History in Art* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015), Chapter 9.

8. Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories*, Chapter 9.
9. In a letter dated 9 November 1768, for example, the Swedes mentioned that quite a number of shops were now located on New Street. 'Säsom Mäklare wid Perlors, uhrs etc. försaljning äro Broderaren Pinqua, Porc. Pinqua, och dens Broder Chequa, Broderaren Ayan, Tysching i nya gatan [New Street], Poucheong i nya gatan [New Street], de bästa och säkraste, annan har jag brukadt Tequa, målaren Leonqua, målaren Laqua, och manga andra, men de äro ej stort bewändt med, Broderaren Soychang säljer bäst af alla, men kan ej betro honom det ringaste i händerna'. Nordic Museum archive, Godegårdsarkivet. Ostindiska Handling F17: 1–7 (hereafter referred to as NM: F17), T1_00052. Many other references testify to New Street being the place where one could buy anything. Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories*, Chapter 9.
10. There is considerable confusion over the number of shopping streets in Canton (whether there were two or three) and the names. These issues are explained in Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories*, Chapter 9.
11. Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1175, 1777.01.01, p. 120r.
12. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Fires and the Risks of Trade in Canton 1730s–1840s', in *Canton and Nagasaki Compared 1730–1830: Dutch Chinese, Japanese Relations*, ed. Evert Groenendijk, Cynthia Viallé, and Leonard Blussé, *Intercontinenta* no. 26 (Leiden: Institute for the History of European Expansion, 2009): 171–202.
13. Ch'en has misunderstood the role that chinaware played in the EIC ships. It was much more than simply ballast. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 339.
14. Christiaan J. A. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 51. See also J. de Hulle, 'De Porceleinhandel der Oost-Indische Compagnie en Cornelis Pronk als Haar Teekenaar', *Oud Holland* 33 (The Hague: 1915), 51, 53–54; and G. A. Godden, *Oriental Export Market Porcelain and Its Influence on European Wares* (London: Granada, 1979), 38, 102; and John Goldsmith Phillips, *China-Trade Porcelain: An Account of its Historical Background, Manufacture, and Decoration and a Study of the Helena Woolworth McCann Collection* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), 40.
15. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 51.
16. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): Canton 237, General Report, 1775.12.31, pp. 49–50. Godden has shown that the EIC porcelain chests seem to have been taller in the early eighteenth century. Godden, *Oriental Export Market Porcelain*, 103.
17. Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), 63 and 204n59.
18. For a discussion of some ballast items used in the China trade, see George Bryan Souza, 'Ballast Goods: Chinese Maritime Trade in Zinc and Sugar in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', in *Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, C. 1400–1750*, ed. Roderich Ptak and Ditmar Rothermund (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991), 291–315; and George Bryan Souza, 'Country Trade and Chinese Alum: Raw Material Supply and Demand in Asia's Textile Production in the 17th and 18th Centuries', *Review of Culture*, International Edition no. 11 (July 2004): 136–53.
19. For examples of shingle ballast, see BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.08.17, pp. 49–50; and Godden, *Oriental Export Market Porcelain*, 103.
20. There is much confusion in the ship journals concerning Macao stones, shingle ballast and pea ballast. The term 'Macao stones' actual does not appear in most of the EIC ship journals, but is commonly found in the Dutch and Danish records. In the latter documents, Macao stones and shingle (or single) ballast often appear as one and the same. The EIC ship journals clearly list pea ballast being separate from shingle ballast. The different terms

seem to refer to different sizes of stones. Because pea ballast was usually the last item to be put into the hulls, it was probably the smallest. For a few examples of both shingle and pea ballast being loaded into EIC ships, see BL: IOR L/MAR/B/399D, L/MAR/B/141H, L/MAR/B/366K, L/MAR/B/267A, L/MAR/B/182B and L/MAR/B/165C.

21. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.08.17, pp. 49–50.
22. BL: IOR R/10/4, letter dated 1757.08.24, pp. 27–28.
23. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 31; and Souza, 'Country Trade and Chinese Alum', 136–53. For a nice description of how the VOC ships were ballasted, see Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 50–51.
24. NAH: Canton 78, 1769.07.25 and 28.
25. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, Appendix 8, pp. 217–20. The costs were calculated into the cargos of each VOC voyage, making it impossible to separate them out, which is why Jörg included them in the ballast figures.
26. Earl H. Pritchard, *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations 1750–1800* (1936; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 395–96.
27. Jörg has pointed out that the taxing of porcelain according to weight is one of the reasons for Chinese coarse ware becoming less popular as an export item. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 124. This is plausible, and perhaps partially the outcome of the changes to the duties in the 1780s. But it should also be pointed out that course ware paid a lower duty than fine ware in the eighteenth century. Milburn, who was quoting a source from 1756, shows the duties on fine ware to be: '74 per pecul' (0.74 taels) and course ware to be '55 per pecul' (0.55 taels). William Milburn, *Oriental Commerce*, 2 vols. (London: Black, Parry, & Co., 1813; reprint, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1999), 495. A list of duties from 1759 that is now in the Royal Library in Copenhagen shows the duties in Guangdong Province to be 1.3 taels per picul on fine ware and 0.10 taels per picul on coarse ware. Copenhagen, Royal Library (KB): Kallske. 362, 4o 'Reglement Hvorefter Tolden udi Provicerne Canton og Tsche=kiang i Keyserdommet China bereignes ved accurat Translation samlet af Niels Fursman', dated Canton 30 December 1759. See entry Nos. 766 and 775. There is another list of Chinese export duties in the Danish archives dated December 1734. The entries concerning porcelain are confusing, because it is unclear whether the duty is being applied to the picul, to 1000 pieces, or to 100 pieces. But despite the confusion, that list also shows different rates for course and fine porcelain. The former was 0.1 taels ('for 1000 fra 4 Teil til 5') and the latter was 0.3 taels ('pr 100 2 Teil a 9' or '100 par 2 Teil til 3'). RAC: Ask 1116 'Prise Courant til Canton og Keiserens told, December 1734'. As Milburn noted on page 494 in the reference above, 'The duties on all goods imported and exported are paid by the Chinese; it is therefore very difficult to ascertain the real duties of any commodity, as they are frequently altered by the Mandarins'. This means that there is no way to know for certain which one of these lists, if any, are correct. After the Nanjing Treaty of 1842, the customs duties were restructured. The duties on porcelain were then the same for fine and coarse ware, at 0.50 taels per picul. Samuel Wells Williams, *The Chinese Commercial Guide* (Canton: Chinese Repository, 1856), 134.
28. For one example of the private traders catering to their individual markets, see Historical Society of Pennsylvania (HSP): Waln Papers Vol. 21, p. 160. On this page Waln shows a 'Memorandum of China Ware Suitable for the Philad[elphia] Market'. There are many other examples of Americans taking specific orders from families and friends.
29. The tonnages of the Dutch ships are shown to be much larger in J. R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra and I. Schöffer. *Dutch Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries*. 3 vols. (The Hague: Rijksgeschiedkundige Publicatiën, 1979 & 1987) and F. S. Gaastra and J. R. Bruijn, 'The Dutch East India Company's Shipping, 1602–1795, in a Comparative Perspective', in *Ships, Sailors and Spices: East India Companies and Their Shipping in the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries*,

ed. Jaap R. Bruijn and Femme S. Gaastra (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1993), 177–208. In these references, the Dutch ships appear to be the same size as the Danish and Swedish ships. This is the case because the tonnage figures include the space for cabins, mess hall, storage spaces for equipage, animal pens, sleeping quarters, etc. After some discussion with Bruijn and Gaastra, it was agreed that the Dutch tonnages could be reduced by 20 percent, to only show their cargo carrying capacity. If this correction is made, it reduces the size of the VOC ships in China from 1000 to 1200 tons to 800 to 900 tons, and puts them into proper persective with other companies' ships. For the adjusted tonnages of the Dutch ships, see Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Operational Efficiencies and the Decline of the Chinese Junk Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: The Connection', in *Shipping Efficiency and Economic Growth 1350–1800*, ed. Richard Unger (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 223–46.

30. For a visual plan of how the porcelain, tea and other items were loaded into the hulls of the VOC ships, see the stowage schematics reproduced in Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 52–53; Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Plates 14–15; and Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Bookkeeping as a Window into Efficiencies of Early Modern Trade: Europeans, Americans and Others in China Compared, 1700–1842', in *Narratives of Free Trade*, ed. by Kendall Johnson (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 17–31, figure 1.8.
31. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Packing for Success: Sago in Eighteenth Century Chinese Trade', in *Kuayue haiyang de jiaohuan* 跨越海洋的交換 [The transoceanic exchange] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2013), 167–92; and MCM 1:68. As Jörg has pointed out, the Dutch used sago in their porcelain shipments up to the early 1770s. In the 1760s, they began to complain that if sago became wet it swelled and could break the items in which it was packed. They consequently ceased using it in porcelain. But as I point out in the article above, the other companies and the Americans did not seem to have such concerns and continued to pack their hollow porcelain with sago into the nineteenth century. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 51, 86, 129.
32. Van Dyke, 'Packing for Success', 167–92; and MCM 1:68.
33. Pritchard combined the EIC porcelain and sago export figures together, owing to the difficulty of knowing whether or not the cost of the porcelain also included the cost of sago that was packed inside. Earl H. Pritchard, *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations 1750–1800* (1936; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 67 and 396.
34. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 118.
35. Coqua often shows up in the Dutch records as Koqua or Kooqua. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 118 and 351n92. For Coqua's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 5.
36. 'De Porcelain koopers werden gepersuadeerd van de Hooge Mandarijnen om het resteerend Hoppo geld van't Huijs van Kooqua ## te betaalen en daar voor in plaats te neemen de Porcelainen een ijder na rato zijner betaaling waar tegen zij schrikkelijk aan kanten, maar worden gedreijgt zulks niet doende hunne boutiquer te sluijten, en hunne handeling met de Europeaanen te stoppen'. NAH: Canton 88, 1779.03.12. See also NAH: Canton, 1779.03.16, 1779.05.05, 1779.05.10 and 1779.07.21; and Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 118 and 351n92.
37. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 118–21; and NAH: Canton 88, 1779.08.31. In 1757, the English had estimated that the Canton merchants were expending upwards of 20,000 taels per year on these presents. MCM 1:61. If these estimates are trustworthy, then the amounts expended for presents increased with the expansion of the trade.
38. On 21 October 1783, a linguist reported to the Dutch that the Hoppo was not aware of any increase in the duties on porcelain or other goods and asked who the persons were who were responsible for this rumour. NAH: VOC 4425, *dagregister*, 1783.10.21, p. 28; and Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 118. The Danes received a similar statement from the Hoppo on 4 November 1783. RAC: Ask 1191, 1783.11.04, p. 69r. But on 6 December 1783,

Exchin reported to the English supercargos 'that the Hoppo had double Duties to be levied on all Goods exported by such as were not Hong Merchants, and that himself not being of that description would be very much affected thereby, and be compelled either to put up with a considerable loss, or raise the price of his Goods'. BL: IOR G/12/77, 1783.12.06, pp. 169–70; and Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 118. The English protested the rise in prices, but again the Hoppo wanted to know who had told them the duties had been doubled. They knew Exchin would be in trouble if they exposed him, so they answered the Hoppo in general terms stating that they 'had not our Intelligence from any particular person, but only common report'. BL: IOR G/12/77, 1783.12.06, p. 170. The Danes reported on 26 October 1783 that the Hoppo and other Mandarins, at the behest of the Hong merchants, raised the duties of merchants who sold silk, Nankeens and porcelain (meaning all the outside merchants). RAC: Ask 1191, 1783.10.26, pp. 65–66.

39. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 118–21. See Jörg's Appendix 1 for the number of VOC ships in China. For total number of ships in port each year, see Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident: Le Commerce à Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 2:523–24. For a brief account of the French presence in Canton in the early 1790s, see Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822*, 59–61.
40. Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2:523–24. My new list of ships is not finalized yet for the 1780s, but so far corresponds almost exactly with Dermigy's numbers.
41. For a brief discussion of the Spanish trade at Canton from the 1780s and after, see Chapter 3 and also Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822*, Chapter 4.
42. Gary Sturgis, 'A Few Small Ships: Botany Baymen in China, 1788–1801', forthcoming.
43. For the numbers of Portuguese ships trading in Macao, see George Bryan Souza, 'Merchants and Commerce in Asia and the Portuguese Empire over the Long 18th Century', *Review of Culture*, International Edition no. 34 (April 2010): 64–76.
44. For the numbers of ships arriving each year and changes in the total tonnage, see Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2:523–24.
45. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 38, 140; and Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company* (Providence: Foris Publications, 1988), 146–50.
46. Williams, *The Chinese Commercial Guide*, 170.
47. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*; Hulle, 'De Porceleinhandel der Oost-Indische Compagnie en Cornelis Pronk als Haar Teekenaar'; Godden, *Oriental Export Market Porcelain*; and Phillips, *China-Trade Porcelain*. There are of course many other studies.
48. NAH: Canton 91, 1785.10.01 p. 46.
49. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 121 and 353n123.
50. The wages of full-time employees in Canton and Macao, for example, including carpenters, bricklayers, painters, servants, cooks, sailors, tea packers, caulkers, cabinet makers, and coolies in general, often included meals provided by the employer. For examples, see the online data files of wages in Canton and Macao at the International Institute of Social History website, especially the file entitled 'Description of Price and Wage Data from Canton and Macao 1704–1833' by Paul A. Van Dyke (4 March 2008). The same seems to have been the case with coolies who transported the products from the interior to Canton and other workers in the interior. Canton merchants often blamed the higher prices of their products on the higher costs of feeding the porters and manufacturers.
51. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 116–23; and NAH: Canton 49, 1787, doc. No. 7. The famine was very visible in Canton with people found dead on the street every morning. Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822*, Chapter 4.
52. The number of ships each year was taken from Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2:523–24.
53. NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.03.28, p. 4; and Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 119.

54. For a list of the West River tolls that the Dutch paid from 1763 to 1816, see Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690–1845' (PhD diss., Department of History, University of Southern California, 2002), Appendix AH. See also Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 103–5.

## Chapter 7

1. A brief summary of this chapter was published in 2013 in Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Porcelain Dealers in Eighteenth Century Canton', in *Chinese Export Fine Art* 清代外銷藝術精品, ed. Guangdong Museum (Guangzhou: Lingnan meishu chubanshe, 2013), 20–29.
2. Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) (hereafter referred to as MCM 1), 186–87.
3. For a brief account of Pinqua's trade as a Hong merchant, see Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 296–97; and Weng Eang Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), see 'Pinqua' in the index.
4. MCM 1:10–12.
5. Nordic Museum archive, Godegårdsarkivet. Ostindiska Handling F17: 1–7 (hereafter referred to as NM: F17), pp. T1_04440–57 and T1_04474–502.
6. Christiaan J. A. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 118–19 and 351n94; and Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1762 (Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2006) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1762), 100n67.
7. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 339–48.
8. MCM 1: Chapter 8.
9. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 118.
10. NM: F17, pp. T1_04440–57 and T1_04474–502.
11. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 339.
12. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/62, 1777.10.01, p. 39. For a list of the items and prices see G. A. Godden, *Oriental Export Market Porcelain and Its influence on European Wares* (London: Granada, 1979), 134–38.
13. BL: IOR G/12/76, 1782.10.28, p. 125.
14. BL: IOR G/12/77, 1783.12.06, pp. 169–70.
15. The following EIC ships did not load porcelain: 6 out of 29 EIC ships in 1786, 1 out of 29 ships in 1787, 4 out of 26 ships in 1788, 1 out of 21 ships in 1789, 8 out of 25 ships in 1790, 7 out of 11 ships in 1791, 1 out of 16 ships in 1792, 8 out of 18 ships in 1793, 5 out of 21 ships in 1794, and 8 out of 16 ships in 1796. Some of the ships that loaded porcelain also began to reduce the number of chests they took in. In 1796, for example, 2 of the 16 ships only took in one chest of porcelain, when they would previously have loaded perhaps 100 to 200 small chests. From 1797 and after, chinaware no longer appears in the EIC export cargo lists. BL: IOR G/12/85, pp. 268–69, G/12/87, pp. 230–31, G/12/95, pp. 210–11, G/12/97, pp. 140–41, G/12/99, pp. 160–61, G/12/102, 'General Abstract', G/12/104, pp. 118 and 130, G/12/107, pp. 91 and 94, G/12/109, pp. 111 and 147, G/12/115, p. 48, and G/12/117, 'Abstract of Cargoes'.
16. In 1777, for example, Exchin supplied porcelain and sago to the ships *Earl of Sandwich* (804 tons) and *Resolution* (836 tons). After deducting the 2 percent rebate for breakage, the amount he supplied each ship came to about 5,000 taels. BL: IOR G/12/62, 1777.07.10, p. 18 and 1777.10.20, p. 46. These were among the largest ships that Exchin supplied, with

many others being smaller. For the size of the EIC ships, see Anthony Farrington, *Catalogue of East India Company Ships' Journals and Logs 1600–1834* (London: British Library, 1999).

17. BL: IOR G/12/87, pp. 230–31.
18. Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident: Le Commerce à Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 2:523–24.
19. BL: IOR G/12/86, pp. 86–87.
20. 'Exchin having acquainted us that he wished to know what quantity of China Ware we should want for the ensuing season as it was now a proper time to send his orders up to Nankeen to get it made'. BL: IOR G/12/79, 1784.10.11, p. 71.
21. Like Exchin, the porcelain dealer Foutia also sent his orders into the interior in the winter months, and then the products arrived in September. 'Having ordered Footia in the winter to send into the Chinaware country for several setts [*sic*] of Chinaware to the quantity of three hundred chests of different sorts, he told us about the quantity of sixty chests were come, and that he expected more daily'. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1760.09.05, p. 71. For Foutia's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 12.
22. It was important for the EIC ships to leave on schedule, otherwise demurrage fees had to be paid to the ships' owners for each day the vessels were delayed. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 1:70, 172; 2:153; 5:179–80; and MCM 1:52 and 443n7.
23. BL: IOR G/12/89, 1788.09.27, p. 107.
24. BL: IOR G/12/96, 1789.10.03, p. 45.
25. 'As Exchin will not have sufficient quantity of China Ware to floor all the ships Synchong was sent for, when we agreed to pack with him 170 chests to be sent on board the Sulivan'. BL: IOR G/12/96, 1789.11.14, p. 84.
26. BL: IOR G/12/98, 1790.09.01, p. 36
27. BL: IOR G/12/98, 1790.09.30, p. 43.
28. BL: IOR G/12/98, 1791.01.31, par. 22, p. 142.
29. Godden, *Oriental Export Market Porcelain*, 48–50, 80, 288; and Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 353n127.
30. BL: IOR G/12/101, 1791.11.29, par. 24–25, p. 102.
31. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 339.
32. BL: IOR G/12/110, 1795.05.14, pp. 12–13.
33. For some very nice examples of Guangcai ware, see Guangdong Sheng Bowuguan 廣東省博物館, Xianggang Yishuguan 香港藝術館, and Aomen Bowuguan 澳門博物館, eds., *Haishang zhi lu: Yue Gang Ao wenwu da zhan* 海上之路：粵港澳文物大展 [Maritime porcelain road: Relics from Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao museums] (Guangzhou: Lingnan meishu chubanshe, 2012), 145–61.
34. For a survey of the polychromes in the Qing Dynasty, see Daniel Nadler, *Porcelaines Chinoises Polychromes: Trios Siècles de Commerce sous la Dynastie des Qing (1644–1908)* (Paris: Les Editions de l'Amateur, 2001). Thanks to Christiaan Jörg for pointing this reference out to me.
35. Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1208, 1794.10.16, p. 36v and 1794.10.22, p. 37r.
36. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): OIC 195, *dagregister*, 1794.12.26–7, p. 118–19 and OIC 196, *grootboek*, p. 7.
37. NAH: Canton 97, 1798.02.25, 1798.11.29 and 1799.12.21.
38. BL: IOR G/12/116, 1796.12.29, par. 138, p. 40.
39. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 339–45.

40. For the settling of these Dutch debts, see also NAH: Canton 61, Resolutions dated 9 January and 17 October 1799.
41. NAH: Canton 264, report dated 10 January 1801, par. 3.
42. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 339–45.
43. If Lisjoncon had a business name, it would likely be shown on one of the chops in Plates 07.03 and 07.04. The Yuanquan Hang chop appears on Plate 07.03, but that was the Hong merchant Chowqua's firm through which Lisjoncon did his trade. The other chops on these documents should be from Lisjoncon. Unfortunately, they are illegible.
44. On 25 December 1758, for example, Lisjoncon sold 40 chests of Peco tea to the VOC. University of Minnesota, James Ford Bell Library (JFB): B 1758 fNe, *dagregister*, 1758.12.25–26.
45. 'In Porceleynen raaden UW Ed: aan Li Sjon kon [Lisjoncon], Tinqua, de Zoon van Soequa, & Kgan Switsia, & de eerste zullen UW Ed de voornaamste vinden, van de Boutiquiers is Pinkqua de beste, dog extra duur, & heeft nog veele Oude vodden, die voor deesen aan onse Natie heeft verkogt.' NAH: VOC 4381, 1757 trade report, p. 229v; and Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 114.
46. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*.1763 (Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1763), 6 April, p. 37 and 2 September, p. 112.
47. NM: F17, 1764.03.19, pp. T1_00722–26, 1764.06.18, pp. T1_00745–51.
48. NM: F17, p. T1_05135.
49. NM: F17, 1765.03.02, pp. T1_00784–5.
50. NM: F17, 1764.01.27, p. T1_07262, 1764.01.31, pp. T1_00707–9.
51. NM: F17, 1766.12.12, pp. T1_06063–64, 1770.02.12, T1_01956, 1772.01.30, pp. T1_02012–15. Other documents in this collection also show Lisjoncon's loans at 20 percent interest, without precise dates. See pp. T1_01938, T1_05374–81, T1_06090–91, T1_06430–31 and T1_06575.
52. NM: F17, 1766.12.12, p. T1_06356, 1768.01.17, p. T1_06604, 1768.05.10, T1_06614. See also p. T1_04894.
53. NM: F17, letter from Michael Grubb in Macao dated 1763.09.10, pp. T1_01691–94.
54. Aix-en-Provence, Archives Nationales d'Outre-mer (ANOM): C.1.16, pp. 81v and 87v
55. NM: F17, 1765.01.12, pp. T1_06710 and T1_07314.
56. NM: F17 pp. T1_04440–57, T1_04474–502.
57. For other examples of the Swedes giving private loans to merchants with whom their company had contracted, see Appendixes 2E and 2F in this volume, and Appendixes 5H and 9L in MCM 1.
58. In 1778, for example, the Danes withheld a payment of 40,000 taels that the DAC owed Ingsia, because of a private loan that he had taken out from one of the Danish supercargos and had not been repaid. MCM 1:158.
59. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 117. 'Alles op gewoone Conditie, niet meer als 15 PrCo zuivere winst op den Inkoop in de binnen landen voor de Leverantiers en vrijheidom by minder aanweezen van een of meer Schepen, zo veel minder in verdeeling te ontfangen.' NAH: VOC 4417, Report dated 1779.01.24, p. 119. This entry seems to imply that the porcelain dealers agreed not to charge the Dutch more that 15 percent from the purchase prices in the interior. If this is correct, then 15 percent would be the gross profit (difference between the purchase and sale prices). The net profit would be the difference between the purchase and sale prices, minus costs (transportation, warehousing, packing and handling, depreciation on assets, and other overhead). The Dutch and other foreigners in Canton, of course, had no way to determine all of the related costs that were involved so when they talked about Chinese merchants 'profits' in their records, they usually meant gross profits.

60. The Dutch posted a declaration outside their factory door in Canton, written in Dutch and Chinese, that the company would not honour any private debts of its employees. MCM 1: Plate 01.01.
61. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 118.
62. CMD 1762, 18 September, p. 16, 24 September, p. 23, 10 October, p. 34 and 11 October, p. 36. See the index in this source for other references to Lisjoncon.
63. CMD 1763, 10 February, p. 20.
64. Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), 120. For a discussion of the gold trade and how it helped merchants gain quick capital, see MCM 1:18–19.
65. CMD 1763, 9 January, p. 8.
66. Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke. *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1764 (Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2009) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1764), 1 February, p. 18 and 1 April, p. 36; NAH: Canton 26, doc. No. 2, 1763.02.11 and doc. No. 3, 1763.02.25.
67. CMD 1763, 13 October, p. 38.
68. CMD 1764, 6 April, p. 44.
69. CMD 1764, 9 October, p. 215.
70. NM: F17, 1766.12.12, pp. T1_06063–64, T1_06356, T1_06575, T1_06424–25, 1767.11.14 and T1_06591.
71. MCM 1:164–65.
72. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.09.18, pp. 42–43.
73. NM: F17, pp. T1_04709 and T1_05483.
74. MCM 1:111, 208, 482n3.
75. NM: F17, 1768.02.20, pp. T1_00075–77 and T1_00151–53.
76. 'gamla Lozunkung' NM: F17, 1772.12.12, p. T1_02613.
77. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 140; and NAH: Canton 237, General Report, 1775.12.31, p. 125.
78. On 1 March 1777, for example, Lisjoncon offered a batch of Singlo tea to the Dutch. NAH: Canton 40, doc. No. 2, 1777.03.01.
79. NAH: Canton 88, 1779.09.24.
80. ANOM: C.1.15 pp. 69r–70v, C.1.16, pp. 81v and 87v.
81. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 118.
82. ANOM: C.1.16, pp. 81v, 87.
83. NAH: Canton 90, 1784.03.14, p. 14, 1784.09.23, p. 37, 1784.09.30, p. 42.
84. MCM 1:188.
85. NAH: VOC 4388, 1761.11.12, p. 58v; and Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 119.
86. NM: F17, 1766.08.25, p. T1_00851–55.
87. NAH: VOC 4387, doc. dated 1760.12.08, p. 737.
88. On 11 November 1763, for example, an entry in the VOC *dagregister* states that they set the prices of porcelain with Lisjoncon and Suchin Kinqua. CMD 1763, 11 November, p. 150. The *resolutie* dated 30 June 1764 shows a payment to Suchin Kinqua in the amount of 370 taels for porcelain he delivered. NAH: Canton 27, doc. No. 4, 1764.06.30. The *dagregister* for 1764, however, shows that they purchased the porcelain from Suchin Chinqua this year. CMD 1764, 29 September, p. 210. In the *grootboek* for 1764, the Dutch recorded all transactions with all Chinese merchants, and all of these porcelain transactions, including the 370 taels above, were placed under the name of Suchin, with the corresponding dates and page numbers. There is no mention of a Suchin Kinqua or Suchin Chinqua in the *grootboek*. NAH: VOC 4396, *grootboek*, p. 9. In the 1765 *grootboek*, this Suchin is shown as Suchin Kinqua. NAH: VOC 4397, *grootboek*, p. 9. They were all the same person.
89. NM: F17, pp. T1_06346 and T1_06357.

90. RAC: Ask 1179, 1778.09.05–7, pp. 59–61.
91. A few of the Dutch enterprises that followed the VOC and that were involved in the China trade include the Comité Oost-Indische Handel en Bezettingen (OIC), Raad der Aziatische Bezettingen en Etablissementen (RAB) and the Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij (NHM). The latter company was established in 1824 and sent many ships to China. W. M. F. Mansvelt, *Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 1824–1924*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Ned. Handel-Maatschappij, 1924–26).
92. E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, *Van Compagnie naar Koopvaardij, De scheepvaart verbinding van de Bataafse Republiek met de koloniën in Azië 1795–1806* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1988).
93. For Foutia's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 12.
94. The Dutch exports were calculated from the total of all receipts in the ledgers (*grootboeken*) for the 29 years. For references see Appendix 7Q.
95. NAH: Canton 75, 1766.08.11 and VOC 4399, *dagregister*, 1766.09.04; and Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 117.
96. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 117.
97. NM: F17 p. T1_06357.
98. NAH: Canton 77, 1768.01.16.
99. NAH: Canton 85, 1776.09.24.
100. NAH: Canton 86, 1777.10.02.
101. These receipts show the name Suchin Kinqua, but in the resolution dated 17 October 1799 in NAH: Canton 61, he is again referred to as just Suchin.
102. NAH: Canton 264, report dated 10 January 1801, par. 3.
103. 'Heeden voor de middag overlijd den Porceleijn Leverancier Suchin Kinqua'. NAH: Canton 98, 1804.12.13.
104. NAH: Canton 272, letter dated 1807.12.31, par. 18.
105. NAH: Canton 378,'t Gen. Comptoir Batavia in Rekening met 't Comptoir China Ao 1811, entry dated 1811.04.31.
106. NM: F17, 1766.08.25, pp. T1_00851–55, 1767.01.23, T1_06357.
107. RAC: Ask 1175, 1777.01.01, p. 120r.
108. The total Danish exports were calculated from the total of cargos shown in the ledgers (*negotieprotocoler*) for those 29 years. For references see Appendix 7R.
109. On 19 September 1775, he packed his porcelain for the VOC into three chests. On 25 August 1776, he again packed his porcelain into three chests. NAH: Canton 84, 1775.09.19, p. 107 and Canton 85, 1776.08.25. See also NAH: Canton 39, doc. No. 7, 1776.03.06; and Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 119.
110. BL: IOR G/12/76, 1782.09.03, p. 79.
111. BL: IOR G/12/76, 1782.12.29, p. 195.
112. Josiah Quincy, ed., *The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, the First American Consul at Canton: With a Life of the Author* (Boston: Wm. Crosby and H. P. Nichols, 1847), 198.
113. BL: IOR G/12/86, 1787.09.09, p. 87.
114. National Maritime Museum, Caird Library (CL): Hamilton Family Papers, HMN 5, 35 and 77.
115. Brown University, John Carter Brown Library (JCB): Stephen Dexter Journal, 24 July 1802.
116. Phillips Library, Peabody Essex Museum (PEM): Benjamin Shreve Papers MH–20, box 10, folder 4, ship *Minerva* Account Book 1809, pp. 42, 50, 53.
117. PEM: Bryant P. Tilden Journal 1815–1816, typescript, pp. 86–87.
118. Pennsylvania: Historical Society of Pennsylvania (HSP): 687 Waln Family Papers, Vol. 2, 'Book of Prices, Canton 1819', p. 28.
119. For the Yifeng Hang's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 7.

120. This receipt is reproduced in MCM 1: Plate 11.07.
121. For the Guangyuan Hang's story, see MCM 1: Chapter 11.
122. Gothenburg, Landsarkivet (Provincial Archive, GL): Öijareds säteris arkiv A 406. Seriesignum F III. 1–5 Förteckning över Svenska Ostindiska Companiets skepp under gamla och nya octroyen, och en kort berättelse om göromålen i Canton med packningslista, kina prisbok u.å., 1720–1764. (hereafter referred to as GL: A 406).
123. NM: F17 p. T1_06332, entry dated 1765.11.16.
124. Yeckhing signed his name (Yixing 益興) on a receipt in the American archives. Providence, Rhode Island Historical Society (RIHS): Miscellaneous Archives, Mss 776, Ward Family Papers, ship *General Washington* Documents, 1788–1789, receipt dated 19 December 1788, 'Mr Yeckings—chop'.
125. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 118–19.
126. NAH: Canton 48, doc. No. 1, 1786.02.23. Jörg has pointed out that many manufacturers in the interior had ceased making fish platters by the early 1780s. Out of over a hundred factories that had been making coarse ware, eighty of them had gone broke by the early 1780s. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 124–25.
127. NAH: Canton 48, doc. No. 1, 1786.02.23 and Canton 92, 1786.11.14, p. 72.
128. RAC: Ask 1208, 1794.09.17, pp. 26r–v.
129. Gothenburg Universitetsbibliotek (GUB): Skeppspredicanten C.C. Ströms papper. H 21:1, No. 1171, p. 3.
130. GUB: Svenska Ostindiska Kompaniets Arkiv. H 22:12 Avräkning med Superkargören i Kanton Gustaf Palm 1799–1801.
131. NAH: Canton 97, 1799.12.21.
132. See also resolutions dated 9 January and 5 and 21 December 1799 in NAH: Canton 61.
133. NAH: Canton 264, report dated 10 January 1801, par. 3.
134. In 1844, Tiffany mentioned a merchant by the name of Yeckhing. It is unclear whether this was the same shop. Osmond Tiffany Jr., *The Canton Chinese, or the American's Sojourn in the Celestial Empire* (Boston: James Munroe and Company, 1849), 124–26.
135. GUB: Skeppspredicanten C. C. Ströms papper. H21.1 Nr 1171 p. 3.

## Chapter 8

1. A brief summary of things discussed in this chapter was published in 2013 in Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Porcelain Dealers in Eighteenth Century Canton', in *Chinese Export Fine Art* 清代外銷藝術精品, ed. Guangdong Museum (Guangzhou: Lingnan meishu chubanshe, 2013), 20–29.
2. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): Canton 88, 1779.03.12, 1779.03.16, 1779.05.05, 1779.05.10 and 1779.07.21.
3. University of Pennsylvania Library (UPL): Ms. Coll. 499. F. Molineux's Accounts of Purchases at Canton. 'Receits' for 1784–86, p. 48r.
4. UPL: Ms. Coll. 499, p. 22r.
5. UPL: Ms. Coll. 499, p. 21r.
6. For the Heli Hao and Limsia's story, see Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) (hereafter referred to as MCM 1), Plates 07.07, 08.16, and pp. 160–61.
7. Jean McClure Mudge, *Chinese Export Porcelain for the American Trade 1785–1835* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1962; reprint, East Brunswick: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1981), 56–58; Gertrude Selwyn Kimball, 'The East-India Trade of Providence from 1787 to 1807', in *Papers from the Historical Seminary of Brown University*, ed. J. Franklin

Jameson (Providence: Preston and Rounds, 1896), 33; and Rhode Island Historical Society (RIHS): Miscellaneous Archives, Mss 336, Carter-Danforth Papers.

8. This phrase has been reproduced several times by various authors, including Kimball, 'The East-India Trade of Providence', 33; G. A. Godden, *Oriental Export Market Porcelain and Its Influence on European Wares* (London: Granada, 1979), 293; and Mudge, *Chinese Export Porcelain*, 56–57.
9. Phillips Library, Peabody Essex Museum (PEM): Benjamin Shreve Papers MH-20, box 10, folder 4, ship *Minerva* Account Book 1809, p. 53.
10. PEM: Benjamin Shreve Papers MH-20, box 10, folder 4, ship *Minerva* Account Book 1809, p. 42.
11. Pennsylvania: Historical Society of Pennsylvania (HSP): 687 Waln Family Papers, Vol. 1, p. 31 and Vol. 2, 'Book of Prices, Canton 1819', p. 28.
12. A 'Foochong' appears in some private papers from a Frenchman from Nantes who was in Canton in 1826. He gave the Frenchmen a few presents of tea canisters. I found no entries showing porcelain being purchased from him. Archives Municipales, Nantes (AMN): Papiers Dobrée 1771–1896, 8Z 507, document entitled 'The following are particulars of all Presents received by the Supercargo in Canton'.
13. HSP: 687 Waln Family Papers, Vol. 1, p. 9.
14. PEM: Benjamin Shreve Papers MH-20, box 10, folder 4, ship *Minerva* Account Book 1809, p. 42.
15. Godden, *Oriental Export Market Porcelain*, 37–38.
16. PEM: Benjamin Shreve Papers MH-20, box 10, folder 4, ship *Minerva* Account Book 1809, p. 54.
17. PEM: Benjamin Shreve Papers MH-20, box 10, folder 4, ship *Minerva* Account Book 1809, p. 43.
18. Based on the author's own experience.
19. HSP: 687 Waln Family Papers, Vol. 1, p. 9.
20. HSP: 687 Waln Family Papers, Vol. 2, 'Book of Prices, Canton 1819', p. 28.
21. There is also a Comshong who appears in a French journal in 1844, but he seems to have been a different person. Charles Lavollée, *Voyage en Chine* (Paris: Just Rouvier, 1853), 328–33.
22. HSP: 687 Waln Family Papers, Vol. 2, 'Book of Prices, Canton 1819', p. 28.

## Chapter 9

1. Parts of this chapter were previously published in Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Weaver Suckin and the Canton Silk Trade 1750–1781', *Review of Culture*, International Edition no. 29 (January 2009): 105–19. I thank the *Review of Culture* for permission to reproduce it here.
2. Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, *The Philippine Islands 1493–1898*, 55 vols. (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1903–1909), 42:150.
3. For a comparison of Chinese silk and tea exports to England from 1760 to 1833, see Lin Man-Houng, *China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808–1856* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), 65.
4. Christiaan J. A. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), Appendix 8.
5. Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident: Le Commerce à Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 1:402–5.
6. I made a rough estimate of total tea, porcelain and raw silk exports in 1775, with the following results.

| Exports | Piculs | Percentage of total | Average taels per picul | Taels | Percentage of total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tea | 124,277 | 0.87 | 22.000 | 2,734,094 | 0.76 |
| Porcelain and Sago | 14,834 | 0.10 | 3.165 | 46,950 | 0.01 |
| Raw Silk | 3,710 | 0.03 | 225.000 | 834,750 | 0.23 |
| Total | 142,821 | 1.00 | | 3,615,794 | 1.00 |

Source: Earl H. Pritchard, *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations 1750–1800* (1936; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1970), Appendixes V and VI; and British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/58, 'Exports'. Unfortunately, the values of other exports are not easily obtained. But their total value would only be a small fraction of total exports. In terms of value, silk was by far the second most important commodity. For the Dutch silk exports, see Christiaan J. A. Jörg, 'Chinese Export Silks for the Dutch in the 18th Century'. *Transactions of the Oriental Ceramic* Society 73 (2008–2009), 1–24. See pp. 13–16 and Appendix 1, which also shows silk to be a very significant export in terms of value.

7. As I mentioned in the Preface of the first volume, I collected the names of all Chinese that appear in the EIC Canton factory records from 1689 to 1846 and there are no silk weavers, painters or embroiderers among them. Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*. Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) (hereafter referred to as MCM 1), pp. xv–xvii. For examples of the EIC purchasing raw silk from ten or more different merchants in 1776, see BL: IOR G/12/59, pp. 238–46. Some of the men shown on these pages were Hong merchants. Other names have not been identified, but they would be either outside merchants or inland agents. A few of these men also sold tea.
8. Guangzhou shi wenhua ju 廣州市文化局, *Guangzhou Jinlun Huiguan zhengti yiwei baohu gongcheng ji* 廣州錦綸會館整體移位保護工程記 (Beijing: Zhongguo jianzhu gongye chubanshe, 2007), 3.
9. For a picture of the inside of the Jinlun Huiguan, see MCM 1: Plate 09.16.
10. In the past ten years, there has been much research done on the stone steles in local institutions and temples in Guangdong Province, Hong Kong, and Macao. Many of these stone inscriptions have been transcribed and published. Tan Dihua 譚棣華, Cao Tengfei 曹騰騑 and Xian Jianmin 冼劍民, eds., *Guangdong beike ji* 廣東碑刻集 [Collection of stone steles in Guangdong] (Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001); Xian Jianmin 冼劍民 and Chen hongjun 陳鴻鈞, eds., *Guangdong beike ji* 廣東碑刻集 (Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 2006); and Tan Shibao 譚世寶, *Jinshi mingke de Aomen shi: Ming Qing Aomen miaoyu beike zhongming jilu yanjiu* 金石銘刻的澳門史：明清澳門廟宇碑刻鐘銘集錄研究 (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2006).
11. Guangzhou shi wenhua ju, *Guangzhou Jinlun Huiguan zhengti yiwei baohu gongcheng ji*. I loaded the names from the steles from 1732 to 1876 into a spreadsheet for easy searching. These steles have more than 8,500 names on them. This data enabled me to see quickly whether any of the silk workers I discuss in the next chapter were contributors. There were very few matches (Chapter 10).
12. Philadelphia, Independence Seaport Museum (ISM): Benjamin Etting Journal, 1821, pp. 38–39.
13. William Milburn, *Oriental Commerce*, 2 vols. (London: Black, Parry, & Co., 1813; reprint, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1999), 2:519.
14. Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1764 (Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2009) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1764), 18 March, p. 31.

15. The Dutch documents that discuss the silk trade are far too numerous to list here. For a few examples, see National Archive, The Hague (NAH): Canton 27, Resolution No. 1, dated 1764.06.22 and No. 46, dated 1764.12.23, Canton 42, Resolution No. 4, dated 1779.09.14 and No. 6, dated 1779.09.30, Canton 74, 1765.08.02, Canton 75, 1766.07.27, and Canton 78, 1769.08.01.
16. NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1792.09.20, p. 60 and *generaal raport* for 1792, dated 1792.11.28, paragraph No. 31.
17. NAH: Canton 27, Resolution No. 5, dated 1764.08.08; and CMD 1764, 8 August, p. 163.
18. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.03.24–25, pp. 25–26, 1759.04.26, p. 43, 1759.04.28–30, pp. 45–46, 1759.07.15, pp. 72–73.
19. The EIC Consultation for 1759 states on 19 July that the *Winchelsea* and *Prince of Wales* were ordered to proceed from Macao to Whampoa on 19 July. The logbooks from these ships, however, show them already at Whampoa by 20 June. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.07.19, p. 79, L/MAR/B/525A, L/MAR/B/4D and L/MAR/B/404H.
20. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.10.17, p. 126.
21. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.11.04, p. 136.
22. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1762 (Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2006) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1762), 16 September, p. 10; and Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1763 (Macao: Macao Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1763), 15 January, p. 11.
23. NAH: Canton 74, 1765.04.21. Dermigny shows a total of 28 ships at Whampoa in 1764 and 32 in 1765. Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2:521–25. These numbers match very closely with my new ship list that I hope to publish in the near future.
24. For examples of inflation of food prices, see Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), 65. There are many complaints in the foreign records from the late eighteenth century of the rise in silk prices, much of which was attributed to the rise in the price of rice.
25. Foreigners tried to keep food prices from rising as well, by tying the compradors' contracts to prices of former years. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 57–58.
26. For a detailed discussion of the silk industry in Guangdong Province, see C. W. Howard and K. P. Buswell, *A Survey of the Silk Industry of South China* (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1925).
27. There are many scattered references in the foreign archives to fabrics coming from Foshan, some of which are included below and in the next chapter. For one example, see BL: IOR G/12/50, 1741.10.27, p. 30. In 1766, the Dutch mentioned that their silk fabrics were being spun at Foshan. 'Den Weever Suckin eijndelijk van faischeant [Foshan], alwaar de Zijde-Stoffen gefabriceerd werden.' NAH: Canton 75, 1766.10.23. For an extensive study of the silk production areas in China, see Lillian Li, *China's Silk Trade: Traditional Industry in the Modern World 1842–1937* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
28. BL: IOR G/12/25, 1724.10.01, p. 10.
29. Phillips Library, Peabody Essex Museum (PEM): MH 219 Bryant P. Tilden Journals. Typescript, pp. 773–74.
30. MCM 1:16.
31. PEM: Tilden Journals. Typescript, pp. 831 and 957.
32. BL: IOR G/12/7, 1704.12.30, p. 1049. Leanqua's surname is unknown but he signed his name as 連官 on a letter in the British Library. BL: IOR E/1/2 letter No. 117, ff. 214–15. Other examples include: the governor general prevented a Manila ship from leaving China in 1723 owing to suspicions that it had yellow silks aboard. BL: IOR G/12/21, 1723.05.21, pp. 14–5. In 1728, 'The Hoppo officers came about noon, and going to ship our wrought

silks, we had still more objections rais'd by them of the colours yellow & crimson, which are prohibited, and refus'd to ship them.' BL: IOR G/12/27, 1728.12.24, p. 130. See also Jörg, 'Chinese Export Silks for the Dutch in the 18th Century', 14.

33. BL: IOR G/12/35, 1733.07.30, p. 14, 1733.08.05, p. 23, and 1733.08.06, p. 24. In 1727, the EIC ship *Prince Augustus* received 'two luggage boats 64 chests of silks being ship'd of in a Hurry by the Chineese Merchants upon the Acco[un]t of a new Hoppo being Order'd by the Emperour; they alledging, that if they were not ship'd before he took place, the Yellow and Crimson Colours, would not be allowed to go; at least not without an extraordinary Present which they could not afford'. BL: IOR L/MAR/B/665, 1727.11.25. There are many other such examples in the foreign records.
34. BL: IOR G/12/50, 1741.11.18–19, pp. 47–48.
35. See for example, the illegal gold contract written in Dutch and Chinese reproduced in MCM 1: Plate 03.10. Another contract for gold and silk is reproduced in Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Plate 18.
36. For a brief discussion of the contraband trade, see Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Chapter 7.
37. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 5:79–80; Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1141, 1759.09.15; and Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 95–96.
38. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5:79–80; RAC: Ask 1141, 1759.09.15; and Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 95–96.
39. 'Wanneer zij 3) waren voortgevaaren; hoe het althoos gebruijkelijk was voor alle geele op 't sjap te zetten *Thee Couleur!* (na de gemeene Cantonse Thee die veel na Olijfsweemd) . . . Nu zeggen de Kooplieden dat de voorige Hoppo zig meede althoos hebben gehouden als of ze geloofden dat het geen voor Thee Couleur op 't sjap wierd gezelt zulks werklijk was.' NAH: Canton 75, 1766.11.28. An entry on 30 November states that the Dutch were able to ship off 96 and 102 pieces of yellow silks in two separate chests to two different ships so they found a way to get them past customs. NAH: Canton 75, 1766.11.30.
40. For a discussion of the smuggling going on in the bottom of the foreign flag boats, see Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 117–20.
41. RAC: Ask 1157, 1767.12.21; and MCM 1:97 and 456n56. See also Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 95–96; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 5:70.
42. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 129, 'Table 7: Tidewaiters' Connivance Fees in Whampoa and Canton, 1834'.
43. By the late eighteenth century, most of the connivance fees seem to have been monetary charges rather than payments in kind. The connivance fee for opium, for example, was about 20 Spanish dollars per chest. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 127–34.
44. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690–1845' (PhD diss., Department of History, University of Southern California, 2002), Chapters 1, 5, and 6; and NAH: Canton 78, 1769.10.07.
45. Fu Lo-Shu, ed. *A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644–1820)* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966), 1759.08.17, p. 226 and 1762.06.04, p. 231; and CMD 1762, 16 September, p. 10; and CMD 1763, 15 January, p. 11.
46. These sources show that by 1780, the quota had been raised to 100 piculs per ship. NAH: Canton 43, Resolution No. 2, dated 1780.02.02, Canton 93, 1788.01.15; and BL: IOR G/12/73, 1781.12.27, p. 115, 1781.12.31, pp. 125–26 and G/12/76, 1782.12.02, pp. 165–66.
47. 'Of silk, eighty peculs to each vessel is the prescribed quantity, but the regulation is evaded by sending down the extra quantity by other vessels, and then transhipping it.' W. W. Wood, *Sketches of China: With Illustrations from Original Drawings* (Philadelphia: Carey & Lea,

1830), 217. See also Weng Eang Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 163nn141–42.

48. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire: The Period of Subjection 1834–1911*, 3 vols. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910; reprint, Taipei: Yung Mei Mei Publishing, 1966), 1:76.
49. Li, *China's Silk Trade*, 62–69. For a very lengthy and detailed explanation of the silk quotas in 1762 and 1763, see NAH: Canton 26, Resolution No. 6, dated 1763.05.15.
50. BL: IOR G/12/227, 1822.10.01, pp. 275–76; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 4:54–55.
51. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1768.03.15, p. 11.
52. 'alle Europeanen Vrijheid in ijder van haar scheepen te laaden 50 picols rauwe Cantonse, en 30 picols rauwe Nankingse Zijde van de tweede soort' (all Europeans have the freedom to load 50 piculs of raw Canton and 30 piculs of raw Nanking silk in each ship). It further states that this quota was set by the emperor. NAH: Canton 26, Resolution No. 6, dated 1763.05.15.
53. NAH: Canton 26, Resolution No. 6, dated 1763.05.15.
54. Morse mentions that in 1810 'for the first time, the Court ordered 100 piculs of Canton silk to be included in the investment'. The Canton variety was exported by the EIC after this date, but not every year. Morse, *Chronicles*, 3:138, 176, 181; and 4:4. Beginning in the 1760s, there are lists of total Canton exports in the EIC and VOC archives. They confirm that the EIC ships were only exporting Nanking silk, whereas the country, American and other ships were exporting large quantities of Canton silk, and sometimes also Nanking silk. In the EIC archive, these cargo lists can be found in the Diaries for each year. In the VOC archive, there are copies of these cargo lists scattered throughout, under many different file names. But a good deal of them can be found in NAH: 'Hoge Regering van Batavia' (HRB) collection and Canton 268.
55. CMD 1763, 15 January, p. 11. As late as 1836, foreigners were still complaining about the quotas placed on silk exports, but were unable to convince the Qing court to remove them. *Canton Register* (8 November 1836).
56. There are endless examples of merchants refusing to contract silk unless they received silver in return. Here is one example. 'Drie Engelsche capteins vertrekken na boord ten einde met hun schepen onder zeijl te gaan, blijven dus nog 2 schepen leggen welke dagelijks denkelijk binnen 10 dagen zullen geExpedieert worden, wagten de nog na de ruwe Nankingse Zijde die de Country Lieden niet wil bringeren zonder contante penningen, en zulks is niet nog bij de kooplieden nog bij hun te vinden.' NAH: Canton 92, 1786.02.15, pp. 6–7.
57. MCM 1:18–19.

## Chapter 10

1. There are now many studies on silk, in numerous languages. I list here only a few of the books that discuss the silk trade in China. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966); Earl H. Pritchard, *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations 1750–1800* (1936; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1970); K. N. Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Lillian Li, *China's Silk Trade: Traditional Industry in the Modern World 1842–1937* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); and Alvin Y. So, *The South China Silk District: Local Historical Transformation and World-System Theory* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986).
2. A couple of examples of studies that have focused on the Sino-American silk trade include Carl L. Crossman, *The Decorative Arts of the China Trade. Paintings, Furnishings and Exotic*

*Curiosities* (Suffolk: Antique Collectors' Club, 1988); and Huang Man Man, 'Chinese Export Silk for the American Market in the 19th Century and the Female Influence' (MA thesis, Department of History, University of Macau, 2013).

3. Christiaan J. A. Jörg, 'Chinese Export Silks for the Dutch in the 18th Century', *Transactions of the Oriental Ceramic Society* 73 (2008–2009): 1–24; and Friederike Wappenschmidt, *Chinesische Tapeten für Europa* (Merlin: Deutscher Verlag für Kunstwissenschaft, 1989). Hanna Hodacs is presently doing a study on the Danish and Swedish silk trade in the eighteenth century, but from a European perspective.
4. Much of this section on Weaver Suckin was previously published in Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Weaver Suckin and the Canton Silk Trade 1750–1781', *Review of Culture*, International Edition no. 29 (January 2009), 105–19. I thank the *Review of Culture* for permission to reproduce it here.
5. Nordic Museum Archive (NM), Stockholm. Godegårdsarkivet: F17 (hereafter referred to as NM: F17), pp. T1_04928 and T1_005636–37.
6. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): VOC 4381, report dated 1758.01.19, p. 229r.
7. NAH: VOC 4381, doc. dated 1757.09.27, p. 104 and doc. entitled 'Retouren 1758', pp. 291–93. There are more than thirty entries on these pages showing Tan Anqua and Suckin selling various kinds of fabrics to the VOC in partnership, and no entries showing Suckin trading alone.
8. NAH: VOC 4381, *dagregister*, 1757.10.15, pp. 188r–v, 1757.10.23, p. 189r and 1757.11.04, pp. 190r–v. I have no other references to Weaver Lamqua in any of the East India companies' records. He only shows up this one year.
9. NAH: VOC 4382, Resolution dated 1759.01.08, p. 138, journal entry 1759.01.10, p. 40, and *grootboek*, p. 27.
10. The Dutch mentioned that the French were willing to pay 1 to 1.5 taels more than other Europeans. However, some explanation is needed to understand what that meant. The prices for wrought silks were set according to lots of so many pieces of 50, 100, 150, etc. Certain types of fabrics were sold in lots of 50 pieces, while other types might be sold in lots of 300 to 400 pieces (for examples, see Plate 09.02). What the Dutch seem to imply is that the French paid 1 to 1.5 taels more per lot than what other Europeans were willing to pay. NAH: Canton 26, Resolution No. 6, dated 1763.05.15.
11. It is unclear whether 'Tenhi' was another spelling for 'Chancri', or a different person. NAH: VOC 4381, resolution dated 1758.01.12, p. 124r and *dagregister*, 1758.01.12, p. 199r.
12. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1763 (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1763), 11 April, p. 39, 10 September, pp. 119, 177n52 and 185n128. 'The French, who are known to transport the best fabrics, have contracted 600 pieces with Inksia, because the weaver, who has always served them (and who is the same one who makes all of our fabrics) will accept no other *fiador* or Hongist than the house of Swetia'. CMD 1763, 10 September, p. 119.
13. See Chapter 8 and Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) (hereafter referred to as MCM 1): 160, 364, 472n64 and Plates 09.07 and 09.16.
14. NAH: VOC 4381, Report dated 1758.01.19, p. 223v. The next reference I have to him is in a resolution from 1764. NAH: Canton 27, Resolution No. 46, dated 1764.12.23.
15. In 1779, the Dutch wrote: 'zo wierd verstaan den Weever Suckin, woonende te Faisant [Foshan], te laeten ontbieden om ten spoedigsten herwards te komen, ten einde met hem te reguleeren de quantitijt en priesen der nog ontbreekende stoffen' (we have requested Weaver Suckin, who lives in Foshan, to come here [Canton] quickly so we can establish the prices and quantities of silk that we are in need of). NAH: Canton 42, Resolution No. 4, dated 1779.09.14.

16. NAH: Canton 75, 1766.01.28, 1766.07.27, 1766.09.03, 1766.10.23.
17. NAH: Canton 79, 1770.08.01–2.
18. NAH: Canton 34, Resolution No. 6, 1771 and Canton 80, 1771.02.08 and 1771.08.18–20.
19. NAH: Canton 76, 1767.02.13.
20. NAH: Canton 32, Resolution No. 1, dated 1769.04.30 and No. 4, dated 1769.12.02, Canton 33, Resolution No. 2, dated 1770.08.02, Canton 34, Resolution No. 3, dated 1771.03.26, Canton 35, Resolution No. 7, dated 1772.03.18, Canton 76, 1767.02.13.
21. This loan contract is reproduced in Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), Plate 41.
22. NM: F17 pp. T1_00048–52; and Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690–1845' (PhD diss., Department of History, University of Southern California, 2002), Chapter 5.
23. NAH: Canton 33, Resolution No. 31, dated 1770.08.01; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 1:288.
24. NAH: Canton 76, 1767.08.12, 1767.08.10–12, 1767.08.20 and1767.11.03–4. 'De zijde stoffen zijn tot dezelve prijzen, als die van het voorig jaar besteed, en uit aanmerking der Cohang gelden, en zonder dat zouden de weevers, om de duurte van de zijde 4 pr ct meerder moeten hebben'. NAH: VOC 4556, entry under 'Cohang', there is no date on this entry but it seems to relate to the 1767 discount of 4 percent.
25. NAH: Canton 77, 1768.02.16.
26. NAH: Canton 33, Resolution No. 2, dated 1770.08.02, No. 31, dated 1770.08.01.
27. NAH: Canton 35, doc. No. 7, dated 1772.03.18.
28. References to weavers, painters and embroiderers do not begin to appear in the DAC records until the 1770s so we do not know how the Danes might have treated those persons in the 1760s. There are many references to porcelain dealers throughout the eighteenth century in the DAC archives. Those men's accounts are also listed under their individual names during the years of the Co-hong just like in the Dutch records.
29. There are many references to the Dutch ordering their silk fabrics from Weaver Suckin in the Dutch *dagregisters* from 1764 to 1771. His name shows up in many of the VOC resolutions in those years as well. In the annual *grootboeken* (ledgers), however, Suckin's name does not appear. All of those silk orders were channelled through the three Hong merchants Cai Hunqua, Ingsia and Chetqua. The Co-hong ended in early 1771, and then from 1772 to 1780, Suckin did all his business with the Dutch under his own name. See the VOC *dagregisters*, *resoluties* and *grootboeken* for those years, all of which are cross-referenced with page numbers, one to the other.
30. NAH: Canton 36, Resolution No. 11, 1773.03.11.
31. NAH: Canton 36, Resolutions No. 13, dated 1773.08.25 and No. 21, dated 1773.10.23, Canton 37, Resolution No. 4, dated 1774.02.18.
32. NAH: Canton 38, Resolution No. 3, dated 1775.02.24, Canton 39, Resolution No. 5, dated 1776.02.25, Canton 40, Resolution No. 7, dated 1777.08.17.
33. Li, *China's Silk Trade*, 66–69.
34. Li, *China's Silk Trade*, 66–69.
35. Li, *China's Silk Trade*, 69.
36. Morse shows that the English called 1st, 2nd and 3rd grade raw silk, 'Head', 'Belly' and 'foot', respectively. But then in other entries the English simply entered 'raw silk' in the Diaries and Consultations without stipulating the grade. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1:90, 97, 110, 123–24.
37. NAH: Canton 38, Resolution No. 3, dated 1775.02.24, Canton 39, Resolution No. 5, dated 1776.02.25, Canton 40, Resolution No. 7, dated 1777.08.17, Canton 41, Resolution No. 7, dated 1778.08.20, Canton 42, Resolution No. 6, dated 1779.09.30.
38. NAH: Canton 87, 1778.11.22, 1778.12.03 and 1778.12.07.

39. Christiaan Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 84.
40. NAH: Canton 43, doc. No. 2, dated 1780.02.02, doc. No. 4, dated 1780.09.18, doc. Nos. 10–11, 1780, Canton 44, doc. No. 2, dated 1781.02.19, doc. No. 4, dated 1781.10.15.
41. NAH: VOC 4425, Resolution No. 2 dated 1783.09.22. There is another copy of this document in Canton 45, Resolution No. 2 dated 1783.09.22. I have not been able to track this transaction down in the Danish company records. The Danes did indeed buy silk textiles in the early 1780s, but from Asing, Kiauqua, and Samqua. They also dealt with Pinqua but mostly in tea. It is possible this was a private transaction done between Pinqua and the Danish supercargoes.
42. NAH: Canton 45, doc. No. 4, dated 1783.10.23, Canton 46, doc. No. 3, dated 1784.09.07, 90, 1784.02.23, pp. 7–8, 1784.03.18, p. 16.
43. NAH: Canton 47, Resolution No. 2 dated 1785.03.23.
44. NAH: Canton 43, doc. No. 2, dated 1780.02.02, doc. No. 4, dated 1780.09.18 and doc. No. 5, dated 1780.10.05. Several other documents in this file also mention Tiqua.
45. See for example, NAH: Canton 43, Resolution dated 1780.01.24.
46. NAH: Canton 43, Resolutions dated 1780.02.02 and 1780.09.18, and VOC 4423, Contract dated 1780.02.11
47. NAH: VOC 4425, Resolutions dated 1783.09.22 and 1783.10.18, and Canton 45, Resolution No. 3 dated 1783.10.18.
48. NAH: Canton 95, 1789.12.18, p. 95. The *grootboek* for 1789 in NAH: VOC 4444 shows no entry for Tiqua.
49. Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1185, 1781.10.15, pp. 50r–v and 1782.01.03, p. 101r.
50. On 9 June 1793, in reference to Weaver Conqua, the Dutch in Macao mentioned that 'zijn Moeder hier te Macao Woonende'. NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.06.09, p. 14.
51. 'Conqua is een boutiquier alhier wonagtig, die zeedert 3 à 4 Jaaren reedelijk veel met de Portugeesen en anderen particulieren heeft te doen gehad, ook verscheide stukken en onderscheide soorten, als meubel damasten een & twee CouL: ook twee en drie CouL: Lampassen extra aan de Deenen met groot genoegen geleevert; van de laaste aan ons eenige stukken & patroonen vertoond zijnde heeft men die bevonden te zijn van een deugdzame & gedekte stoffagie, de Bloemen extra fijn uitgewerkt en de Coul: voor de Nuance na behooren ingerigt, en daar hij aannam de bezorging van de hem toeged: parthij te willen doen zonder vooruitbetaling heeft men hem ter aanmaking opgegeven 820 ps van assortmenten als by zijne, hier al mede agtergevoegde aanbesteedings lijst ten duidelijkste gespecificeert staan.' NAH: Canton 46, Resolution No. 1, 1784.
52. 'Bij komst van den Wever Conqua ondervroeg hem der President in de Portugese Taal, of hij emmer aan de adsistenten Melander en Steijn had geklaagd en verhaald, dat den supercargo Dozij van hem voor zig zelv had afgedwongen de betaling van drie percent over het bedragen der geleverde zijde stoffen, des gepasseerden jaars aan de compagnie. Hij antwoorden daar op zonder hæsitatie in 't Portugees, dat dit een Logen was, en hij zulx nimmer aan die Heeren had gezegt.' NAH: Canton 54, Resolution No. 29 dated 1793.03.02.
53. NAH: Canton 48, Resolution No. 1, dated 1786.02.23, Canton 49, Resolution No. 1, dated 1787.02.07, Canton 50, Resolution No. 1, dated 1788.03.07, Canton 51, Resolution No. 2, dated 1789.02.22, Canton 52, Resolution No. 2, dated 1790.02.04
54. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2:197.
55. NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1792.11.12, p. 106; MCM 1:194; and Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 93.
56. NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1792.12.19, p. 134.

57. NAH: Canton 54, Resolution No. 29, dated 1793.03.02.
58. NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1792.12.19, p. 134.
59. NAH: VOC 4447, *general raport* for 1792, dated 1792.12.13, par. 73.
60. NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1793.02.28, p. 197.
61. NAH: Canton 54, Resolution No. 29, dated 1793.03.02, VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.04.17, pp. 6–7, 1793.06.09, pp. 14–15, and Resolution dated 1793.05.30.
62. NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.09.29, p. 42, and Canton 55, Resolution No. 7, dated 1793.09.30 and Resolution No. 30, dated 1793.09.30.
63. NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.10.01, p. 43.
64. NAH: Canton 55, doc. No. 13, dated 1793.11.27, doc. No. 44, dated 1793.11.27, Canton 254, *Generaal Rapport* for 1793, dated 1793.11.29, p. 5, par. 11, p. 10, par. 22, and VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.11.26, p. 79.
65. NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.10.15, p. 52.
66. NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.04.28, p. 9.
67. NAH: Canton 55, Resolution No. 13, dated 1793.11.27.
68. John Carter Brown Library (JCB): Brown Family Papers, Box 1131, folder 1, account book by John Bowers 1797, p. 8.
69. NM: F17, p. T1_05368.
70. RAC: Ask 1179, 1778.08.28, p. 53v, Ask 1180, 1779.08.15, p. 70r.
71. RAC: Ask 1176, 1776.12.04, Ask 1178, 1777.09.19.
72. RAC: Ask 1176, 1776.12.04, p. 108v, Ask 1178, 1777.09.19, p. 53r, Ask 1177, 1778.01.09, p. 148v, Ask 1179, 1778.08.28, p. 53v, Ask 1180, 1779.08.15, p. 70r, Ask 1183, 1780.08.22, p. 56v, Ask 1185, 1781.10.27, pp. 46r-v.
73. JCB: Brown Family Papers, Box 579, folder 1, letter to Samuel Snow and Daniel Olney dated in Providence 24 December 1794, signed by Brown, Benson and Ives, and folder 9 'Account Current with Dan Olney & John Bowers', and Box 1131, folder 1, account book by John Bowers 1797.
74. NAH: Canton 254, *generaal rapport* for 1793, dated 1793.11.29, p. 5, par. 11.
75. NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1792.11.12, p. 106.
76. NAH: VOC 4446, document 'Specifique Lijst fan 950 ps Zijde Stoffen uit de hand gekogt van den Fabriqueur Samqua', dated 1791.11.16, document 'Heeden hebben Wij Ondergetekenden . . . van den Fabriqeur Samqua', dated 1791.11.24, journal entries dated 1791.11.26, p. 30 and 1791.12.08, p. 39, Resolution dated 1791.12.09, and Canton 53, doc. No. 27, dated 1791.11.16.
77. NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1792.12.19, p. 134.
78. NAH: VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1792.11.12, p. 106.
79. RAC: Ask 1207, 1792.12.16, p. 138 and 1792.12.25, p. 143.
80. NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.04.11 and 04.17–18, pp. 6–7, and Resolution dated 1793.05.30.
81. NAH: VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.10.06, p. 46, 1793.10.16, p. 53.
82. NAH: Canton 55, doc. No. 13, dated 1793.11.27, doc. No. 44, dated 1793.11.27, Canton 254, *generaal rapport* for 1793, dated 1793.11.29, p. 5, par. 11, and VOC 4577, *dagregister*, 1793.11.26, p. 79.
83. NAH: OIC 195, *dagregister*, 1794.01.24, p. 24.
84. As Table 10.1 shows that Samqua's prices for Nankeen raw silk in 1794 were 400 taels and above. Other merchants' prices were 325 to 370 taels per picul. RAC: Ask 1208, 1794.10.04, p. 32r, 1794.11.09, p. 43r, 1794.12.07, p. 54v.
85. RAC: Ask 1208, 1794.10.04, p. 32r, 1794.12.02, p. 52r. Samqua's 1794 sales to the Danes do not appear in Appendix 10B because the DAC account book (*hovedboger*) is missing for this year.

86. JCB: Brown Family Papers, Box 579, folder 1, letter to Samuel Snow and Daniel Olney dated in Providence, 24 December 1794, signed by Brown, Benson and Ives.
87. Massachusetts Historical Society (MHS): Ms N-49.53 William Trotter Letter/Journal.
88. JCB: Brown Family Papers, Box 579, folder 1, letter to Samuel Snow and Daniel Olney dated in Providence, December 24, 1794, signed by Brown, Benson and Ives, and folder 9 'Account Current with Dan Olney & John Bowers', and Box 1131, folder 1, account book by John Bowers 1797.
89. University of Pennsylvania Library (UPL): Ms. Coll. 499 F. Molineux's Accounts of Purchases at Canton. 'Receits for 1784–1786', p. 16r.
90. There is an Assing in the VOC records as well, but he was one of the factory servants. NAH: Canton 59, Resolution dated 1797.06.01.
91. The earliest reference I have found to Assing in DAC records is RAC: Ask 1186, 1782.10.14, p. 57r.
92. RAC: Ask 1212, 1799.02.15, p. 40r. See also entries in Ask 2252–53.
93. For another comparison of Lochop's prices in 1784, see NAH: Canton 46, Resolution No. 10.
94. The *grootboeken* for 1784 and 1785 are in NAH: VOC 4426 and 4431, respectively.
95. See for example, NAH: Canton 46, doc. No. 19, 'Specifique Lijst van 200 st Zijde Stoffen' dated 1784.09.25 and attributed to Kiouqua (Geowqua). The fabrics shown in this list may have been supplied by Lochop, but it is unclear.
96. NAH: Canton 46, Resolutions No. 1, dated 1784 and No. 3, dated 1784.09.07, Canton 90, 1784.12.16, p. 107, Canton 47, Resolutions No. 1, dated 1785.02.20, No. 2, dated 1785.03.23, No. 3, dated 1785.09.25.
97. NAH: VOC 4426, Resolution No. 1, dated 1784.03.15, Canton 49, Resolution No. 1, dated 1787.02.07, Canton 50, Resolution No. 1, dated 1788.03.07, Canton 51, Resolution dated 1789.02.22, Canton 52, Resolution No. 2, dated 1790.02.04, Canton 53, Resolution No. 26, dated 1791.01.08, and Canton 54, Resolution No. 2, dated 1792.01.17.
98. 'Dat de zijde stoffen pr *Vasco de Gama* gezonden voldoen de zijn bevonden, is ons zeer aangenaam, en het is den eersten Teckenaar inzonderheid liev, dat zijn oordeel omtrent de stoffen, van Conqua boven die van Lochop gegrond is bevonden geworden.' NAH: VOC 4447, *general raport* for 1792, dated 1792.12.13, par. 73. See also NAH: Canton 54, Resolution No. 2, dated 1792.01.17, VOC 4446, 'Memorie omtrent de 2050 stukken zijde stoffen', dated 1791.10.23 and VOC 4447, *dagregister*, 1792.01.03, p. 4.
99. 'De eerste schilder der Zijde Stoffen in deese gewesten Anthonÿ Thunqua, off van Christen naam Anthonius, bij ons eerst alleen, en vervolgens met zijn gewoonen fabriceur Lamqua, die ook voor een goed workman werd gehouden.' NAH: VOC 4381, doc. dated 1757.09.05, p. 102.
100. NAH: VOC 4381, doc. dated 1758.01.12, p. 124, VOC 4382, Resolution dated 1759.01.08, p. 138, journal entry 1759.01.10, p. 40, and *grootboek*, p. 27.
101. NAH: VOC 4397, *grootboek*, p. 31 and journal entries dated 1765.12.02 and 1766.01.03–6.
102. On 24 January 1766, the Swedes also paid Painter Anthony (Målaren Antony) 339.66 taels for painting some of their silk fabrics. This would have been the final payment after delivery, and before the ships left. Unfortunately, the Swedish records do not mention how much they gave him in advance or details about the fabrics ordered. Gothenburg Universitetsbibliotek (GUB): SOIC H 22.4A Rådplägningsbok för skeppet Götha Leijon 1750–1752 (at the end of the Rådplägningsbok is a Cassa Bok for 1765).
103. NAH: Canton 30, Resolution No. 27, dated 1767.11.20.
104. NAH: Canton 31, Resolution No. 1, dated 1768.05.02 and Canton 77, 1768.01.30 and 1768.07.22.

105. NAH: Canton 31, Resolution No. 1, dated 1768.05.02 and Canton 77, 1768.01.30 and 1768.07.22.
106. NAH: Canton 77, 1768.07.04–12.
107. NAH: VOC 4402, *grootboek*, p. 15.
108. NAH: VOC 4402, *grootboek*, pp. 14–15, journal entries 2 May, p. 10, 12 July, p. 15 and 11 November, p. 38 and Canton 77, 5 November.
109. NAH: Canton 32, doc. No. 16 entitled 'De Onderstaande Zijde Stoffen bij den Wever Suckin aante besteeden voor de aanstaande Handeltijd Ao 1769'.
110. NAH: VOC 4405, *grootboek*, pp. 10, 17, journal, 24 October, p. 33
111. NAH: VOC 4408, *grootboek*, pp. 6, 15, 19, 22, journal, 12 August, p. 12, 6 December, p. 40, VOC 4410, *grootboek*, pp. 7, 19, journal, 18 November, p. 46, 15 December , p. 58.
112. NAH: VOC 4405, *grootboek*, pp. 10, 17, journal, 18–20 November, pp. 45–46.
113. MCM 1:160, 364–65; NAH: VOC 4408, *grootboek*, p. 6, journal, 14 November, p. 29, 16 November, p. 31, VOC 4410, *grootboek*, pp. 7, 19.
114. NAH: VOC 4408, *grootboek*, p. 6, journal, 14 November, p. 29, 16 November, p. 31.
115. VOC 4410, *grootboek*, pp. 7, 19, journal, 8 January, p.1, 31 January, p. 5, 20 March, p. 11, 20 August, p. 12, 7 November, p. 36.
116. Anthony seems to have been involved in these wallpaper orders as early as 1778. NAH: Canton 41, Resolution No. 7, dated 1778.08.20. See paragraph entitled 'Chinese Geschilderde Papieren'.
117. The following source also has some discussion of the Dutch wallpaper orders. Wappenschmidt, *Chinesische Tapeten für Europa*, 73–78. See also Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 88. There was a Hong merchant named Seequa, and several other people with that name involved in trade, which can make it confusing identifying *boutiquier* Seequa in the records.
118. 'Dat voor de geschilderede papieren Antonij den schilder meede eenige desçeijnen zal maaken, ten einde daar uit de patroonen voor de partij te kiezen welke dien na door hem en Sequa gefabriceert en geleevert zal worden tot het bedraagen van duijzend Thaijlen of daar omtrent ingevolge gunstige permissie en qualificatie van onze hoge Heeren en Meesters'. NAH: Canton 48, Resolution No. 3 dated 1786.09.11. Part of this quotation is reproduced in Wappenschmidt, *Chinesische Tapeten für Europa*, 151n245. The wording in that entry, however, is not the same and a different source is given. The entry above is as it appears in NAH: Canton 48.
119. NAH: Canton 49, doc. Nos. 11 and 12, 1787.10.20.
120. For a few other references to Seequa filling wallpaper orders, see NAH: Canton 41, Resolution No. 15, 1778.09.11, Canton 43, doc. No. 4, 1780.09.18, Canton 48, doc. No. 22, 1786.10.10, Canton 50, doc. No. 20, 1788.09.28, Canton 88, 1779.12.31, VOC 4421, *dagregister*, 1780.12.24.
121. RAC: Ask 2240–46 and 2248.
122. See the *grootboeken* in NAH: VOC 4418–19, 4421, 4426, 4432, 4436, 4440 and 4444.

## Conclusion

1. ANOM: C.1.11, 1771.02.12, p. 99v; RAC: Ask 206a; and NAH: VOC 4407, 'Avis Pour la destruction du Cong Hang'.

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| HFM 176 | Annual ledger of total American imports and exports in China 1804–1833. |
| Log 882 | Ship *Lelia Byrd* Logbook 1803. |
| Log 947 | Abstract Logs 1833–1838. The author is unknown but he traveled extensively aboard several ships. The text contains information about the following vessels: *Alexander Baring* 1838, *Asia* 1836–1837, *Delhi* 1839, *Horatio* 1837, and *John O Gaunt* 1838. |
| Log 951 | Ship *Houqua* Logbook. 'Journal kept by Tho. Benedict. 1846.' |
| Misc. 487 | Notebook on the China Trade 1842–1846. |
| Misc. 552 | Nathan Dunn Letter-book 1830. |
| Misc. 556 | George W. Lyman, Invoices 1812–1821. Invoices from several ships involved in the China trade. |
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| MsAm 459.1 | *John Gilpin* (brig) Logbook 1832–1840. |
| MsAm 463.5F | *Neponset* (ship) Logbook 1832–1833. |
| MsAm 465.5F | *Perseverence* (ship) Logbook 1807–1809. |

### *Massachusetts: Massachusetts Historical Society (MHS), Boston*

Abbot, Thomas W. Journal 1845–1846.

Austin, Edward. Account Books 1826–1897.

Bdses 1847 March: List of 16 Dutch ships in Canton and Macao in 1846 with total exports.

Bowditch, Jonathan I. Papers 1836–1862: Miscellaneous documents on the China Trade.

Bullard Letterbook to Bryant & Sturgis 1821–1823.

Cabot, Samuel, Papers.

Cary, Samuel, Papers. Log of the ship *Levant* 1819–1821.

Child, John Richards, Papers 1731–1895. Log of the ship *Hunter* 1810–1815.

Dorr Family Papers 1683–1868.

Drew, Edward B. Papers 1882–1906.

Edes, Samuel B., Papers 1799–1801. Miscellaneous documents relating to the China Trade.

Elting, William P. 'Notebook on the China Trade 1799–1803.'

Faucon, Edward H. 1850–1863.
Forbes Papers. Correspondences concerning the China Trade.
Forbes, James Murray, Papers 1868–1957. Petition from 13 Flower Boats, Canton 1868.
Hooper-Sturgis Papers: Ship Accounts Bryant & Sturgis, 1815–1848.
Houqua Letterbook 1840–1843.
King, Edward, Papers 1835–1842. Log of the ship *Silas Richards* 1835. Correspondences.
Knox, Henry. Papers.
Lamb Family Papers. Miscellaneous documents relating to the China Trade.
*Leonidas* (ship) Logbooks 1825–1829.
Magee, Bernard. Logbooks 1790–1794.
*Midas* (steam schooner) Papers 1844–1845.
Miscellaneous 1792–1797. Documents concerning the China trade.
Morse Papers 1719–1843. Trade and Shipping Documents.
Perkins, Thomas H. Papers 1789–1892. Miscellaneous documents; Log of ship *Astrea* 1804.
*Polly* (Snow) Logbook, 1800–1802.
Pulsifer, Robert Starkey. Papers 1765–1859.
Putnam, George. Journal of Voyage 1850–1851.
Sea Letters 1810–1881.
Story, Horace C., Papers 1842–1844. Log of ship *Probus* 1843.
Sturgis, William, Papers 1799–1804. Journals from China Voyages.
*Sultan* (ship) Account Book 1815–1819.
*Surprise* (ship) Logbook 1850–1861.
Suter, John, Papers. 1804–1848. Miscellaneous documents relating to the China Trade.
Thacher Family Papers. Correspondences Concerning the ship *Alliance*, to China in 1788.
Trotter, William. Letter/Journal 1797.
Wolcott, Bates and Company. China trade Cashbook 1851–1854 and Journal 1851–1855.
Woodard, Marcus L. Letters 1855–1862.

### *Massachusetts: Phillips Library (PL), Peabody Essex Museum (PEM), Salem*

*Aeolus* (ship) Logbook 1805–1806.
*Akbar* (ship) Logbook 1839–1840.
*Aleatus* (ship) Logbook 1844–1845.
*Alert* (ship) Logbook 1819–1820.
*Ann and Hope* (ship) Logbook 1835.
Andrews, John Hancock, Papers. Mss 2. Bark *Patriot* Papers 1811–1824.
*Antelope* (ship) Logbook 1864.
Barton Family Papers. Mss 110. Ship Papers.
*Barwell* (ship) Logbook 1785–1786.
*Bizar* (ship) Logbook 1843–1844.
*Brookline* (ship) Logbook 1833–1834.
*Caroline* (ship) Logbook 1803–1805.
*Charlotte* (ship) Logbook 1841–1842.
*China* (ship) Logbook 1817.
*Clarendon* (ship) Logbook 1844.
*Concord* (ship) Logbook 1799–1802.
*Congress* (Frigate) Logbooks (2) 1819–1820.
Cox, Bejamin. Papers. Mss 168. Ship Papers.
Derby Family Papers. Mss 37. Ship *Astrea* Papers 1789–1790, 1791–1794, 1799; Ship *Light Horse* Papers 1788–1795; Ship *Grand Turk* Papers 1780–1782, 1787–1791.

*Derby* (ship) Logbook 1804.
*Diana* (ship) Logbook 1799–1802.
Dorr Family Papers. MH-21. Miscellaneous documents relating to the China Trade.
*Dromo* (ship) Logbook 1807–1809.
*Eclipse* (ship) Logbook 1831–1832.
*Eliza Ann* (bark) Logbook 1845–1848.
*Eugenia* (ship) Logbook 1805–1806.
Follensbee, Mrs. (wife of Capt. Follensbee) Journal kept aboard the ship *Logan* 1837–1838.
*Francis* (ship) Logbook 1818–1820.
*Friendship* (ship) Logbook 1819–1820. Together with the Logbook of ship *Paragon*.
*Governor Endicott* (brig) Logbooks (2) 1819–1822.
*Gustavous* (Snow) Diary written by John Bartlett aboard several ships from 1790 to 1793. It is incorrectly catalogued as the Logbook of ship *Massachusetts*.
Hale Family Papers. Mss 117. Ship *Geneva* Papers 1837–1847.
*Hamilton* (ship) Logbooks (2) 1809–1815, 1822.
*Heber* (ship) Logbooks (2) 1844–1846.
*Heraclide* (ship) Logbook 1835–1836.
*Herald* (ship) Logbook 1804–1805.
*Hercules* (ship) Logbook 1835–1836.
*Hindoo* (ship) Logbook 1838–1839.
*Hunter* (ship) Logbook 1809–1810.
*Indus* (ship) Logbook 1802–1803.
*Inn* (ship) Diary written by John Bartlett aboard several ships from 1790 to 1793. It is incorrectly catalogued as the Logbook of ship *Massachusetts*.
*Joseph Peabody* (brig) Logbook 1838–1840.
Kinsman, Nathaniel, Papers Mss 43: Ship *Zenobia* Papers 1839–1843.
*Lady Washington* (ship) Diary written by John Bartlett aboard several ships from 1790 to 1793. It is incorrectly catalogued as the Logbook of ship *Massachusetts*.
*Leander* (brig) Logbooks (2) 1827–1829.
*Levant* (bark) Logbook 1835–1838.
*Logan* (ship) Logbook 1837–1838
*London* (ship) Logbook 1836–1837.
*Louisa* (ship) Logbook 1826–1829.
*Lurat*. [This ship is incorrectly catalogued. It should be '*Surat*'.]
*Mandarin* (ship) Logbook 1809–1810.
Martain, William, Papers. Mss 123. Miscellaneous documents relating to the China Trade.
*Martha* (ship) Logbook 1831–1833.
*Massachusetts* (ship) Logbook 1790–1793.
*Mentor* (ship) Logbook 1824–1825. Together with the Logbook of ship *Nautilis* 1823. There is another Logbook for 1829–1830.
*Merchant* (ship) Logbook 1834.
*Midas* (ship) Logbook 1818–1819.
Misc. Journal Excerpts 1800–1803.
*Monsoon* (ship) Logbook 1834–1837.
*Nautilus* (ship) Logbook 1823. Together with the Logbook of ship *Mentor* 1824–1825.
*New Hazard* (ship) Logbook 1811–1812.
*Packet* (ship) Logbook 1824–1825.
*Pallas* (bark) Logbook 1800–1804 Together with the Logbook of ship *John* 1795–1798. There is another Logbook for 1832–1834.
*Paragon* (ship) Logbook. Together with the Logbook of ship *Leander*.

Peabody, Joseph, Papers. Mss 19. Ship *China* Papers & Account Books 1824–1828.
*Pearl* (ship) Logbook 1810.
Peele Family Papers. MH-5. Ship *Rachel* Papers 1802–1805.
*Perseverance* (ship) Logbook 1796–1801.
Phillips Family Papers 1636–1897. MH-4.
Pickman, Benjamin, Papers. Mss 5. Ship *Derby* Papers 1805–1807.
*Potomac* (ship) Logbook 1835–1837.
*Roscoe* (brig) Logbook 1827–1829.
*St. Crouse* (Portuguese ship) Diary written by John Bartlett aboard several ships from 1790 to 1793. It is incorrectly catalogued as the Logbook of ship *Massachusetts*.
*Saphire* (ship) Logbook 1834–1835.
Shreve, Benjamin, Papers. MH-20. Miscellaneous documents relating to the China Trade 1793–1848. This collection contains many journals, correspondences, logs, account books, and ship papers.
Silsbee Family Papers. Mss 74.
*Sumatra* (ship) Logbooks (3) 1830–1831, 1834–1835, 1835–1836.
*Surat* (ship) Logbook 1835 [incorrectly catalogued as ship '*Lurat*'].
*Talent* (brig) Logbook 1829–1831.
*Theodore* (ship) Logbook 1836.
Tilden, Bryant P. MH-219 Journals (Typscript) 1815–1837.
*Tremont* (ship) Logbook 1833–1836.
Tucker Family Papers Mss 165: Ship *Concord* Papers 1802.
*Union* (ship/schooner) Logbook 1802–1803.
Ward Family Papers. Mss 46. Ship Papers.
Waters Family Papers MH-12 & Mss 92: Ship *Mariposa* Papers 1835–1837.
Wigglesworth, Thomas Jr. Papers. MH-6.
*William & Henry* (brig/ship) Logbook 1786–1790.
*Zephyr* (ship) Logbook 1829–1830.

### *Minnesota: James Ford Bell Library (JFB), University of Minnesota, Minneapolis*

Index: *The James Ford Bell Library. An Annotated Catalog of Original Source Materials Relating to the History of European Expansion 1400–1800*. Minneapolis: James Ford Bell Library, 1994.
1732 fIr. Charles Irvine (d. 1771) Papers. Archive of papers relating to the Swedish East India Company: 1724–1774.
1801 sh. Journal of ship *Arat* bound for China 1801
1801 sh. Logbook of ship *Ganges*, Boston to Canton 1801
1801 fTr. Logbook of ship *Taunton Castle* of Deptford 1801–1802
B 1758 fNe. Dagregister in de Ned. Factory Canton 1758 en Onkost Reckening voor het Schippen *Velzen* en *Renswoude* 1758

### *Pennsylvania: Historical Society of Pennsylvania (HSP), Philadelphia*

Index: *Guide to the Manuscript Collections of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania*. Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1991
Am 8650 Chinese Justice
136 Clifford Family Papers
227A Edward Carey Gardiner Papers
250A Simon Gratz Papers

687 Waln Family Papers
734 Wood Family Papers
1242 Chinese Manuscript
1341 Brown Family Papers
1691 John W. Rulon Papers
1729 William Redwood Papers
1860A Claude W. Unger Papers
1929 Edward F. Corson Papers
1934 Drinker Family Papers

### *Pennsylvania: Independence Seaport Museum (ISM), Philadelphia*

Barry-Hayes Papers
Benjamin Etting Papers
Henry Grier Bryant Papers
John S. Whitall Papers
Samuel Archer Letters
Walsh Family Papers

### *Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Library (UPL), Philadelphia*

Ms. Coll. 499 F. Molineux's Accounts of Purchases at Canton. 'Receits' for 1784–1786

### *Rhode Island: John Carter Brown Library (JCB), Brown University, Providence*

Brown Papers. The following files:

| | |
|---|---|
| B126 | Ship Papers 1797 |
| B493–497 | Ship *Arthur* Papers 1802–1809 |
| B546 | Ship *General Washington* Papers 1787–1792 |
| B579 | Ship *John Jay* Papers 1792–1799 |
| B655–657 | Ship *Ann & Hope* Papers 1800–1821 |
| B658 | Ship *Arthur* Papers 1803–1809 |
| B659–660 | Ship *Asia* Papers 1822–1827 |
| B663 | Ship *Isis* Papers 1805 |
| B664 | Ship *John Jay* Papers 1800–1802 |
| B670 | Ship *Rambler* Account Book (1818?) |
| B671 | Ship *Washington* Papers 1819–1826 |
| B715–717 | Ship *Ann & Hope* Logbook 1798–1806 |
| B720 | Ship *Ann & Hope* Logbook 1816–1817, 1823–1826; Journal of Benjamin C. Carter, Surgeon aboard ship *Ann and Hope* 1798 |
| B721 | Ship *Ann & Hope* Logbook 1823–1824 |
| B722 | Ship *Arthur* Logbook 1803–1804 |
| B737 | Ship *General Washington* Logbook 1788–1790 |
| B1131 | Ship *John Jay* Papers 1797–1798; Account Book of supercargo John Bowers 1797 |

Stephen Dexter Journal 1800–1803

### *Rhode Island: Rhode Island Historical Society (RIHS), Providence*

Carrington Papers. The following files:

| | |
|---|---|
| B139 | Ships *Trumbull*, *Baltic*, and *General Hamilton* Papers 1806–1811 |
| B149–150 | Ship *Edwards* Papers 1831 |
| B151–152 | Ship *Fame* Papers 1819–1825 |
| B153–156 | Ship *Franklin* Papers 1823–1836 |
| B157–158 | Ship *General Hamilton* Papers 1818–1824 |
| B159–160 | Ship *George* Papers 1818–1827 |
| B161 | Ship *John Brown* Papers 1819–1821 |
| B162–163 | Ship *Grafton* Papers 1841–1847 |
| B164 | Ship *Lion* Papers 1817–1820 |
| B165–166 | Ship *Integrity* Papers 1817–1824 |
| B169–170, 172–174 | Ship *Lion* Papers 1824–1844 |
| B175 | Ship *Mary Ann* Papers 1815–1822 |
| B178–179 | Ship *Nancy* Papers 1815–1824 |
| B181–187 | Ship *Panther* Papers 1818–1843 |
| B190, 192–194 | Ship *Providence* Papers 1825–1839 |
| B196–197 | Ship *Trumbull* Papers 1816–1825 |
| B198–199 | Brig *Viper* Papers 1815–1821 |
| B204 | Ship *Zypher* Papers 1815–1820 |

Other records consulted at RIHS:

*Franklin* (ship) Accounts, 1824–1825
*George* (ship) Accounts, 1821–1823
*Grafton* (ship) Disbursements, 1841–1844
Journal A 1802–1804
Journal B 1804–1806
Journal C 1806–1811
Miscellaneous Archives. The following files:
- Mss 312. John Brown Papers 1770–1829. Ship *General Washington* Journal and Account Book 1788–1789
- Mss 336. Carter-Danforth Papers
- Mss 776. WardFamily Papers. Ship *General Washington* Papers 1788–1789
- Mss 828. The following logbooks:
  - Ship *Ann & Hope* Logbooks 1798–1836
  - Ship *Asia* Logbook 1804
  - Ship *Canton* Logbook 1799
  - Ship *Eleonora* Logbook 1804
  - Ship *Essex* Logbook 1810–1812
  - Ship *Fame* Logbook 1824
  - Ship *General Washington* Logbook 1787–1789
  - Ship *George Washington* Logbook 1794–1795
  - Ship *Hope* Account Book 1802–1804
  - Ship *Hope* Logbook 1802–1803
  - Ship *Isis* Logbook 1804
  - Ship *John Jay* Logbook 1804–1806
  - Ship *Lion* Logbooks 1826–1833
  - Ship *Panther* Logbooks 1819–1833

Ship *Patterson* Logbook 1803–1804
Ship *Resource* Logbook 1800–1802
Ship *Superior* Logbook 1824–1826
Ship *Susan* Logbook 1797–1798
Mss 997. James Warner Papers. Ship *Ann & Hope* Logbooks 1797–1800.
Nightengale-Jenks papers
'Trader's Book' for Canton, 1797–1808

### *Washington, DC: National Archives*

Despatches from United States Consuls at Canton, 1790–1906 (USCC)

## AUSTRALIAN CHINA TRADE RECORDS

(Listed alphabetically by city/archive)

### *Canberra: National Library of Australia (NLA)*

Milius, Pierre Bernard. 'Voyage aux Terres Australes (1800–1804).' Handwritten Manuscript on microfilm.

Smyth, Arthur Bowes. Manuscript on microfilm of his voyage from Australia to Canton in 1788. This manuscript was published as Fidlon, Paul G. and F.J. Ryan, eds. *The Journal of Arthur Bowes Smyth: Surgeon, Lady Penrhyn 1787–1789*. Sydney: Australian Documents Library, 1979.

## DANISH ASIATIC COMPANY RECORDS (DAC)

(Listed alphabetically by city/archive)

### *Copenhagen: National Archives (RAC, Rigsarkivet)*

[Several ships in this series did not go to China and are incorrectly included in this section.]

| | |
|---|---|
| Ask 206a | Diverse indkomne breve 1737–1845 |
| Ask 234–238 | Indkomne breve fra faktoriet i Canton 1773–1791 |
| Ask 879a–995 | Skibsprotocoler for skibe til Kina 1738–1834 |
| Ask 996–1115 | Skibsjournaler for skibe til Kina 1733–1829 |
| Ask 1116–1229 | Negotieprotocoler for Kinafarere 1735–1833 |
| Ask 2190–2239 | Kasse og hovedbøger fra kinaskibene 1734–1772 |
| Ask 2240–2271 | Hovedbøger for expeditioner til Kina 1782–1833 |
| Ask 2272–2304 | Regnskabsjournaler for ekspeditioner til Kina 1782–1833 |
| Lin 5893:1 | Supercargo Lintrup Private Bog 1739–1741 |
| Soe 368B | Journal for Skibet *Cron Printz Christian* på rejsen til Kina 1730–1732 |

### *Copenhagen: Royal Library (KBC, Kungelige Bibliotek)*

| | |
|---|---|
| Nye Kong. 512, 8° | Dag-Bog holden paa skibet Kron-Printzen paa Reysen til Canton i China Aarene 1802 & 1803. (Also covers 1804 and 1805) |
| Thottske 512 | Extract of adskillige skibsjournaler 1677–1743 |
| Kallske. 362, 4° | Reglement Hvorefter Tolden udi Provicerne Canton og Tsche=kiang i Keyserdommet China bereignes ved accurat Translation samlet af Niels Fursman, Canton i China den 30 Decembr 1759 |

NKS 346 c folio 37 tegninger af Chinesiske Skibe og Fahrtøyer, tegnede i Canton af Chineseren Ju-Qua

## DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY (VOC) AND OTHER DUTCH CHINA TRADE RECORDS

(Listed alphabetically by city/archive)

### *Amsterdam: Rijksmuseum*

Inv. No. NG-1052

### *The Hague: National Archives (NAH)*

Indexes: Raben, R. *De Archieven van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. The Hague: Algemeen Rijksarchief, 1992; Parani, Julianti. *Inventaris van het archief van de Nederlandse Factorij te Canton, 1742–1826*. Den Haag: Nationaal Archief, 1972; and Balk, G. L., F. van Dijk and D. J. Kortlang, eds. *The Archives of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Local Institutions in Batavia (Jakarta)*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.


| | |
|---|---|
| AW 1.11.01.01 | Aanwinsten: generaal rapport, missiven, bylagen en diverse stukken betreffende de China handel 1758–1779 |
| CANTON 1.04.20, 1–390 | Documenten van de Nederlandse Factorij te Canton 1676–1828 |
| COI 2.01.27.06 | Comptabiliteit Betreffende Oost-Indische Bezittingen 1795–1813 |
| HD 2.01.27.05 | Hollandse Divisie bij het Ministerie van Marine en Koloniën te Parijs 1810–1814 |
| HOPE 1.10.46 | Hope familie archief 1630–1769 |
| HRB 1.04.17, 71–140 | Hoge Regering van Batavia: brieven, contracten, minuut, secrete brieven, papieren en bylagen betreffende de China handel 1755–1812 |
| MIN 2, 6, 11, 25, 57, 59, 61 | Ministerie van Koophandel en Koloniën: stukken betreffende de China handel 1798–1813 |
| MK 2.10.01 | Ministerie van Koloniën: stukken betreffende de thee handel 1745–1851 |
| NED 1.10.59 | Nederburgh familie archief 1790s |
| NHM 2.20.01 | Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij archief: brieven van Canton in China beginende met 1830 tot 1838 |
| OIC 2.01.27.01, 193–198, 238A&Q | Comité Oost-Indische Handel en Bezettingen Commissarissen, Generaal, Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en Supercarga's en Commercie-raad te Canton, aan de Eerste Advocaat der compagnie en aan gecommitteer-den uit de Heren XVII en uit het Committé tot de directe vaart en handel op China, met bijlagen van 29 Nov. 1793 tot 31 Dec. 1798. |
| OIT 2.01.27.07 | Oost-Indische Troepen 1799–1807. |
| OS 2.01.27.04 | Commissarissen-Genereaal van Ned. Indie en Kaap . . . Hoop 1791–1793. |
| RAB 2.01.27.02, 140–142, 404–405 | Raad der Aziatische Bezettingen en Etablissementen scheepspapieren, ladingen, cognoscement, factuur, notitie, missiven, en diversestukken betreffende de China handel 1796–1806. |
| RAD 1.10.69 | Radermacher familie archief 1670–1796. |
| VDH 1.10.39 | Van der Heim familie archief 1727–1793. |
| VELH 269–311 | Kaarten van het zuide cust van China en de Canton rivier. |
| VG 1.10.31 | Van Ghesel familie archief 1769–1771. |

VHVR 1.10.45 Van Hoorn en Van Riebeek familien archieven.
VOC 1.04.02, 2346, 2410, 4374–4447, 4554–6, 4576–7, 8714–24, 11204, 11207, 11485 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie Archief: Overgekomen Brieven and Papieren uit China 1729–1790
WIS 2.21.176 Collectie Wiselius: stukken betreffende de China handel 1769–1845

### *Leiden: Leiden University Library, Department of Western Ms. (DOOZA, universiteitsbibliotheek)*

BPL 617 stukken betreffende de Chinahandel en de China commissie 1750–1765
BPL 621 register op de brieven naar China 1758–1778
BPL 2177 verslag van Ambassade Titsingh naar China 1794–1795

### *Leiden: Royal Institute for Linguistics and Anthropology (KITLV)*

DA 8, 1 Map of Hong Kong and territory
DH 434 Chinese kaart van de Chinese zee
DA 7, 3 Kaart van cust te Macao
DH 661 Inv. van het archief van de Ned. factorie te Canton
DH 417 Groenevelt 'De Nederlanders in China'
M 3c 92 'An Authentick Account of the Weights, Measures, Exchanges, Customs, Duties, Port-Charges, &c . . .' (London: C. Hendersen, 1763)
Mo 319 Oost-Indies geldmiddelen: Japan en China handel van 1817 op 1818, door P.H. van der Kamp (Nyhoff, 1919)
Mww 247 John Francis Davis 'Sketches of China . . .' (London: Charles Knight & Co., 1841)
Mww 287 Anonymous. 'Description of the City of Canton . . . Chinese weights and measures, and the imports and exports of Canton' (Canton, 1839)
Mww 413 'From Hong Kong to Canton by the Pearl River' (1902)
Mww 650 'The "Fan Kwae" at Canton'
Ts 1720 k72d 'The Canton Miscellany' vol. 1 (Canton, 1831)

### *Rotterdam: Maritime Museum (MMR)*

C. H. Gietemaker 't Vergulde Licht der Zeevaart ofte Const der Stuerlieden . . . Negotie der Europeaane op China' 1731
P 1711. Album te China

## ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY (EIC) RECORDS

(Listed alphabetically by city/archive)

### *Greenwich: National Maritime Museum, The Caird Library (CL)*

BGR/36 Ship *Hindostan* Account Book 1799
HMN/1–153 Hamilton Family Papers 1793–1820 (all papers pertaining to the China trade were consulted)
LOG/C/64 Ship *Cirencester* Logbook 1802
LOG/C/65 Ship *Royal Charlotte* Logbook 1762

PHB/14 Ship *Ceres* Logbook 1743–1744
WEL/46 Ship *Prince of Wales* Logbook 1736

### *London: British Library (BL), India Office Records (IOR)*

B/61–62, 82 Court Minutes 1730–1734, 1767–1768
D/19 Correspondence Reports 1727.04–1736.03
E/1/2 Miscellaneous Letters Received 1710
E/1/21–25, 49, 53 Miscellaneous Letters Received 1730–1734, 1767, 1770
E/3/101 China supercargoes' instructions copybook 1722
E/3/105 Despatch Books 1730–1732
E/3/109 China supercargoes' instructions copybook 1746
G/12/1–17 Extracts from the China trade 1596–1759
G/12/18–20 Miscellaneous documents relating to the China trade 1753–1815
G/12/21–291 Diaries and Consultations from the Canton factory 1721–1840
H/154–55 Miscellaneous Letters 1779–1781
H/434 George Smith's Letters 1781–1791
H/MISC/75 Thomson's Journal 1732
L/AG/1/5/11–12 The Accountant General's Cash Journals 1720–1728
L/AG/1/6/8–12 The Accountant General's Commercial Journals 1714–1735
L/MAR/A/LIX Ship *London* Logbook 1633
L/MAR/A/CLII Ship *Rising Sun* Logbook 1700–1703
L/MAR/A/CXLIX Ship *Seaford* Logbook 1700–1702
L/MAR/A/CXXIII Ship *Macclesfield* 1699–1700
L/MAR/A/CXXIV Ship *Dorrill* Logbook 1699–1701
L/MAR/A/138 Ship *Trumbal* Logbook 1699–1702
L/MAR/B/1–800A Ship Logbooks 1700–1833 (ca. 900 logbooks from ships that sailed to China were consulted including the 760 logbooks from the eighteenth century)
L/MAR/C/902 Papers on Lascars 1793–1818 (includes Chinese)
Ms 21106 Ship *Lion* Logbook 1793
Mss 02902 Sloane. China Trade Booklet 1700
Mss 15855 Orders and Letters of Commodore George Anson 1740–1743
Mss Eur B 0408 Letter book of Charles Millet, supercargo at Canton 1824–1827
Mss Eur B 0420 Letter book of Captain Charles Besly Gribble 1815–1840
Mss Eur C 0283 Letters of Lt. John Macdonald 1803–1808
Mss Eur C 0425 Private trade book of Captain William Hambly to China 1780–1783
Mss Eur C 0483 Papers of Patrick Begbie, merchant to China 1773–1775, 1782
Mss Eur C 0555 Ship *Lowthan Castle* Logbook 1831–1832
Mss Eur C 0606 Nautical Journal of ship *London* to China 1767–1769
Mss Eur C 0619 Chinese calendar boards and list of ships arriving in Canton 1822–1829
Mss Eur C 0721 Diary of ship's surgeon Edward Bucknell to China 1849–1851
Mss Eur D 0675 Remarks in the *Brittania* bound for Madras and China 1757
Mss Eur D 0963 Trade-Currency Book 1757
Mss Eur D 1051 Robert Williams and Company Accounts of 5 East Indiamen 1782–1797
Mss Eur D 1106 Plowden Papers, miscellaneous documents on the China trade 1805–1853
Mss Eur D 1160 Prinsep Papers, memoirs, and miscellaneous documents 1794–1870
Mss Eur D 1199 Journal of accounts of Capt. John Hamilton to Canton 1800–1801
Mss Eur E 0286 Nautical Journal of ship *David Scott* to China 1810–1811
Mss Eur E 0318 Account of the Wreck *Halsewell* 1786–1814

Mss Eur F 0110 Paper of John Pybus concerning gold and silver standards in the Indies
Mss Eur F 0140 v. 37 Amherst Collection 1789–1835
Mss Eur Ph 377 Photocopy of abridged journal of James Rodgers of the ship *Forbes*, first steam vessel in China 1830
R/10/3–9 Diaries, Consultations and Letter Books from the Canton Factory 1741–1777
R/10/33-66 Orders and Instructions from the Court of Directors 1784–1833
R/10/67 China Records, Miscellaneous 1771–1792

### *London: British Map Library (BML, in the British Library)*

Add 16358A 'Map of Canton showing the extent of the fire in 1822'
Maps.K.Top.116.23 Detail of a View of Canton (centre)
MAR vi 26 'A Survey of the Tigris, from Canton to the Island of Lankeet', by J. Huddart, 1786
983g22 (1–7) Dalrymple, Alexander. 'A Collection of Charts and Memoirs' (London: 1772)

### *London: British Museum (BM)*

1877.0714.401–501 Album
1877.0714.503–603 Album
1877.0714.793–818 Album
1877.0714.1497–8 Album leaves, Street Scenes of Canton

### *London: National Archives (NAL)*

Index: Pong, David. *A Critical Guide to the Kwangtung Provincial Archives, Deposited at the Public Record Office of London*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.
C 111/95-6 Thomas Hall, merchant, correspondences and account books (a few of these concern the China trade) 1724–1726
FO 233/189 Collection of Chinese language documents, 1759–1810
FO 931/1–1954 Kwangtung Provincial Archives: Documents of the Chinese Administration in Kwangtung 1835–1842. The former archive number was FO 682.
FO 1048/1–20 Collection of Chinese language documents, 1793–1835

### *London: Victoria & Albert Museum (V&A)*

No. E.56-1910

## FRENCH EAST INDIA COMPANY (CFI) AND OTHER CHINA TRADE RECORDS IN FRANCE

(Listed alphabetically by city/archive)

### *Aix-en-Provence: Archives Nationales d'Outre-mer (ANOM)*

Index: Ferry, Ferrèol de. *La série d'extrême-orient du fonds des archives coloniales conservé aux archives nationales*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1958.
C.1.7–20 Chine Correspondences, mémoires et documents concernant l'Inde, Compagnie de la Chine, la Compagnie des Indes Orientales, consulat de Canton et documents relatifs au commerce entre la France et la Chine, 1658–1803

### *La Courneuve: Affaires Étrangères Archives Diplomatiques (AEAD)*

Index: 'Mémoires et Documents'

| | |
|---|---|
| 8MD Asie 16–21 | Correspondences, mémoires et documents concernant l'Inde, la Compagnie des Indes Orientales, consulat de Canton et documents relatifs au commerce entre la France et la Chine, 1773–1827 |
| 15MD Chine 16 | Organisation diplomatque et consulaire, 1794–1850 |
| 15MD Chine 17 | Mémoires sur la Chine, 1793–1855 |
| 15MD Chine 21 | Commerce, douanes, exportations en Chine, 1814–1846 |

### *Lorient: Service Historique de la Défense (SHD)*

Index: Legrand, A., and Félix Marec. *Inventaire des Archives de la Compagnies des Indes*. Paris: Imprimerie de la Marine, 1978

| | |
|---|---|
| 1P299 | Correspondance diverse et documents relatifs à la ville de Lorient. Liasse 31: Lettres de fonctionnaires de la Compagnie en Chine et dans l'Inde,1754–1762 |

### *Montigny-le-Bretonneux: Archives Départementales des Yvelines (ADY)*

| | |
|---|---|
| E 3056 | Lettres de Robien, de Canton et de Bretagne (1767–1780) |

### *Nantes: Archives Départementales du Loire-Atlantique (ADLA)*

| | |
|---|---|
| E 1245 | Lettres de François Terrien, de Canton (1775–1778) |

### *Nantes: Archives Municipales (AMN)*

Indexes: Boisrouvray, Xavier du. *Inventaire des Papiers Dobrée (1771–1896)*. Nantes: Bibliothèque Municipale, 1968; and *Voyages a la China 1817–1827. Collections Thomas Dobrée*. Nantes: Musées Départementaux de Loire-Atlantique, 1988.

Papiers Dobrée 1771–1896

| | |
|---|---|
| 2-A-113 | Unelettre datée de Canton, 20 December 1818 |
| 2-A-118 | Correspondances adressée de Canton, 1820–1826 |
| 8Z 394–403, 407, 412–14, 501, 506–7, 509–11 | Mémoires, instructions, equipage, cargaison, connaissements, factures, journaux de bord des navires, correspondances et d'autres documents relatifs au commerce entre la France et la Chine, 1817–1827 |

### *Nantes: Bibliothèque Municipale (BMN)*

| | |
|---|---|
| MS 1172 | Six contrats chinois |

### *Paris: Archives Nationales (ANP)*

Index: Bourgin, Georges. *Inventaire des Archives de la Marine*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1963

| | |
|---|---|
| 4JJ 129–41 | Voyages en Chine. Journaux de bord, 1698–1788 |

Archives des Colonies (Col), Ministere de la France D'Outre-Mer, Serie CI Extreme Orient. (These are microfilm copies of the documents listed above in ANOM)

| | |
|---|---|
| C.1.7 | Chine, mémoires divers. |
| C.1.10–16 | Correspondance de Chine, 1732–1803 |

### *Paris: Bibliothèque Nationales (BNP)*

l'album du thé: RESERVE OE-78-PET FOL. RC-B-07235-84 (Folios 1–50)
ID No. IFN-52504111/103, fig. 47

## OSTEND GENERAL INDIA COMPANY (GIC) AND OTHER CHINA TRADE RECORDS IN BELGIUM

(Listed alphabetically by city/archive)

### *Antwerp: City Archive (SAA, Stadsarchief)*

Index: Prims, Floris. *Inventoris op het archief der Generale Indische Compagnie (Compagnie d'Ostende) 1723–1777*. Antwerp: Stad Antwerpen, 2000

| | |
|---|---|
| IB 2562 | Comptes du Comprador du hang à Canton. Expense Boek voor het Factorie en Imp. Schip *Prince de Kaunitz* 1779–1780 |
| IC 5682 | *L'Aigle* et *S. Elisabeth*. Journal concernant le commerce fait par *l'Aigle* et la *Ste. Elisabeth* à Canton 1724 |
| IC 5684 | Casse Boeck, Journael, Groot Boeck. Negotiatie van de laedinghe van den *Arent* en heylighe *Elisabeth* tot Canton anno 1724 |
| IC 5687 | Copey boeck *Marquies de Prié* 1724 Dagboek op het Schip *Marquis de Prié* gehouden 1727. Daarna: de copie van brieven van Capt. Rijngoedt, Canton 1727 |
| IC 5688 | Journal de Laville Pichard, lieutenant du vaisseau *L'Aigle* 1724. Journal pour le cervice du sieur de Laville Pichar . . . d'Ostende à la Chine, sorti du port le 10 févr. 1724. (Microfilm: MF 002 K) |
| IC 5689[bis] | Scheepsjournaal, 'Particulier journaal van Gerard de Bock' 1724 |
| IC 5690–5692 | Grand Livre et Journal du commerce du *Marquis de Prié* a Canton à la Chine 1725. Journal of affairs transacted by . . . supercargoes |
| IC 5695 | Journael Groot-en Cas Boeck 1727 . . . van de negotie ghederigeert tot Canton door de supercargoes van de *Leeuw*, den *Tiger* en den *Arent* |
| IC 5696[2] | Chine. Journal de Waele 1726–1727. Journael van het schip 'den *Arent*' |
| IC 5697–5701 | Journaalen, Groot Boecken, en Resolutien van de scheepen *Tiger, Marquis de Prié, Concordia,* en *Leeuw* gedestineerd naer Canton 1726–1727 |
| IC 5704–5710 | Journaalen, Grootboecken, Dagverhaal, Daegelyksche Aenteekeninghe, en Brieven van de scheepen *Concordia, Marquis de Prié, Apollo,* en *Duc de Lorraine* gedestined naer China 1727–1732 |
| IC 5710[bis] | Brieven uit Canton aan de directeurs, 1723–1729 |
| IC 5740–5741 | Pakboeken en consumptieboeken – Canton 1724–1732 |
| IC 5744 | Expensie Boeck in de factorie Canton. Anno 1727 . . . van de twee K.I.C. schepen de *Concordia* en *Marquies de Prié* |
| IC 5752–5753 | Chine. Résolutions, Contats, et Journal par de *Lyon, Tiger, Eagle, Concorde,* et *Marquis de Prié* i Canton 1726–1727 |
| IC 5757 | A Diary of Transactions by Robert Hewer in Canton 1726 (Microfilm: MF 002 K) |
| IC 5921[bis] | *St. Joseph* Canton 1723. Encaissage du thee. (Microfilm: MF 002 K) |
| IC 5922 | Varia Documenten, Brieven, en Papieren van het Indische Compagnie 1720–1734 |

### *Antwerp: Plantin-Maretus Museum (PMA)*

| | |
|---|---|
| 479 | Boek Gehouden in Canton |
| 1214–1215 | Dossiers Commerciaux 1650–1787 (1–20) |
| 1416 | Grootboek van Schilder-Maretus 1730–1755 |

### *Ghent: University Library (GHL, Universiteits Bibliotheek)*

| | |
|---|---|
| Ms 1837 | Extrait du Journal du Capne Jacobus Larmes Commandant le Vaisseau le *Lion* 1726 |
| Ms 1839 | *Tygers* Journall Ghehouden door my vierde Steerman Jacobus Laurence Cleere. Capn. Michiel Pronckaert 1726 en 1727 |
| Ms 1840 | Journael Gehouden op het Schip genaemt den *Tyger* 1726 |
| Ms 1845–1846 | Journaelen Gehouden op het Schipgenaemt de *Marquis de Prié* 1727 |
| Ms 1847–1850 | Journaelen Gehouden op het Schip genaemt de *Concordia* 1727 |
| Ms 1883 | Resolutie en Contracten van het Scheepen *Leeuw, Tygher* en *Arent* 1726 |
| Ms 1920 | Extract Journal van het Schip Arent 1724 |
| Ms 1923 | Journael Gehouden op het Schip genaemt de *Marquis de Prié* 1725 |
| Ms 1925 | Journael Gehouden op het Schip genaemt de *Concordia* 1727. |
| Ms 1926 | Journael Gehouden op het Schip genaemt de *Le Duc de Loraine* 1732 |
| Ms 1927 | Journael Gehouden op een Schip naer Canton in China 1733 |
| Ms 1928 | Journael Gehouden op het (SOIC) Schip genaemt de *Coninck Frederick* 1738 |
| Ms 1930 | Journael Gehouden op het (SOIC) Schip *Fredericus Rex Süesie* 1744 |
| Ms 1985 | Dagregisters Gehouden in het (VOC) Factorie ter Canton in China 1791 |
| Ms 1987 | Trieste Compagnie Documenten van vijf scheepen vaerende naer China 1771–1784 |

## PORTUGUESE RECORDS RELATED TO MACAO AND CHINA

(Listed alphabetically by city/archive)

### *Lisbon (documents on microfilm in the Macao Historical Archives)*

Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon (AHU): Macau
Microfilm 0240, cx. 3, doc. no. 74, 1733.01.07
Microfilm 0379, cx. 6, Doc. 18, 1770.10.27, Rezumo particular do Commercio da China com as Naçoens Europèas

## SWEDISH EAST INDIA COMPANY (SOIC) RECORDS

(Listed alphabetically by city/archive)

### *Gothenburg: Gothenburg University Library (GUB, Universitetsbibliotek Göteborg)*

Svenska Ostindiska Kompaniets Arkiv (arkivnr saknas):
Journal för Skeppet *Cron Prins Gustaf* 1781–1783.
Journal för Skeppet *Gustaf III* 1791–1792.
Journal för Skeppet *Gustaf Adolph* 1797–1800.

Svenska Ostindiska Kompaniets (SOIC) Arkiv:

| | |
|---|---|
| H 22:1 | Hoppet Brevkopiebok 1751–1754 |
| H 22:1 | Forsaljning av kompaniets magasinshus i Goteborg |
| H 22:1 | Förteckning over kompaniets skepp under 1 och 2 oktrojerna 1732–1768 |
| H 22:1 | Förteckning over skeppsexpeditioner under 4 oktrojen 1786–1804 |
| H 22:1 | Förteckning over kompaniets skepp under 4 oktrojen 1786–1806 |
| H 22:1 | Förteckning over laster med utlandska fartyg |
| H 22:1 | Förteckning over skeppslaster 1803–1805 |
| H 22:1 | Liggare over infort och utskeppat nankinstyg 1810–1813 |
| H 22:1 | Orsakerna till kompaniets obestand efter 1786 |
| H 22.3B | Journal of sundry transactions . . . Colin Campbell 1732–1733 |
| H 22.3C | Journal of the voyage by Colin Campbell 1735–1739 |
| H 22:3D | Beskrifning på Skeppet *Götha Leijons* resa till Surat och åtskillige andre Indianske Orter 1750–1752. C. H. Braad |
| H 22:4A | Dagbok för skeppet *Riksens Ständer* 1760–1762 |
| H 22.4A | Journal för skeppet *Prins Carl* 1750–1752 (by Pehr Osbeck) |
| H 22:4A | Dagbok för skeppet *Prins Carl* 1753–1756 |
| H 22:4A | Journal för skeppet *Adolph Fredrich* 1776–1777 |
| H 22.4A | Rådplägningsbok för skeppet *Götha Leijon* 1750–1752 (och Cassa Bok 1765) |
| H 22:4B | Journal för skeppet *Terra Nova* 1777–1779 |
| H 22:5 | Brev fran Carl von Linne 1763 |
| H 22:9 | Brev från superkargören Anders Ljungstedt till en av kompaniets direktörer 1807 |
| H 22:9 | Relation betraffande handeln pa Batavia, Isle de France och Kanton (19th c.) |
| H 22:12 | Avräkning med superkargören i Kanton Gustaf Palm 1807 |
| H 22:13 | Skeppet Factura 1768–1786 & 1800–1804 |
| H 22:15–6 | Balansräkningar och andra bokslutspapper 1772–1814. |

Skeppspredicanten C. C. Ströms papper. H 21:1

| | |
|---|---|
| 1148 | Journal över Resan till *Fredrik Adolphs* Vrak (1761) |
| 1149–50 | Bärgningen från Skeppet *Fredrik Adolphs* Vrak (1761–1762) |
| 1151 | Kontrakt ang. Inköp av Te (1767) |
| 1152 | Promemoria med Råd om Te Inköp (1761) |
| 1153 | Kontrakt ang. Inköp av Te (1767) |
| 1154 | Inköpsräkning ang. 100 kistor Te (1767) |
| 1155 | Uträkning över Diverse Sålda Varor (1767) |
| 1156–57 | Uträkning över Sålt Bly (1767) |
| 1158–59 | Beräkningar till Skeppsritning (1771) |
| 1160 | Intyg ang. Skeppsbesiktning (1771) |
| 1161 | Skeppet Adolph Fredrichs last (1777) |
| 1162 | Skeppet *Gustaf III's* Last (1780) |
| 1163 | Skrivelse fran superkargoren Peter Johan Bladh (1782) |
| 1164–65 | Anmärkningar ang. Rapport till Kejsaren av Kina (1780) |
| 1166 | Edikt av Mandarinen Fou Yune-Lhy (1781) |
| 1167 | Förteckning över Växlar (1781–1782) |
| 1168 | Rulla for skeppet Sophia Magdalena (1792–1794) |
| 1169 | Journaler över resor med Skeppen *Gustaf Adolph* och *Sophia Magdalena* (1794–1796) |
| 1170 | Brev till Direktionen (1795) |

1171 Anteckning om Kinesiska Mynt och Vikter (1796)
1172 Skeppspredikantens persedlar (1796)
1173 Befattningshavare på Skeppet *Gustaf III* (1796)
1174 Skattsedel (1797)
1175 Proviant på Skeppet *Gustaf III* (1797–1798)
1176–77 Kontrakt ang. Inköp av Te mm. (1797)
1178 Proviantlistor (1797–1798)
1179 Omkostnader för Faktoriet (1797–1798)
1180–82 Utdrag ur Skeppet *Gustaf III's* Loggbok (1798)
1183 Skeppet Sophia Magdalenas last (1799)
1184–85 Förteckning over skeppspredikanten C. C. Stroms varor (1799)
1186 Omkostnader i Kinesisk Hamn (1797)
1187 Befattningshavare på Skeppen *Drottningen* och *Sophia Magdalena* (1800)
1188 Förteckning over varor till forsaljning i Goteborg (1804)
1189 Förteckning över kompaniets skepp under 1 och 2 oktrojerna (1732–1768)
1190 Jämförelsetabell over Kinesiska och Svenska Längdmått och Vikter
1191 Förhållningsregler Ombord på Kompaniets Skepp
1192 Befattningshavares Löner
1193 Skrivelse ang. orlogsskepp
1194 Bytesavtal. Kinesisk text

### *Gothenburg: Provincial Archive (GL, Landsarkivet)*

Öijareds säteris arkiv A 406. Seriesignum F III.
1–5 Förteckning över Svenska Ostindiska Companiets skepp under gamla och nya octroyen, och en kort berättelse om göromålen i Canton med packningslista, kina prisbok u.å., 1720–1764.
Östadsarkiver Privatarkiv A 152
57 Räkenskaper för kompaniets affärer I Kanton 1743–1747. Handlingar rörande Ostindiska Kompanier och Chrijstian Tham.

### *Gothenburg: Maritime Museum (GMM, Sjöfartsmuseum)*

Arkivnr saknas: Journal med skeppet *Sophia Magdalena* åhren 1781 och 1782
SMG 6131 Journal hollen under resan till Canton uti China Skieppet *Cronpritcessan Lovisa Ulrica* 1748–1750
SMG 17993 Journal med skeppet *Finland* åhren 1777, 1778 och 1779

### *Gothenburg: City Museum (GCM, Stadsmuseet)*

Chinese Sea Pass. Yuehaiguan waiyang chuanpai
1815 Jiaqing ershi nian shi yue ershiwu ri. Issued to Captain Jianchen. Ruiguo (Sweden). 25 Nov 1815.
1860 Xianfeng shi nian jiu yue shiliu ri. Issued to Captain Dideshi. Muguo (probably short for Linguo = Sweden). 29 Oct 1860.

Göteborg Allmänt. Handel och Sjöfart.
I Diverse Papier öfver Svenska Ostindiska Kompaniet
Handel SOIC. 1–6 Sven Kjellberg's notes on the Svenska Ostindiska Kompaniet

### *Kalmar: City Library (KSB, Stadsbibliotek)*

Ms 81 Dagbok med Respective Ostindiska Compagniets Skepp *Adolph Fredrich* under Resan till och från Canton i China under 1768, 69, 70.

### *Karlskrona: City Library (KKB, Stadsbibliotek)*

Journal Hollen På Respect Swenska Ost Ind. Compag. Skiepp *Printz Carl* För åhren 1753, 54, 55 & 1756

### *Lund: University Library (UBL, Universitetsbibliotek)*

Ostindiska kompaniet dokumenter, correspondence, breven, lijsten, pamphleter.

### *Stockholm: National Archives (RAS, Riksarkivet)*

UD Huvudarkivet E 2 FA.
13 Skrivelse från konsuler 1809–80. Amoy, Canton, Chefoo, Newchwang, Ningpo. 1847–69.

Handel och Sjöfart: Ostindiska Kompagnier.
54 Ostindiska Kompagnier Documenter 1740–1799.
55 Ostindiska Kompagnier Documenter 1800–1813.

### *Stockholm: Royal Library (KBS, Kungliga Biblioteket)*

C.VI.1.24 Wallenberg, Jacob. Min son på Galeian eller en Ostindisk Resa 1769–1771
Kine. ms14 Yuehaiguan yangchuanpai (Chinese Customs Sea Pass). Qianlong liu nian shier yue shiyi ri. Issued to Captain Yashimeng (Askbom) of Ruiguo (Sweden). 11 Jan 1742.
M 270 Dagbok anteckningar under en Resa till Ostindien 1767–1769.
M 278 Journal hållen ombord på Skeppet *Gustaf III* till och från China 1799–1801.
M 280 Dagbok hållen ombord på Skeppet *Götha Leÿon* af Carl Johan Gethe 1746–1749.
M 281a& b Dagbok hållen på resan till China af Gustaf Fridrich Hjortberg 1748–1753.
M 285 Lindahl, Olof. I Korthet war Handelsen 1784.
M 286 Dagbok för Skeppet *Freden* på Resan till China 1746–1747.
M 287:1–2 Osbeck, Pehr. Dagbok öfver en Ostindisk Resa åren 1750, 1751, 1752.
M 288 Dagbok för Skeppet *Ricksens Ständer* på Resan till China 1760–1762.
M 289 Journal ombord på Skeppet *Prins Carl* till China åren 1763–1764
M 292 Dagbok ombord på Skeppet *Götha Leÿon* af Carl Fredrich von Schantz 1746–1749.
M 294 Ost. Indisk resa till Canton uthi China af Mag. Ternström1745–1746.
M 295 De Frondat. Journal du Voyage du Perou en Chine 1708–1710. This Journal is published in Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages*, 1901 (see full citation below).
X 948:1–2 Angerstein, Reinhold R. Discourse over Trade.
X 988 Tabelier öfver Coopvardie Siömån och Fartyg för År 1783.

### *Stockholm: Library of the Royal Academy of Sciences (KVB, Kungliga Vetenskaps-akademiens Bibliotek)*

RLF 50 Map of Canton River

Ms. Braad, C. H. Berättelse om Resan med Skeppet *Hoppet* under Capitaine Fr. Pettersons Commando från Götheborg till Canton i China 1748–1749

Ms. Braad, C. H. Beskrifning på Skeppet *Götha Leyons* Resa till Surat och åtskillige andre Indianske Orter 1750–1752

Ms. Dalman, J. F. Dagbok under resan från Giötheborg til Canton 1748–1749.

Ms. Ekeberg, C. G. Dagbok under Resan till och ifrån Canton uti China 1746–1749.

Ms. Ekeberg, C. G. Kort Dagbok öfver Resan med Skeppet *Hoppet* 1751–1754.

### *Stockholm: Nordic Museum Archive (NM, Nordiska Museet Arkivet)*

Godegårdsarkivet. Ostindiska Handling.

F17:1–17 Ostindiska Kompagnier Documenter and Private Trade Documents of Jean Abraham Grill 1744–1767. Skepps instruktioner, kassabokföring, protokollsutdrag, och inventarieförteckning. Bokföring med Compradoren 1762–1766. The digital page numbers T1_00001 to T1_07458 are used in this study.

### *Uppsala: University Library (UUB, Uppsala Universitetsbibliotek)*

Handskriftsavdelningen.

Ihre 186 Christopher Järnström. Journaler förda under Resa till Ostindien.

L 133 Handlingar om Svenska Handeln. (1734 to end of century.)

L 181–182 Ost Ind. Handl. Journaler, skeppsladdningar, kopierad, utdrag och anteckningar för diverse Ostindiska skeppen 1727–1762.

L 183 Journaler öfver flere Skepps Resor til och ifrån Ost Indien 1732–1765.

L 184 Journal öfver Resan med *Stockholms Slott* till och från Canton i China 1765–1767.

L 185 Handlingar Rorande Swenska Handelen til Ost Indien Häftad med Lösa Blad 1754–1756. C. H. Braad.

L 185a Journal på Skeppet *Hoppet* under Resan till och från Canton 1748, Dagelige Anmärkningar öfwer Ost Indiske Handelen (1750s–1760s) och Rese Beskrifning till China 1748. C. H. Braad.

L 186 Diverse anteckningar om Svenska Ostindiska Kompagniets Handel, Räkningar 1759–1761. C. H. Braad.

L 190 Räkning för Skeppet 1760–1762.

Westen 163 Anteckningar och Bref af Assessor Christopher Henrik Braad under dess Resor till Ostindien åren 1748–1762.

X 388 Journal hållen på Resan till Canton i China 1745–1748 af Israel Reinius. [This journal is available in print].

X 389 Berättelse om resan med Skeppet *Hoppet* från Göteborg till Kanton 1748, 49. Med utsikter af passerade orter. Af C. H. Braad.

X 390 Berättelse om Resan med Skeppet *Hoppet* under Capitaine Fr. Pettersons Commando 1748–1749. C. H. Braad.

X 391 Annotationsbok under Resan. C. H. Braad.

X 392 Resebeskrifning ifrån Sverige till Chinesiska Staden Canton. C. H. Braad.

X 433 Journaler och Dagbok hållen om Bord på Engelska Skippet Bolton af Carl Leonard August Fries 1838–1839.

## PRINTED SOURCES AND UNPUBLISHED PAPERS AND DISSERTATIONS

(Listed alphabetically by author)


Albrecht, Jonas M. 'The Canton System and the Great Divergence: Sino-British Trade ca. 1700–1800.' Master's thesis (Mag. phil.), University of Vienna, 2013.

Anderson, Æneas. *A Narrative of the British Embassy to China in the Years 1792, 1793, and 1794*. Basil: J. J. Tourneisen, 1795.

Andrew, Elizabeth Wheeler, and Katharine Caroline Bushnell. *Heathen Slaves and Christian Rulers*. 1907. Reprint, Tutis Digital Publishing Pvt Ltd., 2008.

Anonymous. *Descriptions of the City of Canton: With an Appendix, Containing an Account of the Population of the Chinese Empire, Chinese Weights and Measures, and the Imports and Exports of Canton*. 2nd ed. Canton: 1839. Copy at Leiden University KITLV Library: M WW 287.

Anonymous. *Address to the People of Great Britain, Explanatory of Our Commercial Relations with the Empire of China and of the Course of Policy by Which It May Be Rendered an Almost Unbounded Field for British Commerce*. By a Visitor to China. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1836.

Anson, George, Esq. *A Voyage Round the World in the Years M, DCC, XL, I, II, III, IV.* (1740–1744) 3 vols. [London?]: John Wilson, 1790. Reprint, Philadelphia: D. N. Goodchild, 2002.

Antony, Robert J. *Like Froth Floating on the Sea: The World of Pirates and Seafarers in Late Imperial South China*. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2003.

Auber, Peter. *China. An Outline of the Government, Laws, and Policy: And of the British and Foreign Embassies to, and Intercourse with, that Empire*. London: Parbury, Allen, and Co., 1834.

Balk, G. L., F. van Dijk, and D. J. Kortlang, eds. *The Archives of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Local Institutions in Batavia (Jakarta)*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

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

**Plate 01.01** Contract (in Danish) dated 29 September 1752, with Swequa (Sviqva), for Bohea tea, to be delivered to the DAC on the specified terms, and showing the chop of the Jufeng Hang. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1131, p. 154r).



**Plate 01.02** Contract (in French) dated 6 April 1756, with Swequa (Tsaïe Souiköa) and his brother Sequa, for Bohea and Tonkay tea, to be delivered to the French Company on the specified terms. Courtesy of Bibliothèque Municipale, Nantes (BMN: Ms1172C16.2.008).



**Plate 01.03** Contract (in French) dated 17 March 1756, with Swequa (Tsaïe Souïköa) and his brother Sequa, for Bohea, Superior Green, and Tonkay tea and Nanking silk, to be delivered to the French Company on the specified terms. Courtesy of Bibliothèque Municipale, Nantes (BMN: Ms 1172C16.2.007).



**Plate 01.04** Contract (in Dutch) dated 8 January 1758, with Swequa (Tzwaa Sui Qua) and his brother Sequa (Tzwaa Sou Qua), for Bohea (bohy) tea that they are to purchase in the tea lands, and deliver to the VOC on the specified terms. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4381, p. 158).



**Plate 01.05** Contract (in Dutch) dated 8 January 1758, with Swequa (Tzwaa Sui Qua) and his brother Sequa (Tzwaa Sou Qua), for Bohea (bohy) tea that they are to purchase in the tea lands, and deliver to the VOC on the specified terms. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4381, p. 298).



**Plate 01.06** Rent contract (in Dutch) dated 1 August 1760, with Swequa (Tswaa Suijqua, alias Long Souqua), for the Dutch factory at 1,800 reals of eight (1,332 taels) for one year. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4384, doc. No. 36, p. 473).



**Plate 01.07** Contract (in Swedish) dated 26 January 1766, with Tjobqua (Jauqua), for Bohea (Bohee) tea to be delivered to the SOIC on the specified terms. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17 pp. T1_04986–87).



**Plate 01.08** Contract (in Swedish) dated 10 March 1767, with Tjobqua (Zey Jauqua), for Bohea (Bohee) and Ankay Congo tea to be delivered to the SOIC on the specified terms. The square chop on the last page shows one of Tjobqua's names to be Cai Tinggang 蔡莛(廷)岡. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17 pp. T1_04988–90).



**Plate 01.09** Bottomry contract (in Swedish) with Tjobqua (Jauqua). In 1762/3 he gave the SOIC 360 pesos (Spanish dollars). According to the Chinese text, he was repaid on 5 February 1768. The square chop shows one of Tjobqua's names to be Cai Tinggang 蔡莛(廷)岡. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17 p. T1_04215).



**Plate 01.10** Extract (in Swedish) from a letter dated 30 November 1772, from Jacob Hahr to Jean Abraham Grill. The letter shows money loaned to Cai Tsjobqua in 1770, totalling 170,000 piasters, at 20 percent annual interest. The first six entries are Frenchmen making up 100,000 piasters; the next entry shows Chinese creditors amounted to 40,000 piasters; and the last entry is Swedish creditors amounting to 30,000 piasters. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17 p. T1_02044).



Canton. February 14. 1770

To the Gentlemen Directors
of the Honorable English East India Company
Gentlemen

Having the honnor to trade with the Honorable Company and
nothing so much at heart as to could continui therin to their
satisfaction but seing the private trade of the Captains in severes
yeare does hinder ther Company and our own by bringin out
so large quantitie of curiosity which the Governament here
obliged the Merchant to buy with their loss we take the
liberty to address ourselfe to You Gentlemen with desire Youll
prevent so be carried out anny more for the future as we
will has at hand in like sortes more than a million value.

the like Gentlemen we humble desire Yours as we in the
quantity of Clothe every year increase than formerly You only
sent for 2 Boxes. Tall and now this last years come to 4 a
5 Boxes. Tall that so large a quantity not to by sent in future
as it is impossible to sell it here and we Merchand will be
obliged to refuse buying it.

Wi hupu Gentlemen Youll excuse our liberty as we having
no other view by it than to facilite Your Trade.

We are Gentlemen Your most obedient humble servants

葉朝官 陳江官 張果官 陳左官 蔡文官 蔡王官 蔡煌官 陳捷官 潁瑛官 潘啓官

**Plate 01.11** Letter (in English) dated 14 February 1770, from the ten Hong merchants in Canton to the directors of the EIC, requesting that the Company reduce the number of curiosities and fabrics sent to Canton. The names of the ten Hong merchants are shown at the bottom, but they appear to be written by the same hand and no chops. Courtesy of British Library Board (BL: IOR E/1/53, doc. No. 50, p. 93).



This is to Certifye that we the underwritten
were Present at Mess^rs Hulle and Megander
Factory where Ten Chinese Merchants were
assembled and declared themselves a Company
established at their own request with the
Sanction of the Tsongton to take care of the
Country, that their Petition had passed the
Several Courts of Justice, and obtained the
Approbation of each respective Court —

Canton
August 16th 1760

Fra. Kinnersley
Francis Wood

**Plate 01.12** Declaration (in English) dated 16 August 1760, from the EIC supercargos Francis Kinnersley and Francis Wood, stating that the ten Chinese merchants had formed a company (Co-hong), with the approval of the Tsongton (governor general) and that they had obtained permission for the same from all of the appropriate courts of justice. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4384, doc. No. 20, p. 448).



**Plate 02.01** Contract (in Danish) dated 25 March 1766, with Monqua (Manqua), for the best variety of Bohea tea called Tausan, to be delivered to the DAC on the specified terms. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1156b, 1766.03.25).



**Plate 02.02** Contract (in Danish) dated 30 July 1766, with Monqua (Manqua), for silk fabrics as specified, to be delivered to the DAC. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1156a, 1766.07.30, pp. 83r–v).



**Plate 02.03** Contract (in Swedish) dated 10 March 1767, with Monqua (Zey Monqua), for Bohea tea, to be delivered to the SOIC on specified terms. Courtesy of Gothenburg University Library (GUB: Skeppspredicanten C. C. Strömspapper. H 21:1, nr 1153).



**Plate 02.04** Declaration dated Jiaqing 1st year 2nd month (1796 March/April, the Dutch translation says March 14), stating that the five merchants Monqua, Poankeequa, Geowqua, Ponqua and Puiqua agree to pay the military expenditures (the Dutch text says port fees) amounting to 8,533.502 taels for the Dutch ambassador Isaac Titsingh's ship *Siam*. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: OIC 238Q).



David Reid Esqr.

Dear Sir.

The Dutch East India Company's Debt to the Hongh of the deceased Monqua is Taels 10445: 3: 0: h. 9971 for Taels 9495: 7: 3: 1. Remaining due on Teas bought of him, and for a year interest ad 10 P.C. from the 29th October 1795 to the 29th October 1796. Taels 949: 5: 7: 3.

I consented with pleasure that you and the Hongh Merchant Poankhequa made your disposition over the said Amount of Taels 10445: 3: 0: h. in favour and for the benefit of the Gentlemen of our Factory being Creditors of the Hong of the abovementioned deceased Monqua to liquidate the debts of the same; provided only that I receive for the dutch E.I. Co. from you and Mr. Poankhequa's Security that the Pegoda duty's, and further expences of Shipping &c: of the 3th White Chest with 821 Pc: 43 Catty } Sea Longo and 400 Quarter Dr. " 269 " 14 " } Tea which still are here standing in our Factory on this Joss, what ever it may be, duely shall be paid by Mr. Poankhequa or your Self.

In opposition of an favorable answer I have the honour to remain Very Respectfully

Dear Sir. Your most Obed.t Hble. Servt.

R: J. Dozij.

Canton 21th Septb: 1797.

**Plate 02.05** Letter (in English) dated 21 September 1797 from the Dutch officer R. J. Dozij to the private Englishman David Reid, concerning the debt of 9,495.731 taels plus 10 percent interest that the VOC owed the failed (and deceased) merchant Monqua for tea he had delivered. The tea was to be shipped to Reid and credited to Monqua's account (for the debt the Dutch owed him). Reid would then apply the tea to the debt owed him by Monqua. Poankeequa stood security for the duties on the tea. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: Canton 303).




**Plate 03.01** Detail of a View of the Pearl River and Canton (ca. 1771) showing the junk *Samkonghing* (Sanguangxing 三廣興, characters are right to left in the painting) anchored before the city. It operated out of Poankeequa's Dafeng Hang 達豐行 (see Plates 03.10, 03.14, and 03.20). This junk was lost in 1772. Anonymous artist. Watercolour on silk. 95 × 368 cm. Courtesy of Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam (Inv. No. NG-1052).

**Plate 03.02** Detail of a View of Canton (ca. 1782) showing junk *Konghing* (Guangxing 廣興, the name is on the stern read right to left). The third *Konghing* (Sanguangxing 三廣興, Plate 03.01) was lost in 1772. This junk was perhaps its replacement. Courtesy of British Library Board (Maps.K.Top.116.23, centre detail).



**Plate 03.03** Contract (in Danish) dated 19 August 1755, with Poankeequa (Pon Keiqva) and his brother Sequa for silk fabrics to be delivered to the DAC. The contract was made out of the Dafeng Hang 達豐行 but was chopped with *xianpuyuanji* 暹圃源記. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1135, pp. 100v–101r).



**Plate 03.04** Contract (in Danish) dated 24 September 1755, with Poankeequa (Pon Keiqva) and his brother Sequa (Seqva), for Bohea tea, to be delivered to the DAC on the specified terms. The contract was made out of the Dafeng Hang 達豐行, but was chopped with *xianpuyuanji* 暹圃源記. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1135 pp. 119v–120r).



**Plate 03.05** Contract (in Danish) dated 21 October 1755, with Poankeequa (Pon Keiqva) and his brother Sequa (Seëqva), for Bohea tea, to be delivered to the DAC on the specified terms. The contract was made out of the Dafeng Hang 達豐行, but was chopped with *xianpuyuanji* 暹圃源記. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1135, pp. 139v–140r).



**Plate 03.06** Contract (in Danish) dated 30 September 1757, with Poankeequa (Pon Keiqua) and his brother Sequa (Seqva), for Bohea tea, to be delivered to the DAC on the specified terms. The contract was made out of the Dafeng Hang 達豐行, but was chopped with *xianpuyuanji* 暹圃源記. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1137, p. 93r).



**Plate 03.07** Contract (in Danish) dated 2 July 1762, with Poankeequa (Pon Keÿqva), Swetia (Svissia), Chetqua (Schecqua) and Consentia Giqua, for Bohea tea, to be delivered to the DAC on the specified terms. Poankeequa made this contract under the name of the Dafeng Hang 達豐行, but he chopped it with his personal name Pan Zhencheng Ji 潘振承記. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1148a, pp. 134r–v).



**Plate 03.08** Contracts (in Danish) dated 24 September 1759, with Poankeequa (Pon Keiqva), for Bohea (Bohi) tea, to be delivered to the DAC on the specified terms. The contract was made out of the Dafeng Hang 達豐行, but was chopped with *xianpuyuanji* 暹圃源記. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1144, pp. 77v–78r).



**Plate 03.09** Contract (with notes in French) dated 16 January 1756, with Poankeequa (Poankeikoa) and his brother Sequa (Sekoa), for the purchase of foreign ginseng (人蔘) imported by the French company on the specified terms, and chopped with *xianpuyuanji* 暹圃源記. Courtesy of Bibliothèque Municipale, Nantes (BMN: Ms1172C16.2.004)



**Plate 03.10** Bottomry contract (with notes in Swedish) dated 30 January 1761 (the Swedish text says 1 February 1761), with Chan Queyqua (Chen Guiguan 陳貴觀) of the Dafeng Hang 達豐行 for a loan of 1,300 piasters from a Swedish supercargo, to insure junk *Samkonghing* 三廣興 (see Plates 03.01, 03.02, 03.14, and 03.20) on a voyage to Vietnam (Annam 安南) or Java (加喇吧), and witnessed by Poankeequa. The principle plus 30 percent interest were to be repaid the day that the junk returned to Canton (in the ninth lunar month, around October). The Swedish text mentions that the investors included Antonio Baptista Stamma (a Macao-based Armenian) and the Swedish merchants Grubb and Grill. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17 pp. T1_05641–43).



**Plate 03.11** Contract (in Danish) dated 14 September 1762, with Poankeequa (Ponkeiqua), Swetia (Suesia), Chetqua (Schecqua), and Consentia Giqua, for best variety of Bohea tea called Tausan, to be delivered to the DAC on the specified terms. Poankeequa made this contract through the Tongwen Hang 同文行, but chopped it with his personal name Pan Zhencheng Ji 潘振承記. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1149, pp. 62r–63r).



**Plate 03.12** Two contracts (in Danish), both dated 16 August 1764. The contract on the left is with Poankeequa (Ponqueiqua), for Bohea and Congo tea, to be delivered to the DAC on the specified terms. The contract was made out of the Tongwen Hang 同文行, but chopped with his personal name Pan Zhencheng Ji 潘振承記. The contract on the right is with Chetqua (Schecqua), for Bohea tea, to be delivered to the DAC on the specified terms. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1152, pp. 65r–66r).



**Plate 03.13** Contract (in Danish) dated 24 August 1764, with Poankeequa (Ponqueiqua) for silk fabrics as specified, to be delivered to the DAC. The contract was made out of the Tongwen Hang 同文行, but chopped with his personal name Pan Zhencheng Ji 潘振承記. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1152, pp. 77v–79r).



**Plate 03.14** Bill of Lading (in Dutch) dated 15 January 1764, for junk *Samkonghing* 三廣興 (see Plates 03.02, 03.10, and 03.20), Captain Tsjon Sinqua (Zhang Zhenguan 張陣觀), showing the VOC cargo that he was to carry to Batavia. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: Canton 278).



**Plate 03.15** Letter (in Spanish) dated 22 June 1764, from Gregorio Chan to the Swedish supercargo Jean Abraham Grill (Juan Abrah Grill), discussing the barque *Jutam*$^{TE}$. *Con* and problems encountered in the Philippines. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17 pp. T1_01362–63).



**Plate 03.16** Invoice (in Spanish) dated 7 May 1765, showing merchandise shipped on junk (champan) *Quimcongtay* Captain Tan Matay (Chen Xieshun 陳協順) on a voyage from Manila. Persons involved in the shipment include Poankeequa (Phwa Kequa), Michael Grubb (Miguel Grueb), Jean Abraham Grill (Don Juan Abrah Grill), and Don Jorge san Clemente. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17 pp. T1_02844–45).



**Plate 03.17** Three contracts (in Danish) dated 21 August 1752. The top left contract is with Poankeequa (Pon Qveiqva) for Bohea tea and showing Poankeequa's chop (*xianpuyuanji* 暹圃源記). The bottom left and top right is a contract with Fat Hunqua (Fæt Huncqva) for Bohea tea with his chop (*yuanlaihaoji* 遠來號記). The right centre is a contract with Awue (Awu) for Bohea tea with his chop (*erlaiyuanji* 而來圓記). The tea was to be delivered to the DAC on the specified terms. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1131, pp. 120v–121r).



**Plate 03.18** Invoice (in Spanish) dated 8 May 1765, for junk (champan) *Quimcongtay* Captain Tan Matay of the company Xieshun Gongsi 協順公司, showing investments on a voyage from Manila. Persons involved in the shipments include Poankeequa (Phua Kequa), Michael Grubb (Don Miguel Grug), Jean Abraham Grill (Don Juan Abrah Grill), and Don Jorge san Clemente. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17 p. T1_05223).



**Plate 03.19** Letter (in Spanish) dated 16 April 1767, from Poankeequa (Phua Kequa) to Jean Abraham Grill (Juan Grill) concerning Jorge san Clemente's trade in Manila. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17 p. T1_02745).



**Plate 03.20** Bill of Lading (in Dutch) dated 1 March 1766, for junk *Samkonghing* 三廣興 (see Plates 03.02, 03.10, and 03.14) Captain Whan-can-congh (Wen Jingguan 溫敬官), showing the VOC cargo to be carried to Batavia (1,168 empty gunny sacks). Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: Canton 279, doc. No. 30, pp. 193–94).



**Plate 03.21** Letter (in Spanish) dated 1 June 1766, from Poankeequa (Phua que qua) to Jean Abraham Grill, concerning Jorge san Clemente and Tan Matay's trade with the Philippines. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17 p. T1_02736–37).



**Plate 03.22** Letter (in Spanish) dated 26 May 1766, from Poankeequa (Phua Kequa) to Jean Abraham Grill, concerning Jorge san Clemente and Tan Matay's trade with the Philippines. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17 p. T1_02741–42).



**Plate 03.23** Invoice (in Spanish) dated 1766, from Poankeequa showing investments made by the Swedes Grubb and Grill for junk *Quimcongtay* (Kim Cong tay) on a voyage from Manila. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17 p. T1_05225).



**Plate 03.24** Contract (in Swedish) dated 10 March 1767, with Poankeequa (Poankeyqua) of the Tongwen Hang, for Bohea and Ankay tea to be delivered to the SOIC on the specified terms. Courtesy of Gothenburg University Library (GUB: Skeppspredicanten C. C. Strömspapper. H 21:1, nr 1151).



**Plate 03.25** Letter (in Spanish) dated 23 February 1771, from Poankeequa (Phua Kequa) to Jean Abraham Grill, mentioning that the Co-hong (Cong Jang) in Canton had ended, and discusses the trade with Manila, Juan Solano, Jorge [san Clemente], Michael Grubb, and the junk *Quimcongtay* (Kim Cong tay). Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17 pp. T1_05227–8).



**Plate 03.26** Invoice (in Dutch) dated 4 April 1799, showing money that Poankeequa II received from the Dutch Board of Commerce in Batavia, plus 10 percent interest, on a debt they incurred in 1795. Note that Poankeequa II also used the same name as his father, Pan Qiguan 潘啟官, but used the chop 翁潘啟官 (Pan Qiguan the elder). Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: RAB 140).



**Plate 04.01** Contract (in Dutch) dated 10 January 1758, with Tan Anqua 陳安觀 of the Jinyuan Hang 晉元行, for Bohea tea to be delivered to the VOC on the specified terms. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4381, pp. 161r–v).



**Plate 04.02** Contract (in Dutch) dated 10 January 1758, with Tan Anqua 陳安觀 of the Jinyuan Hang 晉元行, for Bohea tea to be delivered to the VOC on the specified terms. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4381, pp. 297r–v).



**Plate 04.03** Contract (in Dutch) dated 19 January 1758, with Beaukeequa (Bookeyqua) and Tan Anqua, for Bohea (bohy) tea that they were to purchase in the tea lands and deliver to the VOC on the specified terms. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4381, pp. 300r–v). A duplicate of this contract is reproduced in Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao*, Vol. 1, Plate 08.09.



**Plate 04.04** Contract (in Danish) dated 29 September 1759, with Tan Anqua (Anqva), for Bohea (Bohi) tea, to be delivered to the DAC on the specified terms. Anqua chopped the contract with both his alias, Jong Hoeyqua, and his firm the Jinyuan Hang. Courtesy of National Archives, Copenhagen (RAC: Ask 1144, pp. 86r–v).



**Plate 05.01** Declaration (in Dutch) dated 12 September 1791, from Monqua, Geowqua (Kiouqua), and Locqua, stating that they would stand security for each other, and that they would settle their debts with the Dutch company, in full, by the end of the season. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4446).



**Plate 05.02** Document (with notes in French by de Guignes) dated 23 November 1793 from the Guangzhou Fu 廣州府 and the Guangzhou Coastal Defence 廣州海防 stating that Ounqua (Cai Anguan 蔡安觀), partner in the Yuanshun Hang 源順行 (Geowqua's firm), will stand security for the French ship under supercargo Peron's charge, while it is at Macao and he will pay all duties owed. Courtesy of Affaires Étrangères Archives Diplomatiques (AEAD: 8MD Asie 21, pp. 69–70).



**Plate 05.03** Rent receipt (in Dutch) dated 10 January 1799, from Puiqua (Poeyqua) showing money he received from the Dutch Board of Commerce in Batavia, for two years' rent of the Dutch factory (1798 and 1799). The rent for 1798 was 228 days late so the Dutch paid Puiqua interest for each day, at the rate of 10 percent per annum. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: RAB 140).

**Plate 06.01** Painting of men packing porcelain into barrels for Winchong (Yongchang Hao 永昌號, see Appendix 8E). Courtesy of Winterthur Museum (Inv. No. 1956.0038.125).

**Plate 06.02** Painting showing foreign merchants entering the porcelain shop Heli Hao 合利號. This shop was run by Limsia (Yan Linshe 顏琳舍) and Pinqua (Ni Pengguan 倪鵬官). (See MCM 1: Plates 09.07, 09.16, 09.17, and Chapter 9.) Courtesy of Bibliothèque Nationale de France (ID No. IFN-52504111/103, fig. 47).




**Plate 07.01** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 10 January 1799, from Exhin, showing money he received on account from the Dutch Board of Commerce in Batavia. It is signed and chopped with the name of his shop Yisheng Dian 鷁昇店. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: RAB 140).



**Plate 07.02** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 18 October 1799, from Exhin, showing money he received from the Dutch Board of Commerce in Batavia for porcelain purchased. It is signed and chopped with the name of his shop Yisheng Dian 鎰昇店. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: RAB 140).



**Plate 07.03** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 6 December 1760, from Lisjoncon (Li Zhengmao 李正茂), showing money he received from the VOC for porcelain delivered. He made this transaction through the Yuanquan Hang 源泉行. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4387, p. 736).



**Plate 07.04** Contract (in Dutch) dated 11 January 1758, with Lisjoncon (Li Zhengmao 李正茂), for the specified porcelain to be delivered to the VOC. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4387, pp. 301r–v).



**Plate 07.05** Painting of a porcelain merchant and his crew carrying tubs of porcelain over the mountain passes. Lisjoncon made this trip every year. Courtesy of Martyn Gregory Gallery, London (similar to Martyn Gregory Cat. 69, No. 95(xi), p. 44).



**Plate 07.06** Receipt (in Swedish) dated 11 November 1766 showing 1,305.993 taels owed to Lisjoncon (Li Xianggong 李相公) by the SOIC for porcelain delivered to the ship *Stockholms Slott*. Payment was made in piasters at an exchange rate of 1 piaster to 0.74 taels. An advance of about 70 percent (2,960 taels) was given up front. The amount of 143.26 piasters was deducted from the total to compensate the Swedes for supplying their own chests. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17, p. T1_04979).



**Plate 07.07** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 3 January 1761, from Soychong 聚昌, showing money he received from the VOC for porcelain delivered. This receipt also shows the Guangyuan Hang 廣源行 which was the firm through which Soychong made this transaction. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4387, p. 749).

**Plate 07.08** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 3 January 1761, from Suchin [Kinqua] of the Suizhen Dian 遂珍店 for payment he received from the VOC for porcelain delivered. This receipt also shows the Yuyuan Hang 裕源行 which was the firm through which Suchin made this transaction. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4387, p. 745).







**Plate 07.09** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 10 January 1799, from Suchin Kinqua of the *Liangchang Ciqi Dian* 良昌瓷器店, showing payment he received on account from the Dutch Board of Commerce in Batavia. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: RAB 140).



收到
賀蘭大公司瓷器番銀叁千八佰四十九員
嘉慶四年九月廿三日 良昌

**Plate 07.10** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 18 October 1799, from Suchin Kinqua of the *Liangchang Ciqi Dian* 良昌瓷器店, showing payment he received from the Dutch Board of Commerce in Batavia for porcelain purchased. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: RAB 140).



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**Plate 07.11** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 3 January 1761, from Pontonchon (*Tongchang* 同昌), showing payment he received from the VOC for porcelain delivered. He made this transaction through the Yifeng Hang 義豐行. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4387, p. 751).

**Plate 07.12** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 10 January 1799, from Yeckhing of the Juhe Hao 聚和號, showing payment he received on account from the Dutch Board of Commerce in Batavia. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: RAB 140).







**Plate 07.13** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 21 December 1799, from Yeckhing of the Juhe Hao 聚和號, showing payment he received from the Dutch Board of Commerce in Batavia for porcelain purchased. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: RAB 140).



**Plate 08.01** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 14 December 1760, from Habjak 合益 (same as Hopyek in Appendixes 8C and 8E), showing payment he received from the VOC for porcelain delivered. He made this transaction through the Yuanquan Hang 源泉行. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4387, p. 739).



**Plate 08.02** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 14 December 1760, from Houqua of the Guangyi Dian 廣益店, showing payment he received from the VOC for porcelain delivered. He made this transaction through the Yuanquan Hang 源泉行. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4387, p. 740).



**Plate 08.03** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 3 January 1761, from Quonschong of the Guangchang Dian 廣昌店, showing payment he received from the VOC for porcelain delivered. He made this transaction through the Guangyuan Hang 廣源行. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4387, p. 744).



**Plate 08.04** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 3 January 1761, from Quonsching of the Guangsheng Dian 廣盛店, showing payment he received from the VOC for porcelain delivered. He made this transaction through the Yuanquan Hang 源泉行. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4387, p. 747).



**Plate 08.05** Receipt (in Dutch) dated 3 January 1761, from Neyschong of the Yichang Dian 裔昌店, showing payment he received from the VOC for porcelain delivered. He made this transaction through the Guangyuan Hang 廣源行. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4387, p. 748)



**Plate 08.06** Calculation (in Swedish) from ca. 1767 showing the amounts (in taels) of porcelain purchased by the Swedes from various dealers. The document lists compradors (Ava and possibly Affou) selling small amounts of porcelain. Courtesy of Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17, p. T1_04899).

**Plate 08.07** List (in Swedish) of items purchased from various merchants and advances that were given to them. The list shows three porcelain dealers Exchin, Lisjoncon (Lyzonkung), and Conjac (Quonjeack). They were each charged 12 percent interest per annum (or 1 percent per month) on the advances they received. Courtesy Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM: F17, p. T1_04894).



**Plate 08.08** Painting of junk *Ecktay* 益泰 by Yu-qua. Courtesy of Royal Library, Copenhagen. NKS 346ᶜ, 2º.

**Plate 08.09** Painting of junk *Tayon* 泰安 by Yu-qua. Courtesy of Royal Library, Copenhagen. NKS 346ᶜ, 2º.

**Plate 08.10** Painting entitled 'Transport of Porcelain Overland'. The barrels have the name Guangyi 廣益 inscribed on them, which was the porcelain dealer Houqua's shop (see Plate 08.02). Courtesy of Victoria & Albert Museum (No. E.56-1910).

**Plate 08.11** Painting entitled 'Porcelain Arriving at Canton Warehouse'. The building on the far left shows the name Fengyuan Zhanfang 逢源棧房 (Fengyuan Warehouse) above the entrance. The Fengyuan Hang was owned by Monqua's family (Chapter 2). To the right of this building is another building with the name Hehe 和合 above the entrance. The Hehe Hao 和合號 was involved in the silk trade in Canton. That name appears on three of the stone steles (1764, 1793 and 1826) in the Canton silk guild, Jinlun Huiguan 錦綸會館, as one of the contributors. Courtesy of Victoria & Albert Museum (No. E.56-1910).



**Plate 09.01** Calculation (in Dutch) showing silk prices in 1759 and 1763. All figures are in Chinese taels. The far right column shows the difference. On the whole there was about 25 percent increase in prices from 1759 to 1763. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: Canton 27, doc. No. 6).



**Plate 09.02** Calculation (in Dutch) showing the difference between purchase and sale prices of 2,800 pieces of silk textiles in 1766. The column to the far right is the percentage earned from each item, which ranged from as little as 3 percent to as much as 179 percent. On average, the sale prices were 55 percent greater than the purchase prices. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: Canton 30, doc. No. 10).



**Plate 10.01** Comparison (in Dutch) of silk prices in 1784. The columns to the right show the different prices, in Chinese taels, offered by four Canton weavers, Conqua, Kytsjouqua, Lochop, and Tiqua. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague (NAH: VOC 4428).



**Plate 10.02** Contract (with notes in French) dated 4 February 1757, between silk painter Anthony (Antoine Peintre, Guo Yagui 郭亞貴) and the French, showing all of the items he was to provide including the sizes of the fabrics and the cost of each lot. Courtesy of Bibliothèque Municipale, Nantes (BMN: Ms1172C16.2.003).